Government of the US vs. Judge PurugananFacts:Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States Government,through diplomatic channels requested the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also knownas Mario Batacan Crespo.A Petition for Extradition was filed with theRTC, but beforethe court could act, Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.This was granted. After the hearing,Jimenez submitteda requiredMemorandum,which sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowedto post bail in the amount of P100,000.The alternative prayerof Jimenezwas also setfor hearingandthe court directing theissuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixed bail for his temporary liberty at onemillion pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the requiredcash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty.Issue:WON Jimenez is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extraditionproceedings are pending.Held:As suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a personhas been arrested anddetained for violationof Philippine criminallaws.It does notapply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgmentsof conviction or acquittal.Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence infavor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom asthereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyondreasonable doubt. It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply toa case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue.Thatthe offenses for whichJimenez is soughtto beextradited are bailablein theUnited States is notan argument togrant him onein the present case.To stress,extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses forwhich he ischarged.He should applyfor bail before the courts trying the criminalcases against him, not before the extradition court.

Government of Hongkong v. Olalia, 521 SCRA 470(2007)Private respondent Muoz was charged before Hong Kong Court. Warrants of arrest were issued and by virtue of a final decree the validity of the Order of Arrest was upheld. The petitioner Hong Kong Administrative Region filed a petition for the extradition of the private respondent. In the same case, a petition for bail was filed by the private respondent.The petition for bail was denied by reason that there was no Philippine law granting the same in extradition cases and that the respondent was a high flight risk. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and was granted by the respondent judge subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

Petitioner filed a motion to vacate the said order but was denied by the respondent judge. Hence, this instant petition.IssueWON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bailRulingA potential extraditee is entitled to bail.Ratio DecidendiPetitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.On the other hand, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.

In this case, the Court reviewed what was held inGovernment of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan,Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo GR No. 153675 April 2007,that the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings, the same being available only in criminal proceedings. The Court took cognizance of the following trends in international law:

(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international;

(2) the higher value now being given to human rights;

(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and

(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.

In light of the recent developments in international law, where emphasis is given to the worth of the individual and the sanctity of human rights, the Court departed from the ruling inPurganan,and held that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail.CASE DIGEST ON PADILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS [269 SCRA 402 (1997)]

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA.

Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on apprehended with the help pf a civilian witness. Upon arrest following high powered firearms were found in his possession:

1. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition

2. M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo

3. .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo

4. 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver

Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a complete turnaround and filed Manifestation in Lieu of Comment praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro).

Issues:

1. WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule

No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedurea peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitioners warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually committing another offence in the presence of all those officers. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible.

Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid:

? Seizure of evidence in plain view, elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who had the right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo: objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant)

? Search of moving vehicle

? Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched must be within arrestees custody or area of immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest.

Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea.

2. LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms

No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioners possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioners purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent courts incisive observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported by a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which would justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian.

3. PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution

Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution.

The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellants commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner.

Equally lacking in merit is appellants allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellants erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive.

Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. Just recently, the Court declared that the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution Appellants grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws

Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining petitioners conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT that petitioners indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to 10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as maximum.271 Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals [GR 115407, 28 August 1995] Second Division, Regalado (J): 4 concur

Facts: On 28 January 1990, Miguel Paderanga was belatedly charged in an amended information as a coconspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case 86-39 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which Paderanga was the mayor at the time. The original information, filed on 6 October 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, had initially indicted for multiple murder 8 accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have remained at large up to the present. In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an amended information dated 6 October 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As Paderanga was his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the former's services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the preliminary investigation therein, Paderanga, in a signed affidavit dated 30 March 1989 but which he later retracted on 20 June 1990, implicated Paderanga as the supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag family. Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per his resolution of 7 July 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor, designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new prosecutor dated 6 September 1989, Paderanga was finally charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information dated 6 October 1992. Paderanga assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to the Supreme Court in GR 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en banc decision promulgated on 19 April 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the second amended information against him. The trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest warrant for Paderanga's apprehension but, before it could be served on him, Paderanga through counsel, filed on 28 October 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court which set the same for hearing on 5 November 1992. Paderanga duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On 5 November 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear the application for bail. As Paderanga was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to "acute costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he considered being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the trial court that in accordance with the directive of the chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge. Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated 5 November 1992, the trial court admitted Paderanga to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following day, 6 November 1992, Paderanga, apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed 20 days later on 26 November 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order dated 29 March 1993. On 1 October 1993, or more than 6 months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari. The resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to Paderanga were annulled on 24 November 1993 by the appellate court. Paderanga filed the petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether Paderanga was in the custody of the law when he filed his motion for admission to bail, and whether the trial court properly inquired into the nature of the prosecutors evidence to determine whether or not it is strong to deny or grant the application of bail, respectively.

Held: Paderanga had indeed filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application with the trial court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted to the military camp area. Paderanga, through his counsel, emphatically made it known to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place Paderanga in the physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him under guard. Thus, Paderanga was by then in the constructive custody of the law. Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, Paderanga never made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof. Where the trial court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the application for bail is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must inquire from the prosecutor concerned as the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong. Where the prosecutor interposes no objection to the motion of the accused, the trial court should nevertheless set the application for hearing and from there diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the bail application. No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed to the trial court as regards its order granting bail to Paderanga. A review of the transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of 5 November 1992 and the omnibus order of 29 March 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. The lower court exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order contained the requisite summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and only after sifting through them did the court conclude that Paderanga could be provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up to the present, Paderanga has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.

Miranda vs. TuliaoG.R. #158763,March 31,2006Facts: On Mar. 1996, 2 burnt cadavers were discovered inRamon, Isabela which were later identified as thebodiesof Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of the private respondent Virgilio Tulio who is now under the witnessprotection program.2 informations for murder were filed against the 5 police officer including SPO2 Maderal in RTC ofSantiago City. The venue was later transferred to Manila. RTC Manila convicted all the accused and sentencedthem 2 counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being atlarge. Upon automatic review, the SC acquitted thefour accused on theground of reasonable doubt.In Sept. 1999, Maderal was arrested. He executed a swornconfession and identified the herein petitionerMiranda and 4 others responsible for the death of the victims. Respondent Tuliao then filed a criminal complaintfor murder against the petitioners. Acting Presiding Judge Tumalian issued warrant of arrest against the petitionersand SPO2 Maderal.Petitioners filed an urgent motionto complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recallorquash the warrant of arrest. In thehearing of the urgent motion, Judge Tumaliannoted the absence of petitionersand issued a Joint order denying the said urgent motion on the ground that since the court did not acquirejurisdiction overtheirpersons, themotion cannotbeproperly heardbythecourt.The petitionersappealed theresolution of the Public prosecutor to the DOJ.The new Presiding Judge named Judge Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing theJoint Order of Judge Tumalian. He also ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest.Respondent Tulia filed apetition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for TRO seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad fromfurther proceeding of the case and seeking to nullify the Joint Orders of the said Judge. The SC issued a resolutiongranting the prayer. Notwithstanding the said resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dismissing theinformation against the petition.Respondent Tuliao filed a motion to cite Judge Anghad in contempt. The SC referred the said motion tothe CA. The CA rendered the assailed decision grantingthe petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminalcases in the RTC of Santiago City as well as the issuance ofwarrant of arrest. Hence, this petition.Issue: Whether or not an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submithis person to the jurisdictionof the courtHeld: Petition is dismissed andcost against the petitioners.It has been held that an accused cannot seek judicial relief is he does not submit his person to thejurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the accused can be acquired either through compulsory process, such aswarrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrender to the police orto the court. It isonly when the court hasalready acquired jurisdiction over his person that anaccused may invoke the processes ofthe court. Since, petitioner were not arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty, they cannot seek judicialrelief. 279 Obosa vs. Court of Appeals [GR 114350, 16 January 1997] Third Division, Panganiban (J): 4 concur Facts: On 4 December 1987, Senior State Prosecutor Aurelio C. Trampe charged Jose T. Obosa and three others with murder on two counts, by separate amended informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 56, for the ambush-slaying of Secretary of Local Governments Jaime N. Ferrer and his driver Jesus D. Calderon, which occurred on 2 August 1987, at about 6:30 p.m., at La Huerta, Paraaque, Metro Manila, as Secretary Ferrer was riding in his car, going to the St. Andrew Church near the plaza of La Huerta, to hear Sunday mass. Each information alleged that the killing was with the attendance of the following qualifying/aggravating circumstances, to wit: treachery, evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength, nighttime purposely sought, disregard of the respect due to the victim on account of his rank and age (as to Secretary Ferrer), and by a band. The Prosecutor recommended no bail, as the evidence of guilt was strong. During the trial of the two cases, which were consolidated and tried jointly, Obosa was detained at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro Manila. At the time of the commission of the two offenses, Obosa was a virtual "escapee" from the National Penitentiary at Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, particularly, at the Sampaguita Detention Station, where he was serving a prison term for robbery as a maximum security prisoner. Indeed, by virtue of a subpoena illegally issued by a judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sariaya, Quezon, Obosa was escorted out of prison to appear before said judge on the pretext that the judge needed his presence so that the judge could inquire about the whereabouts of Obosa. While Obosa was out of prison, he was able to participate in the commission of the double murder now charged against him as principal for the ambushslaying of Secretary Ferrer and his driver. In its decision dated 25 May 1990, the lower court found Obosa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide on two counts. On 31 May 1990, the lower court promulgated its decision and on the same occasion, Obosa manifested his intention to appeal and asked the Court to allow him to post bail for his provisional liberty. Immediately, the lower court granted Obosa's motion and fixed bail at P20,000.00, in each case. On 1 June 1990, Obosa filed a written notice of appeal, dated 4 June 1990, thereby perfecting appeal from the decision. On 4 June 1990, Obosa filed a bailbond in the amount of P40,000.00, through Plaridel Surety and Assurance Company, which the lower court approved. On the same day, the lower court issued an order of release. The prison authorities at the National Penitentiary released Obosa also on the same day notwithstanding that, at the time of the commission of the double murder, Obosa was serving a prison term for robbery. On 6 September 1993, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the Court of Appeals an urgent motion, praying for cancellation of Obosa's bail bond. Obosa promptly filed an opposition, to which the People submitted a reply. Thereupon, the appellate Court issued its Resolution dated 19 November 1993: a) canceling Obosa's bail bond, b) nullifying the trial court's order of 31 May 1990 which granted bail to Obosa, and c) issuing a warrant for his immediate arrest. Obosa's twin motions for reconsideration and quashal of warrant of arrest proved futile as the appellate Court, on 9 March 1994, after the parties' additional pleadings were submitted and after hearing the parties' oral arguments, issued its second Resolution denying said motions for lack of merit. Obosa filed the petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the bailbond was validly approved by the trial court. Held: Since Obosa did file the written notice of appeal on 1 June 1990, Obosa's appeal was, perforce, perfected, without need of any further or other act, and consequently and ineluctably, the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case, both over the record and over the subject of the case. While bail was granted by the trial court on 31 May 1990 when it had jurisdiction, the approval of the bail bond was done without authority, because by then, the appeal had already been perfected and the trial court had lost jurisdiction. Needless to say, the situation would have been different had bail been granted and approval thereof given before the notice of appeal was filed. As the approval was decreed by the trial court in excess of jurisdiction then the bailbond was never validly approved. On this basis alone, regardless of the outcome of the other issues, it is indisputable that the petition should be dismissed. Nevertheless, Section 13, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "all persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." Herein, while Obosa, though convicted of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, was nevertheless originally charged with a capital offense. Obosa can hardly be unmindful of the fact that, in the ordinary course of things, there is a substantial likelihood of his conviction (and the corresponding penalty) being affirmed on appeal, or worse, the not insignificant possibility and infinitely more unpleasant prospect of instead being found guilty of the capital offense originally charged. In such an instance, Obosa cannot but be sorely tempted to flee. Our Rules of Court, following the mandate of our fundamental law, set the standard to be observed in applications for bail. Section 3, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. In Borinaga vs. Tamin, which was promulgated in 1993, the Court laid down the guidelines for the grant of bail. However, said guidelines, along with Rule 114 itself, have since been modified by Administrative Circular 12-94, which was issued by the Supreme Court and which came into effect on 1 October 1994. Verily, had Obosa made application for bail after the effectivity of said circular, the case would have been readily and promptly resolved against Obosa. Pursuant to amendments, not only does the conviction of Obosa for two counts of homicide disqualify him from being admitted to bail as a matter of right and subject his bail application to the sound discretion of the court, but more significantly, the circumstances enumerated in paragraphs a, b, d and e of Paragraph 3, Section 5 of the 1994 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which are present in Obosa's situation, would have justified and warranted the denial of bail, except that a retroactive application of the said circular is barred as it would obviously be unfavorable to Obosa. But be that as it may, the rules on bail at the time of Obosa's conviction do not favor Obosa's cause either. The appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review and this includes the penalty, which may be increased. Thus, on appeal, as the entire case is submitted for review, even factual questions may once more be weighed and evaluated. That being the situation, the possibility of conviction upon the original charge is ever present. Likewise, if the prosecution had previously demonstrated that evidence of the accused's guilt is strong, as it had done so in the present case, such determination subsists even on appeal, despite conviction for a lesser offense, since such determination is for the purpose of resolving whether to grant or deny bail and does not have any bearing on whether Obosa will ultimately be acquitted or convicted of the charge. While the accused, after conviction, may upon application be bailed at the discretion of the court, that discretion particularly with respect to extending the bail should be exercised not with laxity, but with caution and only for strong reasons, with the end in view of upholding the majesty of the law and the administration of justice. And the grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5 which now specifically provides that, although the grant of bail is discretionary in non-capital offenses nevertheless, when imprisonment has been imposed on the convicted accused in excess of 6 years and circumstances exist (inter alia, where the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement or evaded sentence, or there is an undue risk that the accused may commit another crime while his appeal is pending) that point to a considerable likelihood that the accused may flee if released on bail, then the accused must be denied bail, or his bail previously granted should be cancelled. In sum, bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an accused, who is charged with a capital offense, appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts must exercise utmost caution in deciding applications for bail considering that the accused on appeal may still be convicted of the original capital offense charged and that thus the risk attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than the capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion. The trial court had failed to exercise the degree of discretion and caution required under and mandated by our statutes and rules, for, aside from being too hasty in granting bail immediately after promulgation of judgment, and acting without jurisdiction in approving the bailbond, it inexplicably ignored the undeniable fact of petitioner's previous escape from legal confinement as well as his prior convictions. BASCO vs RAPATALOFACTS:Inocencio Basco filed a complaint against Judge Leo H. Rapatalo of RTC, Branch 32 of Agoo, La Union for gross ignorance or willful disregard of established rule of law for granting bail to an accused in a murder case without receiving evidence and conducting a hearing.

Basco is the father of the victim of a murder by three men. Roger Morente, one of the three accused, filed for a petition for bail. For several times and several reasons, a hearing for the petition was set but did not push through.

Later, Basco allegedly saw Morente in Rosario, La Union. He later learned that Judge granted the latters petition for bail despite the fact that the petition was not heard at all.

The Judge alleged that he granted the petition based on the prosecutors option not to oppose the petition as well as the latters recommendation setting the bail bond in the amount of P80,000.00. He averred that when the prosecution chose not to oppose the petition for bail, he had the discretion on whether to approve it or not. He further declared that when he approved the petition, he had a right to presume that the prosecutor knew what he was doing since he was more familiar with the case, having conducted the preliminary investigation. Also, the private prosecutor was not around at the time the public prosecutor recommended bail.

Eventually, the bail bond posted by Morente was cancelled and a warrant for his arrest was issued on account of Bascos motion for consideration. Morente is then confined in the La Union Provincial Jail.ISSUE:Whether or not a Judge can grant a petition for bail without a hearing for that purpose.HELD:No, a judge cannot grant a petition for bail without a trial.

The Supreme Court then reiterated the following rules outlining the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is set:

1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation.

2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion.

3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the prosecution.

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.

Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong is a matter of judicial discretion,the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a comment or leave the application of bail to the discretion of the court.While it may be true that the respondent Judge set the application for bail for hearing three times, thus showing lack of malice or bad faith in granting bail to the accused, nonetheless, this does not completely exculpate him because the fact remains that a hearing has not actually been conducted in violation of his duty to determine whether or not the evidence against the accused is strong for purposes of bail.

The Judge is reprimanded with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.