sandro bologna - enea [email protected] progettoreti.enea.it workshop – aict

Sandro Bologna - ENEA [email protected]

http://www.progettoreti.enea.it Workshop – AICTRoma 25 Settembre, 2008

Alcune iniziative di ricerca in Europa e in

Italia sul ruolo della ICT nella Protezione delle

Infrastrutture Critiche

ENTE PER LE NUOVE TECNOLOGIE L’ENERGIA E L’AMBIENTE

mailto:[email protected]

CyberCyber

LayerLayer

Organisational Organisational

LayerLayer

Intra-dependency

Inter-dependencyPhysical Physical

LayerLayer

Three Layers Model for the Critical Infrastructure

Increasing importance of the “Cyber Layer” and “Inter-dependency”

Current Structure of the Electrical System in Europe

TransmissionNational / International

SubtransmissionRegional

Low Voltage

Distribution System

Integrated infrastructures for active network operation

Meter

storage

Demand response

Gx

GyCommunicati

on control local area 3

G2

G3

storage

Demand response

Meter

Communication control

local area 2

DSO 1

Communicationnetwork

G1

storage

Demand response

Meter

Communication control

local area 1

Bulk gen.

TSO

DGop n

DGop 2

DGop 1

DSO n

DSO 2

InformationCommunication

control

Power flow

Microgrid

Microgrid

Microgrid

Power grid

EPCIPDirectorate General JLS

(Policy)

EPCIPDirectorate General JLS

(Policy)

FP7 SECURITY ThemeDirectorate General ENTR(Security Research and

Development)

FP7 SECURITY ThemeDirectorate General ENTR(Security Research and

Development)

FP7 IST ThemeDirectorate General INFSO

(Security)

FP7 IST ThemeDirectorate General INFSO

(Security)

FP7 EU Policy and Research in CIP-CIIPFP7 EU Policy and Research in CIP-CIIP

Join

t R

&D

Directorate General INFSO(Internet; network and information security)

Directorate General INFSO(Internet; network and information security)

Po

licy

Geographical allocation of CIIP R&D relevant initiatives 44 national and 28 EU co-funded

(CI2RCO Project 2006)

4

6

01 1

0

4

24

26

43

2

0

2

16

0 01

0 0

11

2

5

7

10

1

11

78

0

17

2

0

3

10 0

21

6

2

0 0 0

3 3

0 01

0 0

8

4

10 0 0 0 0

2 2

0

2

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Austri

a

Belgium

Bulgar

ia

Czech

Rep

ublic

Danm

ark

Estonia

Finlan

d

Franc

e

Germ

any

Greec

e

Hunga

ry

Irlan

d

Icelan

dIsr

ael

Italy

Latvi

a

Liech

tens

tein

Litua

nia

Luxe

mbo

urg

Malt

a

Nethe

rland

s

Norway

Poland

Portu

gal

Roman

ia

Slovak

ia

Sloven

ia

Spain

Sweden

Switzer

land

Turke

y

United

King

dom

EU project National project

Notice that EU projects

are counted for each

participating country

National initiatives – overview(CI2RCO Project 2006)

NORWAYNORWAY

Projects: 4BAS5 (FFI, 2004-06, 1.3 M€)

IRMA (SINTEF)

IKT Sos (Research Council, 2003-07, 7M€)

Vulnerabilty in railways (SINTEF)

Strategic plan YESSpecific R&D prog. YES.

NORWAYNORWAY

Projects: 4BAS5 (FFI, 2004-06, 1.3 M€)

IRMA (SINTEF)

IKT Sos (Research Council, 2003-07, 7M€)

Vulnerabilty in railways (SINTEF)


Projects: 0

ROMANIAROMANIAStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0



Projects: 2KIRAS (BMVIT, 2005-13, 110 M€)

CIRCA (Bundeskanzleramt, 2000)

AUSTRIAAUSTRIAStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. YES.Projects: 2

KIRAS (BMVIT, 2005-13, 110 M€)

CIRCA (Bundeskanzleramt, 2000)

AUSTRIAAUSTRIAStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. YES.

AUSTRIAAUSTRIAStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. YES.

BULGARIABULGARIA

Projects: 3xCOM (Accademy of Science, 2004-08)

Concept for (Accademy of Science)

Metodology for … (Accademy of Science )

Strategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. YES.

BULGARIABULGARIA

Projects: 3xCOM (Accademy of Science, 2004-08)

Concept for (Accademy of Science)

Metodology for … (Accademy of Science )


Projects: 0

DENMARKDENMARKStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0

DENMARKDENMARKStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0

ESTONIAESTONIAStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0



Projects: 1EBIOS (SCSSI, 2004)

FRANCEFRANCEStrategic plan n.aSpecific R&D prog. n.a..Projects: 1

EBIOS (SCSSI, 2004)

FRANCEFRANCEStrategic plan n.aSpecific R&D prog. n.a..

GERMANYGERMANY

Projects: 5ACIS (BSI, 2002)

KRITIS (BSI)

IT Site (BSI)

Sample Guideline (BSI)

Gutachten zur (BSI, 2002-05)


GERMANYGERMANY

Projects: 5ACIS (BSI, 2002)

KRITIS (BSI)

IT Site (BSI)

Sample Guideline (BSI)

Gutachten zur (BSI, 2002-05)


Projects: 0

HUNGARYHUNGARYStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0



Projects: 0

IRELANDIRELANDStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0

IRELANDIRELANDStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0

ICELANDICELANDStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0

ICELANDICELANDStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0

LATVIALATVIAStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

LATVIALATVIAStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 1Risk Assessment (Energy Institute, 2005)

LITHUANIALITHUANIAStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 1Risk Assessment (Energy Institute, 2005)

LITHUANIALITHUANIAStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0

LUXEMBOURGLUXEMBOURGStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0

LUXEMBOURGLUXEMBOURGStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0

MALTAMALTAStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0



NETHERLANDSNETHERLANDS

Projects: 9NAVI (Min Interior, 2006-09)

KWINT (ECP.NL)

National Platform (ECP.NL, 2006)

Project Critical (NHTCC, 2004-06)

SOVI (Min. Interior, 2006-09)

SCADA (Min. Economic, 2005-06, 0,1 M€)

BVI (Ministerie van Binnenlandse,2002-05)

Next Generation (Dleft Univ, 2004-07)


NETHERLANDSNETHERLANDS

Projects: 9NAVI (Min Interior, 2006-09)

KWINT (ECP.NL)

National Platform (ECP.NL, 2006)

Project Critical (NHTCC, 2004-06)

SOVI (Min. Interior, 2006-09)

SCADA (Min. Economic, 2005-06, 0,1 M€)

BVI (Ministerie van Binnenlandse,2002-05)

Next Generation (Dleft Univ, 2004-07)


Projects: 1Functional safety (Gdansk University, 2002-04)

POLANDPOLANDStrategic plan YESSpecific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 1Functional safety (Gdansk University, 2002-04)

POLANDPOLANDStrategic plan YESSpecific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0

SLOVAKIASLOVAKIAStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0



Projects: 0

SLOVENIASLOVENIAStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0



Projects: 0

SPAINSPAINStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0

SPAINSPAINStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 2Interd (SEMA, 2006-08)

SCADA (SEMA, 2005-06)

SWEDENSWEDENStrategic plan YESSpecific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 2Interd (SEMA, 2006-08)

SCADA (SEMA, 2005-06)



SWITZERLANDSWITZERLAND

Projects: 2CIIP handbook (ETH, )

Sector Roundtables (InfoSurance)

Strategic plan YESSpecific R&D prog. n.a..

SWITZERLANDSWITZERLAND

Projects: 2CIIP handbook (ETH, )

Sector Roundtables (InfoSurance)

Strategic plan YESSpecific R&D prog. n.a..

Projects: 0

TURKEYTURKEYStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

TURKEYTURKEYStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 3Fighting terror (Ben Gurion univ, 2004-)

Enterprice security (iTcon)

Netvision Inst. (Tel Aviv Univ. )

ISRAELISRAELStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. YES

Projects: 3Fighting terror (Ben Gurion univ, 2004-)

Enterprice security (iTcon)

Netvision Inst. (Tel Aviv Univ. )



Projects: 3CRESCO (ENEA, 2006-09, 9M€)

CISIA (Univ. CAMPUS, 2006-)

CIIP info sharing (ISCOM, 2005-)

ITALYITALYStrategic plan YES.Specific R&D prog. NO

Projects: 3CRESCO (ENEA, 2006-09, 9M€)

CISIA (Univ. CAMPUS, 2006-)

CIIP info sharing (ISCOM, 2005-)

ITALYITALYStrategic plan YES.Specific R&D prog. NO

Projects: 0

LIECHTENSTEINLIECHTENSTEINStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0


Projects: 0


Projects: 0

PORTUGALPORTUGALStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0



Projects: 3Root Cause (Univ of Glasgow)

Building Blocks (NISCC)

Nat. Infr. Security . (NISCC )

UNITED KINGDOMUNITED KINGDOMStrategic plan YES.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 3Root Cause (Univ of Glasgow)

Building Blocks (NISCC)

Nat. Infr. Security . (NISCC )

UNITED KINGDOMUNITED KINGDOMStrategic plan YES.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0

BELGIUMBELGIUMStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0

BELGIUMBELGIUMStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 2

IPLU (VTT, 2005-06, 1 M€)

Vulnerability (Oulu Univ., 2004-05)

FINLANDFINLANDStrategic plan YESSpecific R&D prog. n.a..Projects: 2

IPLU (VTT, 2005-06, 1 M€)

Vulnerability (Oulu Univ., 2004-05)

FINLANDFINLANDStrategic plan YESSpecific R&D prog. n.a..

GREECEGREECE

Projects: 2Infosec (FORTH-ICS, )

EAR (FORTH-ICS, 2004-06)


GREECEGREECE

Projects: 2Infosec (FORTH-ICS, )

EAR (FORTH-ICS, 2004-06)

Strategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. YES. Projects: 0

CYPRUSCYPRUSStrategic plan n.a.Specific R&D prog. n.a.

Projects: 0



Projects: 1Inhabitants protection (Institute of Public Protection, 2005-05)

CZECH REPUBLICCZECH REPUBLICStrategic plan YESSpecific R&D prog. n.a..Projects: 1

Inhabitants protection (Institute of Public Protection, 2005-05)

CZECH REPUBLICCZECH REPUBLICStrategic plan YESSpecific R&D prog. n.a..

Geographical distribution of partners into the 28 EU co-funded initiatives


4

7

0

21

0

4

39

36

8

4

2

0

2

34

0 01

0 0

15

5 5

7

10

1

15

11

8

0

26

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Austri

a

Belgium

Bulgar

ia

Czech

Rep

ublic

Danm

ark

Estonia

Finlan

d

Franc

e

Germ

any

Greec

e

Hunga

ry

Irlan

d

Icelan

dIsr

ael

Italy

Latvi

a

Liech

tens

tein

Litua

nia

Luxe

mbo

urg

Malt

a

Nethe

rland

s

Norway

Poland

Portu

gal

Roman

ia

Slovak

ia

Sloven

ia

Spain

Sweden

Switzer

land

Turke

y

United

King

dom

57% of the partners from 4 countries

CONCLUSIONS FROM GAP ANALYSIS (1/4)


#1 CIP/CIIP is still a very immature field of research

#2 There is not yet a real community of researchers - even if there is an increasing large number of actors interested on but not converging

#3 This is partially due to the absence of a clear policy, both EU and MS, about CIP/CIIP and a clear vision of what “concretely" are CIP/CIIP, which are their goals, constraints and boundaries



#4 The majority of Member States have neither a Strategic Plan on CIIP nor a Specific R&D Program

#5 The majority of the R&D activities are funded under different labels, from IT security to Border Control. Moreover, there is a set of different Agencies promoting this kind of initiatives, often with limited coordination

#6 National initiatives of MS are inhomogeneous in economical dimension and time span

#7 In several MS Ministries of interior or defence are in charge to coordinate national initiatives



#8 Stakeholders involvement appears largely deficient. They shown an application oriented vision strongly related to their own infrastructure and business framework, with a limited attention on border elements and trans-domain consequences

#9 In several countries important CI stakeholders appear quite completely absent from the scenario and there is a limited participation from infrastructure's controllers providers (SCADA providers)

#10 Stakeholders initiatives are mainly focused on the risk analysis aspects more than in the technology development to master and shape the future development of their infrastructures



#11 Most of the partners for the EU-funded projects are from a small number of EU Countries (Germany, France, UK, Italy, Netherlands) and in particular from the same organisations.

#12 Strong need to better harmonize EU participation among the Member States because CIIP is a trans-national problem, increasing with globalisation and complexity

#13 Strong need to stimulate R&D involvment and funding from Industrial Stakeholders, Regional and National Governments

#14 Strong need to create a European Research Area on CIIP

A Feedback from 1st CI2RCO Conference

Rome, 30 March, 2006

Too many roadmaps and strategic projects instead of projects from which I can really benefit in daily environment (source: energy provider)

Addressing the safety and security issue: the ENEA SAFEGUARD approach

OBJECTIVE

REFERENCE INFRASTRUCTURE

A supervisory and control system (SCADA) of the electrical transmission network

Development of a network of software components (Agents) to increment the survivability of information intensive critical infrastructures as the electrical transport and distribution networks, during attacks, intrusions, or anomalies caused by network instabilities.

SAFEGUARD multi-agent architecture

Control system of electrical network (RTUs & Control Centers)

Home LCCIs

Topology agent

Negotiation agent

MMI agent

Other LCCIsForeign electrical

networks Communication networks

-------------------

Correlation agent

Action agent

Low

level ag

en

tsH

igh

level ag

en

ts

Network state

monitors

Intrusion Detection wrappers

Anomaly detector agents

Actuators

Commands and information Only information

Network protection at global level

Network protection at

local level

Area 1

Area 2Area 3

Substations Loads GeneratorsPower transport network

Supervisory and Control System

Electrical system physical layer

SIA-RSIA-R

SIA-R

CCNCCR CCR

SIA-C SIA-CSIA-C

Remote Units Control CentersInformation Network

Communication Network

Data concentrators

IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARD TECHNOLOGIES IN THE ELECTRICAL SYSTEM

RTURTURTU

Event sequences checking agent

Invariant checking agent Communication ports checking agent

RTU state hybrid detector

ENEA Testing Platform of SAFEGUARD Technology

emulation on a local network of the components belonging to a SCADA distributed system

RT

U

1R

TU

2

RT

U

3R

TU

n

Electrical load-flow simulator (e-Agora)

SCADA Control Center National

Network Data Base

(Gegional DB)

Network Data Base

(National DB)

SCADA data exchange bus

Attacks/faults

Console design

running

log/documen

t

TEST PLATFORM

Safeguard high level agents

(correlator, action ect.)SCADA Control Center Regional

Message “broker”

Event sequences hybrid detector

(Case Base reasoning)

Hybrid detector for State Estimation

(Checking Invariants)

RTU state hybrid detector

(Neural Network)

Communication hybrid detector

(Data Mining technique)

Low

Level

Agents

ENEA TEST PLATFORM OF SAFEGUARD TECHNOLOGY

OBJECTIVE:

REFERENCES INFRASTRUTTURES: An electrical distribution network

A public voice/data tele-communication network

Provide a technology (named MIT, Middleware Improved Technology) which will reduce the risk of cascading failures caused by interdependency between Large Complex Critical Infrastructures (LCCI)

MIT system will support information sharing between LCCIs operators to augment their mutual situational awareness. MIT system will support negotiation and coordinated actions between neighbouring systems for the establishment of effective and optimal measures;

Addressing the cascading failures issue: the ENEA IRRIIS approach

Electric.Net

TlcNet

Interdependencies between Tlc Net and Electrical Net

Interdependencies between Electrical and Telecommunication Networks

Overall IRRIIS MIT architectureOverall IRRIIS MIT architecture

Telecom

Data Base

Inter LCCIs

data exchange

Communication

Components

LCCIs Data Bases & Alarm

logsLCCI 1 LCCI 2 LCCI n

Add-on Components

The Italian IRRIIS Scenario

MANAGING “INTERDEPENDENCY” BETWEEN DIFFERENT INFRASTRUCTURESMANAGING “INTERDEPENDENCY” BETWEEN DIFFERENT INFRASTRUCTURES

SimCIPSimCIP

TelecomTelecomSimulatorSimulator

LCCI TelecomLCCI TelecomData BaseData Base

ElectricityElectricitySimulatorSimulator

LCCI ElectricityLCCI ElectricityData BaseData Base

MITcommunicationMITcommunicationElectricity MIT Add-onElectricity MIT Add-on

Telecom MIT Add-onTelecom MIT Add-on

Electrical Electrical SCADA EmulatorSCADA Emulator

TelecomTelecomSCADA EmulatorSCADA Emulator

Electrical Control RoomElectrical Control Room Telecom Control RoomTelecom Control Room

Optional External Components

IRRIIS - Physical set-up of the experimentation environment

MIT components

Telecom

MIT components Electricity

Local attacker Telecom

Telecom network

simulation

Power backup

simulation

Electrical network

simulation

Local attacker Electricity

Global attacker

SCADA emulation

Test Bed communication

channel

Local LAN Local LAN

Additional analysis tools

Experimentation GUI

Logger

Local LAN

Experimentation Archive

MIT communication channel

Electricity monitoring panel

Experimentation SERVER

Telecom monitoring panel

View of the IRRIIS Test Bed at ENEAView of the IRRIIS Test Bed at ENEA

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ‘A’ CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE ‘n’

Discovery and

Composition Agent

Metadata Secure

Communication Agent

Ontology based

metadata DB

CI models and related interdependency indicators

MICIE on-line prediction tool

Discovery and

Composition Agent

Metadata Secure

Communication Agent

Ontology based

metadata DB

MICIE Mediation Gateway associated to the CI ‘A’

MICIE Mediation Gateway associated to the CI ‘n’

SECURE METADATA

EXCHANGE OVER ICT LINKS

CI ‘A’ OPERATOR CI ‘n’ OPERATOR

Real time CI ‘A’ Risk level

Real time CI ‘n’ Risk level

Aggregated metadata

Aggregated metadata

CI-specific data CI-specific data

CI models and related interdependency indicators

MICIE on-line prediction tool

Addressing the cascading failures issue: the MICIE approach

CRUTIAL is a RTD Project in the area of Critical Information Infrastructure Protection launched by the European Union under the Information Society Technologies priority of the Sixth Framework Programme.

The project addresses new networked ICT systems for the management of the electric power grid, in which artefacts controlling the physical process of electricity transportation need to be connected with information infrastructures, through corporate networks (intranets), which are in turn connected to the Internet.

CESI RICERCA

electricity grid

communicationnetwork

Critical Utility InfrastructurAL ResilienceCritical Utility InfrastructurAL Resilience

FP6-2004-IST-4-027513 http://crutial.cesiricerca.it

modelling interdependent infrastructures

resilient to both accidental failures and malicious attacks

CRUTIAL’s innovative approach resides in

attempting at casting them into new architectural patterns

ObjectivesObjectives Investigation of models and architectures that cope with openness, heterogeneity and evolvability endured by electrical utilities infrastructures

Analysis of critical scenarios which ICT faults provoke serious impact on the controlled electric power infrastructures

Evaluation of distributed architectures enabling dependable control and management of the power grid

Work PackagesWork Packages

WP1 Identification and description of Control System Scenarios

WP2 Interdependencies modelling

WP3 Testbed development

WP4 Architectural solutions

WP5 Analysis and evaluation of Control System Scenarios

WP6 Dissemination

WP7 Management

Addressing the communication resilience in power control systems:

the CESI Ricerca CRUTIAL approach

OBJECTIVE

REFERENCE INFRASTRUCTURE

Electric Power Transmission and Distribution Grids

Control and Data Networks for Operation and Maintenance activities

to develop the representative control algorithms in the testbeds integrating the electric power system and the information infrastructure

Telecontrol testbed - Control system scenarios

• scenario 1: DSO teleoperation– use of public IP backbone for DSO supervision and control– assess redundant communication architecture– assess vulnerabilities of standard protocols and impact on control

• scenario 2: interaction between TSO/DSO in emergency– assess defense plan actuation (automatic load shedding)– assess security of the TSO-DSO communications– evaluate the impact of attacks in emergency conditions

• scenario 3: integration of DSO operation & maintenance– process control and corporate intranet integration – evaluate the impact of attacks and fault propagation

• scenario 4: ICT maintenance of control infrastructures– assess remote functional testing and operations on ICT devices– assess remote reconfiguration of the substation automation

Scenario 1b: DoS attack implementationControlSystem

Scenarios• Simulation of a DoS attack to a Centre router/gateway by TSP insider

2 - Communication bandwidth reduction

4 - Loss of remote supervision and control functions of all controlled substations from the primary Centre

1 - TSP insider starts attack

PSTN Backu

p

3 - Communication backup line

Telecontrol testbed – scenario 1b

Telecontrol Testbed at CESI Ricerca

• The CRESCO approach wants to be a “proof of concept” of different Simulation Tools supporting (inter)dependencies simulation– The “proof of concepts” is based on a limited number of

scenarios built upon a process of knowledge elicitation from the stakeholders

• The CRESCO approach wants to be a “proof of concept” of computational layers supporting the Simulation Platform – The goal is to assess major advantages/disadvantages

deriving from the use of HPC GRID, in particular ENEA-GRID

• The CRESCO approach wants to be a “proof of concept” of the basic problems with Federated Simulation – The “proof of concepts” is based on a limited number of

Simulators (CISIA, CIAB, eAgora, NS2, Omnet)

Addressing the Interdependencies modelling and simulation issue: the ENEA CRESCO approach

USERS/GIS INTERFACE

MIDDLEWARE (Request Management)

MIDDLEWARE (SIMULATORS INTERFACE)

POWER GRIDSIMULATOR

TELECOMM NETWORK

SIMULATOR

Infrastrutture nSIMULATOR

Agent-basedmodel Entity – Resource

Model

ENEA

ENEA

CRIAI

CRIAI

Tor Vergata

CAMPUSBIOMEDICO

ENEA GRID layer

CRESCO middleware

• •

• •

•

•

Power GridSimulator

Agent-based model

Entity-Resourcemodel

Telecomm NetworkSmulator

CRESCO Simulation Platform running on the top of ENEA GRID

GRID layer

DIESIS middleware

Power Grid

simulator @ENEA

Railway traffic

simulator @TNO

User @IAIS

Network Simulator

@ICL

Public transportation

traffic simulator @CRIAI

DIESIS ARCHITECTUREDesign of an Interoperable European federated Simulation network for critical

InfraStructures

NEISAS – National and European Information Sharing and Alerting System

• Funded by EC DG JLS EPCIP 2008 program

• Objective: deployment of a prototype of a National and European Information Sharing and Alerting System

• Partners: ENEA, Italian Cabinet Office, UK Home Office, UK CPNI, Dutch NICC, Booz & co, Symantec

35

MS3I – Messaging Standard for Sharing Security Information


• Objective: Definition of an Information Sharing framework for exchanging alerts and reports on new vulnerabilities, threats, incidents and good practices

• Partners: Symantec, AIIC, Polizia Postale (C.N.A.I.P.I.C.)

• Stakeholders: National CIP centres, CERTs, CI operators in 15 countries

36

ECCRAMM – Energy Control Centre Risk Analsysis and Management Methodology


• Objective: deployment of Risk Management methodology to protect Energy Control Centres

• Partners: Symantec, UCTE, 9 UCTE TSOs, Estonian Ministry of Economics, Eesti Energia (Estonian TSO)

37

Some of the Projects with participation of ENEA and/or CESI Ricerca (1/5)

• RdS 2006-2008 AdP con MSE: Area “Governo del Sistema” e Area “Trasmissione e Distribuzione” funded by MSE

• SECURE: Security of Energy considering Uncertainty, Risk and Economic Implications funded by EU-FP7

• REALISEGRID: REseArch methodoLogIes and technologieS for the effective development of pan-European GRID funded by EU-FP7

• HARRISON: Galileo Time and Synchronization Applications funded by EC/ESA

• MORE MICROGRIDS: Advanced Architectures and Control Concepts for Microgrids funded by EU-FP6

• DERRI: Distributed Energy Resources Research Infrastructure funded by EU-FP7

• DER-LAB: Network of DER LABoratories funded by EU-FP6

• OSN: Osservatorio sulla Sicurezza Nazionale supported by RdS 2006-2008 AdP, funded by MSE

• GRID: Coordination Action on ICT vulnerabilities of power systems and relevant defense methodologies funded by EU-FP6

• CRUTIAL: Critical UTility InfrastructurAL resilience funded by EU-FP6

• DAMSE: European Methodology for Dams Security Assessment funded by EU-EPCIP



• MIA: Methodology for Interdependence Assessment between ICT and electricity infrastructures, funded by EU-EPCIP

• ASTROM: ASsessment of resilience to ThReaths of cOntrol and data Management systems of electrical network, funded by EU-EPCIP

• ESTEC: Feasibility Study for a European Network of Secure Test Centres for Reliable ICT-controlled Critical Energy Infrastructures, funded by EU-EPCIP

• IRRIIS: Integrated Risk reduction of Information-based Infrastructure Systems, funded by EU-FP6

• MICIE: Tool for systemic risk analysis and secure mediation of data exchanged across linked CI information infrastructures, funded by EU-FP7


• CRESCO.LAIII: Sviluppo di Modelli di Simulazione ed Analisi delle Reti Tecnologiche Complesse e delle loro Interdipendenze, funded by MIUR-PON

• GIACS: General Integration of the Application of Complexity in Science, funded by EU-FP6

• DIESIS: Design of an Interoperable European federated Simulation network for critical Infrastructures, funded by EU-FP7

• COST MP0801: Physics of Competition, Cooperation and Conflict, funded by ESF 2008

• TeRN: Sviluppo di sistemi di Early-Warning in Val d’Agri, funded by Regione Basilicata


• NEISAS: National and European Information Sharing and Alerting System, funded by EU-EPCIP

• TRAMP: Sistema Integrato di Gestione e Controllo per il TRAsporto in Sicurezza di Merci pericolose, funded by MIUR

sandro bologna - enea [email protected] progettoreti.enea.it workshop – aict

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