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Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq Alex J. Bellamy* T he world’s failure to prevent or halt the Rwandan genocide was described as a “sin of omission” by UN secre- tary-general Kofi Annan. 1 British prime min- ister Tony Blair promised that “if Rwanda happens again we would not walk away as the outside has done many times before,” and insisted that international society had a “moral duty” to provide military and humanitarian assistance to Africa whenever it was needed. 2 The United States labeled as “rogues” states that “brutalize their own peo- ple and squander their natural resources for the personal gain of their rulers.” 3 Since 2003, the Sudanese government and its notorious Janjaweed militia have conducted a brutal campaign of mass killing and ethnic cleans- ing in response to an uprising by the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement, who have themselves attacked civilians in the Darfur region, though on a much smaller scale. 4 Recent surveys place the number of deaths caused by direct violence between 73,700 and 172,154. 5 Deaths from malnutrition and pre- ventable disease in internally displaced per- sons camps stood at 108,588 in January 2005, with approximately 25,000 more having died in inaccessible regions. 6 The British Parlia- ment’s International Development Commit- tee put the total casualty figure at around 300,000. 7 At least 1.8 million more had been forced to flee their homes. 8 Following a unanimous vote by the U.S. Congress in July 2004, Colin Powell took the unprecedented step of labeling the violence “genocide.” 31 * I would like to thank Paige Arthur, Mark Beeson, Ian Clark, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Paul D. Williams, Ramesh Thakur, the two anonymous reviewers, and especially Sara Davies for their help and advice on this article. 1 “UN Chief’s Rwanda Genocide Regret,” BBC News World Edition, March 26, 2004; available at news. bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3573229.stm. 2 Tony Blair, speech given to the Labour Party Confer- ence, Brighton, U.K., October 2, 2001. I am grateful to Nick Wheeler for bringing this to my attention. 3 “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America” (September 2002), sec. V; available at www. whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. 4 According to Alex de Waal, the government of Sudan has “consistently franchised its counter-insurgency operations to militia,” in this case the Janjaweed. The government provides the militia with arms, intelli- gence, and air support and allows them to operate with complete impunity, creating an “ethics-free zone.” Alex de Waal,“Briefing: Darfur, Sudan: Prospects for Peace,” African Affairs 104, no. 414 (2005), p. 129. 5 These figures were offered in a detailed study by Jan Coebergh, “Sudan: Genocide Has Killed More Than the Tsunami,” Parliamentary Brief 9, no. 7 (2005), pp. 5–6. The lower figure is extrapolated from an MSF survey and the upper one from a U.S. State Department report. 6 Ibid. These figures are extrapolated from data pro- vided by USAID and the World Health Organization. 7 House of Commons International Development Committee, Darfur, Sudan: The Responsibility to Protect, fifth report of session 2004–05, vol. 1 (HC 67-1), March 30, 2005, p. 3; available at www.publications.parlia ment.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmintdev/67/67i.pdf. 8 UN News Centre, “UN Refugee Agency Withdraws Staff from South Darfur Over Sudanese Restrictions,” New York, November 11, 2004; available at www.un.org/ apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12510. 031-054_Bellamy.qxd 7/6/05 10:00 AM Page 31

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Responsibility to Protect or TrojanHorse? The Crisis in Darfur andHumanitarian Intervention after Iraq

Alex J. Bellamy*

The world’s failure to prevent or haltthe Rwandan genocide was describedas a “sin of omission” by UN secre-

tary-general Kofi Annan.1 British prime min-ister Tony Blair promised that “if Rwandahappens again we would not walk away as theoutside has done many times before,” andinsisted that international society had a“moral duty” to provide military andhumanitarian assistance to Africa wheneverit was needed.2 The United States labeled as“rogues” states that “brutalize their own peo-ple and squander their natural resources forthe personal gain of their rulers.”3 Since 2003,the Sudanese government and its notoriousJanjaweed militia have conducted a brutalcampaign of mass killing and ethnic cleans-ing in response to an uprising by theSudanese Liberation Army (SLA) and theJustice and Equality Movement, who havethemselves attacked civilians in the Darfurregion, though on a much smaller scale.4

Recent surveys place the number of deathscaused by direct violence between 73,700 and172,154.5 Deaths from malnutrition and pre-ventable disease in internally displaced per-sons camps stood at 108,588 in January 2005,with approximately 25,000 more having diedin inaccessible regions.6 The British Parlia-ment’s International Development Commit-tee put the total casualty figure at around300,000.7 At least 1.8 million more had beenforced to flee their homes.8 Following a

unanimous vote by the U.S. Congress in July2004, Colin Powell took the unprecedentedstep of labeling the violence “genocide.”

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* I would like to thank Paige Arthur, Mark Beeson, IanClark, Nicholas J. Wheeler, Paul D. Williams, RameshThakur, the two anonymous reviewers, and especiallySara Davies for their help and advice on this article.1 “UN Chief ’s Rwanda Genocide Regret,” BBC NewsWorld Edition, March 26, 2004; available at news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3573229.stm.2 Tony Blair, speech given to the Labour Party Confer-ence, Brighton, U.K., October 2, 2001. I am grateful toNick Wheeler for bringing this to my attention.3 “The National Security Strategy of the United States ofAmerica” (September 2002), sec. V; available at www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.4 According to Alex de Waal, the government of Sudanhas “consistently franchised its counter-insurgencyoperations to militia,” in this case the Janjaweed. Thegovernment provides the militia with arms, intelli-gence, and air support and allows them to operate withcomplete impunity, creating an “ethics-free zone.” Alexde Waal, “Briefing: Darfur, Sudan: Prospects for Peace,”African Affairs 104, no. 414 (2005), p. 129.5 These figures were offered in a detailed study by JanCoebergh, “Sudan: Genocide Has Killed More Than theTsunami,” Parliamentary Brief 9, no. 7 (2005), pp. 5–6.The lower figure is extrapolated from an MSF surveyand the upper one from a U.S. State Department report.6 Ibid. These figures are extrapolated from data pro-vided by USAID and the World Health Organization.7 House of Commons International DevelopmentCommittee, Darfur, Sudan: The Responsibility to Protect,fifth report of session 2004–05, vol. 1 (HC 67-1), March30, 2005, p. 3; available at www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200405/cmselect/cmintdev/67/67i.pdf.8 UN News Centre, “UN Refugee Agency WithdrawsStaff from South Darfur Over Sudanese Restrictions,”New York, November 11, 2004; available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12510.

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Despite professed commitments to pre-vent future man-made humanitarian catas-trophes, the world’s response to the Darfurcrisis has been muted. At the time of writing,a small, underfunded and understaffedAfrican Union mission (AMIS) is deployedin Darfur.Although it has a mandated size ofapproximately 3,300, there are fewer than1,500 AMIS peacekeepers on the ground.The force has proven unable to halt sporadicescalations of violence or prevent thehumanitarian situation from deteriorating.9

The UN Security Council has taken anambivalent position. On the one hand, it hasto date failed to impose serious sanctions onSudanese officials and has not contemplatedusing force to protect civilians or humani-tarian aid. On the other hand, while it hasyet to decide whether the UN Mission toSudan (UNMIS), created recently to sup-port, monitor, and verify the comprehensivepeace agreement between the governmentof Sudan and the Sudan People’s LiberationMovement/Army (SPLM/A) in the south,will play an active role in Darfur, there is adistinct possibility that it could.10 Moreover,on March 31, 2005, the council took themomentous step of referring the Darfur caseto the International Criminal Court (ICC).11

This article explores what internationalengagement with Darfur tells us about thenorm of humanitarian intervention sincethe 2003 war in Iraq. Do states and regionalorganizations recognize that they have a“responsibility to protect” civilians at risk, asthe International Commission on Interven-tion and State Sovereignty (ICISS) argued?Or is humanitarian intervention perceivedas a “Trojan horse” used by the powerful tolegitimize their interference in the affairs ofthe weak? I examine whether the Iraq warhas shifted the balance between these twopositions, posing the question: Is there moreor less likelihood of global consensus on

armed responses to “supreme humanitarianemergencies”?12 My response proceeds intwo parts. The first provides a brief overviewof the norm of humanitarian intervention,focusing on The Responsibility to Protect andon debates about the impact of the “war onterror” and the war in Iraq on it. The secondoffers a detailed study of the internationalresponse to Darfur.

I argue that the situation in Darfurreveals two subtle changes to the humani-tarian intervention norm. First, althoughthe level of consensus about humanitarianintervention has not perceptively shifted,the debates on Darfur lend credence to thethesis that the Iraq war has underminedthe standing of the United States and theU.K. as norm carriers.13 According toMartha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink,new norms only replace old ones after aperiod of contestation between advocatesof the old and the new.14 If the credibilityof those most associated with the new

9 See Thalif Deen, “New UN Force for Sudan Will SkirtDarfur Crisis,” Inter Press Service, February 9, 2005;available at globalpolicy.igc.org/security/issues/sudan/2005/0208unskirts.htm. It is widely recognized thatafter an initial respite, the humanitarian situation hasactually deteriorated despite AMIS.10 UNSC Res. 1590 (March 24, 2005).11 UNSC Res. 1593 (March 31, 2005). Passed with elevenin favor and four abstentions (Algeria, Brazil, China,and the United States).12 This is Wheeler’s term. Nicholas J. Wheeler, SavingStrangers: Humanitarian Intervention in InternationalSociety (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 34.13 See also Nicholas J. Wheeler and Justin Morris,“Justi-fying Iraq as a Humanitarian Intervention: The Cure IsWorse Than the Disease,” in W. P. S. Sidhu and RameshThakur, eds., The Iraq Crisis and World Order: Structuraland Normative Challenges (Tokyo: United Nations Uni-versity Press, forthcoming). I owe the “norm carriers”idea to them.14 A process they describe as “norm cascade.” SeeMartha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Interna-tional Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” Interna-tional Organization 52, no. 4 (1998), pp. 887–918.

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norm is undermined by perceptions thatthey have abused it or raised it for prima-rily self-serving purposes, the process ofnormative change is likely to be slowed orreversed.15 Traditional advocates of thenew norm will find that their argumentshave less resonance among skeptics. Theproblem is compounded by military over-stretch on the part of key advocates ofhumanitarian intervention, in particularthe United States and the U.K. In short, ithas become harder for these states to per-suade others to act decisively in humanitar-ian emergencies at precisely the momentwhen those states themselves are less able tobear the costs of acting outside the world’sinstitutional framework. From the Ameri-can and British perspectives there is no fea-sible alternative to collective actionthrough the UN or AU in addressing thesituation in Darfur, but they have beenunable to build consensus about collectiveaction at least in part, I would suggest,because of their diminished credibility asnorm carriers.

Second, the Darfur debates have beendeeply infused with the language of a“responsibility to protect.” The meaning ofthat language, however, has been hotly con-tested. Changing the language of the inter-vention debate has done little to forgeconsensus or overcome the strugglebetween sovereignty and human rights. Inthe debates I examine, “responsibility toprotect” talk was used to oppose interna-tional activism as much as to support it. Ifwe accept Quentin Skinner’s argument thatactors will not act in ways that they cannotjustify by reference to the prevailing nor-mative context, it could be claimed that thebrief period of acquiescence to humanitar-ian interventions in the 1990s was at leastpartly due to the absence of plausible argu-ments against them. This claim is made

more compelling when the absence ofplausible arguments against intervention isset against the global consensus that hor-rors such as the Rwandan genocide shouldnot have been permitted.16 In the Darfurcase, as I will show, “responsibility to pro-tect” language has now enabled anti-interventionists to legitimize argumentsagainst action by claiming that primaryresponsibility in certain contested casesstill lies with the state, and not (yet) with aninternational body. Given the credibilitycrisis confronting some of the leadingadvocates of humanitarian intervention,there is a real danger that appeals to aresponsibility to protect will evaporateamid disputes about where that responsi-bility lies.

THE NORM OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION

It is widely accepted that the Security Coun-cil has a legal right to authorize humanitar-ian intervention under Chapter VII of theUN Charter.17 There is also a partial con-sensus among some liberal states that there

15 Ward Thomas, for instance, argues that a new norm’svitality depends on its advocates being seen to practiceit in good faith. Ward Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction:Norms and Force in International Relations (Ithaca: Cor-nell University Press, 2001), pp. 34–35.16 The idea of “acquiescence” to the West’s humanitar-ian agenda is taken from Wheeler and Morris, “Justify-ing Iraq as a Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 15. Myargument draws on Quentin Skinner,“Analysis of Polit-ical Thought and Action,” in James Tully, ed., Meaningand Context: Quentin Skinner and His Critics (Cam-bridge: Polity Press, 1988), pp. 116–17. I am grateful toNick Wheeler for suggesting this.17 Nicholas J. Wheeler,“The Humanitarian Responsibil-ities of Sovereignty: Explaining the Development of aNew Norm of Military Intervention for HumanitarianPurposes in International Society,” in Jennifer M.Welsh,ed., Humanitarian Intervention and International Rela-tions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 32–41.

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is a moral right to intervene without coun-cil authorization in extreme cases.18 It ishighly unlikely that the Security Councilwould have objected had others used forceto halt the 1994 Rwandan genocide.19

Throughout the Security Council’s deliber-ations about Rwanda, no state publiclyargued that either the ban on force (Article2(4)) or the nonintervention rule (Article2(7)) ought to prohibit armed action to haltthe bloodshed.20 Moreover, as SimonChesterman has argued, there is little evi-dence to suggest that sovereignty concernsinhibit states from saving strangers whenthey have the means and desire to do so.21

Throughout the 1990s, the Security Councilexpanded its interpretation of “interna-tional peace and security,”authorizing inter-ventions to protect civilians in so-called safeareas (Bosnia), maintain law and order, pro-tect aid supplies (Somalia), and restore anelected government toppled by a coup(Haiti). However, two questions remainhotly contested: First, who has the authorityto sanction humanitarian interventionwhen the Security Council is blocked by theveto? Second, when should a humanitariancrisis trigger potential armed intervention? Iargue in the following sections thatalthough a partial consensus on these ques-tions was established during the 1990s, thereis now deep division about how to interpretthe effects of the “war on terror” and theinvasion of Iraq on that consensus.

The Partial Consensus on Humanitarian Intervention As mentioned earlier, in the past few yearsmany liberal states have begun to accept theproposition that intervention not author-ized by the Security Council could be legiti-mate. NATO’s intervention in Kosovo was awatershed in this regard. A commission ofexperts found the intervention to be “illegal

but legitimate,” meaning that while it didnot satisfy international society’s legal rules,it was “sanctioned by its compelling moralpurpose.”22 This finding implies a degree ofconsensus around the idea that states have amoral right to intervene to save strangers insupreme humanitarian emergencies. ARussian draft Security Council resolutioncondemning the intervention was rejectedby twelve votes to three (Russia, China, andNamibia).23 While the failure of the Russiandraft did not constitute retrospectiveauthorization, it does add credence to theidea that there is a moral consensus amongliberal states and some others about theright of intervention in supreme humani-tarian emergencies.24 The claim that the

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18 The debates among liberal states about whether tointervene in Kosovo provide the best demonstration ofthis moral consensus. See Alex J. Bellamy, Kosovo andInternational Society (London: Palgrave Macmillan,2002). The best theoretical expression of this liberalconsensus can be found in Michael Walzer, “The Poli-tics of Rescue,” in Arguing about War (New Haven: YaleUniversity Press, 2004), pp. 67–81.19 It is important to note, however, that five statesabstained when France requested a Security Councilmandate to launch Operation Turquoise in Rwanda,most citing concerns about France’s motives. SeeWheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 232.20 See Michael Barnett, Eyewitness to a Genocide: TheUnited Nations and Rwanda (Ithaca: Cornell UniversityPress, 2002); and Wheeler, Saving Strangers, pp. 231–41.21 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humani-tarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 231.22 Independent International Commission on Kosovo,Kosovo Report: Conflict, International Response, LessonsLearned (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 4;and Ian Clark, Legitimacy in International Society(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 212.23 It is remarkable that even traditionally conservativestates such as Malaysia chose to side with NATO ratherthan to abstain. UNSC 3989th meeting, S/PV.3989,March 26, 1999; available at www.un.org/Depts/dhl/resguide/scact1999.htm.24 Nicholas J. Wheeler, “The Legality of NATO’s Inter-vention in Kosovo,” in Ken Booth, ed., The KosovoTragedy: The Human Rights Dimensions (London:Frank Cass, 2001), p. 156.

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consensus extended beyond Western liberalstates in the Kosovo case is further demon-strated by the Organization of the IslamicConference’s support for the intervention,which was communicated to the SecurityCouncil in a letter stating, “A decisive inter-national action was necessary to preventhumanitarian catastrophe and further vio-lations of human rights” in Kosovo.25 This isa partial consensus, however, because many,if not most, of the world’s states do not sub-scribe to the view that in exceptional cir-cumstances unauthorized intervention maybe legitimate. In addition to the well-recorded hostility of Russia, China, andIndia, the Non-Aligned Movementresponded to Kosovo by declaring its rejec-tion of “the so-called right of humanitarianintervention, which has no legal basis.”26

Further evidence of a developing moralconsensus about humanitarian interventionin supreme humanitarian emergencies hasemerged since Kosovo. Article 4(h) of theAU’s Constitutive Act, signed on July 11,2000, awarded the new organization “theright . . . to intervene in a Member State pur-suant to a decision by the Assembly inrespect of grave circumstances, namely: warcrimes, genocide and crimes againsthumanity.”27 And in 2001, Kofi Annan usedhis Nobel lecture to argue, “The sovereigntyof states must no longer be used as a shieldfor gross violations of human rights.”28 Inthe same period there were myriad author-ized and unauthorized interventions.29

In 2001, the Canadian government gavethe high-profile ICISS the task of establish-ing common ground on the question ofhumanitarian intervention.30 The ICISSrecommended replacing the atavistic termi-nology of humanitarian intervention (sov-ereignty vs. human rights) with the newlanguage of the “responsibility to protect.” Itcalled for an approach that looked at the

problem from the victim’s point of view. Itinsisted that the primary responsibility toprotect civilians lay with the host state andthat outside intervention could only be con-templated if the host state proved eitherunwilling or unable to fulfill its responsibil-ities.31

On the question of when to intervene, theICISS adopted the commonly held view thatintervention should be limited to “extreme”cases—in other words, Wheeler’s “supremehumanitarian emergencies”and Tom Farer’s“spikes.”32 Outside intervention, it argued,was warranted in cases in which there waslarge-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing,whether deliberately caused by the state orfacilitated by neglect or incapacity. Thequestion of authority proved thornier. The

responsibility to protect or trojan horse? 35

25 S/1999/363, March 31, 1999, annex.26 See Final Document of the XIII Ministerial Conferenceof the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries (Cartagena,Colombia, April 8–9, 2000), pp. 41–42; available atwww.nam.gov.za/xiiiminconf/index.html. It should benoted that the Non-Aligned Movement itself did notachieve a consensus on this position.27 Constitutive Act of the African Union; available atwww.africa-union.org/About_AU/AbConstitutive_Act.htm.28 Kofi Annan, speech given to the Nobel Foundation,Oslo, Norway, December 10, 2001; available atwww.nobel.se/peace/laureates/2001/annanlecture.html.29 Most of the unauthorized interventions were con-ducted with host nation consent, sometimes coerced.For a definitive list of these operations (up to February2005), see tables 1 and 2 in Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D.Williams, “Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalizationand Contemporary Peace Operations,” InternationalSecurity 29, no. 4 (2005), pp. 35–36.30 Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “Foreword,”in International Commission on Intervention and StateSovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa:IDRC, 2001), p. viii.31 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, p. 17.32 “Supreme humanitarian emergencies” and “spikes”refer to the idea that mass killing is either ongoing orimminent at the time of the intervention. See Wheeler,Saving Strangers, p. 34; and Tom Farer, “CosmopolitanHumanitarian Intervention: A Five-Part Test,” Interna-tional Relations 19, no. 2 (2005), pp. 216–17.

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ICISS proposed a three-layered distributionof responsibility. Primary responsibility laywith the host state. Secondary responsibilitylay with the domestic authorities working inpartnership with outside agencies. If the pri-mary and secondary levels failed to amelio-rate the humanitarian emergency, inter-national organizations would assume re-sponsibility. At this third level of responsibil-ity, the ICISS accepted the view that primarylegal authority for action was vested in theSecurity Council. If the Security Council wasdeadlocked, it argued that potential inter-veners should approach the General Assem-bly under the Uniting for Peace mechanismand, if that failed, work through regionalorganizations. In an attempt to increase thechances of consensus in the council, theICISS recommended that its permanentmembers commit themselves to a series ofcriteria relating to the use of force in human-itarian emergencies. It was suggested thatstates always seek Security Council authori-zation before using force; that the councilcommit itself to dealing promptly withhumanitarian emergencies involving large-scale loss of life; that the permanent mem-bers should commit themselves to notcasting a veto to obstruct humanitarianaction unless their vital national interests areinvolved; and that Security Council mem-bers should recognize that if they fail to ful-fill their responsibility to protect, other statesand organizations may take it upon them-selves to act.33 The commission insisted thatthe question of military intervention shouldbe placed firmly on the Security Council’sagenda if two “just cause thresholds” (large-scale loss of life and ethnic cleansing) andfour “precautionary principles” (right inten-tion, last resort, proportional means, andreasonable prospects) were satisfied.34

Reactions to the ICISS report were gener-ally positive, though there were notable signs

of dissent. It was received most favorably bystates, such as Canada, Japan, Germany, and(to a lesser extent) the U.K., that had, sincethe intervention in Kosovo, been exploringthe potential for developing criteria to guideglobal decision-making about humanitarianintervention.35 When the Security Councildiscussed the report at its annual informalretreat in May 2002, almost all of the perma-nent members expressed disquiet with theidea of formalizing criteria for intervention.The United States rejected them on thegrounds that it could not offer precommit-ments to engage its military forces where ithad no national interests, and that it wouldnot bind itself to criteria that would restrainits right to decide when and where to useforce.36 China had opposed the ideathroughout the ICISS process, and whileRussia was generally supportive, it insistedthat no action should be taken without Secu-rity Council approval, a position that wasunacceptable to the United States, the U.K.,and France.37 For their part, the U.K. andFrance, two advocates of the ICISS principlesamong the Permanent Five, expressed con-cern that formulating criteria to governhumanitarian intervention would not pro-duce the missing ingredients of political willand consensus.38

33 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, paras. 4.19, 6.11,6.29–40, and pp. xii–xiii.34 Ibid., p. xii.35 See Nicholas J. Wheeler,“Legitimating HumanitarianIntervention: Principles and Procedures,” MelbourneJournal of International Law 2, no. 2 (2001), pp. 552–54.36 Jennifer M.Welsh,“Conclusion: Humanitarian Inter-vention after 11 September,” in Welsh, ed., Humanitar-ian Intervention, p. 180.37 Ian Williams, “Writing the Wrongs of Past Interven-tions: A Review of the International Commission onIntervention and State Sovereignty,” International Jour-nal of Human Rights 6, no. 3 (2002), p. 103.38 Welsh, “Conclusion,” p. 204, n. 4.

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The U.S. intervention in Afghanistanseemed to support the idea of a partialmoral consensus on the importance ofhumanitarianism in war. The U.S. adminis-tration felt obliged to argue that OperationEnduring Freedom would improve human-itarian conditions inside Afghanistan, eventhough it was widely recognized as a legiti-mate act of self-defense.39 The 2003 invasionof Iraq, however, proved much more prob-lematic. In this case, the political leaders ofall the major troop contributors (the UnitedStates, the U.K., and Australia) gave consid-erable weight to the humanitarian case forwar in their public justifications, though theformal legal justification was based on theenforcement of existing Security Councilresolutions.40 Although the humanitarianargument received support in some quar-ters, it was widely rejected.41 Whereas in theKosovo case NATO could point to a moralconsensus among liberal states and someothers about the need to act, there was amuch smaller consensus in the Iraq case,with many liberal states (such as Canada,Germany, and France) opposing the war.

The Effect of the “War on Terror” andthe Invasion of Iraq What impact has the so-called war on terrorand the invasion of Iraq had on the partialconsensus on the norm of humanitarianintervention? There are, broadly, three posi-tions. The first group can be described as“optimists.”42 This view accepts that stateswill only intervene in humanitarian emer-gencies when vital national interests are atstake; it makes a virtue of this, however, byarguing that since September 11 interests andhumanitarianism have merged for manyWestern states.43 Two factors contributed tothis merger. On the one hand, Afghanistandemonstrates all too clearly the linkagebetween terrorism and state failure. The

strategic imperative to prevent terrorismtherefore entails a humanitarian imperativeto prevent state failure. As such, Westernstates are potentially more likely to responddecisively to humanitarian crises than theywere prior to September 11.44 On the otherhand, the U.S. response to September 11,especially the so-called Bush doctrine ofpreemption, has reduced the normative sig-nificance of sovereignty. This, Farer argues,should lead us to expect more rather thanfewer interventions.45 The post–September

39 See Colin McInnes, “A Different Kind of War? Sep-tember 11 and the United States’ Afghan War,” Review ofInternational Studies 29, no. 2 (2003), pp. 165–84;Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Humanitarian Intervention afterSeptember 11, 2001,” in Anthony F. Lang, Jr., ed., JustIntervention (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univer-sity Press, 2003), pp. 192–216; and Simon Chesterman,“Humanitarian Intervention and Afghanistan,” inWelsh, ed., Humanitarian Intervention, pp. 163–75.40 See Adam Roberts, “Law and the Use of Force afterIraq,” Survival 45, no. 2 (2003), p. 48.41 Michael Ignatieff, an ICISS commissioner, was anearly supporter; see Ignatieff, “Why Are We in Iraq?(And Liberia? And Afghanistan?),” New York TimesMagazine, September 7, 2003, pp. 38ff. Kenneth Rothwrote one of the most detailed rejections in Ken Roth,“War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention,”Human Rights Watch World Report 2004; available athrw.org/wr2k4/3.htm; see also David Vesel,“The LonelyPragmatist: Humanitarian Intervention in an Imper-fect World,” BYU Journal of Public Law 18, no. 1 (2004),p. 56. It is also worth noting that the humanitarianargument was not raised in the Security Council’s for-mal proceedings.42 This terminology is drawn from Nicholas J. Wheelerand Alex J. Bellamy, “Humanitarian Intervention inWorld Politics,” in John Baylis and Steve Smith, eds.,The Globalization of World Politics, 3rd ed. (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 572.43 I am grateful to Nick Wheeler for this formulation.44 See Chesterman, “Humanitarian Intervention inAfghanistan,” in Welsh, ed., Humanitarian Intervention;and Wheeler, “Humanitarian Intervention after Sep-tember 11, 2001,” in Lang, Jr., ed., Just Intervention.45 Tom Farer, “Humanitarian Intervention before andafter 9/11: Legality and Legitimacy,” in J. L. Holzgrefeand Robert O. Keohane, eds., Humanitarian Interven-tion: Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 80.

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11 record does not fully support these claims. For instance, the West’s contributionto UN peace operations remains paltry, theUnited States has not made a significanttroop contribution to reconstruction effortsin Afghanistan, and it played only a mar-ginal role in alleviating the crises in Liberiaand Haiti.46

The second perspective, shared by someinvolved with the ICISS, is that the “sun hasset” on the humanitarian interventionagenda. This claim is arrived at from twodirections. Thomas Weiss, the commission’sdirector of research, argued that the UnitedStates and the UN’s political will to act inhumanitarian emergencies has “evapo-rated” because of their obsession withAfghanistan, Iraq, and the war on terror.47

This position is helpful inasmuch as it high-lights the fact that the overstretched Amer-ican and British militaries are unlikely to beused in frontline roles, and that strategicconsiderations related to the “war on ter-ror” are likely to trump humanitarian con-cerns when the two collide. On the otherhand, it overstates the extent of humanitar-ian interventionism prior to September 11.In the 1990s, the world failed to “savestrangers” in the Balkans, Rwanda, and else-where, and the legitimacy of humanitarianintervention remained hotly contested.48

Indeed, the Security Council has yet toauthorize humanitarian interventionagainst a fully functioning state without thelatter’s consent.49

The second way of arriving at the conclu-sion that the “sun has set” on humanitarianintervention suggests that the use of human-itarian justifications to defend the invasionof Iraq was widely perceived as “abuse.”ICISS cochair Gareth Evans argued that the“poorly and inconsistently” argued human-itarian justification for the war in Iraq“almost choked at birth what many were

hoping was an emerging new norm justify-ing intervention on the basis of the principleof ‘responsibility to protect.’”50 This view iswidely held among critics: Ian Williamsargued that the Iraq war brought “humani-tarian intervention into disrepute”; RichardFalk lamented that the war risked undermin-ing consensus at the UN; Karl Kaiser insistedthat “Washington has lowered [consensuson] the humanitarian intervention approachto an unprecedented level”; John Kampfnersuggested that “there has been no better timefor dictators to act with impunity”; and The Fund for Peace project collating regionalresponses to humanitarian interventionfound that in the one consultation conductedimmediately before the Iraq war, in Europe,participants were reluctant to supporthumanitarian intervention for fear of tacit-ly legitimizing the invasion of Iraq.51 David

46 See Richard Bruneau, “Selfishness in Service of theCommon Good: Why States Participate in UN Peace-keeping” (unpublished ms.), p. 3.47 Thomas G. Weiss, “The Sunset of HumanitarianIntervention? The Responsibility to Protect in a Unipo-lar Era,” Security Dialogue 35, no. 2 (2004), p. 135; andJames Traub, “Never Again, No Longer?” New YorkTimes, July 18, 2004, p. 12.48 See Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 295.49 A point developed in Paul D. Williams and Alex J.Bellamy, “The Responsibility to Protect and the Crisisin Darfur,” Security Dialogue 36, no. 1 (2005), p. 41.50 Gareth Evans, “When Is It Right to Fight?” Survival46, no. 3 (2004), pp. 59–82.51 Respectively, Ian Williams, “Intervene with Caution,”In These Times, July 28, 2003, p. 7; Richard Falk,“Humanitarian Intervention: A Forum,” Nation, July14, 2003, available at www.thenation.com/doc. mhtml8i=2003071485=forum; Karl Kaiser,“A European Perspec-tive on the Post Iraq New International Order,” paperpresented at the Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies, Jakarta, Indonesia, July 29, 2003; available atwww.csis.or.id/events_past_view.asp?id=5&tab=0;John Kampfner interviewed by Tim Dunne, available atwww.ex.ac.uk/shipss/news/kampfner.htm; and TheFund for Peace, Neighbors on Alert: Regional Views onHumanitarian Intervention, Summary Report of theRegional Responses to Internal War Program, October2003, p. 6.

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Clark, a former special advisor to theBritish Foreign Office, argued that “Iraqhas wrecked our case for humanitarianwars. As long as U.S. power remains in thehands of the Republican right, it will beimpossible to build a consensus on theleft behind the idea that it can be a powerfor good. Those who continue to insistthat it can, risk discrediting the concept ofhumanitarian intervention.”52 The keyquestion, however, is whether states sharethis view.

The answer to this is difficult to gaugeprecisely. Of course, as noted earlier,many states opposed the ICISS agendabefore Iraq. There is evidence, however,that some states that were initially sup-portive of humanitarian interventionhave become less so as a result of per-ceived abuse in the Iraq case. Immediatelyafter the Iraq war, a forum of social-democratic political leaders rejected sec-tions of a draft communiqué proposed byPrime Minister Blair supporting the ideathat the “responsibility to protect” oughtto override sovereignty in supremehumanitarian emergencies. At least one ofthese states, Germany, had previouslysupported the ICISS agenda. Germanchancellor Gerhard Schroeder reportedlyrejected the communiqué because hefeared that any doctrine of unauthorizedhumanitarian intervention would be usedby the United States and the U.K. to jus-tify the Iraq war.53 There is also clear evi-dence that in the Darfur case theSudanese government linked Americanactivism in Darfur with its actions in Iraq,portraying it both as oil-oriented andanti-Islamic, and that this strategy helpedto reinforce African and Middle Easternhostility to the idea of Western enforce-ment.54 Importantly, neither of thesecases clearly indicates an increased reluc-

tance to support humanitarian interven-tion per se. Sudan may have adopted itsstrategy regardless of events in Iraq, whileGermany’s position was directed moreagainst the potential uses of criteria forintervention than against the idea ofhumanitarian intervention itself.

A subtle variation on this theme holds that while the Iraq war has not directlyaffected the norm of humanitarian inter-vention, it has impacted negatively on theability of the United States and its allies toact as norm carriers. According to oneanalyst, the U.S. administration sacrificedits international credibility over Iraq andis therefore not well placed to lead in Dar-fur and elsewhere.55 Similarly, at least onearticle in the British press suggested thatwere Prime Minister Blair to advocateintervention in the Sudan, “oil [would] bethe driving factor.”56 Such skepticism iswhat led Kenneth Roth of Human RightsWatch to predict that one of the mosttroubling consequences of the attempts tojustify the Iraq war in humanitarian termswas that “it will be more difficult next

52 David Clark, “Iraq Has Wrecked Our Case forHumanitarian Wars,” Guardian, August 12, 2003, p. 16;available at www.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,,1016573,00.html.53 See Agence France-Presse, “British PM UrgesTougher Stance against Brutal Regimes,” July 14, 2003;and Kevin Ward, “Process Needed so Countries KnowWhen to Intervene to Protect Human Rights,” CBSNews (Canada), July 13, 2003; available at www.globalpolicy.org/empire/humanint/2003/0713canada.htm.54 Cheryl O. Igiri and Princeton N. Lyman, “GivingMeaning to ‘Never Again’: Seeking an EffectiveResponse to the Crisis in Darfur and Beyond,” CSR no.5 (Council on Foreign Relations, New York, N.Y., Sep-tember 2004), p. 21.55 Scott Straus, “Darfur and the Genocide Debate,” For-eign Affairs 84, no. 1 (2005), p. 128.56 John Laughland,“The Mask of Altruism Disguising aColonial War,” Guardian, August 2, 2004; available atwww.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,3604,1273982,00.html.

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40 Alex J. Bellamy

time for us to call on military actionwhen we need it to save potentially hun-dreds of thousands of lives.”57

A third perspective suggests that theICISS criteria for intervention should beviewed as constraints that will limit states’ability to abuse humanitarian justifica-tions rather than as enablers for interven-tion. Ramesh Thakur, another ICISScommissioner, argues that the moral con-sensus about the “responsibility to pro-tect” is likely to be strengthened in thewake of Iraq as states come to realize thatit provides a language that can be used tooppose legitimate intervention. Accord-ing to Thakur, consensus on criteria willmake it more, not less, difficult for statesto claim a humanitarian mantle for theirinterventions.58

The impact of the “war on terror” andthe war in Iraq on the norm of humani-tarian intervention is therefore hotly con-tested. There is certainly evidence thatprior to the war in Iraq there was a gen-eral consensus about the necessity ofintervention in supreme humanitarianemergencies when authorized by theSecurity Council, and a consensus amongsome liberal states that unauthorizedintervention may be legitimate if thecouncil is deadlocked. However, there areat least three plausible explanations forthe direction the norm has taken since theIraq war. As I will demonstrate in theremainder of the article, the Darfur caselends support to the idea that the human-itarian intervention norm has subtlychanged in two ways. First, the credibilityof the United States and the U.K. as normcarriers has diminished. Second, “respon-sibility to protect” language can be mobi-lized to legitimate opposition tointervention in humanitarian emergen-cies as well as to support it.

INITIAL ENGAGEMENT TO THEDEPLOYMENT OF AMIS

For much of 2003, the internationalresponse to the Darfur crisis was limitedto the delivery of humanitarian aid. Themain political effort during this periodfocused on the Naivasha process aimed atresolving the civil war between theSudanese government and the SPLM/A.In early 2004, Mukesh Kapila, the UN’scoordinator for Sudan, accused Arabmilitia backed by the government of “eth-nic cleansing” and warned that if leftunchecked the humanitarian catastrophein Darfur would be comparable to that inRwanda.59 Secretary-General Annan useda Rwandan anniversary speech to the UNHuman Rights Commission to observethat unfolding events in Darfur “leave mewith a deep sense of foreboding.” He con-tinued:

Whatever term it uses to describe the situa-tion, the international community cannotstand idle. . . .The international communitymust be prepared to take swift and appro-priate action. By “action” in such situationsI mean a continuum of steps, which mayinclude military action.60

57 Kenneth Roth, “The War in Iraq: Justified as Human-itarian Intervention?” Kroc Institute Occasional PaperNo. 25 (The Joan B. Kroc Institute, Notre Dame, Ind.,2004), pp. 2–3.58 Ramesh Thakur, “Iraq and the Responsibility to Pro-tect,” Behind the Headlines 62, no. 1 (2004), pp. 1–16; andRamesh Thakur, “Developing Countries and the Inter-vention-Sovereignty Debate,” in Richard M. Price andMark W. Zacher, eds., The United Nations and GlobalSecurity (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp.194–208.59 Cited in “Mass Rape Atrocity in West Sudan,” BBCNews World Edition, March 19, 2004; available atnews.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3549325.stm.60 SG/SM/9197 AFR/893 HR/CN/1077, April 7, 2004;available at www.un.org/events/rwanda.

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In May 2004, Germany informally pro-posed the deployment of UN peacekeep-ers to Darfur, and it was widely rumoredthat Norway had offered to commandsuch a force.61 The New York Times ran aseries of articles exposing the massivehuman rights abuses there and calling forU.S. action, earning criticism from theSudanese embassy.62 Human RightsWatch, Amnesty International, and theInternational Crisis Group also activelylobbied for action in Darfur.

In April 2004, the UN Human RightsCommission dispatched a fact-finding teamto Darfur. The team found “a disturbing pat-tern of disregard for basic principles ofhuman rights and humanitarian law, whichis taking place in Darfur for which thearmed forces of the Sudan and the Jan-jaweed are responsible.” It concluded that “itis clear that there is a reign of terror in Dar-fur,” and that the government and its prox-ies were almost certainly guilty ofwidespread crimes.63 Before the commis-sion could vote on a resolution based on thedraft report, its content was leaked to thepress. Pakistan and Sudan condemned theleak and called for an immediate inquiry.64

Unwilling to force the issue, and concernedthat a strongly worded resolution would berejected by the commission’s African andAsian members, the EU members watereddown a draft resolution they were prepar-ing. The redrafted resolution neither con-demned Sudan nor mentioned its crimes. Itwas passed with fifty votes in favor and onlythree against (the United States, Australia,and Ukraine).65

The underlying dynamics of the SecurityCouncil’s attitude to Darfur became appar-ent when it met on June 11, 2004, to passunanimously Resolution 1547, expressingthe council’s willingness to authorize apeace operation to oversee the comprehen-

sive peace agreement in Sudan’s south.Although the resolution did not relate toDarfur, some council members neverthelessreaffirmed Sudanese sovereignty andexpressed deep skepticism about humani-tarian intervention. Pakistan reminded thecouncil:

The Sudan is an important member of theAfrican Union, the Organization of theIslamic Conference and the United Nations.As a United Nations Member State, the Sudanhas all the rights and privileges incumbentunder the United Nations Charter, includingto sovereignty, political independence, unityand territorial integrity—the principles thatform the basis of international relations.66

That this was not the view of an isolatedminority in the council was demonstratedby the fact that the resolution’s drafters feltit necessary to doff their caps to Sudanesesovereignty by inserting a passage “reaffirm-ing its commitment to the sovereignty, inde-pendence and unity of Sudan.”67 Pakistan,China, and Russia believed that the scale ofhuman suffering in Darfur was insufficientto provoke serious reflection on whether

responsibility to protect or trojan horse? 41

61 See Human Rights Watch,“Darfur Destroyed: EthnicCleansing by Government and Militia Forces in West-ern Sudan” (New York: Human Rights Watch, May2004), pp. 56–57; available at hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504; and Afrol News,“UN Peacekeeping Missionfor Sudan Prepared,” May 28, 2004; available atwww.afrol.com/articles/12789.62 See, e.g., John Prendergast, “Sudan’s Ravines ofDeath,” New York Times, July 15, 2004, p. A23; andEmbassy of the Republic of Sudan, “The New YorkTimes Faulted Sudan,” April 13, 2004; available atsudanembassy.org/default.asp?page=viewstory&id=262.63 E/CN.4/2005/3, May 7, 2004, p. 3; available atwww.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf.64 Human Rights Watch, “Darfur Destroyed,” p. 55.65 E/CN.4/2004.L11/Add7, April 23, 2004.66 UNSC 4988th meeting, S/PV.4988, June 11, 2004, p. 4.67 UNSC Res. 1547 (2004), June 11, 2004; emphasis inoriginal.

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Sudan was fulfilling its responsibilities to itscitizens, and the United States, the U.K., andFrance were reluctant to force them to do so.All three of the Western democracies thatcontributed to the June 11, 2004, debate madepointed remarks about the Darfur emer-gency and tacitly referred to the commissionof crimes against humanity and war crimes,yet none cast doubts on Sudanese sover-eignty. Germany, for instance, noted thatpeace in Sudan was indivisible and required“an end to the sweeping and widespreadhuman rights violations” without suggestinghow this might be achieved. Similarly, theUnited States pointed toward a litany ofhuman rights abuses in Darfur but simplyconfirmed its support for AU initiatives.68

This pattern was repeated on July 30,2004, when the council met to pass Resolu-tion 1556.69 Three positions were put for-ward during the council’s deliberations,which saw the first injection of “responsibil-ity to protect” language into the debate. Thefirst view, put forward by the Philippines,was that Sudan had failed in its duty to pro-tect its citizens and that international actionwas warranted. The reference to the ICISScould not have been clearer:

Sovereignty also entails the responsibility of aState to protect its people. If it is unable orunwilling to do so, the international commu-nity has the responsibility to help that Stateachieve such capacity and such will and, inextreme necessity, to assume such responsibil-ity itself.70

At the other end of the spectrum, China,Pakistan, and Sudan all rejected talk of inter-vention, while Brazil and Russia exhibitedreluctance to even contemplate the question.China abstained in the vote, complaining thatthe resolution alluded to “mandatory meas-ures”against the Sudanese government,whilePakistan argued that it “did not believe thatthe threat or imposition of sanctions against

. . . Sudan was advisable.”71 The Sudanese gov-ernment itself made a classic “Trojan horse”argument, even referring to the Greek legend.The ambassador wondered,

if the Sudan would have been safe from thehammer of the Security Council even if therehad been no crisis in Darfur, and whether theDarfur humanitarian crisis might not be aTrojan horse? Has this lofty humanitarianobjective been adopted and embraced by otherpeople who are advocating a hidden agenda?72

The resolution’s sponsors and their sup-porters adopted a line between these twopositions. The United States, the U.K., Ger-many, Chile, and Spain invoked the lan-guage of the “responsibility to protect”without suggesting that the responsibilityought to pass from the Sudanese govern-ment to the Security Council. They referredto the AU as bearing the primary responsi-bility for action should Sudan fail in itsresponsibilities. This tension between, onthe one hand, a genuine concern for humansuffering in Darfur and, on the other hand,a reluctance to press for action was mostclearly expressed by the United States:

Many people who are concerned about Darfurwould say that this resolution does not go farenough. Last week, the Congress of the UnitedStates passed resolutions referring to theatrocities in Darfur as genocide. Many peoplewould want the Security Council to do thesame. Perhaps they are right. But it is impor-tant that we not become bogged down overwords. It is essential that the Security Councilact quickly, decisively and with unity. We needto fix this humanitarian problem now.73

42 Alex J. Bellamy

68 UNSC 4988th meeting, S/PV.4988, June 11, 2004, p. 4.69 Passed with thirteen affirmative votes and twoabstentions (China and Pakistan).70 UNSC 5015th meeting, S/PV.5015, July 30, 2004, pp.10–11.71 Ibid., p. 10.72 Ibid., p. 13.73 Ibid., p. 4; emphasis added.

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This debate produced an understandablyJanus-faced resolution that invoked ChapterVII and condemned human rights abuses,but stopped short of sanctioning or evencondemning the Sudanese government.Resolution 1556 gave the government thirtydays to disarm the Janjaweed and punishhuman rights abusers, threatening economicsanctions if it failed to do so. For some, suchas China and Pakistan, the resolution wenttoo far; for others, it did not go far enough.74

The initial international response toevents in Darfur was therefore characterizedby three contradictory trends. First, therewas clear recognition on the part of Westernjournalists, human rights organizations, andsome states of a responsibility to protect thepeople of Darfur. Second, however, therewere significant doubts about which organ-ization should bear that responsibility (theUN, AU, or Sudan?), and a deep reluctanceon the part of key Western states to assumeresponsibility by arguing that the Sudanesegovernment was either unable or unwillingto protect Darfurians. Third, many statesexpressed deep disquiet at any potential vio-lation of Sudanese sovereignty.

FROM AMIS TO UNMIS

The intervention debate crystallizedaround the question of who had the respon-sibility to protect Darfurians. Embedded inthis debate were concerns about the deploy-ment of AMIS and its relationship with theUN, the question of whether sanctionsshould be imposed on Sudan, the prosecu-tion of war criminals, and the compositionand mandate of a UN force (UNMIS) tooversee the peace agreement in the south ofSudan.

This section is divided into two parts.The first focuses on the AU’s involvementin Darfur. Against this backdrop, the sec-

ond returns to the Security Council debatesabout intervention.

African Union Mission in Sudan In July 2004, the AU began to discuss thepossibility of deploying a small force toprotect its civilian monitors in Darfur, whohad been sent to El Fashir to monitor thecease-fire agreement of June 9, 2004. At thesame time, the Sudanese governmentstated that it would “strongly resist all [UNSecurity Council] resolutions calling fordispatching international forces to Darfur”and threatened to use force against peace-keepers.75 Initially, an AU force of approxi-mately 3,000 troops drawn from nine stateswas envisaged.76 In mid-August, Rwandadeployed an advance party of 154 troops,and President Kagame insisted that theywould use force to protect civilians if nec-essary.77 Although the AU indicated in acommuniqué to the Security Council thatits troops would indeed fulfill this role,some AU members expressed reservations.The Sudanese government itself rejectedKagame’s interpretation of the mandate.Foreign affairs minister Abdelwahad Najebinsisted, “The mission for those forces isvery clear: protection of the monitors. As

74 Simon Tisdall described it as a “dark study in disillu-sion.” Simon Tisdall,“Brave Talk but No Action: DarfurGets a Familiar Response from the West,” Guardian,August 3, 2004; available at www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1274670,00.html. I am grateful toPaul Williams for bringing this to my attention.75 “Australia May Join Darfur Mission,” Daily Telegraph,July 28, 2004, p. 8. I am grateful to Sara Davies for bring-ing this to my attention.76 CBC News,“African Union Sending Military Force toDarfur,” July 6, 2004; available at www.cbc.ca/stories/2004/07/05/world/janjaweed040705; and Reuters,“African Union to Send Troops to Darfur,” July 5, 2004.77 Human Rights News, “Darfur: Rwandan Troops toProtect Civilians,” Human Rights Watch, New York,August 17, 2004; available at hrw.org/english/docs/2004/08/17/darfur9241.htm.

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far as the civilians, this is the clear respon-sibility of the government of Sudan.”78

When Nigeria deployed the first 153 of anintended 1,500 troops, President Obasanjoof Nigeria insisted that his forces would onlyprotect AU observers and operate with theconsent of the Sudanese government.79

With Sudan refusing to consent to a broadcivilian protection mandate, a compromisewas found whereby AMIS troops would onlyprotect vulnerable civilians in their vicin-ity.80 The compromise mandate, to whichthe government of Sudan consented,insisted that AMIS would “protect civilianswhom it encounters under imminent threatand in the immediate vicinity, withinresources and capability, it being under-stood that the protection of the civilian pop-ulation is the responsibility of the[government of Sudan].”81

It soon became clear, however, that theAU lacked the necessary financial and logis-tical resources to deploy even the modest3,000 peacekeepers originally intended. Inlate September 2004, with still only 300troops deployed, Secretary-General Annancalled for international assistance to expandAMIS, and President Obasanjo lamentedthat although the AU was willing to deploymore peacekeepers, it was unable to do sowithout international assistance.82 On theground, AMIS was constrained by theSudanese government, which, among otherthings, prevented AU helicopters from flyingby denying them fuel as well as repeatedlyinsisting that AMIS troops were monitors,not peacekeepers.83

On October 20, the AU’s Peace and Secu-rity Council announced its intention toincrease the overall size of its mission to3,320, including some 2,341 troops.84 A weeklater, Rwandan and Nigerian reinforcementsbegan arriving in Darfur, assisted by the U.S.Air Force. However, AMIS remained unable

to do much more than report cease-firebreaches. On December 20, Nigeria’s Gen-eral Okonkwo reported that governmentforces had attacked villages using aircraft.85

Days later, Secretary-General Annan com-plained that the world’s peacekeeping strat-egy in Darfur was “not working,” and thatAMIS had failed to protect civilians or pre-vent the crisis from deteriorating because it“has not been able to put in as many (mili-tary) forces as we had hoped.”86 The situa-tion did not improve in 2005. In February,Jan Pronk, the secretary-general’s specialrepresentative for Sudan (who wasappointed in June 2004), complained thatAMIS was too small and its deployment too

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78 Quoted in Eric Reeves, “The Deployment of NewAfrican Union Forces to Darfur: What It Does andDoesn’t Mean,” October 25, 2004; available atwww.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=6168.79 Human Rights News, “Darfur: African Union MustInsist on More Troops,” Human Rights Watch, NewYork, August 20, 2004; available at hrw.org/english/docs/2004/08/20/darfur9251.htm.80 Duncan Woodside, “Mandate Unclear as AU TroopsHead for Darfur,” Business Day (South Africa), October29, 2004, p. 12.81 African Union Peace and Security Council Commu-niqué PSC/PR/Comm. (XVII), Peace and SecurityCouncil, 17th meeting, October 20, 2004, Addis Ababa,Ethiopia, para. 6, p. 2; available at www.africaunion.org/News_Events/Communiqu%C3%A9s/Communiqu%C3%A9%20_Eng%2020%20oct%202004.pdf.82 UN News Centre, “World is Responsible for Ending‘Terrible Violence’ in Sudan, Annan Says,” New York,September 24, 2004; available at www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=12044.83 “Thousands More Troops for Darfur,” BBC NewsU.K. Edition, October 1, 2004; available at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3706340.stm.84 S/2004/881, November 2, 2004, para. 57.85 Reuters, “Troops Attack in Darfur as a DeadlinePasses,” December 20, 2004.86 Quoted in Thalif Deen, “UN Admits Sudan PoliciesFailing,” Inter Press Service, December 22, 2004; avail-able at www.ipsnews.net/africa/interna.asp?idnews=26779. Also see Leslie Lefkow, “No Justice for Sudan,”Guardian, January 10, 2005; available at www.guardian.co.uk/sudan/story/0,,1387074,00.html.

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slow to afford real protection to Darfur’scivilians.87 Others grumbled that the AMISdeployment was “chaotic,” characterized by“poor logistical planning” and a “lack oftrained personnel, funds and experience inintervening to protect civilians.”88

Return to the Council Was AMIS merely “a fig leaf to cover theworld’s inaction,” as one commentatorlamented?89 The key question for the remain-der of this section is why the Security Counciland supporters of the “responsibility to pro-tect” agenda did not take measures either tocoerce the Sudanese government into compli-ance or to improve the effectiveness of AMIS.

Resolution and the Question of Sanc-tions. Resolution 1556 had imposed a thirty-day deadline in July 2004 for the Sudanesegovernment to comply with the SecurityCouncil’s demands and had threatenedsanctions if it failed to comply. In informalconsultations immediately after its passage,the United States gauged potential supportfor sanctions, including an arms embargoand travel ban on government officials inthe event of Sudanese noncompliance. Dur-ing these consultations a consensus againstsanctions began to emerge. Pakistanopposed sanctions in principle (becausethey violated Sudanese sovereignty), and theArab League joined the chorus by issuing astatement opposing sanctions in any cir-cumstances.90 Other council members(most notably China and Russia) had mixedmotives for opposing sanctions: a combina-tion of principle and economic interests.91

Crucially, the U.K. also informally opposedsanctions. A senior Foreign Office officialtold reporters that the U.K. had two prob-lems with sanctions. First, expressing con-cerns about undermining the Naivashaprocess, the U.K. was “wary of giving the

impression that the international commu-nity is beating up on the government ofSudan.” Second, invoking the “responsibilityto protect,” the U.K. believed that “the bestway to deliver security to the people of Dar-fur is to get those with primary responsibil-ity for it to do it . . . the government ofSudan.”92 British officials apparently wor-ried that coercion could inflame the situa-tion in Darfur and undermine the peaceagreement without delivering securityowing to the logistical difficulties that a Dar-fur deployment would entail.

On September 2, 2004, Pronk observedthat the Sudanese government’s compliancewith Resolution 1556 was mixed. He claimedthat the AU Ceasefire Commission hadreported that government forces had notbreached the cease-fire, a claim hotly dis-puted by the United States.93 Pronk also

87 Quoted in Deen,“New UN Force for Sudan Will SkirtDarfur Crisis.”88 Waranya Moni, “The UN Report on Darfur: WhatRole for the AU?” Pambazuka News, February 10, 2005;available at www.pambazuka.org/index.php?id=26831.89 Eric Reeves, “Genocide by Attrition,” In These Times,February 16, 2005; available at www.inthesetimes.com/site/main/article/1960.90 Amil Khan and Mohamed Abdellah, “Arab LeagueRejects Sudan Embargo,” Reuters, August 9, 2004.91 Russia had recently sold MiG aircraft to Sudan andfeared that the government would use any potentialsanctions as a justification for defaulting on its pay-ments. China has important oil interests in Sudan. SeeScott Peterson, “Sudan’s Key Ties at the UN,” ChristianScience Monitor, August 31, 2004, p. 5.92 Quoted in “Security Council Disagrees over SudanSanctions,” Sunday Standard (Nairobi), August 22,2004, p. 2.93 S/PV.5027, September 2, 2004, p. 2. U.S. ambassadorJohn Danforth argued that Annan’s report was wrongto suggest that there was no evidence of attacks by gov-ernment forces and that the AU Ceasefire Commissionhad in fact reported two such incidents. Cited in UNNews Centre,“Sudan: Annan Calls for Expanded Inter-national Presence to Stop Darfur Attacks,” New York,September 3, 2004; available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=11840.

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noted, however, that the government hadfailed to stop Janjaweed attacks or disarmand prosecute the militia’s members. Never-theless, he endorsed the emerging SecurityCouncil consensus that the Sudanese gov-ernment had primary responsibility forending the crisis. Indeed, he implied that thecrisis had barely gone beyond the first levelof responsibility identified by the ICISS(that is, of the host government) when heargued that “if the government is unable tofully protect its citizens by itself” it should“request and accept assistance from theinternational community.”94 This view wassupported by the secretary-general’s repre-sentative on internally displaced persons,Francis Deng—the author of the “sover-eignty as responsibility” concept that pre-ceded the “responsibility to protect.”95

Paradoxically, Deng argued that althoughthe government “probably” lacked the willand capacity to disarm the Janjaweed, itretained primary responsibility for doing so.Moreover, Deng argued that the govern-ment had indicated its strong preference forcooperating with the AU and “was fearful ofany direct international involvement” tosuch an extent that it “would probably resistit, either directly or through other means.”He concluded that international interven-tion would “complicate and aggravate” thecrisis by increasing the level of violence andcausing the government to withdraw itscooperation.96 The best way forward, heargued, was to encourage the AU to increaseits presence in the region in collaborationwith the government.

Resolution and the Failure of a RobustApproach. Although there was an emergingSecurity Council consensus that primaryresponsibility for alleviating the crisis laywith the Sudanese government in coopera-tion with the AU, the United States contin-

ued to push for stronger measures, pro-pelled by its finding that the governmentand its allies were committing genocide inDarfur.97 In mid-September 2004, it circu-lated a draft resolution finding Sudan to bein material breach of Resolution 1556 andcalling for an expanded AU force, interna-tional overflights to monitor the situation,moves to prosecute those responsible forgenocide, a no-fly zone for Sudanese mili-tary aircraft, and targeted sanctions (such astravel bans) against the ruling elite.98 Reso-lution 1564 contained many of these meas-ures but in a much-diluted form. It called foran expanded AU presence, reiterated earlierdemands for respect for the cease-fire andfor the government to disarm and prosecutethe Janjaweed, invited the secretary-generalto create a commission of inquiry to investi-gate reported crimes, and indicated itsintention to “consider” further measures ifthe government failed to comply.99 The res-olution failed to find Sudan in breach ofResolution 1556, impose measures upon it,or even criticize the government. Onceagain, three positions were apparent.

First, many states expressed deep skepti-cism about the legitimacy of enforcementmeasures against Sudan. Explaining its

46 Alex J. Bellamy

94 UNSC 5027th meeting, S/PV.5027, September 2,2004, p. 3.95 Francis M. Deng et al., Sovereignty as Responsibility:Conflict Management in Africa (Washington, D.C.: TheBrookings Institution, 1996).96 E/CN.4/2005/8, September 27, 2004, paras. 22, 26, and36.97 For an excellent account of why the United States hasadopted an activist role in the Darfur debate, seeSamantha Power, “Dying in Darfur: Can the EthnicCleansing in Sudan Be Stopped?” New Yorker, August30, 2004, pp. 270–87.98 “Powell Declares Genocide in Sudan,” BBC NewsU.K. Edition, September 9, 2004; available at news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3641820.stm.99 UNSC Res. 1564, September 18, 2004, paras. 2, 3, 7, 9,12, and 14.

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abstention, Algeria argued that while “cer-tain measures that might have been unac-ceptable assaults on Sudan’s sovereignty”(such as overflights) had been dropped fromthe original U.S. draft, the resolution wasstill problematic because it failed to recog-nize Sudan’s cooperation with the AU andUN. Russian, Chinese, and Pakistani oppo-sition to sanctions were partly principledobjections to sanctions, partly instrumentalobjections predicated on the view that thesituation in Darfur was improving.Although it supported the resolution, Brazilexpressed disquiet at what it described as the“excessive” use of Chapter VII, which, itfeared, “runs the risk of misleading all par-ties concerned.”100 These views were widelyendorsed outside the council. For instance, acommuniqué issued by an “African mini-summit” on Darfur led by Libya and Egyptreaffirmed a commitment to preserveSudanese sovereignty and expressly rejected“any foreign intervention by any country,whatsoever in this pure African issue.”101

At the other end of the spectrum, twostates spoke out in favor of a more robustapproach. The Philippines reiterated itsview that if a state is unable or unwilling toprotect its citizens,“the Security Council hasthe moral and legal authority to enable thatState to assume that responsibility.” Roma-nia endorsed this view more pointedly,implying that the council had not yet ful-filled its responsibilities:

There should be no moral hesitation in theCouncil in taking up its responsibilities. Whileit may be true that it is not for the Council tomake legal findings, it is certainly within itspolitical, legal and moral obligations to ringthe alarm bell and foster—and indeed, urge—proper consideration of such acts in theappropriate venues.102

As before, the United States and the U.K.adopted a public position midway between

the other two. While the United States notedthat progress had been made, it insisted thatthe Sudanese government remained inbreach of Resolution 1556. Nevertheless, itstopped short of specifically criticizing theSudanese government or calling for furthermeasures. Likewise, the U.K. noted cease-fire violations by all parties to the conflictand reiterated its view that “ultimateresponsibility lies with the Government ofSudan and the rebel groups.”103

What is remarkable is not so much thatthe resolution was toned down to secure aSecurity Council consensus, but that theUnited States especially chose not to arguealong the lines of Romania and the Philip-pines that the council should assume the“responsibility to protect.” This is moststriking in the U.S. case, because its Con-gress and secretary of state had publiclydeclared a genocide in Darfur and because ithad attempted to develop a more activistapproach during the Security Council’sinformal consultations. The United Statesfound itself faced with two options. It couldact as it had over Kosovo and Iraq and adopta robustly activist line in the council. Itcould also declare itself willing to act outsidethe council if that body was unable to reacha consensus. Because of its military over-stretch, however, the latter course wouldhave been a politically infeasible strategy.The alternative was to pursue a consensuswithin the council. Council consensusremained very fragile owing to the deepskepticism expressed toward anything butAU interventionism by states including Rus-

100 S/PV.5040, September 18, 2004, pp. 2–3, 5, 7, and 10.101 By “foreign” the communiqué evidently meant non-African. “Final Communiqué: African Mini-Summiton Darfur,” Tripoli, Libya, October 17, 2004, p. 2.102 S/PV.5040, September 18, 2004, p. 12.103 Ibid., p. 10.

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sia, China, Pakistan, and Algeria, as well asmany key AU members and the League ofArab States. As such, American diplomatsmay have felt unable to take a more robustpublic stance for fear of undermining thecouncil’s fragile consensus.

Resolutions , , and : Compro-mises on Darfur. The situation in Darfurdeteriorated soon after Resolution 1564 waspassed. As noted earlier, evidence grew ofAMIS’s inability to protect civilians. HumanRights Watch pointed to renewed clashesbetween rebels and government forces.104

Jan Pronk reported that government com-pliance was going backward, telling theSecurity Council of “numerous” cease-firebreaches by all parties and militia attacks oncivilians.105 At the end of October 2004, theUN estimated that the number of peopleneeding aid in Darfur had increased by asmuch as 10 percent in the previous monthalone and reported that militia and govern-ment forces were harassing displaced per-sons and preventing the timely delivery ofaid.106 In his monthly report to the SecurityCouncil on Darfur, Secretary-GeneralAnnan noted a string of cease-fire breachesby all parties, very slow progress on disar-mament, and almost no progress on appre-hending Janjaweed militia. Tellingly, headvised that the “Security Council may wishto consider creative and prompt action” toensure effective implementation of itsdemands.107

The U.S. ambassador to the UN expresseddoubts, however, about whether sanctionswould ever be implemented, and suggestedthat “carrots” not “sticks” would be used toalleviate the problem.108 As two observerspersuasively put it, while the UN had“unsurprisingly . . . epitomized paralysis,”the U.S. administration had also decided to“take a pass on Darfur,” owing to military

overstretch and a “tarnished image in theMuslim world.”109 Following this analysis,the fact that the United States had beenforced to seek a consensus—one it thenfailed to reach—on enforcement measuresagainst Sudan could plausibly be attributed,at least in part, to a diminishing of its statusas a humanitarian intervention norm car-rier. Further weight is given to this explana-tion by the positions taken by Germany, theAU, and the League of Arab States describedabove. Lest there be any doubt, even theSPLM/A ruled out “foreign” (non-African)intervention, specifically pointing to theIraq experience. A spokesman for aSudanese opposition organization compris-ing the SPLM/A, Farouk Abu Eissa, insisted,“We are against foreign military interven-tion in Darfur. We have before us the case ofIraq. We do not want a similar situation todevelop in Darfur, or Sudan.”110

In early 2005, Pronk reported thatincreased violence in Darfur had “seeped into

48 Alex J. Bellamy

104 Human Rights News,“Darfur: Donors Must AddressAtrocities Fueling Crisis,” Human Rights Watch, NewYork, September 27, 2004; available at hrw.org/english/docs/2004/09/27/darfur9390.htm.105 UN News Centre,“Sudan Has Failed to Disarm Mili-tias or Prevent More Attacks in Darfur—UN Envoy,”New York, October 5, 2004; available atwww.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=12134.106 UN News Centre, “Sudan: UN Reports 10 PercentJump in Number of People in Darfur Who Need Aid,”New York, October 22, 2004; available atwww.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=12314;and UN News Centre, “Humanitarian Aid in SudanLimited by Insecurity, Road Closures, Says UN Mis-sion,” New York, October 27, 2004; available atwww.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=12360.107 S/2004/881, November 2, 2004, paras. 5 and 16.108 Cited in “Prompt Action Needed in Darfur,” BBCNews World Edition, November 4, 2004.109 Christian W. D. Bock and Leland R. Miller, “Darfur:Where is Europe?” Washington Post, December 9, 2004,p. A33.110 Quoted in Gamal Nkrumah, “Darfur in Flames,” Al-Ahram (Cairo), April 29–May 5, 2004; available atweekly.ahram.org.eg/2004/688/fr3.htm.

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the [internally displaced persons] campsthemselves.”December, he noted, had seen anarms buildup, numerous attacks by all sides,including government aircraft, the spread ofviolence into West Kordofan, and the emer-gence of new rebel groups.111 The only way toimprove the situation, Pronk argued, was todeploy more international personnel intothe region. This recommendation repre-sented an important policy change forPronk, who had previously endorsed AU pri-macy. Now, Pronk tacitly recognized the AU’sinability to protect civilians in Darfur andsuggested that other agencies be deployed.

From this point onward, the sanctionsdebate was complicated by two further inter-related debates. First, there was a debateabout whether to refer the case of Darfur tothe ICC. Second, the conclusion of the peaceagreement for the south of Sudan initiated adebate about whether the UN force createdto police the peace agreement would be aChapter VI or Chapter VII mission, andwhether it would also deploy in Darfur.Importantly, in both debates the UnitedStates attempted to further its case forstronger measures to protect Darfurians. Inthe first, it eventually succumbed to Euro-pean pressure and agreed to refer the case ofDarfur to the ICC despite its continuinggrave concerns about the court. In the sec-ond, it led an informal push to give the newUN mission a role in Darfur.

On January 25, 2005, the UN Commissionof Inquiry concluded that while theSudanese government did not have a policyof genocide, it was implicated in numerouswar crimes and crimes against humanity.Moreover, the commissioners wrote, “Insome instances individuals, including gov-ernment officials, may commit acts withgenocidal intent.”112 However, it judged thatonly a competent court would be able todetermine whether specific crimes were

genocidal. The report sparked a heateddebate about the appropriate venue in whichto prosecute accused war criminals. EUstates, including the U.K., argued that theSecurity Council should refer the matter tothe ICC. The British ambassador to the UNinsisted that the ICC referral was “non-negotiable.” The United States argued thatthe Security Council should create a specialtribunal in Arusha to indict and prosecutewar criminals. Nigeria offered a compromisein the form of an AU tribunal. The EU statesrejected the Nigerian proposal, fearing thatany compromise on the ICC would fatallyundermine the court.113 For more than twomonths, the debate hamstrung efforts to cre-ate a UN force, as the Europeans insisted onthe ICC referral being part of any authoriz-ing resolution.

The deadlock was broken in late Marchwhen the two issues were decoupled. OnMarch 31, the council passed Resolution 1593,referring the case of Darfur to the ICC.Explaining its decision to abstain in the vote,the United States reaffirmed its funda-mental objection to the ICC, which, itclaimed, “strikes at the essence of the natureof sovereignty,” but noted the importanceof a unified response to Darfur and the needto end impunity in the region.114 The UnitedStates had very few options in Darfur, andwas ultimately forced to accept the ICC referral as the only alternative to inaction or unilateralism.

111 S/PV.5109, January 11, 2005, pp. 2–3.112 “Report of the International Commission of Inquiryon Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General,”Geneva, January 25 2005, p. 4; available at www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/ici-sud-25feb.pdf.113 See Peter Heinlein, “UN Security Council Dead-locked over Darfur,” Voice of America News, March 18,2005; available at www.voanews.com/english/2005-03-18-voa10.cfm.114 UNSC 5158th meeting, S/PV.5158, March 31, 2005, p. 3.

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50 Alex J. Bellamy

The debate about the role and nature ofUNMIS was similarly long-winded. Stateswere divided on the mission’s rules ofengagement and its zone of operations. InFebruary 2005, the secretary-general recom-mended a traditional peacekeeping forceunder Chapter VI of the Charter. However,the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Oper-ations found few states willing to contributetroops. Though a group of liberal states thathad come together to form a Multi-NationalStand-By High Readiness Brigade expresseda willingness to contribute forces, mostwanted a Chapter VII resolution giving themauthority to use force to protect themselvesand endangered civilians.115 After protractednegotiation, the council agreed to authorizea Chapter VII operation.

The council remained divided, however,on the question of whether UNMIS could be“rerouted” to Darfur. The United Stateswanted a clear statement authorizingUNMIS to deploy in Darfur, but this wasinformally opposed by Russia, China, andAlgeria. In the end, Resolution 1590 author-ized a Chapter VII peace operation man-dated to observe the cease-fire and protectcivilians, using force if necessary. The resolu-tion avoided pronouncing on whetherUNMIS would be deployed to Darfur, andinvited the secretary-general to investigatethe types of assistance that UNMIS couldoffer to AMIS, identifying “technical andlogistical”assistance as two potential areas.116

No consensus emerged on the question ofsanctions, however. In mid-February 2005,the United States circulated a draft resolu-tion coupling UNMIS and oil sanctions.117

After a protracted round of informal consul-tations, the United States dropped the oilembargo in favor of the imposition of travelbans and asset freezing on suspected warcriminals. Russia and China, however,rejected both the asset freezing and the link-

age between sanctions and UNMIS. TheUnited States revised its draft further, and onMarch 29 the Security Council passed Reso-lution 1591, imposing a travel ban on sus-pected war criminals. Russia, China, andAlgeria abstained—Algeria because itbelieved that the draft failed to recognize thesignificant progress that the Sudanese gov-ernment had made, and Russia and Chinabecause they remained opposed to sanc-tions. Tanzania argued that while it sup-ported Resolution 1591, it believed that thepost–peace agreement government in Khar-toum “should not be subjected to a sanctionsregime less than three months from now.”118

At the time of writing, the UN was prepar-ing to deploy UNMIS to the south of Sudan,ICC prosecutors were investigating crimes inDarfur, and the AU was continuing toexpand its presence in Darfur. On the otherhand, the Sudanese government remained inbreach of Resolution 1556 but had avoidedenforcement measures, violence in Darfurcontinued, and the numbers of dead and dis-placed continued to rise.

MINOR SETBACKS FOR THE HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION NORM

The Darfur experience suggests that theclaims that either the “sun has set” onhumanitarian intervention or that, afterSeptember 11, the West is likely to be moreinterventionist are both misplaced. The first

115 “Sudan Peace Agreement Signed 9 January HistoricOpportunity, Security Council Told,” UN Press Release,SC/8306, February 8, 2005.116 UNSC Res. 1590, March 24, 2005, paras. 4 and 5.117 Reuters, “US Resolution Calls for UN PeacekeepingMission in Sudan,” February 15, 2005; available at globalpolicy.igc.org/security/issues/sudan/2005/0215draftuse.htm.118 UNSC 5153th meeting,S/PV.5153,March 29,2005,pp.2–5.

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overestimates the strength of the humanitar-ian intervention norm prior to the Septem-ber 11 attacks and the subsequent wars inAfghanistan and Iraq—as well as those wars’impact on the norm in general.

If we accept the view that prior to the Iraqwar there was a partial consensus that theSecurity Council has a right to authorizehumanitarian intervention and a moral con-sensus among liberal states that unautho-rized intervention may be a legitimateresponse to supreme humanitarian emer-gencies, the world’s response to Darfur sug-gests that neither of these consensuses hasbeen eroded. This was evidenced by thewidespread political support offered to AMISand by the fact that in the West, at least, therewas little suggestion that an AU interventionrequired either an authorizing SecurityCouncil resolution or the Sudanese govern-ment’s consent. Although AMIS subse-quently received Sudanese governmentconsent for its limited civilian protectionrole, it is significant that when Rwanda uni-laterally gave its peacekeepers a civilian pro-tection role prior to the revised AMISmandate, liberal states did not criticize it fordoing so.

The second view overestimates the linkbetween humanitarian crises and securityconcerns, such as WMD and internationalterrorism. Although there was clear linkagein the Afghanistan case, there was no suchlink with respect to Darfur. What the Darfurcase suggests, then, is that changes to thenorm of humanitarian intervention after theIraq war have been more subtle and complex.Two changes in particular can be identified.

First, debates about how to respond to thecrisis in Darfur lend weight to the thesis thatthe credibility of the United States and theU.K. as humanitarian intervention norm car-riers has significantly diminished as a resultof the Iraq war. Throughout discussions on

Darfur, some states and organizationsexpressly rejected American- and British-ledactivism in the Security Council, whileendorsing the AU intervention and callingfor its expansion. This view was expressed byAU members, the League of Arab States, theOrganization of the Islamic Conference, andseveral Security Council members (such asPakistan and Algeria). There were also signsthat in a context where they were unable toact outside the Security Council because oftheir military overstretch problems, theUnited States and the U.K. appeared to rec-ognize that their diminished credibility asnorm carriers would make it harder for themto take a lead in building a council consensuson action. By autumn 2004, U.K. officialswere informally expressing the view that itwould be imprudent for Britain to push thesanctions issue. Although the United Statescontinued in its attempts to bring pressure tobear on the Sudanese government, and U.S.officials frequently expressed their frustra-tion at being unable to do so, it refrainedfrom taking a robust line in the council’spublic deliberations (as the Philippines andRomania did), and the possibility of unau-thorized action was never seriously raised,even after Congress and Colin Powelldescribed Darfur as genocide. It is too earlyto offer definitive insights about preciselywhy the United States adopted this position.Given military overstretch, however, unau-thorized military action was probably con-sidered infeasible, leaving a consensus-basedapproach through the Security Council asthe only viable alternative. The problem herewas that America’s and Britain’s likely dimin-ished status as norm carriers meant that an aggressive diplomatic push for coercivemeasures would probably have been coun-terproductive.

Second, the Darfur case supportsThakur’s argument that the “responsibility

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to protect” criteria could constrain as well asenable intervention. It casts serious doubt,however, on Thakur’s presumption that thisfurthers the cause of global humanitarian-ism. “Responsibility to protect” languagewas used by both advocates and opponentsof intervention. It enabled opponents ofintervention to legitimate their actions byreference to the prevailing normative order.In effect, it allowed traditional opponents ofintervention to replace largely discredited“sovereignty-as-absolute”-type argumentsagainst intervention in supreme humanitar-ian emergencies with arguments about whohad the primary responsibility to protectDarfur’s civilians. The Sudanese govern-ment, the AU, the League of Arab States, UNofficials on occasion, and in at least oneinstance the U.K. argued that the Sudanesegovernment had primary responsibility,though for different reasons.119 In the con-text of the ongoing debate, this argumentwas used to reject external involvementother than that endorsed by the governmentof Sudan. Occasionally, AU members andUN officials suggested that the governmenthad proven itself either unable or unwillingto protect Darfur’s citizens and that interna-tional organizations, particularly the AU,should assist it. Only the Philippines andRomania argued that the Security Councilshould accept primary responsibility forprotecting Darfurians, and that argumentenjoyed very little support.

According to the ICISS report, the trans-fer of the “responsibility to protect” from thehost state to the Security Council should beguided by what it portrays as a simpleempirical test: when the host state is unableor unwilling to protect its citizens. In prac-tice, this threshold was hotly disputed. Fewstates publicly reject the idea that the Secu-rity Council should act to halt genocide ormass murder, but it has proven difficult to

forge a consensus on when the threshold iscrossed. With Darfur, as with Kosovo,opponents of intervention argued that mili-tary action would probably worsen the situ-ation. Repeatedly, they argued that thesituation in Darfur was improving and hadnot reached the threshold necessary to vali-date intervention.

The point here is that while Thakur wascorrect to argue that “responsibility to pro-tect” language could reduce the likelihood ofhumanitarian justifications being abused,his line of reasoning reveals a deeper prob-lem with the ICISS agenda: changing thelanguage of humanitarian intervention(from sovereignty vs. human rights to levelsof responsibility) has not changed its under-lying political dynamics. As such, “responsi-bility to protect” language may also be usedto inhibit the emergence of consensus aboutaction in genuine humanitarian emergen-cies. As was the case with Kosovo, the debateover Darfur boils down to the question ofwhether enough states can be persuaded toact. The key difference is that in the Kosovocase many liberal states were prepared to actoutside the Security Council if necessary.

In the Kosovo case, the existence of thisalternative route enabled advocates of inter-vention to take a more robust diplomaticline in the Security Council, forcing tradi-tional opponents of intervention toacknowledge the humanitarian catastrophein Kosovo when the council identified Ser-bian ethnic cleansing as a threat to interna-tional peace and security and imposedeconomic and other sanctions on the Bel-grade regime.120 Sadly, due to a combina-

52 Alex J. Bellamy

119 As noted earlier, the U.K.’s position was influencedby a mixture of prudential considerations and depend-ence on Security Council consensus.120 For a discussion, see Bellamy, Kosovo and Interna-tional Society, p. 68.

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tion of military overstretch and the UnitedStates’ and the U.K.’s diminished credibilityas norm carriers, that alternative was notavailable in the Darfur case. As a result, littlesuch pressure has been brought to bear ontraditional opponents of intervention, who,in turn, have been able to legitimate theiropposition to intervention in terms of theresponsibility to protect. While the ICISS

was right to be concerned about reducingthe danger that states might abuse humani-tarian justifications to legitimate unjustwars, it evidently should have paid moreattention to the danger that responsibility toprotect language could itself be abused bystates keen to avoid assuming any responsi-bility for saving some of the world’s mostvulnerable people.

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