sall - csm master's thesis

91
Citizen Vigilance and Mobilization Examining the Use of Information Communications Technologies and Social Media After Social Disorder Rajpreet Sall, S1590073 Master’s of Crisis and Security Management Final Dissertation September 2014 Cohort Supervisor: Dr. E. Bakker Advisor: John P. Sabou Second Reader: Dr. E. Devroe

Upload: rajpreet-sall

Post on 27-Jan-2017

95 views

Category:

Documents


1 download

TRANSCRIPT

   

Citizen  Vigilance  and  Mobilization    

Examining  the  Use  of  Information  Communications  Technologies  and  Social  Media  After  Social  Disorder  

     

           

Rajpreet  Sall,  S1590073  Master’s  of  Crisis  and  Security  Management  

Final  Dissertation  September  2014  Cohort  

 Supervisor:  Dr.  E.  Bakker  Advisor:  John  P.  Sabou  

Second  Reader:  Dr.  E.  Devroe      

  2  

Abstract    

Information   communications   technologies   (ICT)   provide   increasingly   more  

opportunities   for   citizen   engagement   and   mobilization.   These   opportunities   are  

made  possible  due  to  enabling  technologies  that  disregard  traditional  mobilization  

methods.  This  allows  citizens  to  engage  with  peers  and  an  online  community  for  any  

purpose   by   facilitating   discussion   and   mobilization   without   requiring   formal  

organizations.   ICT  and  social  media  give  citizens   the  opportunity   to  play  an  active  

role   in   mobilizing   efforts.   As   technologies   continue   to   develop   and   allow   greater  

citizen   involvement   and   mobilization   in   areas   of   life   previously   not   available   to  

them,  the  effects  of  this  citizen  mobilization  needs  to  be  reviewed.  

 

This   thesis  will   look   at   the   primary   case   study   of   the   2011   and   1994   Vancouver,  

Canada   riots,   and   a   secondary   case   of   the   2011   rioting   in   London,   England   and  

surrounding   areas   to   examine   the   roles   ICT   enabled   citizen   vigilance   and  

mobilization   played   during   and   after   social   disorder.   Along   with   empowering  

citizens,   ICT   and   social   media   provide   ample   occasions   for   organizing,   lateral  

surveillance,  and  persecution  through  the  work  of  a  crowd  of  self-­‐organized  users.  

This   type  of  mobilization  after   social  disorder   can  have  detrimental   effects  on   the  

safety  and  security  of  citizens  and  needs  to  be  approached  with  caution.  However,  

harnessing   the   power   of   citizens   and   recognizing   the   roles   they   can   play   as  

resources   after   social   disorder   or   crises   is   significant   and   must   be   taken   into  

consideration  as  the  field  of  crisis  and  security  management  evolves.  

   

  3  

Acknowledgements    The  past  ten  months  I  have  lived  in  The  Hague  while  attending  Universiteit  Leiden  and  completing  a  Master’s  in  Crisis  and  Security  Management  have  been  a  whirlwind  and  passed  by  more  quickly  than  I  could  have  ever  imagined.  Living  abroad  has  been  a  trying  yet  incredibly  insightful  experience  for  which  I  will  always  be  grateful.    I  could  not  have  finished  this  thesis  on  my  own  and  there  are  individuals  I  owe  thanks  to  for  their  contributions  throughout  this  process:    Dr.  Bakker,  for  his  ability  to  see  and  get  to  the  heart  of  a  matter  quickly  and  efficiently  while  providing  guidance  and  feedback  throughout  the  writing  process.    John,  to  whom  my  most  sincere  thanks  and  gratitude  go.  Endless  advice,  encouragement,  and  support  characterized  our  interactions,  along  with  meaningful  constructive  criticism,  and  an  ability  to  keep  me  on  track.    Beth,  for  encouraging  me  to  do  more  and  be  more  when  I  was  complacent.    Finally,  my  family  and  friends  for  listening  to  me  rant  about  my  topic,  explaining  the  technical  material,  providing  counselling,  and  helping  me  preserve  my  sanity  during  an  intensive  graduate  program.      

  4  

Table  of  Contents  

 

Abstract  ....................................................................................................................................................  2  Acknowledgements  ..............................................................................................................................  3  Table  of  Contents  ...................................................................................................................................  4  Table  of  Figures  .....................................................................................................................................  6  Introduction  ............................................................................................................................................  8  Introduction  of  Cases  .............................................................................................................................................  11  2011  Vancouver  Riot  ..................................................................................................................................  12  1994  Vancouver  Riot  ..................................................................................................................................  17  2011  Rioting  in  London  and  Surrounding  Areas  ............................................................................  19  

Research  Question  ...................................................................................................................................................  22  Relevance  of  Research  Question  ........................................................................................................................  23  Methodology  ..............................................................................................................................................................  24  Structure  of  Thesis  ..................................................................................................................................................  26  

Use  and  Application  of  Theory  ........................................................................................................  27  Evolution  of  Resource  Mobilization  Theory  .................................................................................................  27  The  State  of  Mobilization  Today  .......................................................................................................................  28  The  Role  of  Citizens  .....................................................................................................................................  29  The  Role  of  Information  Communications  Technologies  ...........................................................  30  

Theoretical  Framework  ........................................................................................................................................  31  Benefits  and  Drawbacks  of  Applying  Resource  Mobilization  Theory  to  a  Case  Study  ..............  35  Benefits  of  Using  Resource  Mobilization  Theory  ...........................................................................  35  Drawbacks  of  Using  Resource  Mobilization  Theory  .....................................................................  36  

The  Efficacy  of  Resource  Mobilization  Theory  in  Contemporary  Society  .......................................  37  Analysis  ...................................................................................................................................................  39  Accumulation  of  Resources  .................................................................................................................................  39  Identification  of  Resources  in  Vancouver  ..........................................................................................  41  Identification  of  Resources  in  London  ................................................................................................  43  

Organization  .............................................................................................................................................................  46  Leadership  of  the  Movement  ..................................................................................................................  46  Behaviour  of  Citizens  ..................................................................................................................................  48  Citizens  as  Resources  .................................................................................................................................  52  Commitment  of  Citizens  ............................................................................................................................  54  

Involvement  from  Outside  the  Crowd  .............................................................................................................  56  Establishing  an  Identity  .............................................................................................................................  56  Citizen  Vigilance  and  Defining  the  Situation  ....................................................................................  57  Impatience  of  Citizens  ................................................................................................................................  60  

Supply  and  Demand  of  Resources  ....................................................................................................................  63  Recruitment  for  the  Cause  ........................................................................................................................  65  

Costs  and  Benefits  of  Participation  ..................................................................................................................  67  Framing  the  Message  ..................................................................................................................................  67  

  5  

Costs  of  Participation  .................................................................................................................................  68  Benefits  of  Participation  ............................................................................................................................  71  

Conclusion  .............................................................................................................................................  72  Reflection  ....................................................................................................................................................................  76  

Bibliography  .........................................................................................................................................  78  Blogs  ..............................................................................................................................................................................  78  Books  .............................................................................................................................................................................  78  Conference  Proceedings  ........................................................................................................................................  79  News  Articles  .............................................................................................................................................................  79  Podcasts  .......................................................................................................................................................................  83  Reports  and  Legislation  ........................................................................................................................................  83  Scientific  Articles  .....................................................................................................................................................  85  Social  Media  Sources  ..............................................................................................................................................  90  Websites  .......................................................................................................................................................................  91  

     

  6  

Table  of  Figures    Figure  1:  Interconnectedness  of  Resource  Mobilization  Theory                          32  Figure  2:  Components  of  Citizen  Vigilance                                75  

   

  7  

           “The  great  thing  about  our  current  state  of  complete  social  media  saturation  is  that  we  no  longer  have  to  rely  on  that  singular  person  keeping  their  respective  whoever  in  check  .  .  .  we  have  the  advantage  of  a  global  community.      Can  we,  as  perfect  strangers,  make  those  who  deserve  to  feel  ashamd  [sic]  actually  feel  it?    Whether  the  regret   felt   is  regret   for  their  action,  regret  being  caught,  or  regret   fro  [sic]  the  ensuing  consequences  is  a  moot  point:  If  we  can  make  people  regret  (in  any  sense  of  the  word)  what  happened  then  it’s  a  job  well  done.    All  I  have  to  say  is  if  you  are  a  looter  and  riotous  criminal,  social  networking  OWNS  you!”1      

                                                                                                               1  Retrieved  from  ‘Criminal  List:  Anonymous  Crime  in  a  2.0  World?  I  Don’t  Think  So!’  

  8  

Introduction    

Information   communications   technologies   (ICT)   are   being   used   the  world   over   to  

wage  revolutions,   lead  campaigns  against  poverty  and  other  social  causes,  develop  

mobile   applications   to   provide   medical   technologies   to   remote   communities,  

provide  crowdsourced  information  for  various  reasons,  and  much  more  (Lindgren,  

2013).   ICT   is   giving   citizens   worldwide   opportunities   to   exchange,   filter,   publish,  

and  share   information  by  providing   tools   to  allow   the  exchange  of  user  generated  

content   (Simon,   et   al,   2014).   ICT,   its   mobility,   and   its   spatial   fragmentation   have  

provided   important   resources   and   the   unprecedented   ability   to   coordinate   the  

mobilization   of   large   masses   of   people   to   accomplish   great   feats   that   transcend  

geographical   limitations   (Lindgren,   2013;   Rutherford,   et   al,   2013;   Eltantawy   &  

Wiest,   2011).   In   order   for   these   types   of   activities   to   build   momentum   and   be  

successful  motivation  is  required.  

 

Motivation   is  needed  for  mobilization  to  occur;  without  motivation  any  endeavour  

or  social  movement  is  unlikely  to  succeed  (Klandermans,  1984).  Motivation  leads  to  

goals,   and   occasionally   for   these   goals   to   be   fulfilled   they   require   citizen   support.  

The  desired  goal  may  vary:   to  mobilize   citizens   to   clean  up  after  a   riot,  or   to  help  

police  identify  provocateurs  and  participants  after  the  same  event;  the  means  used  

to  reach  this  goal  are  information  communications  technologies,  most  often  through  

forms  of  social  media,  such  as  Facebook,  Twitter,  and  Blackberry  Messenger  (BBM).  

This   is   due   to   social   media’s   ever-­‐growing   role   in   everyday   life   and   social  

interactions,   leading   to   its   ability   to   document,   distribute,   and   respond   to   events  

online   with   speed   and   ease   (Schneider   &   Trottier,   2012).   Thus   the   motivation  

required   to  achieve   these  goals  must  be  about  mobilizing   citizens,   as   they  are   the  

resources  that  use  social  media.  Mobilizing  citizens  for  these  goals  can  be  based  on  

noble  aspirations,  yet  in  reality  they  can  also  have  negative  consequences.  If  ICT  and  

  9  

social  media  are  to  be  used  and  relied  upon,  the  conditions  that  can  affect  success,  or  

result  in  failure  must  be  understood  (Rutherford,  et  al,  2013).    

 

Schneider  and  Trottier  (2012)  argue  that  citizen  involvement  and  vigilance  online  is  

a  direct  product  of  both  information  communications  technologies  and  the  culture  it  

spawns.   This   means   that   as   technology   continues   to   grow   and   become   more  

pervasive,  so  to  can  we  expect  more  instances  of  crowdsourced  information  sharing  

and  lateral  surveillance.  Crowdsourcing  is  a  form  of  cooperative  work  involving  an  

indeterminate  number  of  participants  and  is  premised  upon  the  belief  that  ICT  can  

be  leveraged  to  manage  information,  resources,  and  crowds  in  order  to  respond  to  a  

need,  which   can   include   social   disorder   and   crises   (Liu,   2014).  Therefore   the   role  

this   type  of  behaviour  has   in  post-­‐crisis   and   social  disorder   response   is  becoming  

greater  and  is  gaining  both  popularity  and  appeal  in  its  ability  to  increase  situational  

awareness   and   reduce   response   times   for   aid.   This   is   especially   true   in   an   age   of  

technology,  which  has  proliferated  the  existence,  and  subsequent  use  of  devices  to  

record   and   communicate   during   and   after   crises   and   social   disorder   (Furlong   &  

O’Keefe,  2011).  These  same  technological  advances  also  make  it  much  more  difficult,  

or   even   impossible,   to   hide   in   the   anonymity   of   the   crowd   (VPD   Annual   Report,  

2011).   “We   live   in   a   culture   that’s   saturated   with   recording   devices,   and   that  

normalizes  it.  We’re  constantly  being  recorded   .   .   .  we  tell  ourselves  to  keep  acting  

the  way  we  usually  act”  (Lewis,  2013,  14  June).  

 

Mobilization   for   social   movements   hinges   on   changing   interests,   changing  

opportunities  and  threats  to  interests,  and  changing  inclinations  to  act  on  collective  

interests  rather  than  individual  interest  (Zald  &  McCarthy,  1979).  These  movements  

can   range   from  radical,   all-­‐encompassing  entities   that   strive   to  affect  monumental  

social   change;   to  narrow  specifically   focused  attempts   to  cause  a   shift   in  policy  or  

society  (McCarthy  &  Zald,  1973).  Regardless  of  the  type  of  movement  resources  are  

the   key   to   their   success,   or   the   fault   in   their   failures.   Mobilizing   resources  

successfully   means   reaching   out   to   people   and   reacting   within   a   short   period   of  

  10  

time,  ICT  provides  opportunities  and  mediums  to  make  this  happen  (Rutherford,  et  

al,  2013).  

 

Riots  and  social  movements  are  not  a  new  phenomenon  yet  social  media  is  radically  

changing  how  riots  form  and  spread  (Bohannon,  2012).  Until  recently  it  was  difficult  

and  time  consuming  for  a  large  crowd  of  strangers  to  coordinate,  regardless  of  the  

reasons   for   it,   now   with   the   proliferation   and   diffusion   of   information  

communications   technologies   coordinating   and   communicating   with   enormous  

numbers   of   people   is   at   the   tips   of   our   fingers   and   keyboards   (Bohannon,   2012).  

There   is   now   a   pattern   of   social   behaviour   by   which   citizens   take   to   their  

smartphones,   tablets,   and   computers   to   vent   frustration,   organize,   communicate,  

and   otherwise   engage   with   others   regardless   of   geographic,   financial,   ethnic,   or  

religious   differences   (Panagiotopoulos,   Bigdel   &   Sams,   2014).   Baker   (2011)   calls  

this   a   ‘mediated   crowd’,   which   forms   due   to   a   fundamental   change   in   public  

communication   practices   as   a   result   of   new   social   media   and   communication  

technologies.  This  mediated  crowd  refers  to  the  collective  actions  that  occur  in  the  

virtual   sphere   rather   than   the   physical   one,   which   faces   geographic   limitations  

(Baker,  2011).  New  technologies  enable  instant  modes  of  exchange  for  the  mediated  

crowd,   which   differs   from   a   standard   crowd   by   its   reliance   on   communication  

technologies  to  mobilize  and  sustain  collective  action  (Baker,  2011).  

 

The   term   information  communications   technology   is  used   for   the  purposes  of   this  

thesis  because  the  breadth  of  the  definition  is  broader  than  that  of  social  media.  ICT  

includes  more  than  Internet  based  communications  technology;  it  also  encompasses  

cellular   technology,   and   other   communications   mediums   (Goldsmith,   2015).   The  

emphasis   of   ICT   is   on   communication,   online   interactivity,   data   mining,   and  

mobility;   this   is   possible   through   digital   communities   that   create   a   web   of  

interconnectedness  by  linking  disparate  entities  (Fulk,  1993).  

 

  11  

Introduction  of  Cases    

There   are   a   number   of   interesting   cases   that   elucidate   the   use   of   ICT   and   social  

media   by   citizens   to   mobilize,   including   unrest   in   Ferguson,   United   States   of  

America  beginning  in  2014,  and  perhaps  most  notably  during  Arab  Spring  in  2010.  

This  thesis  will  use  rioting  in  Vancouver,  Canada  in  1994  and  2011  as  the  primary  

case  due  to  the   immediate  and  multifaceted  mobilization  of  citizens  that  occurred.  

The  author  of  this  thesis  also  resides  in  a  city  close  to  Vancouver  and  the  riot  and  its  

aftermath  were  an  area  of  interest,  as  well  as  being  prominent  in  news  and  general  

discussion  for  months  after  the  riot.  The  2011  riot  can  be  distinguished  as  one  of  the  

first   sports   riots   in   North   America   that   took   place   in   reality   and   online  

simultaneously  (VPD  Riot  Review,  2011).  The  significance  of  this  was  important  to  

the   ways   in   which   the  mobilization   of   citizens   occurred   and   reflects   the   changes  

caused  by  ICT.  Ready  access  to  ICT  and  social  media  has  caused  a  fundamental  shift  

in   the   response   to,   and   recovery   from,   crises.   In   the   past,   such   technologies  were  

used  to   inform  citizens,  now  advances  have  allowed  participation  and  engagement  

in   ways   previously   not   possible.   The   actors   involved   have   changed,   as   have   the  

activities  these  actors  engage  in.  

 

The  rioting  in  London,  England  and  its  surrounding  areas  in  2011,  were  selected  for  

their   compatibility   in  displaying  a  pattern  of  behaviour  with   the  mobilization   that  

occurred   in   Vancouver.   ICT   and   its   inability   to   be   confined   by   geographic   space  

allow  mass  mobilization  to  occur  quickly  and  with  little  warning  or  effort.  This  can  

be  especially  potent   for  riots  and  other  social  disorders  as  events  that  can  emerge  

and   escalate   more   quickly   as   a   result   of   ICT   (Baudains,   Johnson   &   Braithwaite,  

2013).  The  2011  riots  in  London  and  neighbouring  cities  stimulated  great  interest  in  

the   role   of   ICT   and   social   media   in   inciting,   mobilizing,   and   organizing   social  

disorder  (Tonkin,  Pfeiffer  &  Tourte,  2012).  The  goals  and  context  of  the  mobilizing  

that  took  place  with  the  use  of  ICT  during  the  2011  rioting  in  London  differed  from  

the  mobilization  in  Vancouver  however  it  still  provides  an  excellent  opportunity  to  

consider   the   negative   consequences   of   using   ICT   and   social   media   for   citizen  

  12  

mobilization   during   and   after   social   disorders   such   as   riots.   This   is   due   to   the  

overarching   connection   of   how   the  mobilization   occurred,   and   the  ways   in  which  

citizens  in  both  cities  used  information  communications  technologies  to  do  so.  

 

2011  Vancouver  Riot    

On   June   15,   2011,   the   Vancouver   Canucks,   a   professional   hockey   team   in   the  

National  Hockey  League,  were  set  to  play  the  final  and  deciding  game  in  the  Stanley  

Cup  championship  against  the  Boston  Bruins.  An  estimated  55,000  people  crowded  

into   a   fan   zone   created   in   downtown   Vancouver   to   watch   the   game,   with   an  

additional   100,000   flooding   the   rest   of   the   downtown   core   (Furlong   &   O’Keefe,  

2011).  In  the  end  the  Canucks  lost  the  game  to  the  Bruins,  with  a  decisive  final  score  

of   4-­‐0.   Public   disappointment   contributed   to   a   variety   of   other   factors   and  

ultimately   culminated   in   social   disorder   breaking   out   that   night   in   the   downtown  

core  of  Vancouver,  British  Columbia,  Canada.  

 

Small   instances   of   trouble  had  begun  by  4:40PM,  before   the   game  had   concluded,  

with  barricades  in  the  fan  zone  being  breached,  fistfights  breaking  out,  and  revellers  

climbing  nearby  structures  and  business  awnings  (Furlong  &  O’Keefe,  2011).  As  the  

game   began   to   come   to   a   close   with   the   Canucks   having   lost   their   chance   at   the  

coveted   Stanley  Cup,   the   riot   began   to   take   shape.  Bottles   and  other   objects  were  

thrown  at  the  large  television  screens  in  the  fan  zone,  hockey  jerseys  for  both  teams  

were   set   on   fire,   vehicles   were   overturned   and   lit   on   fire,   portable   toilets   were  

tipped   over,   windows   were   smashed   and   nearby   businesses   looted,   individuals  

fought   in   the   streets,   and   general   chaos  was   rampant   (Furlong   &   O’Keefe,   2011).  

Vancouver  Police  Department  Chief  Constable  Jim  Chu  called  those  involved  in  the  

riot   “criminals,   anarchists   and   thugs  who  were  bent   on  destruction   and  mayhem”  

(Vancouver   Police   Department,   2011).   Chief   Chu’s   statements   would   prove  

erroneous  as  a  result  of  a  lack  of  situational  awareness  (VPD  Annual  Report,  2011).  

 

  13  

Congestion  made  it  difficult  for  emergency  response  teams  to  access  the  area  to  put  

out  fires,  Molotov  cocktails  and  broken  glass  were  thrown  at  police,  and  sixty-­‐eight  

people  were   injured   (Klein  &  Macklin,   2011).   It   is   astounding   that   there  were   no  

fatalities   and   that   a   full   stampede   of   people   did   not   break   out.   Congestion,   free-­‐

flowing  alcohol,  and  individuals  present  only  to  cause  trouble  led  to  an  unfortunate  

event  that  tarnished  Vancouver’s  reputation  worldwide  (City  of  Vancouver  Internal  

Review,  2011).  Spectators  contributed  to  the  atmosphere  in  the  downtown  core  that  

night   as   an   audience   was   provided   to   those   causing   general   social   disorder.  

Rumours   of   ferry   cancellations   to   nearby   Vancouver   Island   caused   widespread  

public  confusion  and  led  to  thousands  of  people  loitering  in  the  downtown  core,  as  

did  the  closure  of  all  bridges  leading  in  and  out  of  downtown  and  public  transit   in  

Vancouver  (Furlong  &  O’Keefe,  2011).  The  majority  of  people  in  the  downtown  core  

were  not   from  Vancouver;   therefore   rumours  about   ferry   cancellations,   as  well   as  

the  actual  closing  of  bridges  had  significant  impact  on  the  number  of  people  left  in  

the  city  and  unable  to  leave.  The  City  of  Vancouver  internal  review  of  the  riot  (2011)  

cited   an   inability   to   get   correct   information  out   to   the  public   and   accepted   that   it  

contributed  to  the  confusion  of  the  crowds  present  in  the  downtown  core.  

 

Chief  Constable  Chu  remarked  that  the  crowd  was  three  times  as  large  as  the  crowd  

during  the  1994  Stanley  Cup  riot  but  it  took  police  half  the  time  to  shut  it  down,  a  

task  that  took  approximately  three  hours  (VPD  Stanley  Cup  Riot  Review,  2011).  446  

police   officers   were   initially   assigned   to   patrol   and   supervise   the   championship  

game,  however  this  number  more  than  doubled  as  an  additional  482  officers  were  

redirected   from   other   areas   of   Vancouver   and   called   in   from   detachments   in  

surrounding  cities  (Furlong  &  O’Keefe,  2011).  After  the  riot  had  ended  citizens  took  

to   social   media   to   express   frustration   and   anger   at   the   events   that   unfolded   and  

those   who   perpetrated   the   violence,   destruction,   and   chaos.   The   prevalence   of  

camera  phones  had  significant  impact  in  gathering  evidence  of  the  happenings  that  

night,  along  with  images  of  individuals  involved.  The  bystanders,  who  contributed  to  

the  crowds  in  the  streets  and  impacted  police  crowd  control  methods,  also  assisted  

the   police   by   providing   photo   and   video   footage   of   the   events   that   had   occurred.  

  14  

While  the  riot  was  still  ongoing  Facebook  groups  were  created  to  post  photos  and  

videos   of   the   events   in   hopes   of   helping   the   police   identify   and   prosecute   those  

involved.  In  the  following  days  and  weeks  thousands  of  photos  and  video  files  were  

uploaded  on  various  ICT  systems  and  the  naming  and  shaming  of  people  seen  at  the  

riot  had  begun  (Schneider  &  Trottier,  2012).  

 

Individuals   not   involved   in   the   2011   Vancouver   riot   fought   back,   and   they   used  

social  media  and  various  forms  of  information  communications  technology  to  do  so  

online   (Vardy,   2011,   16   June).   Public   engagement   and   social   mobilization   have  

changed  due  to  technological  advances,  and  this  has  changed  the  scope  and  nature  

of  activities  by  citizens  after  crises  or  social  disorder  (McNutt,  2014).  This  is  due  in  

large   part   to   a   fundamental   shift   from   the   Internet   and   ICT   functioning   as   a  

publishing   platform   to   operating   as   an   interactive   and   engaging   communication  

medium  (Henman,  2012;  McNutt,  2014).  Conversely  this  can  also  be  understood  as  

an  evolution  from  simply  informing,  to  engaging,  due  to  a  shift  from  a  one-­‐to-­‐many  

method   of   communication   to   a   many-­‐to-­‐many   interaction   that   involves   more  

participants  (Henman,  2012;  McNutt,  2014).  One-­‐to-­‐many  communication  refers  to  

one   user   broadcasting   a   message   to   many   others,   whereas   a   many-­‐to-­‐many  

interaction  means  that  multiple  users  contribute  and  communicate  with  each  other  

on  any  given  topic  (Rainer,  et  al,  2013).  

 

Police  services  are  now  using  social  media  to  their  advantage.  The  Vancouver  Police  

Department  (VPD)  Twitter  account  saw  followers  increase  by  the  thousands  during  

the   riot   as   people   sought   information   and   almost   every   tweet   made   by   the   VPD  

during   the   riot  was   re-­‐tweeted   by   seventy-­‐five   or  more   people   (VPD   Stanley   Cup  

Riot  Review,  2011).  This  supports  the  idea  that  citizens  look  online  for  information  

and  answers  in  times  of  disorder  and  distress.  An  aware,  technologically  astute,  and  

engaged  public  can  make  a  big  impact  if  they  know  how,  and  when,  to  help  (Furlong  

&  O’Keefe,  2011).  The  VPD  server  crashed  and  was  down  for  several  hours  due  to  

the  files  being  sent,  all  before  the  riot  had  even  ended,  cellphone  networks  were  also  

jammed  by  excessive  use  (Furlong  &  O’Keefe,  2011).  The  investigation  that  followed  

  15  

after   the   rioting   meant   the   VPD   would   spend   the   rest   of   2011   and   half   of   2012  

focused  on  the  largest  criminal  investigation  in  terms  of  the  number  of  suspects  in  

Canadian   history   (VPD   Annual   Report,   2011).   Within   hours   of   the   riot   ending   a  

Facebook  page  had  been  created  to  recruit   the  public   to  help  clean  up  the  city  the  

following  morning;  at  7:00AM  the  next  day  thousands  of  people  rallied  in  downtown  

Vancouver   to   restore   their   city   (Ryan,   2011,   17  November).   “This   is   our   tornado.  

This  is  our  tsunami.  This  is  what  we  will  do  for  our  community,”  said  one  individual  

interviewed  by  the  Vancouver  Sun  newspaper  (Ryan,  2011,  17  November).  

 

 Photo  retrieved  from  Vancouver  Police  Department  www.VPD.ca    

The   Vancouver   Police   Department   received   hundreds   of   letters   and   notes   with  

messages  of  appreciation  and  compliments  for  their  handling  of  the  riot,  as  well  as  

the   restraint   and   care  displayed  by  officers   (VPD  Stanley  Cup  Riot  Review,  2011).  

Widespread  public  support  of  police  response  to  riots  is  almost  unheard  of  but  is  the  

case   for   Vancouver.   The   image   above   shows   a   VPD   patrol   car   parked   in   the  

downtown  core  the  morning  after  the  riot,  and  within  hours  it  was  covered  in  post-­‐

it   notes  with  messages   of   support   and   thanks.   Plywood   used   to   board   up   broken  

shop   windows   was   also   used   as   a   canvas   to   express   solidarity,   support,   and  

  16  

unflinching  resilience.  A  few  photos  of  these  can  be  seen  below  and  a  selection  is  on  

permanent  display  at   the  Vancouver  City  Hall   (City  of  Vancouver   Internal  Review,  

2011).  

 

   

 

  17  

 Photos  retrieved  from  CBC  News  http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-­‐columbia/vancouver-­‐s-­‐riot-­‐wall-­‐to-­‐come-­‐down-­‐1.1053281    

1994  Vancouver  Riot    

The  2011  riot  brought  with  it  memories  of  the  rioting  that  occurred  in  1994  when  

the  Vancouver  Canucks  lost  the  Stanley  Cup  championship  to  the  New  York  Rangers.  

A  difference  to  note  in  the  riots  is  that  the  championship  game  of  the  2011  playoffs  

was  played   in  Vancouver,  while   the   final  game  of   the  1994  playoffs  was  played   in  

New  York  City.  This  may  have  had  impacts  on  the  number  of  people  drawn  into  the  

downtown  core  of  Vancouver  in  2011  when  the  game  was  actually  played  in  the  city.  

Another  key  difference  is  that  the  2011  riot  had  designated  fan  zones  in  the  streets  

of   downtown   Vancouver.   In   1994   the   streets   were   largely   empty   as  most   people  

were  watching  the  game  in  bars  and  restaurants,  it  was  only  after  the  conclusion  of  

the  game   that   the  streets   flooded  with  approximately  70,000  people   (VPD  Stanley  

Cup  Riot  Review,  2011).  

 

  18  

Regardless   of   these   variations,   in   both   instances   rioting   occurred   with   property  

damage,  injuries,  and  general  social  disorder  (Furlong  &  O’Keefe,  2011).  The  riot  in  

1994   began   in   the   evening   of   June   14,   1994,   and   continued   on   into   the   following  

morning.  Once  the  game  had  ended  in  defeat  for  the  Vancouver  Canucks  people  left  

the  bars  and  restaurants  they  had  watched  the  game  in  and  social  disorder  began.  

Fist  fights  broke  out,  cars  were  flipped,  and  a  spontaneous  parade  of  vehicles  drove  

around  downtown  with   young   people   riding   on   the   hoods   of   cars,   hanging   out   of  

windows,  standing  up  through  sun  roofs,  and  sitting  on  the  backs  of  the  vehicles  all  

the   while   ignoring   traffic   signs   and   signals,   as   well   as   police   direction   (British  

Columbia   Police   Commission,   1994).   Fireworks   were   set   off   within   the   crowds,  

alcohol  was  openly  consumed,  police  were  pelted  with  rocks  and  bottles,  property  

was  damaged,  and  general  disorder  was  widespread.  

 

News  media  caught  some  of  these  events  on  camera,  as  the  stationary  news  cameras  

seemed   to   draw   rioters   who   appeared   to   put   on   a   spectacle   for   them   (British  

Columbia   Police   Commission,   1994).   These   cameras   exacerbated   the   1994   riot   as  

they  kept  people  in  the  vicinity  and  agitated  police  crowd  control  efforts.  So  too  did  

the   crowds   of   people   unable   to   leave   downtown   as  British   Columbia  Transit   shut  

down   the   SkyTrain   and   bus   service   in   and   out   of   the   downtown   core   (British  

Columbia   Police   Commission,   1994).  Media   outlets  were   airing   updates   all   day   in  

preparation   for   the  big  game,   included  among   them  were  precautions  police  were  

making   in   the   event   of   any   social   disorder   before,   during,   or   after   the   game.   This  

resulted   in   rioters   knowing   exactly   what   type   of   situation   was   in   the   downtown  

core.  After  the  riot,  police  set  up  video  kiosks  in  key  areas  of  downtown  Vancouver  

so   the   public   could   identify   the   most   disruptive   citizens   for   police   interrogation  

(British  Columbia  Police  Commission,  1994).  

 

 

 

  19  

2011  Rioting  in  London  and  Surrounding  Areas    

Social  unrest,  riots,  and  social  disorder  have  all  been  used  to  describe  the  five  days  

of  violence,  looting,  and  criminality  that  occurred  to  largely  unprecedented  scale  in  

British   history   in   London   and   surrounding   areas   from   August   6   –   11,   2011  

(Baudains,  Braitwaite,  &  Johnson,  2013).  Commentators  agree  that  the  beginning  of  

the   social   disorder   began   with   the   fatal   shooting   of   Mark   Duggan   by   police   on  

August   4,   2011,   in   Tottenham,   England   (Panagiotopoulos,   Bigdeli   &   Sams,   2014).  

Two   days   later   approximately   three   hundred   people   gathered   outside   the   police  

station  demanding  to  speak  to  a  senior  police  official   to  get  answers   for  what  was  

interpreted  by  the  protestors  as  an  unlawful  killing  (Rusbridger  &  Rees,  2011).  The  

initially   peaceful   crowd   grew   violent   and   began   rioting   when   protesters   were  

unsatisfied  with  the  response  of  police  officials  outside  Tottenham  Police  Station.  

 

A  few  hours  before  midnight  a  series  of  clashes  began  in  the  area  as  the  post  office  

was  burnt  down,  a  double  decker  bus  was  set  on  fire,  and  police  cars  were  attacked  

(After   the   Riots,   2012).   By   the   early   hours   of   Monday   August   7th   the   rioting   had  

spread   into   London,   and   in   the   following   days   wrought   havoc   in   sixty-­‐six   areas  

around  England   from  London’s  southern  suburbs,   to  Ealing   in   the  west,  Woolwich  

and  Stratford  in  the  east,  Camden  in  the  north,  and  a  myriad  of  locations  in  between  

(Milmo,  2011,  10  August).  News   reports  and  social  media  have  been  suggested  as  

encouraging  offenders  to  participate  in  rioting  and  looting  at  particular  times  and  in  

particular  locations  (Baudains,  Johnson,  &  Braitwaite,  2013).  

 

  20  

 Photo  retrieved  from  the  Daily  Mail  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-­‐2024203/UK-­‐RIOTS-­‐2011-­‐David-­‐Cameron-­‐orders-­‐police-­‐come-­‐hard-­‐looters.html    

Britons  woke   in   the  mornings   after   the   rioting   to   high   streets   covered   in   broken  

glass,  burnt  out  vehicles,  closed  roads  and  public  transportation  stations,  and  police  

crime-­‐scene  tape  cordoning  off  buildings  (Lydall,  2011,  9  August).  After  the  rioting  

had  ended  the  English  government  mandated  the  creation  of  a  panel  to  investigate  

the  impact  of  the  rioting  on  affected  communities  and  victims.  This  panel  reported  

that  15,000  people  rioted,  five  people  were  killed,  thousands  injured,  including  300  

police   officers,   a   total   of   5,175   crimes   recorded   by   police,   and   a   financial   cost   of  

nearly   half   a   billion   British   pounds   (After   the   Riots,   2011;   Ministry   of   Justice  

Bulletin,   2012).   Additionally,   approximately   2,500   shops   and   businesses   were  

looted  or  set  on  fire  during  the  rioting  (Rusbridger  &  Rees,  2011)    

 

 

 

  21  

   Photo  retrieved  from  the  Daily  Mail  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-­‐2024203/UK-­‐RIOTS-­‐2011-­‐David-­‐Cameron-­‐orders-­‐police-­‐come-­‐hard-­‐looters.html    

The  photo  above  is  of  a  note  that  was  posted  in  the  window  of  a  Subway  restaurant  

during  the  rioting  in  the  suburbs  of  London  and  speaks  to  the  impact  the  rioting  had.  

The  note  reads  “Due  to  the  imminent  collapse  of  society  we  regret  to  announce  we  

are   closing   at   6pm   tonight.”   The   note   brings   a   sense   of   levity   to   the   situation   as  

society  is  not  exactly  disintegrating;  yet  it  does  so  by  also  pointing  out  the  fear  and  

effects  of  the  rioting,  resulting  in  the  early  closure  of  the  restaurant  due  to  fears  for  

the  safety  of  patrons  and  employees  alike.  

 

In   the   initial   three   days   of   rioting   the   police   response   appeared   inadequate   in  

resolving   the   increasing  unrest   and  disorder.  The   fact   that   several   senior  officials,  

including   the   Prime  Minister   and   the  Mayor   of   London  were   away   on   holidays   is  

said   to   have   contributed   to   the  power   vacuum   that   existed   in   regards   to   decision  

making  (Panagiotopoulos,  Bigdeli  &  Sams,  2014).  When  the  Prime  Minister  returned  

  22  

from  his  holiday  he  ordered  16,000  police  officers  to  be  deployed   in  the  streets  of  

London  and  the  neighbouring  areas,  this  helped  to  quell  the  social  disorder  and  aid  

the  3,000  officers  who  had  been  trying  to  contain  the  unrest  (Baudains,  Braithwaite  

&   Johnson,   2013).   ICT   and   social   media   played   a   role   in   inciting   collective   social  

disorder,   but   also   in   cleaning   it   up;   the   citizen   mobilization   in   these   situations  

provides  an  opportunity  to  review  the  use  of  these  technologies  in  crisis  situations,  

during  and  after  social  disorder,  and  for  mobilization  endeavors.  

 

Research  Question    

A   case   study   of   the   1994   and   2011   riots   in   Vancouver  will   be   undertaken   in   this  

thesis  to  evaluate  what,   if  any,  are  the  consequences  of  using  ICT  and  social  media  

for  citizen  mobilization  after  social  disorder,  such  as  riots?  

 

Common  sense  dictates  a  shift  would  have  occurred  in  how  these  two  riots  played  

out  based  simply  on  modernization,  however  the  effects  of  ICT  on  these  riots  cannot  

be  underscored  enough.  The  mobilization  that  occurred  due  to  ICT  to  aid  police   in  

identifying   rioters   and   the   citizens   that   came   out   to   clean   up   the   streets   of  

Vancouver  the  morning  after  the  riot  are  the  primary  components  of  the  research,  

while   the   riots   in   London   and   the   surrounding   areas   in   August   2011,   serve   as   a  

comparison.  

 

The  rioting  in  London  differed  from  that  of  Vancouver;  London  was  primarily  about  

organizing  against  the  authorities,  whereas  Vancouver  was  centered  on  mobilizing  

and  organizing   to  aid   the  authorities.  While   the  goals  differed   in   the  mobilization,  

the   mechanisms   used   to   mobilize   are   similar   and   provide   a   valid   source   of  

assessment  and  comparison  in  an  age  of  ICT  enabled  mobilization  and  organization.  

This   is   accomplished  by   looking  beyond   the   individual   components  of   the   riots   to  

the   mechanism   as   a   whole.   By   doing   so   the   rioting   in   London   highlights   the  

  23  

similarities  in  the  use  of  ICT  by  citizens  to  mobilize  for  various  movements  and  as  a  

result,   shows   a   pattern   of   behaviour   that   is   only   increasing   in   depth   and  

universality.  

 

Relevance  of  Research  Question    

After   the   2011   riots   the   Vancouver   Police   Department   faced   different   challenges  

than   did   their   colleagues   after   the   1994   riot.   The  most   significant   being   that   the  

rioting   unfolded   on   the   streets   and   on   social   media   simultaneously,   leaving   a  

moment-­‐by-­‐moment   timeline   and  map   of   the   social   disorder,   however   discerning  

fact  from  fiction  was  difficult  (Robinson,  et  al,  2012,  11  June).  The  realms  of  Twitter  

and   Facebook  were   inundated  with   updates   about   the   situation   in   the   downtown  

core  as  citizens  documented,  posted,  and  shared  content  online.  Public  engagement  

is  a  norm  in  virtually  all  aspects  of  management  and  governance.  According  to  Liu  

(2014),   this   participation   is   furthered   by   ICT   through   crowdsourcing,  

decentralization,  online   cooperation  and  collaboration,   and  voluntary   involvement  

in  the  initiatives  put  forward  by  the  online  community.  

 

ICT  has  created  new  roles  for  citizens  in  the  domain  of  crisis  management;  there  has  

been  a  move  from  passive  to  active  citizens  (Alexander,  2014).  A  shift  has  occurred  

from  a  sit  back  and  be  told  culture,  to  a  making  and  doing  culture  (Lindgren,  2013).  

Studies  have  shown  that  social  media  and  ICT  use  before,  during,  and  after  a  crisis  

increases;   leading   to   the   assumption   that   public   participation   is   part   of   the   new  

narrative   of   crisis   management   (Jin,   Liu   &   Austin,   2014).   ICT   can   contribute   to  

situational  awareness,  sense  making,  connectivity,  and  crowd-­‐funding  initiatives  in  

all   phases   of   a   crisis,   however   it   can   also   threaten   citizens   through   faulty   data  

mining   and   identification.   Citizen   vigilance   is   one   example   of   how   ICT   can   have  

negative   effects   on   citizens.   This   is   due   to   the   publish   then   filter   phenomenon  

prevalent   in   various   forms   of   social   media   and   ICT   compared   to   the   filter   then  

  24  

publish  approach  of  traditional  media  (Watson,  et  al,  2014).  This  phenomenon  can  

incorrectly  identify  and  accuse  an  innocent  party  or  parties  after  an  incident,  having  

a  large  social  impact  and  causing  irreparable  reputational  damage  and  in  some  cases  

threats  to  an  individual’s  security  (Schneider  &  Trottier,  2012).  

 

Methodology    

Qualitative   research   will   be   the   basis   for   the   use   of   information   communications  

technologies  on  the  citizen  vigilance  and  social  mobilization  that  occurred  after  the  

riots  in  Vancouver  in  1994  and  2011,  and  in  London  in  2011.  This  type  of  research  is  

most  effective  in  analyzing  the  rationale  and  behaviour  of  citizen  mobilization  as  it  

provides   the   tools   to  assess  how  things  occurred,  but  also  why   they  occurred   in  a  

certain  way.  The  research  design  for  this  thesis  is  a  narrative  account  of  the  events  

that  unfolded  following  the  riots  in  Vancouver  and  London,  and  will  use  appropriate  

literature   reviews   and   document   analysis   through   the   use   of   empirical   data   and  

examination.  

 

Initially   this   thesis  was   to   be   based   solely   on   the   riots   in   Vancouver   in   1994   and  

2011,  however  while  applying  the  theoretical   framework  to  this  case,  analysis  and  

comparison  to  the  2011  London  riots  became  a  good  case  study  to  supplement  that  

of  Vancouver  in  the  instances  where  it  is  applicable.  This  was  especially  pertinent  in  

regards   to   police   prosecution   and   access   to   closed   circuit   television   footage   in  

London   compared   to   photo   and   video   footage   provided   to   police   by   citizens   in  

Vancouver.  The  similarities  with  these  riots  do  not  lay  in  common  goals,  but  rather  

in  how  they  mobilized  and  the  tools  used  to  do  so.  Analysis  of  the  2011  London  riots  

will   be   a   post-­‐riot   review;   this   thesis   will   not   address   questions   regarding   the  

causes,   tensions,   or   otherwise   analyze   the   dimensions   of   the   riot.   The   same   was  

done   for   analysis   of   the   Vancouver   riots,   the   purpose   of   this   research   is   not   to  

understand   the   root   causes   of   these   riots,   but   rather   to   analyze   and   consider   the  

  25  

negative  effects  of  using  ICT  and  social  media  for  citizen  mobilization  as  a  result  of  

citizen  vigilance.  

 

The  sources  used  in  this  thesis  will  be  both  primary  and  secondary.  Primary  sources  

will  include  blogs,  Facebook  groups  and  posts,  as  well  as  a  podcast  on  justice  in  the  

social  media   age.   Secondary   sources   used   in   this   thesis  will   include   scientific   and  

news   articles,   various   websites,   and   police,   city,   and   independent   reviews   of   the  

riots.   This   thesis   is   limited   by   some   of   the   social  media   groups   and   pages   having  

been  taken  down  due  to  the  length  of  time  that  has  passed  since  the  riots.  In  these  

cases   secondary   sources   that   cited   these   pages   will   be   used   to   articulate   the  

message.  For  example,  the  largest  Facebook  group  that  was  created  after  the  2011  

Vancouver   riot   to   post   photos   of   the   event   was   ‘Vancouver   Riot   Pics:   Post   Your  

Photos,’  and  it  has  since  been  disbanded.  However  Schneider  and  Trottier  (2012  &  

2013)  have  analyzed  all  the  postings  made  on  the  page  and  their  work  will  be  used  

to  determine  the  effects  upon  citizen  vigilance  and  social  mobilization.  The  quotes  

selected   for   this   thesis   were   ones   that   exemplified   the   arguments   made   in   this  

thesis.   To   be   quite   clear   the   quotes  were   not   selected   and   then   arguments  made  

based   upon   those   selective   quotes.   A   further   limitation   is   a   lack   of   overarching  

theoretical  framework  for  the  1994  and  2011  riots  in  Vancouver  and  the  rioting  in  

England   in  2011,  due  to   the  different  contexts  and  triggers   that   led  to   these  social  

disorders.  As  a  result,  the  Vancouver  riots  are  the  foundation  of  this  thesis  with  the  

rioting   in   England   serving   as   a   supplement   for   understanding   the   use   of   ICT   and  

social  media  for  citizen  mobilization  and  vigilance.  

 

The  author  expects   this   thesis   to  address   rising  questions  and  concerns  about   the  

effects  of  ICT  during  and  after  a  crisis,  especially  in  its  ability  to  mobilize  citizens  for  

any  cause  or  goal.  The  expectation  is  that  this  thesis  will  add  meaningful  insights  to  

the  existing  body  of  knowledge  on  citizen  social  mobilization  aided  by  information  

communications  technologies  by  providing  analysis  of  the  rioting  in  Vancouver  and  

London.   This   field   will   continue   to   expand   and   grow   to   follow   the   rise   in  

technological  advances,  leaving  evermore  space  for  citizens  to  mobilize  either  with,  

  26  

alongside,   or   against   their   governments   and   peers.   Therefore   it   is   important   to  

understand  the  possible  detrimental  aspects  of  using  ICT  and  social  media.  

 

Structure  of  Thesis    

This   thesis   began  with   an   introduction  of   the   topic   and   a  brief   background  of   the  

riots  under  review,  after  which  was  a  brief  methodology,  then  a  theoretical  chapter  

will  follow  outlining  resource  mobilization  theory,  which  is  the  theory  applied  to  the  

cases,  and  its  evolution,  relevance,  efficacy,  and  the  costs  and  benefits  of  using  it  in  

this   thesis.   A   theoretical   framework   that  will   be   applied   to   the   cases  will   also   be  

summarized  in  the  theoretical  chapter,  and  it  will  outline  the  five  key  components  of  

resource   mobilization   theory   that   will   comprise   the   framework,   which   are  

resources,  organization,  involvement  from  outside  the  crowd,  supply  and  demand  of  

resources,  and  the  costs  and  benefits  of  participation.  Next  will  be  the  application  of  

this  framework  to  the  case  of  the  1994  and  2011  riots  in  Vancouver,  as  well  as  the  

August   2011   rioting   in   London   and   surrounding   areas  where   relevant.   The   thesis  

will  then  go  on  to  wrap  up  with  concluding  remarks  and  reflections  from  the  author.  

Use  and  Application  of  Theory    

This  chapter  will  discuss  the  theory  used  in  the  thesis,  the  evolution  of  that  theory  

and  the  state  of  citizen  mobilization  today.  Next  will  be  an  outline  of  the  theoretical  

framework   used,   the   costs   and   benefits   of   using   such   a   framework,   and   finally  

conclude   with   the   efficacy   of   using   the   theory   in   contemporary   society.   The  

theoretical   lens  used   is   resource  mobilization   theory  and   its  basis   is   the  collective  

behaviour   and   self-­‐organizing   of   citizens   to   accomplish   a   goal   (McCarthy   &   Zald,  

1977).  This  collective  organization  and  activity  ultimately  occurs  when  actions  have  

occurred  that  the  crowd,  community,  or  relevant  group,  protests  (Roderick,  1999).  A  

crowd   is   understood   as   any   group   of   citizens   coalescing   for   common   purposes.  

Roderick   (1999)   also   asserts   that   this   crowd   must   have   a   sense   of   identity   that  

differentiates  between   the  crowd  and   the  collective  other  and   this   crowd  must  be  

able  to  both  attribute  the  injustice  suffered  to  this  other  and  be  willing  to  engage  in  

action  to  remedy  it.  McCarthy  and  Zald  (1977)  refer  to  this  as  shared  grievances  and  

indicate  that  general  agreement  for  the  causes  of  grief  must  also  be  shared.  

 

Evolution  of  Resource  Mobilization  Theory    

In  the  broadest  and  most   inclusive  definition  a  social  movement   includes  all   those  

people  who   in   any   form   support   the   general   ideas   of   the  movement   (McCarthy  &  

Zald,  1973).  People  and  support  mobilize  for  social  movements  to  affect  change  and  

therefore   these   movements   are   dependent   upon   their   members.   In   this   way   the  

resources  of  the  social  movement  are  those  entities  that  are  used  as  tools  to  achieve  

the   goals   set   by   the   crowd.   Attachments   between   members   to   the   goals,   the  

movement,   and   each   other   allow   influence   to   accumulate   and   have   substantial  

effects  on  outcomes  (Friedkin,  1998).  This  contributed  to  the  change  in  the  study  of  

social  movements   from   insular,   psychologically  driven  movements,   to   the  ways   in  

  28  

which  influences  from  outside  the  movement  affected  and  influenced  the  movement  

(McCarthy  &  Zald,  1973).  Especially  in  regards  to  how  actors  and  crowds  mobilized  

effectively  in  pursuit  of  desired  goals  (McCarthy  &  Zald,  1977).  

 

Zald   and  McCarthy   (1979)   foresaw   a   shift   in   social  movements   from   questioning  

why  people  want  social  change,  to  analysis  of  how  those  same  people  organize,  pool  

resources,   and   employ   them   effectively   to   achieve   the   goals   of   their   social  

movement.   To   find   answers   to   questions   regarding   how   people   organize   and  

mobilize   resources,   resource  mobilization   theory  emphasizes   societal   support   and  

constraint  of  social  movements,  examination  of   the   types  of  resources  available   to  

be   mobilized,   links   with   other   social   groups,   and   dependence   upon   third   parties  

(Zald  &  McCarthy,  1979).  These  ideas  are  the  essence  of  the  five  key  components  of  

resource   mobilization   theory   are:   the   accumulation   of   resources,   organization,  

involvement  from  outside  the  crowd,  supply  and  demand  of  resources  towards  and  

away   from   goals,   and   costs   and   benefits   of   participation   (McCarthy  &   Zald,   1977,  

Jenkins,  1983).  

 

The  State  of  Mobilization  Today    

Information   communications   technologies   are   changing   how   resources   are  

mobilized,  which  resources,  and   the  speed  with  which   this   is  done;  as  a  result   the  

landscape   of   collective   action   has   been   fundamentally   transformed   (Eltantawy   &  

Wiest,  2011).  Here  collective  action  is  designated  as  the  acts  committed  in  pursuit  of  

predetermined  goals.  Mobilization  is  becoming  easier  to  facilitate  through  enabling  

technologies   that  grant  mobility,  access,  and  coalition   formation  at  unprecedented  

levels  (Buechler,  1993).  Online  communities  have  emerged  in  a  form  of  situational  

altruism  in  response  to  those  in  need.  Recognizing  the  new  roles  citizens  can  play  in  

post-­‐crisis  situations  is  pivotal  to  understanding  the  effects  these  roles  can  have.  ICT  

serves   as   an   enabler   for   citizen  mobilization  by  providing  multiple   platforms   that  

  29  

can   be   exploited   for   any   cause,   goal,   or   movement.   The   earliest   contemporary  

iteration   of   citizens   using   ICT   post-­‐crisis   is   that   of   the   crisis   mapping   and  

crowdsourcing   that   spontaneously   took   place   after   the   2010   earthquake   in   Haiti  

(Liu,  2014).  Ordinary  citizens  thousands  of  kilometres  away  were  able  to  aid  in  the  

situational  awareness  of   emergency   responders   in  Haiti  by  mobilizing  a  volunteer  

force   to   digitally  map   the   situation   in  Haiti   using   satellite   imagery   and   geospatial  

data  to  determine  hardest  hit  areas,  where  rescue  efforts  were  needed,  and  places  

that  needed  other  forms  of  aid  and  support  (Liu,  2014).  

 

The  Role  of  Citizens    

The  role  of   citizens  as   resources   in  mobilization  efforts   is   the  underlying  research  

question  in  this  thesis.  For  the  purposes  of  this  thesis  a  citizen  is  understood  to  refer  

to  anyone  linked  to  a  given  area  through  sociological  or   legal  ties.   ICT  has  enabled  

the  mobilization  of  large  crowds  of  citizens  for  time-­‐critical  feats  ranging  from  real-­‐

time   crisis   mapping   and   crisis   response   to   organizing   rallies   and   protests  

(Rutherford,   et   al,   2013).   Simultaneously   mobilization   requires   highly   connected  

and   active   citizens   to   be   motivated   to   participate   in   the   crowd   or   movement.  

Motivation   for   mobilization   is   key   to   understanding   this   research   and   it   is  

understood   as   the   justification   used   by   citizens   for   any   actions   they   collectively  

undertake  in  the  name  of  a  particular  cause  (Pickard,  et  al,  2011;  Zald  &  McCarthy,  

1979).  Citizen  resilience  is  also  an  element  of  this  thesis  and  is  defined  as  the  ability  

to   facilitate   the   fastest   possible   return   to   a   normal   state   after   crisis.   In   this   way  

citizen   resilience  can  be   the  motivation   for  actions  undertaken  by  citizens.  Citizen  

vigilance   is   a   central   tenant   of   this   thesis,   and   is   considered   to   encompass   the  

actions  of   citizens   to   involve   themselves   in   their   communities   and   the   events   and  

circumstances  within   it  with  the  objective  of  providing  aid   in  any   form  and  to  any  

entity.   The   help   provided   by   citizens   to   the   Vancouver   Police   Department   in  

identifying   suspected   rioters   is   an   example   of   this   citizen   vigilance.   In   this   way,  

  30  

citizen   vigilance   can   be   seen   to   go   hand   in   hand   with   citizen,   and   more   broadly  

community,  resilience.  

 

The  Role  of  Information  Communications  Technologies    

Intentional  mobilization  is  occurring  as  ICT  has  provided  the  tools  and  applications  

necessary  for  people  a  world  away  to  engage  and  participate  in  problem  definition,  

crisis   framing,   and   situational   awareness   (Rainer,   et   al,   2013).   New   technologies  

have   been   useful   in   organizing   and   implementing   activities   for   the   crowd,  

promoting   community   and   collective   identity,   establishing   connections  with   other  

movements,   and  publicising   the   cause   to   gain   support   (Eltanawy,  &  Wiest,   2011).  

This   occurs  due   to   decentralized   information   sharing   and   collaboration   through   a  

many-­‐to-­‐many  network.  ICT  and  various  forms  of  social  media  have  introduced  the  

speed   and   interactivity   that   was   lacking   in   traditional   mobilization   endeavours,  

which  relied  upon  person-­‐to-­‐person  communication,  then  on  phone  trees,  and  then  

on  email  to  coordinate  and  participate  (Edwards  and  McCarthy,  2004).  Social  media  

provides   an   ideal   medium   for   these   relationships   as   it   allows   individuals   with  

common  interests  and  goals  to  connect  and  form  a  network  for  their  own  ends  that  

is  easily  accessible  (Weare,  et  al,  2014).  

 

ICT   is   ubiquitous   and   its   use   can   both   aid   and   hamper   police   investigations,   and  

both   result   in   harm   and   protection   for   citizens   (Jin,   Liu   &   Austin,   2014).   This  

dichotomy   in   ICT   during   and   after   crisis  will   be   explored   further.   ICT   can   hinder  

police  by  advertising  police  precautions,  but  it  also  provides  various  mediums,  such  

as  social  media,  that  police  can  use  to  convey  messages  to  citizens.  Cell  broadcasting  

and   crisis   informatics   are   examples   of   how   ICT   can   protect   citizens,   while   do-­‐it-­‐

yourself  justice  on  social  media  is  an  example  of  how  citizens  can  be  harmed  by  ICT.  

Regardless  of  any  positive  or  negatives  affects  they  may  have,  various  forms  of  ICT  

allow   online   communities   to   form,   evolve,   and   participate   in   filtering,   verifying,  

synthesizing,   and   otherwise   curating   information   during   and   after   any   type   of  

  31  

significant  event  (Dailey  &  Starbird,  2014).  Analyzing  this  involvement  will  be  at  the  

root  of  this  thesis.  

 

ICT  is  transforming  emergency  response  and  crisis  management,  changing  not  only  

how  things  are  done,  but  also  what  kinds  of  task  are  necessary  and  who  does  them  

(Dailey   &   Starbird,   2014).   Crisis   informatics   is   a   relatively   new   subfield   in   crisis  

management  and  can  be  understood  as  borne  from  technological  advances  (Pipek,  

et   al,   2014).   By   taking   an   interdisciplinary   approach   to   crisis   management   crisis  

informatics  considers  the  social,  technical,  information,  and  collaborative  aspects  in  

the  lifecycle  of  a  crisis  or  disaster  and  seeks  to  use  various  forms  of  ICT  to  respond  

quickly,  efficiently,  and  effectively.  (Pipek,  et  al,  2014).  In  this  way  crisis  informatics  

is   reliant   upon   ICT   to   collaborate;   crisis   crowdsourcing   and   other   emerging   crisis  

management   tools   that   rely   on   these   technologies   to   mobilize   successfully   play  

significant  roles  in  the  ways  in  which  citizens  can  contribute  during  and  after  crises  

(Daily  &  Starbird,  2014).  

 

Theoretical  Framework    

The   accumulation   of   resources   is   instrumental   to   the   success   of   any  mobilization  

effort  and  resource  mobilization  theory  stresses  how  these  resources  are  organized,  

pooled,   and   employed   for   successful   mobilization   and   goal   achievement   (Zald   &  

McCarthy,  1979).  There  has  been  a  “shift  from  hierarchical  and  market-­‐based  forms  

of  organization  towards  more  networked  forms  that  are  shaped  by  cultural  tensions  

and  affinities  that  emerge  as  actors  adjust  to  new  patterns  of  interaction”  (Weare,  et  

al,  2014,  p  591).  This  interaction  is  based  on  networked  modalities,  which  rely  upon  

networks   of   relationships   that   are   having   increasingly   more   impact   on   how  

mobilization  occurs  (Vieweg,  et  al,  2010).  Networks,  relationships,  and  their  depth  

and   breadth   are   significant   to   the   mobilization   of   resources   (Jenkins,   1983).   The  

accumulation  of  resources  is  affected  by  the  organization,  involvement  from  outside  

  32  

the  crowd,  supply  and  demand  of  resources,  and  costs  and  benefits  of  participation.  

To  mobilize   resources   an   organized   and   coherent   demand   is   needed   to   supply   it  

from   outside   the   crowd   after   they   have   weighed   the   costs   and   benefits   of  

participation.   In   this  way   all   five   components   of   resource  mobilization   theory   are  

interconnected  and  interdependent.  

 

Figure  1:  Interconnectedness  of  Resource  Mobilization  Theory  

 

   

Mobilization   is   the   process   through   which   a   crowd   secures   control   over   the  

resources  it  needs  to  accomplish  its  goals  (Jenkins,  1983).  In  this  categorization  the  

main   concerns   are   regarding   the   existence   of   resources   prior   to  mobilization,   the  

ways   in   which   the   crowd   pools   resources   for   its   goals,   and   the   extent   to   which  

people   outside   the   crowd   increase   the   pool   of   resources   (Jenkins,   1983).  

Distinguishing   between   the   types   of   resources   is   important.   Freeman   (1979)  

differentiates  between  tangible  and  intangible  assets;  tangible  assets  are  resources  

such   as   money,   communications   technology,   and   facilities,   whereas   an   intangible  

asset  refers  to  the  non-­‐material  resources  that  form  the  basis  of  the  movement  such  

as   commitment   and   loyalty.   Mobilized   movements   tend   to   be   high   in   intangible  

Resources  

Organization      

Involvement  from  outside  the  crowd  

Supply  +  Demand  

Costs  +  Benerits  of  Participation  

  33  

assets  but  low  in  tangible  assets  as  people  are  the  primary  resources  of  any  crowd;  

understanding  how  these  people  are  aggregated  as  resources  for  a  crowd  is  a  task  

for  social  movement  analysis  (Freeman,  1979).  

 

Resource  mobilization  theory  focuses  on  instrumental  reason  and  rational  collective  

behaviour  to  describe  the  type  of  organization  in  the  crowd  rather  than  an  irrational  

mob  mentality  (Zald  &  Ash,  1966).  Instead  of  panicked  disorder  mobilization  occurs  

due  to  rational,  organizational  behaviour.  This  is  further  expounded  by  Zald  and  Ash  

(1966)   arguing   that   the   ‘iron   law   of   oligarchy,’   which   maintains   that   social  

mobilization  movements  will  be   inherently  oligarchic  and  conservative,   regardless  

of  how  democratically  and  charismatically  they  started,  is  not  as  inevitable  as  some  

academics  argue.  Rather  this  belief  in  the  institutionalization  and  bureaucratization  

of   social  mobilization   in   an   iron   law   relies   on   concentration   of   power,   hierarchy,  

resources,  mobilization  structures,  and  ideological  framing  (Zald  &  Ash,  1966;  Zald  

&   Garner,   2012).   Zald   and   Ash   (1966)   dispute   this   proposition   by   arguing   that  

leadership,   recruitment,   and   commitment   of   members   have   a   more   powerful  

influence  on  the  trajectory  of  a  movement  than  do  the  characteristics  that  support  

the  iron  law  of  oligarchy.  

 

Jenkins   (1983)   maintains   that   the   mobilization   potential   of   a   crowd   is   largely  

determined   by   the   pre-­‐existing   organization   of   the   crowd   and   the   distinctiveness  

and   density   of   the   interpersonal   networks   of   members.   To   this   end   involvement  

from  outside  the  crowed  is  necessary.  If  the  interpersonal  networks  of  members  are  

the   same  or   exceedingly   similar   the  pool   of   resources   they   are   able   to   access  will  

also  be  similar,  this  is  why  distinct  and  dense  networks  are  important  to  successful  

mobilization.  To   this  effect,   crowds  with  weak   identities  and  sparse  networks  will  

not   be   as   successful   as   crowds   that   have   access   to   strong   identities   and   dense  

networks.  In  the  case  of  the  2011  and  1994  riots  in  Vancouver,  the  identity  is  that  of  

law-­‐abiding,  conscientious  citizens  who  rallied  together  against  the  few  bad  apples  

that  were  responsible  for  the  chaos  during  the  riot.  The  interpersonal  networks  of  

those  citizens  were  varied,  as  the  common  denominator  between  them  was  a  belief  

  34  

in  the  wrongness,  or  criminality,  of   the   individuals  who  caused  the  social  disorder  

during  the  riot.  

 

The   supply  and  demand  of   resources  away  and   towards   the  goals  of   the   crowd   is  

dependent  upon  the  participation  and  recruitment  of  resources.  Recruitment  relies  

on  linking  purposive  incentives  to  bring  about  the  goals  of  the  crowd  (Tilly,  1995).  

Incentives  are  marked  as  a  way  to  encourage  participation  in  mobilizing  to  meet  the  

crowd’s  goals  (McCarthy  &  Zald,  1977).  Unequal  distribution  of  resources  can  also  

affect  the  demand  if  the  supply  is  not  available,  this  can  be  either  due  to  an  inability  

to  access  resources  or  a  lack  of  resources  altogether  (Edwards  &  McCarthy,  2004).  

However  when   resources  are  accessible   they  become  collective   resources  and  are  

no  longer  controlled  by  individuals  (Edwards  &  McCarthy,  2004).  

 

Costs   and   benefits   of   participation   in   mobilizing   to   meet   the   goals   of   the   crowd  

describe  why  people  choose  to  participate,  or  not  to  participate  in  the  mobilization  

movement.  The  elite  in  the  crowd  can  also  manipulate  costs  and  benefits  to  increase  

participation:   framing   of   the   message,   social   construction   of   an   incident,   and  

labelling  are  ways   in  which  this  can  be  accomplished  to  reduce  costs  and   increase  

benefits  (Jenkins,  1983).  When  ICT  is  involved  in  mobilizing  citizens  the  elite  in  the  

crowd   would   be   those   who   create   and   control   the   forums   of   participation,   for  

example   the   moderators   of   a   Facebook   page   who   have   the   ability   to   delete  

comments  posted  to  the  page  to  sway  opinion  in  one  direction  or  another.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

  35  

Benefits  and  Drawbacks  of  Applying  Resource  Mobilization  Theory  to  a  Case  Study    

Benefits  of  Using  Resource  Mobilization  Theory    

Resource  mobilization  theory  will  be  applied  to  the  research  question  in  a  five-­‐fold  

typology  using  accumulation  of   resources,   organization,   involvement   from  outside  

the  crowd,  supply  and  demand  of  resources  towards  and  away  from  goals,  and  costs  

and  benefits  of  participation.  This  rubric  is  beneficial  to  understanding  the  entirety  

of  the  mobilization  that  occurred  after  the  riots  in  Vancouver  in  1994  and  2011,  and  

during   and   after   the   rioting   in   August   2011   in   London   as   it   provides   access   and  

insight   into   the   narrative   of   the   participatory   revolution   that   was   resourced   and  

facilitated  by  citizens  as   they  sought   to  use   ICT   for   their  different  goals.  McCarthy  

and   Zald   (1973)   recognized   that   communication   is   crucial   to   the   efforts   of   the  

movement   as   it   activates   and   organises   the   crowd.   If   communication   is   prompt,  

detailed,  and  effectively  conveyed,  the  crowd  is  more  likely  to  take  action  to  rectify  

the   grievances   and   meet   the   goals.   The   immediacy   and   universality   of   emerging  

media   forms   provide   an   increased   communication   potential   that,   if   leveraged  

appropriately,  can  have  powerful  effects  on  a  mobilization  effort  (McCarthy  &  Zald,  

1973;  Eltantawy  &  Wiest,  2011).    

 

Resource   mobilization   theory   emphasizes   structural   factors   in   the   success   of   a  

movement,   such   as   availability   of   resources,   and   the   rationality   of   individuals  

participating   in   social   movements   who   have   assessed   the   costs   and   benefits   of  

participation  (Klandermans,  1984).  Edwards  and  McCarthy  (2004)  further  expound  

on  this  thought  by  arguing  that  this  is  successfully  accomplished  by  making  benefits  

as  high   as  possible   and   lowering   costs   as  much  as  possible   in  order   to   encourage  

participation.  By  doing  so  the  incentives  for  participation  outweigh  the  drawbacks,  

thereby   subtly   manipulating   the   opportunities   for   participation   (Klandermans,  

1984;  Eltantawy  &  Wiest,  2011).  

  36  

Drawbacks  of  Using  Resource  Mobilization  Theory    

A   frequent   criticism   of   resource   mobilization   theory   is   that   it   fails   to   consider  

unequal   distribution   of   resources   among   the  movement,   whether   this   is   between  

individual   members,   across   geographic   regions,   or   during   the   life   cycle   of   the  

movement   (Klandermans,   1984).   Resources   are   fundamental   to   successful  

mobilization,  however  resource  mobilization  theory  assumes  that  the  resources  of  a  

movement   are   uniform   and   equal   for   the   entirety   of   the   mobilization   effort.   The  

theory   does   not   consider   that   they   may   vary,   and   thereby   potentially   having  

detrimental   effects   on   the  movement   (Edwards   and  McCarthy,   2004).   The   theory  

also  fails  to  address  social  movements  that  are  successful  with  minimal  resources.  

 

Another   critique   of   resource   mobilization   theory   is   that   it   underestimates   the  

significance   of   the   grievances   and   ideology   that   lead   individuals   to   participate   in  

movements   (Klandermans,   1984).   In   this   sense   the   theory   assumes   that   the  

movement  will  spontaneously  disband  once  the  grievance  has  been  resolved  or  will  

morph  into  a  movement  for  a  different  grievance  (Klandermans,  1984;  McCarthy  &  

Zald,  1973).   Instead   it   is  argued  that   the  members  of   the  movement  have  a  strong  

commitment  to  it  as  it  was  initially  established  and  will  not  seek  to  remain  part  of  a  

transformed  movement   that  works   toward   resolving   a   different   set   of   grievances  

(McCarthy  &  Zald,  1973).  Further  critiques  of  the  theory  are  that  it  does  not  address  

social   movements   that   begin   with   substantial   resources,   it   overemphasises   the  

necessity  of  resources  from  outside  the  crowd,  supposes  rationality  of  actors,  and  it  

assumes  that  discontent  with  grievances  will  last  and  not  fade  over  time  (Eltantawy  

&  Wiest,  2011).  

 

 

 

  37  

The   Efficacy   of   Resource   Mobilization   Theory   in   Contemporary  Society    

Resource   mobilization   theory   is   the   most   relevant   theory   to   use   for   the   study  

conducted   in   this   thesis   because   it   provides   an   ideal   typology   through   which   to  

understand   the   citizen   and   social   mobilization   after   the   riots.   This   is   due   to   its  

ability  to  recognize  purposeful  activity  as  a  means  to  a  goal  and  the  emphasis  on  the  

acquisition   and   organization   of   resources,   rather   than   the   resources   themselves  

(McCarthy   &   Zald,   1977).   Resources   are   the   lifeblood   of   crowds   and   social  

movements,   without   them   there   is   no   infrastructure   to   meet   the   goals   of   the  

movement.  More  important  still,  is  the  ways  in  which  these  resources  are  organized,  

exploited,  and  mobilized.  

 

The   prevalence   and   increasing   use   of   information   communications   technologies  

presents  an  opportunity  to  re-­‐examine  the  efficacy  of  resource  mobilization  theory  

in  modern  society  (Eltantawy  &  Wiest,  2011).  This  theory  was  developed  in  a  time  

when  the  Internet  and  all  its  acclaims  were  nonexistent,  leaving  substantial  holes  in  

the  modern   summation   of   its   typology.   Resource  mobilization   theory   emphasises  

that  centralized  and  formally  structured  social  movements  mobilize  resources  more  

effectively   than   decentralized   and   informal  movements.   This   distinction   is   not   as  

clear   cut   as   it   once   was   as   the   spatially   fragmented   and   decentralized   nature   of  

information   communications   technologies   has   allowed  decentralized   and   informal  

social  movements  to  be  successful  (Eltantawy  &  Wiest,  2011;  Edwards  &  McCarthy,  

2004).  

 

Another  facet  to  recognize  is  the  emphasis  resource  mobilization  theory  places  upon  

charismatic   and   clear   cut   leadership   as   a   precondition   for   the   success   of   social  

movements,  in  the  decentralized  realm  of  social  media  in  contemporary  society  this  

is   not   a   requirement   for   success.   Using   resource   mobilization   theory   for   social  

movements  in  contemporary  times  is  difficult  as  the  types  and  varieties  of  resources  

that  exist  now  and   those   that  existed  at   the   time   this   theory  was   formulated  have  

  38  

changed  drastically.  Despite   being   out   of   touch  with   current   technologies   and   the  

resources   they   can   provide,   resource   mobilization   theory   is   still   applicable   and  

relevant   due   to   the   five-­‐point   typology   it   provides,   as   discussed   above,   to   assess  

mobilization  for  social  movements  and  collective  action  (Eltantawy  &  Wiest,  2011).  

   

  39  

Analysis    

This  chapter  will  apply  the  theoretical  framework  outlined  in  the  previous  chapter  

to   the   case   of   the   1994   and   2011   riots   in   Vancouver   and   partially   apply   it   to   the  

rioting  that  occurred  in  London  over  the  course  of  five  days  in  August  of  2011.  The  

partial  application  of  the  theory  to  the  rioting  in  London  is  due  to  the  fact  that  there  

is  not  an  overarching  theoretical  framework  that  is  perfectly  relevant  and  applicable  

to   both   cities.   The   core   of   the   research   in   this   thesis   is   on   the   mobilization   in  

Vancouver  and  its  consequences,  thus  the  framework  is  most  suited  for  the  riots  in  

that  city  and  there  will  only  be  a  limited  application  of  the  relevant  components  of  

the  framework  to  the  rioting  in  London.  Included  in  this  framework  is  application  of  

the  case  to  the  five  main  components  of  resource  mobilization  theory  as  discussed  

in   a   previous   chapter:   accumulation   of   resources,   organization,   involvement   from  

outside   the   crowd,   supply   and   demand   of   resources,   and   costs   and   benefits   of  

participation.  

 

Accumulation  of  Resources    

Social  media  plays  a   significant   role   in   today’s   society  as   it   combines   text,   visuals,  

sound,  and  video  onto  one  medium  while  being  portable,  providing  user  generated  

content,  and  opportunities  for  collaboration  (Jin,  et  al,  2014).  Post-­‐disaster  response  

and   crisis   fallout   are   examples   of   ways   in   which   social   media   can   be   utilized   to  

mobilize   individuals.   Situational   awareness,   humanitarian   aid,   fundraising,  

psychological  assistance,  and  quick  resource  mobilization  are  ways  in  which  social  

media   can  be   employed   to   allow   for   a   fastest  possible   return   to   a  normal   state  of  

functioning   (Rainer,   et   al,   2013).   Rapidity   of   communications   and   information  

sharing,  microblogging  such  as  Twitter  to  link  people  and  groups,  low  to  little  cost,  

  40  

and  a  network  for  emotional  support  are  all  ways  in  which  social  media  and  ICT  can  

positively  contribute  to  the  aftermath  of  a  significant  event  (Simon,  et  al,  2014).  

 

ICT   is   revolutionizing   the   way   citizens   respond   to   crises   as   it   removes   the  

dependence   on   governments   to   communicate   and   inform   after   disaster   or   crisis  

(Alexander,   2014).   ICT   has   allowed   citizens   to   share   news   and  photos,   empathize  

with   events  worldwide,   and   affect   change   in   a   number   of  ways,   including   socially  

and   politically   (Kotsiopoulos,   2014).   This   is   made   possible   because   ICT   presents  

tools   to   engage,   exchange,   and   interact   online   through  user-­‐generated   content   for  

any  given   situation.   Suddenly   citizens   are  not  helpless   victims,   they   are   resources  

that  can  be  mobilized  to  respond  to  crises  (Lindgren,  2013).  This  is  aided  by  the  fact  

that   citizens   are   increasingly   relying   on   social   network   websites   to   gather  

information   and   communicate   after   crises   (Wang,   2014;  Dailey  &   Starbird,   2014).  

No   longer   are   the  masses   a   body   to   communicate   to,   they   are   now   engaged   and  

active   participants   who   can   have   significant   effects   on   the   aftermath   of   a   crisis.  

Increasing  situational  awareness  to  come  to  a  more  complete  understanding  of  what  

is  happening  with  the  many  actors  and  moving  parts  involved  after  a  social  event  or  

crisis  is  pivotal  to  recognizing  the  needs  of  those  affected  by  an  event  (Vieweg,  et  al  

2010;  Wang,  2014).  Liu  (2014)  argues  that  perceptions  around  public  engagement  

and  user-­‐generated  content  are  evolving  with  the  emergence  of  online  cooperation  

and   crowdsourcing,   which   marks   a   move   towards   integrative   and   collaborative  

frameworks   for   citizen   engagement.  This   shows   the   shifting  norms  of   considering  

citizens  as  resources  and  not  solely  liabilities  after  a  crisis  (Alexander,  2014).  

 

Regardless  of  these  new  norms  and  the  potential  of  ICT  and  the  use  of  social  media  

after   significant   social   events   such   as   riots,   there   are   concerns   about   the  

ramifications  in  the  use  of  this  type  of  technology.  This  is  especially  significant  in  the  

use   of   ICT   and   social   media   to   identify   individuals,   sometimes   erroneously,   its  

ability   to   incite  mob  behaviour,  and  carry  out  vigilante   justice   (Rizza,  et  al,  2013).  

Social  media  and  other  ICT  have  substantial  impact,  yet  there  remain  apprehensions  

regarding  the   ‘publish  then  filter’  nature  of  this  technology;  contrary  to  traditional  

  41  

media,  which  filters  and  verifies  facts  before  publishing,  social  media  publishes  and  

then  members  of  the  crowd  filter  out  false  information  (Kotsiopoulos,  2014).  While  

it  is  being  verified  the  incorrect  information  is  available  for  anyone  to  view  online,  

this   can   have   detrimental   effects   on   citizens,   threatening   their   livelihood   and  

occasionally   their   security   (Watson,  et  al,  2014).  This  questions   the   reliability  and  

accuracy  of   the   information  posted  online.  Social  media  should  not  be  a  substitute  

for  finding  information  as  it  is  confronted  by  issues  that  traditional  information  and  

communication  channels  are  not  (Ranier,  et  al,  2014).  Included  among  these  issues  

are  concerns  about  the  exploitation  of  social  media  via  information  communications  

technologies   regarding   responsible   information,   individual   liberties,   public   safety,  

and   consequences   of   misuse   (Kotsiopoulos,   2014).   Perhaps   the  most   detrimental  

issue   is   in   regards   to   situational   awareness   and   information   sharing,   anyone   can  

open   an   account   on   social   media   and   begin   publishing   information   without   any  

regard  for  misinformation  and  inaccuracies,  traditional  media  do  not  have  this  issue  

as  they  are  recognized  as  a  legitimate  source  for  information  (Simon,  et  al,  2014).  

 

Identification  of  Resources  in  Vancouver    

Social  media  can  be  used  to  foster  relationships  and  identify  online  communities  for  

citizen  engagement,  this  was  the  case  in  the  aftermath  of  the  2011  Vancouver  riot.  

The   resources   of   the   crowd   varied   but   Facebook   and   Twitter   were   the   most  

dominant   social   media   and   ICT   platforms   utilized   during   and   after   the   riot  

(Schneider  &  Trottier,  2012).  These  were  also  resources  leveraged  and  mobilized  by  

the   crowd   for   their   goals.   Freeman   (1979)   differentiated   between   tangible   and  

intangible  resources;  tangible  resources   include  things   like  money  and  technology,  

while   loyalty,   commitment,   social   relationships,   and   cooperation   are   considered  

intangible  resources.  

 

Facebook   groups,   including   ‘Canucks   fans   against   the   2011   Vancouver   Riots’   and  

‘Post  Riot  Clean-­‐Up  –  Let’s  help  Vancouver’  emerged  as  ways  to  use  Facebook  as  a  

  42  

way   to   emphasize   the   resilience   of   the   community.   Whereas   Facebook   groups  

including  ‘Vancouver  Riot  2011  Video  Footage  &  Photos’  and  ‘Lets  Get  These  People  

Locked  Up  –  2011  Vancouver  Riot  Pics’  demonstrate  the  ways   in  which  the  crowd  

sought   to   mobilize   for   justice.   Robert   Gorcak   created   a   page   on   Facebook   titled  

‘Vancouver  Riot  Pics:  Post  Your  Photos’  within  ten  minutes  of  the  game  ending,  this  

is   because   the   riot   had   begun   to   take   form   and   subsequently   be   narrated   online  

before  the  game  had  concluded  (Robinson,  et  al,  2012,  11  June).  These  online  groups  

are  labelled  ‘community’  groups  by  the  creators,  denoting  and  labelling  these  pages  

as  community-­‐oriented  and  working  in  the  best  interests  of  that  community.  

 

While   there   is  no  substantiated  proof   that  Twitter  was  used   to   incite   rioters  or   to  

encourage   participation,   the   Vancouver   Police   Department   did   use   Twitter   and  

other  ICT  to  mobilize  during  and  after  the  riot.  The  Twitter   feed  for  the  VPD  went  

from   having   10,000   followers   to   13,170   over   the   course   of   the   riot,   with   an  

additional   2,000   followers   joining   over   the   following   week   (VPD   Stanley   Cup  

Review,  2011).  The  VPD  had  a  social  media  presence  throughout  the  championship  

game   and   subsequent   riot,   however   none   of   the   pre-­‐prepared   tweets   were  

appropriate   in   the   event   of   a   major   crowd   disturbance   or   riot   (VPD   Stanley   Cup  

Review,   2011).   This   led   to   a   substantial   delay   in   messaging   on   social   media  

regarding  the  riot,  resulting   in  mass  public  confusion.  This   lack  of   foresight  by  the  

VPD,  especially  with  the  knowledge  of  the  riot  that  occurred  in  1994,  the  last  time  

the  Canucks   lost   their  bid   for   the  Stanley  Cup,   contributed   to   the  confusion   in   the  

downtown   core.   Citizens   were   unable   to   secure   accurate   information   regarding  

potential  closure  of  public  transportation  networks,  roads,  and  bridges,  resulting  in  

thousands  of  people  remaining   in  the  midst  of   the  riot  and  serving  as  an  audience  

for  the  rioters  (Furlong  &  O’Keefe,  2011).  

 

The  VPD  created  the  website  www.Riot2011.vpd.ca  so  that  the  public  could  identify  

rioters  pictured  on  the  website,  while  also  serving  as  a  medium  to  update  the  public  

on  the  status  of  the  investigation.  The  most  significant  use  of  ICT  by  the  VPD  was  the  

use   of   QR   codes.   QR   Codes,   the   abbreviation   for   Quick   Response   codes,   are   two-­‐

  43  

dimensional   barcodes   that   can   be   read   by   imaging   devices   like   the   cameras   on  

cellphones,   to   interpret   information   associated   to   that   particular   code.   QR   codes  

were   used   by   the   VPD   on   the   35,000   ‘Riot   Roundup’   posters   distributed   in  

Vancouver   and   the   surrounding   metropolitan   area,   which   displayed   photos   of  

individuals  wanted  for  participating   in  the  2011  riot.2  The  phrasing  on  the  posters  

was  provocative,  it  encouraged  individuals  who  felt  outraged  or  shamed  due  to  the  

riot   to   take   action   and   fight   back   (Riot   Roundup   Poster,   2011).   The   citizens   of  

Vancouver  took  this  call  to  action  to  heart.  

 

Identification  of  Resources  in  London    

Similar  to  the  riot  in  Vancouver  social  media  use  during  the  rioting  in  London  was  

heavy,   however   the   nature   of   it   was   different.   Blackberry   Messenger   (BBM),  

Facebook,   and   Twitter  were   all   social  media   platforms   used   to   discuss,   plan,   and  

boast   about   rioting   in   London.   However   the  most   powerful   and   up-­‐to-­‐the  minute  

rallying   and   orchestrating   took   place   on  BBM   (Halliday,   2011B,   8   August).   Unlike  

Facebook   and   Twitter,   which   occur   in   a   public   forum,   BBM   messages   are   more  

covert,   they   are   private,   untraceable   due   to   encryption,   and   can   be   sent   instantly  

from   one-­‐to-­‐many   BBM   users   (Halliday,   2011A,   8   August).   The   result   is   that   the  

authorities  must   rely  on  open   social  media   sources   to  keep  abreast  of   the   rioting.  

The   Metropolitan   Police   were   able   to   successfully   prevent   approximately   sixty  

youth  from  looting  in  Oxford  Circus  by  monitoring  social  media,  yet  these  new  forms  

of  interaction  and  communication  facilitated  by  ICT  and  the  power  they  have  are  not  

well  understood  (Rules  of  engagement,  2011).  Police   forces   implemented  different  

approaches   to  monitor  social  media  networks,   including  using  media  departments  

and  intelligence  units,  while  others  had  officers  scanning  these  networks  from  their  

own  personal  ICT  devices  (Rules  of  engagement,  2011).  These  haphazard  measures  

attest   to   the   lack  of  awareness  and   importance  placed  on  social  media.  One  police  

officer   recalled   that   there  were   not   enough   officers   to  monitor   the   overwhelming  

                                                                                                               2  https://riot2011.vpd.ca/,  last  consulted  on  April  3,  2015.  

  44  

volume   of   data   found   on   social   media   and   even   harder   still   to   verify   or   correct  

wrong  or  misleading  information  (Rules  of  engagement,  2011).  

 

BBM  usage  was  so  high  during  the  riots   that   the  Economist  began  referring  to   the  

disorder   as   ‘The   Blackberry   Riots’   (Panagiotopoulos,   Bigdeli   &   Sams,   2014).   One  

message  on  BBM  urged  looters  to  go  to  Stratford,  “if  you're  down  for  making  money,  

we're  about  to  go  hard  in  east  London  [sic]  tonight,  yes  tonight!!   I  don't  care  what  

ends  you're   from,  we're  personally   inviting  you   to   come  and  get   it   in.  Police  have  

taken  the  piss  for  too  long  and  to  be  honest  I  don't  know  why  its  [sic]  taken  so  long  

for   us   make   this   happen.   We   need   a   minimum   of   200   hungry   people.   We're   not  

broke,  but  who  says  no  to  free  stuff.  Doesn't  matter  if  the  police  arrive  cos  [sic]  we'll  

just  chase  dem  [sic]  out  because  as  you've  seen  on  the  news,  they  are  NOT  ON  DIS  

[sic]  TING   [sic].  Everyone  meet   at  7   at   stratford  park  and   let's   get   rich"   (Halliday,  

2011B,   8  August).   It   is   important   to   note   that   this  message  points   out   the   lack   of  

police  seen  on  news  coverage  of  the  rioting  as  a  reason  to  join  the  rioters,  as  will  be  

discussed   further   in   the   thesis   this  perception  of   the  suspension  of  societal  norms  

impacted  the  rioting.  Another  message  said  “everyone  from  all  sides  of  London  meet  

up   at   the   heart   of   London   (central)  OXFORD  CIRCUS!!,   Bare   SHOPS   are   gonna   get  

smashed  up  so  come  get  some  (free  stuff!!!)   fuck   the   feds  we  will   send   them  back  

with  OUR  riot!  >:O  Dead  the  ends  and  colour  war  for  now  so  if  you  see  a  brother...  

SALUT!   if   you   see   a   fed...   SHOOT!"   (Halliday,   2011B,   8   August).   One   individual  

interviewed   by   a   joint   project   reviewing   the   rioting   in   London   between   the  

Guardian   and  The   London   School   of   Economics   said,   “I   don’t   know   about   Twitter  

and   Facebook,   neither   do   I   have   an   account   with   them.   All   I   know   is   that   the  

Blackberry  was   enough   to   give  me   enough   information,   or   tell  me   at   the   time,   of  

what  was  going  on,  where   to   stay  wary  of  and  what   sort  of   things  were   targeted”  

(Rusbridger  &  Rees,  2011,  p  31).  While  BBM  use  by  rioters  was  extensive,  Facebook  

and  Twitter  use  was  less  common  to  incite  participation  in  the  rioting  (Rusbridger  &  

Rees,  2011).  

 

  45  

The   speed   and   mobility   of   these   crowds   was   enhanced   by   the   mobilization   of   a  

mediated   crowd   using   information   communications   technologies   to   organize  

virtually  to  incite  collective  disorder  (Baker,  2011).  The  use  of  ICT  and  social  media  

to  perpetuate  the  rioting  led  to  the  English  government  placing  blame  for  the  riots  

on   social   media   and   debate   shutting   down   or   limiting   social   media   websites  

(Bohannon,   2012;   England   riots,   2011,   11   August).   Yet   there   was   little   evidence  

Twitter   or   Facebook   played   any   significant   role   in   the   mobilization   of   rioters  

(Panagiotopoulos,  Bigdeli  &  Sams,  2014).  ICT  and  the  various  social  media  platforms  

that  evolve  from  it  are  a  fact  of  life  and  simply  alternative  forms  of  communication,  

however  they  may  be  used  (Eltantawy  &  Wiest,  2011).  Questions  about  the  technical  

workability  of  implementing  the  idea  and  civil  liberty  implications  of  shutting  down  

social  media  websites  were  also   raised   in  opposition   to   the   idea,   in   the  end   these  

websites  were  not  shut  down  (England  riots,  2011,  11  August).  

 

Similarly  to  the  VPD  the  police  in  London  and  the  surrounding  areas  used  ICT  and  

social  media   for   their  own  ends,  although  arguably   to  a   lesser  extent.  The  London  

Metropolitan  Police  used  social  media   to  keep   local   residents  updated  about  riots,  

often   responding   to   queries   and   concerns   to   dispel   rumours   and   hearsay  

(Bohannon,  2012).  The  Metropolitan  Police  ultimately  launched  Operation  Withern  

to  round  up  the  rioters,  with  over  125  detectives  involved  (Evison,  2014).  An  aspect  

of  Operation  Withern  was  to  post  closed  circuit  television,  commonly  referred  to  as  

CCTV,  images  on  a  dedicated  police  Flickr  account  (Panagiotopoulos,  Bigdeli  &  Sams,  

2014).   Flickr   is   a   social   networking   website   used   to   host   and   share   images   and  

videos,   and   it  was   used  by   the   police   so   that   the   public   could   identify   individuals  

known   to   them.3  CCTV   use   is   established   and  widespread   in   London,   resulting   in  

over   200,000   hours   of   CCTV   footage   for   the   police   to   comb   through  

(Panagiotopoulos,   Bigdeli   &   Sams,   2014).   A   Facebook   post   summed   up   the   belief  

many  had  in  England  about  the  use  of  CCTV  images  to  identify  rioters  and  looters,  

“smile  your  [sic]  on  camera!”  (Supporting  the  Met  Police  against  the  London  Rioters,  

                                                                                                               3  http://content.met.police.uk/Site/operationwithern,  last  consulted  on  April  16,  2015.  

  46  

posted  August  8,  2011,  11:17PM).  More  than  7.8  million  hits  were  reported  on  this  

Flickr  account  that  the  police  established  to  name  and  shame  suspected  rioters  and  

looters   (Evison,   2014).  A   key  difference   in   the  Vancouver  2011  and  London  2011  

riots  was   that   the   naming   and   shaming   occurring   in   Vancouver  was   orchestrated  

and  facilitated  by  the  public,  whereas   in  London  the  police  began  the  process.  The  

advantage  the  London  Metropolitan  Police  had  over  the  VPD  is  that  their  evidence  

came   directly   from   CCTV   footage   and   thus   could   not   be   questioned   based   for  

legitimacy   or   authenticity.   The   VPD,   however,   received   the   vast   majority   of   their  

evidence   from   citizens,   who   have   the   ability   to   tamper   and   edit   footage   before  

sending  it  to  the  police,   thus   leaving  it  open  to  scrutiny  and  criticism  in  the  courts  

and  potentially  removed  as  evidence,  allowing  the  individual  in  court  to  be  set  free  

(UBC  Dialogues,  2013,  00:26,  28).  

 

Organization    

Leadership  of  the  Movement    

Crowd  organization  has  impact  on  the  resources  it  is  able  to  draw  upon  (Zald  &  Ash,  

1966).  Efforts   to  mobilize   featuring  a   leadership   that   is   focused  on  rationality  and  

reason   is   more   likely   to   gain   resources   than   is   a   movement   that   is   spurred   by  

panicked   social  disorder   (Zald  &  Garner,  2012).   In   the   same  way,   the   recruitment  

and  commitment  of  the  members  that  comprise  the  resources  of  a  movement  go  a  

long  way   in  ensuring   the  success  of   that   same  movement   (Zald  &  Ash,  1966).  The  

leadership  of  the  citizen  vigilance  that  erupted  after  the  2011  Vancouver  riot  cannot  

be   clearly   defined   as   there  was   no   singular,   or   even   a   few,   leaders   that   could   be  

unmistakably  recognized  as  the  decision  makers  of  the  crowd  (Schneider  &  Trottier,  

2012).  However   the  moderators  of   the  Facebook  groups  and  blogs  can  be  seen  as  

the  de  facto  leaders,  though  their  decisions  and  statements  were  not  the  be  all,  end  

all.  Rather,   these  blogs  and  groups   served  as   forums   to   share   content   and  discuss  

  47  

the  situation  to  come  to  a  more  clear  definition  of  the  situation  (Boyd,  2008).  On  the  

Facebook   page   ‘Canucks   fans   against   the   2011   Vancouver   Riots’   the   moderator  

posted  “At  50,000  likes  in  less  than  24  hours  we’ve  showed  that  the  facebook  [sic]  

page  ‘Canucks  fans  against  the  2011  Vancouver  Riots’  is  a  Social  Networking  mob  of  

its  own  that  wants  to  let  the  world  know  that  the  rioters  are  not  Canucks  fans,  that  

we  will  help  identifying  the  individuals  involved  and  to  the  world  that  on  behalf  of  

our   team   and   our   city   we   are   sorry”   (Canucks   fans   against   the   2011   Vancouver  

Riots,  posted  June  17,  2011,  5:54AM).  

 

There  may  have  been  a   lack  of   leadership  after   the  2011  Vancouver  riot  but   there  

was  a  clear  leader  after  the  1994  Vancouver  riot:  the  police.  The  VPD  attempted  to  

mobilize  citizens  after  the  riot  to  view  the  footage  in  the  video  kiosks  set  up  around  

the   downtown   core   of   Vancouver   and   identify   individuals   they   knew   or   were  

familiar  with   (BC  Police  Commission,  1994).  The  VPD  was  criticised   for   the  use  of  

force,   chemical   agents,   and   canine   units   during   the   1994   riot,   when   these   video  

kiosks  were   set   up   the  most   damaging   instances   of   police   heavy-­‐handedness   had  

been   edited   out   of   the   footage   (Furlong   &   O’Keefe,   2011).   By   monopolizing   the  

framing  and  definition  of   the  situation   the  police  were  able   to  control   the  public’s  

perception  and  understanding  of   the  riot.  This   top-­‐down  approach  to  mobilization  

was   a   direct   contradiction   to   the   bottom-­‐up  mobilization   that   occurred   after   the  

2011   Vancouver   riot.   That   riot   was   simultaneously   primarily   instigated,  

documented,   and   posted   by   the   digital   natives   generation;   a   generation   that   is  

growing   out   loud   and   is   disinhibited   about   what   they   post   of   themselves   online  

(Suler,   2004;   Prensky,   2001).   Another   characteristic   of   this   generation   is   to  

document   all   aspects   of   their   lives;  when   the   championship   game  was  happening,  

arguably  the  biggest  event   in  Canada  at  the  time,   this  generation  had  to  document  

the   riot   and   post   it   online   as   empirical   evidence   to   prove   they   were   there   (UBC  

Dialogues,  2013,  00:17:56).  

 

  48  

Behaviour  of  Citizens    

Suler  (2004)  refers  to  online  behaviour  that  may  differ  from  behaviour  in  reality  as  

the   online   disinhibition   effect.   There   are   two   variations   of   this   effect;   the   first   is  

benign  disinhibition,  which  refers  to  revealing  secrets  or  fears  online  (Suler,  2004).  

An  example  would  be  the  Post  Secret  website  which  encourages  individuals  to  mail  

a  postcard  in  with  their  deepest,  darkest  secret  as  a  sort  of  catharsis,  and  then  the  

moderator   posts   a   weekly   selection   of   the   postcards   received   online.   Acts   of  

kindness   and   generosity,   such   as   crowd   funding   are   also   examples   of   benign  

disinhibition.  The  second  variation  is  toxic  disinhibition  and  it  bears  witness  to  the  

rude   language,   hatred,   harsh   criticism,   and   threats   that   are   fuelled   by   anonymity  

and  a  dissociation  that  actions  online  will  not  effect  or  be  linked  to  individual  reality  

(Suler,   2004).  Toxic  disinhibition   can  be   seen   in   the  2011  Vancouver   riot   through  

individuals   posting   photos,   tweeting,   and   commenting   on   the   negative   behaviour  

rioters   engaged   in   and   the   ways   in   which   they   believe   justice   should   be   served  

(Robinson,  et  al,  2012,  11  June).  

 

The  premise  of  toxic  inhibition  is  anonymity,  yet  the  things  posted  online  by  these  

individuals   flew   in   the   face   of   this   and   helped   police   and   the  wider   social  media  

community   identify   and   track   them   down.   “We   live   in   an   age   of   accountability.  

Everything  you  do,  everything  you  say,  everything  you  post,  everything  you’ve  made  

public  you  can  be  held  responsible  for”  (UBC  Dialogues,  2013,  01:13:53).  The  toxic  

disinhibition  of  citizens  involved  in  crowdsourced  policing  after  the  riot  can  be  seen  

in   posts   to   the   Facebook   wall   of   ‘Vancouver   Riot   Pics:   Post   Your   Photos’   with  

individuals   posting   things   like   “BRING  BACK  THE  DEATH  PENALTY”   (posted   June  

16,  2011,  2:42AM)  or   “I  hope  all   those  who  get   charged   for   the   riots   get   raped   in  

prison   and   die   of   rectal   bleeding”   (posted   June   16,   2011,   11:54am),   (Schneider  &  

Trottier,   2013,   p   351).   These   types   of   comments   were   frequent   and   colourfully  

stated,  but  there  were  others  in  the  crowd  who  pleaded  for  restraint,  “This  is  photo  

and  video  evidence  being  gathered  for  the  police  to  decifer  [sic].  The  justice  system  

is  [sic]  flawed  as  it  is,  is  still  better  than  we  as  individuals  gathering  in  our  outrage  

  49  

and  also  gaining  momentum  on  the  mob  mentality  in  the  vigilantism  and  threats  to  

the  people  involved  in  the  rioting,  and  their  families  (inderectly)  [sic].  Grow  up  .  .  .  .”  

(posted   June   20,   2011,   7:09PM),   (Schneider  &  Trottier,   2013,   p   351).   There  were  

still   others   who   were   posting   and   participating   online   to   aid   the   police,   “All   this  

outing  is  strictly  to  allow  justice  and  our  legal  system  to  proceed”  (posted  June  21,  

2011,  12:50AM),  (Schneider  &  Trottier,  2013,  p  352).  

 

In  addition   to   the  Facebook  pages,  websites  and  blogs  were  created   to  attempt   to  

identify  rioters  and  more  generally  to  vent  frustration  with  the  riot  overall.  ‘Letters  

from   the   front   lines:   Vancouver   Riot,’   is   a   tumblr   site   which   posted   letters   from  

individuals   working   on   the   front   lines,   including   police   officers,   firefighters,  

paramedics,   transit   staff,   and   many   more.   Tumblr   is   a   blogging   and   social  

networking  website  that  allows  individuals  to  create  weblogs  on  any  topic  of  their  

choosing   and   post   text,   audio,   video,   or  web   links   related   to   it.4  One   letter  writer  

indicated   “people   are   taking   it   a   step   too   far,   by   posting   home   addresses   and  

telephone   numbers.   We   don’t   need   any   more   people   hurt   or   windows   smashed,  

thank   you.”5  This   is   especially   relevant   due   to   the   fact   that   the   VPD   did   not  

recommend   the   first   set   of   charges   until   six   months   after   the   riot,   and   the  

persecution   taking   place   online   had   an   immediate   impact   on   the   lives   of   the  

suspected   rioters   (Trottier,   2014).   As   one   commentator   posted,   “Yeah   I   think   I’d  

rather  go   to   jail   than  be  publicly  shamed  all  over   facebook  [sic]  and  youtube  [sic].  

These   pics   will   be   there   for   a   lot   longer   than   their   jail   sentence   (Lets   Get   These  

People   Locked   Up   –   2011   Vancouver   Riot,   posted   June   17,   2011,   10:36PM).   This  

speaks  to  the  enduring  nature  of  anything  posted  online,  which  can  be  understood  

as  a  massive  semi-­‐permanent  archive  of  data  posted  by  users  (Goldsmith,  2015).  In  

the  age  of  technology  “you  are  tried,  found  guilty,  and  convicted  all  online,  but  once  

you’ve  done  your  time   in  real  prison  you  can  move  on  with  your   life,  you  can’t  do  

this  with   social  media;   things   online   last   and   reverberate”   (UBC   Dialogues,   2013,  

00:14:27).                                                                                                                  4  https://www.tumblr.com/,  last  consulted  on  April  2,  2015.  5  http://riot2011frontlines.tumblr.com/,  last  consulted  on  April  10,  2015.  

  50  

 

The  rioters  in  London  were  primarily  teenagers  and  young  people,  many  under  the  

age  of   twenty-­‐four,   lending  credence   to   the  perception   that   the  rioting  was  youth-­‐

oriented  and  mobilized  (After  the  Riots,  2012).  These  digital  natives  are  disinhibited  

about  what  they  share  and  do  online  as  they  disassociate  their  online  identity  from  

that   of   their   offline   reality   and   believe   the   two   cannot   be   linked   (Suler,   2004;  

Prensky,  2001).  Jordan  Blackshaw  and  Perry  Sutcliffe-­‐Keenan  are  two  British  youth  

who  discovered  this  is  not  the  case.  Both  were  sentenced  to  four  years  in  prison  for  

inciting  people   to   riot   in   their  hometowns   (Bowcott,  2011,  16  August).  Blackshaw  

created  an  event  on  Facebook  called  ‘Smash  Down  in  Northwich  Town’  for  August  8,  

2011,  no  one  except  the  police  showed  up  to  the  pre-­‐arranged  meeting  point  outside  

the   local   McDonalds   fast   food   restaurant   where   the   young   man   was   promptly  

arrested  (Bowcott,  2011,  16  August).  In  the  early  hours  of  August  9,  2011,  Sutcliffe-­‐

Keenan  used  his  Facebook  account  to  create  a  group  titled   ‘The  Warrington  Riots,’  

causing  panic  throughout  the  town.  Upon  waking  with  a  hangover  Sutcliffe-­‐Keenan  

deleted  the  group  and  apologized  for  the   joke  (Bowcott,  2011,  16  August).   In  both  

instances   no   rioting   occurred   as   a   result   of   the   mobilization   attempts   on   social  

media  yet  it  stands  as  an  example  of  how  easy  it  is  to  attempt  to  do  so  and  the  lack  of  

inhibition  exhibited  by  both  youth,  as  well  as  the  consequences.  

 

‘Criminal   List:   Anonymous   Crime   in   a   2.0  World?   I   Don’t   Think   So!’   was   another  

tumblr  site  created  in  response  to  the  VPD  request  for  photos  from  the  public.6  This  

blog   was   clear   it   did   not   advocate   vigilantism   or   violent   retribution,   instead   its  

purpose  was  to  provide  photos  and  any  other  helpful  information  to  the  VPD  and  in  

the   process   do   “something   that   most   of   us   learned   was   a   horrible   thing   via   our  

mothers:   being   ‘shamed.’”7  This   view   of   social   justice   by  means   of   shaming  was   a  

popular   method   on   social   media   (Schneider   &   Trottier,   2012).   Shaming   was   a  

common   element   of   ‘Canucks   fans   against   the   2011   Vancouver   Riot’   as  

commentators  posted  “Send  them  the  pictures  and  I  hope  the  cops  and  media  print                                                                                                                  6  http://vancityriotcriminals.tumblr.com/,  last  consulted  on  April  2,  2015.  7  https://www.tumblr.com/,  last  consulted  on  April  2,  2015.  

  51  

them  in  every  newspaper  for  a  week.  Shame  them  and  their  friends  or  family  to  turn  

these  bastards  and  women  in.  I  am  disgusted  in  the  actions  of  my  hometown  people  

the  3%  of  you   that   caused  all   those  problems”   (posted   June  16,  2011,  7:44PM)  or  

“Let’s  parade  all   the  asshole   rioters,  handcuffed,  down  Granville”   (posted   June  16,  

2011,   9:40PM).   Granville   Street   is   a  major   street   that   runs   through   the   centre   of  

Vancouver   and   is   a   high   traffic   area   for   pedestrians   and   vehicles   alike   and   being  

marched   down   the   busy   street   would   be   the   embodiment   of   shame   and  

embarrassment.  

 

The   shaming   that   became   popular   on   social   media   came   about   due   to   citizens  

embracing   lateral   surveillance   as   an   aspect   of   their   citizen   vigilance.   Lateral  

surveillance  refers  to  citizens  monitoring  the  behaviour  and  actions  of  other  citizens  

and  reporting  them  to  whom  they  deem  are  the  necessary  authorities  (Lewis,  2013,  

14   June).   This   type   of   surveillance   has   become   increasingly   common   in   a   cyber  

world   where   individuals   are   posting   significant   details   of   their   lives;   we   have   a  

generation   of   digital   natives   who   are   growing   out   loud   (UBC   Dialogues,   2013,  

01:00:23;   Prensky,   2001).   This   means   that   this   generation   has   grown   up   with  

technology  and  the  rapid  advances  within  it;  they  are  what  they  share,  its  how  they  

interact   and   remain   connected   (UBC  Dialogues,  2013,  01:01:29).  This   lends   to   the  

ease   of   lateral   surveillance   as   everything   these   digital   natives   do,   everything   they  

say,  everything  they  post  can  be  held  against  them.  Holding  individuals  accountable  

for   their   actions   is   becoming   easier   to   accomplish   through   the   aid   of   information  

communications  technologies  (Prensky,  2001).  

 

The  security  of  citizens   is   increasingly  being   impacted  by  a   failure   to  protect   their  

anonymity.  Data  mining  after  crisis  can  result  in  malicious  activities  such  as  identity  

theft,  or  be  used  in  citizen  vigilance  to  threaten  or  harass  individuals  believed  to  be  

involved   in   a   riot   (Watson,   et   al,   2014).   An   example   of   this   is   of   a  man  who  was  

slandered   for   being   involved   in   the   looting   and   fires   set   at   the   Hudson’s   Bay  

Company   store   in  Vancouver   the   night   of   the   riot.   It  was   later   discovered   that   he  

worked   for   the  store  and  was   trying   to  stop   the   looting  and  was  putting  out   fires,  

  52  

which   is  why  he  appeared   in  video   footage  and  photos.8  One   individual  posted  on  

the  Criminal  List  blog,  “lets  [sic]  make  sure  we  don’t  paint  everyone  with  the  same  

brush  and  villify  [sic]  those  who  don’t  deserve  it.”9  A  similar  situation  occurred  after  

the  rioting  in  London.  Dane  Williamson  spent  nine  days  in  jail  for  a  crime  he  did  not  

commit  after  being  misidentified  on  social  media.  Williamson  had  five  alibis  proving  

he  did  not  commit  the  arson  he  was  accused  of,  but  the  chaos  of  the  rioting  meant  

that  he  was  arrested  and  set  aside  until  the  rioting  stopped  and  those  arrested  were  

actually   investigated   (Keeling,   2011,   20   August).   This   type   of  misidentification   in  

Vancouver  and  London  are  not  unique  instances.  The  bombing  of  the  2013  Boston  

Marathon  also  had  examples  of  wrongful  identification  of  innocent  individuals,  that  

time   on   social   networking   website   Reddit,   which   allows   members   to   vote  

submissions  up  or  down  the  main  webpage  based  on  their  interests  (Watson,  et,  al,  

2014).   Spectators  at   the  marathon  had   shared   information  and   images  on  various  

social  media  networks   and   a   crowdsourced   investigation  occurred   that   ultimately  

resulted   in   various   individuals   being   wrongly   labelled   as   the   perpetrators   of   the  

attack  (McNutt,  2014).  This  type  of  misidentification  has  serious  security  concerns  

for  the  individuals  accused  as  well  as  lasting  negative  effects  on  their  lives  and  must  

not  be  allowed  to  flourish.  Social  disorder  is  temporary,  but  the  collective  responses  

online  are  lasting.  

 

Citizens  as  Resources    

The  depth  and  extent  of  a   top-­‐down  approach   to  mobilization  versus  a  bottom-­‐up  

mobilization  is  affected  by  the  organization  and  structure  of  the  crowd  and  the  mass  

reaction   it   builds   itself   around   (Sandoval-­‐Almazan   &   Gil-­‐Garcia,   2014;   Henman,  

2012).   A   top-­‐down   approach   does   not   provide   a   platform   or   medium   to   discuss  

mobilization,   instead   it   seeks   to  mobilize   resources   for   a  narrative  determined  by  

the   elites   (Goldsmith,   2015).   A   bottom-­‐up   approach   suggests   the   existence   of   an  

empowered   user   base   and   ICT   only   serves   to   enable   this   empowerment   by                                                                                                                  8  http://vancityriotcriminals.tumblr.com/,  last  consulted  on  April  2,  2015.  9  Ibid.  

  53  

providing  platforms  for  interaction  (Trottier,  2014).  Bottom-­‐up  initiatives  tend  to  be  

longer  lasting  and  more  committed  to  the  goals  of  the  movement  because  they  have  

spontaneously  formed  in  response  to  a  perceived  or  real  grievance,  are  based  upon  

collective  intelligence,  and  are  continually  evolving,  not  fixed  (Henman,  2012;  Della  

Porta,  2014).  

 

The   naming   and   shaming   of   suspected   rioters   is   an   example   of   a   bottom-­‐up  

initiative  that  formed  after  the  2011  riot  in  Vancouver,  another  example  is  the  city  

clean  up  organized  via  social  media.  The  theme  of  the  messages  and  posts  on  social  

media  was  one  of  resilience  as  citizens  mobilized  online  to  clean  up  the  city.  Social  

media   was   a   powerful   force   for   this   mobilization.   A   Facebook   group,   ‘Post   Riot  

Clean-­‐Up  –  Let’s  help  Vancouver’  was  created  within  hours  of   the  riot  ending.  The  

description  posted  for  the  group  said  “Once  the  embarrassing  rioting  has  ended  in  

Vancouver   let’s   all   show   the   world   what   Vancouver   is   really   about   by   helping  

rebuild  and  clean  up  so   it   is  better   than   it  was  before”   (Post  Riot  Clean-­‐Up  –  Let’s  

help   Vancouver,   posted   June   15,   2011,   12:00AM).   In   the   early   hours   of   June   16,  

2011,  citizens  from  Vancouver  and  the  surrounding  metropolitan  area  poured  into  

the   downtown   core   armed   with   brooms,   mops,   shovels,   and   cleaning   supplies   to  

remedy  the  destruction  caused  hours  previously  (Furlong  &  O’Keefe,  2011).  As  one  

individual  posted  on  the  Facebook  page,  “Let’s  all  come  together  to  aid  in  the  clean  

up,  the  true  citizens  of  Vancouver  and  true  Canuck  fans’’  (Post  Riot  Clean-­‐Up  –  Let’s  

help  Vancouver,  posted  June  16,  2011,  2:00  AM).  

 

An   estimated   15,000   citizens   appeared   to   sweep   sidewalks   littered   with   broken  

glass,  scrub  offensive  graffiti,  and  turn  their  city  back  to  the  way  it  was  before  the  

riot  and   looting  took  place  (Ryan,  2011,  17  November).   “THIS   IS  MY  VANCOUVER.  

Please   use  #thisismyvancouver   in   your   twitter   [sic]   posts  when   talking   about   the  

riot”   (Post   Riot   Clean-­‐Up   –   Let’s   help   Vancouver,   posted   June   19,   2011,   2:23AM).  

The  use  of  this  Twitter  handle  echoes  the  unwillingness  of  citizens  to  be  defined  as  

rioters;  they  wanted  the  resilience  and  the  sense  of  community  in  the  people  living  

in  Vancouver   and   the   surrounding   areas   to   be   remembered   instead   of   the   rioting  

  54  

and   looting.   A   post   on   the   Facebook   group   ‘Canucks   fans   against   the   2011  

Vancouver  Riots’  sums  up  the  many  messages  on  social  media,  “Saw  it  first  hand  .  .  .  

Thousands  of  vancouverites  HELPING  to  clean  the  place.  Last  night  I  was  ashamed  

to  be  a  vancouverite…Today,   IVE   [sic]  NEVER  BEEN  SO  PROUD!!  <3  VANCOUVER”  

(Canucks  fans  against  the  2011  Vancouver  Riots,  posted  June  16,  2011,  10:45PM).  

 

Commitment  of  Citizens    

The  grassroots  organization  and  mobilization  facilitated  by  ICT  and  social  media  to  

rally  citizens  and  prompt  a  mass  clean  up  in  Vancouver  the  morning  after  the  rioting  

was  as  successful  as  it  was  due  to  the  public’s  belief  in  their  sense  of  community  and  

the  resilience  of  their  city.  As  McCarthy  and  Zald  (1973)  pointed  out,  the  definition  

of  grievances  will  expand  to  meet  the  changing  and  evolving  nature  and  opinions  of  

the  members  of  the  movement.  In  Vancouver,  the  grievance  was  initially  to  supply  

the   authorities   with   evidence   in   the   form   of   photos   and   video   footage,   then   the  

grievance  evolved   to  helping   the  authorities   identify   those   suspects  online,   and   in  

the  middle  of  this  shift  there  was  a  call  online  to  help  Vancouver  return  to  its  pre-­‐

riot  state  (Furlong  &  O’Keefe,  2011;  Schneider  &  Trottier,  2012).  These  grievances  

appeared  during   the   riot   and  evolved   in   a  matter  of   hours   after   it   had   concluded,  

attesting   to   the   speed   with   which   ICT   can   mobilize   and   spread   a   message.  

Highlighting  the  resilience  of  citizens  was  the  incentive  to  participate  in  the  clean  up  

efforts  and  the  efforts  to  make  this  happen  were  carried  out  in  the  virtual  realm.  

 

There  was   little  evidence  of   the  rioting   in  London  being  propagated  on  Twitter  or  

Facebook   though   these   social   media   platforms   were   used   heavily   to   harness   the  

power  of  social  networking  to  coordinate  and  organize  clean  up  of  areas  affected  by  

rioting   and   looting   (Tonkin,   Pfeiffer   &   Tourte,   2012).   An   account   was   set   up   on  

Twitter   called  @riotcleanup   and   it   attracted   over   70,000   followers   by   the   second  

day   of   rioting   and   its   aim  was   to   help   citizens   coordinate   and  mobilize   clean   up  

efforts   (England   riots,   2011,   9   August).   The   organizing   to   arrange   the   clean   up  

  55  

reached  more  than  seven  million  Twitter  users,  far  in  excess  of  any  tweets  inciting  

rioting  (Rusbridger  &  Rees,  2011).  Groups  were  also  created  on  Facebook,  including  

‘Post   Riot   Clean-­‐up   –   Let’s   help   clean   up   London’   and   ‘Liverpool   Cleanup.’  

Thousands  of  citizens  joined  these  groups  and  expressed  their  support  for  its  goals,  

“we   need   to   pull   together,   help   clean   up   and   show   our   support!”   (London   Riots  

2011,   posted   August   9,   2011,   3:50PM).   Resilience   was   also   a   common   theme,  

“inspirational   and   proof   of   good   outweighing   bad,   that   what   this   is   all   about”  

(Liverpool   Cleanup,   posted  August11,   2011,   12:00PM).   The   photo   below   captures  

the  kick  off  of  a  clean  up  in  Clapham  Junction.  

 

 Photo  retrieved  from  the  Daily  Mail  http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-­‐2024035/UK-­‐riots-­‐2011-­‐500-­‐Londoners-­‐offer-­‐help-­‐clean-­‐rioters-­‐mess.html    

A  separate  and  distinct  type  of  mobilization  was  also  attempting  to  gain  ground  in  

England,  a  hashtag  was  set  up  on  Twitter  entitled  #OperationCupOfTea  and  it  called  

for  citizens   to  stay   in  and  drink   tea,  essentially  establishing  a  self-­‐imposed  curfew  

(Tonkin,   Pfeiffer   &   Tourte,   2012).   The   anti-­‐rioting   campaign   created   a   Facebook  

page  and  had  200,000  likes  within  hours  and  was  seen  as  a  blithe  but  still  serious  

  56  

attempt  to  discourage  riotous  behaviour  by  appealing  to   the  English  temperament  

and  stereotype  of  drinking  tea  (Tonkin,  Pfeiffer  &  Tourte,  2012).  

 

Involvement  from  Outside  the  Crowd    

The  Internet  allows  users  to  seek  specific  information  they  might  not  be  able  to  find  

elsewhere  and  communicate  with  others  regardless  of  spatial  dimensions  like  time  

and  place,  while  also  contributing  to  the  way  in  which  relationships  are  formed  and  

maintained   online   (Neubaum,   et   al,   2014).   This   is   further   impacted   by   the  

willingness   of   people   in   online   communities   to   cooperate   with   each   other,  

regardless   of   the   diversity   that   exists   between   them,   as   long   as   they   are   able   to  

further   the  goals  of   their  movement  (Stanley,  2003).  This  contributes   to   the  social  

cohesion  in  a  society;  Stanley  (2003)  maintains  that  social  cohesion  is  at  the  crux  of  

the  actions  of  a  crowd  as  individuals  form  communities  to  accomplish  their  goals.  If  

members  are  not  committed  to  the  cause  then  the  purpose  they  serve  as  resources  

for  the  mobilization  effort  is  minimal  (Della  Porta,  2014).  

 

Establishing  an  Identity    

Rallying  and  mobilizing  the  resources  was  not  challenging;  social  media  lit  up  faster  

than  a  car  on  fire  outside  Rogers  Arena  where  the  championship  game  was  played.  A  

strong   identity   of   the   rioters   against   everyone   else   spontaneously   erupted   as  

various   forms   of   ICT   enabled   people   in   proximity   to,   or   involved   in,   the   riot   to  

record,  post,  and  share  text,  photo,  and  video  footage  online  (Schneider  &  Trottier,  

2012).  Jenkins  (1983)  asserted  that  strong  identities  lead  to  successful  mobilization  

and   the   identity   that   formed   in   Vancouver   after   the   2011   riot   was   absolute   and  

unwavering;   it  was   the   rioters   on   one   hand   and   everyone   else   on   the   other.   This  

identity  contributed  to  the  citizen  vigilance  that  mobilized  after  the  riot.  Using  this  

us  versus  them  mentality,  involvement  from  outside  the  crowd  would  refer  to  those  

  57  

individuals  who  rioted  and  looted  participating  in  the  citizen  vigilance  and  clean  up  

efforts.  This  did  occur  in  the  sense  that  some  individuals  turned  themselves  in  to  the  

police  or  came  out  to  help  clean  up  the  mess  they  themselves  helped  create,  but   it  

was  not  to  any  great  extent.  The  strong  identities  that  existed  during  the  rioting  and  

the   density   of   the   interpersonal   networks   of   crowd   members   did   not   have   any  

bearing  on  this;  therefore  the  involvement  from  outside  the  crowd  was  negligible.  

 

Citizen  Vigilance  and  Defining  the  Situation    

Schneider  and  Trottier  (2012,  p  62)  define  the  circumstances  in  Vancouver  as  those  

“citizens  not  affiliated  with  law  enforcement  [who]  increasingly  engage  in  a  form  of  

pseudo-­‐police   work   on   social   media   sites.”   The   ubiquity   of   digital   cameras  

contributes  to  a  more  participatory  and  empowered  form  of  lateral  surveillance  as  

citizens  use  everyday  technology  to  leverage  and  manage  the  resources  of  the  crowd  

(Goldsmith,  2015).  Citizen  vigilance  has   contributed   to  bringing   thousands  of  new  

crimes  to  the  attention  of  police,  and  due  to  citizen  scrutiny  they  are  often  reported  

soon  after  they  have  occurred  (Crawford,  2012,  31  October).  

 

Not  to  say  that  this  form  of  activity  did  not  exist  prior  to  the  proliferation  of  social  

media   and   ICT,   centuries   old   “WANTED”   posters   could   be   seen   as   the   earliest  

incarnation   of   citizen   vigilance.   However   the   form   that   occurs   on   ICT   enabled  

mediums  differs  in  that  it  engages  citizens  at  a  different  level:  in  the  definition  of  the  

situation,  a  task  previously  not  possible.  Citizen  participation  in  the  meaning  making  

and  framing  of  a  social  event  is  a  new  phenomenon.  This  is  only  possible  due  to  the  

platforms   presented   by   ICT   to   allow   users   to   participate,   generate   content,   and  

provide  accounts  of  an  event.  This  then  allows  contributions  to  public  sense-­‐making  

and   the   public   definition   of   the   situation,   which   sets   the   parameters   for   the  

possibility   of   action,   including   what,   and   how,   to   respond   (Schneider   &   Trottier,  

2013).   This   does   not  mean   that   ICT   and   social  media   determine   collective   action,  

simply   that   they   provide   a   medium   on   which   individual   views   can   be   traded,  

  58  

amended,  and  distributed  to  come  to  a  shared  consensus  of  the  event  (Schneider  &  

Trottier,  2013;  Watson,  et  al,  2014;  Kotsiopoulos,  2014).  

 

The  definition  of   the  situation  after   the  1994  riot  greatly  differed   from  that  of   the  

2011   Vancouver   riot.   This   is   largely   due   to   the   presence   of   new   information  

communications   technologies   that   contributed   to   citizen  participation   in   the  2011  

riot.   After   the   riot   in   1994,   the   police   requested   raw   video   footage   from   local  

television   stations   and   newspapers   in   an   effort   to   identify   rioters;   the   Canadian  

Broadcasting  Corporation  (CBC)  refused  this  request,  as  they  wanted  to  avoid  being  

messengers  of  the  police  (Schneider  &  Trottier,  2012).  Two  weeks  later  the  CBC  was  

compelled   by   court   order   to   surrender   all   footage   of   the   riot,   as   were   local  

newspapers   the  Vancouver   Sun   and  The  Province   (Schneider  &  Trottier,   2012).  A  

hallmark  of  the  1994  riot  was  the  use  of  force  by  police,  however  the  police  edited  

the   footage   of   the   riot   to   remove   any   images   of   this   brutality   before   they   set   up  

video  kiosks   in   the  downtown  core  of  Vancouver   (Schneider  &  Trottier,  2012).  By  

controlling   the   information  available   to   the  public   at   these  kiosks   the  police  were  

able  to  define  the  situation  and  use  the  media  footage  to  corroborate  their  story  that  

excessive   use   of   force,   including   the   use   of   chemical   agents   and   canine   units  was  

plausible   (BC   Police   Commission,   1994).   The   VPD   was   not   able   to   successfully  

mobilize   citizens   through   these   kiosks,   as   the   use   of   them   did   not   result   in   any  

significant  success  for  the  police  department  (BC  Police  Commission,  1994).  

 

The  2011   riot  was  defined   very  differently,   as   the  police   could  not   put   that   genie  

back  in  the  proverbial  bottle  by  monopolizing  the  public’s  understanding  of  the  riot.  

ICT  and  social  media  were  an   important  and  distinguishing   factor   in   this   riot.  The  

2011  riot  was  at   that  point   in   time,  among   the  most  documented  riots  of  all   time,  

this  was  due  to  the  proliferation  of  communication  and  information  devices  capable  

of  recording  and  disseminating  images  and  video  of  the  riot  (Schneider  &  Trottier,  

2013).   This   has   contributed   to   the   participation   of   citizens   in   shaping   events   as  

people  increasingly  rely  on  social  networks  to  interact  with  each  other  because  they  

provide  a  unique  type  of  emotional  support  during  and  after  crises  (Wang,  2014;  Jin,  

  59  

et   al,   2014).   The   police   were   not   able   to   contain   and   limit   the   definition   of   the  

situation  as  they  did  after  the  1994  riot  due  to  technology,  which  has  allowed  social  

events  like  riots  to  transcend  into  virtual  spaces  in  real-­‐time  (Schneider  &  Trottier,  

2013).  The  ability  to  replay,  review,  and  render  new  opinions  on  the  subject  matter  

is  one  way  in  which  ICT  has  affected  the  ways  in  which  crowdsourced  information  

led   to   citizen  vigilance   (Simon,  et  al,  2014).  While  police  waded   through   the  mass  

amounts   of   data,   users   on   social   media   were   piecing   together   narratives   found  

online   without   the   aid   of   the   police,   any   legal   knowledge,   or   appreciation   of   the  

limits   of   the   law   (Schneider  &  Trottier,   2012).   These   users  muddy   the  waters   for  

police  and  investigators  by  trampling  all  over  the  information  available  online  and  

throwing   out   red   herrings   without   meaning   to   do   so   and   distracting   the  

investigations  with  rumours  and  misinformation  (UBC  Dialogues,  2013,  00:12:58).  

Unintentional  though  they  may  be.  

 

This  citizen  vigilance  emerged  due  to  a  variety  of  reasons,  including  dissatisfaction  

with   the   criminal   justice   system   in   Canada   and   to   highlight   the   resilience   of   the  

people  of  Vancouver  (Schneider  &  Trottier,  2012).  To  put  the  1994  and  2011  riots  

into  perspective,  the  VPD  had  to  process  approximately  one  hundred  hours  of  video  

footage,   all   in   one   format,   for   the   1994   riot;   for   the   2011   riot   more   than   thirty  

terabytes  of  data  was  collected,  including  five  thousand  hours  of  video  and  sixteen  

million   images,   in  a  variety  of   formats10  The  overwhelming  amount  of   information  

presented  to  the  police  in  these  formats  led  to  the  creation  of  the  seventy  member  

Integrated  Riot   Investigation  Team  (IRIT)  with  police  officers  and  civilian  analysts  

from   eight   police   agencies   coming   together   to   deal   with   the   non-­‐traditional  

investigative  challenges  presented  by  the  2011  riot  (VPD  Annual  Report,  2011).  An  

upgraded   forensic   video   lab   also   had   to   be   funded   by   the   provincial   Ministry   of  

Justice  to  deal  with  the  challenges  presented  by  this  riot.  

 

                                                                                                               10  https://riot2011.vpd.ca/,  last  consulted  on  April  3,  2015.  

  60  

Impatience  of  Citizens    

ICT  has  changed  citizens’  expectations,   they  have  become  used   to  getting  answers  

right   away   and   were   confused   as   to   why   the   VPD  was   not   pressing   charges   left,  

right,   and   centre   when   they   had   a   seemingly   endless   supply   of   evidence   (UBC  

Dialogues,  2013,  00:26:45).  One  of  the  initial  tasks  of  the  IRIT  was  to  catalogue  the  

data;  without  doing  so  the  VPD  argued  that  dealing  with  all  the  raw  data  would  have  

been  similar  to  trying  to  find  a  book  in  the  public  library  without  a  catalogue  (VPD  

Annual   Report,   2011).   The   VPD   justified   the   time   dedicated   to   this   endeavour   by  

reasoning  that  they  wanted  to  ensure  suspects  were  held  accountable  for  any  and  all  

actions   they   took  during   the   riot,   not   just   the   ones   investigators   stumbled   across.  

Once  the  indexing  was  complete  the  VPD  could  explore  this  catalogue  like  an  online  

search   engine   and   separate   incidents   could   be   linked   to   show   criminal   behaviour  

over   the   course   of   the   riot   to   the   courts   to   try   and   attain  more   serious   sentences  

(VPD  Annual  Report,  2011).  For  example   if  a  suspect  was  wearing  a  white  belt  all  

the   video   footage   and   photos   could   be   searched   for   anyone  wearing   a  white   belt.  

This  was  instrumental  to  the  charges  recommended  against  rioters,  as  it  was  clear  

that  many  suspects  were  involved  in  multiple  events  (VPD  Riot  Review,  2011).  

 

It   is   important   to   note   that   text,   photos,   and   video   footage   posted   online   do   not  

automatically  become  evidence  of  wrongdoing,  rather  it  is  information  collected  by  

the   police   during   the   starting   point   of   an   investigation   (UBC   Dialogue’s,   2013,  

00:26:59).  Information  is  gathered  and  investigated  and  may  become  evidence  but  

is  not  evidence  merely  by  its  existence  (UBC  Dialogue’s,  2013,  00:27:15).  Individuals  

began  posting  on  various  social  media  websites  about  the  riot  within  minutes  of  the  

first  signs  of  trouble  and  were  a  great  source  of  information  for  police  (Robinson,  et  

al,   2012,   11   June).   These   eyewitness   accounts   have   the   potential   to   contribute   to  

situational  awareness  so   first   responders  can  make   informed  and  better  decisions  

(Dailey  &  Starbird,  2014).  In  these  ways  information  communications  technologies  

helps  link  disparate  actors  to  allow  joint  sense  making  through  mediated  interaction  

(Fulk,  1993).  This  sense  making  is  related  to  influence,  which  is  also  a  form  of  social  

  61  

control   and   affects   the   context   surrounding   the   crisis   or   social   event   and   thereby  

impacts  the  definition  of  the  situation  (Friedkin,  1998;  Friedkin  &  Johnsen,  1999).  

 

The   dissatisfaction   with   the   legal   system   and   recourse   to   citizen   vigilance   has  

contributed  to  undermining  the  law  and  is  a  threat  to  Western  democracies  (Rizza,  

2013).  The  case  of  Nathan  Kotylak  is  an  example  of  this.  During  the  2011  Vancouver  

riot   Kotylak   was   photographed   attempting   to   set   a   police   car   on   fire   and   was  

identified   on   Facebook   less   than   twenty-­‐four   hours   later   (Schneider   &   Trottier,  

2012).   A   legal   minor   at   the   time   of   his   actions   during   the   riot,   Kotylak   and   any  

criminal   acts   he   committed  would   be   protected   by   the   Youth   Criminal   Justice  Act  

which  prohibits   publishing   the  name  or   any   other   information   related   to   a   young  

person   under   the   age   of   eighteen   if   it   would   identify   that   person   as   having   been  

dealt  with  under  the  act  (Youth  Criminal   Justice  Act,  2002).   In  theory,  Facebook   is  

included  in  the  act  along  with  traditional  media.  In  practice,  however,  social  media  

websites   present   legal   challenges   to   the   publication   and   identification   of   minors  

committing   crimes   due   to   the   ubiquity   of   ICT   and   social   media   (Schneider   &  

Trottier,   2013).  Commentators  on   social  media  were  posting   comments   about   the  

consequences  Kotylak  would  face  from  the  police  and  society  “I  bet  you  its  [sic]  just  

a  slap  on  the  wrist.  apperently  [sic]  hes  [sic]  under  18.  hell  [sic]  pay  though..  when  

hes   [sic]   out   in   society..   he  WILL   pay.   (Lets   Get   these   People   Locked   Up   –   2011  

Vancouver   Riot   Pics,   posted   June   17,   2011,   11:55PM).   As   a   result   of   online  

harassment   and   threats   from  citizens’   upset   by  his   actions  Kotylak   and  his   family  

had   to   leave   their   home   in   suburban   Maple   Ridge   until   the   emotion   abated  

(Schneider  &  Trottier,  2012).  

 

In  London  there  was  also  citizen  mobilization  in  response  to  a  lack  of  faith  and  trust  

in   the  authorities   in   the   form  of   vigilantes  who  patrolled   the   streets,   shopkeepers  

protecting   their   businesses,   and   Sikhs   standing   guard   to   prevent   looting   at   their  

gurdwaras.  However  there  is  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  this  mobilization  occurred  

through  ICT  and  over  social  media,  therefore  they  can  be  seen  as  participants  of  the  

movement  acting  from  outside  the  crowd.  This  mobilization  spontaneously  formed  

  62  

in   response   to   what   was   seen   as   a   lack   of   police   presence   and   control   over   the  

rioting   (Manning,   2011,  11  August).  The  most  notable   example  of   these   vigilantes  

was  a  group  of  Millwall  Football  Club  supporters,  themselves  typically  associated  in  

the  media  with  hooliganism  (Tonkin,  Pfeiffer  &  Tourte,  2012).  One  member  of   the  

group  said,  “everyone  will  come  out  tonight.  If  people  come  around  here  smashing  

our   shops   up,   then   they'll   get  what   they   deserve.  We're   happy   to   get   into   it  with  

them"  (Manning,  2011,  11  August).  The  irony  of  the  footballers  patrolling  the  streets  

did  not  escape  the  Millwall  supporters;  “you  know  things  are  bad  when  the  football  

crowds  have  to  police  the  streets”  (Croft  &  Holden,  2011,  10  August).  Another  one  of  

the   vigilante   patrollers,   this   one   from   the   right   wing   English   Defence   League,  

described  the  opinion  of  those  he  walked  the  streets  with,  “we've  had  enough  of  the  

police   just  standing  there,  basically  scratching  their  arses  while  people  are   looting  

and  ruining  the  whole  area.  Everybody  here  pays  tax  and  we've  all  had  enough  of  it.  

We're  sickened  by  the  police  doing  absolutely  nothing”  (UK  riot  vigilantes,  2011,  10  

August).    

 

Contrary   to   groups   like   the  Millwall   supporters,   Sikhs   and   shopkeepers   protected  

their  property,  and  did  not  consider  themselves  a  pseudo-­‐police  force  roaming  the  

streets   (Croft   &   Holden,   2011,   10   August).   Armed   with   kirpans,   the   traditional  

sword   of   Sikhism,   and   field   hockey   sticks,   Sikhs   in   the   Southall   region   of   London  

turned  out  to  guard  the  local  gurdwaras  from  the  rioters  and  looters  who  had  been  

roaming  the  area  (UK  riot  vigilantes,  2011,  10  August).  Shopkeepers  and  other  small  

business  owners  stood  sentinel   in   front  of   their  establishments   to  prevent   looting.  

One  man  interviewed  by  Reuters  said  he  was  not  a  vigilante,  “it’s  just  about  being  on  

the  streets,  it's  not  about  running  battles,  it's  just  being  here.  It's  exercising  our  right  

to  walk  the  streets"  (Croft  &  Holden,  2011,  10  August).  Then  Mayor  of  London  Boris  

Johnson   encouraged   this   type   of   behaviour,   and   is   quoted   as   saying   “people  who  

have   the   interests   of   the   community   and   who   want   to   look   after   each   other,   of  

course  I  want  them  out  on  the  streets”  (Manning,  2011,  11  August).  The  website  for  

the  Metropolitan  Police  echoed  similar  sentiments  by  stating  that  anyone  who  came  

  63  

under   attack   could   use   reasonable   force   to   protect   themselves   or   others.11  On  

Amazon,   a   popular   online   shopping   website,   sales   of   baseball   bats   rose   at  

exponential  rates,  as  did  sales  of  a  police  style  baton,   lending  support  to  the  belief  

that  citizens  were  organizing  to  protect  themselves  (Manning,  2011,  11  August).  

 

This  organic  mobilization  had  no  relationship  with  ICT  or  social  media,  rather  it  was  

a   response   to   several   consecutive   nights   of   rioting   and   a   perceived   lack   of   police  

action;  it  was  not  promoted  or  mobilized  through  or  on  ICT.  Many  individuals  who  

were  interviewed  by  the  panel  convened  by  the  English  government  to  investigate  

the  riot,  and  had  been  accused  or  convicted  of  rioting,  cited  a  perception  that  police  

could   not   contain   the   scale   or   extent   of   rioting   in   Tottenham   and   London   as   the  

reason   they  participated   in   the   riots   (After   the   riots,   2012).   Therefore   the   looting  

can  be  understood  as  a  result  of  opportunism  and  a  perceived  suspension  of  societal  

laws   and   norms.   This   is   supported   by  Baudains,   Johnson,   and  Braithwaite   (2013)  

who   argued   that   rioting   might   prompt,   permit,   pressure,   or   provoke   additional  

offences,  as  further  disorder  is  deemed  acceptable  given  the  circumstances.  A  lack  of  

confidence  in  police  appeared  to  encourage  people  to  mobilize  online  and  assemble  

in   large   groups   to   vandalize   and   loot   without   fear   of   being   challenged   by   the  

authorities  (After  the  riots,  2012).  One  individual  interviewed  by  the  writers  of  the  

joint  report  issued  by  the  Guardian  and  The  London  School  of  Economics  is  quoted  

as   saying   that   “normally   the   police   control   us.   But   the   law  was   obeying   us,   know  

what  I  mean?”  (Rusbridger  &  Rees,  2011).  

 

Supply  and  Demand  of  Resources    

In  order  to  supply  resources,  a  demand  must  first  be  recognized.  In  the  case  of  the  

2011  Vancouver  riot   the  demand  was   twofold:   for   the  supply  of  photos  and  video  

footage   of   suspected   rioters,   and   consequently   identification   of   those   same  

                                                                                                               11  http://content.met.police.uk/Site/operationwithern,  last  consulted  on  April  18,  2015.  

  64  

individuals.  This  demand  was  met  by  the  thousands  of  individuals  who  mobilized  on  

social  media  through  various  forms  of  ICT  in  response  to  the  VPD’s  request  for  any  

information   the  public  could  supply   to  aid   in   the  arrest  of   rioters  and   looters.12  In  

this  sense  the  goals  of  the  movement  and  the  demand  were  one  and  the  same.  The  

recruitment  of  citizens  to  meet  the  demand  did  not  occur  in  the  traditional  sense  of  

going  out  and  seeking  individuals  to  join  the  movement.  In  the  case  of  the  2011  riot  

in  Vancouver  the  supply  was  there,  they  just  had  to  be  mobilized  and  linked  to  the  

demand.  

 

The  demand  was  met,  and   then  crowd  continued  beyond   the   initial  parameters  of  

the  mobilization  effort.  Beginning  as  a  way  to  simply  supply  information  to  relevant  

authorities,   the   crowd   quickly   transformed   into   a   self-­‐organized   group   of   users  

intent  on  seeking   justice   in   their  own  way  (Trottier,  2014).  This  was  affected  by  a  

lack  of  context.  As  discussed  above,   individuals  were  falsely  accused  and  maligned  

for  being   rioters,  when   they  were  not.  Marwick  and  Boyd   (2010)  determined   that  

social  media  combines  elements  of  broadcast  media  and  face  to  face  communication,  

and   by   doing   so   removes   the   ability   to   negotiate   the   complex   variations   in  

presentation  and  impression,  resulting  in  the  collapse  of  context.  One  comment  left  

on  the  Facebook  group  ‘Canucks  fans  against  the  2011  Vancouver  Riots,’  remarked  

that   the   group   should   “Stay   focused   on   the   goal   to   bring   criminals   that   were  

defacing   public   properly   [sic],   theft,   assault,   vandalism   and   so   forth   to   justice!”  

(posted  June  21,  2011,  11:08PM).  This  is  especially  true  in  the  case  of  context  as  a  

picture   can   be   easily  misinterpreted.   Schneider   and   Trottier   (2012)   expanded   on  

this   by   recognizing   that   social   media   presents   a   narrow   and   often   incriminating  

view  of  users;  the  adage  a  picture  is  worth  a  thousand  words  would  be  an  apt  way  to  

describe  this  context,  or  lack  thereof.    

 

 

                                                                                                               12  https://riot2011.vpd.ca/,  last  consulted  on  April  3,  2015.  

  65  

Recruitment  for  the  Cause    

Tilly  (1995)  argues  that  incentives  must  be  linked  to  the  goals  of  the  crowd  in  order  

to   supply   the   demand.   It   has   been   determined   that   there   was   no   grassroots  

mobilization  after  the  1994  riot  as  the  police  attempted  to  mobilize  citizens  to  little  

effect.   There   were   no   incentives   to   encourage   citizens   to   aid   the   police   in   their  

mobilization  effort  (BC  Police  Commission,  1994).  The  goals  of  the  crowd  after  the  

2011  riot  were   to   identify  and  punish   the   rioters,   and  help  Vancouver   return   to  a  

normal  state  as  soon  as  possible.  These  goals  simultaneously  acted  as  the  incentives  

to  mobilize   the   crowd.   Fulk   (1993)   suggests   that  when   an   individual   experiences  

attraction  to  a  group,  that  individual  buys  in  to  the  group’s  norms  and  attitudes  and  

begins   to   exhibit  behaviour   that   is   consist  with   that  of   the  group.   Incentives  need  

not  be  a  personal  gain  for  members  of  the  crowd,  they  can  simply  be  to  accomplish  

the  goals  of  the  crowd,  and  if  the  members  are  adequately  motivated  to  meet  those  

goals  they  will  participate  and  be  incentivized  (McCarthy  &  Zald,  1973).  In  the  case  

of   the   2011   riot   in   Vancouver,   ICT   and   the   proliferation   of   these   technologies  

contributed  to  the  crowdsourced  information  gathering  and  policing  that  mobilized  

as  a  result  of  the  goals  and  incentives  of  the  crowd.  There  is  limited  understanding  

of   the   limits   of   technology-­‐mediated   mobilization,   however   it   is   understood   that  

incentives  will  determine  the  extent  of  recruitment  and  goal  achievement,  as  well  as  

whether  or  not  individuals  choose  to  participate  in  a  social  movement  (Rutherford,  

et  al,  2013;  McCarthy  &  Zald,  1973).  

 

In  the  case  of  the  rioting  in  London  and  neighbouring  cities  the  causes  vary  and  are  

disputed,  however  economic  conditions,  especially  high  unemployment,  racism,  and  

police  brutality  are  recognized  as  the  key  justifications  used  by  rioters  (Yelaja,  2011,  

10  August).  Academics  on  the  other  hand,  acknowledge  that  “a  complex  set  of  macro  

and  micro   factors  were   at   play   here,   including   anger   at  Mark  Duggan’s   death,   the  

disenfranchisement   and   disillusionment   of   young   people,   as   well   as   the   ‘wanton  

criminality’   that  has  been   the  subject  of  many  politicians’   ire”   (Bohannon,  2012,  p  

831).  This  wanton  criminality  refers  to  the  social  disorder  caused  by  citizens  due  to  

  66  

their   participation   in   the   crowd,   regardless   of   the   consequences.   This   online  

mobilization  used  various  forms  of  ICT  and  social  media  to  enable  individuals  intent  

on   social   disorder   to   form   communities,   share   plans,   and   organize   themselves   to  

carry   out   their   actions   (Rules   of   engagement,   2011).   The   online  mobilization   that  

occurred  in  London  was  twofold  and  by  opposing  groups  of  citizens,  on  one  hand  to  

encourage  participation  in  the  rioting,  and  on  the  other  to  coordinate  the  clean  up  

and  restore  the  cities  to  their  pre-­‐riot  state.  

 

In  any  type  of  crowdsourced  information  it  has  been  suggested  that  one  percent  of  

the   crowd   will   create   the   content,   ten   percent   will   validate   it,   and   eighty-­‐nine  

percent  will  use  it  (Alexander,  2014).  In  the  case  of  Vancouver  these  numbers  may  

not  necessarily  be  accurate.  Schneider  and  Trottier  (2013)  conducted  a  study  of  the  

most   popular   Facebook   page   used   after   the   riot,   ‘Vancouver   Riot   Pics:   Post   Your  

Photos,’  and  found  12,587  postings  in  the  first  fourteen  days  following  the  riot  on  a  

page  with  more  than  100,000  ‘likes’,  this  would  be  approximately  7.9  percent  of  the  

crowd   posting   content.   However   it   is   not   possible   to   measure   the   accuracy   or  

validity   of   the   content  without   police   consultation   to   determine   how  much   of   the  

content   was   of   actual   rioters   and   their   criminal   behaviour.   Though   as   of   April   3,  

2015,   the  Vancouver  Police  Department  has  recommended  366  rioters  be  charged  

with   ultimately   300   rioters   charged;   1,266   recommended   charges   and   907  

approved  charges  after  2,424  web  tips  received  and  16.3  million  images  viewed.13    

 

This  large  supply  of  resources  was  due  in  part  to  dissatisfaction  with  the  Canadian  

criminal  justice  system  and  its  perceived  leniency  and  delay  in  prosecuting  accused  

rioters   (Schneider  &  Trottier,   2013).  A  post   on   the   Facebook   group   ‘Canucks   fans  

against   the  2011  Vancouver  Riots’   speaks   to   this,   “Punks   that  deserve   to  be   in   jail  

and  not  out   in  public.  There   [sic]  disgraceful   to   all   of  B.C.  Thank  god   there   is   alot  

[sic]  of  good  people   in  B.C.  And  Van  with  camera’s  to  catch  the   little  basterds  [sic]  

and  hopefully   the  Mayor  and   the   law  give’s   it   to   them   .   .   .”   (posted   June  17,  2011,  

                                                                                                               13  https://riot2011.vpd.ca/,  last  consulted  on  April  3,  2015.  

  67  

3:21AM).  Phrases  such  as  vigilantes,  mob  justice,  and  social  witch  hunts  began  to  be  

used   to   describe   the   prejudicial   fervour   with   which   online   users   identified   and  

criminalized  suspected  rioters.  (Schneider  &  Trottier,  2012).  The  boundary  between  

seeking  justice  and  righting  perceived  wrongs,  and  persecuting  individuals  online  is  

blurry,   especially   when   these   activities   are   in   the   hands   of   unaccountable   and  

untrained  citizens  (Trottier,  2014).  

 

Costs  and  Benefits  of  Participation    

Framing  the  Message    

In   regards   to   the   costs   and   benefits   of   participation   in   a   crowd’s   goals,   resource  

mobilization  theory  questions  why  citizens  choose  to  participate,  or  not  participate  

in   the   mobilization   movement   (McCarthy   &   Zald,   1977).   This   decision   can   be  

influenced   by   the   elites,  which   as   discussed   in   the   theoretical   framework   for   this  

thesis,   can   be   considered   the   moderators   of   social   media   and   ICT.   There   is   no  

evidence  of  these  moderators  manipulating  the  crowd  after  the  2011  riot,  but  there  

are  examples  of  these  individuals  attempting  to  reign  in  the  fury  and  emotion  linked  

to   the   crowd’s   behaviour   (Trottier,   2014).   The   editor   of   the   ‘Criminal   List:  

Anonymous  Crime  in  a  2.0  World?  I  Don’t  Think  So!’  made  a  post  on  June  21,  2011,  

that   reads   as   follows:   “While   there   were   very   constructive   and   uplifting   things  

posted,   there  were   some   incredibly   horrible   things   posted   as  well,   items   such   as  

racism,   sexism,   threats,   blaming   everyone   from   specific   suburbs   via   blanket  

statements,  and  harassment.  .   .   .  Why  are  people  calling,  harassing,  and  threatening  

people  whose  only  guilt  in  this  is  being  related  to  someone  who  participated  in  the  

riot?   What   is   the   point   of   hurting   these   innocent   people,   and   how   is   that   any  

different   then   the  mob  behaviour  of   rioters   lynching  people   in   the  streets?”  Or  on  

the  Facebook  group  ‘Lets  Get  These  People  Locked  Up  –  2011  Vancouver  Riot  Pics’  

  68  

the  moderators  made  a  post  that  “Without  rock  solid  evidence  we  shouldn’t  wrongly  

accuse  anyone  (posted  June  18,  2011,  6:24PM).  

 

The   1994   riot   was   a   different   story;   in   that   case   the   police   did   manipulate   the  

message  by  editing  out  instances  of  police  brutality  (Furlong  &  O’Keefe,  2011).  The  

VPD  had  responded  to  that  riot  with  an  escalated  force  model  of  policing  to  disperse  

the   crowd   and   media   coverage   had   been   critical   of   police   actions   (BC   Police  

Commission,   1994).  By   removing   the   footage  of  police  brutality   the  police   framed  

the  narrative  surrounding   the  riot.  By  doing  so,   the  police  were  able   to  encourage  

citizen  mobilization  to  respond  only  to  the  senseless  actions  of  a  group  framed  to  be  

an  aberration  from  the  normal  behaviour  of  citizens,  not  to  the  police’s  use  of  force  

or   crowd   control   methods   (Stanley,   2003).   This   manipulation   was   possible   as  

technology   in   1994   did   not   allow   the   continuous   review   and   analysis   of   media  

footage   as   is   possible   with   current   technology.   This   means   that   in   1994,   an  

individual  had  to  record  the  news  footage  as  it  was  airing  on  television  in  order  to  

have  a  copy.  Technological  advances  have  allowed  the  2011  riot  to  be  recorded  by  

citizens  and  also  be  easily  accessible  by  searching  various  ICT.  YouTube  footage  of  

the  riot  is  an  example  of  the  availability  of  such  footage.  

 

Costs  of  Participation    

A  post  on   the  blog   ‘Criminal  List:  Anonymous  Crime   in  a  2.0  World?   I  Don’t  Think  

So!’  discusses  a   friend  who  works   for   the  VPD  who  advised  “If  you  have  photos  of  

crime   downtown,   posting   them   on   the   Net   is   not   helpful.   E-­‐mail   the   high-­‐res  

originals   to   the   Vancouver   police   DIRECTLY   at   [email protected]   and   give   them   times,  

locations,  context  of  photos,  and  your  contact  information.”14  This  recommendation  

is   further   reiterated  by   arguments   that   citizens  unaffiliated  with   law  enforcement  

agencies   hamper   investigations   as   they   engage   in   a   form   of   pseudo-­‐police   work  

without:   formal   training,   following   criminal   justice   protocols   in   regards   to  

                                                                                                               14  http://vancityriotcriminals.tumblr.com/,  last  consulted  on  April  2,  2015.  

  69  

limitations  of   the  police,   control  of  evidence,  and   the  basic   legal  principle  of  being  

innocent  until  proven  guilty   (Schneider  &  Trottier,  2012;  Dailey  &  Starbird,  2014;  

Crawford,   2012,   31  October).   These  were   the   costs   for   the   self-­‐righteousness   and  

emotion   that   swept   over   Vancouver   as   ICT   enabled   new   forms   of   public  

participation  during  crises  and  social  disorder;  studies  have  shown  that  the  public  

turns   to   ICT   and   online   platforms   to   engage   with,   seek   information,   and   share  

experiences  (Dailey  &  Starbird,  2014).  

 

“Knew  I  could  count  on  people  posting  the  stupid  antics  they  did,  and  paying  for  it”  

(Canucks   fans   against   the   2011   Vancouver   Riots,   posted   June   17,   2011,   5:26AM).  

Comments  such  as  this  highlight  how  posts  made  by  individuals  were  beneficial  to  

the  crowdsourced  policing   that   took  place  as   they  provided   the   ‘evidence’  used  as  

part   of   the   name-­‐and-­‐shame-­‐athon   that   took   place   online   (Crawford,   2012,   31  

October).  This  sharing  online  can  be  considered  a  cost  of  the  changes  in  privacy  and  

immediacy   as   a   result   of   advances   in   ICT,   especially   in   regards   to   social  media   as  

individuals  post  and  share  things  from  every  aspect  of  their  lives  with  little  regard  

to  who  sees  it  (UBC  Dialogues,  2013,  00:10:39).  The  immediacy  provided  by  ICT  can  

be  seen  as  a  factor  in  the  lack  of  faith  in  the  criminal  justice  system  that  contributed  

to  citizen  vigilance.  The  law  works  at  a  glacial  speed,  and  with  good  reason  when  it  

may  deprive  an   individual  of   their   liberty.  However   in  a  modern  age  when  finding  

information   can   be   at   the   fingertips   of   anyone  with   access   to   ICT  within   seconds,  

this   lapse   of   time   is   seen   as   an   abnormality   and   can   lead   to   individuals   trying   to  

create   their   own   justice   (UBC  Dialogues,   2013,   00:26:28;   Kietzmann,   et   al,   2012).  

The  VPD  report  on  the  2011  riot  pointed  out  that  the  shaming  occurring  on  various  

forms   of   ICT   reached   a   point   at   which   they   felt   the   need   to   issue   a   statement   to  

remind  citizens  to  be  patient  and  trust  in  the  justice  system;  yet  they  contend  that  at  

the  writing  of  the  report  approximately  thirty-­‐seven  people  had  turned  themselves  

in  as  a  result  of  the  shaming  (VPD  Stanley  Cup  Review,  2011).  

 

A   common   criticism   after   the   2011   Vancouver   riot   was   that   the   police   were   not  

doing   enough   to   arrest   suspected   rioters   when   there   appeared   to   be   so   much  

  70  

evidence   available   to   them   due   to   all   the   photos   and   videos   collected.   This  

frustration  with  the  VPD  was  further  exasperated  by  the  speed  with  which  citizens  

could   see   arrests   and   court   sentencing   occurring   in  England   after   the   rioting   that  

occurred   there   later   that   same   summer.   As   previously   discussed,   the   VPD   spent  

considerable   time   gathering   evidence,   cataloguing   it,   and   proving   its   legitimacy.  

However   the  authorities   in  London  were  able   to  pull  evidence  directly   from  CCTV  

footage  with   no   verification   needed   to   prove   its   authenticity.   This   had   enormous  

impact  on  the  speed  of  the  investigation  and  how  quickly  suspects  were  identified,  

arrested,  and  sent  to  the  courts.  Within  one  month  of  the  rioting  ending  in  London  

over  1,500  offenders  appeared  in  courts  nationwide,  which  functioned  twenty-­‐four  

hours  a  day,  seven  days  a  week  in  order  to  prevent  a  backlog  in  the  courts  (London  

riots  arrests,  2011,  25  August).  A  side  note  to  this  point  is  that  of  the  4,000  suspects  

ultimately  arrested  for  rioting  or  looting,  nine  out  of  ten  were  already  known  to  the  

police,  meaning  that  their  personal  data  and  information  would  already  have  been  

in  the  police  systems  and  easily  accessible  (After  the  riots,  2012).  

 

These  types  of  sentiments  were  expressed  on  social  media  as  commentators  wrote;  

“It’s  good  to  see  swift   justice   for  a   lot  of  rioters  unlike   the  Vancouver  Riots  where  

not  a  single  person  has  been  arrested  since  their  riots  back  in  June”  (London  Riots  

2011,   posted   August   18,   2011,   12:00AM).   The   advantage   of   having   access   to  

undisputable   evidence   was   of   enormous   help   to   the   police   in   London   as   it  

“expedited   the   process   of   indictable   offences;   there   is   no   room   for   a   judge   to  

question   the   legitimacy   of   the   evidence,   whereas   in   Vancouver   there   were  

allegations  of  evidence  being  photo-­‐shopped”  (UBC  Dialogues,  2013,  00:27:29).  Fake  

or   doctored   images  were   a   real   concern   in   Vancouver,   but   not   in   London,   having  

significant   impact   on   the   speed   of   arrests   and   the   public’s   satisfaction   with   the  

police   and   whether   or   not   they   resorted   to   citizen   policing   (Crawford,   2012,   31  

October).  

 

  71  

Benefits  of  Participation    

Citizens  choose  to  participate,  or  not  to  participate  in  social  movements  for  various  

reasons;  the  leaders  must  make  the  costs  as  low  as  possible  and  the  benefits  as  high  

as  possible   to  encourage  participation   (Jenkins,  1983).  As  discussed  earlier   in   this  

thesis  there  were  not  any  clearly  identifiable  leaders  of  the  movements  that  formed  

in  either  Vancouver  or  London  who  encouraged  citizen  mobilization.  In  Vancouver  

maintaining  resilience  and  trying  to  resuscitate  the  damaged  reputation  of  their  city  

were  the  motivations  for  citizens  to  participate  in  the  mobilization  efforts,  but  these  

did  not  create  tangible  benefits  for  the  citizens  themselves.  Rather  the  benefit  was  to  

the   community   at   large.   This   was   made   possible   by   the   informal   coalitions   that  

formed   and   allowed   collective   action   for   the   sake   of   the   community   (Buechler,  

1993).   In  London  resilience  was  at   the  heart  of   the  mobilizing   to  clean  up  the  city  

however   causing   disorder   was   at   the   root   of   the   rioting   (Baudains,   Johnson   &  

Braithwaite,  2013).  This  dichotomy  of  actions   in   the  mobilization   that  occurred   in  

the   city   represents   both   the   costs   and   benefits   of   the   use   of   information  

communications  technologies  for  citizen  mobilization.  

   

  72  

Conclusion    

Technology  will  continue  to  advance  and  the  ways  in  which  crises  are  managed  will  

continue   to  shift  as  a  result.   “New  communications   technologies—especially  social  

media   via   the   Internet—have  become   important   resources   for   the  mobilization  of  

collective  action  and  the  subsequent  creation,  organization,  and  implementation  of  

social  movements  around  the  world”  (Eltantawy  &  Wiest,  2011).  As  a  result  of  the  

technological   advances   available   to   society   this   author   contends   that   a   reverse  

mobilization   is   occurring.   Before   the   advances   that   allowed   citizens   to   carry  

information   communications   technologies   and   access   to   the   Internet   in   their  

pockets,  a  crowd  gathered  resources  for  their  social  movement,  now  resources  exist  

online  and  wait  for  a  crowd  to  make  use  of  them.  These  resources  are  the  networks  

and   clusters   of   actors,   communities,   and   ‘friends’   an   individual,   or   crowd,   have  

access   to   in   working   towards   the   goals   of   the   movement.   There   has   been   a  

fundamental   change   in   how   resources   are   mobilized;   no   longer   does   a   need   for  

resources  need  to  be  promoted  and  then  gathered,  instead  the  resources  just  need  

to  be  accessed  online  and  then  deployed  to  relevant  areas  and  for  intentional  goals.  

Social  networks  are  the  ties  that  bind;  these  ties  create  an  interconnected  web  that  

allows  interactions,  norms,  and  common  practices  to  occur,  exist,  and  form  between  

individuals.  This  can  be  seen  in  the  cases  discussed  earlier.  

 

Statements   made   by   users   on   social   media   provide   social   cues   for   others   that  

contribute   to   the   user’s   definition   of   the   situation   and   the   ways   in   which   they  

respond.  Recruitment   in  Vancouver  was  based  upon  the  definition  of   the  situation  

and   identity;  an  us  versus  them  mentality  differentiated  between  those  who  made  

the  mess  and  those  willing  to  clean  it  up.  The  mobilization  that  occurred  was  heavily  

motivated   by   citizen   resilience   and   the   need   to   identify   perpetrators   of   social  

disorder  and  to  clean  up  the  streets  of  Vancouver.  In  London  the  mobilization  was  to  

riot  and  loot,  but  also  to  clean  up  the  affected  areas.  The  demand  existed  and  it  was  

  73  

a  matter  of  supplying  the  resources  needed  to  meet  it.  In  other  words,  there  was  no  

recruitment  drive  to  encourage  participation  in  the  mobilization  efforts.  Due  to  ICT  

citizens   were   able   to   interact   and   organize   with   others   online   by   searching   for  

relevant   communities   on   social  media.   Individuals  were   able   to   join   social  media  

communities,  whether  that  was  for   identifying  suspected  rioters  or  to  plan  a  clean  

up  of  the  city,  on  their  own.  The  nature  of  Facebook  groups  is  such  that  you  can  be  

invited  to  join  them  or  you  can  join  them  on  your  own,  or  request  participation  if  the  

group  is  private.  The  riot  related  groups  cited  in  this  thesis  were  not  private,  as  the  

very  purpose  of  them  was  to  gain  as  many  supporters  and  members  as  possible  in  

order   to   expand   the   movement.   As   a   result   of   this,   the   interaction   facilitated   by  

social   media   is   not   one   that   requires   the   leadership   of   a   movement   to   recruit  

members;   instead   the   members   find   the   groups   and   communities   online.   This  

represents   a   fundamental   shift   in   the  way   in  which   resources   are  mobilized   for   a  

movement   as   it   takes   the   onus   away   from   the   leadership   and   places   it   upon   the  

members  who  become  the  resources.  London  provided  an  interesting  comparison  to  

Vancouver   and   as   previously   mentioned   the   mobilization   was   as   a   result   of   a  

different   context  but   it   shows  a  pattern  of  behaviour   for   the  use  of   ICT  and  social  

media  for  the  purposes  of  citizen  mobilization.  Rioting  is  typically  characterized  by  

spur   of   the   moment   violence   and   destruction,   with   the   proliferation   of   ICT   this  

rioting  can  be  pre-­‐planned,  organized,  or  even  mobilized  in  the  heat  of  the  moment  

by  mass  broadcasting  of  messages  from  personal  devices.  

 

Contrary  to  how  governments  and  informal  groups  may  tend  to  interact,  Vancouver  

was   an   example   of   the   police   working   with   social   media   networks   and   the  

community  at   large   for  a  mutual   end.  The   coalition   that   formed  was   informal  and  

existed  due   to  police  encouragement  of  public  participation   in   the   investigation  of  

the   riot,   the   public   did   so   by   mobilizing   online   through   ICT   and   social   media.  

Whereas  a  police  officer  online  is  a  sole  actor,  lateral  surveillance  through  a  crowd  

relies  on  that  crowd  to  serve  as  a  multitude  of  watchers  (Trottier,  2014).  Therefore  

the   emphasis   is   on   presence,   community,   and   the   levels   of   interaction   to   work  

towards   the   crowd’s   goals   by   leveraging   the   social   capital   in   the   networks   of   the  

  74  

members  of  the  crowd.  In  this  instance  social  capital  refers  to  the  relationships  and  

connections  in  an  individual’s  social  network  that  can  be  utilized  and  mobilized  for  

whatever  goal  is  set  by  the  crowd.  

 

We  live   in  a  contemporary  society  that  privileges   information,  and  the  quicker  the  

information  can  be  attained  the  better.  The  prevalence  and  importance  placed  upon  

information  communications  technologies  and  the  Internet  can  be  seen  in  the  way  

we  validate  and  use  it  to  find  answers,  ‘Googling  it’  is  steadily  becoming  entrenched  

in   our   consciousness   as   ICT   is   understood   as   the   go   to   place   for   information.  

Unfortunately   impatience   with   traditional   information   sourcing   has   bled   into   the  

execution   of   justice,   resulting   in   social   media   groups   and   blogs   appearing   either  

during,  or   right  after   the   rioting   in  Vancouver.  Far   from  usurping  or   replacing   the  

power  and  presence  of  conventional  policing,  citizen  vigilance  enhances  its  scope  by  

ignoring  the  limitations  and  law  the  police  abide  by  (Trottier,  2014).  An  example  of  

this  was  discussed   in   the   analysis   chapter   regarding   the   Canadian  Youth  Criminal  

Justice  Act.  

 

In   lieu   of   citizen   policing   or   crowdsourced   policing   socially   mobilized   citizen  

vigilance  is  a  more  robust  and  complete  description  to  describe  the  events  that  took  

place  after  the  2011  riot  in  Vancouver.  The  citizen  response  after  the  2011  riot  was  

unprecedented   and   at   its   most   basic   level   was   about   transparency.   This   original  

reason   for   the   mobilization   that   occurred   shifted   from   transparency   through   the  

provision   of   relevant   evidence   to   the   police,   to   identifying   suspected   rioters   and  

looters,   and   then   on   to   organizing   the   clean   up   of   areas   affected   by   the   social  

disorder.   Nonetheless,   these   shifts   did   not   profoundly   absolve   the   nature   of   the  

mobilization;  it  was  merely  modified  through  the  course  of  citizen  vigilance.  Citizen  

policing   and   crowdsourced   policing   are   not   adequate   to   describe   the   situations  

described   in   this   thesis  as   they  have  connotations   that   infer  citizens   taking  on   the  

mantle   of   conventional   policing   which   is   not   the   case.   Socially   mobilized   citizen  

vigilance   is   preferable   as   it   represents   the   notion   of   heightened   awareness   that  

  75  

came  about  to  provide  evidence,  identify  suspected  rioters  and  looters,  and  organize  

city  clean  ups.  

 

Figure  2:  Components  of  Citizen  Vigilance  

 The  components  outlined   in  the   figure  above  detail   the  components  that  comprise  

the  concept  of   citizen  resilience  as  determined  by   this   thesis.  A  combination  of  all  

three   factors   of   emotion,   a   sense   of   justice,   and   resilience   come   together   to   form  

citizen   vigilance,  which   can  be   used   for   the   goals   of   any   social  movement.   Citizen  

resilience   is   the   motivation   that   led   to   citizen   vigilance.   The   citizen   vigilance   in  

Vancouver   did   not   occur   the   same  way   during   and   after   the   riots   in   London   that  

same  year.  Citizen  vigilance  in  Vancouver  was  about  helping  the  police  and  cleaning  

up  the  city,  in  London  the  citizen  vigilance  was  only  about  cleaning  up  the  city  as  the  

other  forms  of  mobilization  were  against  the  police.  Yet  the  common  themes  of  self-­‐

reliant  and  empowered  citizens  mobilizing  for  their  movements  is  a  correlation  and  

indicates   a   wider   pattern   of   increased   citizen   vigilance   and   involvement   in  

previously  neglected  aspects  of  citizenry,  a  pattern  made  possible  by  the  growth  of  

information  communications  technologies.  

 

Emotion   Sense  of  Justice   Resilience   Citizen  

Vigilance  

  76  

Reflection    

Citizen  vigilance  and  crisis  management  run  in  parallel.  Crisis  management  is  a  field  

handled   by   professionals,   whereas   citizen   vigilance   is   about   the   resilience   and  

strength   of   citizens   and   the   community   at   large.   Information   communications  

technologies   have   increased   the   scope   and   extent   to   which   this   participation   is  

possible   and  will   only   continue   to   increase.   The   increase   is  made   possible   by   the  

role  of  ICT  and  social  media  expanding  the  actors  involved  in  such  activities,  as  well  

as   the   purpose   they   serve,   and   the   actions   they   take.   The   future   of   crisis  

management  needs   to  embrace   the   roles   citizens  will  play  after   social  disorder  or  

crises  as  well  as  ensuring  their  actions  do  not  infringe  upon  the  safety  and  security  

of   others.   This   thesis   has   made   a   contribution   to   the   field   of   ICT   enabled  

mobilization  by  suggesting  that  resources  are  mobilized  in  a  new  and  fundamentally  

different   way   through   reverse   mobilization   by   existing   online   and   waiting   to   be  

mobilized.  This  transformation  cannot  be  highlighted  enough  and  as  a  result  of  this  

change,  examination  of  citizen  mobilization  also  needs  to  be  rethought.  

 

Citizens  need  to  be  adequately  prepared  to  respond  to  crisis  situations,  and  the  most  

significant   aspect   of   that   is   timely   and   accurate   information   dissemination.   New  

technological  mediums,  such  as  cell  broadcasting,  should  be  embraced  and  adopted  

by   police   forces   and   municipalities   alike.   Cell   broadcasting   sends   an   official   text  

message  to  all  mobile  devices  within  a  specified  area,  including  visitors  from  outside  

the   immediate   region.   This   communications   technology   allows   information   to   be  

shared   quickly,   broadly,   and   effectively   as   the  message   goes   to   all   devices  within  

range   of   the   cell   towers   selected.   The   system   uses   short   bursts   of   energy   and   is  

therefore  able  to  function  even  when  cell  towers  are  inundated  by  excessive  traffic.  

The   capability   to   receive   these   kinds   of  messages   is   built   into   all  modern  mobile  

devices,  yet  the  software  is  not  active  in  the  majority  of  them.  Over  time,  the  use  of  

this   type   of   technology   should   become   equivalent   to   tuning   into   specific   radio  

channels   to   receive   accurate   information.   As   is   currently   done   in   many   cities   to  

provide  road  condition  reports  for  commuters.  

  77  

 

A  common  theme  in  the  research  conducted  into  the  Vancouver  and  London  rioting  

was  the  lack  of  access  to  accurate  and  timely  information.  It  is  of  utmost  importance  

that  this  information  comes  from  a  reliable  source  with  access  to  up-­‐to-­‐date  data.  By  

having  the  ability  to  mass  broadcast  pertinent  messages  to  all  cellphone  users  in  a  

target  area,  situational  awareness  is  increased,  as  is  the  ability  to  mobilize  citizens.  

Possible  examples  include  messages  sent  out  requiring  assistance  from  doctors  and  

nurses   in   an   area   ravaged   by   a   natural   disaster,   notification   of   safe   zones   during  

rioting,  or  provision  of  general  information  such  as  the  closure  of  bridges  and  public  

transportation.  The  resilience  of  citizens  has  enormous  impact  on  the  aftermath  of  

social   disorder   or   crisis   as   resources   and   aid   are   mobilized   and   distributed.   The  

continued  growth  and  expansion  of  citizen  vigilance  will  only  serve  to  heighten  this  

resilience   and   the   outcome   will   be   technologically   aware   and   mobilized   citizens  

prepared  to  respond  to  crisis  situations.  

   

  78  

Bibliography  

Blogs    

Criminal  List:  Anonymous  Crime  in  a  2.0  World?  I  Don’t  Think  So!  Retrieved  on  April  

1,  2015,  http://vancityriotcriminals.tumblr.com/.  

 

Letters  from  the  front  lines:  Vancouver  Riot.  Retrieved  on  April  1,  2015,  

http://riot2011frontlines.tumblr.com/.  

 

Books  

 

Edwards,  B.  &  McCarthy,  J.D.  (2004).  Resources  and  social  movement  mobilization  

in  Snow,  D.A.,  Soule,  S.A.  &  Kriesi,  H.  (eds)  The  Blackwell  Companion  to  Social  

Movements.  Oxford:  Blackwell  Publishing.  

 

Freeman,  J.  (1979)  in  Zald,  M.N.  &  McCarthy,  J.D.  (eds)  The  dynamics  of  social  

movements.  Cambridge:  Winthrop  Publishers,  Inc.  

 

Friedkin,  N.E.  (1998).  A  structural  theory  of  social  influence.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  

University  Press.  

 

Lindgren,  S.  (2013).  New  noise:  a  cultural  sociology  of  digital  disruption.  New  York:  

Peter  Lang  Publishing.  

 

McCarthy,  J.D.  &  Zald,  M.N.  (1973).  The  trend  of  social  movements  in  America:  

professionalization  and  resource  mobilization.  Morristown,  General  Learning  Press.  

 

  79  

Zald,  M.N.  &  McCarthy,  J.D.  (1979)  The  dynamics  of  social  movements.  Cambridge:  

Winthrop  Publishers,  Inc.  

 

Conference  Proceedings  

 

Rizza,  C.,  Pereira,  A.G.,  &  Curvelo,  P.  (2013).  “Do-­‐it-­‐yourself  justice:”  considerations  

of  social  media  use  in  a  crisis  situation:  the  case  of  the  2011  Vancouver  riots.  

Proceedings  of  the  10th  International  ISCRAM  Conference  –  Baden-­‐Baden,  Germany,  

May  2013,  411-­‐415.  

 

Vieweg,  S.,  Hughes,  A.L.,  Starbird,  K.  &  Palen,  L.  (2010).  Microblogging  during  two  

natural  hazards  events:  what  twitter  may  contribute  to  situational  awareness.  

Proceedings  of  the  28th  ACM  Conference  on  Computer  Human  Interaction  –  Atlanta,  

Georgia,  USA,  April  2010,  1-­‐10.  

 

Watson,  H.,  Baruh,  L.,  Finn,  R.  &  Scifo,  S.  (2014).  Citizen  (in)security?:  Social  media,  

citizen  journalism  and  crisis  response.  Proceedings  of  the  11th  International  ISCRAM  

Conference  –  University  Park,  Pennsylvania,  USA,  May  2014,  294-­‐298.  

 

News  Articles  

 

Bowcott,  O.  (2011,  16  August).  Facebook  riot  calls  earn  men  four-­‐year  jail  terms  

amid  sentencing  outcry.  The  Guardian.  Retrieved  on  April  16,  2015,  

http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/16/facebook-­‐riot-­‐calls-­‐men-­‐jailed.  

 

 

 

  80  

Crawford,  T.  (2012,  31  October).  Online  vigilantes  can  slow  police  investigations,  

UBC  study  on  Stanley  Cup  riot  concludes.  The  Vancouver  Sun.  Retrieved  on  March  

30,  2015,  

http://www.vancouversun.com/technology/Online+vigilantes+slow+police+investi

gations+report+Stanley/7478872/story.html.  

 

Croft,  A.  &  Holden,  M.  (2011,  10  August).  Londoners  vow  to  defend  themselves  

against  rioters.  Reuters.  Retrieved  on  April  17,  2015,  

http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/08/10/uk-­‐britain-­‐riot-­‐vigilantes-­‐

idUKTRE77959K20110810.  

 

England  riots:  government  mulls  social  media  controls.  (2011,  11  August).  BBC  

News.  Retrieved  on  April  17,  2015,  http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-­‐

14493497.  

 

England  riots:  Twitter  and  Facebook  users  plan  clean  up.  (2011,  9  August).  BBC  

News.  Retrieved  on  April  16,  2015,  http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-­‐england-­‐london-­‐

14456857.  

 

Garside,  J.  (2011,  9  August).  UK  riots:  mobile  phone  operators  help  police  to  identify  

looters.  The  Guardian.  Retrieved  on  April  16,  2015,  

http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/09/uk-­‐riots-­‐mobile-­‐phone-­‐operators.  

 

Halliday,  J.  (2011A,  8  August).  London  riots:  Blackberry  to  help  police  probe  

Messenger  looting  ‘role.’  The  Guardian.  Retrieved  on  April  16,  2015,  

http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/aug/08/london-­‐riots-­‐blackberry-­‐

messenger-­‐looting.  

 

 

 

  81  

Halliday,  J.  (2011B,  8  August).  London  riots:  how  Blackberry  Messenger  played  a  key  

role.  The  Guardian.  Retrieved  on  April  16,  2015,  

http://www.theguardian.com/media/2011/aug/08/london-­‐riots-­‐facebook-­‐twitter-­‐

blackberry.  

 

Keeling,  N.  (2011,  20  August).  Police  got  the  wrong  man:  Salford  teen  charged  with  

Miss  Selfridge  arson  during  Manchester  riots  is  cleared.  Manchester  Evening  News.  

Retrieved  on  April  16,  2015,  

http://www.manchestereveningnews.co.uk/news/greater-­‐manchester-­‐

news/police-­‐got-­‐the-­‐wrong-­‐man-­‐salford-­‐teen-­‐868744.  

 

Klein,  J.  &  Mackin,  B.  (2011).  Trouble  in  Vancouver’s  streets  after  defeat.  New  York  

Times,  June  16,  2011,  accessed  on  February  17,  2015,    

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/sports/vancouver-­‐fans-­‐take-­‐to-­‐the-­‐streets-­‐

after-­‐loss.html?_r=0.  

 

Lewis,  N.  (2013,  14  June).  Social  media  and  the  2011  Vancouver  riots.  ArtsWIRE.  

Retrieved  on  March  31,  2015,  http://wire.arts.ubc.ca/featured/social-­‐media-­‐and-­‐

the-­‐2011-­‐vancouver-­‐riots/.  

 

London  riots  arrests  reach  2,000,  Met  Police  says.  (2011,  25  August).  BBC  News.  

Retrieved  on  April  16,  2015,  http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-­‐14668770.  

 

Lydall,  R.  (2011,  9  August).  Shock  and  anger  as  city  awakes  to  worst  scenes  since  the  

Blitz.  London  Evening  Standard.  Retrieved  on  April  16,  2015,  

http://www.standard.co.uk/news/shock-­‐and-­‐anger-­‐as-­‐city-­‐awakes-­‐to-­‐worst-­‐

scenes-­‐since-­‐the-­‐blitz-­‐6430993.html.  

 

 

 

 

  82  

Manning,  S.  (2011,  11  August).  Vigilantes  raise  tensions  on  street.  The  Independent.  

Retrieved  on  April  17,  2015,  

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/vigilantes-­‐raise-­‐tensions-­‐on-­‐

street-­‐2335681.html.  

 

Milmo,  C.  (2011,  10  August).  The  night  that  rioters  ruled  and  police  lost  control  of  

the  streets  of  London.  The  Independent.  Retrieved  on  April  16,  2015,  

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/the-­‐night-­‐that-­‐rioters-­‐ruled-­‐and-­‐

police-­‐lost-­‐control-­‐of-­‐the-­‐streets-­‐of-­‐london-­‐2335067.html.  

 

Riots  in  Tottenham  after  Mark  Duggan  shooting  protest.  (2011,  7  August).  BBC  

News.  Retrieved  on  April  16,  2015,  http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-­‐england-­‐london-­‐

14434318.  

 

Robinson,  M.,  Kane,  L.,  Duggan,  E.  &  Law,  S.  (2012,  11  June).  Vancouverites  fight  back  

against  rioters  through  social  media.  The  Vancouver  Sun.  Retrieved  on  April  1,  2015,  

http://www.vancouversun.com/technology/Vancouverites+fight+back+against+rio

ters+through+social+media/4958109/story.html.  

 

Ryan,  D.  (2011,  17  November).  Thousands  stream  into  Vancouver  to  clean  up  after  

riot.  The  Vancouver  Sun.  Retrieved  on  March  30,  2015,  

http://www.vancouversun.com/sports/Facebook+campaign+inviting+public+clean

+after+Vancouver+riot/4958518/story.html.  

 

Vancouver  police  arrest  more  than  100  in  riot.  Damage  to  shops  and  streets  to  cost  

millions.  (2011,  16  June).  CBC  News.  Retrieved  on  March  30,  2015,    

http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-­‐columbia/vancouver-­‐police-­‐arrest-­‐more-­‐

than-­‐100-­‐in-­‐riot-­‐1.1036582.  

 

 

 

  83  

Vardy,  M.  (2011,  16  June).  Twitter  playing  big  role  in  reporting  of  Vancouver  Riot.  

The  Next  Web.  Retrieved  on  April  1,  2015,  

http://thenextweb.com/ca/2011/06/16/twitter-­‐playing-­‐big-­‐role-­‐in-­‐reporting-­‐of-­‐

vancouver-­‐riot/.  

 

The  BlackBerry  riots.  (2011,  13  August).  The  Economist.  Retrieved  on  April  16,  2015,  

http://www.economist.com/node/21525976.  

 

UK  riot  vigilantes  attempt  to  ‘reclaim  the  streets.’  (2011,  10  August).  The  Huffington  

Post.  Retrieved  on  April  17,  2015,  

http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2011/08/10/uk-­‐riot-­‐vigilantes-­‐

attemp_n_923110.html.  

 

Yelaja,  P.  (2011,  10  August).  U.K.  riots  reveal  social  media  double  standard.  CBC  

News.  Retrieved  on  April  16,  2015,  http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/u-­‐k-­‐riots-­‐

reveal-­‐social-­‐media-­‐double-­‐standard-­‐1.977131.  

 

Podcasts  

 

In  the  social  media  age,  can  justice  be  served?  (2013,  13  March).  UBC  Dialogues.  

Retrieved  on  April  1,  2015,  

http://www.alumni.ubc.ca/2013/events/dialogues/ubc-­‐dialogues-­‐vancouver-­‐

social-­‐media-­‐justice/.  

 

Reports  and  Legislation  

 

2011  Stanley  Cup  Riot  Review.  (2011).  Vancouver  Police  Department.  

  84  

After  the  riots:  the  final  report  of  the  riots  communities  and  victims  panel.  (2012).  

Government  of  the  United  Kingdom.  

 

Beyond  the  Call:  Annual  Report  (2011).  Vancouver  Police  Department.  

 

City  of  Vancouver  Internal  Review  of  the  2011  Stanley  Cup  Riot  (2011).  City  of  

Vancouver.  

 

Furlong,  J.  &  Keefe,  D.  (2011).  The  Night  the  city  became  a  stadium:  independent  

review  of  the  2011  Vancouver  Stanley  Cup  Playoffs  Riot.  Solicitor  General  and  

Minister  of  Public  Safety  British  Columbia.  

 

Government  response  to  the  riots,  communities  and  victims  panel’s  final  report.  

(2013).  Department  for  Communities  and  Local  Government.  

 

Ministry  of  Justice.  Statistical  bulletin  on  the  public  disorder  of  6th  to  9th  August  

2011  –  February  2012  update.  Ministry  of  Justice  Statistics  Bulletin.  1-­‐17.  

Report  on  the  riot  that  occurred  in  Vancouver  on  June  14-­‐15,  1994.  British  Columbia  

Police  Commission.  October,  1994.  

 

Riot  Roundup  Poster  (2011).  Vancouver  Police  Department.  

 

Rusbridger,  A.  &  Rees,  J.  (2011).  Reading  the  riots:  investigating  England’s  summer  

of  disorder.  The  Guardian  and  The  London  School  of  Economics.  1-­‐40.  

 

The  rules  of  engagement:  a  review  of  the  August  2011  disorders.  (2011).  Her  

Majesty’s  Inspectorate  of  Constabularies.  

 

Youth  Criminal  Justice  Act  (S.C.  2002).  c.  1,  Canada.  

 

  85  

Scientific  Articles  

 

Alexander,  D.  (2014).  Social  media  in  disaster  risk  reduction  and  crisis  management.  

Science  and  Engineering  Ethics,  20,  717-­‐733.  

 

Anduiza,  E.,  Cristancho,  C.  &  Sabucedo,  J.M.  (2014).  Mobilization  through  online  

social  networks:  the  political  protest  of  the  indignados  in  Spain.  Information,  

Communication  &  Society,  17,  750-­‐764.  

 

Baker,  S.A.  (2011).  The  mediated  crowd:  new  social  media  and  new  forms  of  rioting.  

Sociological  Research  Online,  16.  

 

Baudains,  P.,  Braithwaite,  A.M.  &  Johnson,  S.D.  (2013).  Target  choice  during  extreme  

events:  a  discrete  spatial  choice  model  of  the  2011  London  riots.  Criminology,  51,  

251-­‐285  

 

Baudains,  P.,  Johnson,  S.D.  &  Braithwaite,  A.M.  (2013).  Geographic  patterns  of  

diffusion  in  the  2011  London  riots.  Applied  Geography,  45,  211-­‐219.  

 

Boyd,  D.M.  (2008).  Social  network  sites:  definition,  history,  and  scholarship.  Journal  

of  Computer-­‐Mediated  Communication,  13,  210-­‐230.  

 

Buechler,  S.M.  (1993).  Beyond  resource  mobilization?  Emerging  trends  in  social  

movement  theory.  Sociological  Quarterly,  34,  217-­‐235.  

 

Dailey,  D.  &  Starbird,  K.  (2014).  Journalists  as  crowdsourcerers:  responding  to  crisis  

by  reporting  with  a  crowd.  Computer  Supported  Cooperative  Work,  23,  445-­‐481.  

 

Della  Porta,  D.  (2014).  Comment  on  organizing  in  the  crowd.  Information  &  Society,  

17,  269-­‐271.  

  86  

Eltantawy,  N.  &  Wiest,  J.B.  (2011).  Social  media  in  the  Egyptian  Revolution:  

reconsidering  resource  mobilization  theory.  International  Journal  of  Communication,  

5,  1207-­‐1224.  

 

Evison,  M.P.  (2014).  The  third  forensics  –  images  and  allusions.  Policing  and  Society,  

1-­‐19.  DOI:  10.1080/10439463.2014.895347  

 

Friedkin,  N.E.  &  Johnsen,  E.C.  (1999).  Social  influence  networks  and  opinion  change.  

Advances  in  Group  Processes,  16,  1-­‐29.  

 

Fulk,  J.  (1993).  Social  construction  of  communication  technology.  Academy  of  

Management  Journal,  36,  921-­‐950.  

 

Garner,  R.  &  Zald,  M.N.  (2012).  Now  we  are  almost  fifty!  Reflections  on  a  theory  of  

the  transformation  of  social  movement  organizations.  Social  Forces,  91,  3-­‐11.  

 

Goldsmith,  A.  (2015)  Disgracebook  policing:  social  media  and  the  rise  of  police  

indiscretion.  Policing  and  Society,  25,  249-­‐267.  

 

Henman,  P.  (2012).  Governmentalities  of  Gov  2.0.  Information,  Communication  &  

Society,  15,  1–22.  

 

Jenkins,  J.C.  (1983).  Resource  mobilization  and  the  study  of  social  movements.  

Review  of  Sociology,  9,  527-­‐553.  

 

Jin,  Y.,  Liu,  B.F.,  &  Austin,  L.L.  (2014).  Examining  the  role  of  social  media  in  effective  

crisis  management:  the  effects  of  crisis  origin,  information  form,  and  source  on  

publics’  crisis  responses.  Communication  Research,  41,  74-­‐94.  

 

  87  

Kietzmann,  J.H.,  Silvestre,  B.S.,  McCarthy,  I.P.  &  Pitt,  L.F.  (2012).  Unpacking  the  social  

media  phenomenon:  towards  a  research  agenda.  Journal  of  Public  Affairs,  12,  109-­‐

119.  

 

Klandermans,  B.  (1984).  Mobilization  and  participation:  social-­‐psychological  

expansions  of  resource  mobilization  theory.  American  Sociological  Review,  49,  583-­‐

600.  

 

Kotsiopoulos,  I.  (2014).  Social  media  in  crisis  management:  role,  potential  and  risk.  

Utility  and  Cloud  Computing  (UCC),  2014  IEEE/ACM  7th  International  Conference,  

681-­‐686.  

 

Liu,  S.B.  (2014).  Crisis  crowdsourcing  framework:  designing  strategic  configurations  

of  crowdsourcing  for  the  emergency  management  domain.  Computer  Supported  

Cooperative  Work,  23,  389-­‐443.  

 

McCarthy,  J.D.  &  Zald,  M.N.  (1977).  Resource  mobilization  and  social  movements:  a  

partial  theory.  American  Journal  of  Sociology,  82,  1212-­‐1241.  

 

McNutt,  K.  (2014).  Public  engagement  in  the  Web  2.0  era:  social  collaborative  

technologies  in  a  public  sector  context.  Canadian  Public  Administration,  57,  49-­‐70.  

 

Marwick,  A.E.  &  Boyd,  D.  (2010).  I  tweet  honestly,  I  tweet  passionately:  Twitter  

users,  context  collapse,  and  the  imagined  audience.  New  Media  &  Society,  13,  114-­‐

133.  

 

Merchant,  G.  (2012).  Unravelling  the  social  network:  theory  and  research.  Learning,  

Media  and  Technology,  37,  4-­‐19.  

 

  88  

Neubaum,  G.,  Rosner,  L.,  Rosenthal-­‐von  der  Putten,  A.  &  Kramer,  N.  (2014).  

Psychosocial  functions  of  social  media  usage  in  a  disaster  situation:  a  multi-­‐

methodological  approach.  Computers  in  Human  Behavior,  34,  28-­‐38.  

 

Novak,  J.M.  &  Vidoloff,  K.G.  (2011).  New  frames  on  crisis:  citizen  journalism  

changing  the  dynamics  of  crisis  communications.  International  Journal  of  Mass  

Emergencies  and  Disasters,  29,  181-­‐202.  

 

Panagiotopoulos,  P.,  Bigdeli,  A.Z.  &  Sams,  S.  (2014).  Citizen-­‐government  

collaboration  on  social  media:  the  case  of  Twitter  in  the  2011  riots  in  England.  

Government  Information  Quarterly,  31,349-­‐357.  

 

Pickard,  G.,  Pan,  W.,  Rahwan,  I,  Cebrian,  M.,  Crane,  R.,  Madan,  A.  &  Pentland,  A.  

(2011).  Time-­‐critical  social  mobilization.  Science,  334,  509-­‐512.  

 

Pipek,  V.,  Liu,  S.  &  Kerne,  A.  (2014).  Crisis  informatics  and  collaboration:  a  brief  

introduction.  Computer  Supported  Cooperative  Work,  23,  339-­‐345.  

 

Prensky,  M.  (2001).  Digital  natives,  digital  immigrants.  NCB  University  Press,  9,  1-­‐9.  

 

Rainer,  K.,  Grubmuller,  V.,  Pejic,  I.,  Gotsch,  K.  &  Leitner,  P.  (2013).  Social  media  

applications  in  crisis  interaction.  Systems,  1,  112-­‐127.  

 

Roderick,  M.  (1999).  Mobilization  theory:  a  new  paradigm  for  industrial  relations?  

Human  Relations,  52,  1205-­‐1216.  

 

Rutherford,  A.,  Cebrian,  M.,  Dsouza,  S.,  Moro,  E.,  Pentland,  A.  &  Rahwan,  I.  (2013).  

Limits  of  social  mobilization.  Proceedings  of  the  National  Academy  of  Sciences,  110,  

6281-­‐6286.  

 

 

  89  

Sandoval-­‐Almazan,  R.  &  Gil-­‐Garcia,  J.  (2014).  Towards  cyberactivism  2.0?  

Understanding  the  use  of  social  media  and  other  information  technologies  for  

political  activism  and  social  movements.  Government  Information  Quarterly,  31,  365-­‐

378.  

 

Schneider,  C.J.  &  Trottier,  D.  (2013).  Social  Media  and  the  2011  Vancouver  Riot.  

Studies  in  Symbolic  Interaction,  40,  335-­‐362.  

 

Schneider,  C.J.  &  Trottier,  D.  (2012).  The  2011  Vancouver  riot  and  the  role  of  

Facebook  in  crowd-­‐sourced  policing.  BC  Studies,  175,  57-­‐72.  

 

Simon,  T.,  Goldberg,  A.,  Aharonson-­‐Daniel,  L.  Leykin,  D.  &  Adini,  B.  (2014).  Twitter  in  

the  cross  fire  –  the  use  of  social  media  in  the  Westgate  Mall  terror  attack  in  Kenya.  

PLoS  ONE,  9,  1-­‐11.  

 

Snow,  D.A.,  Zurcher  Jr.,  L.A.  &  Ekland-­‐Olson,  S.  (1980).  Social  networks  and  social  

movements:  a  microstructural  approach  to  differential  recruitment.  American  

Sociological  Review,  45,  787-­‐801.  

 

Stanley,  D.  (2003).  What  do  we  know  about  social  cohesion:  the  research  

perspective  of  the  federal  government’s  social  cohesion  research  network.  The  

Canadian  Journal  of  Sociology,  28,  5-­‐17.  

 

Suler,  J.  (2004).  The  online  disinhibition  effect.  Cyber  Psychology  &  Behavior,  7,  321-­‐

326.  

 

Tilly,  C.  (1995).  To  explain  political  processes.  American  Journal  of  Sociology,  100,  

1594-­‐1610.  

 

Tonkin,  E.,  Pfeiffer,  H.D.  &  Tourte,  G.  (2012).  Twitter,  information  sharing  and  the  

London  riots?  American  Society  for  Information  Science  and  Technology,  38,  49-­‐57.  

  90  

Trottier,  D.  (2014).  Police  and  user-­‐led  investigations  on  social  media.  Journal  of  

Law,  Information  and  Science,  23,  75-­‐96.  

 

Wang,  X.  (2014).  How  do  people  participate  in  social  network  sites  after  crises?  A  

self-­‐determination  perspective.  Social  Science  Computer  Review,  32,  662-­‐677.  

 

Weare,  C.,  Lichterman,  P.  &  Esparza,  N.  (2014).  Collaboration  and  Culture:  

Organizational  Culture  and  the  Dynamics  of  Collaborative  Policy  Networks.  The  

Policy  Studies  Journal,  42,  590-­‐619.  

 

Zald,  M.N.  &  Ash,  R.  (1966).  Social  movement  organizations:  growth,  decay  and  

change.  Social  Forces,  44,  327-­‐341.  

 

Social  Media  Sources  

 

Canucks  Fans  Against  the  2011  Vancouver  Riots.  Retrieved  on  April  17,  2015,  

https://www.facebook.com/Canucks.fansagainstthe.2011.Vancouver.Riots?fref=ts.  

 

Lets  Get  These  People  Locked  Up  –  2011  Vancouver  Riot  Pics.  Retrieved  on  April  5,  

2015,  https://www.facebook.com/pages/Lets-­‐Get-­‐These-­‐People-­‐Locked-­‐Up-­‐2011-­‐

Vancouver-­‐Riot-­‐Pics/152782464792896?ref=br_rs.  

   

Liverpool  Clean  Up.  Retrieved  on  April  17,  2015,  

https://www.facebook.com/events/158783327533310/.  

 

London  Riots  2011.  Retrieved  on  April  17,  2015,  

https://www.facebook.com/LondonRiots.  

 

  91  

Post  Riot  Clean-­‐up  –  Let’s  Help  Clean  Up  London.  Retrieved  on  April  17,  2015,  

https://www.facebook.com/LondonRiotsCleanUp.  

 

Post  Riot  Clean-­‐up  –  Let’s  Help  Vancouver.  Retrieved  on  April  5,  2015,  

https://www.facebook.com/theREALvancouver?fref=ts.  

 

Supporting  the  Met  Police  Against  the  London  Rioters.  Retrieved  on  April  17,  2015,  

https://www.facebook.com/pages/Supporting-­‐the-­‐Met-­‐Police-­‐against-­‐the-­‐London-­‐

rioters/158315884244236?fref=ts.  

 

Websites  

 

Metropolitan  Police.  Retrieved  on  April  16,  2015,  

http://content.met.police.uk/Site/operationwithern.  

 

Tumblr.  Retrieved  on  April  2,  2015,  https://www.tumblr.com/.  

 

Vancouver  riot  2011:  help  identify  suspects.  Integrated  Riot  Investigation  Team.  

Retrieved  on  April  3,  2015,  https://riot2011.vpd.ca/.