security design 8 - concentric events · oakland federal building security design revised november...

8

Security Design

F A C I L I T I E S S T A N D A R D S F O R T H E P U B L I C B U I L D I N G S S E R V I C E

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8.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS8.0 TABLE OF CONTENTS

8.1 Planning and Cost231 Planning231 Zones of Protection232 Cost233 Site Planning and Landscape Design233 Vehicular Control234 Perimeter Vehicle Inspection234 Site Lighting234 Site Signage234 Landscaping

8.2 Architecture and Interior Design235 Planning236 Interior Construction237 Additional Features

8.3 New Construction239 Exterior Walls240 Exterior Windows

8.4 Existing Construction Modernization

8.5 Historic Buildings

8.6 Structural Engineering246 General Requirements248 Good Engineering Practice Guidelines

8.7 Mechanical Engineering250 Air System250 Utility Protection251 Smoke Control (Removal) Systems

8.8 Electrical Engineering252 Service and Distribution252 Power and Lighting252 Communications and Security Systems

8.9 Fire Protection Engineering253 Active System

8.10 Electronic Security255 Control Centers and

Building Management Systems255 Security for Utility Closets, Mechanical Rooms,

and Telephone Closets255 Monitoring255 Closed Circuit TV (CCTV)255 Duress Alarms or Assistance Stations

8.11 Parking Security257 Parking257 Parking Inside the Building257 Parking Facilities

8.12 Submission Requirements

S E C U R I T Y D E S I G N

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Capability to Increase or Decrease Security. Designsshould include the ability to increase security in responseto a heightened threat, as well as to reduce security ifchanges in risk warrant it.

Multidisciplinary Approach. Improving security is thebusiness of everyone involved with Federal facilitiesincluding designers, builders, operations and protectionpersonnel, employees, clients, and visitors. Professionalswho can contribute to implementing the criteria in thisdocument include architects and structural, mechanical,fire protection, security, cost, and electrical engineers.Blast engineers and glazing specialists may also berequired as well as building operations personnel andsecurity professionals experienced in physical securitydesign, operations, and risk assessment.

Each building system and element should support riskmitigation and reduce casualties, property damage, andthe loss of critical functions. Security should beconsidered in all decisions, from selecting architecturalmaterials to placing trash receptacles to designingredundant electrical systems.

Site Security Requirements. Site security requirements,including perimeter buffer zones, should be developedbefore a site is acquired and the construction fundingrequest is finalized. This requirement may be used toprevent the purchase of a site that lacks necessary features,especially sufficient setback, and to help reduce the needfor more costly countermeasures such as blast hardening.

Adjacent Sites. When warranted by a risk assessment,consideration should be given to acquiring adjacent sitesor negotiating for control of rights-of-way. Adjacent sitescan affect the security of Federal facilities.

8.1 Planning and Cost

PlanningSecurity must be an integral part of building and siteplanning, starting at the earliest phase and continuingthroughout the process. A multidisciplinary team willdetermine the appropriate design criteria for each project,based on a facility-specific risk assessment and an analysisof all available information on security considerations,constraints, and tenant needs.

In historic buildings, to minimize loss of character,design criteria should be based on facility-specific riskassessment and strategic programming. Strategic pro-gramming includes focusing security modifications onvulnerability points and locating less vulnerable activitiesin the historic buildings. All security/egress issues shall bediscussed with both GSA regional fire protection engineerand physical security specialists.

Zones of ProtectionA zoned protection system is used, with intensifying areasof security beginning at the site perimeter and moving tothe interior of the building.

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design(CPTED). CPTED techniques should be used to helpprevent and mitigate crime. Good strategic thinking onCPTED issues such as site planning, perimeter definition,sight lines, lighting, etc., can reduce the need for someengineering solutions.

For further information on CPTED, see:• Publications by the National Institute of Law

Enforcement and Criminal Justice (NILECJ).• Crowe, Timothy D., Crime Prevention Through

Environmental Design. National Crime PreventionInstitute (1991).


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Access Control and Electronic Security. Electronicsecurity, including surveillance, intrusion detection, andscreening, is a key element of facility protection; manyaspects of electronic security and the posting of securitypersonnel are adequately dealt with in other criteria andguideline documents. These criteria primarily addressaccess control planning - including aspects of stair andlobby design - because access control must be consideredwhen design concepts for a building are first conceived.While fewer options are available for modernizationprojects, some designs can be altered to consider futureaccess control objectives.

CostInitial Costs. When cost is not considered, one risk canconsume a disproportionate amount of the budget whileother risks may go unmitigated or not addressed at all.Budgets should match the requirements of the riskassessment. It is important that decision-makers knowfunding needs early so that they can request funding tofully implement the requirements of the risk assessment.Should projects be over budget, security, along with otherbuilding elements, may be reevaluated. However, ifsecurity is decreased, there should be compensatingoperational procedures and/or periodic reevaluation tosee if technology or procedures can mitigate the risk.

The security budget should be an output of a project-specific risk assessment. After the initial risk assessmenthas been conducted, a plan should outline securityrequirements for specific building systems. To facilitatefunding, cost control, and risk management, agenciesshould consider a work breakdown structure whichsummarizes security expenditures in a specific accountthat can be clearly identified and monitored throughout

Thomas Eagleton Courthouse, St. Louis, MO


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design phases. This can facilitate the allocation of thosefunds to countermeasures for project-specific risks. Forexample, funding crime prevention may be moreimportant than funding terrorist preventioncountermeasures for some projects.

Cost-Risk Analysis. Actual costs may be more or less thanbudgeted. This cost risk results from the need to predictbidding market costs years in advance, evolvingtechnology, changing risks, different countermeasures,and varying project conditions. The “Standard Practice forMeasuring Cost Risk of Buildings and Building Systems,”ASTM E 1946-98, may be used to manage cost risk.

Economic Analysis. A guide for selecting economicmethods to evaluate investments in buildings andbuilding systems can be found in ASTM E 1185-93. Twosuch economic practices are ASTM E 917-93 to measurelife-cycle costs, and ASTM E 1074-93 to measure neteconomic benefits. ASTM E 1765-95 provides a way toevaluate both qualitative and quantitative aspects ofsecurity in a single model.

Security’s life-cycle cost objective should be to minimizethe total cost of building ownership while simultaneouslyimproving a building’s efficiency. Total costs include allcosts incurred by the owner and users of a building. Whilegreat emphasis is often placed on meeting initial budget,scope, and schedule, these are only a small fraction of abuilding’s total life-cycle costs. Operations is a critical areawhere improved effectiveness and productivity can havethe greatest impact upon cost, performance, and missionaccomplishments. Serious consideration of life-cycle costsduring the initial project stages can greatly reduce totallife-cycle costs.

Site Planning and Landscape Design

IMPORTANT NOTE: The following criteria do NOT apply toall projects. Follow each criterion only if instructed to byyour project-specific risk assessment.

Many criteria are based on the recommendations of aspecific building risk assessment/threat analysis. Wherethe criteria include a blank or offer a choice ofapproaches, the recommendations from risk assessmentwill provide information for filling in the blank orsuggesting a choice of approaches.

Effective site planning and landscape design can enhancethe security of a facility and eliminate the need for someengineering solutions. Security considerations should bean integral part of all site planning, perimeter definition,lighting, and landscape decisions.

Vehicular ControlDistance. The preferred distance from a building tounscreened vehicles or parking is _____(project-specificinformation to be provided). Ways to achieve this distanceinclude creating a buffer zone using design features suchas street furniture and bollards that can function asbarriers; restricting vehicle access (see sections onPerimeter Parking Zone and Landscaping below, andChapter 9). See Chapter 2: Site Planning and LandscapeDesign, for fire department fire apparatus accessrequirements.


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Perimeter Protection Zone. Site perimeter barriers areone element of the perimeter protection zone. Perimeterbarriers capable of stopping vehicles of _______ lbs., upto a speed of ______, shall be installed (project-specificinformation to be provided). A vehicle velocity shall beused considering the angle of incidence in conjunctionwith the distance between the perimeter and the point atwhich a vehicle would likely be able to start a run at theperimeter. A barrier shall be selected that will stop thethreat vehicle. Army TM 5-853-1 and TM 5-853-2/AFMAN 32-1071, Volume 2 contain design procedures.In designing the barrier system, consider the followingoptions:

• Using various types and designs of buffers and barrierssuch as walls, fences, trenches, ponds and waterbasins, plantings, trees, static barriers, sculpture, andstreet furniture;

• Designing site circulation to prevent high speedapproaches by vehicles; and

• Offsetting vehicle entrances as necessary from thedirection of a vehicle’s approach to force a reduction inspeed.

Perimeter Vehicle Inspection

• Provide space for inspection at a location to bespecified.

• Provide design features for the vehicular inspectionpoint that stop vehicles, prevent them from leaving thevehicular inspection area, and prevent tailgating.

Site LightingEffective site lighting levels: At vehicular and pedestrianentrances, ____ (project-specific information to beprovided) horizontal maintained foot candles; and forperimeter and vehicular and pedestrian circulation areas,____ horizontal maintained foot candles. In mostcircumstances, perimeter lighting should be continuousand on both sides of the perimeter barriers, with minimalhot and cold spots and sufficient to support CCTV andother surveillance. However, for safety reasons and/or forissues related to camera technology, lower levels may bedesirable. Other codes or standards may restrict sitelighting levels.

Site SignageConfusion over site circulation, parking, and entrancelocations can contribute to a loss of site security. Signsshould be provided off site and at entrances; there shouldbe on-site directional, parking, and cautionary signs forvisitors, employees, service vehicles, and pedestrians.Unless required by other standards, signs should generallynot be provided that identify sensitive areas.

LandscapingLandscaping design elements that are attractive andwelcoming can enhance security. For example, plants candeter unwanted entry; ponds and fountains can blockvehicle access; and site grading can also limit access. Avoidlandscaping that permits concealment of criminals orobstructs the view of security personnel and CCTV, inaccordance with accepted CPTED principles.

Oakland Federal Building


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8.2 Architecture and Interior Design



PlanningOffice Locations. Offices of vulnerable officials should beplaced or glazed so that the occupant cannot be seen froman uncontrolled public area such as a street. Wheneverpossible, these offices should face courtyards, internalsites, or controlled areas. If this is not possible, suitableobscuring glazing or window treatment shall be provided,including ballistic resistant glass (see section on NewConstruction, Exterior Windows, Additional GlazingRequirements), blast curtains, or other interior protectionsystems.

Mixed Occupancies. When possible, high-risk tenantsshould not be housed with low-risk tenants. If they arehoused together, publicly accessible areas should beseparated from high-risk tenants.

Public Toilets and Service Areas. Public toilets, servicespaces, or access to vertical circulation systems should notbe located in any non-secure areas, including the queuingarea before screening at the public entrance.


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Loading Docks and Shipping and Receiving Areas.Loading docks and receiving and shipping areas should beseparated by at least 50 feet in any direction from utilityrooms, utility mains, and service entrances includingelectrical, telephone/data, fire detection/alarm systems,fire suppression water mains, cooling and heating mains,etc. Loading docks should be located so that vehicles willnot be driven into or parked under the building. If this isnot possible, the service shall be hardened for blast.

Retail in the Lobby. Retail and other mixed uses, whichare encouraged by the Public Buildings Cooperative UseAct of 1976, create public buildings that are open andinviting. While important to the public nature of thebuildings, the presence of retail and other mixed uses maypresent a risk to the building and its occupants andshould be carefully considered on a project specific basisduring the risk assessment process. Retail and mixed usesmay be accommodated through such means as separatingentryways, controlling access, and hardening sharedpartitions, as well as through special security operationalcountermeasures.

Stairwells. Stairwells required for emergency egressshould be located as remotely as possible from areaswhere blast events might occur. Wherever possible, stairsshould not discharge into lobbies, parking, or loadingareas.

Mailroom. The mailroom should be located away fromfacility main entrances, areas containing critical services,utilities, distribution systems, and important assets. Inaddition, the mailroom should be located at the perimeterof the building with an outside wall or window designedfor pressure relief. It should have adequate space forexplosive disposal containers. An area near the loadingdock may be a preferred mailroom location.

Interior ConstructionLobby Doors and Partitions. Doors and walls along theline of security screening should meet requirements ofUL752 Level___(project-specific information to beprovided).

Critical Building Components. The following criticalbuilding components should be located no closer than___ feet in any direction to any main entrance, vehiclecirculation, parking, or maintenance area (project-specificinformation to be provided). If this is not possible, hardenas appropriate:

• Emergency generator including fuel systems, day tank,fire sprinkler, and water supply;

• Normal fuel storage;• Main switchgear;• Telephone distribution and main switchgear;• Fire pumps;• Building control centers;• UPS systems controlling critical functions;• Main refrigeration systems if critical to building

operation;• Elevator machinery and controls;• Shafts for stairs, elevators, and utilities;• Critical distribution feeders for emergency power.

Exterior Entrances. The entrance design must balanceaesthetic, security, risk, and operational considerations.One strategy is to consider co-locating public andemployee entrances. Entrances should be designed toavoid significant queuing. If queuing will occur within thebuilding footprint, the area should be enclosed in blast-resistant construction. If queuing is expected outside thebuilding, a rain cover should be provided.

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Forced Entry. See section on Exterior Walls for swingingdoor, horizontal sliding door, and wall criteria. See sectionon Structural Engineering, New Construction, ExteriorWindows for window criteria.

Equipment Space. Public and employee entrances shouldinclude space for possible future installation of accesscontrol and screening equipment. In historic buildingsplace security equipment in ancillary spaces wherepossible.

Entrance Co-location. Combine public and employeeentrances.

Garage and Vehicle Service Entrances. All garage orservice area entrances for government controlled oremployee permitted vehicles that are not otherwiseprotected by site perimeter barriers shall be protected bydevices capable of arresting a vehicle of the designatedthreat size at the designated speed. This criterion may belowered if the access circumstances prohibit a vehiclefrom reaching this speed (see section on Site Planning andLandscape Design, Vehicular Control, Perimeter ProtectionZone).

Additional FeaturesAreas of Potential Concealment. To reduce the potentialfor concealment of devices before screening points, avoidinstalling features such as trash receptacles and mail boxesthat can be used to hide devices. If mail or express boxesare used, the size of the openings should be restricted toprohibit insertion of packages.

Roof Access. Design locking systems to meet therequirements of NFPA 101 and limit roof access toauthorized personnel.

Sam Gibbons U.S. Courthouse, Tampa, FL


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structural members beyond this localized damage zone(i.e., the loss of additional columns, main girders, etc.).This does not preclude the additional loss of secondarystructural or non-structural elements outside the initialzone of localized damage, provided the loss of suchmembers is acceptable for that performance level and theloss does not precipitate the onset of progressive collapse.

Building Materials. All building materials and typesacceptable under model building codes are allowed.However, special consideration should be given tomaterials which have inherent ductility and which arebetter able to respond to load reversals (i.e., cast in placereinforced concrete and steel construction). Carefuldetailing is required for material such as pre-stressedconcrete, pre-cast concrete, and masonry to adequatelyrespond to the design loads. The construction typeselected must meet all performance criteria of thespecified Level of Protection.

Exterior Walls Design for limited load:

• Design exterior walls for the actual pressures andimpulses up to a maximum of ___ psi and ___ psi-msec(project-specific information to be provided).

• The designer should also ensure that the walls arecapable of withstanding the dynamic reactions from thewindows.

• Shear walls that are essential to the lateral and verticalload bearing system, and that also function as exteriorwalls, shall be considered primary structures. Designexterior shear walls to resist the actual blast loadspredicted from the threats specified.

• Where exterior walls are not designed for the fulldesign loads, special consideration shall be given toconstruction types that reduce the potential for injury(see Building Materials in this section).

8.3 New Construction

Progressive Collapse1. Designs that facilitate or arevulnerable to progressive collapse must be avoided. At aminimum, all new facilities shall be designed for the lossof a column for one floor above grade at the buildingperimeter without progressive collapse. This design andanalysis requirement for progressive collapse is not part ofa blast analysis. It is intended to ensure adequateredundant load paths in the structure should damageoccur for whatever reason. Designers may apply staticand/or dynamic methods of analysis to meet thisrequirement. Ultimate load capacities may be assumed inthe analyses.

In recognition that a larger than design explosive (orother) event may cause a partial collapse of the structure,new facilities with a defined threat shall be designed witha reasonable probability that, if local damage occurs, thestructure will not collapse or be damaged to an extentdisproportionate to the original cause of the damage.

In the event of an internal explosion in an uncontrolledpublic ground floor area, the design shall preventprogressive collapse due to the loss of one primarycolumn, or the designer shall show that the proposeddesign precludes such a loss. That is, if columns are sized,reinforced, or protected so that the threat charge will notcause the column to be critically damaged, thenprogressive collapse calculations are not required for theinternal event. For design purposes, assume there is noadditional standoff from the column beyond what ispermitted by the design.

Discussion: As an example, if an explosive event causesthe local failure of one column and major collapse withinone structural bay, a design mitigating progressivecollapse would preclude the additional loss of primary



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Design for full load:

• Design the exterior walls to resist the actual pressuresand impulses acting on the exterior wall surfaces fromthe threats defined for the facility (see alsodiscussions in Design for limited load above).

Forced Entry:

• Security of Swinging Door Assemblies ASTM F 476Grade ____ (project-specific information to beprovided).

• Measurement of Forced Entry Resistance of HorizontalSliding Door Assemblies ASTM F 842 Grade ___(project-specific information to be provided).

• A medium protection level (per TM 5-853) for wallswould be the equivalent of 4” concrete with #5reinforcing steel at 6” interval each way or 8” CMUwith #4 reinforcing steel at 8 in. interval. TM 5-853provides other alternatives for low, medium, and highprotection.

Exterior Windows The following terms are to be applied and identified foreach project-specific risk assessment:

No restriction. No restrictions on the type of glazing.

Limited protection. These windows do not requiredesign for specific blast pressure loads. Rather, thedesigner is encouraged to use glazing materials anddesigns that minimize the potential risks.

• Preferred systems include: thermally tempered heatstrengthened or annealed glass with a security filminstalled on the interior surface and attached to theframe; laminated thermally tempered, laminated heatstrengthened, or laminated annealed glass; and blastcurtains.

• Acceptable systems include thermally tempered glass;and thermally tempered, heat strengthened orannealed glass with film installed on the interiorsurface (edge to edge, wet glazed, or daylightinstallations are acceptable).

• Unacceptable systems include untreated monolithicannealed or heat strengthened glass; and wire glass.

The minimum thickness of film that should beconsidered is 4 mil. In a blast environment, glazing caninduce loads three or more times that of conventionalloads onto the frames. This must be considered with theapplication of anti-shatter security film.

The designer should design the window frames so thatthey do not fail prior to the glazing under lateral load.Likewise, the anchorage should be stronger than thewindow frame, and the supporting wall should bestronger than the anchorage.

The design strength of a window frame and associatedanchorage is related to the breaking strength of theglazing. Thermally tempered glass is roughly four timesas strong as annealed, and heat strengthened glass isroughly twice as strong as annealed.

Design up to specified load. Window systems design(glazing, frames, anchorage to supporting walls, etc.) onthe exterior facade should be balanced to mitigate thehazardous effects of flying glazing following an explosiveevent. The walls, anchorage, and window framing shouldfully develop the capacity of the glazing material selected.

The designer may use a combination of methods such asgovernment produced and sponsored computerprograms (e.g., WINLAC, GLASTOP, SAFEVU, andBLASTOP/WINGUARD) coupled with test data andrecognized dynamic structural analysis techniques toshow that the glazing either survives the specified threats



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While most test data use glazing framed with a deep bite,this may not be amenable to effective glazing performanceor installation. It has been demonstrated that new glazingsystems with a 3/4-inch minimum bite can be engineeredto meet the performance standards of Table 8-2 with theapplication of structural silicone. However, not muchinformation is available on the long-term performance ofglazing attached by structural silicone or with anchoredsecurity films.

or the post damage performance of the glazing protectsthe occupants in accordance with the conditions specifiedhere (Table 8-1). When using such methods, the designermay consider a breakage probability no higher than 750breaks per 1000 when calculating loads to frames andanchorage.

Table 8-1Glazing Protection Levels Based on Fragment Impact LocationsPerformance Protection Hazard Condition Level Level Description of Window Glazing Response

1 Safe None Glazing does not break. No visible damage to glazing or frame.

2 Very High None Glazing cracks but is retained by the frame. Dusting or very smallfragments near sill or on floor acceptable.

3a High Very Low Glazing cracks. Fragments enter space and land on floor no further than 3.3 ft. from the window.

3b High Low Glazing cracks. Fragments enter space and land on floor no further than 10 ft. from the window.

4 Medium Medium Glazing cracks. Fragments enter space and land on floor andimpact a vertical witness panel at a distance of no more than 10 ft.from the window at a height no greater than 2 ft. above the floor.

5 Low High Glazing cracks and window system fails catastrophically.Fragments enter space impacting a vertical witness panel at adistance of no more than 10 ft. from the window at a height greater than 2 ft. above the floor.

* In conditions 2, 3a, 3b, 4 and 5, glazing fragments may be thrown to the outside of the protected space toward the detonation location.



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All glazing hazard reduction products for these protectionlevels require product-specific test results and engineeringanalyses performed by qualified independent agentsdemonstrating the performance of the product under thespecified blast loads, and stating that it meets or exceedsthe minimum performance required. Performance levelsare based on the protection conditions presented in Table8-2. A Government-provided database indicating theperformance of a wide variety of products will be madeavailable to the designer.

• Window Fenestration: The total fenestration openingsare not limited; however, a maximum of 40 percent perstructural bay is a preferred design goal.

• Window Frames: The frame system should develop thefull capacity of the chosen glazing up to 750 breaks per1000, and provide the required level of protectionwithout failure. This can be shown through designcalculations or approved testing methods.

• Anchorage: The anchorage should remain attached tothe walls of the facility during an explosive eventwithout failure. Capacity of the anchorage system canbe shown through design calculations or approvedtests that demonstrate that failure of the proposedanchorage will not occur and that the requiredperformance level is provided.

Glazing alternatives. Glazing alternatives are as follows:

• Preferred systems include: thermally tempered glasswith a security film installed on the interior surface andattached to the frame; laminated thermally tempered,laminated heat strengthened, or laminated annealedglass; and blast curtains.

• Acceptable systems include monolithic thermallytempered glass with or without film if the pane isdesigned to withstand the full design threat (seeCondition 1 on Table 8-2).

• Unacceptable systems include untreated monolithicannealed or heat-strengthened glass; and wire glass.

In general, thicker anti-shatter security films providehigher levels of hazard mitigation than thinner films.Testing has shown that a minimum of a 7 mil thick film,or specially manufactured 4 mil thick film, is the minimumto provide hazard mitigation from blast. The minimumfilm thickness that should be considered is 4 mil.

Table 8-2Test Structure

1, 2 5

43b3a 2 ft

3.3 ft

10 ft

Test window should be in the designposition or centered on the wall.

Side view of test structure illustratingperformance conditions of Table 8-1

Robert C. Byrd Courthouse, Charlston, WV



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Not all windows in a public facility can reasonably bedesigned to resist the full forces expected from the designblast threats. As a minimum, design window systems(glazing, frames, and anchorage) to achieve the specifiedperformance conditions (Table 8-2) for the actual blastpressure and impulse acting on the windows up to amaximum of ___ psi and ___ psi-msec. As a minimumgoal, the window systems should be designed so that atleast __ percent of the total glazed areas of the facilitymeet the specified performance conditions whensubjected to the defined threats (project-specificinformation to be provided).

In some cases, it may be beneficial and economicallyfeasible to select a glazing system that demonstrates ahigher, safer performance condition. Where tests indicatethat one design will perform better at significantly higherloads, that design could be given greater preference.

Where peak pressures from the design explosive threatscan be shown to be below 1 psi acting on the face of thebuilding, the designer may use the reduced requirementsof Exterior Walls, Limited Protection, in this section.

Additional Glazing Requirements:

• Ballistic windows, if required, shall meet therequirements of UL 752 Bullet-Resistant Glazing Level___ (project-specific information to be provided). Glass-clad polycarbonate or laminated polycarbonate are twotypes of acceptable glazing material.

• Security glazing, if required, shall meet therequirements of ASTM F1233 or UL 972, BurglaryResistant Glazing Material.

This glazing should meet the minimum performancespecified in Table 8-2. However, special considerationshould be given to frames and anchorages for ballistic-resistant windows and security glazing since their inherent



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• The designer shall implement architectural or structuralfeatures that deny contact with exposed primaryvertical load members in these areas. A minimumstandoff of at least 6 inches from these members isrequired.

• Primary vertical load carrying members shall bedesigned to resist the effects of the specified threat(see Progressive Collapse in this section).

Loading Docks. The loading dock design should limitdamage to adjacent areas and vent explosive force to theexterior of the building. Significant structural damage tothe walls and ceiling of the loading dock is acceptable.However, the areas adjacent to the loading dock shouldnot experience severe structural damage or collapse. Thefloor of the loading dock does not need to be designed forblast resistance if the area below is not occupied andcontains no critical utilities.

Mailrooms and Unscreened Retail Spaces. Mailroomswhere packages are received and opened for inspection,and unscreened retail spaces (see Architecture and InteriorDesign, Planning, Retail in the Lobby and Mailroom) shallbe designed to mitigate the effects of a blast on primaryvertical or lateral bracing members. Where these roomsare located in occupied areas or adjacent to criticalutilities, walls, ceilings, and floors, they should be blastand fragment resistant. Significant structural damage tothe walls, ceilings, and floors of the mailroom isacceptable. However, the areas adjacent to the mailroomshould not experience severe damage or collapse.

Venting. The designer should consider methods tofacilitate the venting of explosive forces and gases fromthe interior spaces to the outside of the structure.Examples of such methods include the use of blow-outpanels and window system designs that provide protectionfrom blast pressure applied to the outside but that readilyfail and vent if exposed to blast pressure on the inside.

resistance to blast may impart large reaction loads to thesupporting walls.

• Resistance of Window Assemblies to Forced Entry(excluding glazing) ASTM F 588 Grade___ (project-specific information to be provided; see above forglazing).

• Design for eavesdropping and electronic emanations isbeyond the scope of the criteria.

Non-Window Openings. Non-window openings such asmechanical vents and exposed plenums should bedesigned to the level of protection required for theexterior wall. Designs should account for potential in-filling of blast over-pressures through such openings. Thedesign of structural members and all mechanical systemmountings and attachments should resist these interior fillpressures.

Interior Windows. Interior glazing should be minimizedwhere a threat exists. The designer should avoid locatingcritical functions next to high risk areas with glazing, suchas lobbies, loading docks, etc.

Parking. The following criteria apply to parking inside afacility where the building superstructure is supported bythe parking structure:

• The designer shall protect primary vertical loadcarrying members by implementing architectural orstructural features that provide a minimum 6-inchstandoff.

• All columns in the garage area shall be designed for anunbraced length equal to two floors, or three floorswhere there are two levels of parking.

Selected Design Areas. For lobbies and other areas withspecified threats:

Edward T. Gignoux U.S. Courthouse, Portland, ME


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8.4 Existing ConstructionModernization

Existing structures undergoing a modernization should beupgraded to new construction requirements whenrequired by the risk assessment except where noted inProgressive Collapse, below. The requirements of newconstruction apply to all major additions and structuralmodifications.

Protection Levels. Risk assessments based on the newconstruction criteria shall be performed on existingstructures to examine the feasibility of upgrading thefacility. The results, including at a minimumrecommendations and cost, shall be documented in awritten report before submission for project funding.

Progressive Collapse. Existing buildings will not beretrofitted to prevent progressive collapse unless they areundergoing a structural renovation, such as a seismicupgrade.

Prior to the submission for funding, all structures shall beanalyzed according to requirements for new construction,and a written report shall clearly state the potentialvulnerability of the building to progressive collapse. Thisreport will be used as a planning tool to reduce risk.Findings of the design-analysis shall be incorporated intothe project’s risk assessment and include the methodology,the details of the progressive collapse analysis, retrofitrecommendations, cost estimates, and supportingcalculations.

8.5 Historic Buildings

Historic buildings are covered by these criteria in thesame manner as other existing buildings (see ExistingConstruction Modernization in this section).


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General RequirementsDesigner Qualifications. For buildings designed to meetMedium or Higher Protection Levels, a blast engineermust be included as a member of the design team. He/sheshould have formal training in structural dynamics, anddemonstrated experience with accepted design practicesfor blast resistant design and with referenced technicalmanuals.

Design Narratives. A design narrative and copies ofdesign calculations shall be submitted at each phaseidentifying the building-specific implementation of thecriteria. Security requirements should be integrated intothe overall building design starting with the planningphase.

Compliance. Full compliance with the risk assessmentand this chapter is expected. Specific requirements shouldbe in accordance with the findings of the facility riskassessment.

New Techniques. Alternative analysis and mitigationmethods are permitted, provided that the performancelevel is attained. A peer group should evaluate new anduntested methods.

Methods and References. All building componentsrequiring blast resistance shall be designed usingestablished methods and approaches for determiningdynamic loads, structural detailing, and dynamicstructural response. Design and analysis approachesshould be consistent with those in the technical manuals(TMs) below.

8.6 Structural Engineering



The intent of these criteria is to reduce the potential forwidespread catastrophic structural damage and theresulting injury to people. The designer should exercisegood judgment when applying these criteria to ensure theintegrity of the structure, and to obtain the greatest levelof protection practical given the project constraints. Thereis no guarantee that specific structures designed inaccordance with this document will achieve the desiredperformance. However, the application of the criteria willenhance structural performance if the design events occur.

There are three basic approaches to blast resistant design:blast loads can be reduced, primarily by increasingstandoff; a facility can be strengthened; or higher levels ofrisk can be accepted. The best answer is often a blend ofthe three.

The field of protective design is the subject of intenseresearch and testing. These criteria will be updated andrevised as new information about material and structuralresponse is made available.

Refer to Chapter 4: Structural Engineering, for additionalrelated information.


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The following are primary TMs (see Good EngineeringPractice Guidelines, Item 18, in this section for additionalreferences):

• Air Force Engineering and Services Center. ProtectiveConstruction Design Manual, ESL-TR-87-57. Preparedfor Engineering and Services Laboratory, Tyndall AirForce Base, FL. (1989)

• U.S. Department of the Army. Fundamentals ofProtective Design for Conventional Weapons,TM 5- 855-1. Washington, DC, Headquarters, U.S.Department of the Army. (1986)

• U.S. Department of the Army. Security Engineering, TM5-853 and Air Force AFMAN 32-1071, Volumes 1, 2, 3,and 4. Washington, DC, Departments of the Army andAir Force. (1994)

• U.S. Department of the Army. Structures to Resist theEffects of Accidental Explosions, Army TM 5-1300, NavyNAVFAC P-397, AFR 88-2. Washington, DC,Departments of the Army, Navy and Air Force. (1990)

• U.S. Department of Energy. A Manual for the Prediction of Blast and Fragment Loading on Structures,DOE/TIC 11268. Washington, DC, Headquarters, U.S.Department of Energy. (1992)

Structural and Non-Structural Elements. To addressblast, the priority for upgrades should be based on therelative importance of a structural or non-structuralelement, in the order defined below:

• Primary Structural Elements - the essential parts of thebuilding’s resistance to catastrophic blast loads andprogressive collapse, including columns, girders, roofbeams, and the main lateral resistance system;

• Secondary Structural Elements - all other load bearingmembers, such as floor beams, slabs, etc.;

• Primary Non-Structural Elements - elements (includingtheir attachments) which are essential for life safetysystems or elements which can cause substantialinjury if failure occurs, including ceilings or heavysuspended mechanical units; and

• Secondary Non-Structural Elements - all elements notcovered in primary non-structural elements, such aspartitions, furniture, and light fixtures.

Priority should be given to the critical elements that areessential to mitigating the extent of collapse. Designs forsecondary structural elements should minimize injuryand damage. Consideration should also be given toreducing damage and injury from primary as well assecondary non-structural elements.

Loads and Stresses. Where required, structures shall bedesigned to resist blast loads. The demands on thestructure will be equal to the combined effects of dead,live , and blast loads. Blast loads or dynamic rebound mayoccur in directions opposed to typical gravity loads.

For purposes of designing against progressive collapse,loads shall be defined as dead load plus a realistic estimateof actual live load. The value of the live load may be aslow as 25 percent of the code-prescribed live load.

The design should use ultimate strengths with dynamicenhancements based on strain rates. Allowable responsesare generally post elastic.


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Good Engineering Practice GuidelinesThe following are rules of thumb commonly used tomitigate the effects of blast on structures. Details andmore complete guidance are available in the TechnicalManuals listed in the New Techniques, Methods andReferences section, and in the references below. Thefollowing guidelines are not meant to be complete, but areprovided to assist the designer in the initial evaluationand selection of design approaches.

For higher levels of protection from blast, cast-in-placereinforced concrete is normally the construction type ofchoice. Other types of construction such as properlydesigned and detailed steel structures are also allowed.Several material and construction types, while notdisallowed by these criteria, may be undesirable anduneconomical for protection from blast.

• To economically provide protection from blast, inelasticor post elastic design is standard. This allows thestructure to absorb the energy of the explosion throughplastic deformation while achieving the objective ofsaving lives. To design and analyze structures for blastloads, which are highly nonlinear both spatially andtemporally, it is essential that proper dynamic analysismethods be used. Static analysis methods will generallyresult in unachievable or uneconomical designs.

• The designer should recognize that components mightact in directions for which they are not designed. Thisis due to the engulfment of structural members by blast,the negative phase, the upward loading of elements,and dynamic rebound of members. Making steelreinforcement (positive and negative faces) symmetricin all floor slabs, roof slabs, walls, beams and girderswill address this issue. Symmetric reinforcement alsoincreases the ultimate load capacity of the members.

Protection Levels. The entire building structure orportions of the structure will be assigned a protectionlevel according to the facility-specific risk assessment.Protection levels for ballistics and forced entry aredescribed in New Construction in this section. Thefollowing are definitions of damage to the structure andexterior wall systems from the bomb threat for eachprotection level:

• Low and Medium/Low Level Protection - Majordamage. The facility or protected space will sustain ahigh level of damage without progressive collapse.Casualties will occur and assets will be damaged.Building components, including structural members,will require replacement, or the building may becompletely unrepairable, requiring demolition andreplacement.

• Medium Level Protection - Moderate damage,repairable. The facility or protected space will sustain asignificant degree of damage, but the structure shouldbe reusable. Some casualties may occur and assetsmay be damaged. Building elements other than majorstructural members may require replacement.

• Higher Level Protection - Minor damage, repairable.The facility or protected space may globally sustainminor damage with some local significant damagepossible. Occupants may incur some injury, and assetsmay receive minor damage.

U.S. Census Bureau, Bowie, MD


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• Redundancy and alternative load paths are generallygood in mitigating blast loads. One method ofaccomplishing this is to use two-way reinforcementschemes where possible.

• In general, column spacing should be minimized so thatreasonably sized members can be designed to resistthe design loads and increase the redundancy of thesystem. A practical upper level for column spacing isgenerally 30 ft. for the levels of blast loads describedherein.

• In general, floor to floor heights should be minimized.Unless there is an overriding architectural requirement,a practical limit is generally less than or equal to 16 ft.

• Lap splices should fully develop the capacity of thereinforcement.

• Lap splices and other discontinuities should bestaggered.

• Ductile detailing should be used for connections,especially primary structural member connections.

• There should be control of deflections around certainmembers, such as windows, to prevent prematurefailure. Additional reinforcement is generally required.

• Balanced design of all building structural componentsis desired. For example, for window systems, the frameand anchorage shall be designed to resist the fullcapacity of the weakest element of the system.

• Special shear reinforcement including ties and stirrupsis generally required to allow large post-elastic behavior.The designer should carefully balance the selection ofsmall but heavily reinforced (i.e., congested) sectionswith larger sections with lower levels of reinforcement.

• Connections for steel construction should be ductileand develop as much moment connection as practical.Connections for cladding and exterior walls to steelframes shall develop the capacity of the wall systemunder blast loads.

• In general, single point failures that can cascade,producing wide spread catastrophic collapse, are to beavoided. A prime example is the use of transfer beamsand girders that, if lost, may cause progressive collapseand are therefore highly discouraged.


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• It is recommended that the designer use fully groutedand reinforced CMU construction in cases where CMUis selected.

• It is essential that the designer actively coordinatestructural requirements for blast with other disciplinesincluding architectural and mechanical.

• The use of one-way wall elements spanning from floor-to-floor is generally a preferred method to minimizeblast loads imparted to columns.

• In many cases, the ductile detailing requirements forseismic design and the alternate load paths provided byprogressive collapse design assist in the protection fromblast. The designer must bear in mind, however, thatthe design approaches are at times in conflict. Theseconflicts must be worked out on a case by case basis.

The following additional references are recommended:• Biggs, John M. Introduction to Structural Dynamics.

McGraw-Hill. (1964).• The Institute of Structural Engineers. The Structural

Engineer’s Response to Explosive Damage. SETO, Ltd., 11Upper Belgrave Street, London SW1X8BH. (1995).

• Mays, G.S. and Smith, P.D. Blast Effects on Buildings:Design of Buildings to Optimize Resistance to BlastLoading. Thomas Telford Publications, 1 Heron Quay,London E14 4JD. (1995).

• National Research Council. Protecting Buildings fromBomb Damage. National Academy Press. (1995).

8.7 Mechanical Engineering



The mechanical system should continue the operation ofkey life safety components following an incident. Thecriteria focus on locating components in less vulnerableareas, limiting access to mechanical systems, andproviding a reasonable amount of redundancy.

Air System Air Intakes. On buildings of more than four stories,locate intakes on the fourth floor or higher. On buildingsof three stories or less, locate intakes on the roof or ashigh as practical. Locating intakes high on a wall ispreferred over a roof location.

Utility ProtectionUtilities and Feeders. Utility systems should be located atleast 50 feet from loading docks, front entrances, andparking areas.

Incoming Utilities. Within building and property lines,incoming utility systems should be concealed and givenblast protection, including burial or proper encasementwherever possible (see section on Electrical Engineering,Service and Distribution, Utilities and Feeders).

Philadelphia Veterans Center


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Smoke Control (Removal) Systems Smoke Evacuation. In the event of a blast, the availablesmoke removal system may be essential to smoke removal,particularly in large, open spaces. This equipment shouldbe located away from high risk areas such as loadingdocks and garages. The system controls and power wiringto the equipment should be protected. The system shouldbe connected to emergency power to provide smokeremoval.

The designer should consider having separate HVACsystems in lobbies, loading docks, and other locationswhere the significant risk of internal event exists.

Smoke removal equipment should be provided withstand-alone local control panels that can continue toindividually function in the event the control wiring issevered from the main control system.

During an interior bombing event, smoke removal andcontrol is of paramount importance. The designer shouldconsider the fact that if window glazing is hardened, ablast may not blow out windows, and smoke may betrapped in the building.

8.8

IMPORTANT NOTE: The following criteria do NOT applyto all projects. Follow each criterion only if instructed toby your project-specific risk assessment.


The major security functions of the electrical system areto maintain power to essential building services,especially those required for life safety and evacuation;provide lighting and surveillance to deter criminal

8.8 Electrical Engineering


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activities; and provide emergency communication (seesection on Architecture and Interior Design, InteriorConstruction, Critical Building Components, for location ofcritical building components).

Service and DistributionDistributed Emergency Power. Emergency and normalelectric panels, conduits, and switchgear should beinstalled separately, at different locations, and as far apartas possible. Electric distribution should also run atseparate locations.

Normal Fuel Storage. The main fuel storage should belocated away from loading docks, entrances, and parking.Access should be restricted and protected (e.g., locks oncaps and seals).

Emergency Fuel Storage. The day tank should bemounted near the generator, given the same protection asthe generator (see section on Emergency Generator,below), and sized to store approximately _____ hours offuel (project-specific information to be provided). Abattery and/or UPS could serve a smaller building orleased facility.

Tertiary Power. Conduit and line can be installed outsideto allow a trailer-mounted generator to connect to thebuilding’s electrical system. If tertiary power is required,other methods include generators and feeders fromalternative substations.

Emergency Generator. The emergency generator shouldbe located away from loading docks, entrances, andparking. More secure locations include the roof, protectedgrade level, and protected interior areas. The generatorshould not be located in any areas that are prone toflooding.

Utilities and Feeders. Utility systems should be locatedaway from loading docks, entrances, and parking.Underground service is preferred. Alternatively, they canbe hardened.

Power and LightingSite Lighting. Site lighting should be coordinated with theCCTV system.

Restrooms. Emergency power should be provided foremergency lighting in restrooms.

Communications and Security SystemsRedundant Communications:

• The facility could have a second telephone service tomaintain communications in case of an incident.

• A base radio communication system with antennashould be installed in the stairwell, and portable setsdistributed on floors. This is the preferred alternative.

Radio Telemetry. Distributed antennas could be locatedthroughout the facility if required for emergencycommunication through wireless transmission of data.

Alarm and Information Systems. Alarm and informationsystems should not be collected and mounted in a singleconduit, or even co-located. Circuits to various parts ofthe building shall be installed in at least two directionsand/or risers. Low voltage signal and control copperconductors should not share conduit with high voltagepower conductors. Fiber-optic conductors are generallypreferred over copper.

Empty Conduits. Empty conduits and power outlets canbe provided for possible future installation of securitycontrol equipment.


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Active SystemWater Supply. The fire protection water system should beprotected from single point failure in case of a blast event.The incoming line should be encased, buried, or located50 ft. away from high threat areas. The interior mainsshould be looped and sectionalized.

Dual Fire Pumps: Electric and Diesel. To increase thereliability of the fire protection system in strategiclocations, a dual pump arrangement could be considered,with one electric pump and one diesel pump. The pumpsshould be located apart from each other.

Egress Door Locks. All security locking arrangements ondoors used for egress must comply with requirements ofNFPA 101, Life Safety Code.

8.9 Fire Protection Engineering



The fire protection system inside the building shouldmaintain life safety protection after an incident and allowfor safe evacuation of the building when appropriate.

While fire protection systems are designed to perform wellduring fires, they are not traditionally designed to survivebomb blast. The three components of the fire protectionsystem are:

1. active features, including sprinklers, fire alarms, smokecontrol, etc.;

2. passive features, including fire resistant barriers; and 3. operational features, including system maintenance

and employee training.

See Chapter 7 for additional information.

Martin Luther King Courthouse, Newark, NJ


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8.10 Electronic Security

IMPORTANT NOTE: The following criteria do NOT applyto all projects. Follow each criterion only if instructed toby your project-specific risk assessment.



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The purpose of electronic security is to improve thereliability and effectiveness of life safety systems, securitysystems, and building functions. When possible,accommodations should be made for future developmentsin security systems.

This chapter is not a design guide for electronic securitysystems. The following criteria are only intended to stressthose concepts and practices that warrant special attentionto enhance public safety. Please consult design guidespertinent to your specific project for detailed informationabout electronic security (see section on Architecture andInterior Design, Interior Construction, Critical BuildingComponents for location of critical building components).

Control Centers and Building Management SystemsOperational Control Center (OCC), Fire CommandCenter (FCC), and Security Control Center (SCC):

• The SCC and OCC may be co-located. If co-located, thechain of command should be carefully pre-planned toensure the most qualified leadership is in control forspecific types of events.

• Provide secure information links between the SCC,OCC, and FCC.

Backup Control Center (BCC):

• A backup control workstation should be provided in adifferent location, such as a manager’s or engineer’soffice. If feasible, an off-site location should beconsidered.

• A fully redundant BCC should be installed (this is analternative to the above).

Security for Utility Closets, Mechanical Rooms, and Telephone ClosetsKey System. Anticipate use of a key system.

Intrusion Detection. Some or all of the following basicintrusion detection devices should be provided:

• Magnetic reed switches for interior doors andopenings.

• Glass break sensors for windows up to scalableheights.

• Balanced magnetic contact switch sets for all exteriordoors, including overhead/roll-up doors; review roofintrusion detection.

Monitoring

• Monitoring should be done at an off-site facility. • Use an on-site monitoring center during normal

business hours.• Have a 24-hour on-site monitoring center.

Closed Circuit TV (CCTV)A color CCTV surveillance system with recordingcapability shall be provided to view and record activity atthe perimeter of the building, particularly at primaryentrances and exits. A mix of monochrome camerasshould be considered for areas that lack adequateillumination for color cameras.

Duress Alarms or Assistance StationsCall buttons should be provided at key public contactareas and as needed in the offices of managers anddirectors, in garages, and other areas that are identified ashigh risk locations by the project-specific risk assessment.


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Parking on Adjacent Properties. The recommendedminimum setback distance between the building andparked vehicles for this project is _____ (project-specificinformation to be provided). Adjacent public parkingshould be directed to more distant or better protectedareas, segregated from employee parking and away fromthe facility.

Parking Inside the Building

• Public parking with ID check.• Government vehicles and employees of the building

only. • Selected government employees only.• Selected government employees with a need for

security.

On-site Surface or Structured Parking. Adjacent surfaceparking shall maintain a minimum stand-off of _____feet. Parking within _____feet of the building shall berestricted to authorized vehicles (project-specificinformation to be provided).

Parking FacilitiesNatural Surveillance. For all stand-alone, above groundparking facilities, maximizing visibility across as well asinto and out of the parking facility shall be a key designprinciple.

The preferred parking facility design employs express ornon-parking ramps, speeding the user to parking on flatsurfaces.

Pedestrian paths should be planned to concentrate activityto the extent possible. For example, bringing allpedestrians through one portal rather than allowing themto disperse to numerous access points improves the abilityto see and be seen by other users. Likewise, limitingvehicular entry/exits to a minimum number of locations

8.11 Parking Security



Parking restrictions help keep threats away from abuilding. In urban settings, however, curbside orunderground parking is often necessary and/or difficult tocontrol. Mitigating the risks associated with parkingrequires creative design and planning measures, includingparking restrictions, perimeter buffer zones, barriers,structural hardening, and other architectural andengineering solutions.

ParkingParking on Adjacent Streets. Parking is often permittedin curb lanes, with a sidewalk between the curb lane andthe building. Where distance from the building to thenearest curb provides insufficient setback, andcompensating design measures do not sufficiently protectthe building from the assessed threat, parking in the curblane shall be restricted as follows:

• Allow unrestricted parking.• Allow government-owned and key employee parking

only.• Use the lane for stand-off. Use structural features to

prevent parking.


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Perimeter Access Control:

• Security screening or fencing may be provided atpoints of low activity to discourage anyone fromentering the facility on foot, while still maintainingopenness and natural surveillance.

• A system of fencing, grilles, doors, etc. should bedesigned to completely close down access to the entirefacility in unattended hours, or in some cases, all hours.Any ground level pedestrian exits that open into non-secure areas should be emergency exits only and fittedwith panic hardware for exiting movement only.

• Details of the parking access control system will beprovided for the designer.

Surface Finishes and Signage. Interior walls should bepainted a light color (i.e., white or light blue) to improveillumination. Signage should be clear to avoid confusionand direct users to their destination efficiently. If an escortservice is available, signs should inform users.

Lighting. Lighting levels should comply with Table8-3.

The lighting level standards recommended by theIlluminations Engineering Society of North America(IESNA) Subcommittee on Off-Roadway Facilities are thelowest acceptable lighting levels for any parking facility.The above table adjusts the lighting levels according to theprotection level. A point by point analysis should be donein accordance with the IESNA standards.

is beneficial. Long span construction and high ceilingscreate an effect of openness and aid in lighting thefacility. Shear walls should be avoided, especially nearturning bays and pedestrian travel paths. Where shearwalls are required, large holes in shear walls can help toimprove visibility. Openness to the exterior should bemaximized.

It is also important to eliminate dead-end parking areas,as well as nooks and crannies.

Landscaping should be done judiciously so as not toprovide hiding places. It is desirable to hold plantingaway from the facility to permit observation of intruders.

Stairways and Elevators:

• Stairways and elevator lobby design shall be as openas code permits. The ideal solution is a stair and/orelevator waiting area totally open to the exteriorand/or the parking areas. Designs that ensure thatpeople using these areas can be easily seen - and cansee out - should be encouraged. If a stair must beenclosed for code or weather protection purposes,glass walls will deter both personal injury attacks andvarious types of vandalism. Potential hiding placesbelow stairs should be closed off; nooks and cranniesshould be avoided.

• Elevator cabs should have glass backs wheneverpossible. Elevator lobbies should be well-lighted andvisible to both patrons in the parking areas and thepublic out on the street..


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CCTV:

• Color CCTV cameras with recording capability and pan-zoom-tilt drivers, if warranted, should be placed atentrance and exit vehicle ramps. Auto-scanning unitsare not recommended.

• Fixed-mount, fixed-lens color or monochrome camerasshould be placed on at least one side of regular useand emergency exit doors connecting to the building orleading outside. In order for these cameras to capturescenes of violations, time-delayed electronic lockingshould be provided at doors, if permitted by governingcode authorities. Without features such as time-delayed unlocking or video motion detection, thesecameras may be ineffective.

Emergency Communications. Emergency intercom/duress buttons or assistance stations should be placed on structure columns, fences, other posts, and/or free-standing pedestals and brightly marked with stripping orpaint visible in low light. If CCTV coverage is available,automatic activation of corresponding cameras should be provided, as well as dedicated communications withsecurity or law enforcement stations. It is helpful to in-clude flashing lights that can rapidly pinpoint the locationof the calling station for the response force, especially invery large parking structures. It should only be possible tore-set a station that has been activated at the station witha security key. It should not be possible to re-set thestation from any monitoring site.

A station should be within 50 feet of reach.

Table 8-3Maintained Illumination Levels (Footcandles)2

Horizontal illumination at pavement, minimum Low Low/Med. Medium Higher

Covered parking areas 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00Roof and surface parking areas 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00Stairwells, elevator lobbies 2.5 3.5 4.5 5.5Uniformity ratio (average: minimum) 4:1 4:1 4:1 4:1Uniformity ratio (maximum: minimum) 20:1 20:1 20:1 20:1

Vertical illumination 5 feet above pavement, minimum Low Low/Med. Medium Higher

Covered parking areas 0.625 0.75 0.875 1Roof and surface parking areas 0.125 0.25 0.375 0.5Stairwells, elevator lobbies 1.25 1.75 2.25 2.75


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8.12 Submission Requirements

Every project will have unique characteristics andrequirements for submission and review. These shall bedeveloped by the GSA Project Manager.

The general submission requirements for each phase ofproject development are described in Appendix A.

1Design to mitigate progressive collapse is an independent analysis to determine asystem’s ability to resist structural collapse upon the loss of a major structuralelement. It is not a part of traditional blast analysis. It is possible, however, that ablast may be the cause of the removal of structural members. ASCE 7-95 describesprogressive collapse and offers additional guidelines.

2From Chrest, Anthony P., Smith, Mary S., and Bhuyan, Sam. Parking Structures:Planning, Design, Construction, Maintenance and Repair, 2nd edition. Chapmanand Hall. (1996).

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