retooling the consequence argument.pdf

7/29/2019 Retooling the Consequence Argument.pdf

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02If determinism is a threat to our free will, it is so only because thereare true propositions about the remote past [prior to our existence]. Ifthis is the case, though, then the Third Argument cannot provide ageneral argument for incompatibilism. That there is a remote past is

a contingent truth about the actual world, one that is not essential tothe thesis of determinism. (2007: 109)

We can answer this objection to the Consequence Argument by retoolingthe formalization embodied in the Third Argument in such a way that itshows that on the assumption of determinism, for all times t relative towhich there is a past, no human act is freely done at t.

Van Inwagens Third Argument employs a sentential operator thatworks as follows: Np stands for p and no one has, or ever had, any

choice about whether p (1983: 93). We will instead employ a slightlydifferent sentential operator: N*p, t stands for p and no one has anychoice at tabout whether p. There are two rules of inference that governour operator (which mimic van Inwagens (a) and (b)):

(a*) For all t: from p deduce N*p, t(b*) For all t: from N*(p q), t and N*p, t deduce N*q, t

stands for the material conditional. Following van Inwagen, let P bethe proposition that the judge J does not raise his hand at time t. Let Po*

be a proposition that expresses the total state of the universe at some timeto* prior to t (to* could be one second prior to t). Let L stand for aproposition that expresses the laws of nature. Here is the New ThirdArgument:

(1) ((Po*& L) P) assumption of determinism(2) (Po* (L P)) (1)(3) N*(Po* (L P)), t (2), (a*)(4) N*Po*, t premiss

(5) N*(L P), t (3), (4), (b*)(6) N*L, t premiss(7) N*P, t (5), (6), (b*)

One difference, we have seen, between van Inwagens Original ThirdArgument and the New Third Argument is that where OTA used N ...,NTA uses instead N* ..., t. Van Inwagen was accordingly forced tochoose for his proposition about the past some proposition Po express-ing the total state of the universe at a time in the remote past, before any

humans existed. Suppose instead that van Inwagen chose a proposition Poexpressing the total state of the universe, say, five minutes before t, whenth j d J f il t i hi h d Th it ld b ti b i f

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02NPo

because that premiss stands for Po and no one has, or ever had, a choiceabout whether Po. Van Inwagen cannot assume mid-argument that fiveminutes before t (when the judge fails to raise his hand), no one had achoice about what they did. Van Inwagens choice of Po, a propositionexpressing the total state of the universe at a time to before any humansexisted, leads to Campbells objection.

Since NTA uses N* ..., t instead of N ..., we are free to use anyproposition about the past relative to t in formulating the argument.Premiss (4) N*Po*, t is true because for any time to* before t, no onehas any choice at tabout whether the proposition is true. So let to* be fiveminutes before t (when the judge fails to raise his hand), and accordingly

let Po* be a proposition expressing the total state of the universe at to*.Nothing in Campbells paper calls into question the other premiss of theargument (6) and the same is true of the inference rules (a*) and (b*).Thus, we can conclude that given the assumption of determinism, no one including the judge has any choice about whether P (the propositionthat the judge does not raise his hand at t). Proponents of freedom wouldhold that the judge has a choice about P, since they hold that he can chooseto raise his hand at t. NTA shows that the proponents of freedom arewrong.

NTA generalizes to show that given determinism, no human act per-formed at a time relative to which there is a pastis a free act. A Campbell-style objection to NTA will dwindle to this: NTA does not apply to actsperformed at times relative to which there is no past. Adam was said to becreated by God on the sixth day. So by NTA, none of Adams acts weredone freely, since each act was performed at a time relative to which therewas a past. Campbell considers an alternative Adam who exists in adeterministic world at the first moment in time, tfirst (2007: 109). If Adamperforms act A at tfirst, then for all the New Third Argument has shown,

A is a free act. (Of course, there was no time during which this Adam coulddeliberate, even very quickly, before performing A!) By NTA, no subse-quentact of Adams is free, and no subsequent act performed by any otherhuman is free (supposing that the only human existing at tfirst is Adam).1

Is this limitation on NTA problematic? I do not see why, if determinismis the thesis that the past and the laws necessitate the future. On this

1 Campbell in effect argues that since there is no past relative to tfirst, van Inwagen

cannot come up with a proposition about the remote past before Adam existedwhich, given the resources of OTA, can be used to impugn the freedom of Adams

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12conception of determinism, the assumption that there is no past relativeto the time at which A is performed will quite naturally give rise to theconsequence that there is no argument from the assumption of determin-ism to the conclusion that A is not free.2

University of California, Santa BarbaraSanta Barbara, CA 93106, USA

[email protected]

References

Campbell, J. K. 2007. Free will and the necessity of the past. Analysis 76: 10511.van Inwagen, P. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

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The irrelevance of the Consequence Argument

Lynne Rudder Baker

Peter van Inwagen has offered two versions of an influential argument thathas come to be called the Consequence Argument. The ConsequenceArgument purports to demonstrate that determinism is incompatible withfree will.1 It aims to show that, if we assume determinism, we are com-mitted to the claim that, for all propositions p, no one has or ever hadany choice about p. Unfortunately, the original Consequence Argumentemployed an inference rule (the b-rule) that was shown to be invalid(McKay and Johnson 1996). In response, van Inwagen revised hisargument. I shall argue that the conclusion of the revised Consequence

2 It is worth noting that as van Inwagen originally formulates the doctrine of deter-minism, L together with a proposition expressing the total state of the universe at atime later than now necessitate a proposition expressing the total state of the universenow (1983: 65; Campbell 2007: 106). So a version of the Consequence Argumentcould be constructed using a proposition expressing some distant future total stateoccurring after the demise of humans about which no one has any choice. Adams actA, and all other human acts, could presumably be shown to be unfree by means ofsuch an argument. The trick would be to find a future total state that is causallyisolated from human acts.

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