risse. governance without a state

7/21/2019 Risse. Governance Without a State

1/64

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Urv;vl ,.:,iJ

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~ - - - - - - -

1

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1

Governance in Areas of Limited Stateboocl

Introduction nd OJ crPin 1

T -IO.MAS

RISSE

I

N T H E T W E N T Y - F I R S T C E N T U R Y IT

IS

BECOivl lNG

increasingly clear that conventional modes of political steering; by

nation-states ;u1d i n t : c r n a t i o n ~ l regulations are not effectively dealing

with global chaLlenges such as environmental problems, humanitarian

catastrophes, and new security tl1reats.

1

This is one of the reasons governance

h:ts become such a central topic of research within the social sciences,

focusing in particular on nonstate actors

that

parricipatc in rule ndcing

and implementation. There is wide agreement

thctt:

governance is supp('Sccl

to achieve certain st


2/64

l ~ l u b a l norms and rules. Even t he discourse on failed, h i l i n ~ , and flagile sL1Lcs

: c ~ : ~ s s ~ ~ t < :

b t l j l d i

; : ; ~ ; - ; - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i ) f(Jr c s ~ ~ l ; i i s ; i J ~ g ~ ~ ~ ~ : l ~ i ~ ~ g ) ( J ~

litical and socd order

(sec, e.g.,

R o t b e r ~

200 i ;

Rothcrv

200+ Schncdcncr

--- --

- - - - -- -- -


3/64

,Ji \''' ' '

U.

I

_ r < : . < . . l ( c l c ~ S t ~ ~ t e h c : : c c \ = {j i.Utl...\. bt) 1 \A. s - - f . t : ~ . . . ~ - t J.S l i ~

.

. 'Ovnvicw t o

ex:.err vv,o,.,o\ l.ol - 1

GU t \Th

;J

:

if

the modern , developed , and sovereign nati oll

SLlte turns om ro be a hi sto rical excep ti on in the context

of

this diversity'

of

:trC.lS

of limited sr;He

hood

? b-en in

Europe

, rhc

birthpla

ce or mo dern state-

12om, nation-states were o1Jy able to ful f)l establish the monopol y over

the

nor

c { W C'-(j \

but

1

o

l'c j

.

..

I

JJ SC

of

force in the nineteenth century

(Reinhard

2007)._And the gloh:lli,,ation , , r.

C'-

'-c r c ? I

ll cc rr.t

1


5/64

Cc._l\, ~ ' d

fr

;vl t

en

. (:.,..,

\:i

o11

C;1

ll l

t E i i iJl

X lntrodll c

ti

on

J H.t

Overview

of sovere i

gn

statehood

as

the dominant featu re of.tl1e contemporary interna

t i o ; ~ ~ ; ; : ; i ~ ~ ~ ] ) ; - r o o k -

pl-a-ce_i

_

tl

1_c_I_9-:6-o-s,-a-s_

_l

_

s:-::ur.l,..,o,..,t""d,-e""

cotoillza:tlo i --

- y;: - I d

today,

;;,-a

n imer;1ational community

of

tates,

is

largely based

on

the

fiction that it is populated

by uUy

consolidated state

s.

Internat_onal

- - -

embodies

th

e idea of sovereign nation-state

s,

which the international com-

1 1 1 ~ ; ; ; ~ ; ; ~ ; ~ f ~ ~ c ~ i o n i n g s ~ a ~ ~ s t i ~ ~ ~ ' ~ ~ f f e c t i v ~ ~ u c l ~ ; J

(-

Jver

rhC rtcmt0;: es

ec

c h ~ i ; P C L ; d ~ v i g ~ ~ d R t ; d o l

The

~ n a J j , r o h i b on intcr\'cning

iu

the

interna

l affairs of sovcrc1gn

st:ltcs assumeS' hat

rh

c;e sta t

es

~ a v e tl1e full ~ p a c i t y to conduct l 1 ~ r

own

do

-:.

mc;;tic a f f a ~ Ironically, many developin g countries where limited statehood

~ ~ ~ i t

p a r t ~ daily

ex

per ience of he citizens firmly

in

sist on their full

rights as

sove

reign states and arc

ad

amantly opposed to any intervention in

tTicD-T;;tt;:

nal

affairs. Moreover,

~ ? 2 : < : t h _ : J _ c _ g _ ' : 0 ~ ~ < : : '

5 ~ f ~ r ~ ~ J 5 L

~

have

increasingly embedded stat

es

in a net ofkg ll ann

llows

cl osely t he

under

standi ng of governance that

is

widesp

re

ad within the social

sc

iences

(e.g., Mayntz

2004-,

20o8; Kohler

-K

och 998; Benz 200

4-a;

Sclmppert 20

0 5;

Schupp ert and Zi.irn 2008). Gove rn ance consists of both structu ral (" in st: i

tlltiona

li

ze

cl

")

an

d process dim ensions ("modes

of

social coo rdina

ti

on").

Accordingl

y,

governance covers steering by the state ("governance

_l1y g l , _

n r r

G ovPj

.

(\

1 Y ' ~

n

r

0

-

-


6/64

I ( 1

l l

\

I

~ 1 t

I

ll

i

\

1

\ . .

'

ll n

,J

JlcJl7, 2oo+a; Czcmpicl and Rosenau

1992;

Cr,tndc and Pauly 2005; Z L'trn

Covcrn;liKC is supposed to provide colkcrivcly binding rules

as

well

as collective goods.

5

The

modern (VVestcrn) nation-state, thus, constitutes a governance struc

wrc. First,

it

provides a strucrure of

rul

e

and

authority, a system

of

political

and social institutions

ro

generate and to irnplcmelll' aurhoril'ative political

decisions. Today, democracy and the rule of law belong to the general ly ac

cepted norms of these institutions for atlthorirativc rule making. Second, the

We

ste

rn

nation-state h

as

the

task

to protect the internal

ami

c.xr

c

rml

scetl

rity of its c i t i ~ e c n s . The monopoly over the means or violence is suppose d to

d< ; just

th

~ l ; ; ; t i ~ ~ ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ~ 1 ;;;x;. .

['his chang;cs profoundly under c < : : 1 9 _ ~ t ~ 1 2 ~ Y J ' J i l _ l ] . i t ~ d .. t i l l c . Gov

crn;Wcm:if

cas-of r r ; - ; ; - ; i . c ~ r ~ r ~ r ~ T requires providing these very gover- "

'

.. .v \

n,m cc

~ C I ' I ' I C C S

3 ~ 1 s e n c c of a

f u l l y

f i . ~ t : t e ' s ~ x e : - ~ t : g lc,JSt .1 St .

1

n _ 1 2 : _

~ r a r c : Wit h the ab1ltry to enforce and unplcment dcctstons. d

This impli

es

that we will have to look for lilt tCti f

1\;j;t(i'\-governancc w ok place through colonial rulers ("states'' ), transnational

''public-private" _ < : _ ~ _ ~ ~ 1 i e s (e.g., the Hudson Bay Coni'pany in N.


7/64

12 ln rrodunion ; d Ovcrvin v

(3uvcrnance also includes bargaining processes and ho

ri zo nt

al negotiation

as

we ll as nonmanipul ative communication, persuasion, and l

ea

rning. The ht

ter modes

of

gove

rn

an

ce

ai m

at ch

a

JJ

cng

in

g fixed interests and preferen ces so

. : ~ t ~ t o r arc induced 11 a soc 1ahzauon proce

ss to

mtc

rnali

ze

new rules

:111d

0

'p

(.

v

1 J i l

; - ; ;

s ~ 1 os t p ~ t h C S c c o n d p a ~ t o i ' i h i s book' Xj)lore' ti

;? '

barg.ai

,Jn

g -

;;t' . - -

f( e

0

1

.;;-esscs between Str . up in nriv:ll-c co

ff

e rs. At rhc same time, d1c militan t fslami st organization of

\... ..) J

L

Hanus prov

id

ed crucial gnvern

;l

nce services in the soc

ial

, education, :md

public health sectors vf the p,llc.st

ini

;m territo ri es. So, who go\'lTIJ

ed

P

alc

<

ti

nc at

rh

c.

tim

e? lf

wc usc the previously stared guvern;mce definition, 1

-Llm:l

s

is J

an us

-faced :

On th

e one hand, it is a.governance

Jct:o

r

pro

viding public

servic

es

in Palestine. O n th e od1cr h:md :

md

almost

ar

the same time, it is a

terrorist"

or

ga

ni

z.

arion that undermines govc

rn

a.

n

cl'

in

the scc

urit"

y realm. The

me h

eld tn1

c for the l\ilcst

ini

an Authority under Ar

af:

ll:

ft

s securit y agencies


8/64

I

I I

J 1 ntroduc tion and \ c rvi

c\

words , they transfo rm

pub li

c goo r pri vate go od

s. ln

a

different way, emergence

of

's

h;1d

ow states" .

< ro

be consi

dered

here

too (Koehler J.n

'

urCJcr

2

00

4-; J

cr 2007)

.

On the on e h

aJ1d,

formal

- State in

stitutions have ceased to exis t or

to p r o v i d ; g o v c ; ; K ~ ~ ~ ; . ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~

i l i n g

m d f a i l ~ d

starei.-

Ot; o t i ~ ~ ~

E ; ; 1 ~ i _ ,

c - " ;

. ~ - ;

g o v c ~

; ; ; ~ ~ i ; " l 0 { L U C i ~ n

l - ; ; ; g ~ _ i ~ ; ~ ; g _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ d " E : ~

I i t i c

~ _ t : ~ e r as

well

as

co

ll

ective goods ,

r e b y

p r c v c n ~ 0

the c c 2 ~ ~ . : : Y

or_

the

r e g i ~ l _ _ J : _ o ~

~ O _ _ t _ ~ ~ ~

L _ : _ ~ ~

' : s ~

imo anarch

y.

In som e cases, such as the

So

ut h

ern

Caucasus, shadow states

over extended periods of time.

These examples challenge the way in

wh

ich

the

concepts

of "state" and

"pu blic"

as

we

ll

as "non state"

and

"p ri vate" arc mo s

tl

y used

interchangeab

ly

111 the social sciences based o n

the

hi sto rical experience

of

'vVestern

moder

nity They also show the implicit

normative connot

ations

of

the dis

tinction

(sec L a d ~ g ; ; - r _ c ; c ; ? ; ~ - ; - ; - ~ h a p t

by

I ~ a c h ; , g ~ ~ ; - ; : { ~ J ; ; j ~ t ~ ~ e ).

We

l l y c l ( . P ~ c _ t s ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ c t o r s contribute to governan

ce,

~ ~ t b a t t l } c : r _

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l ~ c public rather than the private interest. At least, they are su pp os

ed

to

justit

)r

their actions with regard ro the

commo

n

good

(sec

Zi.i

rn

2005).

Whil

c:

n u k c r

might be

~ c k ~ t a t e ~ _ ' : i : > l _ ? ~ ~

-a

_ n s o J j : c b t e

stale - nu l l l J t t ~

h w

t r a t

2 : _

su }posed to

dir

ect

Lbc

i

r...

toward gove rn ance

in

the c o

mm

on

intere

s

t.

And

if the

y abuse th eir

power,

we

can throw them

oul through democrati

c procedures or, in th e

wo

rst case,

rhrollgh th e judicial sys tem . L_im iled sta tehood, however, consists o r w : k

~ i ~ c - ~ ~ J l t i t u t i c > n

l

ac

king

tJl

c

; ; ~ t r ~ i 1 1 p m v c r f t ~ g

\s

a result, it becomes pr

ob

lematic

t:o

speak

of "public''

a

cror

s

fl r

snch

c.1scs or to

assume rhat state actors

promote the

public inrercsr. As

t:o

private

1

f i E ' < : ~ _ r _ > _ ~ ' C l i ~ ~

~ ~ L _ a

: : a t e C O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ ~ j ) _ l ~ s u e their ; - ; ; ~ ; ~

11;-\o 'd' 1 ,, intcrrstLe

ve

n

if

their

i m : ~ ) _ ~ _ e s

p r ~ t c C . ' i _ j . R Q . d u . < , ; L _ j 2 Q . i ext

c:;

rnalities

f{n

c

~

,,

\:J

1

~ G \ ~ h e

m m u n i t y

{jobs, wclLHe,_\J.).

B ~ t

we

L 1 _

1 2 C

_r

[pt

aC _Q

t

:s

J . e ~ ' l ' c 0 '

w

H llll the

mnf'ines

of

the l.

1w-.md

1f

n

ot, ti

E

__

~

rake

c1 1e

...,.,

& .:,::. of

h e

m.

lS , -

.l,S

ll

lllj'

ti

on:

rh.11

conK wi th rhc " public-j

1r

iva1c" distinction arc

~ t > . , ; . .

e.

)

t "

~ - : , ' 0 ' - ' -

f

>

r gr;mtcd. The conccptu;JI prob lem ca nnot

be

solved easily-fix exa

mple,

. . : -'i-'\. < _ ~ 1 1 . :

could speak of "hybrid" regimes

gr

t o r n ~ < ; _

o f _ g c r n < ~ : : ~ ~ ~ d e r _ : l

V -

the distinction between the

public

;md private r

ea

lms

or

between s

tate

Q ' ' :>-. '

J>

:1

I J ) J I . I . I

:V \

~

\ . l s t ; l l c

actors (e.g., JC ll e e ta .

2002 .

sue

1

a

~ ~ 2 . ) S

IC e-

,o

,

__. / :

l

~ J ) S

' : : _ C r o b

l c m

to discern who provides g o v ~

r n a n

se rvices and w ho docs

-

/ ' -

G ~ w c r n ~ c

in Areas

of

Limit ed Statehood

15

1 . "

al

em

pi rica

Y.

w

10

se rves

as

a

gove

rn ance

a c t o r t ~ ~ ~ Q I : J : 2 _ < po

st-

~ ~ ~ ' : _ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ~

~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

wo

rds,

one wo

uld search

for functional equivalents

ot

public"

act:q_rs

(Draude 2007 , 2008) .

]

1

1tcntion.ality

nd

Normatil ity

of

Governance

These cons

id

er

at

ion s lead

to

a

second problem

w ith re

gar

d to

th

e

app li

cabi

l

ity

of the gove

rnance

co

n

cept

to

areas o

flimit

ed

statehood

.

The govc

rn ::mce

con

cept

as de

li

ned earlier is gea red

toward producing

a

nd implem

e

ntin

g

co l

lec ti vely binding ruJcs and pr ovid ing co llective

goo

ds. In other wo rds,

gover

nance implies

e n t i o n

actio n

toward providing

public se rvices fo r a g i

ve

n

co

mmunit

y

(Mayntz

2004-,

67 ) . Thi

s

docs

not

mean that governance

actors

have

ro

be necessarily

motivated

toward

the public interest

, even though

mo

tivation

s

toward

the common

im

ere

st

do

not hurt.

Poli

cy

-makers, fo r

example, can still

be

egoistic

power-maxim

izers. Yet, in a

conso lidated

state,

they are usually

embedded

in

governance

st ru ct

ures that

institutionalize

the

intent

iona

li

ty

of governance toward providing

services for th e c

ommunily.

6

The inher

ent

intention

a

li

ty

of gove rnan

ce b

eco me

s

problematic

when ap

plied to arcJs

of limited

state h

oo

d . Fir

st,

as

not

ed earlier,

we

can no lo n

ge

r

a

ss um

e

that

gove

rnance institutions

s

11

ch as

the

state

or

its

"s

h

adow of hi

erar

chy'' emb ody

intent

ions

toward

pro viding collective

goods. Second

,

we

need

to c isting

ui

sh b c n v e e t

- l ? E : ? ~ ~ ~ ~ : _ ~ f : . ~ c : ? . l 2 . c _ c _ : ~ . _ e _ 0 ~ - ~ - g _ C ? _ < _ ? ~ l s : ~ i _ : : ~ ~

~ _ l : ' : i ~ ? . . ~ ~ ~ : ~ C . : . 9

.

?J:

_

' t i ' : i ~ i ?.

t:

th

c one

ha

nd,

and

the

exp li

cit reg

ulation of

social i

ss

ues am

\

intentional

~ ; f c ; >

5 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ _ ; :

~ ~ L ~

; ~ ~ - ; ;

; ~ i ~

~ ; ; ; ; ; ~ i i ; i g ; ~ : ~

r c i l ; ; J ; f as

g(>\'CI :_

n

anceif we st

ick

to th

e

e a r l < : P t ~ o n .

1 " ;

i : ; ~ 1

the

~ t ~ ~

i t h

an O

il compa

nies such as

Bl'

in A n

go

la

routinel

y usc private security Jirms

to pr

o tect their

indu

st

ri

al produc

ti

on i l i t i c

in

areas

of limit

ed st

ate

h

oo

d .

This transform

s sec

urit

y

int

o a

p

ri

vate good .

Protectin

g such f

:K

ilities mig ht b

:JV

c positive extcrn : litics t


9/64

6

1n

trodu cr io n and Overvi

ew

ln other cases, we arc faced wid1 a c

ontinuum

r;mg in g fio m gover nance

in the sense defi ned here to racketeering : The wari(Jrd who uses

hi

s

mili

tias

to

provide public security the ~ r c a ?f his rule G_: n r eg _

l i c ~ C : : . < : i L i l l f l ;I_cl u b

or

private goo

d.

- ~ ~ -

~ ~ ~ -

~ ~ d

be k c : : : c ~ : :

(Ch

ojnacki

and

7

00 7

; Schuppcrt 2007, 479 ; sec the a 1apt

cr

by Chojnacki and Br,m

ov

ic in this

vo

lume

).

Thus, J

P l?

lyjng g ~ ~ : < : I : ' ~ ~ c _ c : __ ~ _ ' : 2 ~ ~ _ p _

~ 9 . . e a ~ _ o

l i n 1 i state

ho

od

hig

hl

ights its implicit nornl J ti vit)' 1 we de

fi ne governance -a s is comm on in tJ1c soc ial s

ci

ences - as

tJ1c

making and

implementing of co

ll

ectively binding rules aJll'l the provision

of

collective

go ods,

we

cannot re

fr

ain

fr

om aclmow lcdging tha t go

ve

rnance is linked n or

~ n r i v c l toward what is supposed to be in the co

mmon

interest.

But

w ho a rc

those in areas of limited state

hood

in wh ose nam e the co

mmon

interest is

be

in

g What is th e rcle

va

llt co

mmuni

ty

or

collectivity fo r wh om

go vernance is provided ? Once issues : : ~ ~ ? E . ~ < : .

ideal typical modern s_ate }l2

mo

st cases, governance is provided fo r

th e people or the cidz,cns living in a g iven te rritory. \Vhile som e services a rc

only acc

essi ble to

the citizens rather

tJ1an

the reside

nt

s, even

no n

citizen r

es

i

dents enjoy

so me

basic rig

ht

s as well as access

to

at least som e public services.

All thi s b

eco

mes problemati c in areas of limited stateho od ..lnma l})' cases,

it rema

in

s uncle

ar

who arc

th

e

addr

essees of governance, wh o is e ntitled to

whi ch govern ance services, and who ac nta

Jl

y receives them in pract ice. \Ve

cannot simply a

ss

ume that the co

ll

ectivity fo r w

hi

ch governance is

pro

vid ed

is c

learl

y defin

ed

. Take border regions in sub

-S

aharan AJi-ica, fo r cxa1nplc,

dl at ar

c b

ey

ond the control of ce

nt r

al

governm

ents. Arc

tJ

10sc enti tled

to

r

ece

iving go

vern

ance t he people living o n a given territory? Or me

mb

ers of

parricular t

ribal

or ethnic communi t i

es? And who

decid es w ho is CIJtirlcd

to

wh;Jt,

u l a r l

in cases of extr emely scarce resources( Is ir govern ance iC

coll

cc l'ivc

goods become club goods in the sense tl1at only p articular ethnic,

re

li

gious, or

gc

ndcrcd communiti es arc entitled to n:ccivc them >Th e latter

co

nstit'LIITS pr

ac

t

ice

in man y : - ~ r c of limited statehoo d , bo th hi s

tmically and in

th

e contempo rary internati onal system.

T

hu

s, ~ . ' _ l _ . c ~ -

~ ) - ~ ~ ~ ~ :

~ c t t requires taking a

: _ I _ ~ ~ ; J ~ I r a i n i 2 2 _

1 ; 2 j r l i l l g ' ' ~ ~ p _ t u a l

so

-

Gover

nance

in

reas of Limited Stateh

ood 7

lu

tions. 01: _J_

c

_o

nch

a;K , if < ~ K e _s r b l ~

__

::i t1

_

c : : n g

~ oricmati o n tc?:vard the co

mmon

goo d or

the

public n t c i we

,;,ill -not-

fi

;1d much governance in areas of limited stateh

oo

d by definition

(on .t11 is po in t, sec Schu ppcrt 2007 ) . travel

very far outsid e rhc developed OEC D world . On th e o ther hand , if we strip

~ - ~ ( ) ) ; c q ) t

f

govc rn ,1i1cc'o f:{l r t ; J co

nnotati

o ns, ~ ; ; ; : y r h i - ; ; -

of

co

ll

ec

ti ve

goods b

as

IH

J

nmti

ve

we

ig

ht

equal to thcp rovision of pu b lic

goo

ds.

--I so mething in ' : _ C _: way ou t :

w ~ t : _

~ c r govc:r -

_ a ~ ~ ' O t h a \ ? I ~ c s s Y i ~ - ; ~ ~ ~ i t

~ ~ ~ n

& v _ c J )

~ l ~ ~ c g c l o : c : ~ ~ fo rmulat

ed

,_J1e _n)o re _CJ7J.anre and the as

ha

dow rf' ff

eut J

fvt

Cc

:, . : I : I

\

third problem with regard to the application o f the govcman cc concept

.---

to areas of limit ed statehood co ncerns what has been called the shad

ow

of

hie rarchy

(S

charpf 19Y3) - Research

on

modes o f govc

ma n

ce in

d1

e

OE C

D

world ;l l l d on the

tr

ansfo rmation

of

(modern ) statehood h

as

demo n

st

rated

7

:::

l r

~ ; ; r; ,

[o . Uue

r

-

S t ,t

1 }1r;o-:.J

. .tt

n

f

,. / ; ) 11 .;

(.

.

.

- / ' :

" } / ~

(;

f (

J f

v

J , - . __ :'


10/64

rl

]

X I

n roduct ion < d

Overview

u

i/

'\' .

0 ,\..

\

) ,y 0- ''

~ \ J . j . \ , ~

r > ' - ~

i .

l }

rhat public-private cooperation (such as PPPs) and private sclfrcgulation arc

usuall y

Jl1-rissu-C:l1--asi- f1c-Eu i:O

-pC:-U1-

Union. Moreover-and pa radoxi-

~ \: - ),

carrv=-

strong

stafcs- o '"stf n s i b ~ _ i l (C5R).

/ l

- -In u m , ."his overview suggests that there arc so me implicit biases in

the

govcrn:1ncc

concept

as it has been

developed

in the

cont

ext ofvVcsten1-b3scd

social sciences

and

modern statehood. However,

one

should not throw out

tl1c

baby

with the

bathwatcr. Th e gov

ernance

concept provides J usdi.d tool

to ana

lyze policies

and

politics in areas

of

limited

statehoo

d,

pr

ecisely be-

~ \ ) 1 ' 6 "

0 \ \

cause

it

directs

our attention to the

role

of

nons ate actors, on

the

one

hand

, ""

1

l ~ ( / \ . ;

and nonhierarcbical mo des of stee

ring,

on the o t h e r . ~ a result,

governance

cJ...LV

overcomes

d1c statc-ccnr

ri

c bias

implicit

in the

literatur

e on Llilcd and Jail -

\

\ St.ltc

butldm

g

Jll

ateJs ofltm Jtcd

statehood 1111ghr

be futile,

hut "govc

Jn.mcc-

ing stJt-cs as

we

ll as d1c modcrniz;uion bias of most develop ment studies.

b ~ . . , ~ ~

\ J A ~ ~

I ,

v\"

1

\

~ ~ '

" - ' ~ )

( ' ' ~ "

._,Jr> (\

/ '

\

\

shaping" ccn

::tinJy is not, :1s Bro;,us

argues

in his chapter.

\


11/64

2 0

troduction

; ~ n d

Overview

I now turn

to

the co ntriburions

in

this book

in

more detail to explore the

wlc of nonstat:c actors in the provision of governance, on the one hand, and

the con triburion of rhc international communi ty

to

governan

ce

in areas

of

lim

ir

ed statehood,

on

rhc other.

Who

Governs

in Areas of

Limited S

tateho

o

d?

Th e Role of Nomtatc

Act

ors

As arpucd ea

rli

er, areas of limi

ted

statehood arc not devoid

of

governance.

- - - -

-

... --

-- ... -....... - .. _ .. . -

R.at"h cr, nonhicrarchical mod

es of

social interaction and nonstate actors en-

gagccT

in - ; ; ; ~ ; ; ; ; ~ ~ ~ ~ d : rhc

p r e r ..

~ ; i s vo lume. t . i e m ~

t m e .

In stitutional sta

te

weakness implies that public-private partnerships

or

even

~ ~ ~ < > } ~ i t : U t o J : ; i ~ s

of

gpve

rn

ancc. arc becoming the rule rather than the

~ ~ ~ ~ i o n , if governance services ar

c.

supplied at aU. While public-1)rivate

.

---

----

-- ..

--- -- - --

-- "

. .

. . .....______

---

---- ---

l ; ~ ~ p s i n c r e : : : : _ ~ ~ l y _ 5 : ~ 1 ~ q j < . . in \1\Tes tern de-

v c i ~ E _ t ~ l ~ "hey h

av:_

to

t ~ L ~

t ~ t ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

k Q e S

_ : ' ~ ~ in areas o f limi ted

~ 1 _ ; 1 : ~ 2 ~ ~ L ' ~ < J f . ~ I

t c n i ~ < l J : y ,

in

p()licy sectors,

or

with regard to

1 ~ 0

J ? . ~ } < : . > n

l(> begin with, the chapter by Sebasti

an

Conrad

rzcl e_ al. argue -in -their c T ; a p t t ~ c ; ~ ~ - i : h c

; ; ; ~ T i t

under which com pani

es

engage in environmental self-regulatio n.

- '

Ili"C

.. ttbsequcnt four de;; , with v c r n role

of

nonstate

actors in areas of 1mi ted statehood fiom va rious empiric

al

perspective s. :.rhc _

ch,lp ler by Sven

Chojn-:1ck.i

and

?.cljkn

Bra no1 ic takes o n a particularly hard

cas: i t h ~ J i ~ ; ; c i i i ~ ~ ~ ; ~ ~ ~ i ; ; ~ w ich t ; ~ ~ .1:1n her

han

ai \'al"iJ-ed good

em

he prm

id

n l n >cJl under the most adverse con-

~ i r i o n s of

g l f s _

f a i i

~ : - : ;

~ i ~ f

~ c 0 , _ Sta te ) I f , l l

; : s e

n d ~ ; m ~ d con flict

gi

ve.

ri se to areas where security is

pro

vid ed selectively by a va riety

of

state,

quasi -s tare or n s t ~ t e actors. Tn

order

to systematically ditferent iatc and an

alyze the provision of sec

urit

y

in

areas of limited t c h o o d

. ~ l c

aut hors trace

sev

er;

1

modes of security leadin g

to

va rying forms of security gove rn ance

(sec

urity as a public

goo

d, as a club good, and as a private commodity). he

chapter us

es

the anal

ogy of

the market

t"O

argue that the emergen

ce

of

i f ~

ent mod es ot sccunty results from strategJes o( collective actors on

ha:1-

ardo us

1 : i . i 1 c r s o f p r ~ l h e s c arc

J i ~ c

by areas whe re diHcrent public

a ~ v ; 1 r c

acto rs compete over t:erritnri:1l contro

l,

natural resources, and

rJ1e

r ~ ~ ; ; - e n t - o f members. The eme rgence

of u r i r

governance

d c p e n L l

cco

no

nJic a m f i

g r a p h i c opportunity

struct

u1 -cs

and on the expected utility

t:o

invest in prod uctive means instead or unproductive a rming and fighting.

The authors then di scuss the conditions und er whi ch even violcm nonstate

}, j

t t _

. ;

J

{ / I I / , (' < ,;

t r; l l (.

' :

/Vi

': l

. ; : .

;-

tYt

t

f vt

e

OJ

?

rchth or l

I


12/64

'

2 2 [ntroductioJ

md

Ov

erv

iew

actors such

as

warlords or rebel groups it

in

their

i 1 J t to

prov

jJ

e _

,

cc

urit y , . public good l

or

a g

iv

en population. Chojnacki and

B r a t ~ o ~ i c

cl


13/64

~ p

24 Introduction and OveiYicw

become governance actors in t11at t Cy arc s y s t c m a t i < : _ ~ j v eng:1gcd in m J : _ ~ ~ ~ k i ~

or

the provision

of

collective goods.

~ r n a n c c

without a s ate d c p ~ . . : ~ ' - ~ ~ . ~ 1 [ t i c ~ _ J : _ S c J p . c

conditions ;md on incmtivc s t n ~ : ; t ~ E ~ . ~ ~ - ~ ~ l t : c i r J g n . o n s . t ~ t c a ~ t g r ~ such

IS

firms or

even warlm:ds

; ; ~ ; . j ; [ ~ - ; J ~ : ; ; ; [ l s . t o

c o n ~ t : i L : u . r s .. P. g o _ y c r n ~ n c s _ : . TI::sc scope concli

t i c ; ~ ~ ; ; ~ ~ ~ ~ E c ~ ~ ; i d ~ - ~ ~ ~ ; c r i o n ~ I : q : t v a l c n ~ ~ E ~ r ~ _ s t _ a E ~ ~ ' : ' 1 J a c ~ o ~ v _ c 2 L i l i ~ r a ; ~ h ) ~ '

~ i s

svstcmatically lacking or even missing in areas

of

limited statehood.

l Lrst b u r - ; i e ~ ~ t , the ci1alJters also dCJJlonstratc tEat

t l J c _ ~ t ~ t c _ ~ : ~ ~ s _ a : :

__

not absent in areas

of

limited statehood. The debate is not between either gover

nance b y c l ; ~ ; t a ~ c ~ - r c l ; ~ ~ o n ~ p l ~ t ~ p ; . i v a t i z a t i o n of governance services. Rat11er,

c _ : n l J ~ i r i c a l

C9_J1tributions

to

tl1is

volume show the various forms of interactions

, u 2 . c U : _ a r g ~ i n i n g rc;lationships between governments and nons ate actors. In some

cases (sec chapter

by

Endcrlcin ct al.), even hostile interactions can contribmc to

the provision

of

collective goods,

in

tl1is

case

macroeconomic stability.

Multilevel Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood:

'fhc Role ofExternal

Actors

Governance in areas of limited statehood regularly involves international

and transnational actors

in

providing basic services and supplying gover

nance. This includes foreign governments, inter national org anizatio ns (such

as the United Nations and its suborgani?,ations ), as well as transnational

nonstate actors, such as multinational corporations, NGOs, .or transnational

Pl'Ps.

The involvement of n t ~ ~ and ~ ~ ~ . i f l l i E . . i . L g m : f J l i l l l c ~ r _ e :

suits from necessity

given tlJC

state weakness in these

_ c o u t 2 2 j C : ~ . : . J D . m.Jny_

c a s l . ~ s : 1 ; - [ c ; : - ~ ; - d ; ; , ~ ; ; ~ a t i ~ ; ~ ; ; r ; ~ t c ; r ~ - d i t : e c t i ) , i ; J ~ ~ r f ~ r ~

with

the "Westphalian

sovereignty"

in

ar-eas of

limited statehood,

that

is, they authoritatively rule

in the absence of a consolidated state (sec chapters

by

Sclmeckcncr and Bro

z;us;

Krasner zoo+; Fearon and Laitin 2004-).

In other

words, shared sewer

rignty

is

an

p ~ i c a l ~ ~ ~ t z _ 2 . _ ~ ~ ~ . L ~ l ~ ~ ~ ~ tha_t_Jack t _ h c _ ~ b i i ~ t y to sofqrce

central decisions.

However , shared sovercignty::-th;_

d i v i ~ i _ o n

~ I ~ ~ - d_istributi


14/64

:

,

26 Imrnducrion

and

Overview

analyzes various state-building strategies, such as "liberalization first,'' se-

curity first," " institutionalization first,'' and "civil society first."

Each of

these

strategies inevitably produces unintended consequences. Liberalization

fir

st" often underestimates the destabilizing effects of rapid democ ratization

and market liberalization. In contrast, "security first" risks

strengthening

rhc statlls quo, including the stabilization of authoritarian rule. While an

emphasis on institution building tends

to

empower those

elites

who

profit

from the status

quo

, focusing on civil society leads to the opposite pitfalls

by underminin g local social structures. Schneckencr then argues that

what

all these strategies have in common

is

to overlook the multilevel

governance

character of external efforts at state building. As a result, incompatibilities

berwecn the goals and time-hori zons of external actors, on

the

one

hand

,

and

local communities,

on

the other hand , arc inevitJblc.

Schncckencr

concludes

that cl

1

c

key

issue for

extend

acto

rs

is

not

how

to

avoid counterprod uctive

eflccts and unintended consequences of their interference

in

the

domestic

sovcreignry of states,

but

how to cope

wicl1

them. First and

foremost,

they

have to underst;U1d that th ey arc not external to local developments, but part

of the process and its dynamics. Since external efforts

at

stabilizing

postcon

Hict si1:1.1at:ions result in multilevel governance structures, the imernationals

have to

rCJli

zc roo that they arc bound

up

with the political, social, eco

nomic, and culrural developments

on

the

ground.

Exit strategies'" amount

in c l f ~ b e t r a y a l . Rather, external actors have to

und

erstand

that

interventions

in the governance arrangements of areas of limited statehood change both

those being interfered with

nn

the intervenors.

ln

other wo;ds, g o v c r n a n c ~

travels back.

The concluding chapter by Lars

Brows

takes

up the

se cha

ll

enges in d

discusses the co n

se

quences of the book's findin gs for

international

fo l ign

and security policy. Current inrernatjonal foreign and security policY, 0,fl2atcs

picture areas oflimited statehood

as

presenting security

challeng

es t(f t

he

so

ca lled developed world. ~ < J S o f the scc iJ.Iri m disc [lssc.d refer to ch

1

llcnges

1

n

11

1 in g Jiom intn nJtional d

cs

tJbili

za

ti on because of conflicts spi lling-mcr

fi nm arc;Is ufl imircd statehood. Terrorism, organiz.cd crimc ,_


15/64

~ r

:''

2 Introduction and Overview

that also involves nonstate actors in a systema6c fashion (sec the ch apters in

l

:

the second

part of

this volume), we may actually witness

the emergence

of

new political and social orders in areas of imited statehood.

Conclusions

This

book ,

1

rgues that the social science debate on governance implicitly or

l

. - 1 .

11131

115

,,,cdded

to

an ideal

t ]1e of modern statehood-with

full

cxp Clt)'

IC , , ,

I

-, . ,,e

1

eignt" and t11c canaCJt)' to make, tmplcment,

and

enforce

deo-

c omcstK so 1 ' '

-

r

. a glol1tl as well as a historie


16/64

lntroductton

,1nd verview

NOTES

I.

I

iJJJnk

Tmja Biirzd 1 nd two .monymous

ITIicwcrs f(Jr very

useful cornrnCIJtS

011

the draft. I also thank Lars Brozus, Ankc Draude, and Ursula Lehmkuhl for numerous

discussions on the topic

of

this chapter.

2

. This section builds upon Risse 2005; Risse 2008; Risse and Lehmkuhl

wu7.

3

. Weber's notion of legitimacy witlt regard to the control

o1u

the means of vio

iciKe

should not be

con i.Ised

with an empirically derived notion of rmmJrr-lif"jJicrm inlwmplr.wn R t ~ f C J y . r t c n r m . \Viesbadcn:

\'S

\'crl.t).'.

fiir

Sozi


17/64

ntro u

ction

lJJd

verv iew

lJramlc , Ank

e.

2007. "Wc.r regicrt wi

e>

h ir

ci

ne aquivalcn

zf

unktio nali st iscbe Bcubdch

tung von Governance in

Raumcn

bcgn:nz tcr S taa tlic

hk

eit." SFB

700

Governance

in Raumen bcgrcnztcr S taatlichkeit, fU Berlin, SFB Governance Working l'apc r

Series, Berlin.

--- . zooS. "Wcr rcgicrr wie? Eurozenr rismu s in dcr Govc rn

anc

d orschu ng

und

der

Vcrsuch cincr merhodischcn Grcnziibcr

sc

hre

inm

g." l 71-amdi.rzipliniirc Govcr-

11nllrr

rmdi111(_11- Gcmcimmn hi11tcr den

Stant

blidlc71, edited by SybiUc De La H.

os

a

;

md

Matthias Kiirt e

r,

IOO-

JJ8

.

Baden-Baden: N

om o

s.

Erdmann,

Gcro. woz. "Neopatrimonialc

Herr

schafi- - oder: VVarum es

in

J\fri]q

so v

icl

c H ybrid rcgim c gibt." In

Hyi11

dc

Rq}ime.

%m Konzcptirm und

b upin'c dc

molimti.rc/;rr (

;muz.o71C11,

edited by Petra Bcndc:l, Aurcl Croissant, :lJld l ~ r i c d h c r t W.

Riih, 323-4

2.

Opladcn: Leske l\uclrich.

Frdmann, Gcro, and Ulf Engel. 2007. "Neoparrimoniali sm Reconsidered: C ri tical

Revi

ew

and Elaboration of

;m

Elusive

Co

nccpr."

Commrm

wcnlth n.nd

CompamtiPc

l'

o it.irJ +5

,

no. 1

:95

- 119.

Fe;lron, j ames

D

., and David D. Laitin.

2004

.

"Ncotr

ustccship

an

d

th

e

PrubknJ

of

Weak States:' lntcmatio/1(11

Scrurity

28, no. 4:5- 43.

Fuhr

, l Ia raid , M

;l

rkus Lederer, and l'diri am Sc

hr

oder.

2007

. "Klimascbutz lUJd Ent

wicklungspolirik: Dcr Bei trag privatcr

Unrernehmen." In

RC ficrC/1 ohm

Staat?

GoP

cnuma in

ltdmm11

brgmzztcr Stnat icMrit,

edited by Thomas Risse an d U rsula

l.chmknhl , 292 - 308. Bad en-Baden: Nllmos.

(; bhlcr, Gcrh:ml, Ulrikc 1-loppncr,

;md

Sy bille De La

Ro

sa, cds.

20 0

9.

W

cic

he

Stm r-

111 1/ St11dim wr Stmr:rii1(1J dunh dislmrsiPe Pmlitilim, A

1Zf

111C11fc tmd

SJmbole.

Badcn B;lclcn: Nomos.

c:oldstc in , ju di th L.

,

Miles Kahler, Robert 0. Keohane, and An n e-M ari e SI.HJgh tc r,

cds. woo. "Legalization and World

l'

ol iri cs}' Spccia.l is sue of 11t.crnn.tion nl

0

1;[]'1

11i:.otio11.

Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. '

Grande, Edgar, and Louis W. Pauly, eds. 2005 . Complr.x S o P c r c ~ 1 1 t )

Rc

cumtitutiii J

l'olitiwl ilutbority

in tbe ' 1 P m t y f i r < t Cm/.111)' Toromo: Toro

nto

U ni vers

it

y Pre ss .

I all , Rodney

Bru

ce, and

Th

om1 s ). llicrslckcr, eds. 2002. '}he /ime1JJC1 1CC of' i Timtc

A11thority iu

Global GoJmwucc.

Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versi ty l'rcss.

H criticr, J\dricnnc, ed.

. Common

Goods: R cinFC1Ifi11JJ l it1BJ W1/.

nndlillcn111tional

(;

o1'1'171n1lrc. Lanham ,

Md.:

Rowm an l .ittl

dicld.

- . wo ; . "New lv odcs of Governance in Europe:

Incr

easing Political C1pacity and

l'nlicy Effectiveness>" In 7/Jc Stille

of'tbe European

Union, vol.

o,

Lmr>, l'olitic.tion of


36/64

) 2 c;ovcrning Areas

o

Li nitcd Statehood

specific protection measures arc thus not only closely interconnected,

but t

also constitute the core clements for the identification of areas of strategic (

security or insecurity. .

.;

However, territorial control

and the

ability to reduce external threats

do

not in and of hemselves constitu te indicators for

the

quality of security, since

r

that

control of the use of force can also be used for indiscrim inate violence .

'

and the systematic massacre of

the

population in

the

territory. As long

as

. {

rebels

or

local militias provide security

only

sporadically

and

in a territorially

undefined context, security remains a rival commodity that can be excluded

fiom consLmlption Brauer T999, 6-7). Stated differently: by the strategic

maintenance of insecurity and the simultaneou s existence of various forms

of

security witl1in an area, not only is tl1c effectiveness and stability of the

security system called into question, but security also docs not attain tbe

quality of a public good. Nevertheless, there arc ways out

of

insecurity

and

tl1e protection screw (Mchlum, Mocnc, and clorvik zooz, 448), which per-

mit security as a good to once again move more markedly fi-om the private

toward the public realm on a quality axis.

Idc;11ly, in war-torn areas of imited statehood, tlvo basic l(mns of security

without or beside the state can be ascertained: (1) security by coercion and

a certain degree of institutionalization and reliability; and (z) self-organized

l(mns of protection against internal or external threats (self-protective secu

rity). A third conceivable alternative form of sccurit)' production

is

tl1c del

egation

of

protection functions

to

commercial supplicrs

6

AU

three variants

arc brought together systematically in table 4.1.

I

fwc

dcf1nc security govern ance as

the

intentional provision

of the

collec

tive good security for a defined

group of

protection recipients, the first type

is best c1ualified to be conside red security g overnan ce in

the narrower

sense.

This involves tl1c specific strateg ies of militarily potent actors who invest

in

the establishment

of

monopolies on the usc

of

J(xce, and advance processes

of

governance

formation-that

is, the establishment of institutionalized po

litical and economic

systems

of rule. First of all, dominant

and

sanction ap

proved ar med actor s usc tl1cir abilities to control territory and social relations

(i.e., the civilian population)

to

build up internal and external protection

systems; second, they no longer finance themselves by means of organized

looting,

but

rather through institutionalized taxation systems Prototypes arc

rebel groups

as

the Fuerzas armadas rcvolucionarias de Colombia (FARC)

or the Sudan People's Liberation

Army

(SPLA) in southern Sudan. But even

local warlord bctions in Afghanistan

or

in Somalia have invested in the build

TAJJLE 4.1 Forms

;md Qualities of Security

.--

orm

T)j C

r

.

Protection provider:

monopolist

.

Mechanism:

institutionalized system

Coercive

security

of

taxation and order

.

Cmgc: territorial control

.

vieans: military

protection

of

the

external borders, internal

control (e.g., police

functions)

.


recruitment among

own people

.

Mechanism: reactive to

violent context, pooling

Self-protective

of resources

security

.

Range: territorially

limited

t

a defined

group (i.e., selective and

exclud,1blc)

.

vicans: patrols,

fortification systems,

hiring of local militias

.


commercial security

com pames

Comnlcrciali,Kd

.

Mechanism: competition

security and prices, delegation by

state and private groups

.

Range: persons, property

.

vicans: diverse range of

services

Qual f)

Securit-y equals public

good (no selectivit-y

within tbc territory)

Security equals pool

and club commodity

(group mcm bcrs

clearly identifiable)

Security

c q u ~ l s

private commodity

(however, there

is an

implementation of

security governance)

t

I

I


37/64

'1-J

l;ovnuing

Areas

of Limited Statehood

up

of political and social regulatory structures, which

produce both

a cer

tain degree of

mutual

ex1xctations

and

colleccively

binding

decisions

[

01

.

L. .__ a

defined group. Thus, the assumption of go\'ernancc formation applies to

difkrcnt

degrees of institutionalization

and

to a large number of forms of

nonstate armed organizations.

In

successful cases, security in such situations

increasingly takes the form

of

a public

good.

If security is ranked in a hierarchy

of

public goods

as

the central

pre

condition fclr a

funnioning

political order (

cr

Rorberg

2.003; Komad and

Sk:1pcrdas

2005),

which is necessary t

obtain

positive beneficial cHeers in

other realms, it foUows that the rudimentary instirutionalization can be

re

stricted to the establishment

of

a system of

protection and

taxation. This

implies, first, formal and informal institutions that organize rhc monetary

transaction between the provider and the recipients of protection, and also

an organi?>ationaJ

framework that

guarantees territorial integrity toward

1hird parties.

From

a ncoinsrinltional perspective, this process gives rise to

security expectations,

both on t.hc part

of

the

civi i;m

population and

of the

dominant

armed actors.

The

civilian

population

can assume,

on

the bases of

information

as

to

the military capacities

of

the protection

provider, a certain

degree of effectiveness, t'lut is,

the protectjon provider

in

L1Ct

appears

as

are

liable security monopolist in the eyes of

t:hc

population (cf VVcinstein

20o6,

J )9-70 ). Moreover, it is assumed that the productivity of the civilian popula

tion will increase because of

the

perceived territorial security, since more time

and resources can be invested in production than in sclf-protcctiva means. In

turn, the armed organization achieves reliability regarding a regular income

that it ohuins through the institutionaJizcd taxation system. Thus armed

gwups secure

not

only their own organizational structures, but als


38/64

r

i

) , (]ovcrning Areas

of

Limited Statehood

f om looting),

or

international organizations (e.g., protection of persons or

buildings, mine-clearing). The activities

of

commercial security companies

1rc

clearly defined f1.mctionally (protection

of

an oil field

or of

govern

111

e

tal buildings) a nd direct ed toward a narrowly defined group of beneficiaries .

(members of a company or the public employees of a transitional adnunis

tration). Certainly, the delimitation toward the public-security structures is

often fuzzy. For example, c o m m e r ~ ~ a _ _ s ~ . ~ t y . j t y _cqmpanies engaged to pro

tect buildings may certainly

produce

positive externalities for t he immediate

n c i g l 1 b Z 1 : h ~ ~ d

~ 1 ; d

e x t e 1 ~ d

the

range of

the

protection services they provide .

The protection

of

administrative: _facilities

and

the

constmction of

security

structmcs in l r ~ ~ K I Afghanis:_;ation, or ifmilitaryclul

lcngers endanger a weakly ins tituti onalized system

of

rule. But even

if these

panial orders of violence arc llequently unstable, it should be clear that

the

minimum prerequisite for the classification

as

governance consists primarily

in the quality of security as a collective good as well as the implications of

consumption and territoriality.

New Modes of Security 97

"Jb

explain why and under which conditions violent actors engage in se

curity

governance, in the next section we

mal;;_c

usc

of

the concept

o

security

markets by assuming that the market structures and economic logics in the

security domain encompass the terms under which violent actors shape their

preferences, select strategies tor action, and make decisions.

Security Mar kets

Security, and in the narrower sense, protection, arc not ordinary market com

modities and diller in many ways fl:om

other

consumer goods.

8

As Skaper

das

(2oOJ)

and Skapcrdas and Konrad

(wo+)

have plausibly demonstrated,

the

competition in the provision of protection differs from classic economic

concepts regarding the bctors of

production,

pricing mechanisms, and the

resulting quality of the

market

product. Private protection providers do nor

compete via price mechanisms; rather, tJ1cy usc violent means to gain con

trol

of

territory

and

revenues resulting ilom protection services. Moreover,

it

is necessary to take into account

that

ownership of goods and services

is

not exchanged voluntarily, but is rather acqu ired by force (Eiwert 1999, 87).

Unlike

ordinary commodity markets, greater competition in the protection

providers' segment thercfixe docs not lead to more but rather less gain in

benefits Cor all (Skapcrdas 200 J 174-). At

the

same time, competition bct\vecn

nonstate armed actors witJ1 no regulating central autl1ority means that secu

rity dilemmas and arms races arise that favor an increase in violence. \Vithom

any cifective protecti on of heir lives or property rights, large segments

or

the

population arc prevented l om engaging in economically productive activi

ties and arc Jot-ccd

to

invest in their own protection instead (Bates, Greif, and

Singh

2002

613). This necessity to invest in the means of violence reduces

economic productivity and cilicicncy (Skaperdas,

2001

187).

9

Under

condi

tions of overt violence, resources eomnot be clfcctivcly distributed. Survival

in areas

of

limited

statehood

and the possibilities of profiting from the pro

vision of protection services thus depend on one's relative ability to exercise

violent control of resources and social relations. Violence therefore becomes

a necessary--albeit

not

a su licicnt--condition for the ability

to p a r t i c i p ~ 1 t c

as a competitive actor in the security market. In this context, the growth or

sclf-dclcuse groups in Afghanistan

that

protect t hcmselvcs against attacks

y

the J : 1 l i b ~ 1 1 1 or by unils of the Northern Alliance has to be considcn:d just JS


39/64

y (;ovcrning t\rcas o( Limned Statchoud

much as that

of

security-market participants and well-organized


40/64

ill

i 11

1 Governing Arras

ofLimired Statehood

strategies of indiscriminate violence (Kalyvas 2oo6; Weinstein 2006 ; Olsen

2007; Wood 2008) and promot e diffuse insecurity. Both empirical evidence

and

formal models have provided evidence that arbitrary violence and

de

struction of property arc more probable in zones

of

strategic insecurity

be

cause

of an asymmetric distribution of information and multiple materia]

insecurities (Skaperdas 2001, r88; Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2006 . However

the

ability to cause either security or insecurity ( or b oth) becomes a political

and economic

resource, and hence

an

alternative source

of

power. As a result

the price for protection services increases with the military capabilities of

potent armed actors (Mehlum,

Mocne, and

T01vik 2002). Theoretically, the

production

of

(in- )security is thus immediately tied

to

the logic of violence

and

resource extraction.

o

sum up, in the context of an increasing tendenc y toward fragmentation

of d1c actors' spectrum, as well as the associated implicat ions for th e forms of

security, d1C concept of the security market describes the structure and com

position of the supply and

demand

side in the provision

of

protection

com

modities and its temporal and spatial coincidence in areas where the provi

sion is not monopolized. Similar to corporations on regular markets, violent

groups

calculate

their profit margi n

of

nvestments in the supply

of

security

that is, whether to invest in the

production of

a secure environ ment (areas of

strategic security) or to perpetuate the violent appropriation

of

resources.

Opportunity Makes Thieves

The structure and d y n ~ m 1 i c s of security markets, like the question of the qual

ity

of security, cannot be adequately

understood

without considering the

ch:mging opportunity structures in areas of limited statehood. If there is any

truth to

rhe

popular saying

opportunity

malzes

thieves; it should be

con

sidered that the absence or breakdown of states creates extraordinary oppor

tunities for entrepreneurs of violence to either enric h themselves by looting,

extortion, or resource exploitation, or else to offer protection against looting

by

violent groups.

Theoretically, structures of opportunity encompass the conditions under

which

actors

formulate preferences, make decisions, and act (Siverson and

Starr 1991; Most and

StaiT

1980; Collier

and

Hocfl ler 1998).

In

the research

into

the causes of

war, they have often been used

as

explanatory

fac "Ors

for

the probability

of

the outbreak

of

both internal and international warfare.

New Modes

of

Security

1 1

f{owevcr, both the twin concepts of oppormnity and willingness developed

y

Benjamin

Most

and Harvey Starr (Starr 1978; Most and Starr 1980) and

UJC

opportunity model

of

he \Vorld Bank

group

around Paul Collier (Collier

and Hoeffler 1998, 200+)J

3

are oriented toward the relatively static bound

a )' conditions of methodological nationalism (including borders,

number

of

dlC

neighboring states, or primary-goods exports). Beyond that, the approach

developed by the

VVorld

Bank group relates the motivation of armed actors

primarily

to

greed and the relative share

of

the export of primaiy goods to

the

overall volume

of

export (cf the criti que by Crame r 2002; Fearon 2005 ).

Moreover, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) see structures of opportw1ity as preex

isting factors in conflicts between rebel

group

and governments

that

primarily

reflect the conditions that increase the risk of he outbreak of civil wars involv

ing

two conflicting parties.

But

precisely

under

the conditions offailing states,

opportunity structures

and

the configuration of actors may shift, both in time

and space. Resources may be completely exploited, the emergence of splin

ter factions, and the inte1vention

of

external actors may change the balance

of power between coni1icting parties,

or one of

these parties may over time

establish a dominant position within a defined territory. The term o p p o r t 1 m i ~ '

structures is

therefore used herein

as

a broad category that encompasses

all

ma

terial and territorial

options

actors llnd

under

conditions

of

time and space,

and thus refers

both

to incentive structures favoring the perpetuation

of

vio

lence and to those factors

promoting

the establishment

of

orders

of

violence.

Dominant armed actors GU1 then decide how and to what end they wish to

apply force; unilaterally against the popul ation , offensive against competing

violent groups, or defensively as reliable protection provider for the civilian

population against internal and external threats. Economic and geographic

structures of opportu nity, which we will discuss in greater detail in the follow

ing section, arc thus theoretically especially informative in this context.

Econmnic pportunities

The lack or breakdown

of

security guar


41/64


42/64

. : I I ~

1111

ro+ Governing Areas of Limited

Statehood

for

the

development of security markets. Appropriately, research

on

interna

tional war began as early as the 1970s to concepmalizc such geographical con

ditions as

direct

neighborhood and spatial distance as explanatory factors

for

the occurrence and diffusion of armed conflicts and wars (e.g., Diehl 19

9

.

Starr 1991 . Somewhat belatedly, recent civil war research bas d iscovered the

geography of war; Current studies show that topographical variables, like

forests

and

mount ains, not only affect the manner in which internal violent

conflicts

are

carried

out but also arc important in determining

the

prospect

of winning a battle or the war (cf. Gates 2002; Buhaug and Gates 2oo

2

;

J3uhaug and

Rod

2006). At the same time, geography also limi ts th e number

of potential violent actors and provides inf ormatio n for an under stan din g of

organizational logics of violent groups. Both formal models and empirical

evidence indicate that greater distance between cont endin g groups affects the

probability

that competitive violent grou ps will emerge (Gates 20 02, 127).

Particularly linked to geographic opportunity structures is the concen

ttation

of

resources

affecting the possibilities

of

canying

out

certain forms

of

violent

control and making profits from the resource extraction. First,

one

has

to

bear in mind that nan1ral resources differ considerably in their

concentration and location (Lc Billon 2oor, Ross 2004-). Second, central

i:ocd resources such as

petroleum and easily accessible mines arc consider

ably

easier to monitor than geographically widely dispersed resources, such

as opium plantations, alluvial diamonds, or tropical forests. Third, a critical

aspect is the proximity to the headquarter of a rebel group or th9 capital

of

the state. It

has been

demonstrated empirically that nati1ral resources that

arc

located near

the capital

of

a country can be

monitored more

easily

by

the

existing

government than more remote extraction sites (Lc Billon 2001).

The reverse is just as true: the further a potential extraction site

is

away from

the state center,

the easier it is for nonstatc armed groups

to

appropriate

and the

more probable will it be that violent conflicts,

and

hence areas

of

strategic

insecurity,

arise. Rebel organizations that operate in resource-rich

regions

will, in the course of he conflict, in

turn

be confronted

with

a "princi

pal-agent problem" (Ross

1973):

if their combatants operate in remote areas,

they

will be diflicnlt to coordinate and monitor internally. To respond to this

dilemma, there are

two contrary strategies: either, a high degree

of

military

and

social control, such

as

guerilla m ovements prefer, or more decentralized

organizational forms, as in the case of

phenomenon

of warlord systems

(B


43/64

1 l C ~ o v e r n i n g Areas

of

Limited StJtchood

limited statehood

can

be

characterized both

by

zones

of permanent

insecu

rity and by the institutiorulization of protection ~ m d taxation systems (areas

of

strategic security), structures of

politic.1l and

soci


44/64

i ll lit

his

system of rule, Taylor finally, in

1997,

aimed for the presidency of all of

Liberia-with the well-known result of the renewed escalation of violence

in the war in Liberia and his arrest in March 2006 Aside from the ultimate

fate ofTaylor himself, it is clear

that the

state apparanrs

and the

perspective

ofintcrnational recognition remain

important

resources,

both

internally (po-

litical

legitimacy, advantages over political rivals) and externally (e.g., in

the

form

of

international financial aid or by access

to

international assistance).

It

can

therefore be assumed

that opportunity

structures such

as

the

form of

a state and the norm of sovereignty will in the future continue to determine

the options

for

action of (some) private armed groups.

NOTES

1.

The concept of rhe "security marke t" refers to tl1e structure and composition of

the spectnrm of actors

as

well

as

tl1c interaction

of

supply (provision)

and

demand of

and for security.

2.

Security governance thus incorpor ates the regulatory structures

and

processes

by means of which security is provided intentionally as a collective good for a defined

group of recipients. Hence, tl1c present article operates with a minimal definition of

governance, without addressing here the broad range

of

differing definitions. Our

understanding of security governance also differs fi'om Krahmann (2003), who ap-

plies the term to

tl1e

emergence of complex security structures in

Europe

and North

America.

J.

The analytical distinction

common

in the debate over the privatization

of se-

curit;' between top down processes

of

the delegation

of

functions to private suppliers,

and bottom up processes of local sclJ:organization of security appears adequate at ilic

outset, in order to obtain an overview of the multifarious suppliers

of

security

(cf.

Mandel 2003; Bt;'den 2006). In contrast-, its analytical utility

is

restricted: first, it

establishes no immediat-e theoretical correlation between the shortage and tl1e active

provision

of

security; second, neither the forms

and

expressions

nor

the quality of

security arc differentiated.

The central gml functions

of

the usc

of

force arc in the

short

term one's own

survival, the ability to finance on e's c apabil ities t usc force, and tl1e seizure of control

oLm

area.

In the long term, they include the protection

ofthe

comrol against internal

and external challengers.

5

vVc rhus oOcr a middle-gr ound s trategy between the classical definition of secu

rity

as

the absence

of

existential threat s

to

a political unit (sec, for a comprehensive

ew Modes orSecurity

109

discussion, Baylis 2005) and widening the concept

to

include nonstate actors

as

cn

ucpreneurs

of

security governance strengthened by state collapse and the dynamics

of internal wars.

6.

Vlc

concemrate here on security dynamics

without

or beside the stare and will,

therefore, not discuss

other

possible forms such

as

"governa nce witl1 gover nment." A

good example for tl1e latter is provided by Elisabeth Jean Wood (2.008). y exploring

different social processes

of

civil war she illustrates the emergence

of

insurgent gov

ernance" in Sri Lanka by the Li berati on Tigers ofT.


45/64

iii

110

(;ovcrning

Arc,Js of

Limited

Statehood

Olson (1993) or Kurrild-Klitgaard and Svendsen (2003) have the problem that they

merely auach

tl1e

extraction logic of violent actors to the civilian popul.1tion,

but

leave

aside alternative structures of oppottunity,

11. Sack (198(,, 19)

defines territoriali ty

as attempt by an

individual

or group

to

ailcct, influence, or control people, phenomena, and relationships,

by

delimiting and

asserting control over a geographic area."

16. Elwert (1999,

R6)

defines "markets of violence" as ''economic fields dominated

l.>y

civil wars, warlords

or

robbery, in which a sclf:pcrpct uating system emerges which

links non-violent commodity markets

witJ1 the violent

acquisition

of

goods?'

As

highly profitable systems these markets may achieve stability len certain periods of

time.

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Intcmatio11trllntcnn1.ions

17, no. t: 1-9.

Walter, Barbara F 1997. The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement." bztcnmtimm

Oz;tJanizatiozz 51, no.

3:335-

('4-

I

t


47/64

lil:i

4

Governing

Areas of

Limited Statehood

Weinstein, Jeremy

Jvl. 2005.

"Resources

and the Inf(mnation Problem

in Rcbe]

Rc

cruitmcnt:']mmud ofCo7 flict Resolution +9, no. 4-:598-624-.

. 006.

Imide Rcbe/lirm: 17;c Politics

o

]nsUl;wnt Violence.

Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Wood, Elisabeth Jean.

2008.

"The Social Processes

of

Civil War: The Wartime Trans

formation of Social Networks?' .ilmlllrd

RcPicJP

o(I olitiml Scimrc

11:539-GJ.

5

11-ansnational Public-Private Partnerships

< Uld the Provision

of

Collective Goods

in Developing Countries

ANDREA

LIESE

AND MARIANNE BEISIJE l \1

T

A N S N A T IO N A L P U B L J C - l ' R I V A T E

l ' AR TNER S l l ' S

(PPPs) arc

often described

as an innovative f(xm

ol

governance, in

which nonstatc actors (e.g., nonprofit organiz;atious, companies)

together with state actors (e.g., international organiz:nions,

donor

agencies)

perform functions and provide services that

prcviomly

rested firmly

within

the authority

of

sovereign states.

These actors jointly govern across multiple

levels (transnational

to

local). In the OECD world, community-level Pl'Ps

often complement or supplement governmental rcgulatiorJ

or

services (Vaill

ancourt R osenau 2000 . l n at-e3s

of

limited statehood (sec Risse, chapter

in

this volume; and Risse


48/64

International Legal and Moral Standards

of Good Governance in Fragile States

BERND LADWIG AND BEATE

Runou:

F

A G I L E STATES A B O U N D I N TH E W O R L I J T O D A Y

The

reasons for state fragility vary greatly, fiom ethni c temions, social

unrest, or increased migration caused by economic

or

environmental

factors

to

inters tate conflicts oYer territory or resources.

\s

a result, nttmcrous

entities

that

arc

considered to

be states

under

public international

hw ::m:

tmablc to exercise

power

over all their territory

or

in all policy fields. Yet,

even if a state, by its flagility, verges on dissolving or being J. fJiJing or

failed state, it re mains a state in the legal sense. This charactcri7>:ltion hardly

squares with the traditional requirement of he definition of a state according,

to which its authorities must exercise cfkctivc 'ower over its population and

territory. Yet, through this legal fiction, imernatioll:d bw protects "bilcd"

states

Ji-om

becoming term md im : d hence the object of military conilKts

for its annexation.

Ncvenhclcss, the lcg


49/64

Ill il

I

lJii llli ftl

Hlj

~ I J i j H I i l 1 ~

',,,j'

"

i J I 1 i l l l : l 1 1 1 1 ~ 1

MHiliili.IH;j

l l

i[ :

1

r

iiiliiiiiPifl:l\1

unable

to

fulJill even t he basic func tion

of

states-securing

internal pe,lCe-Jcr

alone the more

ambitious normative standards of

good

governance.

In

discussing

solutions

to this

tension, we

will

proceed

as follows: we will

show that the rather

ambitious sundards

of

good governance

are already

part

of

positive law, and

that

they also can

be

justiJ1cd

by

a rights-based

ap

proach

of

political morality.

Applied

to

conditions

of

fragile

statehood, the

criteria pose

problems oflegitimacy

on

two

logically distinct levels. We argue

that this gives reason

to

f(xus primarily

on

a responsibility to rebuild, which

is

already recognized

by international

law.

t encompasses,

in particular, the

obligation

to

establish

institutional structures and

social

cohesion that

may

necessitate taking

nonstatc

actors

into account.

v\Te

conclude by

finding that

not

only states, but

nonstate

actors

and the international community

arc

bound by international legal

standards

of good

governance.

In

our contribution, we develop

a

normative concept of

good governance

based

on

public

international

law

and

political morality

that is built on

the


50/64

Sure guilding

and

o o d uvcrn mcc

](1 determine the normative dimension

of

smercigntv the vuicJLI . b.

. L

5

I ll he

HIIcrnanonallaw standards of good gove rnance will be examined 1

1

,

1

a

nar-

row sense, Good Governance'' is a concept within the context

of

devclo _

mcnt cooperation, the meaning

of

which varies in diffcrcm lcgoJ cor

t

P

--

'-- 1 cxts.

fn

a more general sense, good governance me;ms the fnllillmcm of public

intemational

law

rules on the way

in which

power must be exercised within

a state. fffidfilled, governance can be

considered

to

he.

"good

governance:'' In

1hc

f ( 1 J l o w i n ~ ,

we shaH examine the cent ral com11onents of Pood

a

01

,e

1

.

, o

in this broad sense: lmman rights, the rule of aw, responsivmes,,, and public

participation.

HUMAN RIGHTS

The most important category

of

11uhlic international law rules on good gov

ernance arc human rights, because they reg ulate the exercise

of power

within

a st;ltc. On the universal level, the cmtral sources arc the International Cov

enant on Civil


51/64

r I 1+.

lll

r

1

1ilr:'

1.

l t

lrflll

l i l k r ; , q j l ~ ~

'lll li'l,

ill

i ~ l

lllll1fr.llllfll

.

1

1 lfl[

.:

111

h1

zn+ St.llc Building and (jood Governance

J

CESCR

takes the latter difficulty into account

through the obligation

to

realize economic, social, and cultural rights progressively (article

2. r).1o

Thus

the covenant docs

not

require states to fulfill the rights

immediately,

but

move

as

expeditiously and effectively

as

possible towards that

goal;'u

and "to

the maximum of

its

available resources" (article

2.1

).

Even

the "minimum

core obligation" under

each

covenant right, namely "to ensure the satisfac

tion o( at the very least, minimum essential levels

of

each of the

rights"

is

not

an absolute obligation, but must take

into account

the

resource

constraints

within a

country.)}.

However,

if

a state demonstrably is

not

able to fulfill even

the core rights, it

is

obliged to usc resources available through international

cooperation and assistancc.

1

3

Whether the

international

community, in turn,

is obliged to provide such

help-as

the

ICESCR

Committee assumes-will

be examined later.

The lCCPR does not contain a comparable provision

on

progressive

implementation

of

the rights guaranteed. This diftcrence reflects

the-now

outdated-understanding that

civil

and political rights contain "negative ob

ligations;' that

is,

they require mere abstention, while

economic,

social, and

cultural rights

give

rise to "positive obligations,"

that

is, they necessitate

ac

tion bv the state

and

hence the usc

of

financi


52/64

1 1 1

/

l;ifi\ ;1

l ~ l i l l i i l f f l

W > St.m

Building and c;ood

Governance

of

all

individuals,

on

the

basis

of their active,

hcc

:tnd meaningful partici

pation."'S

Consequently, responsiveness reflects the convic6on that human

beings

arc

at

the

risse. governance without a state

Documents