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Defence Technology & Innovation CentreWeapons Integrated Technology Team

CDE theme day

Welcome

Countering Difficult Air Targets (C-DAT)


• Mr Robin Horne• Maj Michelle Crawford

• Dr Philip Smith• Mr Andrew Burles

• PL 4 DTIC• SO2 J3 Ops - Jt

GBAD HQ• Dstl• Dstl

Today’s presenters


Agenda

• Define objectives, scope, boundaries


Agenda


• Introduce C-DAT


Agenda


• Introduce C-DAT

• Introduce current capability & operational perspective


Agenda


• Introduce C-DAT


• Coffee


Agenda


• Introduce C-DAT


• Coffee

• Introduce Maritime perspective


Agenda


• Introduce C-DAT


• Coffee


• A glimpse into the future


Agenda


• Introduce C-DAT


• Coffee


• A glimpse into the future

• Wash-up


Agenda

• Define objectives, scope, boundaries• Introduce C-DAT• Introduce current capability & operational

perspective• Coffee• Introduce Maritime perspective• A glimpse into the future• Wash-up• How & what to submit


Objective

• Reduce or eliminate threat caused by difficult air targets


Scope

• We want to improve our ability to counter: – Rockets, artillery & mortars (C-RAM)– Tactical Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles

• We are concerned about: – Non-state actors– Asymmetric/homemade threats– The proliferation of sophisticated kit


What’s not covered in this call


• DRIT– Detection– Recognition– Identification– Track

• Air Situational Awareness• Command and control • Dynamic Air Defence Resource Allocation• Deny enemy capability through

– Interception (prior to firing)– Effectors (once in flight)

What is covered by this call


Definitions - RAM

• Rockets Artillery & Mortars (RAM)– Indirect Fire weapons (IDF)


RAM


RAM – flight profiles


Definitions - TUAV

• Tactical Uninhabited Aerial Vehicles (TUAV)– Micro UAV– Mini UAV– MALE


TUAV


• 240mm

• Homemade 65MM

Non-State Threat - RAM


• Hezbollah UAVs over Lebanon/Israel

• Hezbollah UAV post flight

Non-State Threat – TUAV


Asymmetric – TUAV

Model aircraft


Model aircraft + GPS/Autopilot

Asymmetric – TUAV


Model aircraft + GPS/Autopilot + Payload = Threat

Asymmetric – TUAV


Asymmetric – Light Aircraft

Tamil Tigers modified ZLIN

143


Definitions – threat credibility

• Threat credibility depends on: – Readiness to use

• Practical readiness of the target weapons system• Political will

– Ability to use • Detection capability• Targeting • Availability/capability/survivability of launch

– Probability of encounter• May not be through direct confrontation with

country of origin


Future Effectors

• Kinetic effectors:– Rapid integration onto platform– Improved Lethality at range– Ability to take out Difficult Air Targets– Reduced collateral damage– Low cost seeker trade-offs– Rapid system upgrade– Missile commonality

• Non-Kinetic effectors:– Directed Energy Weapons– Soft-Kill – ?


Kill chain

• The kill chain is made up of a number of discrete events.

– Each event has a time penalty: • Time to detect (Td) + Time to inform (Ti) + Time to launch (Tl) + Time to cue

(Tc) + Time to kill (Tk)

– Anything that can reduce these time penalties improves the chances of success

• We need a networked whole kill chain approach to optimise response time and:

• Integrate available ABAD, GBAD and MFAD assets• Maximise enabler system effectiveness

– Ensure that we engage targets in effector probability-of-kill priority. Within this we need to improve, develop and integrate:

• Air target ID and tracking concepts and technology • Air Situational Awareness• Command and control • Dynamic AD Resource Allocation


Things to think about

• Defeat or disrupt

• Troops must want to use it

• Cost of use V’s cost of threat

• The target signature

• Your signature

• SWaP

• Manning levels

• Operational environment


Environment


Questions?


Things to think about

• Defeat or disrupt

• Troops must want to use it

• Cost of use V’s cost of threat

• The target signature

• Your signature

• SWaP

• Manning levels

• Operational environment


Bid hints

Identify Identify the the

innovationinnovation

Give Give tangible tangible

deliverabledeliverabless

Clearly Clearly identify identify

IPR IPR ownershipownership

ReasonablReasonabl

e GFA e GFA demandsdemands

One step One step at a timeat a time

Implications Implications to to

exploitation exploitation routeroute

Identify Identify subcontractsubcontract

or or relationshiprelationship

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Documents

future slide

maritime perspective

future washup slide

threat asymmetric tuav

weapons idf slide

country of origin slide

nonstate threat ram

detection capability