rosenthal on ibn al-arabi

7/16/2019 Rosenthal on Ibn Al-Arabi

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IBN 'ARABI BETWEEN"PHILOSOPHY" AND "MYSTICISM"

"Sufism and Philosophy are neighbors and visit each other"

fa-inna at-tasawwuf wa-t-tafalsuf yatajdwardniwa-yatazdwardni*

by

Franz Rosenthal

Hamden,Conn.

It needs hardly any comment that the terms "philosophy" and "mysticism"

requiredefinition in order to realize the differencebetween them (and between

mysticism and religion). There are no doubt many who would deny the

existence of suitable clearcut distinctions. In Islam, "philosophy" can be

considered as equivalent to what Muslims themselves designated with a

loanword from the Greek,falsafah. The curious modern term "mysticism"has

no such direct identifying connection between Arabic and a second language.

In Arabic, tasawwufwas the label for a diverse and, eventually, all-pervasivereligious and societal movement that touched intellectuals and the social elite

as well as the masses. It is not always absolutely clear why an individual was

considered a faylasuf or a sufi, or into which category he might fall accordingto our understanding of philosophy and mysticism.

Ibn 'Arabi (1165-1240) represented, by general agreement, a Sufi approachto the universe in his thought and attitude. He himself would not have denied

it, but such a broad classification would have been unacceptable to him

without further modification. He thought of himself as a special kind of SufT,

and others tended to follow this view of himself. "Sufism," without further

* AbuiHayyanat-Tawhidi,al-Basd'irwa-dh-dhakha'ir,d. Ibrahimal-Kaylani,III, 1, 277

(Damascus1364ff.).Thefollowingpageswereoriginallypreparedor a colloquium n PhilosophyandMysticism

organizedby Giles Constableand IsadoreTwerskyand held at DumbartonOaks(Washington,D.C.)on November13-15,1983.My participationn thecolloquium aveme theopportunityo

spend many monthsjust readingagain throughthe colossalaeuvreof Ibn 'Arabiand beingfascinated y it, evenif thepoetryof thelanguageandthedepthof its ideasoftenappear o defywhat we like to thinkof as rationality.Myexpositionhere s meantto be purelydescriptive, ot

interpretativer historical.Theinnumerable bviousparallelso earlierMuslim houghtare notexpressly oted.The vastamountof recent esearch n Ibn'Arabi s thesubject f anilluminatingsurveyby J.W.Morris, n JAOS, 106(1986),539-51and 733-56.I regret missedIbn 'Arabi'swork on logic, al-Bulghahj l-hikmah, or which see E. Meyer, in A. Zimmermanned.),Aristotelischesrbe,125-40 Berlin1986).



Franz Rosenthal

qualification, was not enough to characterize his particular position satisfacto-

rily. For him, the "men of God" fall into three classes. In the first place, there

were practical ascetics of the highest moral character called 'ubbdd"worship-pers." They are representedon the literary scene by men such as al-Muhasibi.

In the second, next higher category, there were people who were equivalent to

the first group in all respects, but in addition they were concerned only with

God, and they achieved states and stations, secrets, revelations (kushufj) and

miracles, as well as futiwah status. They are called Sufis, and they also claim

leadership of all the people of God and think of themselves as something

special. And the thirdcategory, finally, encompasses those called Malamiyah.2

They observe all religious obligations mostpunctiliously,

but in noway

do

they distance themselves from the common pedple. They tend toward blamingthemselves and being blamed by others, yet, they are in perfect accord with

God's lordship, and they possess that perfect divine and human wisdom

(hikmah)that consists in assigning to each phenomenon its proper place.3 The

Prophet and Abu Bakr belonged into this third and highest category, as did

quite a few of older as well as contemporary mystics.4 Ibn 'Arabi does not

indicate into which category he placed himself. It might be assumed that he

claimed to belong to all three of them, but, as far as I can see, he does not

expressly claim to belong to the third. In other contexts, he speaks of himselfas belonging to the Sufis of true insight (muhaqqiqlas-Siufryah).sThe Sufi who

combines true insight (muhaqqiq)-in this particular case, insight into the

mysteries of letters-with loving concern ranks higher than ordinary Sufis.6

Ibn 'Arabi assumed the existence of two kinds of Sufis, those who are

truthful possessors of the truth, and those who make such a claim without

having any real understanding.7 Indeterminate numbers of Sufis exhibit the

highest standards of ethical behavior (makarimal-akhlaq), and it is said that

I The terms corresponding in a way to something like divine inspiration were many in Ibn'Arabi's vocabulary, among them kashf, tajalli, fath, wahb,etc.

2 Ibn 'Arabi considers Malamiyah preferableto Malamatiyah, see Fut., II, 16, 1. 15 (ch. 73).The Futiuht al-Makkryahare quoted here as Fut. according to the edition Cairo 1329, except

for the introduction and chapters 1-71 (= I, 665, 1.7, of the Cairine text), for which the first ninevolumes of the edition of 'Uthman Yahya (Cairo 1392/1972-) were available. Yahya's edition isreferred to as "Fut. Y."

3 See below, n. 57, and Fut., II, 16, 11.15 ff. (ch. 73), speaking of the Malamiyah: "They are thelords and imams of the people of the path of God, Muhammad being one of them. They are the

sages (hukama')who have put matters in theirproper places and made them right (ahkamuha)andremoved them from improper places...

4 Fut., III, 34ff. (ch. 309).5 Kitabal-Azal, 8, 11.1f. (Hyderabad 1948).6 Fut. Y, I, 325 (ch. 2). See also below, nn. 31 and 32.7 According to al-Amr al-muhkamal-marbutfit md yalzam ahl tarTqAlldh min ash-shurut,

printedat the end of the undated (1968?) Cairo edition of Dhakhd'iral-a'ldq (Sharh Tarjumdn l-

ashwdq), 264.

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Ibn 'Arabi between "Philosophy" and "Mysticism"

"themore ethicalan individuals, the more of a Sfif he is."8 In Ibn'Arabi's

basic threefoldrankingof all knowledge ('ulum),Sufism,which is meant

although he word s notused,appearsas "theknowledgeof states"attainablethrough"taste"in the middlebetweenintellectualknowledgewhich yieldsresults hatarepartlysound andpartly ncorrect,andthe highestknowledge,the knowledgeof the secrets,whichhas ties to boththeknowledgeof intellectand the knowledgeof states.9

There could be Sufis also amongthe Ash'ariteswho took an intermediate

position with respectto the gnosis of God throughreason.10As did the

ancients(here referring o the philosophers)and the Mutakallimun, ome

Sufis, too, did that expressly forbidden thing, namely, thinking about

(tafakkur)he essenceof God. Amongthem is Ibn 'Arabi'svenerated xem-

plar,al-Ghazzall.11n anotherplace,Ibn'Arabispeaksof "intelligentndivid-

uals and logical thinkers (al-'uqald' wa-ahl al-qiyds)," among them al-Ghaz-

zalI,as beinghis "colleaguesashdb)."12He evengoes so faras to pairSufiswho have no correct nsightwithphilosophers f similarstanding.13

Im sum, it is justified,of course,to speakof Ibn 'Arabi as a Sufi, but he

tried to breakout of the shapelessmold of Sufism,whichby his time had

indeed become an almost all-inclusive erm. This no doubt influencedhis

attitude toward philosophyand presumablymakes it unrepresentative fSufismas a whole, at least before the wide spreadof Ibn 'Arabi's nfluence.

Ibn 'Arabi consideredhimself in possessionof various forms of personaldivinerevelation, hus,as a special,highertypeof Siufi.

Of course,he did not think of himselfas afaylasuf,nor did he use theword

falsafah in the titles of his works or for describinghis own views.14

Throughoutthe centuries,his opponentscould not find enough terms of

opprobriumor him,yet, none of them,it seems,went so far as to smearhim

with the appellationoffaylasuf.l1It is curious hat modernscholarship tates

8 Fut., II, 17, 11.If. (ch. 73).9 Fut.Y, I, 139f.10 Dhakha'ir al-a'ldq, 236.1

Fut., IV, 106,11. 12-14 (ch. 473). Cf. also Fut., III, 233,11. 21 f. (ch. 352). See below, p. 8.12 Kitdbal-Jalalah, 7, 1. 11 (Hyderabad 1948).13 Dhakhd'iral-a'l7q, 28, where other examples of inferior kinds of Sufism are given.14 It seems that none of the very few titles mentioned by 'Uthman Yahya as possibly

containing the wordfalsafah did so originally, cf. Osman Yahia, Histoire et classificationde l'euvred'lbn 'ArabTDamascus 1964), 308, no. 281 (referringto al-I'ldmbi-ishdrdtahl al-ilhdm,publishedHyderabad 1948), and 362, no. 415. Falsafat al-akhldq, listed by Yahia, 198, no. 124, printed in

Cairo 1332, was not available to me. It has been recognized as a work by Yahya b. 'Adi, cf., forinstance, G. Endress, The Worksof YahyaIbn 'Adi, 83 f. (Wiesbaden 1977). For another Ethics,see below, n. 112.

15 The debate pro and con Ibn 'Arabi has produced a large literature, most of it not yetavailable in print. It may well be that statements such as this one, based upon the absence of

evidence, will turn out to be wrong.

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Franz Rosenthal

that he was referred to as Ibn Afladtn"Son of Plato," presumably to indicate

high praise. The origin of the epithet is not known to me. It seems to be

unusual terminology. The number of honorifics as well as infamificsapplied toIbn 'Arabi by his admirers and detractors was legion, but even if it should turn

out that someone used "Son of Plato," it certainly was not one of the

designations commonly applied to him.16He himself was proudly content with

proclaiming himself a "reviver" and "Muhammad," and the one and concrete

essence of his time:

It may be mentioned here that some of Ibn 'Arabi's works, though printed, were not available,and others I failed to peruse. The works still unpublished include important texts. Moreover, the

question of authenticity often intrudes. I have paid little attention to it here.I have tried, however, to clarify the situation with respectto a unique text contained in the Yale

manuscriptL-64 (Catalogue Nemoy, no. 1129). It is described as containing Ibn 'Arabi's Jadhwatal-istild' and consists of a collection of statements by old Suifs. Since the work contains chapterson Sifism and tafakkur, it is of some potential interest in our context. Yahia, Histoire et

classification,260, no. 159, has expressed doubt about Ibn 'Arabi's authorship, since the work is

obviously different in style and spirit from his other works. It is indeed unusual for Ibn 'Arabi not

to inject his personality into a text of this size (but compare his Muhidarat al-abrir, below, p. 17).The first eight folios and the title-page containing the author's name and the title of the work

are in a hand later than the rest of the manuscript.At the end, the scribe mentions that he copiedthe text in a (!) SumaysatTRibat in Damascus as a "tadhkirahli-sdhibihi, the shaykh, imam,

scholar, and ascetic Najib(?)-ad-din Jamal at-ta'ifah, Thaghr (?, hardly Maqarr/Mafarr) al-ghuraba' al-AbharL."Li-sdhibihfmay mean for his colleague/master/friend, as he refers to him

again in the formulas of blessing. Conceivably, it might indicate al-Abhari as the author of thework. It depends on whether the autograph at the end (Catalogue Nemoy, plate VI) is indeed bythe hand of Ibn 'Arabi, which I have so far been unable to check by comparison with other

autographs.The only AbharT t this time located by me is Hujjat-ad-dln-al-haqlqi'Abd-al-Muhsin

(Muhassin) b. Abi l-'Amid al-Abhari as-Sufi (556-624/1161-1227 in Egypt), who traveled widely,cf. Ibn al-'Imad, Shadhardt,V, 114 (Cairo 1359-51). He could very well have been the author of a

work of this type.Ibn 'Arabi's al-Jadhwahal-muqtabasah(Yahia, Histoire et classification, 259, no. 158) can

hardlybe connected with the Jadhwat al-istilt'. The writer of the title-page of the Yale manuscriptis unlikely to have made up the latter peculiar title, but he could easily have added Ibn 'Arabi as

the name of the author.

16 This was claimed by M. Asin Palacios, "El mistico Murciano Abenarabl," in Boletin de la

Real Academiade la Historia (Madrid), 87 (1925), 99. Asin Palacios was followed by H. Corbin,

L'Imagination creatrice dans le Soufisme d'lbn 'Arabi, 18 (Paris 1958), English trans. by R.

Manheim, 21 (Princeton 1969. BollingenSeries 91). Corbin repeated himself in MultipleAverroes,325 (Paris 1978. Actes du Colloque Internationalorganise a l'occasion du 8501 anniversairede la

naissanced'Averroes,Paris ... 1976). In his preface to R.W. J. Austin's translation of Ibn 'Arabi's

Fisuis, The Bezels of Wisdom,xiii (New York-Ramsey-Toronto 1980), T. Burckhardt says that inhis day (!), Ibn 'Arabi was given the surname of Son of Plato. His own translation of the Fusus, La

Sagesse des Prophetes, 7 (Paris 1955), which had appeared before Corbin's works, had no suchreference.

No source is given by any of these scholars. If there is one, it may have been one of thenumerouscommentaries on Ibn 'Arabi's works and, in particular,the Fusus, most of which are notavailable to me. We can hardly assume that there is here a mixup with as-Suhrawardial-maqtul.The hereticalphilosopherswho called Pharaoh the "Coptic Plato" used a more appropriatephraseto express themselves, see Ibn Taymiyah, Naqd al-mantiq,ed. M. Hamid al-Fiql, 131 (Cairo 1370/1951).

4



Ibn 'Arabibetween"Philosophy"nd"Mysticism"

I am the Muh(y)i. haveno kunyah ndno nisbah eferringo a place.I amal-'Arabi,al-Hatimi,Muhammad.17

Even though Ibn 'Arabi was not expressly describedas a "philosopher," it istrue that his writings, or at least some of them, were attacked as tasawwufal-

faldsifah, meaning philosophical mysticism rather than mystic philosophy.18

And although Ibn Khaldun did not mention Ibn 'Arabi by name when he

characterized a view of the revelationists (ashab at-tajalll) as "a strange view

of philosophical import," he might very well have had him in mind or included

him in such a group.19Modern scholarship has tried to defend the thesis that it is possible to find a

system of mystic philosophy or philosophical mysticism20 in Ibn 'Arabi's

work. A.E. Affifi's introduction to Ibn 'Arabi published in 1939 was entitled

The Mystical Philosophy of Muhyid Din-Ibnul 'Arabi.In the beginning of his

preface, however, he issued a slight disclaimer: "... Mystics have no philo-

sophical system or fixed doctrines ... Mysticism is essentially an eclectic

subject... but Ibnul 'Arabi is an exception to the rule. He has a definite

philosophical doctrine of pantheism, the bearing of which is shown in every

part of his system. There is also a formal dialectic which dominates the whole

of his thought." There are obvious problems with this statement, the principal

one being the term "pantheism." It may conceal antiphilosophy and rejectionof the very idea of "system."

In the earliest of his many works on Ibn 'Arabi, M. Asin Palacios wished to

characterize Ibn 'Arabi's cosmology as an "emanational pantheism"

composed of Aristotelian and Neoplatonic elements unsuccessfully harmo-

nized with Islam, and he spoke of the thought of Ibn 'Arabi as a systematic

and harmonious syncretism formed by the juxtaposition of all sorts of

philosophical elements and dominated by Alexandrian Neoplatonism.21

Today, it seems still unavoidable to associate Ibn 'Arabi with some vague

mystic Neoplatonism or the like22 as if this were a philosophical system ofsome sort or other. H.S. Nyberg, who wrote what is probably still the most

sensible comprehensive study of Ibn 'Arabi, based himself on Ibn 'Arabi's

17 DTwan,4 (Biulq 1271).A final short i is requiredn Muhyiby the meter.Seealso below,n. 187.

18 Cf. Ibn Hajar, Lisan al-Mizan, V, 312 (Hyderabad 1329-31); Inba' VII, 329.19 Cf. Ibn Khaldun, Shifa' as-sd'il, ed. M. Ibn Tfawt at-Tanji, 58, 11.11f. (Istanbul 1957).20 With regard o "philosophicalmysticism," f., for instance,D.R. Blumenthal n post-

MaimonideanYemeniauthors.Blumenthalonsiders hemas representativesf a special"philo-

sophicalmysticism,"eehis contributiono G. Nahon and C. Touati(eds.), Hommage GeorgesVajda, 91-308 Louvain1980).

21 M. Asin Palacios,"Mohidin,"n Homenaje d Menendezy Pelayo, II, 238, 254 (Madrid1899).

22 As was donemostrecently,orinstance,byM.CruzHernandez,Historiadelpensamientoen

el mundoisldmico, II, 221 ff. (Madrid 1981).

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Franz Rosenthal

most "philosophical" works and considered the formation of a system as

something in constant flux in Ibn 'Arabi's head.23 He also spoke of "theo-

sophy," which, whatever may be meant by it, is certainly not philosophy. Tomy mind, "monism" remains a fairly satisfactory term as far as it goes, or

better perhaps, "monistic gnosticism."

Looking at the problem of Ibn 'Arabi's "system" from inside Islam, SeyyedHossein Nasr got closer to the truth of the matter. He made short shrift of

what he calls the "accusations" raised against Ibn 'Arabi of being a pantheist,

panentheist, existential monist, or follower of natural mysticism. "All of these

accusations," Nasr says, "are false, however, because they mistake the meta-

physical doctrines of Ibn 'Arabi for philosophy and do not take into conside-

ration the fact that the way of gnosis is not separate from grace and

sanctity."24 Nasr is not alone in our time in practicing this sort of agnosticismwith respect to a "philosophical system" of Ibn 'Arabi. L. Gardet, for

instance, contended that in Ibn 'Arabi's case, there can be no question of "a

philosophy that has integrated mystic resonances and experiences. It is a case

of wisdom gnosis (gnose sapientiale) which commands a spiritual experience

that in its very texture is accessible only through recourse to a certain

experience." 5

Much in all these statements depends on a particular definition undunderstandingof "philosophy" in order to make sense. It may also be noted

that discussions of Ibn 'Arabi's "philosophy" such as that of Affifi read more

like discussions of works on Kalam, and there is the general and more

fundamental problem of when metaphysics ceases to be part of philosophy.On his part, Ibn 'Arabi, in speaking of the "method (uslib)" of his

Futuhdt,26probably had no fixed system in mind, certainly no system that was

in the least "philosophical." We can deduce his view of "method (tarTq)"n

mysticism as compared to philosophy from his numerous statements on the

comparative value of revelation and inspiration as against intellectual/mental

speculation (nazar, tafakkur). We shall discuss some of them later. Here, it

may again suffice to invoke a few verses of his D Twin:

The sciences of taste have no method

Specified by proofs for the intellects,

23 H.S. Nyberg, KleinereSchriftendes Ibn al-'ArabT,156f. (Leiden 1919).24

Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Three Muslim Sages. Avicenna-SuhrawardT-IbnArabf, 104 (Cam-

bridge, Mass., 1964). Cf. also his article "Rabiteh-ye bayn tasawwuf wa-falsafeh dar farhang-eIran," in Iran Nimeh, 1 (1982), 46-56. For the fallacy inherent in all such labels, see now also

Morris, in JAOS, 106 (1986), 544.25 L. Gardet, "Experienceet gnose chez Ibn 'Arabi," in al-Kitdbat-TadhkarT.Muhyl-d-dinIbn

'Arabi,271 (Cairo 1389/1969).Presentationsof the "philosophy" of Ibn 'Arabi will appearin the future as they did in the past,

cf., for instance, R. Landau, in The Muslim World,47 (1957), 46-61, 146-60.26 See his Fihris,ed. Kurkis 'Awwad, in Revuede l'AcademieArabe de Damas, 29 (1954), 530.

6




Except working according to the data of the religious law

And holding to a worldly law (ndmuzs) ccompanied by acceptance.

As well as the concern of a stern and proud speaker of truth

Providing better guidance (proof) for a weak being than anything else does.27

As we would expect, Ibn 'Arabi is not particularly given to referring to

philosophy and philosophers directly. Yet, his works contain a few statements

explicitly mentioning falsafah and faylasiuf. He also occasionally quotes

persons and opinions which he himself acknowledged as having formed part of

"philosophy." This material will be discussed here. It constitues the most

important basis for understanding his attitude toward philosophy and its

relation to his mysticism.

Arabic scholars nowadays are increasingly engaged in attempts to clarifyIbn 'Arabi's indebtedness to philosophy from his own statements,28 Such

efforts, in fact, go back to as early as the sixteenth century. In a crudely

systematic fashion, some significant passages were collected and discussed bythe learned and prolific ash-Sha'ranl (ca. 1495-1565), principally in his Kitab

al- YawdqTtwa-l-jawdhiri bayan 'aqd'idal-akabir, which served as a stimulus

for the incipient study of Ibn 'Arabi in Europe near the end of the nineteenth

century. Ash-Sha'rani's quotations of passages from Ibn 'Arabi were not

always completelyliteral. He was concerned with

accurately renderingthe drift

of the passages, and that he did. Moreover, it is most difficult to quote Ibn

'Arab! literally and at the same time with the required economy, since his

torrent of consciousness flows so wildly that it cannot easily be dammed up

into quotable segments. A small example of how reliance upon an ash-

Sha'rani quotation could give a seriously misleading impression occurs in one

of his lesser treatises, in which he defends Ibn 'Arabi against the accusation of

sharing the heretical belief of philosophers in the eternity (qidam) of the

world.29 Introducing one of his proof texts as coming from chapter 293 of the

Futiuht, he speaks of the "God-forsaken philosophers (al-faldsifah khadhala-humAllah)" as if Ibn 'Arabi himself had used the phrase. He did not, and as a

matter of fact is quite unlikely to have used strong curses directed against the

philosophers, even where he disapproved of their views.

27 Diwdn, 78. For the meaning of ndmtus, f. the text quoted below, pp. 25f. and n. 134. The

"speaker of truth" in the third verse is no doubt meant by Ibn 'Arabi to be himself.28

Cf., for instance, Mahmud Qasim, Mawqif Ibn 'Arab[min al-'aql wa-l-ma'rifahas-Sufiyah,

15f. (Jdmi'at Ummdurmdnal-IsldmTyah,Mu.hidardt al-mawsim ath-thaqdfi ath-thalith li-l-'amal-jami'T1968-69), or the slightly more detailed study by Muhammad Ghalldb, "al-Ma'rifah 'ind

Muhyi-d-dmnbn 'ArabL,"n al-Kitdbat-Tadhkdrf(above, n. 25), 181-206.29 Cf. ash-Sha'ranl, al-Qawl al-mubmni r-radd 'aid MuhyF-d-dTn, s. Yale L-266 (Catalogue

Nemoy, no. 1161), fol. 12a. The other subject treated in the work is a defense of Ibn 'Arabi againstthe accusation of belief in hulul. See again below, n. 70.

7



Franz Rosenthal

Among the passages in which Ibn 'Arabi speaks explicitly about philosophyand how it compares to mystical concerns is one in the Kitdb al-Isfdr 'an

natd'ijal-asfdr.There he divides the "travelers,"that is, individuals engaged inthe search for metaphysical knowledge, into two groups. He characterizesthe

one group as those "traveling in God with their thoughts (afkdr) and

intellects. They inevitably stray from the road, because they think that the only

guide they can accept to guide them is their own thinking. They are the

philosophers and those who follow a corresponding course. The other groupof those engaged in travel are the messengers and prophets and chosen saints,such as the truly insightful (muhaqqiqun)Sufis like Sahl at-Tustari, Abu Yazid

al-Bistami, Farqad as-Sabakhi,30al-Junayd, and al-Hasan al-Basri as well as

other famous men of this kind down to our own time."31 (This statement is

followed by an interesting explanation of why mystic revelation is more

frequent and quicker in recent times than it had been in the old days.)In the Futuhdt where Ibn 'Arabi refers back to the passage of the Isfdr, the

express reference to the philosophers is not repeated. The distinction between

the two types of travelers is described as one between "those who travel bymeans of thought in the intelligibilia and the experiences (i'tibdrat),and those

who travel by means of actions, the hard laborers."32 It is basically the same

thing. The distinction made here is fundamental for Ibn 'Arabi's attitude andstated by him many times. "The philosophers" are on one side, and "those

who follow a corresponding course," meaning the Mu'tazilites and Mutakalli-

mun in general, are on the other. He concedes that there are also some Sufis

like them who use reasoning with respect to metaphysical matters. At the end,

they are totally unsuccessful in their search for gnosis and the knowledge of

God. Different from the mentioned groups are all truly spiritual seekers,

including the most elevated elite among human beings. By direct, divinely

given revelation and inspiration, they achieve the only true understanding of

God and the world.Ibn 'Arabi describes the purpose of the Futuhdt as "not being concerned

with the results of proofs derived from thought, but having as its subject the

results of divine revelation (kashf)."33Or, put somewhat differently: "We are

not those who would report any statements of the sages (hukamda)34 r the

30 For Farqad, cf. as-Sam'ani, Ansdb, VII, 55f. (Hyderabad 1962-82, under as-Sabakhi). He

alone among the famous Siifis mentioned here is not listed in all the common referenceworks.

31 Kitdbal-Isfdr, 7 f. (Hyderabad 1948).32

Fut., II, 382, 11.24f. (ch. 190). "Hard laborers" translates ashlb al-yaamalat (not taammu-ldt!) "sturdy, hard working camels." The difference between them and those exalted personalitiesmentioned in the Kitdbal-Isfdr is presumably that the former constitute the more general run of

Sufis as against the special muhaqqiqun.33 Fut., II, 389,11. 6f. (ch. 196).34 On the sages, cf. below, pp. 14f.

8




statementsof others(likethem).In our book (the Futuhdt) s wellas all our

other books, we set down only the results of revelationand dictates of the

Truth."35"Ourbook," he sayselsewhere,"is not meant to presentrelation-ships establishedby speculative hought,but its subject s the inspirational,

revelatory sciences (al-'ulum al-wahblyah al-kashfiyah)."36 The well-known

intellectualproofshaveno placein the Futuhdt."The workis builtupon the

religious aw and upon the resultsof revelationand directwitness(shuhud),"

something hat reason s unableto attain.37Note hereagainthe inclusionofthe religious aw. It remainsof fundamentalmportance or Ibn 'Arab! n allhis thought.Thereare numerous imilarexpressions f the same idea.Repeti-tious as theymay appearon the surface, hey alwaysexhibitsomeindividual

featuresdependingmainlyon the contextin whichtheyoccur.Thinking f-k-r)constitutesa "veil." 8 Yet, Ibn'Arabi s keenlyawareof its

great mportance, venthough t is a human,not a divine,attribute. ts role is

indicatedby the many positivereferences o it in the Qur'an:

Thinking is a state, of which I am not unaware,For God has established it(s position) in verses and siirahs.

Thought is a natural epithet (na't). It has

Control only over human beings.39

A recurrent hemein Ibn 'Arabi's work is the many limitations mposedupon thought.Thepowerof thought al-quwah l-mufakkirah)oes not suffice

to achievea perceptionof the essence of God.40However,Ibn 'Arab!also

constantlystresses he theme thatthinkinghas its definiteuses,provided hat

thoughtand inferentialreasoning(istidldl)are sound and that the thinkers

(nuzzar) re not led to doubtsby proofswhich seem to be proofsbut, in fact,are not.41Theintellect s an instrument ivenby God to man.He hasplaced tin man's rationalsoul for moralpurposes,and it should thereforealwaysbe

35 Fut., II, 432, 11.8 f. (ch. 198,fasl 14).36 Fut., II, 355, 11.5 f. (ch. 291).37 Fut., IV, 19, 11.2f. (ch. 414).38 Fut., II, 85, 1. 7 (ch. 73, su'al 67); II, 523, 11.8f. (ch. 226). Cf. also Kitdb at-Tardjim, 12

(Hyderabad 1948): "The veils preventing the perception of the knowledge of the Truth are great,the greatest among them being knowledge... Heraclius (the Byzantine Emperor) possessed

knowledge of Prophecy but had no belief, so his knowledge was of no use to him. The Jews knewthat Muhammad was truly the Messenger of God... Cf. also Kitabat-TarEjim,57. A very different

situation is presupposed in the description of "knowledge" as a veil in Mawaqi' an-nujam(see

below, n. 184).The ignorant speak of knowledge in this way. Ibn 'Arabi explains that knowledge isindeed a great veil. But it is a veil that veils the hearts (and thus protects them) from ignorance.39 Fut., II, 229 f. (ch. 144 beg.). As Ibn 'Arabi explains, "natural" is used here in the sense of

"not divine."40 Fut., II, 319, 11.16f. (ch. 177).41 Dhakha'ir al-a'ldq, 169f., 173.

9



Franz Rosenthal

used.42But it must also alwaysbe kept in mind that its shortcomingsare

numerousand obvious, and what good are the argumentsof reasonwhen

what it builds s demolishedby revelationkashJ)43? evelationhasa clearcutadvantageover it:

O my people! The results of the sciences of revelation (kashf)

Enjoy superiorityover the science of the hearts.

For the intellect cannot roam

In the arena of witnessings and absences.

How many mistakes and shortfalls are there in thinking!But how much correct insight (nazar) does the discerning eye have!

Were it not for the eye, no clear guide would

Show itself to the intellect in a man of heart.44

Ibn 'Arab! sees the clearestproof of that superiorityn the disagreementthathe is convinced s endemicamongphilosophers ndtheir lk.He attemptsto explain the origin of their different views in these terms: "... the sciences of

the intellect derived from thinking contain an element of changeability,because hey follow the temper mizdj)of the thinkingand intelligentndivi-

dual. He considersonly sensible matterswhich may have existencein his

imaginationand accordinglyare his evidence.The result is that theories

(maqalah)withrespect o one and the samethingdifferor one and the sameinvestigator nazir)differswith respectto the same thing at different imes,because of differences n temper and mixture and combinationsin their

developmentnash'ah).Thus theirstatements ifferwithrespect o one and the

samethingand withrespect o the basicprinciplesuponwhichtheyconstruct

their details. In contrast, the directly inspiredand legislativeknowledge

possessesone and the same taste(tain), even if the perceptionsof this taste

(matd'im)differ ..."45 In other words, the mystical experience called "taste"

providesunchangingbasicprinciples f metaphysical nowledge,whereas he

intellectualuest ormetaphysicalnowledge-whose xistences understandablebecausethe intellect s a divinegift in man, which,however,can go only a

limiteddistancebasedas it is on physicalmeansof cognition-is ledastraybyits concernwithwidelychangeable etailsanda neglectof thebasicprinciples.

42 Fut., II, 319, 11.13f. (ch. 177); III, 436, 1. 7 (ch. 371,fasl 3). For the right kind of 'aql, see

Fut., III, 250 (ch. 355).43 Fut., III, 31, 1.25 (ch. 308 beg.), in a poem that starts significantly:

I wonder about someone who says, Be! to non-existence

When what is addressed was not there.Cf., further, for instance, Fut., II, 174,11.22f. (ch. 90 end); II, 183, 1. 22 (ch. 99); III, 420,1. 18

(ch. 371); IV, 112, 11.15 and 17 (ch. 477 beg.).44

Fut., II, 628, 11. 23-26 (ch. 285). Both "witnessings" and "absences" refer to direct

metaphysical contact. They are not contrasting terms, as the English translation seems to imply.45 Fut., Y, V, 147 f. (ch. 68). Cf. also V, 204 (ch. 68 end).

10



Ibn'Arabibetween"Philosophy"nd "Mysticism"

Intellectuals, herefore,constantlyfalter in their assumptions:"Whentheyfollowup the evidence dalll)withthoroughness ndsuccess, heresult s that

they obtain knowledgeof what they wantedproved(madlul).But then, atsome other time, or when a memberof anothergroup-be it a Mu'tazilite,

Ash'arite,Brahman,or philosopher-comes up with something o contradict

or impugn he earlierproofwhichtheyhad fullyaccepted, heir first(view)is

seen as erroneous and not thoroughly proved ..."46

Scholarswho enjoydirectrevelation kashf)find divineguidancethroughthe Qur'an(furqdn).This makes them aware of all the differencesand the

amountof truthanduntruth n the intellectual peculationaboutGod. Thus,

throughdirect nspiration, heyare able to worshipGod both as commanded

by Islamandessentially.However,"thespeculativecholars 'ulama' n-nazar)are distributedover many differentgroups.Each of them has its own idea

about God accordingto the results obtained from speculatingon their

particular videnceconcerning he knowledgeof God. Thus their doctrines

concerningGod differgreatly."47Yet, no matterhow muchtheydifferfrom

each other, they do maintain coherencewithin their particulargroup. The

Ash'ariteargumentaboutknowledgeof God's essence s true,but it's truth s

doubtedby the Mu'tazilah, nd vice versa.Inspiteof it, although heir eading

scholars have differences,they retain their respectiveidentities as eitherAsh'arites r Mu'tazilites. Likewise,"bn 'Arabicontinues,"thephilosophersdo not ceaseto differ n theirdoctrinesaboutGod and theirnecessarybeliefs.

Still,eachgroupis unitedby one and the samepositionand by one and the

same denomination.They differwith respectto the basic principlesof their

commonschool (madhhab), ivingno considerations o the details." On the

otherhand,the prophetsandcomparable xaltedhumanbeingsas well as all

those individualswho possessrevelation kashf)havenever been observed o

differwithrespect o the basicprinciples, ndtheyneverhad doubts aboutthe

belief in God.48 In short, "the way of kashf and shuhid bears no discus-sion."49That of philosophycannot do without t.

Accordingto Ibn 'Arabi'sfirmconviction,there could be only one truth

about the divine.He would have considered t absurd o concede,as modern

historiansof religionare inclinedto do, that directexperienceof the divine

could leadto differing pinionsand beliefs.Butif Ibn 'Arabiwasconvincedof

the unassailability f his position, why then,we may ask, did he bother with

the views of philosophersand other wrongheaded hinkers?The obvious

answer,whichalsoapplies

o the entirerevelation-versus-reasonebate, s that

46 Fut., II, 645,11. f. (ch. 289).47 Fut., III, 402, 11. f. (ch.369,wasl 20).48 Fut., III, 82, 11.15ff. (ch. 322).49 Kitab al-Fana' wa-l-mushahadah,8, 1. 8 (Hyderabad 948).

11



Franz Rosenthal

his claims faced strong opposition and had to be defended and proved, and

this required attempting to demolish those other views. Ibn 'Arabi's own

answer is contained in a remarkablepassage from the long introduction of theFutu.hdt. Exhorting the student who is concerned with the knowledge that

conforms to the Prophetical knowledge inherited from the prophets, the true

metaphysical knowledge, he tells him: "Don't let yourself be turned off, when

you come across a problem that was mentioned by a philosopher or a

Mutakallim or a speculative scholar in any discipline of knowledge, to such an

extent that you would say about the person who mentions it and who is a

truly insightful (muhaqqiq)Sufi that he is a philosopher, just because the

philosopher (al-faylasJf)50 mentioned that very problem and discussed and

believed it. (And don't say) that (the Sufi who discusses it) derived it from (the

philosophers), or that he has no religion, because the philosopher who had no

religion (and was no Muslim) stated it (earlier).Don't do that, friend!It would

be an inconsequential argument. For not all the philosopher's knowledge is

untrue, and that particularproblem may just involve some truth he possesses.This is particularly so when it concerns the wise sayings (hikam) and moral

uprightness5 which (the philosophers) have written about. We must set down

the philosopher's statement with respect to that specific problem and

acknowledge it to be true. For the Prophet, or a companion (of the Prophet),or Malik, or ash-Shafi'i, or Sufyan ath-Thawri has (also) stated it. If you

(attack a truly insightful Sufi by) saying that he heard it from the

philosopher (in oral instruction) or read it in the books of the philosophers, it

could be you lie and show ignorance. The lie would be your saying "he heard

or read it," since you did not observe that directly. The ignorance would be

your failing to make a distinction between truth and untruth with regard to

that problem. Your statement that the philosopher has no religion does not

mean that everything he possesses (in the way of knowledge) is untrue. Every

intelligent person would perceive that right away."52All the elements of Ibn 'Arabi's attitude toward philosophy are to be found

here. The intellect has its proper, if limited, role to play. Ethics as taught by

the philosophers is by and large not objectionable. Metaphysics as expounded

by the philosophers and the speculative theologians-Ibn 'Arabi frequently

refers to the Ash'arites by name, not quite as frequently to the Mu'tazilites,

with often little clearcut distinction between the two and the Ash'arites being

50 With the definite article. The reference may be to Aristotle, but this is not a necessary

assumption.51 Lit., "freedom from desires and psychological trickiness (maka'id)."52 Fut. Y, I, 145f. See now E. Meyer, "Ibn 'Arabi begegnet Ibn Rusd," in Zeitschrift fir

Geschichteder Arabisch-lslamischenWissenschaften,3 (1986), 291ff.

12



Ibn'Arabibetween"Philosophy"nd"Mysticism"

ahead of theothersas faras the plausibility f theirviewsis concerned-53 is

on the whole incorrectand unacceptablebut includesoccasionalpromising

leads. Religion,which means Islam,even if religionin this passageis usedwithout the definite article, provides the true and binding guidelinesfor

everything.The undeniableact that the philosophersived beforethecomingof Islamandthus werenot Muslimsdoesnot disqualify hemperse; however,where theirviewscannot be reconciledwith those of Islam,they cannot be

acceptedas true.It alladdsupto a noteworthydisplayof broadmindedness,f

not tolerance.54 olerances quiteuncharacteristicf the monotheisticmystic.Ibn 'Arabiwasa staunch,evenfanatic,supporter f Muslimbeliefs, raditions,and practices.Here, however,we findhim professing he need for a kind of

intellectual bjectivitywhichreflects he longtraditionof philosophy n Islam.It appearsto agree well with Ibn 'Arabi's personalityas a determinedly

independenthinker,hardlya "liberal,"but a dedicated ntellectual.

Thequestionraisedby thequotedpassagewhether"thephilosopher"ould

refer to Aristotle requiresa brief discussionof Ibn 'Arabi's view of the

relationshipof hikmah"wisdom"and hakim"sage"to philosophy.55 n his

mind, words such as fikr or nazar evoked all sorts of human,non-inspired

endeavor; hey preferably oncern Kalam ratherthan philosophy,although

the potentialdistinction s not alwaysclearcut.Hikmahand hakim,wordsfirmlygroundedn theQur'an,wereexpectedly erymuch usedby him,andin

different onnotations.Theyalso servedhim,of course,as quasi-synonyms f

falsafahandfaylasif. To him, too, hikmahbasicallysignalsa higherform of

knowing.The differencentendedbetween"wisdom" nd"knowledge"s hard

to pin down at times in his view of the world. For instance, the divine

apparition ncounteredby him at the Ka'bahtellshim: "I am the knowledge

(al-'ilm), the known (al-ma'lum),and the knower (al-'alim)-I am al-hikmah,

al-muhkam,and al-haktm."56

53 Fora positiveevaluation f a contemporaryMutakallim/Ash'arite,f. Fut.,IV,22,11. 2 f.

(ch. 416). For the purportedweaningof a contemporaryMu'tazilite rom his theoryof the

creationof humanactions,cf. Fut.,II, 182,11. ff. (ch.98); IV, 179,11.12ff.(ch. 534).54 Onthestrength f thepassagesquotedhere,whichhe knewthroughash-Sha'rani, yberg

concludedthat Ibn 'Arabi had nothingagainst philosophersand Mu'taziliteswhenever heyoffered ometruth,cf. Kleinere chriften,1, n. 3.

55 'Uqala' is occasionallyused by Ibn 'Arabi with reference o faldsifahbut is of little

importancen his work.SeeFut.,II,619,1.8 (ch.282):al-'uqald'minl-faldsifah. f. alsobelow,p.26. For "hukamd' f the alasifah," ee below,n. 65.

Qudamd' ancients"s also not absent, see, for instance,above,p. 3, 1. 10. The 'Uqlatal-

mustawfizin Nyberg,Kleinere chriften, 6) refers o "the ancientphilosophersal-qudamd'l-faldsifah)," ut,accordingo the criticalapparatus f theedition,al-faldsifahs missing romone

manuscript,ndonlyqudamd'ppearsn the continuation f thepassage.56 Fut.Y, I, 219,1.6 (ch. 1).Cf. also below,n. 80.Hukamd' ppearsn one manuscripts a variantreading or aldsifah n Fut.Y, III,219,1.3

(ch.28).

13



Franz Rosenthal

Hikmah s definedby Ibn'Arabias God'ssystemof ordering he worldand

everythingn it. Hikmah n this sense,however, s also applicable o human

sages and may well be comparedto philosophy.With a number of slightvariations, bn'Arabirepeats his definitionover andoveragain.Thedividingline betweendivineand humanhikmah ppearsblurred,f not non-existent,n

many passagesof his writings,and is so also in realityas conceivedby him.57

The common equation of hikmah with falsafah, and hakim withfaylasuf, is

alsoverymuchalivein his works.Oncehe expressly tatesthatbyhukama'he

meant the faldsifah.58 In his at-TadbTrdt l-ildhiyah, he refers to al-hakTmas

the authorof the SecretumSecretorum;n his Fihris,he supplies he nameof

Aristotle.59Hakim standsindubitably or philosopherwhereverIbn 'Arabi

uses the word in connection with the sciences (even at times including

metaphysics): Inrelation o whatwe havementioned,"he informsus, "there

is much difference etweenspeculative ages(hukamd)who do not belongto

ourway (tariq).For the MutakallimquaMutakallimhas nothingto do with

the scienceof (physics).Thisis in contrast o the hakTm. his wordstandsfor

the combinationof metaphysics,physics,propaedeutics riyddt),and logic,and thereare only those four orders of sciences."60All of them, of course,

belong to what was taken to be "philosophy." In fact, Ibn 'Arabi

acknowledged hat "most of the speculativesciencesand practical61 raftswere nventedby thesouls of sageswithpureandstrongminds andthoughts,

although,needless o say, real wisdom(haqiqatal-hikmah)omes as a gift of

God fromsupernaturalorces(al-'ilmal-ladunnt).62

Still, it must alwaysbe kept in mind that ordinarily, bn 'Araby eserved

hikmah/hakTmor a higherorder of consciousness.The Malamiyah,as we

57 Fut., II, 471, 1.26 (ch. 198, asl 42). For the varietyof expressions f this idea, cf., for

instance, at-Tadbirat al-ildhiyah, 194, 11.12f.; Kitdb al-jaldl wa-l-jamdl, 13, 11.11f. (Hyderabad

1948);DTwan, 8, 1.20;Fut.,I, 665,1.1; II, 16,1.16;II, 230,11. 3f. (ch. 144);II, 269,1.16(ch.166beg.);II,332,1.22(ch.178); I, 668,1.21(ch.193); II, 168,11. f. (ch.342);III,210,1.22(ch.349end);III, 455,1.7 (ch.372end);III,455,1.26 (ch. 373);IV.258,1.10;IV,324,1.13(ch.558

end).Seealsoabove,n. 3.58 Fut., III, 456, 1.7 (ch. 373).59 Fihris,528(above,n. 26).60 Fut.Y, IV, 161(ch.47),and343(ch.60). Seealso below,p. 22.Ibn'Arabialsocomplainedhat therewerehukama'whojustthought hattheywerehukamd'

(Fut.,III,508,11.10f. [ch.381])and thattherewere hinkersnuzzdr)who(just)claimedwisdom,cf. Kitdbal-Fana'wa-l-mushdhadah,, 1. 2. In general, cholarswerefew,andignorance f what

matters eallymeantwasprevalent,f. Fut.,II, 185,1.3 (ch. 101)-a complaint ommonlyheard.Seealso below,n. 184.

61 Readal-'amallyah.62 Risalahfi n-nafs wa-r-ruh,ed.M. AsinPalacios,"Lapsicologia egunMohidinAbenarabi,"

in Actes du XIV"CongresInternationaldes Orientalisles (Alger 1905), Troisiemepartie, 163 and 165

(reprintedn Nendeln1968).

14




haveseen,wereacclaimedas truesages.63Thesagesrankedbetweenprophetsandmessengers.64 he expression"greathukamd' f thefaldsifah"65denotes

no doubta specialgroupof philosophers,hose whopossessed heirparticularshareof trueknowledge. t is characteristicf Ibn 'Arabi'scautiousapproachto the equation of hikmahwith falsafah. He felt that such caution was

necessary n orderto avoid givingthe wrongimpression hat he was identi-

fyingwithobjectionablemetaphysical iews foundin philosophy.This becomesclearin anotherfamous and muchquoted passagefromthe

Futuihdt-tomy knowledge he only one in the entire workin whicha Greek

philosopher s cited by name.66Ibn 'Arabi's discussionhere startsfrom the

usualassumptionhat boththinking fikr)and taste(dhawq) ave theirdefinite

placein the processof gainingexperience i'tibdr).The peopleof the path ofGod acceptthis to be so. It is deniedonly by scholarswhose exclusive oncern

is with materialphenomena designated s ahlar-rusum)nd who usespecula-tionand inferential easoningbut haveno tasteof mystical tates. "Itis rare,"Ibn 'Arabicontinues,"that one of themdoes have a taste of mysticalstates.

Among the sages (hukama'),one of those was the divine (ildhT)Plato. His

psychologicaldisposition s foundto be the sameas that associatedwith the

peopleof revelationand existence kashf/wujfud).Some Muslimsdislike him.

Theydo so

onlybecause

theyconnect him with

falsafah.Their attitude is

causedby ignoranceof the meaningof the word alsafah.The hukamd' rein

truth the knowers of God and of everything ... Hikmah is the knowledge of

prophethood.Faylasif means 'lover of wisdom' becausesophiain Greek is

wisdomor, according o anotheropinion (!), 'love.'67Thusfalsafah means

'love of wisdom.'Every ntelligent ndividualoves wisdom.However,peoplewho think, whetherthey are philosophers,Mu'tazilites,Ash'arites,or anyotherkindof thinker,arewrong'with espect o metaphysical uestionsmore

often than they are right.The philosopherswere assumed o be deservingof

63 Seeabove,n. 2.64 Cf. also Fut., III,234,1.12(ch. 352).65 Fut., III, 37,11.7f. (ch. 309),also Fut., II, 677,1. 8 (ch. 295), and hukamd'al-falasifahin Fut.,

II,469,1.23 (ch. 198, asl 38).Inthelastpassage,however, bn 'Arabidistanceshimself romthe

"philosopherages"andtheirview on theoriginof the world.66 Theonlyother Greeknamementionedn the Futuhdts Galen,cf. Fut.,III, 113,1.6 (ch.

330).67 Ibn'Arabiwas interestedn languageand traveledn countriesof manydifferentongues.

On threeoccasions,he mentions heword for "God" n various anguages:Fut.,II, 360,11. -11(ch. 178);II, 683,11. 9-31(ch. 297);andIII, 300,11.17f. (ch.361),andhe even refers o several

wordsfor "horse,"apparentlyn at-Tanazzuldtl-Mawsiliyah. ee Asin Palacios,"El mistico

Murciano,"n Boletin above,n. 16),88 (1926),583 . However, he remark n theetymologyof

"philosopher"s strictly raditional. t standsto reason hat wa-qllas a distortionof isa-fTl(i)"and phil(e)."

15



Franz Rosenthal

blamejust becauseof theirdesignationas philosophers.Their mistakeswith

respect o mattersmetaphysicalwereresponsibleor theircontradictingevela-

tions receivedby the messengers, ince in their thinking, they appliedthewrong deasconcerninghe basicprinciple nd correct ignificancef prophecyand messengership nd therebybecameconfused.Had they, upon fallingin

love with wisdom,soughtit fromGod, and not by means of thinking, heywould have been rightthroughout.Muslim thinkersother than the philoso-

phers,such as the Mu'tazilites ndAsh'arites,ivedafter thecomingof Islam.

By then,Islam hadgainedcontroloverthem,andtheynow started o defend

it in accordancewith theirunderstanding f it. They are basicallyright(intheirviews).Theyarewrong only in some details of interpretationwhich,in

the light of theirthinkingand the intellectual videncethey possessed,they

applied o certainstatementsby the Lawgiver boutGod's truth.Understood

literally, hose statements eem absurdand not provableby reason.In their

view, they therefore constituted unbelief (kufr) ... This, then, is wisdom, and

the peopleof God, such as messengers nd saints,arethe truesages."68

Again,Ibn 'Arabidisplaysa certain oleranceof rationalism ndphilosophyand an understandingor theeffortsof those whothought hattheycouldrelyon philosophicalreasoning.It was not uncommonin Islam to excuse the

Greek philosophers-and thus to a certain degree philosophy itself-onaccountof theirhavinglived before the comingof Islam and consequently

havingbeenunableto know the full truth.Ibn 'Arab!definitelyaccepted his

line of defense.He wasready o admitthat thephilosophers, othancientand

recent,possesseda good deal of true insight, if not the full truth,even in

metaphysical uestionswhereeven Muslim heologianswereapt to misunder-

stand andmisinterprethe full truth that couldeasilyhave been theirs.When

Ibn 'Arabireferred o philosophersof his own time, he used no derogatory

epithets,69 lthoughhe was chagrinedby theirnegativeattitude toward his

own visionaryapproachwhichthey did not hesitateto brand as a kind ofmadness hawas).70n one of his poems,he even wentso faras to claimthat

bothAristotleandal-Ash'ariwould haveagreedwithhimand that all he did

was to rectify heirprinciples ndarguments.71n general, t can be said that

he possesseda historicalunderstandingf the importance f philosophy.His

attitude toward its representativesmay be described as condescendingly

68 Fut., II, 523 (ch. 226).9 See above, p. 7.

70 Fut., II, 591 bottom (ch. 275). The passage was quoted already by M. Schreinerfrom ash-Sha'rani,see his "Beitragezur Geschichte der theologischen Bewegungen im Islam," in ZDMG, 52

(1898), 527, n. 1, reprintedin his GesammelteSchriften,ed. M. Perlmann, 428, n. 1 (Hildesheim-Ziirich-New York 1983). Ash-Sha'rani expands the quotation at the end with an attack upon the

philosophers as being ignorant.71 Diwan, 466, 11.17ff.

16




compassionate, s wasproper or someonewho believed hat he was divinelychosen and privyto the one true knowledge.This then can be said to have

beenIbn'Arabi'sattitude owardphilosophyandphilosophers s expressednhis own statements.

His numerousfurther references o philosophers, heir works, and theirviewsseemto confirmthis impression. t comes as no surprise hat a worksuchas the collectionof significant ayings,whichhe publishedunderthe titleof Muhddaratl-abrdr,s muchless reticentwith respect o the use of namesthan the Fut.uhit. The Muhadarah often quotes wise sayings (hikam) and

attributes hem to suchfamousnamesas Hippocrates,Aristotle,his pupil,the

greatAlexander,and even Pythagoras,Socrates,and Plato. Some of these

sayings are repeatedin the Futiuhdtwithout attribution.72 t may not beaccidental hat the celebratedMuslimsgenerallyknown as philosophersarenot mentionedbynameeven in theMuhddarah.hebeginningof thepoemonthe soul by Ibn Sina is presented implyas belongingto "the poem famous

amongscholars,"with no explicitreference o its authorship.73IbnBajjah,who is knownto us principally s a philosopher,s mentionedn

theFututhdtn a story nvolvinghimand IbnZuhr.Thestory'sonlyconcern swiththeirrespective xpertisen botanyandpharmacology, ut in the tellingof it there is a whiffof Ibn

Bajjahas a

philosopher.bn

Bajjahsupposedlyimagined hat he knew moreabout plantsthan Ibn Zuhr.This, in fact, wasnot the case. He wasbetterthan Ibn Zuhr n physics(al-'ilmat-tabT'7).74ForIbn 'Arabi,such "physics"was a part of falsafah. On anotheroccasion,he

comparesthe shuyukh, he Sufi masters,who are not lawgiversbut the

guardiansof the religious aw as well as the guardiansof humanheartsand

morals, to physiciansas contrasted with physicists.The physicianknowsabout "nature"only in as far as it governsthe humanbody, whereas the

physicistknows it outright,even if he is not a physician.75

Whenspeakingof al-Batalyawsi,bn 'Arabiwouldhardlyhavethoughtofhim as a philosopher,althoughhe refers to his only known philosophicalwork.76And his contacts with a greatcontemporary,Fakhr-ad-din r-Razi,

72 Seebelow,n. 125.73 Muhadarat l-abrar, , 362 (Cairo 1972).A footnoteof the editorrefersto Ibn Sina's

authorship.74 Fut., II, 442, 1. 30 - 443, 1. 2 (ch. 198,fasl 21), trans.M. Asin Palacios,"Avempace

botanico,"n al-Andalus, (1940),257f. IbnBajjah's rave n Feswasnear thatof Ibn'Arabi'sgrandfather,ee IbnAbi Usaybi'ah, Uyunal-anbd',I, 63, 11. 9f. (Cairo-K6nigsberg882-84).

75 Fut.,II, 365,11. -5 (ch. 181).Theuse of tabT'ahn theplural n connectionwithmedicineoften refers o the fourhumors,but this is hardlymeanthere.76 Fut.Y, III, 195 ch.25end).Aspointedoutbytheeditor, hereferences to al-Batalyawsi's

Hada'iq,n particularhefourthchapter. n hisintroductiono theeditionandtranslation f thework(in al-Andalus, [1940],cf. ObrasEscogidas,I-III,496 [Madrid1948]),M. AsinPalaciossaysthat but fortheHada'iq, l-BatalyawsTouldbeclassified sa philologist ndinno wayas a

17



18 Franz Rosenthal

wereclearlywith ar-Razias a Mutakallim.77 bn Rushd's astingfamerests

upon his philosophicalwork, but young Ibn 'Arabi's encounterswith him

were,as far as we know,strictlyon the mystical evel. Ibn'Arabi'sreportonthoseencountershas the aura of an edifying,as well as tantalizing,mysticalanecdote. t is hardto take thereportat face value. Ibn 'Arabimayhave built

uponan actual occurrencebut was carriedaway by his fertile magination.78We have no indication hat he studied hephilosophicalworksof IbnRushd,but it wouldseema safe assumption hat he had at least someknowledgeof

them.79

Ibn 'Arabi'sactualacquaintancewith technicalphilosophicalwritingscan-

not be reliablydocumented. t is no longeracceptable, s it wasin thetimeof

M. Schreiner,o referto the Liberde causisor the Theologyof Aristotleandthus intimate hat Ibn 'Arabihad read themwhen he spokeof the PureGood

or the identityof knowledge,the knower,and the known.80All this was

generalknowledgen his timesharedby all intellectuals.bn 'Arabiconstantly

repeatedhis view on the threeaspectsof knowledge.He madepracticallyno

use of the term "PureGood," but it is clear that he was aware of it. It is

behindhis incidentaldescription f non-existence s pureevil,81or that of the

truthas "pure ight"andof the absurd muhadl)s "puredarkness."82He may

philosopher.Heshows,however, onsiderablehilosophicalnterest lso in hiscommentarynal-

Ma'arriseebelow,nn. 92and 170).Cf.now E. Torero, in al-Qantara, (1984),15-31.77 Cf. the referencesn Fut.Y, III,54f. (ch. 17),andIV, 118(ch. 46),as well as theepistleon

ethicsandfutuwah ddressedo ar-Razi Fut.Y, IV, 55 . [ch. 2]). Seealso the discussion n the

knowledge f God written or him(Hyderabad 948),below,n. 98.78 Fut. Y, II, 372 . (ch. 15).Recent ranslationsppearn H. Corbin,L'Imaginationreatrice,

34-36,Englishrans.,41-43(above,n. 16);R.J.W.Austin,StifisofAndalusia,3f. (London1971);and E. Meyer, op. cit. (above,n. 52), 281ff. The famousepisodeis generallyreferred o in

connectionwithbothmen, cf., for instance,EP2, .v. Ibnal-'ArabTs wellas s.v. Ibn Rushd.79

Nyberg, Kleinere Schriften, 24, quoting Ibn 'Arabi's Autobibliographyand apparently

emendinghis reading"IbnSabil"to "IbnRushd,"statesthat Ibn 'ArabistudiedIbn Rushd's

juridicalworks.However, heeditionof theAutobibliographyy 'Abd-ar-Rahmfn adawin al-

Andalus,0(1955),116,reads"IbnShibl"and makesnoconnectionwithIbnRushd, nspiteof the

seemingly losesimilarity f the forms.Evenmorestranges the fact thatthe titleof thejuridicalworkmentioned yNybergdoesnotagreewiththeindicationsn Badawi's dition.The dentity f

the individual,f it is not IbnRushd orhisgrandfather?),emainso beestablished.80 Cf. M. Schreiner, op. cit. (above, n. 70), 526; GesammelteSchriften, 427. The references

Schreinerad forthe PureGoodandforknowledge,tc., were,respectively,ut.,III,315,1.9 (ch.

364),andFut.Y, II,82(ch.2,fasl 3) [seealsoabove,n. 56].Forsimilar ll too facile dentifications

of "sources,"eealso below,n. 96.81 Fut. Y, I, 212, 1.14,continued on 1. 17 to 213, 1. 3: "One of the travelersof the Truth said to

usin a lengthy tatementn connectionwith a stop(mundzalah)n darkness ndlight: Thegoodis in existence,and theevil in non-existence.'We(however?) now that the Truthhas absolute

existencewithoutrestrictiontaqyTd). e is the puregood thatcontainsno evil. His opposite s

absolutenon-existencewhich s thepureevil thatcontainsno good.Thisis themeaningof their

statementhat'non-existences pureevil.'"82 Fut.,III, 274,11. 8f. (ch. 360).




verywell have read those works,if they were accessible o him and he had

beenlookingfor them,but unless he indicates hat much,proof that he did

wouldrequirehe

unambiguousdentification f

accuratequotations.No suchidentification f passagesfromphilosophicalworks suchas the Theologyor

the Liberde causishas, to my knowledge,as yet beenmade.83

Ibn 'Arabi tells us that he once saw a book with the title al-MadTnahl-

fddilah n someone'spossession n Marchena.He noticed in it the statement:

"We mustspeculateon how to posita god in the world,"usingilah,andnot

Allah.Immediately, e returned he book to its owner n disgust,and he never

againcame across it.84 No such statement s to be foundin al-Farabi'sArd'

ahl al-madTnahl-fadilah,where "The First" is referred o. Nor, for that

matter,does either lahor Allahoccuranywheren that work(or, it seems, nal-Farabi'spoliticalFusuil).Unless it can be proved hatsomeoneelse was the

author Ibn 'Arabi had in mind, thus eliminatingal-FarabT,t might be

assumedthat he was incensedby al-FarabT'smission of any reference o

God, andhe distorted his factin his restlessmagination.Had he returned o

al-MadTnahl-fddilahaterin his life, he mightnot have been so averse o al-

Farabi'swork.At any rate,the quoted passagedoes not tell us much about

the extent of Ibn 'Arabi's acquaintancewith the availablephilosophical-

political iterature.

The one "philosophical"workquoted by Ibn 'Arabiis indeed a workon

politics. It is the Secretumsecretorum,which formed the basis of his

at-TadbTrdtl-ildhTyah.e considered t a genuineworkof Aristotleaddressed

to King Alexander.85More will be said about it below, p. 25. Ibn 'Arabi

appearsto have regretted ater that he interruptedhis purelymetaphysical

pursuitsby spendingtime on the writing of the TadbTratnd occupyinghimselfwith man andman'sworldlyaffairs, venthoughhespiritualizedhem.

He felt that it was wrongfor himto neglectthe discussionof largerconcerns

such as the figureof the Mahdi and the Seal of the Saints,and he tried tomake up for it in his Kitab 'Anqd'mughrib i (ma'rifat) khatm al-awliyd' wa-

shams al-maghrib.86The Secretum secretorum, incidentally, also fueled Ibn

83 Exact identifications of possible sources of Ibn 'Arabi are hard to come by. A good exampleis the discussion of his relationship with Ibn Masarrahby R. Arnaldez, see El2, III, 871 f., s.v. Ibn

Masarra. Nyberg's contention that Ibn 'Arabi had the Rasd'il Ikhwdnas-safa' as his direct source

for the cosmic scheme of God, the first intellect, etc., plausible as it is, is also hard to prove, see

KleinereSchriften, 145.84

Fut., III, 178,1. 11

(ch. 344).For "came across

it,"another

possible but less likelytranslation would be "studied it."85 See above, n. 59.86 This is stated in the introduction of the work. In my translation of Ibn Khaldiin's

Muqaddimah,II, 189, n. 960, I doubted, probably incorrectly, the existence of the editions of the

work, but they have remained inaccessible to me.

19



Franz Rosenthal

'Arabi's keen interest in other magical subjects such as letter magic and

physiognomy; presumably, he did additional reading in monographs on the

latter subject.87Another supposed direct quotation of a philosophical title remainsdoubtful.

We are hampered again by that vagueness generally preferred by Ibn 'Arabi

when speaking about philosophy. In the introduction of the Futuhdt,he refers

to differences among the physicists, the scholars who defined the buildingblocks of the world, with respect to a fifth existent (mawjud),the basis and

origin (asl) of the four elements (arkdn). This fifth element, he says, was

mentioned by al-hakrmf l-ustuqussdt.88The preposition fThere is ambiguous.

According to Asin Palacios, it introduced the title of a book.89 In the context,

this is possible, for Ibn 'Arabi goes on to explain that he learned about the

matter from a medical student who read "it" (the book?) to him and asked

him to comment on it from his specific mystical revelatory (kashf) point of

view. The theory of the existence of a fifth soma or fifth ousia90 was

commonly ascribed to Aristotle, who himself never mentions it explicitly,91

and no Aristotelian peri stoicheion could have been intended here (unless, in

sheer desperation, we assume the meaning of "letters" for stoicheia and

assume that Ibn 'Arabi had in mind Kitdb al-Huruf "Book of letters" as the

Arabic title of the Metaphysics,an assumption that would not be much to hiscredit). In the Muslim world, the fifth element was usually referred to as the

fifth nature (tabFlah).92The differences of the philosophers with respect to the

number and the kind and hierarchyof the elements were known and recognizedas being of ancient origin.93 Since Ibn 'Arabi's informant was a student of

medicine, one might think of a physician who wrote a Kitdbal-Ustuqussit, and

the name of Ishaq b. Sulayman al-Isra'ili (Isaac Judaeus) comes to mind, but

at least what is preserved and known of his work happens to disregard the

theory of the fifth nature.94 All in all, it appears to be more likely that the

87 Cf. the discussion offirdsah in Fut., II, 235-41 (ch. 148).88 Fut. Y, I, 250.89 Cf. M. Asin Palacios, "El mistico Murciano," in Boletin (above, n. 16), 87 (1925), 161f.90 For soma, cf. Pseudo-Plutarch, Placita, I, 3, 22, and II, 20,11; Plotinus, Enneads, II, 1, 2.

The Arabic translation of Placita, II, 20, 11, has 'unsur or soma, cf. H. Daiber, Aetius Arabus: Die

Vorsokratiker n arabischerUberlieferung,156 f. (Wiesbaden 1980). For ousia,cf. the commentaries

on the Physics by Simplicius, ed. H. Diels, 1165,11.21 ff. (Berlin 1895. Commentaria n Aristotelem

Graeca 10), and Philoponus, ed. H. Vitelli (Berlin 1887. Comm. .., 16).91 Aristotle, De cae!o 270b21-22, speaks of the four elements and the ether in the uppermost

region. Ibn 'Arabi also refers to sphere and ether, see below, n. 95. Cf. Daiber, 106f.

92 Cf., for instance, Rasa'il Ikhwdnas-safd', II, 39 f. (Cairo 1347/1928); al-Baqillani, TamhTd,ed. R. J. McCarthy, 45 (Beirut 1957);al-Batalyawsi, Sharh al-mukhtdrmin LuzumfydtAbT-'Ala'

ed. Hamid 'Abd-al-MajTd,I, 189 (Cairo 1970). Cf. also Paul Kraus, Jabir Ibn Hayydn, II, 152f.

(Cairo 1942-43. Memoires de l'Institutd'Egypte 44-45).93 See below, n. 96.94 Cf. Salomon Fried's edition of the Hebrew text (Drohobycz 1900)and Jacob Guttmann, Die

20




prepositionJ does not introduce he title of a book but rather ndicates he

subjectunderdiscussionby theSage, namely, heelements. t shouldbe noted

that Ibn 'Arabi showed himselfsurprisedat learningsomething hat was nodoubtgeneralknowledgen hisenvironment, nd he musthave beenawareof

its familiarity ndtriviality; issurprisemighthave beenfeignedandprompted

by his tendency o dramatize.

Later on in the Futiauht,bn 'Arabi returns to the concept of the fifth

nature.He now considers t self-evident nd does not attribute t to anyone n

particular:"We would not have knownat all that there is the natureof the

sphereswhich is a fifth nature,had we no previousknowledgeof the five

mothers. When we noticed that the spheresoutside (?) these natures were

subject o rules(hukm)not inherentn thesemothers,we realized he existenceof a fifth nature rom theatmospheric'ulwlyah)motion thatis in theether,as

well as the terrestrialsuflTyah) otion thatis in thewaterand the soil."95He

againreturnedo thesubjectof thefourelements arkdn) f thephysicalworld

in a passage n whichhe distinguishesbetweensix different heoriesheld byvariousschools. He maintains hatin his opinion ('indana),hecorrectviewis

thatof a fifthbasicprinciplesasl) to be called"nature abT'ah)"orming he

basis of the four elements(arkin).96It is not clear whetherIbn 'Arabi's

informationcame from the same sourcein all thesepassages.

However this

may be, it seemsmost unlikelythat he had in mind a specificphilosophicalwork we could lay our hands on.

The situation is not much differentwith respectto all of Ibn 'Arabl's

statementson philosophical opics.All the acceptedpartsof philosophywere

alivein hiseducationalbackground. t was almost nevitable or himto touch

on them.97Theambiguityof his attitudewithregard o them as wellas other

fieldsof worldly earnings wellexpressedn theepistlewhichhe addressedo

Fakhr-ad-dinr-Razi:"The ntelligentndividualmuststudyall thosesciences

that serveto perfecthis essenceand move alongwith him whereverhe goes.The only science(that servesperfectionand moves along with him) is the

philosophischenLehren des Isaak Ben Salomon Israeli (Miinster 1911. Beitrdgezur Geschichteder

Philosophiedes Mittelalters 10,4). See also A. Altmann and S.M. Stern, Isaac Israeli, 47 f. (Oxford

University Press 1958); A. Altmann, "Isaac Israeli's 'Chapter on the Elements,"' in Journal ofJewish Studies, 7 (1956), 31-57.

9s Fut. Y, II, 86 (ch. 2, fasl 3). On "mothers" and "pillars," see below, n. 138.96 Fut. Y, II, 309 f. (ch. 11). Greek names to go with the prime element were supplied by M.

Asin Palacios, "Mohidin," in Homenaje (above, n. 21), II, 252, on the basis of Fut., II, 677, 1. 23

(ch. 295), and Muhammad Ghallab, in al-Kitib at-Tadhkdar above, n. 28), 190 f. On the "fifthnature" in Islam, see also, briefly, S. Pines, Beitrige zur islamischenAtomenlehre,43, n. 1 (Berlin

1936).97 Cf. the summary statement by M. Asin Palacios, "Mohidin," in Homenaje, II, 254:

"Nuestro mistico habla de todo: de fisica y de l6gica, de metafisica y de religi6n, de astronomia yde moral, sin order ni concierto..." (!) See below, p. 34.

21



Franz Rosenthal

knowledgeof God obtained as a gift and derived from direct witness

(mushdhadah).or instance,medicine s neededonly in the world of sickness

or disease. Whenyou move on to a world in whichthere is no sicknessordisease, whom could you cure with medical knowledge?The intelligentindividualshould make no effort to learn about it (?), even if he were to

obtain it by way of a (divine)gift as the medicine of the prophets (wasobtainedby themas a divinegift).The sameappliesto geometry handasah).It is needed n the worldof measurement.Whenyou moveon, you leave it in

its world,and the soul continueson unburdenedwith anything.The same

appliesto the occupationwith everysciencewhich the soul leaves when it

moves on to the worldbeyond.Therefore,an intelligent ndividualmust not

seizeany knowledge xceptwhatis absolutelyneeded.Rather,he must make

an effort to achieve what moves on with him when he moves on. This, in

particular,s two sciences,the knowledgeof God and the knowledgeof the

homesteads mawdtin) f the other world."98The sages,he adds elsewhere,wereignorantof the scienceshe himselfhadbrought.99

The philosophicalcanon of logic, mathematics,physics,and metaphysicswas acknowledgedby Ibn 'Arabi,but he viewed all of it as subordinate o

metaphysicsand consideredas bliss only the knowledgeof God, and not

arithmetic, eometry,or astronomy.100 echnical ermshave theirspecialandnecessary ole to play in everyscience; Sufism, oo, has its specialterms.'01Theterminology f a sciencehas to be learned rom ts seasonedpractitioners.This s trueforphilology,102rammar, eometry, rithmetic,hemathematicalsciences ta'7llm), Kalam,andphilosophy.However, he truenovice(al-murld

as-sddiq)among the people of God needs no instruction n the technical

terminologyof his scienceto beginwith. He knows it throughdirect nspira-tion.'03

AlthoughIbn 'Arabi'sentire workhas epistemologyat its core, logic and

logiciansare not oftenmentioned xpressly. t is importantor him to stress nso manywords that the knowledgeof God and the Qur'an, imitless ields of

knowledge hat theyare,"do not follow a logicalcanon(qdnunmantiqT)ndare not governed by a scale (mTzdn)."4 Everything has a mlzdn, and "the

98 Risalah ila l-imdmar-Razt, 6 (Hyderabad 1948). Cf. also Fut. Y, III, 83, 11.11 f. (ch. 19).99 Diwdn, 97, 1.20.100 Fut., IV, 11.11f. (ch. 533).101 Fut., II, 636, 11.21 ff. (ch. 287). This passage presents a slightly different list of sciences

including grammar, arithmetic,geometry, medicine, Kalam, and jurisprudence,but not philology(see n. 102).

102 Mantiqi, used next to nahwi also in Fut. Y, II, 58, 11.7f. (ch. 2, fasl 2), appears to be

intended here by Ibn 'Arabi in this sense and does not refer to logicians.103 Fut. Y, IV, 276 (ch. 54).104 Fut., III, 200f. (ch. 348).

22



Ibn'Arabibetween"Philosophy"nd"Mysticism"

scale of the meanings in the hand of the intellect is called logic, and there are

two plates to the scale, called premises."105 Somewhere in the Futuhat, it may

be added, Ibn 'Arabi includes an example of wrong premises yielding a correctconclusion, such as "Every man is a stone-every stone is an animal--ergo,

every man is an animal, which, of course, is correct."106

The ten categories are included among the things that for all times to the

Day of Resurrection apply to "every order in the world of lights and

darknesses, subtle and coarse (matters), simple and composite (matters),

substances, accidents, times, places, relations, qualities, quantities, positions,

activa, and passiva." 107 However, the ten categories-in this instance referred

to by their proper designation of maqult-do not subsume the essence of

truth.108And, since accordingto the fundamentalQur'anicstatementpondered

by Ibn 'Arabi innumerable times: "There is nothing like Him (42:11),"no positive but only true negative statements can be made about God, the first

eight categories, those of "how, where, when, position, relation, accident,

substance, and how much, do not apply. Of the ten there remain only truly

realized activity (fi7 muhaqqaq) and a concretely substantial agent (fa'il

mu'ayyan) or, in other words, visible activity (fi'l zdhir) in an unknowable

agent (fd'il majhul) whose influence (athar) is seen but whose predicate

(khabar)is not recognized, whose concrete substance ('ayn) is not known, andwhose mode of being (kawn)remains unknown."109 In sum, we may fairly say

that Aristotelian logic was unquestionably accepted by Ibn 'Arabi up to the

point where his metaphysical presuppositions take over.

Ethics was even more firmly acknowledged by Ibn 'Arab! to be an unobjec-

tionable part of philosophy.110 Metaphysical concerns do not intrude here to

any noteworthy degree, apart from the often stressed fact that proper morals

are the hallmark of Sufism.111In a general way, and often with his customary

vagueness, he fully subscribes to theories about parts of the soul inherited

from Greek philosophy."2 The rational soul, as, he says, it is called by the

sages and for which the Qur'an and the Sufis have different but equivalent

105 Fut., III, 6, 11. 16f. (ch. 300).106 Fut., III, 353, 11.9f. (ch. 367).107 Fut.,II, 304,11. 4-18 ch.177).Cf.alsoNyberg,Kleinere chriften,3f., inconnectionwith

inshd'ad-dawd'ir.108 Or "theTruth,"Fut., II, 319,1. 25 (ch. 177 nearend).109Fut.,II, 211,11. 9-33(ch. 127).Cf. also below,p. 31.110

Cf. above,n. 51."1 Cf. above,n. 8.112 If the Risalatal-Akhldq,isted by Yahia, Histoireet Classification,93, no. 745, is

representedy the workof this titlepublishedn Damascus,n. y., whichappears o be differentfromtheFalsafatal-akhldqiscussed bove,n. 14,it would be the besttestimonyo Ibn'Arabi'straditional pproacho ethics n thisrespect.

23



Franz Rosenthal

designations,113was created for the purpose of making it possible for man to

oppose natural desires threatening to take over control of the soul."4 It is

also the right instrument for deriving the proper pleasure from the beauty ofman and nature through sense perception."5 In contrast to the corporealanimal soul, the rational soul means happiness in both this and the other

world. 16

Popular ethics as represented by wise sayings was ubiquitous in medieval

thought and could hardly have been absent from Ibn 'Arabi's work. Favorite

topics of practical ethics such as the usefulness of silence appear in the long

concluding chapter of the Futihat dedicated to "exhortations in the form of

wise sayings (wasayd min manthur al-hikam wa-maysural-kalim)," ' 7 as, for

instance, "Nothing deserves imprisonment more than the tongue."'18 Ibn

'Arabi remembershaving heard the four statements on silence ascribed to the

four kings of the world, the rulers of, respectively, Persia, India, China, and

Byzantium. This happened in Fes when he was in his early thirties. He reportsthe saying in this form: "Four kings made four statements as if shot from one

bow. Kisra said: 'I am better able to rejectwhat I did not say than what I did.'

The king of India said: 'When I make a statement, it owns me, although I

owned it (before).' Qaysar, the king of the Rum, said: 'I have no regretsabout

what I did not say, but I had regrets about what I did say.' And the king ofChina said: 'The consequences of what was said were more severe than regretabout what was not said.'"119

Attributions are rare,120even general ones such as "one of the sages." For

the latter, see, for instance, the saying quoted in the Muhadarah:"One of the

sages said: 'Don't talk about what you don't know, lest you be considered

ignorant of what you do know!'""12 The Platonic "I know that I don't

113 Risalahfi ma'rifatan-nafs wa-r-ruh,

ed. AsinPalacios,

"Lapsicologia,"

153(above,

n.62).114

Fut., II, 319, 11.13f. (ch. 177 near end).115 Fut. Y, 61,11.5 f. (ch. 65). Ibn 'Arabi also follows traditional lines on the comparativelyfew

occasions he discusses pleasure and pain.116 Fut., III, 262 bottom (ch. 358). A hymn in praise of the rational soul, in the first person,

appears in DTwan,37 f.117 See Fut., IV, 549, 11.23ff.118 Fut., IV, 450 bottom.119 Fut., IV, 549, 11.25-29. The remark of the Byzantine emperor is ascribed to Simonides in

Plutarch, de garrulitate 515A. For various forms of the saying of the four (three) kings, cf., for

instance, al-Bayhaqi, Mahdsin, ed. F. Schwally, 424 f. (Giessen 1902), indicating the historian al-

Haytham b. 'Adl as his source = Pseudo-Jahiz, Mahdsin, 21 (Beirut [1955]); al-Washsha',

Muwashshd,ed. R. E. Briinnow, 10(Leiden 1886);al-Mubashshir, Mukhtdral-hikam,ed. 'Abd-ar-Rahman Badawi, 299 (Madrid 1958) = F. Rosenthal, The Classical Heritage in Islam, 126

(London 1975); Ibn Hamdun, Tadhkirah,75 f. (Cairo 1345/1927); al-Ibshlhl, Mustatraf, I, 101f.,ch. 13 (Bulaq 1268).

120 See above, for instance, n. 66, and below, n. 125.121 Muhddaratal-abrar, I, 480 (Cairo 1972).

24




know"appears n suchforms as a reference o the fourfolddefinitionof the

sage, which includes: "The man who knows but does not know that he

knows."'22It is also integratedn the discussionn the form:"A thingis notignorant(j-h-l)of its self but does not recognize '-r-f)that it recognizes ts

self." 123

Politics,another mportantpartof philosophyandethics, s alsorepresentedin Ibn 'Arabiby wise sayings."A sagewrote to Alexander,"we readin the

chapteron exhortationsn the Futuhat,"Know that time affectseverything,

replacest, wears t out, and kills whathas beendone,except orwhat is firmlyanchoredn theheartsof men. Thereforedeposein theirheartsan everlastinglove which will preservefor you a good memory,the generosityof youractivities,and the nobilityof youraccomplishments."24 Politicalcontrol ofothersbeginswith control of oneself,a favoritetopic of ethicaland politicalwisdom literature.Plato said: "He who begins with himself and controls

himself(sdsahd)achievescontrol(siydsah)of people,"and Aristotleadvised

theaspiringpolitician o "improve ourself oryourownsake,andpeoplewill

follow you." 25

Ibn 'Arabi's acquaintance with the Secretum secretorum126brought him

into contact with a fiirstenspiegel ossessingall the ingredientsnecessary o

fascinatemedievalman. TheSecretummixedrealpolitikwithscience,supersti-tion, and magic. It also elaboratedon the theme of man as a microcosm,which embodied a way of looking at the world that was considereda

characteristic art of philosophyand firmlybelievedin by Ibn 'Arabi. In

additionto the Secretum,works on politicalutopias mayalso havecontribu-

ted to his imaginative econstruction f the "trueearth(ardal-haqTqah),"n

enormous dealland with a fantasticadministrativeetupandlocatedbetween

the earth and Paradisebut superior ven to the latter.127

An importantdistinctionof a political-philosophicalharacterconstantly

made by Ibn 'Arabi is the one between the divinereligious aw on the onehand, and what he calls "wisdompolitics(siydsahhikmTyah)"nd "wisdom

laws (nawdmlshikmlyah)"on the other. In his view, the laws of good

governmentwere provided by God in two forms: "One of them, called

wisdompolitics,is implantedby nature n the soulsof greatmen,who then

122 Fut., III, 22, 11.12f. (ch. 305).123 Fut., II, 84, 1. 11 (ch. 73, su'al 65).124

Fut., IV, 551, 11.8-10.125 Muhadaratal-abrar, II, 320 (in the edition Cairo 1282). The sayings of the Muhadarah

reappearin Fut., IV, 540,11.16ff., together with other sayings on politics, but without attributions,see above, n. 72.

126 See above, p. 19.127 Fut. Y, II, 257ff. (ch. 8).

25



Franz Rosenthal

established norms and laid down laws by means of a (special) power theyfound in their souls. (They provided them for) each city, location, and clime

according to the requirements of the temper of each region and their (!)natures, because of their knowledge of the gift given by wisdom. Property,

lives, families, relations (arhdm), and pedigrees were thus preserved intact.

They called them nawdmfs. The word means "reasons for the good," because

in customary technical usage, an-ndmiuss what brings the good, while al-jdsus

"spy" is employed for evil.'28 These are the wisdom laws set down by

intelligent individuals ('uqala') under divine inspiration (ilhdm),of which theywere not conscious, for the purpose (of establishing and preserving) well-

being, order, and a cohesive structure (irtibdt) in places where people had no

revealed (munazzal) religious law (shar'). Moreover, these lawgivers had no

knowledge of the fact that those matters are something that brings (them and

other human beings) near to God. They do not lead to Paradise or Hell nor

anything else concerned with the other world. They did not know that there

was another world and a sensible (mahsus)resurrection after death in natural

bodies... Therefore, their laws (nawamTs)and rules for the public interest

(masalih) were based upon a perpetuation of well-being (salah) in this

world..." Those men then proceeded to speculate about God and the soul,

until a messenger arose among them with a divine revelation concerning allthose matters.'29

Secular laws based upon philosophical speculation continued to exist, but

for Ibn 'Arab1, they were surpassed and superseded by the divine law. In

contrast to the religious law of the prophets which is proven to come from

God, the conventional law (an-ndmuisal-wad'T)required by wisdom has no

such proof. The Exalted Truth takes it from His name(s) al-bdtinal-haklm130

and places it into the hearts of the sages of the moment (hukamd'al-waqt)131

without their being conscious of it. They add that thrust (?) to their specula-

tion, not knowing that it is from God specifically ('aid t-ta yTn),but they seethat the basic principle is from God; so they establish it as law for their

contemporary followers, since they had a prophet whose prophethood was

proven. If they execute on their part the norms of that law (ndmus)and do not

transgress but observe it, God rewards them according to their dealings with

Him in this world and the other world, as does the established religious law...

God declares the words of the giver of the wisdom law (ndmus hikmT) o be

128 Cf. Majd-ad-dinIbn al-Athir, an-Nihayah igharlb al-hadith,I, 191; IV, 188 (Cairo 1322),

quoted in Listn al- 'Arab,VIII, 130(Bulaq 1300-8);Ibn Sayyid-an-nas, 'Uyunal-athar,I, 90 (Cairo

1356).129 Fut. Y, V, 97ff. (ch. 66).130 Al-bdtin here refers to one of the names of God.131 Of divine llumination.

26




true, as He declares the giver of the religious legal law (ndmusshar'l hukmT).As to his reward in this world, there is no doubt about it. It is no secret that it

serves the (continued) existence of the public interest with regards to family,property, and goods (?).132 The same is the case as regards the other world,even if the person in charge of (sahib) the wisdom law does not concern

himself with it, as is the case with the law (ndmus)of the divine order (al-hukm

al-ildhi). In the other world, we have 'what no eye has seen and no ear has

heard nor has it occurred to any human being,' 133 and it comes to us with no

previous knowledge of it. The same results in the other world for the activityof the law (ndmus)required by wisdom for the one who originated it for the

sake of the public interest (maslahah) ..."134

Politics as a branch of philosophy was thus recognized by Ibn 'Arabi as avalid concern. What is more, he tolerated the study of it. Being a product of

intellectual speculation, it was, however, naturally inferior to the divinelyrevealed religious law. While sage lawgivers saw in it a prelude to metaphysical

understanding, it fell far short of the truth, and understandably so, because

the boundaries of the human knowledge of metaphysical truth were clarifiable

only by mystical revelation.

Ibn 'Arabi subscribed to the basic data of the scientific knowledge of

mathematics and medicine which were thegeneral property

of the educated of

his time. Infrequently as he cites such data, he shows originality only in

applying them to his metaphysical preconceptions, at times in a somewhat

bizarre manner. His views on physics also depended on scientific assumptions

developed on the basis of ancient philosophy. Specific attributions by name to

scholars or the sages are again infrequent, nor are the statements reported as

starting points for his discussion anything more than vague paraphrases.Numbers speculation, it may be added, is called Pythagorean, as usual.'35

He refers to some medical opinions. Thus he mentions in passing the

efficaciousness of drugs native to the patient's own country,'36 and states thatit is advisable for women during intercourse to look at pictures of the greatancient sages.137

132'Arad,not 'ird"(family) honor."

133Accordingo a hadfthrelatedo I Cor.2:9),see A.J.Wensinck ndothers,Concordancet

Indices de la traditionmusulmane,I, 47a, 183a (Leiden 1936-69).134 Fut., II, 117, 11.25ff. (ch. 73, suil 125). Further references to ndmus hikmi (hukml?)or

wad'Tr siydsahhikmlyahccur,forinstance,n Fut.,I, 608,1.1 (= Fut.Y, IX, 132,ch. 71);II,170,11. 6f. (ch.90);II,260,1.3 (ch. 160);III, 153,11. 7ff. (ch.338);III,231,1.21 (ch.351);III,480,1. 17(ch. 373).

13S Kitdbal-Mim wa-l-wawwa-n-nin, 8 (Hyderabad 948).References y Ibn'Arabi o musicare not entirely acking,buttheyareinfrequent.

136 In the name of Hippocrates, see Muhl.darat al-abrar, II, 309-11, ch. on hubb al-watan

(Cairo1282).Cf., for instance,Abu Sulayman s-Sijistani, iwdn,ed. D.M. Dunlop,75, 11. f.(TheHague1979); d. 'Abd-ar-Rahmanadawi,209,1. 3 (Teheran1974).

137 Fut., II, 378, 11.13-15 (ch. 187).

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Franz Rosenthal

His reflections on the material cosmos start from theories about the

elements, often designated as mothers (ummahdt)and pillars (arkdn)'38-both

terms used by, among others, the Ikhwan as-safa', especially arkdn,which alsooccurs in the Secretum secretorum-, and they are pervaded by other terms

and ideas common in Muslim theological and philosophical literature. We

have already seen how Ibn 'Arab! dealt with the fifth element.'39 He appearsto have found an overarchingelement more appealing to him in the concept of

hayild "hyle, primordial matter."140 We cannot be absolutely certain whether

he was aware of the Greek provenience of hayiuld;he probably was because of

the strange form of the word and its philosophical origins. On the disputed

problem of matter and form, he stated that "the sages call (every thing that

accepts forms in its essence) hayul." l141 "The universal hayiul accepts everyform."142 It is to be equated with the substance of the "primaryhabd'," the

speck of dust which together with 'amd' "cloud" constitutes the code words

for the transitional stage between God and the material worlds in Ibn 'Arabi's

mystical terminology.'43 The "hylic substance (al-jawharal-hayuldnT),"which

includes the elements, is the inferior equivalent in nature to the "divine breath

(an-nafasal-ildhl)" that has accepted the forms of the universe.'44 Among the

beginnings (sadr) peculiar to each thing in the vast interval between God and

man, "the beginning of time (zamdn)is the time of the acceptance of form bythe hayula."14s

Time as well as space and motion have remained fundamental problems of

physics ever since Aristotle gave them a prominent place in the discussion. For

Ibn 'Arabi, "formal substance, accident, time, and place are the moth~ersof

existence." 146 He wrote extensively on time, space, and motion, and, in

particular, on time.'47 Time played a much larger role in his thought than

space.'48 He came back to time over and over again in his works. It clearly

138 See above, n. 95.139 Above, p. 20.140 Cf. L. Gardet's informative article "hayula" in El2.141 Fut., II, 432, 11.6 f. (ch. 198,fasl 14). The continuation of the statement has been discussed

above (n. 35). Cf. Rasd'il Ikhwdnas-safd', II, 4.142 Fut., III, 195,1. 26 (ch. 347). Cf., further, the schematic presentationsof hayula in Fut., III,

421 ff. (ch. 371), and Insha' ad-dawc'ir, in Nyberg, KleinereSchriften,24 f.

143 Fut., II, 647 f. (ch. 289). Cf. Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah,trans. Rosenthal, III, 88.144 Fusis al-hikam,ed. Abu l-'Ala' al-'Afifi, 144, 1. 1 (Beirut, n. y.).145 Fut., II, 652, 1.30 (ch. 291).146 Fut., III, 404, 1. 22 (ch. 369, wasl 21).147

The three monographs on time, space, and motion mentioned in Autobibliography,ed.Badawi, 125(above, n. 79), and Fihris, in RAAD, 30 (1955), 53 f. (above, n. 26), are apparentlynot

preserved. They may have covered the same ground with respect to these subjects as does the

Futuhdt.Cf. the quotations in Fut. Y, II, 320, 1. 9 (ch. 11); VII, 261, 11.8f. (ch. 69), and Yahia,

Histoire et Classification,285, 354, 530f.148

This, of course, does not count waqt as moment of divine illumination.

28




was a most basic concept for him, and his attitude toward time requires a

larger treatment than can be given to it here. Philosophical conceptions of

time intrude even into his discussion of the prayer times149 and are mentionedin connection with the pilgrimage.150The difficult notions of past, present,and future engaged him very much, especially, as we would expect, the present

moment, the now (waqt), so important in mysticism.'15 It should be under-

stood, however, that the mystical moment of illumination does not concern us

here, but it is time (zamdn) as a physical phenomenon, although the two

cannot always be separated from one another and certainly were not always

strictly kept apart in mystical thought.Ibn 'Arabi's definitions of "time" are consistent but vary slightly from case

to case. As defined by the hukamd',he says, time "is an imagined duration

segmented by the motions of the spheres (muddahmutawahhamahtaqta'uhaharakdtal-afldk)."152 Using the Aristotelian terminology of counting/numberin connection with time he speaks of "time that is numbered by the motions of

the spheres."153 The question prominently raised by Aristotle (Physics

216b31) whether time was an existent or non-existent dominates Ibn 'Arabi's

reflections. Time has no substantive existence,154but belongs to the corporeal

possibilia.155 It is a relationship, imagined to have existence but non-exis-

tent,'56or a

relationshipin the mind that has neither existence nor non-

existence.'57 One of the Futuhdt's chapters dedicated to "time" starts with

149 Fut. Y, VI, 54 (ch. 69), on w,aqtand zaman.150 Fut., I, 677, 11.11f. (ch. 72).151 Fut., I, 554,11.27 f. (= Fut. Y, VIII, 238f., ch. 70); III, 189,11.33ff. (ch. 346); III, 547 (ch.

238, on waqt).152 Fut. Y, IV, 336, 1. 2 (ch. 59), continuing with definitions by the Mutakallimun and the

"Arabs." The connection of time with the imagination does not appear in Aristotle in this manner,

but it comes up in commentaries on Physics 219b2, cf. the old glosses published by 'Abd-ar-Rahman Badawiin his edition of the Arabic translationof the Physics,423 (Cairo 1384-85/1964-65).

153 Fut., II, 4, 11. 16f. (ch. 73), cf. also II, 456 bottom (ch. 198), In the Kitab at-Tarajim, 12

(Hyderabad 1948), the argument runs as follows: "He who says that time is the motion of the

sphere (has to be countered by the observation that) there were things when there was no sphere.He who says that time is the connection between two matters by means of "when" (has to be

countered by the observation that) time has never ceased accompanying things." The Arabictranslation of Physics 223b21f. (ed. Badawi, 479) uses kurah instead of falak.

154 Fut. Y, VI, 61, 1. 10 (ch. 69); VII, 261,1. 9 (ch. 69), speaking of waqt. Time (dahr)"has no

concrete substance (ayn), but it is something intellected by the intellect," cf. Fut., II, 652, 1. 17

(ch. 291 beg.). Cf. also Fut., II, 606 (ch. 278).155

Fut., II, 55, 1.3 (ch. 73, su'aI 22).156 Fut. Y, IV, 335 (ch. 59); Fut., II, 4,1. 18 (ch. 73). Cf. also Fut., II, 458 (11.1f. (ch. 198, fasl

31).157 Fut., II, 64, 11.5 f. (ch. 316). In connection with the material existence or non-existence of

time, referencemay be also made to St. Augustine's view of time as a mental state, see R. Sorabji,Time, Creation and the Continuum,29ff. (Ithaca, New York, 1983).

29



Franz Rosenthal

verses exalting time's basic power and stressing its imaginary nature and its

lack of any perceivable material form:

If the result of time is thoroughly understood, it becomes thoroughly understandable: It isknown as the result of imaginings.

Its influence shows that its power is like nature. Substance from (nature) as well as from

it(self) is non-existent in it.

Through it, things take on substance, while itself it has no substance that would allow it todetermine it(self).

The mind is unable to perceive its forms. Therefore we say that time (dahr) is something

imagined.But for abstract immateriality(tanazzuh)God would not have named His158existence for

it. It is revered in the heart.

If you are fair, (you will recognize that) its origin is from eternity. It is determined as

possessing the character of eternity (azalT).Like the void, it is an extension without limit (on either side) in something incorporeal

provided with corporeality through imagining.'59

In the Sufi spirit, Ibn 'Arabi succinctly describes time as "the ruler(sultan),"

adopting, it seems, an old saying without explaining it.l60 The knowledge of

time ('ilm az-zaman) also belongs to the highest type of inspired knowledge

(al-ma'arif al-mawhufbah)or the spirituality of night and day.161 Time, he

contends, is comparable to eternity (azal) in that it is imaginary and has no

existence, just as eternity is a negative description (wasf salbl) and has no

existence.161a ime, he states further, "is for what is created (muhdath)whateternity (azal) is for what is uncreated (qadTm)."62 Time thus is inseparablefrom metaphysics,'62and in the view of Ibn 'Arabi, this applies also to all the

basic data of physics, since there is no definite boundary between the material

world and the metaphysical structure.

The views on metaphysical questions ascribed expressly to the philosophers

by Ibn 'Arabi are of special interest in our context, since it is here that his

attitude toward philosophy most closely interlocks with his mysticism. Direct

attributions are again rare and held intentionally vague. Expressing his

158Hardly "its," but God as dahr.See F. Rosenthal, "Sweeter than Hope," 10 (Leiden 1983).

159 Fut. Y, IV, 330f.160 Istilah as-Sufiyah, 9 (Hyderabad 1948). For the secular meaning of the remark,which sees

the ruler as the determining influence on conditions (cf. F. Rosenthal, "Sweeterthan Hope," 41),see Ibn Qutaybah, 'Uyiun l-akhbdr,I, 5 (reprintCairo 1963-64):"When Ziyad (b. Ablhi) heard aman slander the time(s), he said: "If he knew what time (az-zamdn) s, I would have punished him.Time is the sultan."'

161 Kitab al-Isfdr, 32, 1. 6 (Hyderabad 1948).161a Fut.Y, VI,61, 1.10(ch. 69).162

Fut., II, 4, 1. 19 (ch. 73). For Ibn 'Arabi's understandingof azal in relation to time, cf.,further, his Kitab al-Azal (Hyderabad 1948).

162a S. Pines points out that Abiu -Barakat al-Baghdadi deals with place in connection with

physics, but with time (to which most of Pines' investigation is devoted) only in connection with

metaphysics, see his Nouvelles Etudes sur Awhad al-zamdn Abu-l-Barakdtal-Baghdadi, 21 (Paris1955).

30




disagreementwith an interpretationf time andspace,he refers o a statement

of al-hakTm:FromtheOne(al-wihid)comesforthonlyone (wahid)."63This

is supposedlydirectedagainstAristotelianism;t may have something o dowith Ibn Rushd's commentson the oneness of the given mattermade in

connectionwithMetaphysics1016b3-5.'64bn'Arab!no doubtvaguelyhad in

mind the unendingdiscussionof the question f, and how, multiplicity ould

result from"the one."

A pointof agreementwas theexistenceof God to whichmostphilosophersand thinkerssubscribed. t was consideredgenerallypermissibleo raise the

questionof theexistence hal)of God, butit wasconsideredmpropernot only

by the philosopher-sages165ut also by "thegroup"to raisethe questionof

His what,how, andwhy."Thegroup(at-ta'ifah)" ppears o referhere to theMuslimtheologians.66

Thephilosophers reusuallymentionedwhereIbn'Arabiwishesto register

disapprovalof theirviews. This is the case wherehe states that al-faylasufdeniesdivineknowledgeof theparticularsn thesensibleworld.'67Becauseoftheirmental imitations,philosopherand Mu'tazilitealikedeny any visionof

God,168and the philosophersare also deniers of (divine) actions.169A

tentative,and immediately etracted, elationships establishedby Ibn 'Arabibetweenhis viewof the

imaginednature

(mutakhayyal)f the entiresensible

world and the general outlook of the Sophists (as-Sufista'l'ah). In the context

of his interpretationf Qur'an8:17, he maintains hatneither hephilosopher(al-faylasuf) nor those who use rational proofs (adillat al-'uqul) believe that,nor do peoplewho clingto externaldata(ashabaz-.zhir)."Onlythe Sophistscome close to thisintuitivensight mashhad).However," bn 'Arabiconcludes,"the distinctionbetween us and them is that they say that all that has no

163 Fut. Y, IV, 155, 1. 10 (ch. 47); Fut., II, 458, 11.19f. (ch. 198,./asI 31). The reference to al-

hakrmoccurs only in the second passage. In citing the first passage, M. Asin Palacios commentsthat the reference is to the Muslim Aristotelians preferringthis view to that of the Neoplatonists of

Alexandria, see his "Mohidin," in Homenaje (above, n. 21), II, 231, n. 1. Cf. also E. Meyer. in

Oriens, 27-28 (1981), 247, n. 42. Professors Richard Frank and Dominic O'Meara refer me as a

possible parallel to arithmetic theories of the unit remaining unchangeable, as expressed byJamblich, Theologoumnenarithmeticae,ed. de Falco, pp. 1 f.

164 Cf. M. Bouyges' edition of Ibn Rushd's Commentaryon the Metaphysics, II, 540, 1. 17

(Beirut 1938-52).165 See above, n. 56.166 Fut. Y, III, 218f. (ch. 28). According to Fur., III, 12, 11.29-32 (ch. 302), agreement also

existed between the sages and a group of "our colleagues" who mairntained hat the spirits were

permanently affected by their connection with the bodies as water might be in tainted vessels.167 Fut., III, 536, 11.16f. (ch. 387).168 Fut., III, 401,1. 20 (ch. 369, wtasl 20): III, 465, 1. 1 (ch. 374). The mental limitations of the

sages also lead to failure with respect to the problem of the divine attributes, cf. Ftt.. III, 495.11.28ff. (ch. 379).

169 Fut. Y, II, 389, 1. 17 (ch. 16).

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Franz Rosenthal

reality (haqTqah).'70We do not say that. We say that it is reality, thus

disagreeing with all the groups but agreeing with God and His Messenger by

virtue of intuitive insight given us by Him."17

Prophecy obviously exists, but it is naturally something that philosophers

do not understand. Ibn 'Arabi therefore feels compelled to exhort his readers

to "leave aside the rules (ahkdm)of philosophical books."172 In this context,

he contrasts the philosophers with the Ash'arites, as he does again in verses

which express his own understanding of the reason why the ultimate goal of

any true human endeavor, the knowledge of God, cannot be reached through

philosophical thought. Indeed, he concludes that the famous Qur'anic word

ummr"illiterate"applied to the Prophet indicates the absence and superfluous-

ness of thinking:The knowledge through 173 God provides ornate embellishment.

The knowledge through thinking leads to doubt (tashbTh) nd error.

The knowledge through thinking is summary generalization and mistakes.

The knowledge through God is verification and specification.174

The knowledge through thinking is abstract labels (a'ladn).

The knowledge through God provides states and saintliness (?).175

Don't be led astray by specious statements!

For what they prove is ignorance and diversion/causalization (ta'l7).176

The philosopher holds that God can be denied throughThe result of his causality. That is atheism.'77

170 The common description of the Sophists speaks of them as "those who declare the realities

(pl.) false (yubtilunal-haqd'iq),"cf., for instance, Ibn Hazm, al-Fisalfil-milal, I, 8 (Cairo 1317-21);

al-Batalyawsi, Sharh, I, 220 f. (above, n. 92). The formulation was no doubt familiarto Ibn 'Arabi.

With his customary independence, he changed it slightly.171 Fut., III, 525, 11.26-29 (ch. 384).172 Fut., II, 595, 1. 32 (ch. 276). The referenceto "books" is not gratuitous. Ibn 'Arabi claims

that his knowledge is based on revelations (tajalliyat) and does not derive from books, see, for

instance, Kitdbal-Masa'il, 6 bottom (Hyderabad 1948). He faults scholars concerned with the

material world ('ulama'ar-rusum) or habitually deriving their knowledge "from books and orallyfrom men of their own kind," cf. Fut. Y, IV, 267, 11.9 f. (ch. 54).

173 The preposition bi- in this connection would ordinarilyyield the meaning of "knowledge of

God," but the context shows that it must be translated as "by means of, (obtained) through."

Words conveying a double meaning by making them mean something they would not normally

mean abound in these verses.174 Cf. Fut., III, 456, 1. 7 (ch. 373) [see above, n. 58]: "(The philosophers) do not know

specification in generalization (at-tafsll fi l-ijml)." See also above, p. 11. The gnosis of God,

however, is generalized (ijmdlTyah) nd allows of no specification, cf. Dhakha'iral-a'laq, 174.

175 TahwTl-tabdTlormally means "change and alteration," but the deviation from normal

usage, as indicated in the translation, appears to be intended.

176 Diversion/entertainment and causal explanation would be the normal meaningsof

ta7Tl,but, as the following verse shows, Ibn 'Arab!wants it to refer to his view of divine causality. Note

his playing with the double meaning of 'illahas disease and cause in his chapter on 'illah n Fut., II,

490ff. (ch. 297).177 God cannot be conceived as cause, as is done by the philosophers, since this would in

realitymean a denial of God. A better translation might be "through assuminghim to be a cause."

32




Al-Ash'ari holds (that God is) a multiple concrete substance.

That is knowledge, but it involves anthropomorphism (tamthl1).178

It would be possible to go on and investigate everything Ibn 'Arabi sayspage by page, line by line, and find that there always is a close connection with

ideas "philosophical" in origin. This is so even if nothing is said about

philosophy, wisdom, or thinking and even where philosophy, wisdom, and

thinking appear to be rejected explicitly or implicitly through competingnotions that are contradictory to them. Philosophy, whether in the Muslim or

the classical meaning of the term, constitutes the frame of reference for Ibn

'Arabi's view of the world. The religious and historical traditions of Islam, its

religious law and jurisprudence were untouchables but they had to be fitted

into that frame-rather, the frame had to be cut to fit them. A constant

problem for us, and for Ibn 'Arabi himself, had he been worried about it, is

separating philosophy as such from philosophy embedded in Kalam. In fact,this cannot be done. An exceptional example is provided by that constantly

repeated theme song of the Futuhdtas well as Ibn 'Arabi's works and thoughtin general: "He who recognizes his soul/himself recognizes his Lord." Ibn

'Arab! cites the statement in its basic form and in quite a few minor variations.

C.A. Nallino was of the opinion that it was impossible to ascertain its

provenience in the thought of Ibn 'Arabi. It could have come from Neoplato-nism or reached Islam through patristic writings.179 In this case, it can be

stated unequivocally that the Church Fathers were responsible for the coiningand the ultimate spread of the statement in its Islamic form familiar to Ibn

'Arabi.180Usually, we cannot be so sure.

A comprehensive assessment of Ibn 'Arabi's scintillating personality and

thought seems almost impossible. On the basis of the facts assembled in this

paper, a few general remarkssuggest themselves. Although we have very little

God is neithercause nor caused but the creator of the causes (Fut. Y, II, 223, 11. f. [ch. 6]) and thecause (!) of the existence of the world (Fut. Y, IV, 171, 1. 7 [ch. 48]). The theologians may speak of

God as the Cause of causes (Fut., III, 212, 1. 2 [ch. 350]). However, essentially He does not accept

'illTyah,cf. Fut. Y, I, 195; Kitab at-Tajalliydt, 31, also Risalah adyu'awwal ilayh, 13, 1. 1.

(Hyderabad 1948). Fusus,220 (above, n. 144), refers to ashdbal-'illah who make the Truth a causefor the existence of the world. If it is this passage to which T. Izutsu refers, his slightly disparagingremarks about "the philosophers who blindly follow Greek philosophy" do not reflect Ibn

'Arabi's expressed view, see Izutsu, A ComparativeStudy of the Key Philosophical Concepts in

Sufism and Taoism, I, 195 (Minatoku, Tokyo 1966). Cf. also M. Schreiner, (above, n. 70), 525;GesammelteSchriften,426, or A.E. Affifi, TheMystical Philosophyof MuhyidDin-Ibnul'Arabi,27f.

178 Fut., II, 644 (ch. 289 beg.).179

C.A. Nallino, Raccolta dei scritti, II, 339 f. (Rome 1940).180 Cf. F. Rosenthal, "On the knowledge of Plato's philosophy in the Islamic world," inIslamic Culture,15 (1941), 397 [addendumto Islamic Culture,14 (1940), 410, n. 4]. A. Altmann, inhis comprehensive study of "The Delphic maxim in Medieval Islam and Judaism," does not

specifically deal with Ibn 'Arabi, see Altmann (ed.), Biblical and Other Studies, 196-232 (Cam-bridge, Mass., 1963).

33



Franz Rosenthal

in the formof evidence o go on, hemayverywellhave readtheworks abeled

"philosophical"n hisenvironment.1 Hecertainlywasacquaintedwith some

of the worksof thespeculative heologians.

He mentionstheir namesrather

frequently,f only a selected ewamongthem,but he is also as hesitant o be

specificwhen he refers to their works,as he is in the case of the philoso-

phers.182What is moreimportant,he wasacquaintedwith all the philosophi-cal thoughtand ways of lookingat the world that had merged nto Muslim

civilization.If he used a bit of everythinghaphazardly,t was not mindless

eclecticism n hispartbut the naturalwayto proceed or a thinker teeped n

the vastculture hatwas his heritage.Next to nothingis known about Ibn 'Arabi'searly development. t seems

likely that he early on acquiredhis mysticalconvictionthat directdivine"revelation,"with whateverArabic termhe mightcall it, was available o a

chosenfew. Throughsuch"revelation," ndnothingelse,manmightbe able

to gain the only worthwhileknowledge,consistingof metaphysicalnsightsand preferably tyled the knowledgeof God. Ibn 'Arabi becamemore and

more convincedthat he was the chosen recipientof such revelationwhich

helpedhim to collectand set down his thoughts.183His way of communica-

ting his insightsto those in this world-which was full of the ignorantand

non-comprehending184-wasree

flowingmeditation. t centered, n the first

place, on words and phrasesof the Qur'an. Then it took for its texts

commonly accepted terms and propositionsof earliermystics and other

appealingstatementscurrent n his culturalbackground.Finally,his most

eccentricand striking procedurewas to reflecton words which he chose

because heystruckhis fancy,andto meditateon themwith a ferventntensityand constantoutpouringof surprising erbalassociationswhich continue to

astonishand impresseven today'sreader.He nevercompromised,however,withrespect o his basicbeliefs.Apartfromthismysticandlargelyunsystema-

tic bend, he saw the metaphysicalworld in terms that were ultimatelyphilosophical.The greatproblemsof time, space,and motionoccupiedhim

constantly.Themetaphysicalworldwas to be seen andunderstood s philoso-

phy saw and understood he physicalworld-only he wouldhave put it the

other way round. The true order of the world resulted from assigning

everythingts properstation.That was"wisdom,"mysticalanddivineas well

as philosophical,withultimatelyno distinctionbetween he two.185Mystical

181 Seeabove,pp. 19ff.

182 Note, in particular,bn'ArabY'sncidental bservationn Fut.III, 398,11.10f. (ch. 369,wasl18) hatresponsibilityorsome nformationscribedo al-Baqillaniestsuponthetransmitter

(wa-l-'uhdah 'all an-ndqil).183 An example,amongothers,may be foundin Mawdqi' n-nujim. n the absenceof the

printed ext,I usedthemodemmanuscriptYale ar.480,p. 76.184 P. 29 of the mentionedmanuscriptf Mawdqi'an-nujim.Seealsoabove,nn. 38 and 60.185 See above, p. 13.

34




revelationwas thus logically transformed nto a long series of "sciences

('ulum),'186 mysticalpropositionson the one hand, and philosophicaland

epistemologicalproblemson the other. This breakupof knowledgeinto

innumerable ndividualpieces, incidentally,constituted a victory for the

ancientaphoristicalwayof thinkingover the systematicmethodof expositioninherentn "philosophy."bn'Arabiexhibitsa palpablehesitationwithregardto decidingwhether"knowledge 'ilm)"or "gnosis (ma'rifah)" nd "wisdom

(hikmah)"was moreimportant n the schemeof things.In spiteof protesta-tions to thecontraryon his part,the balancealwaysappears o be in favor of

"knowledge."This marks the final stage of a mysticismwhich, in order to

surviventhesurroundingntellectuallimate,hadbecomewedded o philosophy.

By the timeof Ibn 'Arabi,thatprocess,which had startedearlyin Islamichistory, had been completed.Ibn 'Arabi'sgreat immediatemodel was al-

GhazzalT. s is clearfrom the overallplanof theFutuhatwhichstartsout with

a thoroughdiscussionof the meaningof the principalMuslim ritualobliga-tions, he aspiredto replacingal-Ghazzal's revival of Islam with his own

renewal of it in a purer,mystical language.187More determined han al-

GhazzalT o accord absolute preeminence o a monomaniacmysticismto

whicheverythinghad to be subordinated, e succeededn becoming he hero

of an extremistmysticismnever really to be surpassedin its kind and

effectiveness.Al-GhazzalT emainedthe guiding light of a more moderatecenter. This madehim eventuallya morepowerfuland influentialhistorical

force.

Even more than othermysticsand intellectuals, bn 'Arabishowedhimself

fond of the combinationof contraries or thepurposeof drawingattention o

his ideas. Knowledgeis at the same time ignorance,188being might be

conceived as non-being,189 ight guidanceimpliesboth bringingnear and

keepingaway,190reedom s slavery,191t would seem to be fair to describe

him in this manner.Theattemptmadehereto let hisown statements peakforthemselves and to see him as he might have seen himself leads to his

characterizations bothbroadminded ndintolerant,bothliberaland conser-

vative, both extremely earnedand narrowlyfocused, both extraordinarily

originalandtotallytraditional,both a thinkerandbeyondthinking-in short,both a philosopherand a mystic.

186 Cf., in particular, the long lists of such 'ulum at the end of chapters in the Futuhat,

beginning with ch. 293.187 See also above, n. 17.188 For instance, Fut., I, 728, 11.18f. (ch. 72).189

Fut., III, 362 (ch. 369).190

35

rosenthal on ibn al-arabi

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