seeing like a state_ a conversation with james c. scott _ cato unbound

7/23/2019 Seeing Like a State_ a Conversation With James C. Scott _ Cato Unbound

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September 2010

ABOUT THIS ISSUE

James C. Scott’s 1999 book Seeing Like a State has had an enduring influ-

ence across the ideological spectrum, and particularly in an unexpected cor-

ner among market liberals. !lthough Scott has described himself, some-

"hat cryptically, as a #crude $arxist, "ith the emphasis on %crude,’& it is

clear that his "ork does not fit merely the $arxist paradigm. 'hough em-

pirically based in peasant studies in Southeast !sia, Scott’s insights ha(e

applications throughout the modern industrial "orld, and for economies

both planned and spontaneous. )*ur banner art, depicting a rice paddy

(ie"ed from the air, pays tribute to this aspect of Scott’s career.+

ndeed, affinities can be seen bet"een rofessor Scott’s "ork and theorists

as di(erse as Jane Jacobs and $ichel oucault, to say nothing of riedrich

/ayek and the rest of the !ustrian School of 0conomics. Scott’s thesis is

startlingly simple States can only exert their po"er on "hat they can kno"

about. 2no"ing re3uires measuring, systemati4ing, and simplifying.

t re3uires, in other "ords, missing out on a lot of particular local data.

Strategies of resistance to state po"er often take these gaps as their starting

point, and problems "ith state rule often begin here as "ell. 'he state itself

to a high degree may be said to run on legibility the ability to kno"

"hat’s really going on in a go(erned population or territory. 5egibility,

ho"e(er, is in limited supply, and it comes at a cost.

ng Like a State: A Conversation with James C. Scott | Cato Unbound http://www.cato-unbound.org/print-issue/487

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Joining in our con(ersation this month are Donald J. Boudreaux, an

economist at 6eorge $ason 7ni(ersity8 J. Bradford Delong, an econo-

mist at the 7ni(ersity of California, erkeley8 and Timothy B. Lee, a

scholar at Center for nformation 'echnology olicy at rinceton 7ni(ersity

and a Cato !d:unct Scholar.

LEAD ESSAY

The Trouble with the View from Above

By James C. Scott

Lead Essay

September 8, 2010

tate naming practices and local, customary naming practices are

strikingly different. 0ach set of practices is designed to make the

human and physical landscape legible, by sharply identifying a

uni3ue indi(idual, a household, or a singular geographic feature.

;et they are each de(ised by (ery distinct agents for "hom the purposes of

identification are radically different. urely local, customary practices, as

"e shall see, achie(e a le(el of precision and clarityoften "ith impressi(e

economyperfectly suited to the needs of kno"ledgeable locals. State nam-

ing practices are, by contrast, constructed to guide an official #stranger& in

unambiguously identifying persons and places, not :ust in a single locality,

but in many localities using standardi4ed administrati(e techni3ues.

'o follo" the progress of state-making is, among other things, to trace the

elaboration and application of no(el systems "hich name and classify

places, roads, people, and, abo(e all, property. 'hese state pro:ects of legi-

bility o(erlay, and often supersede, local practices. <here local practices

persist, they are typically rele(ant to a narro"er and narro"er range of in-

teraction "ithin the confines of a face-to-face community.

! contrast bet"een local names for roads and state names for roads "ill

help illustrate the t"o (ariants of legibility. 'here is, for example, a small

road :oining the to"ns of =urham and 6uilford in the 7.S. state of Con-


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necticut. 'hose "ho li(e in =urham call this road )among themsel(es+ the

#6uilford >oad,& presumably because it informs the inhabitants of =urham

exactly "here they’ll get to if they tra(el it. 'he same road, at its 6uilford

terminus, is called, the #=urham >oad& because it tells the inhabitants of

6uilford "here the road "ill lead them. *ne imagines that at some liminal

midpoint, the road ho(ers bet"een these t"o identities. Such names "ork

perfectly "ell8 they each encode (aluable local kno"ledge, namely "hat is

perhaps the most important fact one might "ant to kno" about a road.

'hat the same road has t"o names, depending on one’s location, demon-

strates the situational, contingent nature of local naming practices. nfor-

mal, #folk& naming practices not only produce the anomaly of a road "ith

t"o or more names8 they also produce many different roads "ith the same

name. 'hus, the nearby to"ns of 2illing"orth, /addam, $adison, and

$eriden each ha(e roads leading to =urham, each of "hich the inhabitants

locally call the #=urham >oad.&

?o" imagine the insuperable problems that this locally effecti(e folk sys-

tem "ould pose to an outsider re3uiring unambiguous identifications for

each road. 5et’s imagine, for example, that you ha(e been in an automobile

accident on the road bet"een =urham and 6uilford and are in danger of

bleeding to death. ;ou call 911 and tell them you need an ambulance and,

"hen they ask your location, you tell them that you are on the =urham

>oad. 'he ambulance dispatcher "ould then ha(e to ask, #<hich =urham

>oad@& t is, thus, no surprise that the road bet"een =urham and 6uilford

is re-incarnated on all state maps and designations as #>oute AA& a scheme

"hereby each state road is assigned a uni3ue number in a potentially infi-

nite series. 'here can no" be no ambiguity about the road on "hich you are

bleeding. 0ach micro-segment of that route, moreo(er, is identified by

means of telephone pole serial numbers, milestones, and to"nship bound-

aries. 'he naming practices of the state re3uire a synoptic (ie", a standard-

i4ed scheme of identification generating mutually exclusi(e and exhausti(e

designations.

!ll (ernacular place names, personal names, and names of roads or ri(ers

encode important kno"ledge. Some of that kno"ledge is a thumbnail his-

tory8 for example $aiden 5ane denotes the lane "here fi(e spinster sisters

once li(ed, "hile Cider /ill >oad is the road up the hill "here the Cider $ill


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and orchard once stood. !t one time, "hen the name became fixed, it "as

probably the most rele(ant and useful name for local inhabitants. *ther

names refer to geographical features $ica >idge >oad, are >ock >oad,

all rook >oad. 'he sum of roads and place names in a small place, in

fact, amounts to something of a local geography and history if one kno"s

the stories, features, episodes, and family enterprises encoded "ithin them.

or officials "ho re3uire a radically different form of order, such local

kno"ledge, ho"e(er 3uaint, is illegible. t pri(ileges particular kno"ledge

o(er synoptic, standardi4ed kno"ledge. n the case of colonial rule, "hen

the con3uerors speak an entirely different language, the unintelligibility of

the (ernacular landscape is a nearly insurmountable obstacle to effecti(e

rule. >enaming much of the landscape therefore is an essential step of im-

perial rule. 'his explains "hy the ritish *rdinance Sur(ey of reland in the

1BDs recorded and rendered many local 6aelic place names )e.g., un na

h!bhann, 6aelic for #mouth of the ri(er&+ in a form )urnfoot+ more easily

understood by the rulers.

Vernacular Communities as Illegible to Outsiders

t is both striking and important to recogni4e ho" relati(ely little the

pre-modern state actually kne" about the society o(er "hich it presided.

State officials had only the most tenuous idea of the population under their

:urisdiction, its mo(ements, its real property, "ealth, crop yields, and so

forth. 'heir degree of ignorance "as directly proportional to the fragmenta-

tion of their sources of information. 5ocal currencies and local measures of

capacity )e.g., the bushel+ and length )the ell, the rod, the toise+ "ere likely

to (ary from place to place and "ith the nature of the transacting parties.

'he opacity of local society "as, of course, acti(ely maintained by local

elites as one effecti(e means of resistance to intrusions from abo(e.

/a(ing little synoptic, aggregate intelligence about the manpo"er and re-

sources a(ailable to it, officials "ere apt either to o(erreach in their exac-

tions, touching off flight or re(olt, or to fail to mobili4e the resources that

"ere, in fact, a(ailable. 'o follo" the process of state-making, then, is to

follo" the con!est o" illegibility. 'he account of this con3uest an

achie(ement "on against stiff resistance could take many forms, for ex-

ample the creation of the cadastral sur(ey and uniform property registers,

the in(ention and imposition of the meter, national censuses and curren-


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cies, and the de(elopment of uniform legal codes.

6i(en the (ariability of (ernacular naming practices, the early modern state

found it difficult e(en to identify particular indi(iduals "ithin a community

"ithout local cooperation. ! banal example from a mediocre film, #itness,

"ill illustrate the problem. n this film /arrison ord plays a detecti(e try-

ing to track do"n a young boy "ho, he belie(es, "itnessed a murder in bus

station. 'he boy, he learns, comes from an !mish family. /e arri(es in the

area "ith only a name and turns to that classical instrument of modern po-

lice "ork, the telephone directory. <hat is a telephone directory, after all,

but an alphabetical listing of names, addresses, along "ith the uni3ue n!m$

ber assigned to them, "hich ser(es in turn as the means of contacting them.

ut the !mish do not use phones, and he is stymied. /e kno"s the last

name )patronym+ of the boy, but, it turns out that, as a relati(ely closed

community, many !mish share common last names )e.g. /oo(er, oop+.

!gain he is at an impasse. 'he success of his in(estigation, and the lo(e in-

terest in the film, turns on his enlisting the cooperation of the boy’s mother

)played by 2elly $c6illis+. 'he point is that "hen confronted "ith an illegi-

ble, (ernacular community such as the !mish, an outsider, and by exten-

sion the state, can only na(igate "ith the help of a #local tracker& "illing to

share his or her kno"ledge. /a(ing no other independent, reliable com-

pass, the outsider is liable to be manipulated by that local tracker.

'he permanent patronym, "hich most <esterners ha(e come to take for

granted, is in fact a comparati(ely ne" phenomenon. 'he in(ention of per-

manent inherited patronyms "as, along "ith the standardi4ation of "eights

and measures, uniform legal codes, and the cadastral land tenure sur(ey, a

(ital techni3ue in modern statecraft. t "as, in nearly e(ery case, a state

pro:ect designed to allo" officials to identify unambiguously the ma:ority of

its citi4ens. 'he armature of the modern state tithe and tax rolls, property

rolls, conscription lists, censuses, deeds, birth, marriage and death certifi-

cates recogni4ed in la" "ere inconcei(able "ithout some means of fixing an

indi(idual’s identity and linking him or her to a kin group. 'he permanent

patronym "as, in effect, the no" long superseded precursor to modern

photo-= cards, passports, fingerprints, personal identification numbers,

fingerprints, iris scans, and, finally =?! typing.

7ntil at least the fourteenth century, the great ma:ority of 0uropeans did


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not ha(e permanent patronyms. !n indi(idual’s name "as typically his

gi(en name, "hich normally "ould suffice for local, (ernacular. f some-

thing else "ere re3uired, a second local designation "as added indicating

)in the 0nglish case+, say, occupation )smith, miller, baker+, geographical

location )edge"ood, hill+, the father’s gi%en name )in Je"ish and $iddle

0astern practice preceded by #ben& #ibn& #bin& or in the Celtic case pre-

ceded by #*’&, #$c&, #!p& or, as in the rench case, simply appended, as hy-

pothetically "ith Eictor )son of+ /ugo+ or a personal characteristic )strong,

short, doolittle, fair, ne"comb+. 'hese secondary designations, ho"e(er,

"ere not permanent surnames, they did not generally sur(i(e their bearers.

'he ac3uisition of last names is, in fact, an exceptionally sensiti(e measure

of the gro"ing reach of the state. 'he census For catastoG of the lorentine

state in 1HIA "as an audacious )and failed+ attempt to rationali4e the ad-

ministration of re(enue and manpo"er resources by recording the names,

"ealth, residences, land-holdings, and ages of the city-state’s inhabitants.

!t the time, (irtually the only 'uscan family names "ere those of a handful

of great families Fe.g., Stro44iG "hose kin, including affines, adopted the

name as a "ay of claiming the backing of a po"erful corporate group. 'he

(ast ma:ority "ere identified reasonably unambiguously by the registrars,

but not by personal patronyms. 'hey might list their father and grandfather

)e.g., 5uigi, son of aulo, son of 6io(anni+ or they might add a nickname, a

profession, or a personal characteristic. t is reasonably clear that "hat "e

are "itnessing, in the catasto exercise, are the first stages of an administra-

ti(e crystalli4ation of personal surnames. !nd the geography of this crystal-

li4ation traced, almost perfectly, the administrati(e presence of the loren-

tine state. <hile one-third of the households in the city declared a second

name, the proportion dropped to one-fifth in secondary to"ns, and then to

a lo" of one-tenth in the countryside. 'he small, tightly knit (ernacular

"orld had no need for a #proper name& such names "ere, for all practical

purposes, official names confined to administrati(e life. $any of the inhab-

itants of the poorest and most remote areas of 'uscany those "ith the

least contact "ith officialdom only ac3uired family names in the se(en-

teenth century. ?or "ere fifteenth-century 'uscans in much doubt about

the purpose of the exercise8 its failure "as largely due to their foot-dragging

and resistance. !s the case of lorence illustrates, the naming pro:ect, like

the standardi4ation of measurements and cadastral sur(eys, "as (ery much


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a purposeful state mission.

<estern state-making in the se(enteenth and eighteenth imposed perma-

nent patronyms as a condition of citi4enship. t became "ell nigh uni(ersal

"ith the exception of celand "hich, for folkloric reasons in most cases,

mandates the old ?orse system )i.e. $agnus 0ricson, 2atrin Jnsd&ttir+.

'he telephone directory there lists subscribers by gi(en name and occupa-

tion. ?ations such as ran, 'urkey, and 'hailand that ha(e imposed perma-

nent patronym as a state pro:ect in the t"entieth century ha(e until com-

parati(ely recently organi4ed the phonebook alphabetically by gi(en name.

'he imposition of permanent, anglici4ed patronyms on indigenous peoples

of ?orth !merica coincided, in the 7nited States, "ith the issuance of prop-

erty deeds connected to efforts to sei4ing the bulk of tribal lands, and in

Canada among the nuit, "ith inter(entions by the "elfare and health bu-

reaucracies. oth episodes make for a reading that is filled "ith e3ual parts

of hilarity and melancholy.F1G urma, ndonesia, $alaysia and much of the

$iddle 0ast ha(e not adopted permanent patronyms but no" ha(e mo(ed

to more modern technologies of personal identification.

Legibility and Poer

'he 3uest for legibility, "hen :oined to state po"er, is not merely an #obser-

(ation.& y a kind of fiscal /eisenberg principle, it has the capacity the

change the "orld it obser(es. 'he "indo" and door tax established in

rance under the =irectory and abolished only in 191A is a striking case in

point. ts originator must ha(e reasoned that the number of "indo"s and

doors in a d"elling "as almost perfectly proportionate to the d"elling’s

si4e. 'hus a tax assessor need only "alk around the house counting the

"indo"s and doors to estimate its si4e. !s a simple expedient, it "as a bril-

liant stroke, but not "ithout conse3uences. easant d"ellings "ere subse-

3uently designed or reno(ated "ith the formula in mind so as to ha(e as

fe" apertures as possibleK <hile the fiscal losses could be recouped by rais-

ing the tax per opening, the effects on the long term health of the rural pop-

ulation lasted for than a century.

'he "indo" and door tax illustrates something else about #state optics&8

they achie(e their formidable po"er of resolution by a kind of tunnel (ision

that brings into sharp focus a single aspect of an other"ise far more com-

plex and un"ieldy reality. 'his (ery simplification makes the phenomenon


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at the center of the field of (ision more legible and hence more susceptible

to careful measurement and calculation. Combined "ith similar obser(a-

tions, an o(erall, aggregate, synoptic (ie" of a selecti(e reality is achie(ed,

making possible a high degree of schematic kno"ledge, control and manip-

ulation.

The In!ention of "cientific #orestry

found this process strikingly e(ident in the in(ention of scientific forestry

in 1Bth-century russia and Saxony. !n abbre(iated account of forest #sci-

ence& can ser(e both as a model for processes of state-simplification as "ell

as the ad(antages and disad(antages it entails.FIG 'he lens, as it "ere, for

this simplification "as #cameral science& the efforts to rationali4e the re(-

enue of the princely states. 'o that end, the forests "ere reconceptuali4ed

as streams of salable commodities, abo(e all so many thousands of board

feet of timber and so many cords of "ood fetching a certain price. 'he

cro"n’s interest "e resol(ed through its fiscal lens into a single number

representing the re(enue yield that might be extracted annually from the

domainal forests. 'he truly heroic simplification in(ol(ed here is most e(i-

dent in "hat "as left out of this utilitarian and minimalist conception of the

forest. $issing "ere all those trees, bushes, and plants holding little or no

potential for cro"n re(enue. $issing as "ell "ere all those parts of trees,

e(en re(enue-bearing trees, "hich might ha(e been of great use to the pop-

ulation but "hose (alue could not easily be con(erted into fiscal receipts.

/ere ha(e in mind foliage and its uses as fodder and thatch, fruits and

nuts as food for people, domestic animals, and game. '"igs and branches

as bedding, fence posts, hop poles, and kindling8 bark and roots for making

medicines and for tanning8 sap for resins, and so forth.

rom a naturalist’s perspecti(e, nearly e(erything "as missing from the

state’s narro" frame of reference. 6one "as the (ast ma:ority of flora

grasses, flo"ers, lichens, mosses, mushrooms, shrubs, and (ines, 6one too,

"ere reptiles, birds, amphibians, fish, and innumerable species of insects.

6one "ere most species of fauna, except for the large game integral to the

aristocratic hunt.

'he utilitarian state could, 3uite literally, not see the real existing forest for

the )commercial+ trees. ?e" techni3ues of measurement "ere de(eloped.

>epresentati(e samples of the forest "ere designated8 fi(e classes of tree


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si4e ) 'ormalba(me+ "ere specified, the timber yield of each "as estimated

using the cone-(olume principles of solid geometry, and a complete census

of a representati(e section "as carried out to determine the distribution of

trees by si4e class. 'his kno"ledge, coupled "ith careful assumptions about

rates of gro"th made possible the tables from "hich the scientific forester

de(ised a plan of extraction based on "hat "as assumed to be the maxi-

mum sustainable yield.

t is, ho"e(er, the next logical step in 6erman scientific forestry that com-

mands our attention. 'hat step "as to attempt to create through careful

seeding, planting and cutting, a redesigned forest that "as easier to count,

manipulate, measure, and assess. 'hus "as born the modern, #production&

forest a mono-cropped )?or"ay spruce or Scotch pine+, same-age, tim-

ber-farm planted in straight ro"s. 'he (ery uniformity of the forest (astly

simplified its management and exploitation. orestry cre"s could follo" a

fe" simple rules for clearing the underbrush, trimming and fertili4ing8 the

mature trees of comparable girth and length could be felled into the alleys

and marketed as homogeneous units to logging contractors and timber

merchants. or nearly a century, during "hich 6erman scientific forestry as

a codified discipline became the "orld standard, the #production forest&

"as a resounding success in terms of steady yields at lo" cost.

>edesigning the forest as a #one-commodity machine,& ho"e(er, had, in the

long run, catastrophic conse3uences for forest health and production. 'he

mono-cropped, same-age forest "as far more (ulnerable to disease, blight,

and storm damage. ts simplicity and formal order, together "ith the elimi-

nation of underbrush, deadfalls and litter dramatically reduced the di(er-

sity of the flora, insect, mammal, and bird populations so essential to soil

building processes. *nce the soil capital deposited by the old-gro"th forest

had been depleted, the ne" forest entered a period of steep decline in

gro"th and production. 'he term ##aldsterben& entered the (ocabulary of

modern forestry science and led, in turn, to huge outlays for fertili4ers, ro-

denticides, fungicides and insecticides as "ell as efforts to artificially rein-

troduce birds, insects and mammals that had disappeared. y redesigning

the complex and poorly understood ecology of the old-gro"th forest as a

(eritable "ood-fiber farm and bracketing e(erything else, scientific forestry

had destroyed a (ernacular forest and a host of ecological processes that


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came back to haunt it.

Conclusion

'he example of scientific forestry is meant here as a signal and cautionary

example of the dangers of the forms of simplification typical of states and

large bureaucratic organi4ations. n Seeing Like a State, de(eloped se(eral

examples in considerable detail the imposition of uniform land tenure and

cadastral sur(eys on (ernacular forms of land tenure8 the imposition of uni-

form legal codes on (ernacular customs, the replacement of dialects "ith a

national language, the design )or redesign+ of abstractly planned cities )e.g.

rasilia+ compared to #(ernacular& unplanned to"ns, the forced resettle-

ment of peasants and pastoralists in poor countries compared to #(ernacu-

lar& mo(ement and settlement, agricultural collecti(i4ation compared "ith

small-holder mixed farming, and, finally, the difference bet"een praxis or

(ernacular kno"ledge on the one hand and epistemic kno"ledge on the

other. 'he emphasis, throughout, is on the processes "hereby hierarchical

organi4ations, of "hich the most striking example is the state, create legible

social and natural landscapes in the interest of re(enue, control, and man-

agement.

nter(ention in society )or nature+ for )hate%er purpose )e.g. deli(ering

"elfare benefits to those "ith particular disability or keeping "atch on po-

litical enemies+ re3uires creating the mapping or optics necessary to legibil$

ity. n Seeing Like a State, and as a student of politics, concentrate on

state-making and go(ernment. ?e(ertheless, as endea(or to make clear,

large-scale capitalism is :ust as much an agency of homogeni4ation, unifor-

mity, grids, and heroic simplification as the state, "ith the difference that,

for capitalists, simplification must pay. 'he profit moti(e compels a le(el of

simplification and tunnel (ision that, if anything, is more heroic that the

early scientific forest of 6ermany. n this respect, the conclusions dra"

from the failures of modern social engineering are as applicable to market-

dri(en standardi4ation as they are to bureaucratic homogeneity.

$otes

F1G #'he roduction of 5egal dentities roper to States 'he Case of the

ermanent amily Surname.& Comparati%e St!dies in Society and *istory

HH)1+ January IDDI, pp.H-HH.


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FIG n abbre(iating, of course, simplify as "ell.

RESPONSE ESSAYS

Promiscuous, Productive Ideas

By +onald J. Bo!drea!

-esponse Essays

September 10, 2010

ames Scott’s fascinating essay reminds us that trade-offs are in-

escapable. $uch useful local kno"ledge is indeed lost "hen namesand other descriptors of roads, ri(ers, and e(en family lines are

changed from their original, locali4ed, and idiosyncratic expressions

into synoptic, standardi4ed expressions that are meaningful to a larger and

more di(erse group of people. n return, though, something useful is gained

namely, greater coordination among larger numbers of people.

ut :ust ho" useful is this greater coordination@

f it is chiefly for commercial purposes, it’s almost certainly (ery useful. 'he

coordination of the plans, expectations, and actions of larger numbers pro-

ducers, traders, and consumers results in more-speciali4ed labor, greater

reliance on machinery and other capital assets )including human capital+,

and impro(ed abilities to di(ersify and, hence, to reduce the costs of

risks.

*r, to exploit a useful metaphor offered by $att >idley in his latest book,

he -ational /ptimist , mo(ing from idiosyncratic descriptors to synoptic

descriptors encourages ideas to become more promiscuous and, therefore,

more producti(e.

>idley con(incingly argues that much of our prosperity results from ideas

ha(ing sex "ith each other. *ne creati(e idea might contain one-tenth of the )figurati(e+ =?! necessary to concei(e, say, a smart phone. 'hat poten-

tial, ho"e(er, isn’t released until the idea mates "ith other ideas be it one

or one thousand other ideas that contain the rest of the =?! re3uired to


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successfully concei(e an economically practical smart phone.

?ote that in the case of ideas, monogamy is do"nright antisocial and unde-

sirable. olygamy is far more producti(e. $ore producti(e, too, are idea or-

gies as compared to simple idea coupling. ree lo(e might be destructi(e

"hen practiced by humans, but it’s all to the good "hen ideas go at it "ith

each other, "ithout inhibition.

'he easier it is for ideas to get together, check each other out, and :ump into

bed "ith each other, the greater "ill be the number of ne"ly created ideas

ideas that "ould not other"ise be concei(ed. Synoptic descriptors if

not 3uite a dating ser(ice for ideas can at least encourage and enable

ideas to meet more fre3uently and in larger groups.

'he result of all this idea coupling and grouping and mutual insemination

is a higher material standard of li(ing for nearly e(ery human being li(ing

in societies "here ideas ha(e sex "ith each other promiscuously.

f, in contrast, the coordination encouraged by synoptic naming is em-

ployed principally for predatory purposes, it’s certainly a curse. 'o the ex-

tent that synoptic names better enable marauders to coordinate their at-

tacks on a local population, the local population’s economic production

)and, of course, their standard of li(ing+ "ill fall. So, too, "ill the economic

production of the marauders fall. 'he reason is that the greater ease of co-

ordinating their marauding makes marauding, relati(e to producing, a

more attracti(e option than before the synoptic names "ere adopted.

*b(iously, the marauders need not be men literally on the mo(e, raping

and pillaging helpless locals. $arauders can instead be "hat $ancur *lsoncalled #stationary bandits& po"erful pooh-bahs or other officials "ho )for

"hate(er reason+ en:oy the allegiance of organi4ed groups of men special-

i4ed in using physical force. )'hese speciali4ed groups are indeed o(er-

"helmingly made up of men mostly yo!ng men.+ 0ach stationary bandit,

be it an indi(idual or a team, relies upon these groups to gather resources

from the population and to suppress insurrection. 'he more synoptic are

the names of roads, bridges, (alleys, (illages, and the like, the better able

are stationary bandits and their troops to keep the local population in line.

<e ha(e here the classic tension bet"een decentrali4ation and centrali4a-


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tion. !nd e(eryone, regardless of political (ie"point, should ponder this

tension seriously.

or example, libertarians )of "hich am one+ are 3uick to applaud any ob-

stacles to the state’s ability to o(ersee and go(ern the populace. ut "hat to

make of this report from rof. Scott@

t is both striking and important to recogni4e ho" relati(ely little

the pre-modern state actually kne" about the society o(er "hich it

presided. State officials had only the most tenuous idea of the pop-

ulation under their :urisdiction, its mo(ements, its real property,

"ealth, crop yields, etc. 'heir degree of ignorance "as directly pro-

portional to the fragmentation of their sources of information. 5o-

cal currencies and local measures of capacity )e.g., the bushel+ and

length )the ell, the rod, the toise+ "ere likely to (ary from place to

place and "ith the nature of the transacting parties. 'he opacity of

local society "as, of course, acti(ely maintained by local elites as

one effecti(e means of resistance to intrusions from abo(e.

<ith the pre-modern state hamstrung by a lack of kno"ledge of the peoples

and regions under its domain, "hy didn’t indi(idual freedom reign and cap-

italism burst forth be"ore the modern state emerged "ith its impro(ed abil-

ities to monitor and control its sub:ects@

'here are plausible, libertarian-friendly ans"ers to this 3uestion. or in-

stance, indi(iduals might ha(e been restrained from acting entrepreneuri-

ally by cultural taboos or by religious beliefs. ?e(ertheless, the fact remains

that de "acto decentrali4ation of po"er de "acto inability of the state to

impose its "ill, at "ill, across its entire domain is ob(iously not a suffi-

cient condition for freedom and entrepreneurial capitalism to take root and

blossom.

0(en the most ardent libertarian must keep an open mind on this matter.

erhaps the emergence of the modern state did, in fact, play a positi(e role

in pa(ing the "ay for the capitalist "ealth explosion that began in 1Bth-cen-tury 0urope. ?ation-states’ standardi4ation of language, "eights, and mea-

surements, information on o"nership of real property, and kno"ledge

about the destination of roads might not ha(e been necessary to help spark


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the ndustrial >e(olution8 that is, it might ha(e been possible for such stan-

dardi4ation to emerge through purely pri(ate actions )in much the same

"ay that pri(ate railroads created #standard time& 4ones in Canada and the

7nited States+. ut it surely seems to be untrue that a state gro"ing in both

scope and po"er necessarily diminishes the prospects for entrepreneurial

capitalism to take hold and bloom.

$arkets are al"ays opportunistic and ne(er ideological. " the state, for

"hate(er reason, takes steps that reduce the costs of creating or ser(ing

markets, entrepreneurs respond. 'hink of ho" credit card companies,

banks, and many other pri(ate firms use !mericans’ Social Security num-

bers as a reliable and standard means of identifying indi(iduals. $y Social

Security number impro(es my ability to get credit from strangers. 2eeping

track of the "hereabouts and beha(iors of #=on oudreaux& "ould be a

much more challenging task than keeping track of the "hereabouts and be-

ha(iors of the person "ho must, "hene(er he seeks a ne" line of credit, re-

(eal his uni3ue nine-number identification code. Scholars "ho study coun-

tries that fail to de(elop such as many countries in sub-Saharan !frica

often note the absence of such standardi4ed, reliable identifiers of indi(idu-

als.

! thoroughly impersonal string of numerals )and "hat is more impersonal

than being identified by a string of !rabic numerals assigned to me at birth

by the state@K+ enables strangers to cost-effecti(ely gauge rele(ant aspects of

my personality, such as my procli(ity to pay my debts on time.

=oes this ad(antage of Social Security out"eigh its costs )the reality and

si4e of "hich belie(e are a"esome+@ ’m tempted to say no, but, honestly, don’t really kno". /o" do "e "eigh the higher taxes that Social Security

saddles !mericans "ith against the benefits of "idespread, impersonal, and

highly li3uid consumer credit markets that use Social Security numbers as

reliable #names& for all !mericans seeking credit@

!ll can do all that anyone can do is to speculate. So speculate that

as the demand for consumer credit rose o(er the past se(eral decades, along

"ith impro(ements in technologies for tracking debtors, some cle(er entre-

preneur "ould ha(e de(ised something akin to today’s Social Security num-

bers for use by pri(ate creditors to assess the credit"orthiness and to track


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the beha(iors of debtors and potential debtors. )*r perhaps the ideas of

se%eral cle(er entrepreneurs "ould ha(e had sex "ith each other in order to

concei(e a usable means of identifying credit customers.+

Consumer credit markets might "ell ha(e become as deep and as sound

or e(en deeper and more sound in the alternati(e "orld that speculate

about abo(e as those markets are today in actuality. f so, this benefit of

standardi4ed identification "ould ha(e been secured "ithout the horrible

mess that is the Social Security system’s distorting taxes and looming bank-

ruptcy. ut that Social Security numbers are among the sort of synoptic

#names& that Scott so intriguingly discusses is a fact that mustn’t be lost

sight of.

James Scott’s fact-filled essay offers much food for non-standard thoughtK

Seeing Like a Movie Mogul

By imothy B. Lee

-esponse Essays

September 1, 2010

n his lead essay, James Scott "rites about the efforts of 6erman

foresters to create #a redesigned forest that "as easier to count, ma-

nipulate, measure, and assess,& and throughout Seeing Like a State,

he uses this as a metaphor for (arious state pro:ects to reshape the

complex, messy "orld to make it more susceptible to centrali4ed measure-

ment, control, and expropriation. Scott describes ho" states made modern

statecraft possible by forcing unruly peasants to conform to state-defined

names, "eights, measures, and especially property rules, so that they could

efficiently be taxed, regulated, and conscripted. ’m struck by the parallels

bet"een this process and the efforts of today’s incumbent media and soft-

"are firms to domesticate the rapidly changing "orld of high technology.

'he big difference is that this time, the centrali4ers are on the defensi(e.

'he great media technologies of the IDth century, tele(ision, radio, and

mo(ies, "ere inherently centrali4ing. 'hey had high fixed costs that could

only be paid by large, hierarchical institutions, and the existence of these

costs allo"ed the institutions to shape the opinions of millions of people.


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Similarly, the de(elopment of increasingly sophisticated, but (ery expen-

si(e, computing de(ices starting in the late nineteenth century aided cen-

trali4ation by enabling large institutions to efficiently manage e(er-larger

amounts of information.

'he nternet and the microprocessor are re(ersing these trends, "ith pro-

found social conse3uences. or most of the t"entieth century, only a tiny

minority of people had access to the means to distribute creati(e "orks to

"ide audiences. ?o", anyone can do it for next to nothing, and the former

gatekeepers are furious. 7sing misleading property rights rhetoric, they

ha(e lobbied for, and gotten, ne" legal pri(ileges that make their respecti(e

markets more amenable to centrali4ed control.

Consider /olly"ood’s long-running conflict "ith the consumer electronicsindustry. n the early 19BDs, /olly"ood came one Supreme Court (ote shy

of outla"ing the EC>, "hich it predicted )incorrectly, as it turned out+

"ould de(astate the mo(ie industry. n 199B, the mo(ie industry lobbied

for the passage of the =igital $illennium Copyright !ct, "hich gi(es copy-

right holders a legal (eto o(er the design of media de(ices capable of play-

ing their content.

/olly"ood has used its authority under the =$C! to force consumer elec-

tronics manufacturers to comply "ith #digital rights management& schemes

that are a digital embodiment of the kind of legibility-through-simplifica-

tion pro:ect Scott describes in Seeing Like a State. Scott argues that a sin-

gle-minded focus on timber yields in state forests tended to short-change

other important (alues pro(ided by the forest, such as kindling, "ildlife,

herbs, and scenery. ncumbent media firms ha(e a similarly narro" (ie" of their customers. 'hey seek to reduce the infinite (ariety of "ays customers

can interact "ith creati(e "orks do"n to a handful of standardi4ed, usually

passi(e, acti(ities that can be easily monitored, counted, and paid for.

$anufacturers "ishing to produce de(ices capable of playing /olly"ood

content are re3uired to sign a licensing agreement dictating in great detail

ho" the de(ices must beha(e. n an effort to pre(ent unauthori4ed copying,

=>$ schemes attempt to enumerate all of the operations consumers are al-

lo"ed to perform, and re3uire de(ices to perform thoseand only those

functions. 'his is "hy, for example, most =E= players don’t allo" you to


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fast-for"ard through commercials8 this beha(ior conflicts "ith /olly"ood’s

business model, and so /olly"ood has compelled consumer electronics

manufacturers to disable that feature "hen commercials are playing.

=E= players "ork fine for consumers "ho "ant to use them as /olly"ood

intended, and they make it some"hat less con(enient to make illicit copies

of /olly"ood mo(ies than it might other"ise be. ut this achie(ement has

come at the price of dramatically restricting the functionality of home (ideo

de(ices. or example, for o(er a decade consumers ha(e en:oyed the free-

dom to #rip& their music C=s to their computers and portable de(ices, mak-

ing possible the iod re(olution. Similar soft"are has long been a(ailable

for =E=s, but such soft"are is illegal in the 7nited States. !nd hard"are

manufacturers "ho offer products "ith that capability, such as #(ideo :uke-

box& set-top boxes, face la"suits under the =$C!.

! similar conflict is under "ay in the soft"are industry. Soft"are has tradi-

tionally been afforded copyright protection, "hich regulates literal copying

of soft"are code, but not patent protection, "hich co(ers broader classes of

#in(entions.& ut beginning in the late 19BDs, a series of court decisions

ga(e the green light to patents on soft"are. 'his de(elopment "as initially

greeted "ith alarm in the soft"are industry. atents, unlike copyrights, are

susceptible to inad(ertent infringement, in "hich one company accidentally

de(elops soft"are "ith functionality claimed by another firm’s patent. ill

6ates clearly understood the danger. n 1991, "hen $icrosoft "as still a rel-

ati(ely small company, he "rote a memo to his executi(es "arning that if

soft"are patents are legali4ed, #some large company "ill patent some ob(i-

ous thing& and use the patent to #take as much of our profits as they "ant.&

n Seeing like a State, Scott describes ho" colonial officials in ndia, Eiet-

nam, and else"here sought to expropriate the nati(es by imposing state-de-

fined property boundaries. *(er the last t"o decades, something similar

has been happening in the soft"are industry. irms that agreed to partici-

pate in the patent system "ere recogni4ed as #o"ners& of broad and arbi-

trarily defined #technologies,& and could use that o"nership to extract rents

from those "ho did not participate. !lthough they "ere initially skeptical,

large firms disco(ered that patents made their tumultuous industry more

legible and predictable, by transforming a rapidly changing technological

ecosystem into series of discrete, bureaucratically defined #technologies&


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that can be bought, sold, licensed, and put on balance sheets. 'he fact that

these #technologies& ha(e only the most tenuous relationship to "hat the

engineers "ere doing "as of little concern as long as the patents continued

generating licensing fees. !fter all, colonial officials didn’t much care if the

property lines on their maps reflected actual or historical culti(ation pat-

terns so long as someone "as paying the re3uired taxes.

So soft"are firms began building patent portfolios. !s 6ates and other

skeptics predicted, soft"are patents ha(e become so broad and numerous

that it’s almost impossible to build any large soft"are product "ithout in-

fringing some. 'oday, most soft"are companies don’t e(en try to a(oid in-

fringement. nstead, they simply assume they "ill infringe and stockpile

patents of their o"n to deter anyone from suing them.

y the da"n of the t"enty-first century, $icrosoft had built a substantial

patent portfolio of its o"n. ?o" a #large company& itself, it "as concerned

free soft"are products "ere cannibali4ing the market for some of $icro-

soft’s o"n proprietary products. !nd so $icrosoft began threatening (en-

dors "ho offered operating systems based on the free 5inux kernel "ith

patent litigation. !lthough $icrosoft has declined to produce a specific list

of patents being infringed, the sheer si4e of $icrosoft’s patent portfolio and

the likelihood of inad(ertent infringement makes the threat credible. !nd,

of course, $icrosoft no" lobbies in fa(or of patents on soft"are.

roprietary soft"are firms are, understandably, focused on maximi4ing the

number of copies they sell. ut the licensing terms re3uired to ensure that

each user pays for his or her copy the has a side effect of undermining three

of "hat ree Soft"are oundation founder >ichard Stallman calls the foursoft"are freedoms the freedom to use, study, share, and modify soft"are.

roprietary soft"are offers customers the first freedomusefor a fee, but

the other three freedoms are typically not a(ailable at any price, because

they conflict "ith the (endor’s business model. *rdinary consumers may

not care about these other freedoms, since they lack the kno"ledge and

skills to take ad(antage of them. ut many computer programmers care

about them 3uite a bit, because they make the soft"are "e use much more

useful. t allo"s us to fix bugs, add ne" features, and diagnose compatibil-

ity problems. !nd as users of irefox can appreciate, preser(ing these free-

doms for geeks often has spillo(er benefits for the general public.


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*nce again, a myopic focus on the cash-for-copies business model has led

to the creation of technology that’s dramatically less useful than it could be.

Just as 6erman foresters ignored uses of the forest that could not produce

re(enue for the cro"n, so soft"are firms’ focus on selling copies of soft"are

has led them to ignore uses of soft"are that cannot be easily #moneti4ed.&

Some of the most sophisticated users of soft"are ha(e become increasingly

dissatisfied "ith this arrangement and ha(e begun building their o"n alter-

nati(e base of soft"are, called free soft"are, that is not so limited. ;ou

might say that free soft"are is the natural forest to proprietary soft"are’s

#production& forest.

n both of these disputes, incumbents ha(e used the rhetoric of property

rights to :ustify their efforts to sei4e control o(er "ealth they did not create.

/olly"ood didn’t in(ent the lu->ay player, flat-screen 'Es, or other inno-

(ations, but under the banner of property rights they ha(e demanded, and

gotten, a (eto o(er the e(olution of these technologies. Similarly, patent liti-

gation in the soft"are industry is rarely about actual copying of a competi-

tor’s code. t typically in(ol(es transferring "ealth from firms that produce

inno(ati(e products to firms that are adept at na(igating the patent system.

raming these contro(ersies as disputes o(er property rights has allo"ed

/olly"ood and the patent bar, respecti(ely, to claim the high ground for

"hat might other"ise be percei(ed as simple rent-seeking.

ecause libertarians reflexi(ely )and correctly+ fa(or strong enforcement of

property rights, "e need to be careful about too credulously accepting the

#property rights& frame for proposals to create or expand legal pri(ileges.

Such arguments can be found in a "ide (ariety of fields, including gene

patents, the recording industry, and spectrum policy. Clear and predictable

property rules are a tremendous engine of economic gro"th and indi(idual

liberty. ut Seeing Like a State reminds us that the creation of ne" prop-

erty rights can sometimes be a process of expropriation, "ith the state in-

(enting ne" rights to transfer "ealth to parties "ith political po"er.

>easonable people can disagree about "hether the ne" property rights

"hose creation Scott describes in Seeing Like a State had positi(e conse-

3uences in the long run, but it’s hard to deny that some of the short-run

conse3uences "ere deeply illiberal, transferring "ealth from ordinary peas-

ants to those "ho had the closest ties to the state. <hen large firms deploy


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the rhetoric of property rights in defense of creating ne" legal pri(ileges for

themsel(es, libertarians especially need to employ an appropriate degree of

skepticism.

Perhaps. And Sometimes.

By J. Brad"ord +eLong

-esponse Essays

September 1, 2010

n LHI != the late >oman )early y4antine@+ 0mperor Justinian

"rote to his raetorian refect concerning the army trained and

e3uipped and paid for by the >oman State to control the barbariansand to #increase the state.& Justinian "as, eter Sarris reports in his

Economy and Society in the 3ge o" J!stinian, upset that

certain indi(iduals had been daring to dra" a"ay soldiers and

"oederati from their duties, occupying such troops entirely "ith

their o"n pri(ate businessM. 'he emperorM prohibitFedG such in-

di(iduals from dra"ing to themsel(es or di(erting troopsM ha(ing

them in their householdM on their property or estatesM. F!Gny in-

di(idual "ho, after thirty days, continues to employ soldiers to

meet his pri(ate needs and does not return them to their units "ill

face conNscation of propertyM #and those soldiers and "oederati

"ho remain in paramonar attendance upon themM "ill not only

be depri(ed of their rank, but also undergo punishments up to and

including capital punishment.

Justinian is "orried because "hat is going on in the country he rules is not

legible to him. Soldiers soldiers "hom he has trained, e3uipped, and

paid for ha(e been hired a"ay from their frontier duties by the great

landlords of the 0mpire and employed on their estates and in the areas they

dominate as bully-boys. *ne such great landlord "as Justinian’s o"n some-

time 4rae"ect!s 4raetorio per /rientem la(ius !pion, to "hom one of

la(ius’s tenants and debtors, one !noup, "rote


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?o in:ustice or "ickedness has e(er attached to the glorious house-

hold of my kind lord, but it is e(er full of mercy and o(erflo"ing to

supply the needs of others. *n account of this , the "retched sla(e

of my good lord, "ish to bring it to your lordship’s kno"ledge by

this present entreaty for mercy that ser(e my kind lord as my fa-

thers and forefathers did before me and pay the taxes e(ery year.

!nd by the "ill of 6odM my cattle died, and borro"ed the not in-

considerable amount of 1L solidi M. ;et "hen approached my

kind lord and asked for pity in my straits, those belonging to my

lord refused to do my lord’s bidding. or unless your pity extends

to me, my lord, cannot stay on my ktema and fulfill my ser(ices

"ith regard to the properties of the estate. ut beseech and urge

your lordship to command that mercy be sho"n to me because of

the disaster that has o(ertaken meM

'he late >oman 0mpire as Justinian "ished it to be "ould consist of )a+

sla(es, )b+ free >oman citi4ens )some of "hom o"ned a lot of land+, )c+ sol-

diers, )d+ bureaucrats, and )e+ an emperor. 'he sla(es "ould "ork for their

masters. Sla(es along "ith their citi4en masters and non-sla(eholding citi-

4ens "ould farm the empire )some of the citi4ens o"ning their land, somerenting it+. !ll "ould be prosperous and pay their taxes. !nd the emperor

"ould use the taxes to pay the soldiers "ho dealt "ith the ersians, the

/uns, the 6oths, and the Eandals8 to fund the building of /agia Sophia and

other "orks of architecture in Constantinople8 and to promote the true

faith and extirpate heresy. f the countryside "ere legible to him, that is

ho" things "ould beOsla(es and citi4ens in their places, landlords and ten-

ants in their mutually beneficial contractual relationships, all prosperous

and all paying their taxes to support the empire.

ut Justinian kno"s (ery "ell that the countryside is not legible to him.

'he contracts that la(ius !pion makes "ith his tenants are made under

the shado" of the threat that if la(ius !pion does not like the "ay things

are going he "ill send a b!cellari!s to beat you up. !noup is not pointing

out to la(ius !pion that their landlord-tenant relationship is a good thingand that keeping him as a tenant rather than thro"ing him off the land for

failure to pay the rent is in both their interests. nstead, !noup is calling

himself a sla(e )"hich he is not+. !noup is calling la(ius !pion a lord


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)"hich he is not supposed to be+. !noup is appealing to a long family his-

tory of dependence of himself and his ancestors on the (arious la(ii !pi-

onoi and la(ii Strategioi of past generations. Justinian thinks that things

"ould be better ser(ed if the countryside "ere properly legible to him and

he could force reality to correspond to the legal order of sla(es and citi4ens,

tenants and landlords interacting through contract, and taxpayers. la(ius

!pion "ould prefer that the order be one of proto-feudalism that all the

!noups kno" and understand that they are at his mercy, and that the em-

peror is far, far a"ay. !nd "e don’t kno" "hat !noup thinks. <e do kno"

that it does not sound as though he experiences the lack of legibility of the

countryside to the emperor and his state as a full and complete liberation.

!nd "e do kno" that the 0mperor Justinian "as gra(ely concerned about

the transformation of his soldiers into b!cellarii , into the dependent

bully-boys of the landlordsOboth because it meant that they "ere not on the

borders "here they belonged and because it disturbed "hat he sa" as the

proper balance of po"er in the countryside and "hat he sa" as the em-

peror’s :ustice.

Justinian’s big )and to him insoluble+ problem "as that the la(ius !pion

"hose bully-boys beat up his tenants "hen they displeased "as the same

la(ius !pion "ho headed Justinian’s o"n bureaucracy.

'hus "hen James C. Scott speaks of ho" local kno"ledge and local ar-

rangements ha(ing the ability to protect the people of ci(il society from an

o(ermighty, blundering state, say #perhaps& and say #sometimes.&

t is certainly the case that the fact that Sher"ood orest is illegible to the

Sheriff of ?ottingham allo"s >obin of 5ocksley and $aid $arian to sur- (i(e. ut that is :ust a stopgap. n the final reel of %anhoe the fair >ebecca

must be rescued from the un"orthy rogue 'emplar Sir rian de ois-6uil-

bert )and packed offstage to marry some young banker or rabbi+, the Sheriff

of ?ottingham and Sir 6uy of 6isborne must recei(e their comeuppance,

the proper property order of ?ottinghamshire must be restored, and <il-

fred must marry the fair >o"enaOand all this is accomplished by making

Sher"ood orest and ?ottinghamshire legible to the true king, >ichard

#5ionheart& lantagenet, and then through his :ustice and good lordship.

! state that makes ci(il society legible to itself cannot protect us from its


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o"n fits of ideological terror, or e(en clumsy thumb-fingeredness. ! state to

"hich ci(il society is illegible cannot help curb ro(ing bandits or local nota-

bles. !nd neither type of state has pro(ed terribly effecti(e at constraining

its o"n functionaries.

n some "ays, the #night "atchman& state the state that enables ci(il so-

ciety to de(elop and function "ithout distortions imposed by ro(ing ban-

dits, local notables, and its o"n functionaries, but that also is content to

simply sit back and "atch ci(il society is the most po"erful and unlikely

state of all.

THE CONVERSATION

Coordination vs. Coercion

By imothy B. Lee

he Con%ersation

September 20, 2010

on oudreaux makes an interesting point about the "ay stan-

dardi4ation facilitates social cooperation and the di(ision of la-

bor. ut think it’s important to remember that the distincti(e

feature of the state-building pro:ects James Scott describes

"asn’t :ust standardi4ation, but coercion. eople "ere compelled to adopt

ne" surnames, geographical indicators, property boundaries, and the like

"hether they liked it or not. !nd most of the time they didn’t like it, be-

cause it "as ob(ious that the point of the exercise "as to make the populace

more amenable to centrali4ed control.

6i(en ho" many of the standardi4ed features of modern life ha(e their ori-

gins in state-dri(en pro:ects, it might seem like state compulsion is re3uired

to achie(e large-scale standardi4ation. ut this is not so, as "e ha(e an ex-

ample of an almost perfectly non-coerci(e standardi4ation pro:ect the n-ternet.

t’s true that the nternet’s early de(elopment "as funded by the federal

go(ernment, and the feds did encourage and subsidi4e nternet adoption


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"ithin academia during the 19BDs. ut the nternet’s most explosi(e

gro"th happened after the nternet "as pri(ati4ed during the 199Ds. 'he

(ast ma:ority of nodes on the nternet today :oined the nternet after the

net"ork had become independent and self-financing. $illions of pri(ate or-

gani4ations :oined the nternet because they "anted access to the rapidly

gro"ing uni(erse of content it offered.

'he nternet offers its users an unprecedented degree of standardi4ation

and legibility. 0(ery computer on the net"ork )more or less+ is identified by

a uni3ue string of I ones and 4eros kno"n as an address. 'he entire n-

ternet has adopted the =omain ?ame System, a kind of online #yello"

pages& that con(erts names like #cato.org& or #google.com& into I-bit

addresses. !nd layered on top of that is the 7niform >esource dentifier, or

7>, "hich, as its name suggests, allo"s anyone in the "orld to uni3uely

identify any online resource, such as this blog post.

'here’s one crucial difference bet"een this system of legibility and the

state-dri(en systems of legibility that are the focus of Seeing Like a State

the nternet makes it easy to find computers, people, blog posts, and the

like, but only i" they )ant to be "o!nd. ecause there’s no central authority

controlling access to the net"ork or (erifying that people are "ho they say

they are, indi(iduals on the nternet are free to maintain multiple indepen-

dent identities or they can decline to identify themsel(es at all.

'his is great for the #idea orgies& oudreaux lauds, but as "e might expect,

it dri(es state officials cra4y. 'here’s a perennial debate in tech policy cir-

cles about anonymity on the nternet. 5a" enforcement officials and as-

sorted busybodies are perpetually complaining that the nternet’sanonymity-friendly architecture facilitates a "ide (ariety of harms, includ-

ing online harassment, illicit file-sharing, and the spread of child pornogra-

phy. 'hese critics regularly demand that the nternet be re-architected to

facilitate centrali4ed control, although they rarely ha(e a clue about ho" to

do it.

'hus "e should be cautious about ascribing the beneficial effects of state-

dri(en standardi4ation pro:ects to state compulsion. *nce the state has

compelled a nation’s citi4ens to adopt a standardi4ed scheme, it’s not sur-

prising that pri(ate parties begin to use that scheme for their o"n purposes.


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ut if oudreaux is right that standardi4ation is economically beneficial,

and think he is, standardi4ation schemes may (ery "ell ha(e emerged

spontaneously before too long.

!nd as "e see in the case of the nternet, (oluntary standardi4ation

schemes ha(e a different character than externally imposed ones. ecause

people adopt them only "hen and to the extent they’re useful, they tend to

be less useful for centrali4ed, coerci(e pro:ects such as tax collection.

<e can see this dynamic at "ork in the contemporary debate o(er propos-

als for a national = card. Currently, the 7nited States has a de "acto system

of national identification that consists of the combination of your Social Se-

curity ?umber and state-issued dri(er’s license. 'his combination is per-

fectly ade3uate for most pri(ate interactions8 the Social Security ?umberpro(ides a globally uni3ue identifier that almost e(eryone has, "hich can be

used for credit checks and the like, and the dri(er’s license is a pretty good

"ay to establish your identity. ut the decentrali4ed and minimalist charac-

ter of this ad hoc system make it ill-suited for centrali4ed, coerci(e state

pro:ects such as excluding undocumented "orkers from the labor market.

'here has been a gro"ing push to create a standardi4ed national = card

and a national database that ties biometric information to peoples’ Social

Security ?umbers. Such proposals "ill do little or nothing to facilitate the

kind of (oluntary cooperation oudreaux lauds in his response. >ather,

their function is to enhance state control o(er the !merican people.

So oudreaux is absolutely right that standardi4ation begets cooperation,

the di(ision of labor, and more. ut "e should be careful about conflating

standardi4ation "ith coerci(e centrali4ation. Some standardi4ation pro:ects

are much more centrali4ed, and centrali4ing, than others. State-dri(en

pro:ects are almost al"ays centrali4ing pro:ects, sometimes "ith a helpful

side-effect of enabling #idea orgies.& n contrast, pri(ate-sector standardi4a-

tion pro:ects are primarily information aphrodisiacs, and they can be de-

signed to th"art centrali4ed control.

Uncommonly Good Law


de 45 12/12/2015 14:23



By +onald J. Bo!drea!

he Con%ersation

September 22, 2010

imothy 5ee’s distinction bet"een state-enforced standardi4ation

and spontaneously ordered standardi4ation is crucial. !nd all

that 5ee says on this point )and in his earlier essay in this thread

at Cato 5nbo!nd + has earned my sincere applause.

!nyone "ho blogs at CafP /ayek, as do, can hardly 3uestion the mar-

(elous reach and po"er of spontaneous ordering forcesK

!nd anyone "ho has been so deeply influenced, as ha(e been, by the

"orks of James uchanan and 6ordon 'ullock can scarcely doubt that

politicians and their appointees "ill abuse "hate(er po"ers they might ex-

ercise to bring about standardi4ation. Centrally imposed standards "ill be

created and used O as 5ee correctly points out O for the good of the state.

*nly by happenstance "ill the good of the state correspond to the good of

society.

ondering this 3uestion calls to my mind 0nglish common la". Celebrated

by /ayek )among many others+ as a chief reason "hy 0ngland and her

progeny, such as the 7nited States, ha(e been open and free societies, the

common la"’s (ery name suggests standardi4ation. Common la".

!t one le(el, the common la" might be said to be the product of the 0nglish

cro"n after 1DQQ, 0nglish monarchs understood that their ?orman blood

"ould be less disagreeable to their sub:ects if these sub:ects "ere allo"ed to

keep their local customs. !s long as these customs kept the populace pro-

ducti(e )and, hence, taxable+ and as long as these customs posed no seri-

ous threat to the security of the cro"n the cro"n courts adopted into la"

many of the customs and norms that spontaneously arose from the e(ery-

day actions of ordinary folk going about their daily li(es. 'hat is, "ith rela-

ti(ely fe" exceptions, the la" in 0ngland "as not designed8 it emerged de-

centrally and "as disco%ered by :udges.

Common themes "ere disco(ered by the courts and "ere gi(en surer form

and clearer identity as these "ere enunciated and enforced o(er the years.

ut these common themes the substanti(e rules of the common la"


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"ere mostly not the creation of the state.

n this light, ha(e al"ays found /ayek’s distinction bet"een #la"& and

#legislation& to be (ery helpful. 5a" is a set of )seldom rigid+ rules or

principles that are disco(ered by the courts8 legislation is a set of much

more rigid rules that are created and imposed consciously by the so(ereign,

often to achie(e ends that ser(e the so(ereign’s interests at the expense of

the general population. )'o this day "ince "hene(er hear legislators de-

scribed as #la"makers.& 'hey are not.+

So, in fact, "hat "as common about the common la" "asn’t so much its

specific content as it "as the procedure for that la"’s disco(ery and en-

forcement. ! so(ereign, head3uartered in 5ondon, "as sufficiently "ise )or

prudent+ to standardi4e through 0ngland only the proced!re for disco(er-ing and enforcing la". 'he resulting specific la"s thus "ere more attuned

to the expectations and practices of ordinary people throughout the realm,

and also not part of any master plan to micromanage 0nglish society.

'his rather standard )K+ summary of the history of the common la" neces-

sarily omits countless details, nuances, and 3ualifications. !nd in light of

James Scott’s lead essay no" suspect that the 0nglish cro"n "as more ac-

ti(e than ’d pre(iously thought at imposing throughout 0ngland centrally

designed standards for the purpose of impro(ing the cro"n’s ability to tax

or to other"ise control its sub:ects for its o"n narro" goals.

Still, the common la" historically emerged from ?orman con3uerors’

self-interested "ish to extract as much tax re(enue o(er time as possible

from the 0nglish people, yet one happy result of this particular form of

standardi4ation "as a system of la"-making that allo"ed for greater per-

sonal freedom and, e(entually, unprecedentedly rapid and "idespread eco-

nomic gro"th.

Of Hayek and Rubber Tomatoes

By imothy B. Leehe Con%ersation

September 2, 2010


de 45 12/12/2015 14:23



enry arrell "rites that #/ayek argues that markets are supe-

rior because they allo" the %dispersed bits of incomplete and

fre3uently contradictory kno"ledge "hich all the separate indi-

(iduals possess’ to be aggregated in a useful "ay.& /e then

faults /ayek for failing to ackno"ledge a key limitation of the price mecha-

nism its tendency to #destroy& kno"ledge in the process of defining stan-

dardi4ed commodities. n attributing to /ayek the (ie" that #markets are

superior,& arrell conspicuously fails to mention superior to )hat6 'his

omission allo"s arrell to construct a curious stra" man of /ayek’s (ie"s,

suggesting that /ayek championed large-scale commodity markets o(er

smaller-scale markets that employed more local kno"ledge. !lthough it’s

possible /ayek staked out this position some"here in his (oluminous "rit-

ings, it’s certainly no"here to be found in the famous essay arrell linked

to.

'hat essay, #'he 7se of 2no"ledge in Society,& criti3ues the tendency

among economists to treat economic information as #gi(en& to centrali4ed

decision-makers. /e explains the "orking of the price system as a counter-

example to this #high modernist& conceit. t’s true, of course, that the price

mechanism selecti(ely discards some kno"ledge in the process of aggregat-

ing and transmitting other kno"ledge. ut this isn’t a special fla" of the

price mechanism. t’s inherent to all economic processes that in(ol(e more

than one human being. !ll economic actors transmit information to others

in simplified, standardi4ed "ays that communicate the information they re-

gard as most important and discard information they regard as less impor-

tant. t’s true, of course, that some international commodity markets tend

to be particularly ruthless in this respect, but see no reason to interpret

/ayek as championing this type of market in particular. 'he small-scale

talian tomato markets arrell lauds here are markets, and /ayek’s argu-

ments apply "ith at least as much force to them as they do to the interna-

tional agricultural commodity markets Scott is critici4ing.

ndeed, /ayek is 3uite explicit about the fact that the price mechanism is

:ust one example of a bottom-up social institution that facilitates large-scale

cooperation. eginning "ith a line from !lfred ?orth <hitehead, /ayek

"rote

#Ci(ili4ation ad(ances by extending the number of important operations


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"hich "e can perform "ithout thinking about them.& 'his is of profound

significance in the social field. <e make constant use of formulas, symbols,

and rules "hose meaning "e do not understand and through the use of

"hich "e a(ail oursel(es of the assistance of kno"ledge "hich indi(idually

"e do not possess. <e ha(e de(eloped these practices and institutions by

building upon habits and institutions "hich ha(e pro(ed successful in their

o"n sphere and "hich ha(e in turn become the foundation of the ci(ili4a-

tion "e ha(e built up. 'he price system is :ust one of those formations

"hich man has learned to use )though he is still (ery far from ha(ing

learned to make the best use of it+ after he had stumbled upon it "ithout

understanding it.

Clearly, /ayek’s point is not that the price system is superior to other de-

centrali4ed social institutions. >ather, he’s pointing out that all successful

large-scale cooperati(e efforts in(ol(e standardi4ation, "hich necessarily

means discarding some potentially rele(ant kno"ledge in the process of

codifying other kno"ledge deemed more important. 'he important 3ues-

tion is not )hether to standardi4e in this "ay, it’s deciding ho), and ho)

m!ch to standardi4e. 'oo little standardi4ation means missing out on op-

portunities for economies of scale and the di(ision of labor. 'oo much stan-

dardi4ation means discarding information that consumers actually care

about, leading to the infamous rubber tomatoes of standardi4ed agricul-

ture. !nd the "rong kind of standardi4ationdiscarding important infor-

mation "hile preser(ing tri(ial informationis doomed regardless of the

degree of standardi4ation.

<hat makes decentrali4ed economic institutions po"erful isn’t standard-

i4ation but the possibility for competition among alternati(e standardi4a-

tion schemes. >ubber tomatoes create an entrepreneurial opportunity for

firms to establish a more exacting tomato standard and deli(er tastier

tomatoes to their customers. n real markets, you see competition not only

among indi(idual firms but among groups of firms using alternati(e stan-

dards. $arkets gradually con(erge on the standards that are best at trans-

mitting rele(ant information and discarding irrele(ant information. n con-

trast, "hen standards are set by the state, or by pri(ate firms "ho ha(e

been granted de "acto standard-setting authority by go(ernment regula-

tions, there is no opportunity for this kind of decentrali4ed experimenta-


de 45 12/12/2015 14:23



tion. 'hen the market is likely to be permanently stunted by the use of a

standard that does a poor :ob of transmitting the information consumers

care about most.

'o return to the theme of my last post, this process of competiti(e stan-

dards-setting is by no means limited to the market setting. 'he "eb

bro"sers "e all used to retrie(e this article conform to a (ariety of technical

standards, including 'CR, /'', and /'$5. Just as commodity stan-

dards "ork by making heroic simplifying assumptions about agricultural

products, so nternet standards make heroic simplifying assumptions about

the beha(ior of our computers and soft"are. 'his suite of no"-dominant

protocols emerged from an intense process of inter-standard competition

during the 19BDs and 199Ds. 'his competiti(e standardi4ation process is

not a market processaccessing a "eb page is not a financial transac-

tionbut it is (ery much a /ayekian one.

So arrell’s criti3ue of /ayek strikes me as something of a stra" man. 'o

my kno"ledge, /ayek ne(er claims that #markets are superior& to other

bottom-up social processes such as those defended by Scott, Jane Jacobs,

and others in their "ritings. >ather, he offered markets and the price mech-

anism as a particularly compelling example of the superiority of decentral-

i4ed economic institutions o(er centrali4ed, #high modernist& schemes for

economic rationali4ation. !lthough Scott specifically declines to endorse

/ayek’s policy agenda, think Seeing Like a State is s3uarely "ithin the

/ayekian intellectual tradition.

Seeing Like a State: Best of the Blogs By he Editors

he Con%ersation

September 17, 2010

his month "e’(e been fortunate to ha(e some (ery astute outside

commentary on the discussion. /enry arrell suggests that See$

ing Like a State undermines /ayekian economics. riefly, "e

face a tradeoff bet"een homogeni4ation of products, bringing

economies of scale and local kno"ledge, supposedly the engine of a lais-


de 45 12/12/2015 14:23



se4-faire economy

FriedrichG /ayek is remarkably incurious about the actual social

processes through "hich markets "ork, and in particular the

forms of standardi4ation that are necessary to make long-distance

trade "ork. imagine Scott’s counterblast going something like

this t is all (ery fine to say that markets pro(ide a means to com-

municate tacit kno"ledge, and it is e(en true of many markets, es-

pecially small scale ones "ith participants "ho kno" each other,

kno" the product and so on. ut global markets do not rely on

tacit kno"ledge. 'hey rely on standardi4ation the homogeni4a-

tion of products so that they can be lumped under the appropriate

heading "ithin a set of standard codified categories. ar from com-

municating tacit kno"ledge, the price system )and the codifiedstandards that underlie it+ destroys it systematically.

think that this criti3ue is hard for /ayekians to ans"er on their

o"n terms. /ayek goes to some length to adumbrate economists

for their failure to treat non-scientific and non-codified kno"ledge

as important. f markets both distort production )by pushing to-

"ards products that can be standardi4ed+ and destroy kno"ledge

)by lumping concrete things that are differentiated in important "ays under abstract headings+, then the /ayekian case for markets

is at least 3ualified. *ne can still preser(e the claim that modern

markets preser(e and communicate some aspects of non-codified

kno"ledge. ut one has to ackno"ledge that other forms of eco-

nomic order can do this too )and at least under some circum-

stances may perhaps do it better, if Scott is to be belie(ed+.

'o "hich 'yler Co"en replies


de 45 12/12/2015 14:23



agree "ith the frustration about a lack of detail about markets.

?onetheless, am more optimistic than this. Standardi4ed prod-

ucts often fund a more general trade or communications infra-

structure "hich the non-standardi4ed products then piggyback

upon. 'hink of funding a port "ith oil shipments )by the "ay, ho"

many grades of crude are there@+ but at the margin using it to

trade strange toys as "ell. !lternati(ely, a highly standardi4ed

product can be communicating the )sometimes tacit+ kno"ledge

that li3uidity and interchangeability and lots of direct competition

matter more than does product di(ersity.

'he 6rossman-Stiglit4 frame"ork helps us think through the

trade-off bet"een the a(erage and the margin. 5et’s say that some

trades shift into the more standardi4ed, li3uid market and out of

the more idiosyncratic market. Some kno"ledge is lost. ut at the

margin, there is no" a stronger incenti(e for information-gather-

ing, or kno"ledge mobili4ation, in the less li3uid market. t "ill be

easier to beat the rest of the market )price is not much of a suffi-

cient statistic+ and so people "ill try harder.

'his topic is related to the current contro(ersy o(er "hether s"aps

contract "ill be o(erly customi4ed )"ider spreads and harder to

monitor and higher regulatory risk@+ or o(erly standardi4ed )more

li3uid but less useful@+.

<e "eren’t able to determine exactly ho" many grades of crude oil there

are, but it’s 3uite a fe". ! better example might be the elemental commodi-

ties, although for these it is difficult to see the (alue to the consumer of the

lost producer-side local kno"ledge, aside from kno"ledge about externali-

ties and titles. 'hese though remain (ery important and are often the basis

of competition in the elemental commodities markets.

$o(ing from information about commodities to information as a commod-

ity, the Cato nstitute’s =irector of nformation olicy Studies Jim /arper

"rites


de 45 12/12/2015 14:23



stumbled across Scott "hen "as researching my book on identi-

fication policy, dentity Crisis. !s Scott obser(es, naming systems

for people ha(e been altered o(er time from (ernacular to formal,

the latter ser(ing the needs of go(ernments and large institutions.

'he next step in the process is numbering )"ell under"ay, the So-

cial Security number+ and full-fledged national = and possibly

"orld = systems. Such systems "ould be used to peg humans into

their place in go(ernmental, economic, and social machinery, ob(i-

ously at a high cost to liberty and social mobility.

'"ice in the paragraph abo(e used the passi(e (oice to hide the

actor. t "as go(ernments, of course, that pushed formal naming

systems, but both go(ernments and corporations "ill use our in-

creasingly formali4ed and machine-processable naming systems to

assign people their roles. Scott is far from a libertarian battler

against go(ernment po"er, and he specifically disclaims ha(ing

/ayekian aims in his book. 'his makes it all the more po"erful

and opens the door to interesting path"ays of thought, parallels

bet"een corporate en(ironmental destruction and go(ernment in-

ter(ention in economic life, for example.

!s al"ays, your letters remain "elcome. Send them to :ku4nicki at cato dot

org. urther feedback on this month’s issue is encouraged, and the four

principals are in(ited to continue discussing through the rest of the month.

Letters to the Editor: Jacob T. Levy on

Seeing Like a State By he Editors

he Con%ersation September 20, 2010

ditors note9 4olitical theorist Jacob . Le%y o" :c;ill 5ni%er$

sity sends !s his tho!ghts on this months disc!ssion, )hich )e

are pleased to share in "!ll.

begin "ith a fe" "ords of unembarrassed admiration. James Scott’s See$

ing Like a State, from "hich his essay is largely dra"n, is one of the most


de 45 12/12/2015 14:23



important books in political science of the past t"enty years )ri(aled by the

recently published companion (olume, he 3rt o" 'ot Being ;o%erned9 3n

3narchist *istory o" 5pland So!theast 3sia, much of "hich could ha(e

been called he 3rt o" 'ot Being Seen by States.+ t is the only "ork of pro-

fessional political science that normally use in my introductory course in

political theory, and think that "e political theorists "ill still be some time

in fully incorporating its lessons.

am also among the book’s libertarian and /ayekian admirers, of "hom

there ha(e been many since the book "as first published. think that "e

libertarians, too, "ill be some time in fully incorporating its lessons. n this

essay ’d like to point to"ard some of these. Since Scott "rites not primarily

as a political theorist and not at all as a libertarian, these may not be the

lessons he intends, a point to "hich "ill return at the end.

!dam Smith, generally thought of as the first systematic analyst of the mar-

ket economy, "as in my (ie" the first ma:or analyst of the modern state

"ho sa" it more or less completely its permanent system of taxation and

debt, its permanent expenditures on public "orks, its standing army, its bu-

reaucratic structure, its colonial and imperial (entures, its complicated re-

lationship "ith economic gro"th and prosperity, and in general the in-

e(itability of a system of #police& or policy. 'his is not "holly distinct from

his "ork as an analyst of the market8 standing armies and professional bu-

reaucracies are aspects of the di(ision of labor, and the "ealth o" nations is

a key determinant of their ability to fulfill their state pro:ects. ut it is

partly distinct.

n the final edition of the heory o" :oral Sentiments, Smith "rote


de 45 12/12/2015 14:23



'he man of systemM is apt to be (ery "ise in his o"n conceit8 and

is often so enamoured "ith the supposed beauty of his o"n ideal

plan of go(ernment, that he cannot suffer the smallest de(iation

from any part of it. /e goes on to establish it completely and in all

its parts, "ithout any regard either to the great interests, or to the

strong pre:udices "hich may oppose it. /e seems to imagine that

he can arrange the different members of a great society "ith as

much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chess-

board. /e does not consider that the pieces upon the chess-board

ha(e no other principle of motion besides that "hich the hand im-

presses upon them8 but that, in the great chess-board of human so-

ciety, e(ery single piece has a principle of motion of its o"n, alto-

gether different from that "hich the legislature might chuse to im-

press upon it.

/ere interrupt Smith for t"o thoughts.

*ne is that James Scott’s later "ork o"es a clear debt to $ichel oucault,

in its appreciation of the deep connections bet"een kno"ledge and po"er,

and in its flexible understandings of the (arious "ays of kno"ing. ut the

difference is as profound as the debt. n oucault’s "ork, agency can be

hard to locate any"here, either in those on "hom po"er is exercised or in

those "ho exercise it. ut nearly all of Scott’s "ork has been about locating

agency e%ery)here. /is is a social "orld in "hich the superordinate and

the subordinate constantly constrain and reshape one another. 'o put it an-

other "ay, Scott takes (ery seriously the idea that the pieces ha(e their o"n

principles of motion. Scott also, think, takes more seriously than does .

!. /ayek the agency of the man of system himself. Scott’s planners do not

sit idly in their failure to kno" all of the needed information. 'hey go out

into the social "orld to reshape )and sometimes break+ it to make it more

kno"able. !nd they often, to a considerable extent, succeed not in kno"ing

e(erything, but in kno"ing much of "hat they need to for their administra-

ti(e purposes.

'he second is thought is that many readers of this essay at Cato 5nbo!nd

e(en those "ho ha(e encountered these "ords of Smith’s before "ill

ha(e thought immediately of the in(isible hand )notice the #hand&

metaphor in this passageK+, of economic actors pursuing their o"n ends and


de 45 12/12/2015 14:23



the superiority of the market order to "hat the #man of system& could de-

sign, and of the insights of /ayek into spontaneous order. ut the )mildly+

famous #man of system& paragraph does not occur in a discussion of eco-

nomics and markets, but in one of constitutional reform and state capacity-

building. 'he #man of system& is contrasted "ith the better reformer "ho

"ill lea(e unmolested #the great orders and societies, into "hich the state is

di(ided& and #the confirmed habits and pre:udices of the people.& <hile #he

should consider& some such old pri(ileges and habits #as in some measure

abusi(e, he "ill content himself "ith moderating, "hat he often cannot an-

nihilate "ithout great (iolence.& /ere is the conclusion of the indictment of

the man of system

t is upon this account, that of all political speculators, so(ereign

princes are by far the most dangerous. 'his arrogance is perfectly

familiar to them. 'hey entertain no doubt of the immense superi-

ority of their o"n :udgment. <hen such imperial and royal re-

formers, therefore, condescend to contemplate the constitution of

the country "hich is committed to their go(ernment, they seldom

see any thing so "rong in it as the obstructions "hich it may some-

times oppose to the execution of their o"n "ill. FMG 'he great ob-

:ect of their reformation, therefore, is to remo(e those obstruc-

tions8 to reduce the authority of the nobility8 to take a"ay the pri(-

ileges of cities and pro(inces, and to render both the greatest indi-

(iduals and the greatest orders of the state, as incapable of oppos-

ing their commands, as the "eakest and most insignificant.

/ayek, suppose, "ould ha(e had no 3uarrel "ith this, but it is far from hiscentral interests. >ather, in this criti3ue of the state policymaker "ho "ill

flatten society in the effort to make sure that his policies operate more

smoothly and "ithout interruption or resistance, "e should see an an-

tecedent of the "ork of James Scott.

'o be sure, Smith’s concerns aren’t precisely Scott’s. Smith’s solicitude for

the established pri(ileged orders )presumably, though not explicitly, those

that "ere to be o(erturned during the rench >e(olution+ sounds rather

more like "hat rad =e5ong "orries about in Scott’s approach than it does

like Scott’s o"n aims. !nd Smith "as decidedly ambi(alent about a case


de 45 12/12/2015 14:23



that might ha(e been nearer to Scott’s heart that of the Scottish high-

landers, able to partly resist incorporation into the Scottish and then

ritish states for so long thanks to their geography, and thereby shaping

those states themsel(es. )he 3rt o" 'ot Being ;o%erned is in large part

about the resistance to states and systems that is made possible by geogra-

phy, specifically hills and mountains. 'he book is centered in Southeast

!sia but makes mentions of parallel cases around the "orld the !tlas

$ountains, the !lps, the !ppalachians, and the mountains of South !mer-

ica all appear as geographic spaces into "hich those "ho "ish not to be

go(erned or con3uered ha(e sometimes escaped to form ri(al social or-

ders.+ ut the resemblance is real.

$oreo(er, Smith unlike, say, the social contract theorists understood

that the state "as a sometimes thing. 5ike Scott, Smith treated it as espe-

cially associated "ith settled agricultural and commercial societies. 7nlike

the social contract theorists, he did not think that that means agriculture

"as a prere3uisite to social or political order and organi4ations8 there "ere

other social and political orders associated "ith other kinds of production.

'his is one lesson that think political theorists ha(e yet to properly learn.

5ike our social contractarian forbears, "e too easily imagine the modern

state as natural and un3uestionable. <e moreo(er too easily assume a"ay

the information and kno"ledge problems that in (ery different "ays

ha(e so preoccupied /ayek, oucault, and Scott. <e ask "hat states should

do "ithout "ondering "hat they "ould ha(e to kno" in order to do it, or

ho" they "ould gain that kno"ledge, or "hat the effects "ould be of their

attempts to do so. 'he combination of Seeing Like a State "ith he 3rt o"

'ot Being ;o%erned re(eals a "orld in "hich states are particular kinds of

social pro:ects, not natural preconditions for social order8 in "hich states’

kno"ledge and penetration of their societies comes in degrees8 and in

"hich states’ acti(ities may create their o"n limits by pro(oking those be-

ing go(erned.

!nother lesson applies mainly to political theorists critical of liberalism.

'he idea that freedom can mean freedom from the state, or freedom from

state interference, has come in for "idespread abuse o(er the past genera-

tion. reedom, "e are assured, is a ci(il condition, one that conceptually

can only pertain "ithin a political order, and thus a state one that pro-


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tects us from the kinds of domination rad =e5ong in(okes. reedom

surely has nothing to do "ith keeping one’s o"n self out of state conscrip-

tion, or one’s o"n goods a"ay from the state’s tax-collector, or one’s o"n

information a"ay from the census-taker. )'he conser(ati(e Canadian go(-

ernment has proposed to make the long-form census optional, repealing

the rule that it must be filled out under threat of fines and imprisonment8

most of my friends among Canadian social scientists are outraged, insisting

that good 3uality policy depends on states being able to see their people

(ery, (ery thoroughly.+ ?othing in Scott’s "ork can settle the philosophical

dispute about "hat freedom #really& means. ut he does re(eal a social

"orld in "hich many not only modern bourgeois capitalists guarding

their incomes ha(e sought refuge from the state’s sight and :urisdiction,

and ha(e treated the freedom from state intrusion as a freedom "orth ha(-

ing.

'hat said, there are crucially important lessons for libertarians, too. think

that libertarians ha(e often :oined the aspiration to this anti-statist, pri-

(acy-oriented freedom "ith 5ockean property and contract theory. 'he

union does not succeed. 5ocke’s state is a state "ith excellent maps, the bet-

ter to settle disputes about land o"nership. t is a state that kno"s "ho its

members are, the better to call upon their financial and military resources.

t is a fully functioning modern state. !s Scott’s ;ale colleague Ste(en in-

cus sho"s in his recent book 188, 5ocke and his re(olutionary friends

"ere state-builders and state-moderni4ers. 'hey completed the "ork the

Stuarts had begun of transforming ritain into a modern bureaucratic

state, one in "hich trade and market-based "ealth )rather than, as the Stu-

arts had hoped, land and agricultural "ealth+ "ould support military and

imperial might. #'ruck, barter, and exchange,& in Smith’s "ords, are e(ery-

"here8 but the modern commercial economy is coe(al "ith the modern

state, and has al"ays in part been a tool of state purposes. 5ibertarians

need to better understand such entanglements of market and state. 'hose

"ho ha(e been influenced by 0linor *strom’s pioneering "ork on the (ari-

ety of property regimes and social orders in the "orld can probably see

these issues more clearly but *strom’s lessons, like Scott’s, ha(e to be al-

lo"ed to reshape rather than merely add onto traditional libertarian habits

of thought.


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/ere, think, is a lesson for Scott as "ell. suspect that Scott has been

mildly embarrassed by the libertarian enthusiasm for Seeing Like a State,

and since its publication he’s been at pains to be clearer than he "as in the

book that the market can also be a force of high-modernist social flattening.

ut he has not )that ’m a"are of+ pushed the thought (ery far, or told his

readers much about "hen the market is that kind of force on its o)n, and

"hen it is so )hen <oined to state po)er. 'he cash nexus is a key instru-

ment of market homogeni4ation of the "orld8 it makes all things fungible

and countable by a common metric, "ith real costs and distortions to the

complexity of the social "orld. ut a recurring idea in Scott’s "ork has been

that peasants are forced into the cash nexus by ta collectors, and by state

officials )colonial and other"ise+ "ho seek a common metric for extracting

social resources. 'he great right angles of land in the !merican $id"est

that Scott uses in Seeing Like a State to sho" that commercial agriculture

is high modernist descend from the !merican imperial state pro:ects of ex-

propriation, resettlement, and con(ersion to agriculture from the ?orth-

"est *rdinance on"ard. ?o", an indefinitely spreading market in land in

itself homogeni4es it makes all land fungible. !nd the existence of a high

market price on my land creates pressure for me to sell, at "hate(er cost to

my local kno"ledge and customs. ut it does not pressure me in the same "ay that !merican ndians "ere pressured by the 7nion !rmy, and the dif-

ference seems to me morally (ery significant.

am sure that Scott is right that market and state alike can be homogeni4-

ing and reductionist forces. !nd am sure that states making !se o" mar-

kets can be especially thoroughgoing homogeni4ers. ut in his eagerness to

confirm that he is no simple cheerleader for the market, hope that Scott

does not lose the interest in agency and sensiti(ity to po"er that marks his

"ork. hope that he too distinguishes moments of state-market fusion,

"ith state actors deliberately flattening social facts in order to encourage

and make use of commercial "ealth, from market forces themsel(es, and

that if he thinks the latter’s homogeni4ing effects as destructi(e as the for-

mer’s, that he is careful to explain, ho", and "hen, and at "hose hands

and "ith "hat conse3uences for those "ho resist the homogeni4ation.


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Some Replies on Markets, Languages, andLaw

By James C. Scott

he Con%ersation

September 27, 2010

ha(e been struck by both the 3uality and breadth of the responses to

my essay and, it’s clear, to the argument in Seeing Like a State that

lies behind it. n some cases, am some"hat at a loss to reply inas-

much as am not an economist, not a "ell-read libertarian, not a po-

litical philosopher, and not a specialist on intellectual property and free-

dom.

6i(en these handicaps, let me try to bundle together a fe" repetiti(e

themes and at least try to clarify my position and, in some cases, to think

through possibilities had not addressed or en(isaged in my essay or in the

book.

"tandardi%ation and Poer

take the point that markets are inherently standardi4ing. also take the

point that kno"ledge is lost in the process and that there may be )e(en

massi(e+ gains in "ealth and emancipation. !s point out in Seeing Like a

State, the #in(ention& of the standardi4ed rench citoyen bearing e3ual

rights in place of the medie(al estates "as surely a great emancipation

though, as also point out, it also made possible, for the first time, the con-

scription for ?apoleon’s total "ar.

*ne might say that the commodity form of large-scale trade and capitalism

is the locus classicus of standardi4ation the standard bushel of "heat or

mai4e, the ingot of pig iron, the bolt of linen. $ore broadly, "ould en-

dorse olanyi’s argument that the factors of production so central to classi-

cal economics, land and labor, are the #commodity names& for natureRthe

en(ironment on the one hand and human life on the other. 'hey enter clas-sical economics only in their standardi=ed form of #acres& #factory hands,&

and so forth.

<hat "ould seem important to a libertarian, and not :ust a libertarian, is


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the "ay in "hich this standardi4ation comes about and, in particular, the

degree to "hich it is a coerci(e process. Judgments about coerci(eness are,

"ith some exceptions, not #either-or& 3uestions but matters of degree. 5et

me take three examples along the spectrum state-designated and created

ethnicity, common la", and language.

n the case of state-designated ethnicity, the process is generally highly co-

erci(e an official designation is made )e(en if it is originally a (oluntary

self-description+ and then it is fro4en and, depending on the circumstances,

the #ethnic& is then treated according to the regulations go(erning that cat-

egory. 'hus, "hen the =utch arri(ed in ata(ia, on the island of Ja(a, they

discerned a group "hom they called the #Chinese.& 'he people in 3uestion

do not describe themsel(es in this "ay. 'heir affiliations "ere fluid, and

their customs bled imperceptibly into the range of cultures around them.

?e(ertheless, the =utch, in their 5innaean mania, erected a Chinese 4one,

codified "hat they take to be its customary la", set up courts and schools

and police exclusi(ely for the Chinese, and appointed customary Chinese

headmen. 5o and behold, after QD years or so of being funneled into ethnic

traffic patterns, a once largely fictitious category became a li(ed identity. t

"as essentially a coerci(e, albeit slo"-motion process of state-created eth-

nic-fabrication that, at the end of the day, appears as an embraced identity.

Juridical racial hierarchies, as a group-creation process as found histori-

cally in South !frica and the 7nited States operate essentially this "ay.

'he standardi4ation of common la" seems to me to be an intermediate

case. t seems more open to inno(ation and ad:ustment from county magis-

trates, practice, and custom, although, o(er time, as precedents and deci-

sions accumulate, it becomes largely a recei(ed codification for subse3uent

generations, a codification open to ad:ustment only at the margin. !nd, of

course, the source of inno(ation is largely confined to elites )e(en if local+

and not the tenants and laborers, let alone the proletariat.

5anguage, it seems to me, is perhaps the best example, and one to "hich

/ayek himself referred, of a relati(ely un-coerci(e standardi4ation. 'he

grammarians, the !cademies, and the literati may aspire to control lan-

guage use but are generally unable to do so. 'he spoken language especially

remains open to all sorts of inno(ations "hich, if found expressi(e or use-

ful, #go (iral& and become part of the repertoire of speakers. 5anguage is


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not, of course, anything like a pure democracy but for something so stan-

dardi4ed it is a pretty good model of open-source soft"are that all speakers

may use and contribute to. 5ibertarians, and not :ust libertarians, might

aim for institutions that "ere more like languages and less like markets.

&hich Brings 'e to 'ar(ets

begin in an odd location banditry and coercion the plunderers rad

=e5ong refers to. am more familiar "ith "ater-borne banditry, that is,

"ith the early $alay States "hich "ere essentially piratical enterprises. !s

see it, they began (ying "ith other small bands of pirates to make them-

sel(es master of a choke point on a na(igable ri(er or strait in order to con-

trol the trade. *nce one band had established its supremacy )ignoring the

internal politics "ithin the band+ it "ould plunder the trade. 'he leaders

understood, or soon came to understand, that if they did not limit their

plunder they risked seeing the trade circum(ent them by taking another

route or, if there "as none, drying up altogether. 'he heads of the petty

$alay statelets therefore 3uickly became a protection racket, exacting a toll

from the passing trade and defending their monopoly profits and mer-

chants from competitors. 'hey might e(en encourage trade by competiti(e

exactions and treating all merchants e(en-handedly. 'he early maritime

state, in its elementary forms, looks (ery much like this toll collecting state.

'he typical pattern of early state expansion "as for a (ery successful chiefly

state of this kind to absorb its smaller neighbors, appointing their chiefs, in

effect as go(ernors in return for occasional tribute. <hy not8 "ere they not

already collecting taxes and go(erning the area, like a rudimentary state@

'he subsidiary chiefs themsel(es then became the sub:ect of a toll-collect-

ing protection racket "ith the threat that if they failed to deli(er tribute,

they "ould be dri(en out by their state-making patrons.

"ant to make the argument that, "ith the key exceptions that capitalist

enterprises actually produce goods and ser(ices and often fail to establish

effecti(e monopolies, much of their beha(ior is comparable. !lthough they

may arise in a competiti(e setting Obut let us ne(er forget that the great

aristocratic landed fortunes of 0ngland "ere made by office-holding not

trade capitalist firms are constantly stri(ing through collusion, lobbying,

legal maneu(ering, and (iolence to establish monopoly positions. 'hey


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stri(e mightily to transform uncertain and often small profits into rents

guaranteed by force, la" or influence at the enforcement stage )i.e. corrup-

tion+.

or pirates, narco-statelets, and early capitalism )e.g. >ockefeller+ the cur-

rency con(ertible to rents "as force, either the buying of police protection

or paramilitary forces operating often "ith the complicity of the state. n

more mature democracies, such brute force has been replaced by the influ-

ence on the media, on legislation, on regulatory agencies, on courts, and on

elected officials made possible by the accumulation of "ell nigh permanent

disparities in "ealth and purchased expertise. 'his is "hat !ntonio 6ram-

sci pointed to in his analysis of hegemony and "hy uni(ersal suffrage did

not bring about the re(olution by peaceful means in taly.

<here this disparity in financial "here"ithal is great, it accomplishes the

same alchemy as successful piracy it turns a competiti(e market of price-

takers into an oligopoly of price-gi(ers "ho, one might say, purchase their

secure rent-seeking opportunities by their enormous ad(antages as pur-

chasers of the policies they re3uire. ;es, they 3uarrel among themsel(es

)e(en 5enin sa" that+ and their ad(antages can be temporarily nullified by

economic crisis or "ar. ut the tendency to"ard the accumulation of these

strategic, positional resources by "ealth and property holders in mature

democracies seems undeniable.

'he market in such circumstances is, to be sure, as /ayek obser(ed, still a

form of tacit coordination that could not concei(ably be achie(ed by imper-

ati(e coordination. ut the positional ad(antage of some players is so o(er-

"helming and entrenched that the deck is stacked against the (ast ma:ority of economic actors and citi4ens. !s a colleague of mine is fond of saying, the

political system is run for the benefit of the top 1L of income earners )*2,

let’s e(en say ID+ and the trick of conser(ati(e consolidation is to use

some of the resources of this elite ID to make certain that the net thirty

percent of the income earners fear the bottom LD more than they en(y or

resent the top ID. Judging from public policy since at least the >eagan

era, this political hegemony is secure and its influence on legislation is fur-

ther buttressed by massi(e lobbying at the regulatory stage.

<ere a libertarian, think "ould find it hard to defend a market so


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ske"ed by large and seemingly permanent structural ine3uality. t makes a

sham of the ideal of free, (oluntary contracts "hen the playing field is so

une3ual. 'o take an extreme example, someone in ndia "ho decides to sell

a kidney or a child to a "ealthy family in order to buy food is, in the

strictest sense, making a (oluntary choice. ut "ho "ould not deplore the

structural ine3ualities that made such desperate choices necessary@

'he /ayekian case for the petty bourgeoisie, in competiti(e markets, is a

strong one8 it looks more like the case of language as sketched abo(e. am

not a /ayek scholar but "ould ask those "ho are "hat he has to say about

cases "here disparities in po"er and influence turn choice and mutual co-

ordination into something more akin to #an offer on can’t refuse.&

Digital 'edia and )nclosure

n the case 'imothy 5ee discusses, of media and the digital re(olution,

"onder if the concept of #enclosure& might not ser(e us "ell as a metaphor.

'he original enclosures in 0ngland "ere brought about by legal acts of ar-

liament )a body of substantial landholders, of course+, then enforced on the

ground by the police po"er and magistrates of the state. !re the large play-

ers in the media "orld not also identifying no(el property rights and then,

by dint of their grip on the legislati(e process and legal muscle, enclosing

them so they yield reliable rents protected by la"@ !s understand it, this

process has nothing to do "ith efficiency, let alone democracy. n addition

to their political hegemony, the deep pockets of the large players )$icro-

soft, !ma4on, 6oogle+ are such that they can simply buy out any upstart

that might e(en remotely threaten their position. 'his pattern gather is so

understood that many startups are de(ised precisely to make themsel(es at-

tracti(e to such a buyout.

Legibility Is 'orally $eutral

5et me close "ith t"o points on "hich am often misunderstood. am not

a defender of local kno"ledge and practice across the board. Such local

practices may and often do include forms of oppression and unfreedom. t

depends8 or as rad =e5ong says, #sometimes.& Second, legibility is a ca-

pacity and, as such, is not morally "orthy or un"orthy in and of itself. t

depends on the purpose for "hich it is used.


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seeing like a state_ a conversation with james c. scott _ cato unbound

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