russia’s power engineering over the next 20–30 years

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41 ISSN 1019-3316, Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2007, Vol. 77, No. 1, pp. 41–46. © Pleiades Publishing, Ltd., 2007. Original Russian Text © O.N. Favorskii, 2007, published in Vestnik Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk, 2007, Vol. 77, No. 2, pp. 121–127. In Russia’s electric power engineering, the installed capacity of which is 216 GW, approximately 66% of the electric power and about 40% of the heat are pro- duced by the heat plants of RAO UES of Russia, their total capacity being 131.5 GW. At the same time, the capacity of condensation plants, which produce only electricity, is 65.3 GW, and the capacity of combined heat and power plants, which generate both electricity and heat (the latter energy being produced in a quantity two times greater than the former), is 66.2 GW. In addi- tion, hydroelectric plants with a total capacity of 44.9 GW produce 18% of RAO UES of Russia’s elec- tric power. There are several geothermal plants with a total capacity of about 50 MW and hundreds of central- ized boiler plants within the heat supply system. Nine nuclear power plants of the Russian Federal Agency for Atomic Energy (Rosatom) with a total capacity of 22.2 GW (10.5% of all capacities installed) generate about 16% of the electric power. In addition to central- ized energy and heat supply, there are independent energy systems in the Far North, eastern Siberia, the Far East, Sakhalin, Kamchatka, and some other regions, as well as tens of thousands of small decentral- ized power plants with capacities from several kilo- watts to tens (more rarely hundreds) of kilowatts, located mainly in the Far North. These are diesel, wind- power, and small hydroelectric plants that do not always operate round the clock. They produce no more than 2% of the total electric power of the country. The achievements of Russian electric engineering are the following: • the implementation of a single electric-power transmission system over the larger part of the country (dating back to the first GOELRO plan, developed by the State Commission for the Electrification of Russia in 1920), which has no parallel in the world in terms of line length and total power transmitted; • a relatively optimal (today) distribution of power output by equipment in use: two-thirds is heat plants, one-sixth is hydroelectric plants, and one-sixth is nuclear plants, based on the comparative cost of elec- tricity over a life cycle of 30–50 years; and • reasonable (today), based on price, environmental, and operational indicators, distribution of electricity output at heat plants by fuel type: natural gas is 66%, coal is about 30%, and petroleum products are 4%. Renewable energy sources, widely advertised in Europe and partially in the United States, such as solar cells, wind plants, tidal hydraulic installations, etc., have not been widely used in the Russian conditions. In our country, only small and energy-isolated systems can be rational, but they do not solve the general prob- lem of power supply. For example, solar cells will never be cheap due to their large dimensions and low-usable (average-usable in Russia) solar energy, the lack of roads and necessary power accumulators, and the main- tenance cost of the whole system. Wind installations, in addition to electricity accumulation means, require constant wind speeds of at least 4 m/s; therefore, they are profitable only in a small number of the country’s regions. Tidal hydroelectric plants are also strictly local and expensive energy sources. We may confidently state that over the next 30–50 years, the share of all these types of power generation systems in Russia will not exceed 1.5–2%. No doubt, we should construct geothermal power plants in regions such as the Far East and Caucasus. Yet their contribution to the country’s power engineering will hardly exceed 1% in the coming decades. Geother- mal sources are much more effective in heat supply. The development of fashionable “hydrogen power” may be economically feasible only if hydrogen is pro- duced from a large excess of the night capacities, most Point of View Already by 2007, Russia will be short of electric power capacity for the development of industry and the main- tenance of the housing and utilities complex. The author sees a way out of the current situation in decentraliza- tion of the heat and power industry. Small heat and electricity plants with gas-turbine installations are less expensive than large natural gas–driven heat and electricity plants, and they are paid off not in decades but in a few years. According to the author, the heat and power industry should build power plants of all types and favor coal-driven heat and electricity plants. DOI: 10.1134/S1019331607010078 Russia’s Power Engineering over the Next 20–30 Years O. N. Favorskii* *Academician Oleg Nikolaevich Favorskii is an RAS advisor and head of the power engineering section of the RAS Branch of Energy, Machine Building, Mechanics, and Control.

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41

ISSN 1019-3316, Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2007, Vol. 77, No. 1, pp. 41–46. © Pleiades Publishing, Ltd., 2007.Original Russian Text © O.N. Favorskii, 2007, published in Vestnik Rossiiskoi Akademii Nauk, 2007, Vol. 77, No. 2, pp. 121–127.

In Russia’s electric power engineering, the installedcapacity of which is 216 GW, approximately 66% ofthe electric power and about 40% of the heat are pro-duced by the heat plants of RAO UES of Russia, theirtotal capacity being 131.5 GW. At the same time, thecapacity of condensation plants, which produce onlyelectricity, is 65.3 GW, and the capacity of combinedheat and power plants, which generate both electricityand heat (the latter energy being produced in a quantitytwo times greater than the former), is 66.2 GW. In addi-tion, hydroelectric plants with a total capacity of44.9 GW produce 18% of RAO UES of Russia’s elec-tric power. There are several geothermal plants with atotal capacity of about 50 MW and hundreds of central-ized boiler plants within the heat supply system. Ninenuclear power plants of the Russian Federal Agency forAtomic Energy (Rosatom) with a total capacity of22.2 GW (10.5% of all capacities installed) generateabout 16% of the electric power. In addition to central-ized energy and heat supply, there are independentenergy systems in the Far North, eastern Siberia, theFar East, Sakhalin, Kamchatka, and some otherregions, as well as tens of thousands of small decentral-ized power plants with capacities from several kilo-watts to tens (more rarely hundreds) of kilowatts,located mainly in the Far North. These are diesel, wind-power, and small hydroelectric plants that do notalways operate round the clock. They produce no morethan 2% of the total electric power of the country.

The achievements of Russian electric engineeringare the following:

• the implementation of a single electric-powertransmission system over the larger part of the country(dating back to the first GOELRO plan, developed bythe State Commission for the Electrification of Russia

in 1920), which has no parallel in the world in terms ofline length and total power transmitted;

• a relatively optimal (today) distribution of poweroutput by equipment in use: two-thirds is heat plants,one-sixth is hydroelectric plants, and one-sixth isnuclear plants, based on the comparative cost of elec-tricity over a life cycle of 30–50 years; and

• reasonable (today), based on price, environmental,and operational indicators, distribution of electricityoutput at heat plants by fuel type: natural gas is 66%,coal is about 30%, and petroleum products are 4%.

Renewable energy sources, widely advertised inEurope and partially in the United States, such as solarcells, wind plants, tidal hydraulic installations, etc.,have not been widely used in the Russian conditions. Inour country, only small and energy-isolated systemscan be rational, but they do not solve the general prob-lem of power supply. For example, solar cells will neverbe cheap due to their large dimensions and low-usable(average-usable in Russia) solar energy, the lack ofroads and necessary power accumulators, and the main-tenance cost of the whole system. Wind installations, inaddition to electricity accumulation means, requireconstant wind speeds of at least 4 m/s; therefore, theyare profitable only in a small number of the country’sregions. Tidal hydroelectric plants are also strictly localand expensive energy sources. We may confidentlystate that over the next 30–50 years, the share of allthese types of power generation systems in Russia willnot exceed 1.5–2%.

No doubt, we should construct geothermal powerplants in regions such as the Far East and Caucasus. Yettheir contribution to the country’s power engineeringwill hardly exceed 1% in the coming decades. Geother-mal sources are much more effective in heat supply.

The development of fashionable “hydrogen power”may be economically feasible only if hydrogen is pro-duced from a large excess of the night capacities, most

Point of View

Already by 2007, Russia will be short of electric power capacity for the development of industry and the main-tenance of the housing and utilities complex. The author sees a way out of the current situation in decentraliza-tion of the heat and power industry. Small heat and electricity plants with gas-turbine installations are lessexpensive than large natural gas–driven heat and electricity plants, and they are paid off not in decades but in afew years. According to the author, the heat and power industry should build power plants of all types and favorcoal-driven heat and electricity plants.

DOI:

10.1134/S1019331607010078

Russia’s Power Engineering over the Next 20–30 Years

O. N. Favorskii*

*Academician Oleg Nikolaevich Favorskii is an RAS advisor andhead of the power engineering section of the RAS Branch ofEnergy, Machine Building, Mechanics, and Control.

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likely, of nuclear plants, stored in a gaseous state, andthen burned in combined-cycle gas-turbine units atpeak loads. Nevertheless, hydrogen power is stillexpensive, and its noticeable use (simply, cost recov-ery) is unreal in Russia in the next decades. However,the corresponding preparatory work is necessary (bythe second half of the 21st century). The extensive useof hydrogen fuel cells in power engineering over thenext 20–30 years is also practically excluded due totheir high price and large size.

Even today, the capacity of Russian power engineer-ing is unable to ensure either industrial growth or theincreasing demands of the housing sector. Note thatnearly 30 of 216 GW of the installed capacity of thepower plants are in remote regions, and approximately15–20 GW are under repair or being modernized (thefleet of overage equipment is about 60%). During the2005 peak consumption of 150 GW, spare capacitiesdid not exceed 10%, and in the winter of 2006, it waseven less. Even with an equipment age of 50 years, noless than 4 GW of capacities should be replaced annu-ally, while less than 1 GW was annually replaced overthe past 15 years. This is why not only all our equip-ment is becoming physically and technologically obso-lete, but also practically all regions of the country(except for the Middle Volga) have become energy defi-cient. This is especially dramatic in Moscow, St. Peters-burg, the Northern Caucasus, and Tyumen’.

We need a

state program ensuring the country’spower consumption.

Hopes for investors are not highdue to the long cost recovery cycle. Even the best ofsmall plants being commissioned pay off in at leastfour–five years. Large plants will recoup costs no ear-lier than in 20–30 years under the current electricity,natural gas, equipment, and construction prices (wemust also account for mediators, who are another trou-ble of ours).

Power equipment in our country is extremely obso-lete according to its ideology and age. The efficiencyeven of the best steam turbines, which have been usedin Russia for more than 30 years, is only 36–38%, andthe share of the state-of-the-art combined-cycle units,whose efficiency is 52–60%, in power equipment isabout 1%. Consequently, we spend 1.5 times more fueland discharge more combustion products to the atmo-sphere. In principle, we should ban the construction ofnew gas-driven power plants that use steam turbines.The turbine equipment of power plants can also be con-siderably improved today.

Russian natural gas and electricity prices, which aremuch less than in Europe, did not stimulate theimprovement of power efficiency at all stages from thetechnological level of power-generating equipment andenergy conversion, control, and transmission systemsto various production processes in industry, the thermalefficiency of construction, lighting, etc. This is why thepower efficiency of the Russian gross national productis three–four times worse than in developed countries.

The fuel problem merits special attention. The largeshare of natural gas in Russian power engineering iscurrently economically advisable. Natural gas is thebest fuel in terms of the environment, operation, andprice (in Russia). Petroleum products, primarily fueloil, are not only more expensive and environmentallyunfriendly but also the main source of transport fuels—gasoline, diesel fuel, and aviation kerosene. Transportdevelopment requires a reduction of their share inpower engineering, which is currently under way. How-ever, fuel oil will still long be a reserve fuel for theobsolete equipment of power plants.

In the long term, the role of coal in power engineer-ing should increase especially for Siberian regions.However, it is necessary to introduce brand new tech-nologies (vortex circulatory and others) of its combus-tion, synthetic gas regeneration for transport, and puri-fication of exhaust gases. All this increases the cost ofcoal-driven heat and power plants and hinders the useof coal in Russian power engineering. Yet again, theprospect of active preparation for the development ofcoal heat and power plants is inevitable over the next30–50 years.

The use of industrial and household wastes as fuelbecomes increasingly acute for the central part of Rus-sia and large cities. This problem is actively beingdeveloped in Europe; for example, the share of suchfuel in Finland is almost 20%. It is not yet treated seri-ously in Russia.

While considering ways of developing nationalpower engineering over the next decades, it is necessaryto take account of very many factors, which are hard topredict in the majority of cases. The most criticalamong them are

• power generation growth in time, which is neces-sary to ensure the country’s life and development;

• a long-term (for at least 40–50 years) fuel ratio thatis guaranteed and economically profitable for the coun-try’s power engineering;

• realistic costs of commissioning, operating, anddecommissioning of new power plants of differenttypes (primarily nuclear power plants), as well as thecost of modernizing the equipment of active powerplants; and

• the efficiency (fuel and environmental) and reli-ability of specific power equipment and energy trans-mission and control systems.

These factors should be evaluated in the first placewhen analyzing the ways of development of powerengineering. Let me begin with electric power needs forthe next 20–30 years.

In recent years, Russia has already developed fourvariants of the Energy Strategy until 2020, in which thepredicted consistent growth of electric power genera-tion has decreased from 1600 to 1200 TW/h. (In 2005,energy consumption in Russia was 940 TW/h.) Obvi-ously, such a forecast is based on the lack of hope for a

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noticeable growth of engineering and housing needs.Meanwhile, the situation in the housing and utilitiessector has changed to a certain growth of electric powerconsumption. As a result of the latest decisions of theRussian president, we are also to expect a growth in thecapacity of the energy system.

China is planning to increase its capacity from 550to 950 GW (by 72%) in 20 years, having commissionedmore than 100 GW over the last two years, which isalmost half of the capacity installed in Russia. TheUnited States is also planning a growth from 980 to1460 GW (47%) in 20 years. By the way, the share ofnuclear plants in the US energy system is 20%; that ofnatural gas–driven heat and power plants is 18%; coal-driven heat and power plants, 50%; and hydroelectricplants, 7%. Obviously, Russia should think today abouta capacity growth not by 30%, as in the strategy devel-oped in 2005, but probably by 45–50% as well. If thisgreater increase is not pursued, our country will not sur-vive as an industrial and cultural power; i.e., the totalcapacity of power engineering must be no less than320–350 GW in 20–30 years.

As for the types of power units and fuels for Russia,it is advisable in terms of economy and reliability toobserve the following relationship in power generationover the next 30–40 years: heat and power plants, 60%,and hydroelectric and nuclear plants, 20% each. In thenext 20 years, it would be advisable to commission atleast 8–10 GW of hydroelectric generating capacities inSiberia and the Far East, where the land value is lowand unemployment is high. Over the same years, itwould be good to noticeably increase (1.5–1.8 times)the capacities of the existing nuclear centers in theEuropean part of the country by building six–eight newpowerful units, as well as two–three nuclear plants inSiberia and the Far East, and manufacturing severalsmall floating nuclear plants for the Far North (and forexport). We should continue modernizing (environmen-tally) natural gas–driven heat and power plants in largecities and simultaneously adopt strict measures to econ-omize on natural gas by using combined-cycle unitsinstead of steam turbines. A simple replacement of theexisting steam turbines at RAO UES of Russia withcombined-cycle units would yield a 70–80 GWincrease (more than 30% of the capacity of the wholeRussian energy system) under the same consumption ofnatural gas. The replacement of steam turbines withdomestic combined-cycle units would also ensure(which is very important for the country) the develop-ment of high-tech industries for the production of thesame units, new materials, machines, different instru-ments, automation equipment, etc. Industry would needdesign and research centers and skilled specialists to betrained by institutions of higher learning. This isextremely important for preserving Russia as an intel-lectual country.

It is especially noteworthy that natural gas willremain the main fuel for power engineering in Russia

for a number of decades. First, its reserves are huge,and, second, its storage is cheap (compared to electric-ity storage), although its transportation is expensive. Itwould be advisable to consider the possibility of build-ing peak electric plants with combined-cycle units nearnatural gas storages to control their daily capacity, aswe today control the capacity of hydroelectric plants orthe natural gas storages of large heat and power plants.

Here it is very important to limit all new powerplants in the number (nomenclature) of equipmenttypes, since it would drastically reduce the price of theequipment itself, its repairs and maintenance, andimprove its reliability. It is necessary to build newpower plants, but the construction of each needs at leastfive–seven years. Even the replacement of a steam tur-bine with a combined-cycle unit needs no less than 2.5–3 years. However, the capacity of the existing powerplants is already not enough. What is a real way out?

In the early 1960s, the world’s first 100-MW two-shaft gas turbine, manufactured at the Leningrad metalworks, was commissioned in Russia. However, theyhave practically not been used since, and now powerengineering still uses mainly steam turbines. Hundredsof small gas turbines (25–35% efficiency) have alreadyappeared in the country, ranging from 30-kW to 300-MW capacities. However, powerful gas turbines arestill not in demand. Meanwhile, if gas turbines are com-bined with steam turbines, we can obtain high efficien-cies. Combined-cycle units with 60% efficiency havebeen implemented in the world since 2003. It is realisticto increase the efficiency of such units to 68–70% by2015–2020.

Note that any serious improvement in fuel efficiencyin power engineering usually leads to a loss in the costsof capital construction. Where is the admissible thresh-old of design complication? The price of thermal equip-ment is 40–55% of the plant cost. It is known that high-capacity machines are (often twice) cheaper in produc-tion than the totality of small machines. Therefore, theywere preferred when centralized power engineeringdeveloped, and this was absolutely justified. However,now, under new economic conditions, it is more profit-able to economize on electric grids than on power-plantequipment. In the past five years, a number of foreignpapers have been advocating the decentralization ofpower engineering (especially after electrical disastersin the United States, Italy, France, etc.). The construc-tion of small power plants drastically reduces the costof electric grids (equipment plus land) under the certaingrowth of equipment prices, since the distance betweenthe plant and energy consumers is reduced. Decentrali-zation is especially effective in heat supply.

Cogeneration of electricity and heat is profitable forremote regions. The point is that the losses in electricand especially heat grids, as well as grid maintenance,largely contribute to the price of electric and heatenergy (heating, hot water, and industrial water steam).It is not by chance that, in the last 20 years, the special-

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ists of the Russian Academy of Sciences have beenintensively advocating the use of small aviation andmarine gas-turbine units modernized as drivers forpower generators.

In Russia, where the demand for heat is high, thereis, of course, no need to dismantle the existing systemof powerful natural gas–driven heat and power plants.It is necessary to replace steam turbines with com-bined-cycle units as soon as possible, which wouldalmost double electricity generation at some old powerplants. At the same time, new residential districtsshould be developed as energy independent right fromthe start. The concern is not only the reasonable price ofsmall heat and power plants with combined-cycle units,because an increase in their output (tens a year) makesthem no more expensive than the large units (Table 1).The main point is that the delivery ex factory of unitsready for operation ensures the construction of powerplants in 1–1.5 years (as opposed to 6–7 years for largeheat and power plants) and their quick payback. Forexample, two heat and power plants, commissioned inNovopolotsk in 2000, with combines cycle units of20

×

2 MW of electricity and 30

×

2 Gcal/h of heat werepaid back in less than two years and have long beenyielding revenues.

Russia manufactures more than 20 types of smallgas-turbine units (Table 2), and about 160 power plantswere equipped with them just from 2002 through 2005.This is very little: tens of thousands of boiler plantsneed such units. Note that old coal boiler plants con-verted to natural gas almost without trimming lose upto 50% of heat, and their replacement with combined-cycle heat and power plants would ensure the sameamount of heat with, as it were, free electricity and evennatural gas economy.

Here is another example. In Moscow, Mosenergo’sheat and power plants generate only 70% of the heatneeded by the city. If (hypothetically, of course) theboiler plants of Moscow and Moscow oblast weretransferred to combined-cycle heat and power plants,the capacity of Mosenergo’s system would increasemore than two times, and the region would have not tobuy but to sell energy in the market. The replacement(again, hypothetically) of all the country’s boiler plantswith combined-cycle heat and power plants wouldmore than double the capacity of RAO UES of Russia.Local authorities must move more energetically in thisdirection.

Thus, the country has a market of quickly repayableequipment, which is very profitable for investors. Weneed only laws that would guarantee the efficient oper-ation of decentralized systems in the common energymarket. Primarily, it is necessary to oblige the centralgrids to buy their energy at a reasonably high price.

The unsatisfactory condition of the domestic pro-duction of large power turbines and generators is espe-cially noteworthy. Factories became obsolete becauseof layoffs and a lack of orders. Today the total maxi-mum output of gas-turbine units by the Leningradmetal works, the turbine and motor factory in Yekater-inburg, and OAO NPO Saturn in Rybinsk does notexceed 2–2.5 GW a year. The first two factories musturgently be reequipped and enroll specialists, who arethe basis for the development of our powerful energyindustry.

The nuclear power industry should, of course, bedeveloped. Moreover, we must be aware of the fact thatthe current relatively low price of atomic energy in Rus-sia is due to the presence of nuclear plants that werebuilt in the time of very cheap (weapon-grade) ura-

Table 1.

The per unit cost of Russian combined-cycle units and a heat and power plant with a combined-cycle unit (GTU–HPP)

GTU–HPPcomplete set

GTU–HPP 500 MW* GTU–HPP 20 MW (GTU-55ST)**

cost, $/kW share in GTU–HPPcost, % cost, $/kW share in GTU–HPP

cost, %

Combined-cycle unit:

gas turbine 117 20.8 345 54

steam turbine 63 10.8 – –

boiler 99 17.8 100 16.6

Electric equipment 49 88.4 40 16.7

Measuring instruments and automation 45 87.7 25 14.2

Water–steam circuit 47 8 – –

Project 54 89.2 35 15.2

Construction 45 87.7 35 15.2

Financial support 65 11.1 20 13.3

Total 584 100 .8 600 100.30

** All-Russia Heat Technology Institute’s data.** ZAO Energoavia’s data.

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nium, cheap labor (convicts), and neglect for the future(disposal of waste and plants themselves). We shouldbe very critical to claims, sometimes voiced in Russia,that the cost of nuclear energy is almost $1000 per1 kW. This is absolutely unrealistic.

The price of a power plant mainly comprises thecosts of capital construction, operation (repairs andlabor compensation), and fuel. In the case of nuclearpower plants, we should add the cost of disposing wasteand the plant itself. Let us consider construction costs.They include the land price; the costs of territory prep-aration and premises construction; the cost of equip-ment of all types, including heat and electricity pro-cessing during generation and transmission; the cost ofwater and air treatment; discharge; design work; andinitial costs. Numerous designs and power plants con-structed in recent years allow us to draw tentative com-parisons of the costs of construction of a 1-GW power

plant (Table 3). They are typical of both contemporaryRussian and international power plants but can bereduced under mass construction.

Of course, the construction of new nuclear powerplants will help preserve human resources and the cor-responding special enterprises in the nuclear industry.At the same time, we should remember that today,many years after the Chernobyl disaster, constructionorganizations and several nuclear engineering indus-tries will have to be established anew. Yet, for regularfuel power engineering, it is easier to solve such prob-lems and there are still a number of effective industries.

In order to determine the life cycle (40–50 years) ofa power plant, we have to add other expenditures toconstruction costs, of course. However, their justifieddetermination is practically unrealistic: the prices offuel, loans, labor, and repairs have been changing toosharply over the past 40–50 years. Furthermore, how

Table 2.

Characteristics of Russian power gas turbines

Manufacturer–designer Model Year of manufacture

Capacity nom./peak, MW Efficiency, %

OAO TMZ GTE-6 2002 6/7.2 24.5

OAO PMZ–Avia Motor GTU-4P 1998 4.3/4.7 24.8

GTU-6P 2000 6.3/7.0 27.3

OAO NPO Saturn GTD-6/RM 2001 6/7.2 25

Kuznetsov SNTK NK-127 2004 4.26 32.15

OAO EMK GT-009 (reg.) 2002 9 36.3

KMPO NK-14E 2000 10 33

OAO NPO Saturn GTD-8RM 2003 8.56/9.0 25.8

GTD-YuRM 2005 10.7/11 29.1

NPP Motor GTP-10/95 2000 8/10 24

Neva Factory GTER-10 (reg.) 1988 10 33

GTER-12 (reg.) 1992 12 32

KMPO NK-18STE 2004 18 33

OAO UTZ GTE-16 2002 16.1/20 30.4

OAO PMZ–Avia Motor GTU-12PER 2001 12.7/13.9 33.7

GTU-16PER 2001 16.8/18.5 35.6

FGUP Salyut GTD-12.5S 2003 12.5/15 33.5

OAO UMPO AL-31STE 2001 20 36

Neva Factory GTER-16 (reg.) 1996 16 32.5

FGUP Salyut GTU-89ST-20 1998 20/22 32.6

Kuznetsov SNTK NK-37 1996 26.5 36.4

ZAO Energoavia GTP-55ST-20 1999 20/22 30.7

OAO UTZ GTE-25U 2002 31.4/36 31.8

Note: TMZ is the Turbo Motor Factory in Yekaterinburg; PMZ is the Perm Motor Factory; SNTK is Samara Research and TechnologyComplex; EMK is the Energy Machine Building Corp.; KMPO is the Kazan Motor Production Association; UTZ is the Ural TurbineFactory; UMPO is the Ufa Motor Production Association; and GTU (reg.) is a gas turbine unit with heat regeneration.

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should we evaluate the costs of all works during theretirement of a nuclear power plant or in emergency sit-uations at the dams of hydroelectric power plants and atnuclear power plants? All this hinders reliable assess-ment of the efficiency of power engineering in the longterm.

We often hear about the inevitable development ofnuclear power engineering due to the limited (and evendepleted) reserves of natural gas. This is an erroneousthesis, because, for example, the world ocean containslarge amounts of methane in gas hydrates and we mustlearn to extract it. On the other hand, Russia has hugedeposits of coal, and it is necessary to master its effi-cient and environmentally friendly use, especially withboth Russian and international experience available.Therefore, in order to ensure a reliable power supply inRussia, it is necessary to develop all types of powerplants and increase the use of coal as a fuel for heat gen-eration.

Summing up the discussion of the nuclear powerindustry, I would like to stress the absolute necessity todesign reliable reactors and implement a closed fuelcycle on fast reactors. Additional hard-to-evaluate costs

are needed to introduce this, although Russia has along-standing experience in operating fast reactors witha liquid-metal coolant. The equipment of nuclear powerplants needs strict standardized designs in order toimprove reliability and reduce operating costs. Unfor-tunately, today each unit at Russian nuclear powerplants is different from others for various reasons.

The above-mentioned facts make it advisable toincrease the installed capacity of Russian power engi-neering from 216 to 320–350 GW, including the capac-ity of nuclear power plants from 22 to 33–35 GW, thatof hydroelectric power plants from 50 to 60–65 GW,and the capacity of heat and power plants from 131 to200–210 GW, over the next 20–30 years. Special atten-tion should be paid to natural gas economy by the wideuse of combined-cycle units and a ban on the use of newnatural gas–driven steam turbines. For a rapid capacityincrease, we will have to establish thousands of small(1–30 MW) heat and power plants with combined cycleunits based on the existing boiler plants. The totalcapacity of such heat and power plants must be 15–20 GW over the next 10–15 years, reaching 30–40 GWover the next decades.

Table 3.

Approximate specific costs of construction of different types of power plants

Components

Costs, $/kW

Gas-driven heat and power plant

(steam tur-bines)

Coal-driven heat and power

plant (steam turbines)

Gas-drivenheat and power

plant (com-bined cycle)

Nuclear power plant

Territory and buildings 300 400 250 600

Heat equipment (turbines, boilers) 250 300 300 250

Reactor, protection – – – 1000

Electric equipment (generators, transformers, controls) 150 150 150 200

Water, air, and discharge treatment 200 300 50 100

Design work and initial costs 55 60 50 100

Total ~950 ~1200 ~800 ~2300