Science v Pseudoscience: What’s the Difference?

Kevin B. KorbClayton School of ITMonash University

kbkorb@gmail.comtwitter: @kbkorb

Abstract

Science has a certain common core, especially a reliance onempirical methods of assessing hypotheses. Pseudoscienceshave little in common but their negation: they are not science.They reject meaningful empirical assessment in some way oranother. Popper proposed a clear demarcation criterion forScience v Rubbish: Falsifiability. However, his criterion has notstood the test of time. There are no definitive argumentsagainst any pseudoscience, any more than against extremeskepticism in general, but there are clear indicators ofphoniness.

Demarcation: Science v Non-scienceWhat’s the point?

Possible goals for distinguishing btw them:

I Rhetorical, Political, SocialI Methodological: aiming at identifying methodolgical virtues

and vices; improving practice

How to proceed?

I Traditional: propose and test necessary and sufficientconditions for being science

I Less ambitious: collect prominent characteristics thatsupport a “family resemblance”

What is Science?

Science is something like the organized (social, intersubjective)attempt to acquire knowledge about the world throughinteracting with the world.

In the Western tradition, this began with thepre-Socratic philosophers and is especiallyassociated with Aristotle.

Nature of Science

Science contrasts to:

I Learning: individuals learn about the world. Their brainsare wired for that.

I Mathematics/deduction: a handmaid to science, butpowerless to teach us about the world on its own.

I Dogma, ideology, faith: These may be crucial to drivingeven scientific projects forward (as are good meals, sleep,etc.), but as they are by definition not tested by evidence,they are not themselves science.

A Potted History of the Philosophy of Science

WissenschaftsphilosophieThe Vienna Circle

Early 20th Century Scientific Major Success Stories:I Charles Darwin (evolutionary biology)I Gottlob Frege (formal logic)I Albert Einstein (physics)

The sciences were showing themselves as the most successful humanproject ever undertaken. In Vienna a group of great philosophers askedthemselves: Why? How did this happen? With the Vienna Circle philosophyof science became a discipline, attempting to answer these questions.

The Vienna Circle & Logical Positivism

The beginning was the appointment of Ernst Mach as Professorof the Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences at the University ofVienna, 1895.

Thereafter, Mortiz Schlick founded the Vienna Circle (andLogical Positivism) in 1922.

Through the helpful activities of Adolf Hitler, theleading philosophers of science introduced the ViennaCircles ideas throughout the English speaking world.

Vienna Circle

Ernst Mach

Moritz Schlick

Rudolf Carnap

Hans Reichenbach

Karl Popper

Paul Feyerabend

Noretta Koertge

Positivismus

Falsifikationismus

Anarchismus

The Vienna Circle

Basic Principles:I Philosophy as logical analysisI The logical foundation of science lies in observation &

experimentI e.g., Rudolf Carnap’s 1928 title: The Logical Construction

of the World!!

Key: Verifiability Criterion of MeaningWhat cannot be proven empirically, is meaningless.

E.g., metaphysics, religion, superstition.

{h,b ` e1, . . .en;e1, . . .en} verifies h

Karl Popper Objects

Many scientific hypotheses are universal:

I E.g., light always bends near large masses. But

{h,b ` e1, . . .e∞;e1, . . .e∞}

is not even a possible state of affairsI Aside from that, metaphysics is an ineliminable part of

science; all science has fundamental presuppositions.

Karl PopperFalsificationism

Key: Demarcation criterion for scienceWhat cannot be falsified empirically, is unscientific.

E.g., Marxism, religion, psychoanalysis.

{h,b ` e,¬e} falsifies h

Theses:

I We can make scientific (or social) progress alternatingbetween Bold Conjectures and Refutations.

I The ideal test (severe test) is guaranteed to falsify one oftwo (or more) alternative conjectures.

I Progress: refuting more and more theories; notaccumulating more and more knowledge.

Imre LakatosSophisticated Falsificationism

{h,b ` e,¬e} falsifies (h&b)

I Hypotheses stand or fall in networks, networked to each other and totheories of measurement, etc. = research programmes

I If a research programme makes novel predictions that come up true, itis progressive

I If a programme lies in a sea of anomalies and is dominated by ad hocsaving maneuvers, it is degenerating

I Unfortunately, there’s no definite point at which a degenerating researchprogramme rationally needs to be abandoned.

Thomas KuhnScientific Revolutions

I In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) he introduced the ideathat science moves (not: progresses) from “normal science” through asea of anomalies to “revolutionary science” to a new “normal science” –from “paradigm” to “paradigm”.

I According to Kuhn, the process is not rational, but explained in terms ofpsychology, social processes and power relationships.

Paul FeyerabendEpistemic Anarchy

I In 1958 Feyerabend went to Berkeley, where he turned against Popper,promoting “Epistemological Anarchism” instead (Against Method, 1974).

I He embraced the inability to reject research programmes, promotingmethodological pluralism instead.

I Denunciations of witchcraft, pseudosciences, etc. are mere expressionsof prejudice.

Ludwig WittgensteinOpen Concepts

Natural language concepts have an “open structure”, based onfamily resemblance, not definition.

Ludwig WittgensteinOpen Concepts

One of Wittgenstein’s examples: Define “game”, in terms of thenecessary and sufficient conditions. Now let’s play a gameinvolving changing those conditions. . .

I Socrates’ game of taking some sophist’s definition for“love”, “knowledge”, “good” and poking holes in it could beplayed forever.

I Hence, Socrates’ phony humility in claiming that he knewnothing.

I The reality is that our understanding and use of languagedoesn’t depend on definitions.

“Science” is an Open Concept

Instead of assembling inadequate necessary and sufficientconditions, let’s collect examples of science and non-scienceand see what the former share in family resemblances. Leaveproblematic cases for later.

Physics MathematicsEpidemiology MedicinePaleontology ReligionClimatology MiningEvolution Theory CreationismEconomics PoliticsPolitical Science Fox News

“Science” is an Open Concept

I’d like to suggest the key family resemblances are:

I Empiricism: insistance on an empirical base versusideological dominance

I Abstraction (generalization) and mathematization (whenpossible) versus anecdotal evidence

I Social processes encouraging objectivity, intersubjectivity,peer review, Popperian critical rationality versusauthoritarianism

Some Pseudoscientific Arguments

AGW/ecology/genetic regulatory/etc models are highlyabstract, lose track of detailed reality and so are not scientific.

I George Box: “All models are wrong, but some are useful.”I Any computer model will misrepresent continuity, but does

it matter?I The question is whether the property of the model of

interest (mapping to reality) is preserved under modeldynamics, not whether irrelevant details are carried along.

The demand for “proof” in science is a good indicator ofdishonesty.

Some Pseudoscientific ArgumentsSimilarly: the model predicts overall process ok, but omits some really tinydetails and therefore is wrong.

Here’s an example I gave a data mining class; 120 years of data on businessprofits.

Looks like three different trends concatenated. Let’s just regress just thepoints from 80-120.

Some Pseudoscientific Arguments

Not bad. But some ornery shareholder says, let’s just try years109-120 instead.

Some Pseudoscientific Arguments

As we can all see profits are hardly moving; let’s turf out theboard!!

Some Pseudoscientific Arguments

NB: profit = global surface temperature; competitiveness =solar energy.

Some References on Scientific Method

F Bacon (1620) Novum Organum Scientiarum.JS Mill (1843) System of Logic.M Gardner (1957) Fads and Fallacies in the Name of Science.

Dover.T Kuhn (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.K Popper (1963) Conjectures and Refutations.R Carnap (1966) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science.C Hitchcock (2004) Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of

Science.