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1 REPORT CONTRIBUTION OF LOCAL AND REGIONAL AUTHORITIES TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP FRAMEWORK AND OPPORTUNITIES The report was written by Aston Centre for Europe – Aston University (Authors: Dr Nathaniel Copsey and Dr Carolyn Rowe) It does not represent the official views of the Committee of the Regions. Aston Centre for Europe Aston University Birmingham B4 7ET United Kingdom W: www.aston.ac.uk T: +44 121 204 5170

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REPORT

CONTRIBUTION OF LOCAL AND

REGIONAL AUTHORITIES TO THE

DEVELOPMENT OF THE EASTERN

PARTNERSHIP

FRAMEWORK AND OPPORTUNITIES

The report was written by Aston Centre for Europe – Aston University (Authors: Dr Nathaniel Copsey and Dr Carolyn Rowe)

It does not represent the official views of the Committee of the Regions.

Aston Centre for Europe Aston University Birmingham B4 7ET United Kingdom W: www.aston.ac.uk T: +44 121 204 5170

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION

PAGE

SUMMARY P. 5 INTRODUCTION p. 7

PART 1

Local and Regional Involvement in the Eastern Partnership

p. 9

The Eastern Partnership (EaP) in detail p. 10 Content of the EaP

p. 14

Added-Value of the EaP

p. 15

The Bi-lateral Track of the EAP

p. 16

The Multi-Lateral Track of the EaP

p. 18

Implications for Local and Regional Authorities in the EaP countries

p. 21

Future perspectives on the EaP from the local and regional point of view

p. 23

The European Commission and EEAS Approach to the EaP

p. 26

Conditionality and the Commission EEAS Approach

p. 27

National Approaches to the EaP: The view of the partner countries

p. 29

ARMENIA

p. 29

AZERBAIJAN

p. 32

BELARUS

p. 36

GEORGIA

p. 41

MOLDOVA

p. 45

UKRAINE

p. 49

National Approaches to the EaP: Overall Summary and Assessment p. 53

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PART 2

Policy Options for the CoR and CORLEAP

p. 55

What can CORLEAP do to strengthen local self-government and local democracy?

p. 56

A long-term action plan is required

p. 57

Establishing a role for CORLEAP in the region – a question of “actorness”

p. 63

What can CORLEAP do to increase cooperation between the local authorities and civil society in the EaP countries?

p. 65

What can CORLEAP do to increase cross-border cooperation?

p. 67

PART 3

Inventory of Local and Regional Initiatives in the EaP area

p. 67

Projects supporting cooperation between local authorities and civil society in the EaP countries

p. 68

Projects supporting the strengthening of local self government and democracy in the EaP countries

p. 73

Projects facilitating cross-border cooperation and learning

p. 77

Analysis of EU financial assistance programmes open to local and regional

authority partners in the EaP countries

p. 82

Baltic Sea CBC Programme

p. 82

Lithuania – Latvia – Belarus CBC Programme

p. 88

CUIDAD: Case Study for Ukraine (and Belarus)

p. 91

Twinning Assistance - Case Study for Ukraine

p. 97

Twinning Assistance: Case Study for Azerbaijan

p. 104

CUIDAD: Case Study for Moldova (and Ukraine)

p. 111

References

p.117

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SUMMARY

This report offers an insight into the contribution of local and regional

authorities to the development of the EU’s Eastern Partnership. It sets this

out firstly by analysing the state of play within the EaP of the local and

regional dimension, considering the manner in which local and regional

perspectives are included in the various arenas of debate that support the

EaP agenda. This section acts as an inventory of needs; that is, the report

offers a nuanced analysis of the EaP at the EU level and at the level of the

partner countries, assessing the key areas of concern and setting out clearly

the primary issues of interest for local and regional governance that CoR

and CORLEAP engagement with the EaP can seek to address.

To summarize the needs of CORLEAP’s members across the EaP countries:

• Whilst there are clearly a number of country-specific issues which

hinder the full achievement of the EaP’s goals, there are also a set of

common factors which slow the development of local and regional

democracy across the Eastern Partner countries. These issues form a

cluster of lobby points, which the CoR and CORLEAP can address as

top priority concerns in their own political work. They include:

• Insufficient governmental autonomy and limited financial capacity;

• The slow pace of development of deep local democracy, including

citizen participation;

• Limited awareness of the financial assistance mechanisms available

to local and regional authorities in the Eastern Partner countries

from EU programmes.

Secondly, the report then considers the engagement of the CoR and more

specifically, CORLEAP in the EaP process, analysing where this interaction

is most effective, considering how this relationship can in future be

reshaped to work even more constructively with the various avenues open

to local and regional perspectives in the EaP. This section argues that the

CORLEAP needs to fulfil four roles:

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– (1) A strategic thinker: drawing up long-term plans about where

local and regional government should be heading, with a road-map

for implementation;

– (2) A timely intervener: both at the EU and MS level to ensure that

development assistance goes towards local and regional democracy

promotion projects;

– (3) A skilful advocate:

o Making a convincing case for a role for local and regional

government in drafting territorial reforms;

o Developing an inside track both to the European institutions

(particularly the Commission and EEAS) and the national

governments of the Eastern Partnership;

o Making the case for decentralization of competences; both

policy-making and fiscal competences;

– (4) A high performance cheerleader: showing how to build a high

performance culture at the local and regional level with a focus on

improving the training and skills set of local and regional government

officials.

Finally, the report offers an overview of areas of local and regional

cooperation with Eastern Partners, and an assessment of how EU funding

regimes have been used to underpin actions to improve, enhance and

develop further local and regional governance in the EaP partner countries.

This assessment offers scope to understand the real contribution of EU

assistance at the local and regional level, and showcases instances of best

practice, which could be replicated across other partner states.

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INTRODUCTION

The Eastern Partnership (EaP) offers new scope for European Union actors

to engage with a wide set of actors across the wider Europe to connect in a

process of democratic consolidation that can positively impact on the

future of the continent.

The CoR, through its actions, forums, Opinions and, importantly, through

the new formal vehicle of the Conference of the Regional and Local

Authorities for the Eastern Partnership (CORLEAP), has a strong

opportunity to engage with the ongoing efforts of the European Union to

promote democratic understanding and market transformation in the EaP

countries.

The EaP was originally formulated as an intergovernmental partnership,

launched in 2009. However, it was clear from the outset that a wider set of

stakeholders needed to be engaged in the EaP framework, if it were to

achieve its overarching objectives.

The CoR worked to set up a body which would act as an inter-institutional

platform for dialogue between stakeholders, local and regional

communities of the EU and of the EaP countries. CORLEAP (established

September 2011) has already set out a strong basis for cooperation

between local and regional authorities, providing a valuable component to

the framework of the EaP, offering as it does a real means for better

connecting national authorities and the citizens they serve.

Now that the start-up phase has been completed, and CORLEAP is

furnished with a bureau structure and a strong political leadership, it needs

now to develop its activity profile further, in line with the global EaP

framework. CORLEAP clearly needs to develop both a political dimension

to its activities, and to establish a clear set of objectives which can be

delivered through concerted political actions undertaken by both national

governments and local and regional governments. This must be based on

the experience of local and regional partners in the EaP countries. At the

same time, CORLEAP also has a very clear operational dimension; that is,

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through its ongoing activities as a platform for debate, discussion and the

exchange of perspectives and expertise, it facilitates and fosters stronger

local and regional cooperation with partnership countries. This is a

particularly important element of its remit in the run-up to the 2013

summit.

This report offers an insight into the contribution of local and regional

authorities to the development of the EU’s Eastern Partnership. It sets this

out firstly by analysing the state of play within the EaP of the local and

regional dimension, considering the manner in which local and regional

perspectives are included in the various arenas of debate that support the

EaP agenda. This section acts as an inventory of needs; that is, the report

offers a nuanced analysis of the EaP at the EU level and at the level of the

partner countries, assessing the key areas of concern and setting out clearly

the primary issues of interest for local and regional governance that CoR

and CORLEAP engagement with the EaP can seek to address.

Secondly, the report then considers the engagement of the CoR and more

specifically, CORLEAP in the EaP process, analysing where this interaction

is most effective, considering how this relationship can in future be

reshaped to work even more constructively with the various avenues open

to local and regional perspectives in the EaP. Finally, the report offers an

overview of areas of local and regional cooperation with Eastern Partners,

and an assessment of how EU funding regimes have been used to underpin

actions to improve, enhance and develop further local and regional

governance in the EaP partner countries. This assessment offers scope to

understand the real contribution of EU assistance at the local and regional

level, and showcases instances of best practice which could be replicated

across other partner states.

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Part 1

Local and Regional Involvement in the

Eastern Partnership

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The Eastern Partnership in detail

The “Eastern Partnership” is the name given to the sub-section of the

European Neighbourhood Policy that is concerned with the EU’s European

neighbours to the east of the Union. It is targeted at six countries: Ukraine,

Moldova, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus and Georgia. The policy is both bi-

lateral (that is focused on the EU’s relations with one of the eastern

countries), and multi-lateral (that is focused on promoting integration

between all six eastern neighbours as well as the EU). The following section

reviews the policy thoroughly, considering its origins, content and added

value from a local and regional perspective.

Origins of the EaP

The importance of the EU’s policy towards its neighbours was

acknowledged in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), which

included references to security in the ‘EU neighbourhood’ within three of

the Union’s strategic objectives. It mentioned “neighbours who are engaged

in violent conflict, weak states where organized crime flourished,

dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all

pose problems for Europe” (Council of the EU, 2003). Regarding the East, it

was asserted that it was not in the EU’s interest to create new dividing lines

as a result of enlargement to central and eastern Europe (CEE) and,

therefore, the EU should seek to extend “the benefits of economic and

political cooperation (…) while tackling political problems [in the eastern

neighbourhood]” (Council of the EU, 2003). Thus the origins of the EaP can

be traced back to the years immediately prior to the fifth enlargement of

the Union to CEE in 2004/2007 (Commission, 2003, p. 3) which saw the EU

recognise the need to take account of its new geographical boundaries

which brought it closer to the relatively more politically unstable and

economically less developed former Soviet republics of Ukraine, Belarus

and Moldova. Prior to this, the EU’s policy in the region was mainly

concerned with its relations with its CEE candidate Member States on the

one hand, and Russia on the other, with little consideration for other

former Soviet republics.

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The first move by the EU to respond to the geopolitical and security

realities of CEE enlargement came in the form of a proposal made by the UK

in 2002, which became known as the New Neighbours’ Initiative (NNI) and

was initially aimed only at three countries: Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.

A year later, as a consequence of lobbying by the Southern EU states, the

programme was extended to include a number of the EU’s Southern

partners located around the Mediterranean fringe and was renamed as

‘Wider Europe’. The concept was further developed by the Commission in a

Strategy Paper published in May 2004. This subsequently led to yet another

change in the name of the initiative, which from then on became known as

the European Neighbourhood Policy. As argued by a senior official of the

Commission, the novelty of the ENP was based on its new strategic

framework, which was “an example of our foreign policy being more than

traditional diplomacy” (Landaburu, 2006, p. 3), in the sense that it

combined policies from all traditional ‘pillars’ of the EU. Such an approach

was, arguably, more comprehensive than the traditional ones.

From the outset the ENP was widely perceived as an inadequate

mechanism for (1) stabilizing all the EU’s neighbours and (2) setting them

on a path towards much closer economic and political integration with the

European Union, not least because the policy’s scope was so broad:

covering an arc of states from Morocco in the south-west, through north

Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus to Moldova, Ukraine and Belarus

in the north. Moreover, although the ENP did envisage, at least in the very

long term, a European Economic Area-style relationship for the ENP

countries, at the behest of Member States concerned with absorption

capacity, the policy deliberately made no mention of the possibility of

eventual accession of any of the ENP partners to the European Union. This

lack of a powerful incentive for the ENP states to undertake difficult and

expensive economic and political reforms, curtailed the policy’s

development from the outset. Moreover, the very notion of such a

geographically wide-ranging ENP managed simultaneously to offend the

target countries in both North Africa (who were vexed at being grouped

with former Soviet republics) and in Eastern Europe (who were angered by

being placed on an equal footing with ‘non-European’ countries that, from a

legal or treaty basis, lacked even the possibility of eventual EU accession).

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The question of accession has proven to be of particular importance in the

debate about the future of the ENP for the eastern European states targeted

by the policy. This has challenged official EU rhetoric on the issue and even

though the discourse was somewhat softened and no longer referred to

partnership as a ‘substitute for enlargement’, the Commission clearly stated

that the EU “emphasized that it offers [the ENP as] a means to reinforce

relations between the EU and partner countries, which is distinct from the

possibilities available to European countries under Article 49 of the Treaty

on European Union” (European Commission, 2004, p. 3). On this vital point

the EU’s Member States were strongly divided, with many of the newer,

northern and eastern Member States more strongly in favour, and the

older, particularly southern, Member States far less enthusiastic, and

indeed categorically opposed, to any talk of membership for ENP states.

Whilst the argument could be made under Article 49 of the Treaty on

European Union (1992, TEU) that the European ENP states of Ukraine,

Moldova and Belarus certainly have the theoretical right to apply for EU

membership, it is very doubtful that they would come close to qualifying

for membership in the next decade and a half. As such, it has been argued

that the ENP neither sufficiently confronts “the ghost of enlargement”, nor

seriously addresses problems affecting neighbouring states or achieves

coherence with relations to them. Nonetheless, it was precisely this

difference in the potential future status of the ENP countries to the east

from those in the south that encouraged those EU Member States friendly

towards eastern Europe (led by Poland) to pressurise for a change in the

nature of the relationship between the EU and the eastern ENP countries.

In June 2008, Poland and Sweden jointly proposed to the European Council

the creation of a so-called Eastern Partnership. The European Council in

turn requested a detailed proposal from the Commission, which was

originally scheduled to be unveiled during the Czech Presidency of the

European Union during the first half of 2009.

This small, but important step for the development of the EaP was,

however, soon to take on a more hurried pace with the EaP dramatically

rising in importance on the European foreign policy agenda following

Russia’s intervention in the conflict between Georgia and its breakaway

regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008. This was the first

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time that Russian forces had intervened militarily outside of the Russian

Federation in the ex-Soviet space since 1991. The rapid disintegration of

the Georgian army and the speed of the Russian advance beyond the

territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia towards Tblisi prompted an

emergency meeting of the European Council to discuss the situation. The

feeling that the Union urgently needed to re-enforce its policy toolkit in

what, in August 2008, appeared to be a highly volatile region, led to the

decision to bring forward the launch of the Eastern Partnership to 3

December 2008 (European Commission, 2008 823 final). The resultant

Commission document was endorsed by the 27 Foreign Ministers of the EU

and the six Eastern Partnership (Armenia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia,

Ukraine and Moldova) states in a Joint Declaration following the Prague

Eastern Partnership Summit on 7 May 2009 (European Council 8425/09

(Presse 78)).

As can be noted from the above outline of the origins and development of

the EaP, this partnership was developed at a national level in response to

bilateral concerns between the Eastern Partner countries and the EU. There

has, however, been an increasing focus on expanding the engagement of

non-state actors to the EaP process, and this has opened up enhanced

scope for the development of initiatives and partnerships at the level of

local and regional governmental actors, whose contributions can deliver

key elements of the overall objectives of the EaP strategy:

• The Civil Society Forum of the Eastern Partnership was set up in the

early phase of EaP development in 2009 as a means of fostering the

direct involvement of civil society organisations in delivering the

aims of the EaP.

• The Euronest parliamentary assembly was established in May 2011

as a means to better connect parliamentarians from the European

Parliament and those from EaP countries. Working to facilitate a

better mutual understanding, the Euronest engagement in the EaP

has helped to enhance and strengthen the visibility of the EaP. Its

role has been to lead parliamentary consultations, as well as to

supervise and monitor the Partnership.

• CORLEAP established in 2011, has laid solid foundations for

fostering a regional dimension to the EaP. This particular

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perspective was missing from the original framework for EaP

cooperation, and CORLEAP is regarded as a strong vehicle for

connecting the actions of the EaP with citizens, linking national

authorities with citizens in the fulfilment of the Eastern Partnership

obejctives.

• The European Economic and Social Committee contributes to the

dialogue with civil society in the EaP countries, and plays a

particularly important role in strengthening interaction between

employers’ organisations and trade unions on the one hand and

governmental actors on the other.

Content of the EaP

The EaP came as an addition to a policy area already well-furnished with

aims shared by all Member States, but which was inadequate in terms of

the practical tools required to meet the broad objectives set out with the

shared aims. The EaP’s rhetoric is based on what the Commission called “a

lasting message of EU solidarity” (Commission, 2008, 823 final) between

the EU and the ENP states; but, far more importantly, it also sought to

provide new tools to assist in the achievement of the pre-existing and

longer-standing ENP objectives of nurturing democracy, the rule of law and

the development of free market economies through an open-ended

European integration process that would not necessarily lead to full

accession. Its second area of novelty lay in encouraging the EaP countries to

cooperate multi-laterally between themselves, under the watchful eye of

the European Union; this would provide the motor for regional

cooperation. In addition to the established ENP goal of EEA-style

integration between the EU and the ENP countries, the EaP foresaw the

creation of a regional ‘Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area’ between

the EaP countries as a precursor to deeper economic integration with the

EU – performing a similar function to that of CEFTA for the central

European states in the 1990s. However, in common with the CEFTA

countries in the 1990s, enthusiasm for the idea was somewhat muted –

after all what mattered to the EaP countries was access to the wealthy

single market. For the EU, however, encouraging the EaP countries to work

together was of paramount importance.

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Added-Value of the EaP

The launch of the EaP aimed to send a clear message of solidarity to the

eastern neighbourhood countries and offered the genuine possibility of

much stronger links between them and the European Union through a

‘deep and comprehensive free trade area’ (DCFTA) and eventual visa

liberalization – both of which are highly attractive to the EaP countries.

However, these positive elements should be tempered by the fact that the

DCFTA will prove very hard to negotiate and may not come into existence

for many years, that the visa liberalization remains an ‘aspiration’ – and,

that these goals have been on the agenda for some time. Another criticism

is that the EaP still failed to provide any mention of the possibility of

eventual accession to the Union – which to an extent remained the elephant

in the room although there was no point discussing membership if the

definitive answer was to be ‘no’ for the then foreseeable future. This raises

very specific questions about the added value of the EaP and whether it has

truly moved the issue of EU–Eastern European relations forwards.

In response to this concern, and looking beyond the high politics

aspirations of EU membership, it is possible to observe that the added-

value of the EaP may lie primarily in the fact that the policy set in motion

the development of the Comprehensive Institution Building (CIB)

programme. This was designed to help the EaP countries prepare for

European integration by strengthening their administrative capacity. The

CIB sets modest, achievable targets that should, in theory, lead to progress

in meeting the policy’s stated highline aims and objectives, such as

approximating and successfully implementing key elements of the acquis

communautaire. This process will be monitored annually by the

Commission – as was the case with CEE enlargement during the 1990s and

early 2000s. This depoliticization of the approach towards the eastern

neighbours may prove exceptionally valuable in the future. This is relevant

because the ENP was criticized due to the fact that it proved simply

impossible to separate ‘high’ from ‘low’ politics or technical issues from

politicized aspects, for example, the prospective of membership. This is

reminiscent of similar arguments made in the case of CEE relations with

the EU in the early 1990s following the development of early Association

Agreements.

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Importantly for the EaP states and the pro-enlargement Member States, the

EaP separates the ENP states into potential Member States in the east and

the ‘neighbours of Europe’ in the south. It also represents a modest amount

of progress in the potential depth and quality of relationship with the

Union that the EaP countries can aspire to. Moreover, once they have met

particular objectives, a fresh set of short-term goals can be set – and thus,

little by little, the quality of relations with the EU should improve.

Ultimately, in the view of many interviewees, the EaP’s ‘offer’ to the eastern

ENP states was the best that could have been agreed at that particular point

in time, in 2008 and 2009, given the divisions between the EU’s Member

States on any future enlargement beyond that to the Western Balkans (but

not Turkey, which remains controversial despite its candidate status).

Indeed without the Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008, in the opinion

of one Commission official, the Eastern Partnership might have amounted

to rather less in the way of substance.

The Bi-lateral Track of the EAP

The EaP retained the pre-existing bi-lateral elements of cooperation

between the European Union and eastern Europe, including the upgrading

of relations with the EaP countries to Associate Member, which is

envisaged to take place through the signing of a series Association

Agreements.1 Considerable mention was also made of eventual visa

liberalization necessary to improve the mobility of citizens between the EU

and ENP states – but this was expressed more as a longer-term aspiration

than as something immediate. Enhanced cooperation between the EaP

countries and EU was also proposed in a range of policy areas that

envisaged eventual convergence in areas ranging from Justice and Home

Affairs to education policy. The Association Agreements (one of which, for

example, with Ukraine, has been negotiated and initialled on 30 March

2012 but not signed at the time of writing in 2012) were to be governed by

Association Councils with the power to make decisions that are legally

1 The use of the term Association Agreements was at first contested, with some Member States calling for the

name ‘Enhanced Agreement’ to be employed, implicitly avoiding making a link between the signing of an

Association Agreement and a commitment to eventual accession in the way that followed the signing of the

Association Agreements (also commonly called Europe Agreements) with the central European countries that

joined in the Fifth Enlargement.

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binding on both parties (the EU and the EaP states), which would in a small

way redress the vast imbalance in the power relationship between the EU

and its eastern neighbours. In terms of high-level regular meetings

between the two sides, the EaP promised a twice-yearly summit of Heads of

State and Government from the EU and the EaP that would continue to

provide momentum to the integration process. This would be

supplemented by an annual meeting of foreign ministers and a twice-yearly

meeting of senior officials. These meetings are considered very useful for

the smaller EaP countries which otherwise would struggle to arrange high-

level meetings with EU leaders.

Although the bi-lateral agenda of the Eastern Partnership was theoretically

attractive to the EaP states (barring the low levels of funding available for

policy: around €785 million was earmarked for all the EaP countries

between 2009 and 2013, compared with €67 billion received by Poland

alone in structural and regional funds between 2007 and 20132), it did not

really represent much in the way of new goals and objectives. The true

policy innovation lay in the development of multi-lateral cooperation, lying

on top of the bi-lateral context of the ENP.

The bilateral relationship element of the EaP builds on the previous ENP

funding instruments. This means that the two main instruments of the EaP

on the bilateral level of cooperation are the Association Agenda and the

Association Agreement.

• The Association Agenda is an instrument which replaces the previous

Action Plan, and has been signed with all EaP countries apart from

Belarus;

o The Association Agenda “will prepare for and facilitate the

entry into force of the Association Agreement”.

o This document is based on the joint ownership, responsibility

and monitoring of results, but it is not legally binding

2 ‘Cohesion policy 2007–13: Poland, the biggest beneficiary, has plan and priorities agreed with the

Commission’. Commission Press Release, Reference: IP/07/633, Date: 08/05/2007, available at:

«http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/633&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN

&guiLanguage=en».

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Unlike the former Action Plans, the Association Agenda also includes the

principles of political association and economic integration

The Multi-Lateral Track of the EaP

The second, and arguably, most important innovation in the Eastern

Partnership was the introduction of a multi-lateral integration track for the

six Eastern European countries. The multi-lateral element includes the

following five features:

1. The establishment of common positions in various policy fields Developing common positions between actors is one of the core rationales

of the multi-lateral track. This element offers opportunity for structured

dialogue between the EU and the Eastern Partners with a view to engaging

on many of the issues which shaped the contours of the wider EU approach

to the EaP region.

2. The creation of a structured ‘approximation process’ for the

implementation of EU regulation across the region;

The creation of a structured approximation process is novel because it

mirrors the ‘screening’ of the acquis that was carried out in the early stages

of the integration of the Member States of central and eastern Europe. The

proposals of the Commission to create a sort of multilateral screening-light

should also be an important utility for the EAP countries. While the Union

will certainly not call this facility ‘screening’, it should be remarked that

such a multi-lateral facility was only offered to the new member states in

Central Europe once the negotiations for membership had started.

Probably the Commission did not envisage anything like the intensity of

advice, which was being given to those new Member States in the case of

the EAP. Nevertheless a significant problem for the EAP states will be

ensuring that the legal approximation it undertakes leads to a proper

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implementation of the acquis. This proposed facility might help to solve

this problem.

3. The establishment of four thematic platforms, as follows:

i. democracy, good governance and stability; ii. economic integration and convergence with EU policies;

iii. energy security; iv. contacts between people

The development of this platform-based approach to debates in a set of

policy fields is of particular note within the multi-lateral track. These

platforms, which meet on at least two occasions per year, involve input

from senior officials operating in relevant policy areas. The platforms then

report to the annual meetings of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the EaP. It is

therefore very significant that the CoR has been active as a permanent

member in all four of these platforms since November 2011. This

engagement offers real scope for the results of CORLEAP deliberations

to be channelled into ongoing policy thinking about the future shape

and scope of the EaP.

The 2009 Prague Declaration which established the Eastern Partnership

also foresaw the possibility that these platforms might be supported by

further thematic panels, which could develop thematically driven

perspectives on certain sub-policy fields, and offer vital expertise to the

platform deliberations. Thus far, two of the platforms have taken advantage

of this opportunity. Platform 1 has set up three panels, on:

• Integrated Border Management;

• The Fight Against Corruption; and

• Public Administrative Reform

Platform 2 has also established three panels, on:

• Small and Medium-sized Business Enterprises

• Trade Related Regulatory Approximation, linked to DCFTAs

• Environment and Climate Change

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The creation of these panels is of further significance for advancing the

local and regional dimension of the EaP. Of particular note in this regard is

the EaP Panel on Public Administration Reform, which is a core element of

Platform 1. Its establishment responds to the need repeatedly stressed by

the European Commission in its communications on the EaP that public

administration reform is crucial for the strengthening and deepening of

cooperation within the EaP. Indeed, in recent assessments of the progress

of the ENP, the Commission has stressed that “the reform of public

administration remains one of the significant unmet challenges for partner

countries”, and that “the need to encourage good governance remains

pressing, both as a goal in itself, and because it ultimately underpins

political stability and economic growth.”3

In addition there will likely be other opportunities for ongoing CoR and

CORLEAP interventions in a number of other panels, not least that on

environment and climate change, but the CoR presence within the

platforms will allow for an initial assessment of the opportunities

presented by panel working groups.

4. Implementation of key ‘flagship projects’, such as: integrated border management, improved facilities for SMEs, interconnection of regional electricity markets, development of a southern energy corridor and cooperation in management of natural disasters;

The proposed flagship initiatives will depend on the availability of

resources and this is likely to be a matter of dispute between the Member

States, particularly in the run-up to the 2014–20 financial framework

(which is even more fraught than usual as a result of the global financial

crisis).

5. The establishment of a Neighbourhood Economic Community, rather

like the European Economic Area. 3 Taking stock of the European Neighbourhood Policy’. Communication from the Commission to the European

Parliament and the Council. Brussels, 12/05/2010. COM(2010) 207. P. 4.

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Another interesting element within the multi-lateral track is economic

integration and the idea of the ‘Neighbourhood Economic Community’,

which this could be similar to the EEA. However, the technical problems

involved in creating a regional FTA will be enormous – and it will cost a

great deal of money. It is also not clear what the economic benefits for the

EAP countries would be of integrating between themselves before

integrating with the EU.

Implications for Local and Regional Authorities in the EaP countries

The Committee of the Regions has been closely monitoring the

development of the Eastern Partnership process since its conception, and

has engaged widely in opportunities to foster an enhanced local and

regional dimension.

In April 2009, the CoR responded to the Czech Council Presidency

consultation on the Eastern Partnership. In its Opinion on the “The Role of

Local and Regional Authorities within the Eastern Partnership”, written by

rapporteur Istvan Sertö-Radics.

In 2011, the CoR adopted six opinions covering local and regional

development and cooperation with the European Union in each partner

country. These Opinions explore the extent to which local and regional

authorities are involved in the preparation of bilateral cooperation

agreements with the EU and the implementation of the Eastern Partnership

initiative, including the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI)

and cross-border cooperation, in the respective partner countries. This set

of Opinions on the neighbourhood partner countries also offer insights into

the ways in which the CoR could provide added value in terms of, for

instance, supporting modernisation, administrative reforms or

administrative capacity building at the local and regional level. These are

all issues that have been identified to be common to all six partner

countries.

The CoR Opinion on “The Role of Local and Regional Authorities within the

Eastern Partnership” (CdR 78/2009) prepared by Rapporteur Istvan Sertö-

Radics, outlined a number of key steps which would be useful as a means of

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institutionalising local and regional cooperation within the framework of

the EaP. This would allow for a wider mainstreaming of local and regional

concerns as the EaP process moved forward.

Many of these proposals from 2009 have by now resulted in concrete

action:

• A call to develop forms of closer cooperation with countries involved

in the Eastern Partnership has resulted in the development of the

CORLEAP partnership initiative itself;

• The recommendation to establish closer relations between the EU

regional and local authorities and the EaP process itself has seen the

CoR now take on a full and active role within each of the four

thematic platforms of the partnership;

• The CoR’s request that future ENPI funding schemes allocate at least

10% of the global budget to cross-border cooperation programmes

was taken on board as a means of enhancing cooperation from the

bottom up.

These successes illustrate that the articulation of local and regional needs

within the framework of the future Eastern Partnership is of real

significance and it is therefore vital that the CoR and CORLEAP present

action points to relevant strategic partners as a means to advance further

the local and regional dimensions of future schemes.

The time has now come, however, to take local and regional engagement in

the EaP process to the next level, and to establish real action points for

cooperation between LRAs within the EU and the partner countries which

can deliver a significant impact into the future scope and operation of the

EaP as a whole.

Local and regional authorities will also have a role to play in the

comprehensive institution building element of the EaP. The policy

recommendations on democracy, good governance and stability are

contained in Part 2 of this report. Local and regional authorities have a vital

role to play in making sure that there is convergence with EU policies at the

local and regional level. They also have a role to play in delivering energy

security through greater energy efficiency. They are the primary engine of

increased contacts between people through pupil and student exchanges,

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town twinning and cross border cooperation programmes, facilitating the

broader understandings which the EaP, globally, sets out to achieve.

Future perspectives on the EaP from the local and regional point of

view

The Eastern Partnership Roadmap to the autumn 2013 summit4 offers

clear scope for advancing local and regional viewpoints in the Eastern

Partnership process. A new programme, the “Eastern Partnership

Integration and Cooperation” programme (EaPIC) is currently being

established, with an indicative allocation of €130 million for 2012-13. Its

focus on promoting democratic transformation and institution building for

sustainable and inclusive growth, alongside increased confidence building

measures, has clear scope for local and regional input. It is in this aspect of

the future EaP and the “roadmap” that CoR and CORLEAP members can

make a substantial impact to the future shape and scope of this particular

funding instrument.

The Roadmap specifically identifies the CORLEAP initiative as an important

tool through which a regional dimension of the Eastern Partnership can be

enhanced. CORLEAP’s ability to strengthen ties between local authorities

across the EU and EaP areas is regarded by EU leaders and the EU

institutions as an important means of connecting with citizens in the

fulfilment and delivery of the Eastern Partnership’s objectives5. CORLEAP

activities can therefore make a significant contribution to the global

objectives of the EaP.

In addition to new initiatives and proposals developed by CORLEAP as it

continues its work in the run-up to the 2013 summit, there are some

existing areas of cooperation which can yield significant results in the

interim period. Three major instruments have been designed specifically

for implementation at the local and regional level. These are:

1) Pilot Regional Development Programmes

4 Eastern Partnership: A Roadmap to the autumn 2013 summit JOIN (2012) 13 final

5 Eastern Partnership: A Roadmap to the autumn 2013 summit JOIN (2012) 13 final, page 16

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Pilot Regional Development Programmes (PRDPs) have been developed in

the framework of EU bilateral cooperation with EaP countries. Modelled on

EU cohesion policy, PRDPs focus on tackling significant structural

problems, such as economic and social disparities between regions and

population groups, historical, cultural, ethnic or religious differences. The

new PRDPs allow EaP partner countries firstly to develop but also to

support regional development strategies, with a focus on overcoming

disparities. Projects which are financed under the PRDPs will address

structural deficiencies.

The EU has earmarked €75 million of additional funding for the period

2012–13 to support the implementation of PRDPs in the six eastern

partner countries.

PRDPs have the potential to make a significant contribution to the future

development of local and regional governance capacities in the EaP region.

The CoR and CORLEAP should closely monitor their implementation

and their impact in order to develop recommendations regarding

their future after the initial 2012-2013 funding phase. A point of view

on PRDPs should be developed by the CoR and CORLEAP ahead of the

autumn 2013 Eastern Partnership summit.

PRDPs are supported by regional policy dialogues with EaP countries.

2) The ENPI cross-border cooperation programme

As a key priority of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership

Instrument (ENPI), cross-border cooperation (CBC) is regarded as an

important tool which can significantly enhance the economic and social

development of regions in border areas.

The CBC strategy for the EaP area has four primary objectives:

• To promote economic and social development in border areas;

• To address common challenges on both sides of a national border;

• To ensure efficient and secure border management;

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• To promote people-to-people cooperation.

In order to achieve these objectives, two types of CBC programmes have

been established:

• Land border programmes between two or more countries sharing a

common border or short sea crossing;

• Multilateral programmes covering a sea basin;

Significantly, priority is given within these programmes to local and

regional authority actors. Not only can CBC establish and strengthen

networks between LRAs in cross-border spaces, but it can also offer a

substantial basis from which to develop a robust regional policy. CBC

supports two main developmental factors, which are pre-requisites for the

roll-out and subsequent successful delivery of a regional policy: CBC is

concerned primarily with practical problem-solving in a broad range of

fields of everyday administrative life. CBC involves a certain stabilization of

cross-border contacts, i.e. institution-building, over time (Perkmann, 2003,

p. 156). This cross-border interaction can facilitate the necessary

institutional learning and administrative capacity building which can

supply the basis on which a regional policy can be delivered successfully

and can lead to regional development in the cross-border space.

Thus it can be seen that the CBC strategy is an integral component of the

overarching EaP framework, supporting and reinforcing other individual

elements, such as the roll out of the PRDPs, for instance.

3) The territorial cooperation programme, which complements the

cross-border initiatives.

Financed through the ENPI programme, the territorial cooperation

programme for the Eastern Partnership countries was set up in response to

the communication on the Eastern Partnership (COM(2008) 823), which

itself had recommended the creation of an effective territorial cooperation

programme between border regions in the Eastern Partnership countries,

modelled on the lines of existing ENPI cross-border cooperation

programmes.

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The European Commission and European External Action Service

(EEAS) Approach to the EaP

The Commission and the European External Action Service (hereafter

EEAS) approach to the EaP and its local and regional dimension is

structured around the rollout of the flagship initiatives and of the regional

policy facility, which is being delivered in the next few years6. The exact

scope of many of these projects remains unclear; this therefore presents a

real set of opportunities for both CORLEAP, the CoR and local and regional

authority partners in the EaP countries to make a significant difference to

the form many of these implementations will take. Enhanced dialogue

with stakeholders in the EaP countries is necessary to ensure that an

appropriate and effective regional policy can be devised, which meets

the real needs of local and regional actors in these countries.

From the Commission and EEAS point of view, cross-border projects and

those aiming at the stabilisation of frontier regions will probably be

especially welcome. Such projects could help the EaP countries both to

stabilise life along their borders but also to encourage limited economic

development there too.

Potentially there could of course also be dangers in the Eastern

Partnership. One worry is that in an effort to maintain equality across the

region, relations with the EU will progress at the rate of the slowest reform

state in the region. This seems an unlikely outcome. The Commission

proposal underlines that the principle of differentiation will apply: i.e. the

integration of each Eastern European state with the European Union will

proceed at a speed, which suits each particular state. Nevertheless, it will

be important for all EaP countries to ensure that there is no delay to their

progress integrating with the internal market on account of slow progress

elsewhere. A second danger is that because EU foreign ministers are

6 Europe Aid (2011) Update on the Eastern Partnership, Paper presented to the EaP summit, 29-30 September

2011, Warsaw

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extremely short of time, multilateral political dialogue may be used to

restrict bilateral political dialogue, but this is unlikely.

Conditionality and the Commission EEAS Approach

A key feature of the ENP is conditionality, whereby the EU’s neighbours are

rewarded for undertaking reforms with access to the Single Market on a

progressive basis, and with additional funding (albeit on a modest scale,

given the tasks in hand). This is also known as ‘more for more’. It logically

also follows that countries who violate the EU’s values are not rewarded.

Yet conditionality was previously been applied to states with a realistic

membership perspective. The EaP, by contrast, offers merely the hope of an

ever closer association through substantive deep and comprehensive trade

agreements – although it does not rule membership out. Rather than

focusing cooperation in the Eastern Neighbourhood region simply on

energy cooperation and the energy resources at these countries’ disposal, it

has been argued that European and international partners should make

energy imports conditional upon democratic reform (Askarov, 2010, p. 9).

In the view of the Commission and EEAS, for the moment, all the countries

are continuing to make progress and this is to be commended. There are a

number of roadblocks that need to be overcome for some countries, such as

Ukraine, for progress to be made. In the Ukrainian case, these roadblocks

are: (1) the selective justice problem that is caused by the out-of-date

Ukrainian criminal code and prosecution procedure; (2) the need for free

and fair elections, which are due to be held in October 2012; and (3) the

need to accelerate the reform agenda. Local and regional partnerships

can contribute to this agenda through increased training and

exchange of best practice initiatives which offer capacity building

opportunities to local and regional governments.

The problems of corruption, and poor implementation of democratic

systems of governance continue to shape Commission and EEAS progress

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reports on development within the EaP states.7 There continues to be

progress in all these areas (with particular progress on public financial

management, intellectual property rights and the business environment),

and neither the Commission, nor the EEAS, are distracted by passing

political spats from the wider integration agenda. CORLEAP would be

advised to do the same, without, however, compromising its values should

the political situation decline any further – which is not expected to be the

case.

Increasingly, European Commission and EEAS reports on the ENP and EaP

have emphasised the important contribution which robust frameworks for

local and regional democracy can make to delivering on the global

objectives of the EaP agenda. They note in particular that “local and

regional authorities have a key role to play in narrowing the gap between

the population and institutions, promoting a culture of political

participation at local level and ensuring that policy decisions take local

needs into account.”8 As the body which best understands the practical

dimension of these issues, CORLEAP therefore needs to work with its

members to outline core measures which can be undertaken to

ensure that these aspirations can become a reality within the EaP

countries.

7 See the latest country progress reports published on 15 May 2012 at:

http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#2 8 European Commission (2012) “Delivering on a new European Neighbourhood Policy”, JOIN(2012) 14 final.

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National Approaches to the EaP:

The view from the partner countries

ARMENIA

General National Approach to the EaP

Given Armenia’s relatively modest ambition of getting closer to the

European Union, its government views the EaP positively. Armenia sees the

EU as a way to diversify its global contacts and improve its economic

situation. However, Armenia’s position is highly dependent on the regional

context and on Turkey in particular. Armenia’s interest in the EU has grown

since the launch of the EaP in 2009. In contrast to some other countries, the

Armenian authorities, opposition and civil society are optimistic about the

EaP’s potential to generate substantial benefits for their country.9

Strengthening Local Self-Government and Local Democracy

Administratively, Armenia is organised into the city of Yerevan and ten

provinces (marz), which are further divided into communities

(hamaynkner). Armenia’s local self-government is clearly defined by

legislation, instituting representative and executive bodies in all

communities. However, in practice local self-government bodies are not as

strong as they need to be, not always transparent and dependent to an

extent both politically and financially on regional governors, who are in

turn appointed by the central government.10 Often, voters are

(understandably) economically motivated and therefore economic elites

tend to play the role of community leaders. For this reason, the media,

perhaps unfairly, sometimes refer to the country’s leading businesspeople,

many of whom hold seats in parliament or regional administrations, as

“feudal lords”. Little authority is left to local governance bodies, which

often lack transparency, accountability, a clear understanding of the

division of powers, and adequate human resources. Despite constitutional 9 Wolczuk, K (2011) ’Perceptions of, and Attitudes towards, the Eastern Partnership amongst the Partner Countries’ Political Elites, Eastern Partnership Review n°5, Estonian Centre of the Eastern Partnership, available at: http://www.eceap.eu/ul/Review_No5.pdf 10 Structured Dialogue (2011), ‘Local authorities in development for European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) countries,’ Background document for European Commission seminar in Baku, 11 February 2011, available at: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/fpfis/mwikis/aidco/images/3/32/Background_document_ENP_seminar_130111.pdf

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amendments in 2005 that consolidated the independence of local self-

governance bodies, no improvements have been visible in practice. The

Union of Communities of Armenia, the collective body representing all 915

local self-governing bodies in the country, stresses the need for enhanced

self-governance capacities at the local level, a greater level of financial

autonomy for local authorities in the country, as well as an overall need for

further decentralisation of governmental competences.

Since 2009, the Ministry of Territorial Administration of Armenia has been

making plans to merge communities in order to increase their financial and

managerial potential. On 10 November 2011, the government adopted a

concept for the enlargement of communities and began planning practical

steps for reducing the number of communities to about 200 nationwide

(down from nearly 1000). As regards regional development, the focus of

future Pilot Regional Development Programmes is being discussed with the

government, on the basis of its regional development strategy. Greater

attention to regional policy dialogue with the EU will help Armenia

maximize the benefits of these programmes.11 In June 2011, Yerevan also

hosted a congress of local self-government in Council of Europe member

states, and a conference on “Migration as a Challenge to Local and Regional

Authorities,” which involved over 70 participants. Both these events are

usually held in Strasbourg, but were conducted in Yerevan at the invitation

of the Armenian government as a pledge of the country’s commitment to

developing local self-government.

Co-operation between Local Authorities and Civil Society

Armenian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operate in a generally

favourable legislative climate and are respected in society. Controversial

draft amendments to the Law on Public Organizations were revised in 2010

under pressure from civil society organizations. Armenia’s civil society is

considered to be vibrant and the number of registered organizations is

growing. However, the impact of such public advocacy on government

policy remains limited. The Association of Local Democracy Agencies

(ALDA) is helping to launch a local democracy agency in 2012 supporting

11 See the latest EU progress report: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/progress_report_armenia_en.pdf

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the capacity building of local authorities and civil society in citizens’

participation.12

Cross Border Co-operation

Armenia is engaged in one CBC programme with the EU (the Black Sea

basin programme).13 The scope for CBC programmes is limited by the

absence of a land border with an EU member state, poor relations with

neighbouring Azerbaijan (over Nagorno-Karabakh where border clashes

were seen in June 2012), and historically poor relations with Turkey

(linked especially to the 1915 genocide). There has, however, been some

improvement in cross-border links with Turkey in recent years through the

Eurasia Partnership foundation.14

Within the framework of the Fostering Regional Development in Armenia

and Georgia Through Cross-Border Co-operation project, the National

Association of Local Authorities of Georgia (NALAG) and the Communities

Association of Armenia (CAA), as the project‘s partners, established

EuroCaucas on 15 June 2009 which is the first entity of its kind in the

region. The organisation is based upon the experiences of European

regions with the aim to assist local governments in the Armenian–Georgian

border regions in developing cross-border co-operation initiatives. It is

hoped that EuroCaucas will play an important role of initiator/generator of

activities of cross-border collaboration under the auspices of the EU

Eastern Partnership Policy.

12 Association for Local Democracy Agencies (2011), ‘The Local Democracy Agency in Armenia: a tool for local democracy and citizen participation,’ available at: http://www.alda-europe.eu/newSite/public/doc/353-The-Local-Democracy-Agency-Armenia-200711.pdf 13 See CBC programme website: http://www.blacksea-cbc.net 14 Füsun Özerdem (2011) ‘Turkey’s EU Cross Border Cooperation Experiences: From Western Borders to Eastern Borders,’ Journal of European Perspectives on the Western Balkans, Vol.3, No.2, pp.75-103.

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AZERBAIJAN

General National Approach to the EaP

European leaders have taken a pragmatic approach towards

democratisation in their relations with Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is lukewarm

towards the EaP and seeks to communicate with the EU on an equal basis,

mostly discussing the initiative’s economic aspects. Within Azerbaijan,

support for the EaP is difficult to secure because of the perceived lack of EU

support for the country’s territorial integrity. Therefore, the EaP is

predominantly seen as a means of asserting the country’s role as a major

regional and international energy player and obtaining the EU’s support for

the development of its strategic energy infrastructure. Azerbaijan’s elites

emphasize their modest aspirations for cooperation with the EU. They ask

to be treated as a self-reliant ‘partner’ rather than a recipient of EU

guidance and assistance.

Strengthening Local Self-Government and Local Democracy

Azerbaijan is organised along 59 districts (rayon), 11 cities and the

Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic (which itself contains 7 districts and 1

city). The districts (rayon), which are directly subordinate or accountable

to the central government are further divided into elected, self-governing

municipalities. In September 2009, the Law on the unification of

municipalities reduced the number of municipalities to 1,766. Authorities

argued that the reform increased the efficiency of local self-government,

especially in territories with a small population. However, this may result

in fewer posts for local representatives.

Municipalities and representations of executive bodies function in parallel,

even in small administrative territorial units, which may lead to less

effective governance and create favourable conditions for the executive

bodies to keep municipalities under informal control.15 Limited progress

has been made in promoting effective local self-government. Contrary to

15 NGO alliance for municipal development (2011), ‘Assessment of conformity of organizational and operational aspects of municipalities in Azerbaijan within the principles and requirements of the European charter: Monitoring report,’ Baku, 2011, available from: http://www.alda-europe.eu/newSite/public/doc/415-Report-Monitoring_ENG_BINA_2011-FINAL.pdf . This report is based on monitoring by local government associations in Azerbaijan.

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the European Charter for Self Government, local authorities in Azerbaijan

lack both strong political status and significant sources of finance.16

President Ilham Aliyev’s rule has moved Azerbaijan towards

authoritarianism. This trend continued in 2011, with the regime taking a

more systematic approach to cracking down on youth and opposition

activism. Local self-government in Azerbaijan is to an extent heavily

influenced by the executive branch, which in part is the result of a national

governance system dominated by the ruling party.17 Municipalities are

underfunded and lack meaningful responsibilities or decision-making

authority.

In 2001, Azerbaijan ratified the European Charter of Local Self-

Government, which endows municipalities with substantial responsibilities

and decision-making authority. However, in reality, municipalities have few

responsibilities and remain subordinate to the executive.18 There is little

transparency in the work conducted by self-governance structures, and

citizens have only vague ideas about what elected or appointed officials

actually do – although this in practice is common in many countries. As a

consequence, public trust in local self-government structures is low.

Local elections held in December 2009 were condemned by the opposition

as the first ballot in which “the country’s leadership did not even bother to

create a semblance of democracy.”19 The mayor of Baku continues to be

appointed by the president despite strong calls by the CoE to make this an

elected office. In contrast to other municipalities, the exclave of

Nakhchevan enjoys a strong degree of autonomous governance, but is not

always fully observant of democratic standards. The chair of the local

parliament for the past 13 years is Vasif Talibov, who is related by marriage

to the Aliyev family, which indicates the importance of close relationships

16 See the most recent EU progress report: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/progress_report_azerbaijan_en.pdf 17 Hug, A. (ed.) (2011) Spotlight on Azerbaijan, London: Foreign Policy Centre. 18 Ibid. 19 ‘Low turnout, alleged violations mar Azerbaijani local elections,’ Caucasus Report, RFE/RL, January 4th, 2010, available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/Low_Turnout_Alleged_Violations_Mar_Azerbaijani_Local_Elections/1920949.html

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between the governing elite.20 Restrictions on rights and freedoms can be

severe.

Co-operation between Local Authorities and Civil Society

Uncooperative government policies and a strategy of selective funding have

left the still-developing nongovernmental organization (NGO) sector

splintered and without significant impact. Most active organizations are

based in the capital, Baku. A growing number of pro-government NGOs (or

GONGOs21) operate in the country. These organizations have been set up by

the authorities or persons close to them with the aim of creating a third

sector for international funders to work with. Because these compliant

entities usually get better access than groups that are vocally critical, some

donors see them as more effective. The country’s political opposition has

been effectively undermined over the past years; consequently, authorities

have no serious political rivals. Civic and political apathy is widespread,

and self-censorship is prevalent.

The 2008-2015 State Programme of Poverty Reduction and Sustainable

Development in the Azerbaijan Republic contains better mechanisms of

public and state supervision of municipalities’ financial and operational

activities. However, the programme does not specify what these better

mechanisms are. Under the said programme, civil society will be

strengthened and NGOs will be supported so that communities take part

more in addressing local problems and community-based development is

nurtured.22

The NGO Alliance for Municipal Development was established in May 2009

by NGOs operating in the field of better local self-governance in Azerbaijan.

The alliance primarily seeks to develop and implement sound strategies on

better local self-governments (municipalities) and to coordinate the efforts

of and collaboration between national NGOs in order to strengthen the

organizational and institutional capacity of municipalities. The Alliance’s

mission is to support decentralization and democratic processes. ALDA is

20 The original source for this assertion is a leaked diplomatic cable from the U.S embassy in Baku, published on the ‘WikiLeaks’ website. This claim was subsequently circulated through other sources, including the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the Freedom House, Nations in Transit Report (see: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/azerbaijan). 21 GONGO is an acronym for government organised non-governmental organisation. 22 NGO alliance for municipal development (2011), p.32

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taking initial steps to establish a local democracy agency that will support

the capacity building of local authorities and civil society in citizens’

participation.23

Cross Border Co-operation

Azerbaijan was invited to participate in CBC programmes, but elected not

to participate in the Black Sea basin programme as it “refuses to become

involved in joint projects with Armenia.” 24 Prospects for cooperation with

the EU are further hindered by the fact that Azerbaijan has no land border

with an EU member state. It has, however, some limited experience of

cross-border co-operation with Georgia and Turkey, as noted above.

23 Ibid, p.34/ 24 See ENPI programming website news section: http://www.enpi-programming.eu/wcm/en/programming-process/ep-debate-on-the-cross-border-cooperation.html

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BELARUS

General National Approach to the EaP

By the end of 2011 the Belarusian authorities had not succeeded in

‘capitalizing’ on its policy of normalization of relations with the EU and

confrontation with the Russian administration. Nevertheless, the

Belarusian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has, on several occasions, called

upon the European Commission to adopt as soon as possible “accurate and

transparent regulations” for the consideration and further financing of the

submitted projects, and to fill the whole programme with practical

contents, although it appears that Belarus is interested in the material

benefits of participation in the EaP, but not on fulfilling its obligations that

form part of the agreement.25 Indeed, it appears that if the EaP cannot

respond to Belarus’ interests (including aid, investment and trade

preferences) and continues to promote a normative approach towards

Belarus (for example, through non-inclusion of Belarusian

parliamentarians in EURONEST and legitimisation of Belarusian civil

society through the Civil Society Forum), the Belarusian government might

quickly lose its interest in further participation.

In a sign that the regime is growing increasingly frustrated with what it

considers to be excessive demands imposed by the EU, the Belarusian MFA

in September accused the EU of ‘politicising’ the EaP.26 Since then, Belarus

has boycotted recent EaP meetings as relations with the EU have

deteriorated in the face of sanctions following the sustained crackdown

against the domestic political opposition over the course of 2010-11.

Furthermore, the EU’s new Dialogue for Modernization in 2012 is aimed

solely at civil society and political opposition, excluding the Belarusian

authorities (and by implication LRAs) for the time being until political

prisoners are released.27

25 Dzianis Melyantsou (2011), ‘Belarus – EU: Dialogue anticipating the elections,’ available at: http://nmnby.eu/by-2010en/melyancov-en.html 26 ‘Belarusian foreign ministry accuses EU of politicizing Eastern Partnership,’ Belarus News, available at: http://naviny.by/rubrics/english/2011/09/29/ic_news_259_377385/ 27 Andrei Yahorau, Elena Tonkacheva, Ulad Vialichka, Dina Shavtsova, Vladimir Dunaev (2012), European Dialogue on Modernization with Belarus, full text available from: http://eurobelarus.info/en/article/european_dialogue_on_modernisation_with_belarus

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Strengthening Local Self-Government and Local Democracy

Belarus is administered by the city of Minsk and six regions (voblast),

which are further divided into districts (raion) and

towns/cities/municipalities of regional/district subordination. However, in

practical terms Belarus has seen the complete disappearance of local self-

government and its replacement by local government in which local

authorities are a constituent part of the ‘presidential vertical’, with the

executive branch dominating the representative one (the Soviet model).

LRAs cannot be considered as a separate self-government institution

representing interests of the local community and protecting the latter

from excessive interference from the state. In November 2011, the

president issued the military rank of major-general to the heads of all

[regions] and the city of Minsk, making them responsible for the

deployment of military defence in their territories. This move further

strengthened the subordination of local officials to the president by

assuming a military-like chain of command.

Since January 4th 2010, LRAs have been following the new version of the

law ‘On local government and self-government in the Republic of Belarus’.

The law introduced no decisive changes into the Belarusian system of local

government and self-government. It simply redistributed powers between

local councils of deputies and regional executive bodies that used to be

duplicated at regional and district levels. Nevertheless, state authorities are

taking certain actions to improve local authorities’ work, especially in the

sphere of business. In this area, at least, Belarusian authorities are

liberalizing economic activities at the expense of local authorities: their

financial dependence is growing, the consolidated national budget is

further centralized as local budgetary receipts are reducing.28 This has

further weakened LRAs in Belarus, with local governments often left

drastically underfunded due to the lack of local revenue sources.

Because Belarus is not a member of the Council of Europe (all other EaP

partners are), it is under no obligation to comply with their standards for

local government. Elections to local councils in April 2010 saw only six

opposition members elected among the 21,288 council members 28 Zmicier Kuhley (2010), ‘Local Authorities: Self-government sacrificed to liberalization,’ Belarus News, available at: http://nmnby.eu/by-2010en/kuhley-en.html

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nationwide, and overall Belarus is classified as a consolidated authoritarian

regime with increased oppression observed throughout 2011. Local

branches of opposition organisations often struggle to register or secure

offices.29 This weakening of the formal powers and representative

functions of LRAs in Belarus has allowed local state functionaries to get

used to controlling the way in which local representative bodies are formed

and have consequently become more unaccountable to local communities

over time.30 Although not democratically elected, the upper house of

parliament, the Council of the Republic (comprising pro-regime

representatives from the regions), has a Council for Cooperation of Local

Self-Government Bodies (http://www.sovreg.gov.by) which is also

involved with links with LRA in other countries

Co-operation between Local Authorities and Civil Society

Because the authorities generally view community-based organizations

acting on local issues as a form of political activity, local political and civic

activists are closely monitored and have less freedom than their

counterparts in Minsk. For these reasons, many local civil society groups

avoid broader political agendas, focusing instead on apolitical issues of

local importance. Indeed, in 2010, many local NGOs chose to pursue a

conspicuously apolitical agenda in order to improve their chances of

engaging with local authorities. This brought mixed results, as in the case of

the Belarusian Association of Regional Development Agencies (Belarda),

whose registration was revoked in 2010, despite its efforts at pursuing a

less overtly political agenda.

It is often difficult to distinguish between civil society and the political

opposition at the local level. The authorities generally view community

organizations focussed on local issues as a form of (anti-regime) political

activity. Moreover, local organizers, many of whom are very young, tend to

develop political profiles and become active in NGOs and political parties at

the same time. Other programmes involving external actors (e.g. EU/UNDP

Local Development programmes) often stipulate active participation of

NGOs, which so far have been treated very unfavourably by Belarusian

29 See Freedom House, Nations in Transit report, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/belarus 30 Kuhley (2010).

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authorities both at the highest and at the local levels. Despite these

constraints, objective circumstances do often compel local officials to

involve NGOs in order to receive help from abroad, including financial help.

In order for the regime to be able to draw upon a reliable source of NGOs

that are often required to access external resources, it has formed pro-

government public associations (or GONGOs) which are gradually

infiltrating the third sector, pushing NGOs that want to stay independent of

the regime into the background. The presence of pro-governmental NGOs

secures legitimization of the ruling establishment, political mobilization,

control over election processes, and helps to establish cooperation with

foreign partners.

Any hints at a softening by the regime have almost disappeared. For

example, for almost two years [from 2009], the Lukashenka administration

presided over an alternative forum for dialogue between government and

civil society. For example, the Public Advisory Council of the Presidential

Administration consisted of 30 members, including prominent critics of the

government. In September 2011, however, it was dissolved having met

only 4 times.

An unintended, although perhaps positive development, was that the

overtly repressive atmosphere of 2011 also encouraged [independent]

NGOs to coordinate their activities more closely, giving new life and

importance to Belarus’s membership in the Eastern Partnership Program’s

Civil Society Forum (CSF). In October 2011 Belarus’s National Platform

elected a steering committee and adopted an official memorandum (or

mission statement), which invited all civil society organizations in Belarus

to sign.31 This was the first formal consolidation of civil society energies

toward a common goal since the 1997. In an effort to build on these fragile

but promising foundations the Association for Local Democracy Agencies

(ALDA) is initiating a project with Belarusian partners to try and mobilise

civil society and LRA to work on civic community projects.32

31 See: http://eurobelarus.info/en/article/belarusian_np_of_the_eap_csf_elected_interim_coordination_committee 32Association of Local Democracy Agencies (ALDA) (2011) Activity Report, available at: http://www.alda-europe.eu/newSite/public/publications/108-ALDA-Activity-Report-2011-web.pdf

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Cross Border Co-operation

Belarus currently participates in three CBC projects: one sea basin CBC

programme and two land border programmes.33 According to one

assessment, “multilateral cooperation projects within the EaP framework

could be better interconnected with existing, small-scale CBC projects,

including within Euroregions. In fact, Belarusian regions readily cooperate

with their Ukrainian neighbours in the framework of two Euroregions: the

Bug and Dniepr. The EU should seek to work more closely with the

Association of European Border Regions (AEBR), in which Bug is a member

and Dniepr has observer status, to develop these Euroregions’ institutional

capacity.”34

The participation of Belarusian LRAs in cross border cooperation projects

has encountered some serious problems. The most serious obstacles

include: the poor quality of Belarusian partners’ applications, which often

do not comply with established requirements; the difference between the

interests of potential partners in neighbouring states; and the complex,

bureaucratic and time-consuming procedure for project approval from the

Belarusian side. In addition, all projects must be endorsed by the relevant

ministries and agencies in Belarus, and should are then required to seek

the approval of a special committee of the Council of Ministers on

international technical assistance, after which the Prime Minister makes

the final decision. Many joint projects, despite their often smooth and

successful implementation, are usually unable to involve all the potential

interested institutions and civic organizations.

33See programme website: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/enpi-cross-border/programmes/index_en.htm 34 Anais Marin (2012), ‘Sociological study on the composition of the Belarusian society,’ External report for the European Parliament, Brussels: European Parliament, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/fr/studiesdownload.html?languageDocument=EN&file=73991

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GEORGIA

General National Approach to EaP

Georgia appears to be satisfied with the EaP’s bilateral incentives and

opportunities for multilateral cooperation. The political leadership and

society of Georgia are enthusiastic about the EU and see no alternative to

integration with Western structures. The EU, in turn, praised progress

made by Georgia although it did also raise concerns over the extent to

which local electoral processes may be described as democratic, the

dominance of the executive in the political system, and restrictions on the

freedom of the press. The EU offered its full support on the issue of

Georgia’s territorial integrity.35 In general, therefore, Georgia can be

considered to be an enthusiastic participant in the EaP.

Strengthening Local Self-Government and Local Democracy

Georgia is organised into two autonomous republics (Adjara and Abkhazia

– the latter claiming independence) and ten regions (including separatist

South Ossetia, which claims independence), which are further divided into

districts. New amendments to the constitution adopted in 2010 entered

into force in January 2011, establishing a separate chapter on local self-

governance. The new chapter sets and defines some institutional

guarantees for the independence of local governance. However, the ruling

party’s monopoly on power would need to loosen for political competition

to flourish at regional and local levels. Starting in 2013, the constitution

envisages the transfer of the power of appointment so that governors will

be appointed by the central government, and not by presidential decree, as

is currently case.

Adjara remains the only regional entity with limited autonomy. The head of

Adjara’s regional government is elected by the local Supreme Council, but

proposed by the president of Georgia. The president currently has

extensive rights to dismiss Adjara’s parliament and government, but in the

new version of the constitution, effective in 2013, he will be required to

seek the government’s approval in advance. The autonomous republics,

35 Rafał Sadowski (2012), ‘European Neighbourhood Policy Package – Conclusions for the Eastern Partners,’ OSW Commentary, Centre for Eastern Studies, available at: http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2012-05-25/european-neighbourhood-policy-package-conclusions-eastern-partn

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Abkhazia and South Ossetia, are out of the central government’s control,

since they were declared Russian-occupied territories by the 2008 Law on

Occupied Territories.

The ruling United National Movement party controls all local councils [the

lowest level of self-government], although the opposition increased its

representation in local councils countrywide from 11 percent in 2006 to 14

percent in 2010. The government often uses decentralization as a means

for transferring costs to local budgets. The ruling party’s monopoly on local

councils has diminished political competition on the local and regional

levels, and opposition parties play a limited role in the decision-making

process. Regional governors often specify a work programme to the local

councils and municipal executives under their supervision, with limited

attention from NGOs or media, which remain underdeveloped in most

Georgian regions. Municipal governments depend entirely on the central

government for funding.

Co-operation between Local Authorities and Civil Society

Many observers have pointed to a decline in the impact of the civic sector

following the departure into politics of influential civic activists who

participated in the peaceful demonstrations of 2003. Additionally, some

influential NGOs have refrained from criticizing the new administration,

and international donors have reoriented their programmes towards

government-led projects. It could be argued that this overall drain of

intellectual and other resources has weakened the country’s civil society in

comparison to government institutions.

Institutionally, civil society organizations are protected by law; no formal

or informal obstacles exist to hinder the creation and operation of NGOs in

any form. In fact, many thousands of NGOs are officially registered, and

several hundred operate in all parts of the Georgian territory – this is very

encouraging. Quite a few organizations specialize in the areas such as

public health, environment, gender issues, minority issues, and human

rights. The influence of civil society in policy formulation remains rather

low and is an area perhaps for improvement. This is partially due to a

reluctance of public institutions to engage in systematic public policy

debates with civil society actors. Public officials often fail to see the benefit

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of involving a wide range of stakeholders in the policy formulation process,

since non-profit organizations are often considered interest-driven and

biased, and their products are seen as unprofessional.

Financial instability remains a major concern for Georgia’s civil society

organizations. While business entities provide funds for charity, they

refrain from funding civic activities. To improve this situation, in 2011

parliament passed several amendments to the law on grants, allowing

ministries to issue grants directly to universities, NGOs and individuals.

According to the State Strategy for Regional Development of Georgia 2010-

2017 “effective regional governance implies a co-ordinated initiative of

central and regional authorities as well as individual or joint efforts of civil

society on the regional level which ensures the effective exercise of the

authorities of governmental bodies and the provision of quality services

to the population.”36 This is to be welcomed.

Cross Border Co-operation

Georgia participates in one EU-sponsored CBC programme, the Black Sea

basin programme.37 In Georgia, though, regional development priorities

were and still are defined by the ministries and state Trustees (Governors)

based upon the information provided to the Government of Georgia. No

legal instrument ensures the involvement and participation of the local

self-governments in the elaboration of regional development programs. At

present local self-governments do not have the right to independently set

an agreement with another country’s local self-government bodies. It

appears that there is a low importance attached to cross-border

co-operation of regions by the Government of Georgia.

In addition, within the framework of the Fostering Regional Development

in Armenia and Georgia Through Cross-Border Co-operation project, the

National Association of Local Authorities of Georgia (NALAG) and the

Communities Association of Armenia (CAA), as the project’s partners,

established EuroCaucas on 15 June 2009 which is the first entity of its kind

36 Government of Georgia (2010), ‘State Strategy for Regional Development of Georgia, 2010-2017,’ available at: http://www.lsg.gov.ge/files/_2335_719149_STATESTRATEGY2010-2017ENG.pdf 37 See CBC programme website: http://www.blacksea-cbc.net

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in the region. The organisation is based upon the experiences of European

regions with the aim to assist local governments in the Armenian-Georgian

border regions in developing cross-border co-operation initiatives.

EuroCaucas will play an important role of initiator/generator of activities

of cross-border collaboration under the auspices of the EU Eastern

Partnership Policy.38

There remains, however, a perceived need at the local and regional level in

Georgia for further capacity building amongst local government officials,

with regard to making full use of EU funding and partnership opportunities.

38 Davit Narmania and Sargis Grigoryan (2010), Cross-Border Co-operation between Georgia and the Republic of Armenia: Existing Problems and Challenges, available at: http://www.entwicklung.at/uploads/media/20101115_Cross_Border_Study__FINAL.pdf

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MOLDOVA

General National Approach to EaP

Moldova could perhaps be considered as a candidate for the title of the new

success story of the Eastern neighbourhood. Moldova is more enthusiastic

about the EaP than Ukraine and, indeed, the other EaP partners, viewing it

as ‘the first big step forward towards the EU prospect’. Chisinau hopes that

accelerated integration with the EU will also help speed up the resolution

of the Transnistrian conflict as Moldova will become more attractive due to

increased mobility of its population.39 Indeed, Moldova is considered the

country most keen to embrace the EaP as a vehicle for advancing its ties

with the EU.40 The European Commission identified Moldova as the best

performer among its eastern neighbours. The key challenges that remain

include: the implementation of structural reforms (of the judiciary, the

police and security forces, and the public administration.41

Strengthening Local Self-Government and Local Democracy

Moldova is organised into 32 districts (raioane), three municipalities, the

Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia and the Transnistrian Region. A

new national strategy for decentralization was unveiled during 2011. If

implemented as envisioned, it should significantly increase the autonomy

of local governments by giving local elected officials greater decision-

making autonomy and independent access to resources. Overly centralized

administration has been an ongoing problem in Moldova throughout the

post-socialist period. Local government elections were successfully carried

out in June 2011, and were generally considered free and fair. Local

elections in 2011 were not dominated by the ruling coalition, and still faced

a strong challenge from the opposition communists.42 Indeed, in April 2012

the prospects for Moldovan LRAs were significantly increased when the

parliament adopted a National Decentralization Strategy.43 39 Jos Boostra and Natalia Shapovalova (2010) ‘The UE’s Eastern partnership: One Year Backwards,’ FRIDE Working Paper, available from: http://www.fride.org/download/WP99_EP_ENG_may10.pdf 40 Wolczuk, K (2011), p.12 41 Sadowski, R (2012) 42 Mircea Ticudean ‘Moldova's Communists Remain Leading Party Following Local Elections,’ RFE/RL News, June 7th, 2011, available at: http://www.rferl.org/content/moldova_elections_communists/24227168.html 43Government of the Republic of Moldova (2011) ‘National Decentralization Strategy,’ Chisinau, available at: http://www.descentralizare.gov.md/public/files/temp/The_draft_National_Decentralization_Strategy_eng.pdf

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At the current time, budgets are largely under the control of central

authorities. Remuneration for those working in local administration is

quite low, undermining professionalism and service delivery. One

important impediment to effective local government is corruption, whether

in the form of misdirected public funds, favouritism in the granting of

contracts, or cronyism. However, popular support for local government is

greater than for central political institutions. Mayors’ offices are perceived

positively by 50.6 percent of the population, well over twice the level of

support received by central bodies.44 One possible explanation for the

higher rating of local officials is that they are better known in their

communities than national leaders, and are not considered responsible for

the ongoing political crisis at the national level. In other words, they are

perceived as doing a good job. This is to be welcomed.

Co-operation between Local Authorities and Civil Society

Civil society organizations continue to play a key role in political life in

Moldova. In critical areas, such as media, justice and local governance,

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are active in advancing reform

efforts.45 Indeed, the central government actively engaged with the non-

government sector in the drafting of the decentralisation strategy.46 At the

national level, at the initiative of the Moldovan Government, cooperation

with civil society was strengthened by establishing a permanent platform

for dialogue and consultation called National Participation Council (NPC),

which is composed of 30 non-governmental organizations working in

various fields.47 Over 130 representatives of local and central authorities,

civil society and development partners met at the First National Conference

on Inter-Municipal Cooperation, held on June 5-6, 2012. The event aimed to

expand cooperation between central and local public administration with

the representative associations and all those interested in local and

44 Institutul de Politici Publice [The Public Policy Institute], Barometrul Opiniei Publice Republica Moldova-Noiembrie 2011 [Barometer of Public Opinion: Republic of Moldova, November 2011] (Chisinau: IPP, 16 November 2011), http://www.ipp.md/libview.php?l=ro&idc=156&id=580&parent=0. 45 Freedom House, Nations in Transit report, 2012, available at: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/moldova 46 Eastern partnership Civil Society Forum, see: http://www.eap-csf.eu/en/news-events/news/national-decentralisation-strategy/ 47 Eastern partnership Civil Society Forum, see:http://www.eap-csf.eu/en/countries/republic-of-moldova/

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regional development, and to develop cooperation initiatives between local

communities.48

Cross Border Co-operation

Moldova is currently engaged in one sea basin CBC programme and one

land border CBC programme.49 The National Development Strategy of the

Republic of Moldova for 2008-2011 is quite reserved as regards the

mechanisms and actions for developing cross-border cooperation, although

Point 1.4.2 of this document is titled similarly in the EU-Moldova Action

Plan, stating a commitment to intensify cross-border cooperation between

the Republic of Moldova, EU member states and neighbouring countries by:

(i) organizing common Moldovan-Ukrainian state border management; and

(ii) developing regional cooperation between relevant legal authorities

(police, border guards, customs).50

The primary factors restraining the development of cross-border

cooperation in the Republic of Moldova are the following: direct

interdependence of the cross-border cooperation intensification from

political conjuncture emerging in any given period, rather than from

pragmatic effectiveness and urgency; the result of the last territorial-

administrative reform, which led to the fragmentation of the counties in

rayons, which significantly reduced the financial and organizational

capacities of small border regions of Moldova in cooperation with

neighbouring counties of Romania; the need to co-finance joint projects in

the amount of 10 per cent of the budget, which in most cases is a major

constraint for the administration of border areas of Moldova; a major

constraint on the success of projects is the inability of officials and local

entrepreneurs to use the instruments of business planning; and, finally, a

lack of active dialogue aimed at achieving practical goals and tasks

between the management of Euroregions and the central authorities.

48 United Nations Development Programme, ‘Inter-Municipal Cooperation is important for local authorities efficiency and public service quality,’ available at: http://www.undp.md/presscentre/2012/JILDP_5June/index.shtml 49 See ENPI website: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/neighbourhood/regional-cooperation/enpi-cross-border/programmes/index_en.htm 50N. Dandis and B. Hasdeau (2010) ‘ Perspectives of cross border cooperation of the Republic of Moldova within the frameworks of the ENPI (2007-2013),’ available at: http://www.euroeconomica-danubius.ro/arhiva/2.Dandis.pdf

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Some key political steps are required within Moldova in order to ensure the

proper functioning of local self-government. These include: ensuring more

even levels of regional development through specific regional approaches

in order to avoid the increase of social and economic differences, caused by

the greater capacity of already more developed regions to use EU funds; to

build an adequate legal framework – in the context of decentralization –

which will provide regional/local authorities with competencies regarding

CBC; and, finally, to consider and accelerate procedures for accession to the

3rd Protocol to the Madrid Convention of 2009 on establishment of

European Cooperation Groupings (ECGs).

Moldovan local authorities themselves struggle with a very low level of

local autonomy, both at the administrative level and at the financial level. In

fact, in terms of decentralised fiscal capacities, Moldovan local authorities

have only very low levels of discretionary spending. These problems of

local autonomy are further compounded by a lack of human resources at

the local level, and an outmoded, uncorrelated and contradictory legislative

framework.

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UKRAINE

General National Approach to the EaP

The views of Ukraine on the EaP have evolved from an ideologically

opposed position to a more pragmatic approach. This is to be welcomed.

Ukraine already has an advanced relationship with Brussels; for example, it

is the only state to have completed negotiations with the EU on an

Association Agreement. Thus at first, Ukraine saw the multi-lateral EaP

policy as a distraction from the bi-lateral track. Nonetheless, despite the

government change and the pragmatic shift in foreign policy orientation

since 2010, EU integration remains high on Ukraine’s agenda. It must be

noted, however, that the current EaP offer omits the matters most

important to Ukraine: a clear perspective of full membership of the EU.

Unfortunately this has led to the development of heightened “expectation

gap”51 which has problematized Ukrainian relations with the EaP further at

the national level.

In addition, Ukraine received a critical assessment on its progress towards

European integration from Brussels, primarily as a result of the use of

selective justice, which the EU sees as being politically motivated.52

However, it is clear that the selective justice issue is more complicated than

it appears on the surface. That said, the upcoming parliamentary elections

in autumn 2012 will be an important test for Ukraine–EU relations.

The challenge for Ukraine now is to maintain progress in its relations with

the EU. At the technical level, progress remains excellent and Ukraine is

well on track to integrate successfully through an Association Agenda

which will include transposition and implementation of much of the acquis

communautaire (EU law).

Strengthening Local Self-Government and Local Democracy

Administratively, Ukraine comprises the cities of Kyiv and Sevastopol, 24

regions (oblast) and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, which are further

divided into districts (raion) and towns/municipalities or regional/district

subordination. There is, however, no clear separation between the

51

CdR 78/2009 “The role of local and regional authorities within the Eastern Partnership”. 52Sadowski, R. (2012)

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responsibilities of central and local governments. In practice, the scope of

local self-government is limited. Some non-governmental organizations

stress that local governance still remains one of the weakest points in

Ukraine.53

The key problems hindering the development of local self-government

include: the absence of strict delimitation of powers of different self-

governing entities; vagueness of the criteria and procedures for

establishing various territorial units; extreme fragmentation of lower-level

administrative units; absence of an adequate financial basis for local

government budgets through fiscal decentralisation; unfair and inefficient

accumulation of funds by the central government; and poor staffing of local

self-government bodies (UNDP, 2011).

While the Yanukovych government declared its support for placing greater

powers in the hands of local authorities, in practice it has boosted its own

powers, sometimes at the expense of local government. Among other steps,

the national leadership abandoned the previous administration’s attempts

to reform local government, and consolidated power in the executive

branch through the annulment of the 2004 constitutional amendments

(forcing the authorities to start from scratch on the basis of the 1996

constitutional language). That said, the matter of the Ukrainian

constitutional settlement is not closed and developments are awaited with

interest.

A new electoral law was enacted just two weeks before the beginning of the

2010 local election campaign, giving political parties little time to adapt to

the new voting system. Observers noted pressure on independent and

opposition candidates, irregularities during the voting, low turnout, a large

number of votes “against all,” delays in the vote counting, and a wave of

legal challenges (although this last point in particular is a feature of most

Ukrainian elections, mainly due to the shifting nature of the rules on

voting). According to the official results, the ruling Party of Regions won a

nationwide majority. Moreover, the problem of politicized appointments of

local executives reappeared in 2011. Oblast governors are appointed and

dismissed by the president after submission of candidates by the cabinet.

53 See the Local Government and Public Services Reform Initiative, Ukraine country profile, available at: http://lgi.osi.hu/country_datasheet.php?id=181

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Some posts in local government are similarly political, and do not always

take full account of professional qualities. Administrative reform has

included plans to reduce the size of the bureaucracy by half at the local

level, which could hinder the work of local government.

The functioning of local and regional self-government is affected by the

Soviet legacy of entrenched centralisation and bureaucracy. Shortly after

the reporting period, the Parliament (Rada) adopted a law on the

establishment of a State Fund for Regional Development. Together with the

process of updating the National Regional Development Strategy, this

represents a very positive development, which is to be welcomed.54

Co-operation between Local Authorities and Civil Society

The civil society sector continues a play an important role in Ukraine, and is

often at the forefront of numerous public events in defence of freedom of

assembly, media freedom, electoral rights, and environmental integrity

during 2010 and 2011, and they remained vocal in promoting dialogue

with policymakers to influence legislation and other decisions. However, a

combination of societal apathy and lack of capacity among NGOs prevented

them from effectively resisting the year’s antidemocratic trend. Indeed,

civil society activists increasingly faced various forms of direct pressure

and hostility from the authorities (Stewart, 2009).

There was no significant new state pressure on Ukraine’s relatively robust

civil society sector in 2011. Most functioning NGOs are concentrated in the

cities of Kyiv and Lviv, followed by Zaporizhya, Dnipropetrovsk, and

Odessa. The government, however, continued to engage in dialogue with

civil society in the established formats. Hundreds of civic councils were

established at different levels of government in accordance with a new

regulation (No. 996) adopted by the cabinet in late 2010. The councils

consisted of more than 9,000 people; among those attached to central

government agencies, 39 per cent of the members represented NGOs, 32

per cent trade unions and business associations, and 7 per cent charity

organizations. NGOs have reported an “imitation” of public participation, in

which the government simply declares its will to engage with civil society,

but does so mostly in a selective way. 54See recent ENP progress report, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/docs/2012_enp_pack/progress_report_ukraine_en.pdf

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There was, however, some progress during 2011 on NGO legislation. A

draft law on civil society organizations (No. 7262-1) that had been stuck in

the parliament for several years was advanced in a first reading. If finally

adopted, the law will provide more space for non-profit activity,

liberalizing the registration of new NGOs, removing some artificial

administrative barriers, and addressing most of the negative issues. In

2012, a new government strategy for civil society development was

introduced, including harmonization with European legislation;

participation of CSOs in decision-making and implementation of policies on

national and local levels; delegation of certain competencies in social and

humanitarian spheres from executive bodies to CSOs.55

Cross Border Co-operation

Ukraine participates in one sea basin CBC programme and three land

border CBC programmes. Experts on regional policy recommend that the

government of Ukraine ratify the Third Additional Protocol to the Madrid

Outline Convention on Euroregional Cooperation Groupings, which

established a common legal framework for all regional and local authorities

within the member states of the Council of Europe. This legal act would

foster cooperation between the regional authorities in Ukraine and their

counterparts from the EU.56 In August 2010, the Cabinet of Ministers

approved the Concept of the State Program of cross-border cooperation

development for 2011-2015. (Nr. 1838-r dated 08/15/2010). It is noted

that cross-border cooperation in Ukraine is carried out under considerable

disparities of socio-economic development of border areas, as well as the

level of employment of these Ukrainian territories and border regions of

neighbouring states, which leads to social instability of the subjects of

cross-border cooperation. This is, in effect, an admission of fact and does

not detract from the fact that Ukraine has at least made a positive move by

approving the Concept.

55 UCIPR (2012), ‘On Strategy of Government Policy for Civil Society Development,’ available at: http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua/publications/on-strategy-of-government-policy-for-civil-society-development/lang/en 56 A. Duleba and V. Bilcik (eds.) (2011) Taking stock of the Eastern Partnership, Bratislava: Slovak Foreign Policy Association, available at: http://www.ucipr.kiev.ua/userfiles/SFPA_book2011.pdf

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National Approaches to the EaP: Overall Summary and Assessment

This overview of national approaches to the EaP on a country-by-country

basis illustrates that whilst there are clearly a number of country-specific

issues, which hinder the full achievement of the EaP’s goals, there are also a

set of common factors which are constraining the development of local and

regional democracy across the Eastern Partner countries. Of course there

are many positive developments across the region that are to be welcomed,

most notably the response both the EaP and CORLEAP which is hugely

encouraging. However, it is the areas for improvement that inevitably

dominate. Positively viewed, these issues form a catalogue of lobby points,

which the CoR and CORLEAP can address as top priority concerns in their

own political work.

1) Local and regional self-government: lack of governmental autonomy

and limited financial capacity

Without an enhanced capacity to exercise real government responsibility at

the local and regional level, supported by an appropriate legal and financial

framework, it will be impossible for Eastern Partner countries to develop a

robust system of multi-level governance. EU financial assistance and

partnership programmes can improve and enhance expertise within

administrations, but further action is required by the CoR and by

CORLEAP at the political level, to ensure that the EaP can address the

domestic framework within which local and regional governments

operate.

2 ) Development of local democracy, including citizen participation

If the Eastern Partnership is to deliver real and substantive improvements

to the security, stability and prosperity of its Eastern partner countries,

then democracy needs to be firmly rooted, from the bottom up. As the

preceding analysis of local and regional perspectives on the EaP within the

six participant Eastern states reveals, democratic infrastructure in these

countries is weak, and is particularly precarious at the local and regional

level. Support mechanisms for local and regional democratic initiatives are

therefore of vital importance, as it is only by building democratic controls

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from the bottom up that a stable and sustainable democratic governance

model can be established.

The CoR and CORLEAP can foster democratic renewal at the local and

regional through sustained participation in capacity building

programmes, the exchange of expertise and best practice, as well as

offering training to elected local and regional personnel from the

partner countries. This is a real area of need where CoR and CORLEAP

initiatives have the potential to make a substantial difference.

3) Limited awareness of the financial assistance mechanisms available

to local and regional authorities in the Eastern Partner countries

from EU programmes;

Research has shown that associations of local authorities in the Eastern

Partner countries sometimes demonstrate a lack of awareness of the

potential opportunities for project development and cross-border learning

which are presented by the numerous EU financial assistance schemes for

the region. The ENPI instrument is the most well-known EU financial

assistance package; however other opportunities for local and regional

authorities to benefit from these funding schemes remain under-

appreciated. The CoR and CORLEAP can work to heighten awareness of

the potential presented by the full range of EU funding programmes

with opportunities for local and regional authority engagement, not

least through an awareness-raising campaign which focuses on some

of the success stories at the local and regional level in the Eastern

Partner states.

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Part 2

Policy Options for the CoR and CORLEAP

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What can CORLEAP do to strengthen local self-

government and local democracy?

A long-term action plan is required

The establishment of strong and effective local self-government and

democracy in the Eastern Partnership countries is an essential objective

that will build long-term, sustainable democratic stability from the bottom

up within the Eastern partner countries. Local and regional government

needs to be trusted by those it serves, responsive to the needs of the

population and as uncorrupt as possible. These should serve as the guiding

principles of both the CoR and CORLEAP with regard to developing any

future action plan for the EaP.

Varying degrees of progress have been made across the countries of the

Eastern Partnership towards building democracy at the level of the central

state (indeed for much of the region, electoral democracy is now firmly

established), but this also needs to be complemented at the local and

regional level, which will allow local populations to manage their own

affairs, understand participatory governance at the local level and see

governmental institutions in their communities which directly respond to

their individual needs. From the perspective of both the EU and the EaP

countries, this should be regarded as an essential part of a wider

construction of deep democracy.

Local government structures have always existed across the Eastern

Partnership region, but the legacy of the Soviet era meant that they tended

to be organized in a rigid top-down fashion, with a clear chain of command

from the centre to the smallest unit of local government. As the previous

analysis of national approaches to the EaP has highlighted, some hesitant

progress has been made in changing the constitutional structures presently

in place in order to bolster the quality of local government in the region.

However, constitutional and legal changes are only a part of what should

best be regarded as a process, rather than an instant achievement. Change

can take a long time to come into effect as citizens become better

acquainted with new rules and new styles of local democracy. Confidence

in local democracy in particular can take a long time to establish. Delivering

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real and substantive change in the Eastern Partnership countries at the

local and regional level should therefore be regarded as a long-term

objective of the CoR and of CORLEAP, as the headline objectives will not be

achievable through short-term actions, nor without a wider, multi-faceted

approach which addresses inter-related aspects.

Establishing a role for CORLEAP in the region – a question of

“actorness”

The fundamental question for CORLEAP here, therefore, is what it can do to

support this process. In order to establish itself as an actor in the process of

enhancing local and regional governance in the EaP countries, CORLEAP

can adopt four specific roles which, collectively, can make a substantial

contribution to the quality of local and regional governance. The four roles

are as follows:

– (1) A strategic thinker: drawing up long-term plans about where

local and regional government should be heading, with a road-map

for implementation;

– (2) A timely intervener: both at the EU and MS level to ensure that

development assistance goes towards local and regional democracy

promotion projects;

– (3) A skilful advocate:

o Making a convincing case for a role for local and regional

government in drafting territorial reforms;

o Developing an inside track both to the European institutions

(particularly the Commission and EEAS) and the national

governments of the Eastern Partnership;

o Making the case for decentralization of competences; both

policy-making and fiscal competences;

– (4) A high performance cheerleader: showing how to build a high

performance culture at the local and regional level with a focus on

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improving the training and skills set of local and regional government

officials.

1 - A Strategic Thinker

It is essential that the responsibility for leadership and pushing forward the

agenda on local and regional governance issues in the EaP must be taken

primarily by local and regional authorities from the Eastern Partnership

countries. In other words, CORLEAP’s participants need to have full

ownership of the reform agenda if it is to acquire the necessary traction. It

should be recognized that there will, at first, be varying degrees of

enthusiasm amongst local government leaders. However, CORLEAP can act

as a beacon for change. Already, CORLEAP has brought together a small

group of pioneering local government leaders. Collectively, these can now

play a strongly pro-active role in driving forward the CORLEAP workplan,

acting as multipliers of change. In this matter, what CORLEAP needs to

identify in the first instance is a wider group of enthusiastic local or

regional government leaders from EaP partner states to play the role of

policy entrepreneur in order to champion CORLEAP’s vision across the EaP

region.

Having found these entrepreneurs, it is vital that CORLEAP is able to

provide them with an essential level of resources to bring their vision

forward. In practice, this could involve support with travel grants,

assistance in setting up meetings with senior European and Member State

officials, MEPs and national parliamentarians and providing a platform for

the pioneering group to bring their message to those will be allies in

helping them deliver it. All of this could be done with a modest level of

well-targeted support.

Local and regional self-governments from the European Union also have a

vital role to play in providing know-how, lessons drawn from past

experience, and encouragement, but the primary holders of responsibility

must be the EaP countries. The CoR and CORLEAP can act as a vehicle for

this exchange of knowledge and expertise between LRA representatives

from the EU member states and LRA representatives from around the

Eastern Partnership area. Thematically centred forums, workshops and

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seminars on particular issues of interest to EaP countries can facilitate

large-scale learning across a number partner countries, and would be an

excellent starting point for showcasing both CORLEAP as a body and its

agenda for stimulating change at the local and regional level across the

Eastern Partner countries.

2 – A Timely Intervener

In the role of timely intervener, CORLEAP can ensure that development

assistance goes towards local and regional democracy promotion projects.

In the initial phase, CORLEAP can use its relations with partner countries

and associations of local authorities within these states to operate a wide-

scale awareness building programme, with strategic marketing

interventions. Talks, seminars and outreach visits in the countries,

organised in partnership with locally based local and region authority

groupings, offers a means for CORLEAP to act as a multiplier of knowledge

and understanding on EU funding programmes which are operational at

the local and regional level, as well as expertise on how to access these.

Such in-country actions could potentially be supported at the EU level

through themed workshops and seminars hosted at the CoR itself.

Beyond this, CORLEAP also offers a potential mechanism by which to shape

the funding priorities of the EU. By showcasing the substantive impact that

EU financial assistance has made to local and regional authorities in the

Eastern Partner countries, in line with the global objectives of the EaP

itself, CORLEAP can draw attention to the Commission and to EU member

states of the value added of continued and indeed, enhanced, financial

assistance in this area.

Bilateral assistance programmes between individual member states and

EaP states may also benefit from enhanced understanding of how financial

assistance at the local and regional level in Eastern Partner countries has

delivered substantive change. In its role as a timely intervener, CORLEAP

can advise member state actors on both policy priorities, and the methods

most appropriate for delivering them. In many (though by no means all)

cases, these suggestions will be welcomed by officials who may be

struggling to decide on priorities on the basis of inadequate information

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about the prevailing local conditions. This is something on which CORLEAP

can capitalize.

An obvious starting point for the timely intervener would be those Member

States with substantial bi-lateral assistance programmes to the EaP

countries. Germany and Sweden (via Sida) are the best examples of these,

where significant funding is available. Another obvious place for CORLEAP

to engage as a timely intervener, is those local and regional authorities

within the EU that undertake decentralised development cooperation – in

many cases, these local and regional authorities will be seeking partners

from the EaP countries. Further information on decentralised development

cooperation is readily available on the CoR ATLAS of decentralised

cooperation website.57

3 – A Skilful Advocate

The primary function of the skilful advocate is to make a convincing case

for the inclusion of local and regional authorities in drafting territorial

reforms and for the decentralization of competences, both policy-making

and fiscal. This is the primary political objective of CORLEAP in its

engagement with the countries of the Eastern Partnership.

In the EaP countries, the key audience for these messages are national

governments that are in some measure beyond the reach of the CoR. As a

means of reinforcing this particular message, CORLEAP should use its

ongoing partnerships with the European Commission and with the EEAS to

make the case that local democracy reform and the quality of local

government should serve as a priority for the conditionality that the EU

will impose on the EaP countries in return for access to the Single Market.

This could significantly incentivize the national governments of the EaP

countries towards moving in a positive direction.

Another core opportunity for CORLEAP to act as a skilful advocate for the

advancement of good local and regional governance in the EaP is through

the CoR’s participation in the four thematic platforms of the EaP, most

notably through platform 1, which is focused on democracy, good

57

http://lra4dev.cor.europa.eu/portal/en/atlas/Pages/maps.aspx

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governance and stability. Through this dialogue with senior officials from

both the European Commission and from the partner countries, CORLEAP

has the potential to put forward solutions for lasting change in local and

regional governance within EaP states.

In this capacity, attention should also focus on opportunities for extending

the EU’s twinning programmes to local and regional levels of governance.

4 – A High performance cheerleader

A more prosaic, yet vital role for CORLEAP in strengthening local self-

government and local democracy is in helping to foster a high performance

culture of good governance at the local and regional level. Local democracy

cannot flourish in the Eastern Partnership countries if its practitioners are

under-qualified and insufficiently skilled for carrying out their basic

functions.

To this end, CORLEAP could consider the establishment of a High

Performance Delivery Unit, bringing together trainers and officials from

local and regional government from all CORLEAP countries to undertake

training in the following crucial areas:

– Public service ethics in local government. This module would be at

the heart of any training programme, talking about what it is that

local and regional government do, what their ethical responsibilities

are and how they can contribute to the creation of ‘deep democracy’;

anti-corruption measures would feature on the agenda, as would

managing relations with other sections of the democratic polity

including the national and European levels of government.

– Leadership in local government. This module would target potential

leaders in local government and provide training in the creation of a

high performance culture and what this means for local and regional

government. The focus would be on both individual mentoring and

the development of core leadership skills, as well as working on case

studies of transformation in local government and providing a forum

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for local government leaders to discuss issues of mutual concern and

interest.

– Performance management tools. Local government and the public

sector more generally sometimes struggles to manage its staff in such

a way that they deliver the highest standards of service. This module

would provide an overview of performance management in local

government with a focus on creating positive outcomes.

– Local government and European integration. This module would

explore the relationship between local government and European

integration, explaining what the role of local government is in

pushing forward the EU integration agenda, and how European

integration acts as a supporter of democracy at the local and regional

level.

– Once the above modules had been completed, the ‘graduates’ of the

High Performance Delivery Unit would be invited to take part in

regular Best Practice seminars composed of local government

officials from EU and EaP countries, which would consider topical

matters of interest and provide an international peer group for local

government leaders, whilst helping to refresh and replenish their

leadership skills.

Taken as a whole, this initiative will make a significant and long lasting

impact on the level of governmental capacity at the local and regional level

in the Eastern Partner countries, meeting a real and identified need for

training assistance58.

The scope and budget of the High Performance Delivery Unit will depend

on the share of resources allocated to CORLEAP’s activities. However, it

ought to be possible to set up and run the High Performance Delivery Unit

(HPDU) without excessive outlay, and ideally the project could be funded

from donor assistance. The HPDU could be hosted by a local or regional

authority within an Eastern Partnership country and staffed locally. It is

essential that the HPDU sets – and is seen to set – a high standard for

provision of a service that is both high quality and value for money. This

latter point is particularly important.

58

See Section 2 of this report on “National Approaches towards the EaP”

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The above-mentioned policy options on improving the quality of local and

regional democracy and self-government in the EaP countries constitute a

plan that will require a sustained period of time, effort and political will to

bring to fruition. Success will depend in part on the quality of the strategic

thinking exercise and long-term planning exercise that needs to be carried

out at the onset.

What can CORLEAP do to increase cooperation

between the local authorities and civil society in the

EaP countries?

Following the example of South-Eastern Europe, CORLEAP could consider

the option of setting up Local Democracy Agencies (LDAs) bringing

together different regions within the same EaP country. The purpose of

these networks could be to bring together local and regional politicians,

alongside local government officials, with the representatives of civil

society to discuss a range of political and policy issues. These meetings

could take the form of a policy forum, with briefing papers circulated in

advance for comment and discussion. These agencies or networks should

begin their work by building coalitions of the willing, and then grow the

networks gradually. Funding for such initiatives need not be enormous. It is

also vital that such networks be co-funded, although the EaP country co-

funding could be in kind (in terms of conference facilities) rather than in

hard cash.

Local Democracy Agencies or Networks could establish working groups to

discuss policy and political challenges, and to propose solutions

appropriate to the locality. Topics for discussion could range from the

essential – including questions of what the state should do and what local

and regional government’s role must be – to the more particular and

practical.

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Political parties

The best means by which cooperation could be boosted between civil

society and local and regional government in the EaP countries is by

helping to establish properly institutionalized political parties. In meeting

this goal, there is an important role to be played by COR members from the

EU-27, in particular from the EU-15. Political parties are vital parts of the

institutions of a vibrant, deep democracy because they represent the

primary means by which the needs and demands of society and particular

segments of society are aggregated and voiced collectively.

One means that CORLEAP could deliver this goal, would be by encouraging

the political groupings within it to organize training and networking events

with their approximate ideological counterparts from the EaP countries. An

annual meeting could be organized over a two-day period, ideally hosted by

a political foundation from one of the EU Member States (such as the

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung or the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung) or by one of the

European political parties. Topics for discussion would vary depending on

the political colours of the organizers, but might include questions such as:

• Ideology and World View – what is a social democracy? What is

Christian democracy? What does it mean to be a liberal in the 21st

century?

• Managing relations between the grassroots and the leadership in the

21st century;

• Fundraising – how can political parties diversify their revenue

streams and avoid capture by a single interest group?

• Fighting local and regional election campaigns – how might

techniques and strategies vary from national campaigns?

• Mobilizing popular support from non-party members – is there a role

for primaries in local and regional elections?

• Relations with other social partners: what is the link between

political parties and business organisations or trade unions?

Some of the democratic challenges facing the EaP countries can be resolved

with better institutional design, but many of the features of deep

democracy can only be addressed through stronger political parties. For

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this reason, we would suggest that CORLEAP gives its consideration to

means of boosting political parties across the EaP countries.

What can CORLEAP do to increase cross-border

cooperation?

In terms of increasing participation in cross-border cooperation

programmes between CORLEAP members, most of the challenge here is

about increasing awareness of the funding streams available – and

demonstrating their limitations so that would-be participants can work

around these. The evidence from the case studies presented in Part 3 of this

report offer insights into good practice in the funding of local and regional

authority projects in the EaP countries.

CBC remains a cornerstone of the EU’s financial assistance package to the

EaP countries, and is the largest single means through which direct support

has been provided to local and regional authorities in the EaP countries.

CBC programmes are widely recognised as fostering social cohesion

through economic interdependence and harmonization, as well as serving

to improve competitiveness by encouraging coherent, viable regions (Deas

and Lord, 2006, p. 1848).

It is also recognised that CBC is more likely to be effective in countries with

a strong tradition of communal autonomy (Perkmann, 2003, p. 165). Thus,

democratic institution-building in Ukraine must go hand in hand with the

development of CBC such as those rolled out under the framework of the

ENPI for the 2007-2013 programming period. CORLEAP must therefore

prioritise political and constitutional reform as well as institution-

building as a key element of its interaction with and support for local

and regional government in the Eastern Partner countries. The two

objectives are therefore mutually reinforcing and thus inextricably linked.

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Part 3

Inventory of Local and Regional

Initiatives in the EaP area

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Local and regional initiatives in the

Eastern Partner countries

This section showcases some examples of projects undertaken with the

assistance of EU financing, at the local and regional level in the countries of

the EaP, with local and regional governments themselves acting as partners

in most instances. Many of these projects offer multiple outputs across a

range of policy areas; for ease of analysis, however, they are clustered

below around the headline deliverable in each instance.

The projects showcased here focus on the following policy goals:

1 Projects supporting cooperation between local authorities and civil society in the EaP countries

2 Projects supporting the strengthening of local self government and democracy in the EaP countries

3 Projects facilitating cross-border cooperation and learning

The second part of this section provides analysis of implementation

procedures in a range of EU-financed projects across the region. Focusing

on issues relating to implementation procedures, funding sources and

project management, this section also offers some suggestions as to how

CORLEAP members can push for further targeted assistance at the local

and regional level, across a number of key policy areas.

1) Projects supporting cooperation between local authorities and

civil society in the EaP countries

TANDEM”: Cooperation for citizen participation and community

development in Belarus

This project was supported by the European Commission’s EuropeAid

team, under the thematic programme “Non-state actors and local

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authorities in development”, which aims to encourage non-state actors and

local authorities, both from the EU and in developing countries, to get more

involved with development issues. All projects financed by means of this

instrument must comply with the terms of Regulation (EC) No. 1905/2006

establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation.

The TANDEM project aims to increase the participation of citizens in

Belarus in nascent processes of local democracy, and to foster their long-

term cooperation with local authorities. Citizen participation at the local

level in Belarus is currently still very limited. The TANDEM project

therefore aims to support the development of local communities and civil

society organisations, and their cooperation with local authorities, both

through technical and financial support. The TANDEM project is at present

in its startup phase, with most projects still at the conceptual stage and few

have yet been launched. TANDEM runs throughout 2011 and 2012.

The TANDEM project has achieved the following:

• It has enabled community groups to participate in training

workshops and to receive information on the role played by local

authorities. This has emphasised clearly the possibilities for citizens

and civil society organisations to cooperate more actively with local

authorities.

• It has provided grants to civic community initiatives which have

undertaken action programmes to ensure sustainable development,

in cooperation with local authorities.

o Two of these initiatives have operated as partnership projects

and have involved cooperation with local authorities from

other countries, who have brought their own knowledge and

experience of cooperation with citizens into the project.

o The project partners are local authorities in EU member states,

ensuring that these initiatives benefit from cross-border

cooperation opportunities and the exchange of expertise and

experience at a territorial level. Both Gulbene municipality in

Latvia and Vilnius in Lithuania are actively involved in these

TANDEM projects.

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Individual funded projects under the TANDEM framework all aim to

support cooperation between local authorities and civil society

organisations and will, in due course, implement activities to create

sustainable development at the community level.

The variety of projects and geographical diversity is remarkable:

• An initiative of a cycling organisation in Minsk which wants to improve

the quality of bike paths in the Belarusian capital and create a micro-

level bicycle infrastructure there.

• The Association of Gomel children and young people (ASDEMO), in

cooperation with the local authorities in Gomel, will create a leisure

activities place for young people in Gomel’s district number 19.

• Another project covering the cultural heritage will be implemented by

the Information and Regional Studies Centre at Golshanskaya Rural

Library District Oshmyany in Northwestern Belarus. The initiative will

set up a virtual museum of the Struve Geodetic Arc, a chain of

commemorative plaques and obelisks which were built along the

meridian line from Norway to Moldova in the 19th century. The project

aims to share the knowledge of the Struve Arc and to disclose the

historical and cultural potential of the regions where the Struve Arc

runs. The Arc became a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2005. This

particular project will be implemented with the support of the Latvian

municipality Gulbene, which is also situated near the line of the Arc.

Overall, the TANDEM project seeks to raise the capacity of civic community

groups to be more active actors in the field of development. At the same

time, the project has raised the awareness of local stakeholders’

understanding of each other and the benefits of cooperating for sustainable

community development.

The TANDEM project is implemented in Belarus by the Association of Local

Democracy Agencies (ALDA), in partnership with the Lev Sapieha

Foundation and the Belarusian Organisation for Working Women. EU

financial assistance was provided through the EU’s Non-State Actors

financing programme.

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“Local self-government in the micro district of “Volotova”, Belarus

This project aimed to create and develop local initiatives which would

overcome a tendency amongst citizens to adopt a passive “wait and see”

strategy with regard to issues of local concern within the city of Gomel. The

main goal of the project was therefore to support individual citizens’

participation in the decision-making process at a micro-district level, with

the involvement of representatives of the local administration and deputies

of the city council.

As a starting point, a meeting was held by Gomel regional administration’s

committee of natural resources and preservation of the environment, with

the primary civil society actor taking part in this initiative, Gomel

Association of Youth and Children (ASDEMO). The focus of the project was

on citizens’ participation in the environmental problem-solving actions

undertaken by local authorities.

The ASDEMO representatives used this meeting to raise concerns about the

proposed expansion of the summer houses area in the city, as plans had

been put forward to build these summer houses on an environmentally

protected site. As a direct result of the meeting, a Commission in charge of

territory monitoring was created, gathering representatives from local

authorities and from civil society, including the Deputy Head of Gomel

district council and the Director of ASDEMO. Following a territorial survey,

an agreement was adopted to put a ban on the allocation of any new plots

of summer houses in this particular district of the city.

Several events were organised as part of this project. Stands and banners

were prepared to provide large-scale information to local people about the

pollution of the birch woods and infringement of the legislation on nature

protection around the Pokaljubichsky water supply point, which would

have been directly affected by these building proposals. A video clip about

people’s irresponsibility in failing to take action was produced and

broadcast on the local television channel “Nireya”, showcasing how citizen

action could make a real impact at the local and regional level. Further,

more than 30 people took part in an action to collect waste in the area.

Rubbish bins and “no litter” signs were put up in schools across the district,

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and an ecological and sporting event was organized in Gomel City Park,

with more than 200 people taking part.

Overall, this particular project saw more than 250 schoolchildren taking

part in meetings aimed at spreading awareness of environmental

protection. At a final showcasing event, a seminar on “Public territorial self

government: from theory to practice” was held, and involved

representatives of LRAs in three EU member states: Sweden, Poland and

Lithuania. This offered an opportunity for critical reflection on the added

value of this project’s implementation in the micro-district of Volotova, and

what EU member states’ own experiences of managing similar projects in

previous years could teach the Ukrainian LRAs about future developments

and project legacy capture.

The primary achievement of this particular project was the development of

favourable conditions and some necessary capacities for the creation, in

future, of local communities of territorial self-government in the micro-

district. In the near future, the project team has plans to further build on

the connections established through the REACT funding and to create

additional self-government bodies.

This project was financed under the REACT – Reinforcing Actions of

Capacity Building for Civil Society in Belarus umbrella initiative, which ran

between 2009 and 2010 and was financed under the EU’s Non-State Actors

programme. Its global aim was to facilitate citizens’ active engagement in

the local development process. It also set out to strengthen cooperation

between local authorities and non-state actors, implementing concrete

actions in this field. The primary focus of the project was the support of

civic initiatives which fostered citizens and civil society organizations in

favour of poverty reduction.

REACT financed a number of successful initiatives at the local and regional

level over the course of its life span, which involved the active participation

of LRAs in Belarus. As such, they have made a lasting impact on the

development of community understandings of local and regional

governance in the country.

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2) Projects supporting the strengthening of local self government

and democracy in the EaP countries

Advancing Healthy Communities through responsive local

governance, Azerbaijan

This project was implemented in Azerbaijan over a period of 3 years from

2009 to 2012, and was funded with an EU grant of €750 000 from the Non-

State Actors programme financing scheme.

Focusing on the notion of global public health, this project set about

improving and ensuring the access to quality primary healthcare in 49

communities across Azerbaijan, working closely with local authority

partners. The project focused on establishing local health committees,

drawn from a wide range of stakeholder groups alongside local

government representatives. These committees then worked with local

medical professionals to compile lists of necessary medicines, equipment

and other related material needs. As a whole, this project has therefor

helped to raise awareness of and build the capacity of civil society

organisations to have a say in the health reform process.

The project, which was delivered by Oxfam, the British voluntary

association, sought to raise awareness amongst local public officials about

good governance in local healthcare service provision and delivery, and

how wider stakeholder engagement can lead to better governance

solutions and public healthcare management. This has strengthened the

capacity of local and regional government participants in understanding

good governance in the field of public health.

One of the key outputs of this project was the creation of a so-called

“Community Based Primary Health Care (CBPHC) model, which ensures

that the poorest people in society can have access to the services they need.

Through education, information and awareness building actions, the

project also brought about changes in health-care seeking practices and

behaviours, which will benefit the most vulnerable people.

This project has also led to better healthcare delivery for citizens, further

showcasing how engagement with European models and standards

through EU funding schemes can have a positive outcome for citizens.

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There is increased communication on new healthcare service schemes and

local medical professionals have been trained using this project’s funding

streams, in order to widen community take-up of these healthcare

opportunities.

Some of the project’s achievements were the following:

• The rehabilitation of 8 health-care centres in rural communities, in

Khoylu, Nizamikend, Balchili, Banovshalar, Qullar, Qarayusfili,

Imamgulubeyli and Kolayir

• 54 outreach visits by trained cardiologists, gynaecologists and

paediatricians were carried out across 49 communities, with roughly

2694 beneficiaries.

• 922 school children received training on “personal hygiene and

healthy lifestyles” and 952 children participated in healthy nutrition

workshops as the result of health awareness sessions.

• A health event to promote environmental issues and encourage

people to protect their communities was held in March 2011,

focusing on the topic of environmental protection. The headline

slogan of this event “A Clean Environment is a Healthy Environment”

raised awareness of individual community action.

• Two regional learning and advocacy meetings were held in Barda and

Tartar districts with representatives from local authorities.

Strengthening the capacity of 20 village municipalities to provide

public services (safe water supplies) in Central Azerbaijan

Funded with an EU assistance grant of €336 605 from the Non-State Actors

programme financing, this project aimed to achieve a core marker of local

government’s ability to provide public services – access to safe water for

communities across Azerbaijan.

The Garabagh lowlands of Central Azerbaijan is the most water-poor region

of the entire country. Access to safe drinking water is one of the most

fundamental challenges in this part of the country; women are particularly

affected by this problem. There are an insufficient number of artesian

wells, an irregular power supply, water pipelines are poorly maintained

and there is an overall lack of public water management.

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This project established the supply of safe drinking water to 20

municipalities from the Agjabedi, Barda and Tartar regions, and ran for

three years from 2010-2013. In addition to providing an essential public

service, the project also contributed to the processes of democratization

and good governance.

Some of the core ouptuts of this project include:

• Supporting better water supply systems in villages, through an

assessment of the water infrastructure and offering options on

improvements

• The development of an effective mechanism of water supply

management through a cost-benefit analysis and a mechanism to

transfer responsibilities to municipalities.

• The construction of 5 water supply systems in Gaynag (Tartar

region), Chelebiler (Barda region), Mollaguller (Agjabedi region),

Eliyanli (Barda region) and Garavelli (Barda region) to improve

water supplies

• Building an efficient funding mechanism by developing strategies and

practices for secure and effective water supply by municipalities

• Providing capacity building on managerial skills of the municipalities,

with a particular focus on women

• The training of 5 municipalities on how to manage the water supply

in their own districts

• Awareness raising of the water issues facing poor rural communities

in the media

• The publication of a book on water supply and effective management

As this project is still ongoing, evaluations are limited, but these indicators

of progress and achievements illustrate the impact that financial assistance

to support governing capacities at the local and regional level in the

neighbourhood area can have on citizens’ lives.

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Supporting Participative Development of Local Authorities in Regions

of Georgia

This project ran for three years from 2009 to 2012, with an EU assistance

grant of €300 000, delivered through the Non-State Actors programme.

The main aim of the project was to support the establishment of an efficient

self-governance institute in Georgia, through the support of civic

involvement, public awareness and accountability. The emphasis was on

raising awareness and understanding amongst citizen communities across

Georgia of the nature and value of local self-governance as a principle of

“good governance”, and how this must be driven by the interests of local

populations.

In detail, this project undertook an analysis of the statutes and regulations

of the units of self-governance in Georgia, with regards to civic

involvement. A further analysis was undertaken of the level of observance

of civil involvement regulations within these statutes pertaining to self-

governance in Georgia. Following on from this analysis, a mapping exercise

was undertaken to examine and understand better the reasons for a

perceived lack of sufficient civic involvement in the activities of self-

governing bodies, setting out some core recommendations to foster

stronger engagement by civil society actors in the work of local authorities

in Georgia.

Some of the key project outputs included:

• The creation of institutional mechanisms fostering cooperation

between local governments, the non-governmental sector and the

general public

• Mechanisms for establishing continuous dialogue between the

population and local authorities

• Tools to improve understanding of citizen engagement and how

community action programmes can be structured

The project was implemented in 4 regions of Georgia: Kakheti, Shida Kartli,

Guria and Adjara. Within this particular project, 151 rural leaders were

selected to act as champions and representatives of local community

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interests within the local authority structures of self-governance. All were

trained in effective leadership skills.

Additionally, around 1000 local government officials were provided with

training on the management of good community governance practices.

Further outputs included:

• More than 100 public meetings were held between citizens and

representatives of local authorities in the selected regions.

• A cycle of programmes on self-government issues was developed to

generate media debate and discussion about civic participation in

local government.

• Handbooks on local self-government were produced for officials

working within local authority administrations on best practice in

fostering civic and community engagement

• Local public assemblies were set up, involving citizens and civil

society, alongside business representatives

• A short film, entitled “Self-Government: This is You” was produced

and widely distributed to foster awareness of local community

governance

The Project Manager Guranda Romanadze said that the project has

achieved some major outputs. “Compared to the launch of the project, we

now have more active, more informed citizens…Most importantly, the

citizens have acknowledged that they themselves are self-government and

that self-government, it is us59”.

3) Projects facilitating cross-border cooperation and learning

Didactic infrastructure modernization of Poland-Belarus cooperation

in aid of the disabled

Funded under the framework of the Poland-Belarus-Ukraine cross-border

cooperation programme (CBC) for 2007-2013, this particular project which

is operated by the Hajnówka Powiat local authority in Poland and the

Kamianiec District Executive Committee in Belarus has developed an

59

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innovative co-operative approach to the joint management of the issue of

educational opportunities for people with disabilities, living within the

Poland-Belarus border region. This project has delivered some strong

results and is regarded as a beacon project under this particular EU CBC in

terms of cross-border cooperation capacity between member states and

partners in the neighbourhood area.

Funded for 15 months, this project ran with a total budget of €743 221.

The overarching aim of this project was to develop a better infrastructure

for the education of people with disabilities in the Polish-Belarusian

borderland. A previous lack of training opportunities and prevented this

group of individuals from obtaining the appropriate rehabilitation and

correction treatment required, thereby reducing their opportunity to have

a balanced development in their future lives. This project was specifically

designed to address this need and to address the long-term problem of

lower levels of social integration of people with disabilities in this region.

This particular project therefore set out to introduce a number of new

educational opportunities for these disabled people. Firstly, the project

allowed for the modernisation of two buildings housing educational

centres for people with disabilities: the special education centre for

disabled people in Hajnwka, Poland and the Centre of Developmental

Science and Rehabilitation in Kamianiec, Belarus. The project also allowed

for these new centres to be fully equipped with new state-of –the art

learning technologies.

Another key strand of this project was the financing of a school-level

exchange between these two centres for education of people with

disabilities, as well as the creation of an internet portal for teachers of

disabled children. The Belarusian centre is learning from their Polish

colleagues’ experience of conducting educational lessons for disabled

students; the Polish centre is by way of return learning from the

Belarussian experience of carrying out rehabilitation actions.

“As different as we are”: A 7 ethnia project at the Black Sea

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This particular project is operated by the District Centre for the

Preservation and Promotion of traditional culture of Vaslui, Romania, a

local authority partner, in collaboration with the District Department for

Culture in Hînceşti, Moldova, together with two NGO partners, the

Romanian Youth Assocation from Basarabia and Bucovina, and the Public

Youth Organisation “New European Generation”, from the Odessa Region in

Ukraine. This innovative cross-border project therefore brings together

both local and regional authority actors as well as NGO actors based in both

EU member states and neighbourhood partner countries, offering a means

to foster both cooperation between the local authorities and civil society,

but also a means to strengthen and enhance cross-border regional

cooperation in this field.

Funded under the “Educational, social and cultural exchanges” measure of

the “People to people co-operation” priority within the Romania-Ukraine-

Moldova ENPI CBC, this particular project sought to promote greater

interaction between people and communities living in the border areas,

foster social cohesion and break down stereotypes amongst different

groups and ethnicities through interaction on a cultural level.

The specific objectives of the project were devised to meet this

fundamental objective. Firstly, the global aim of the project was to increase

the cultural contacts between members of seven ethnic communities from

the cross-border area: Romanians, Ukrainians, Gagauz people, Bulgarians,

Roma, Russians and Lippovans. In addition to fostering cultural exchanges,

the project also emphasised the importance of cultural heritage to

community groups, and showcased best practices in ways in which to

conserve the traditions and cultural practices of ethnic groups. The project

also sought, through community outreach events, to raise awareness of the

social issues facing ethnic communities in the cross-border area. These

events also sought to achieve local, regional and national press coverage, as

a way of reinforcing understanding of the nature and benefit of

multiculturalism for pluri-ethnic societies in border regions, framed within

the headline goal of “unity through diversity”. Over the longer term, this

project also aimed to establish new networks between young people from

around the cross-border area, in order that these contacts may continue for

years to come and would lead to future cross-border cooperation projects

in a wide range of areas.

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Some of the key activities operationalized under this project’s financing

included:

• Cultural festivals, with around 25 000 participants

• Training youth folk ensembles in traditional folk dance from around

the region

• Conferences and debates

• Public information and communications actions (brochures, posters,

banners)

• The filming of one documentary film

This project ran for one year, between March 2011 and March 2012. It was

funded with an EU grant under the ENPI CBC for €149 873. Interim

evaluations have shown that the project did meet its first indicative goal,

that of facilitating and supporting common planning initiatives around the

cross-border region, encouraging the exchange of experience and

establishing cooperation networks in the thematic area (culture and

heritage).

Using the leading European medical practices – the basis of improving

the quality of medical services in the region

This project, funded under the “People to People Cooperation” strand of the

Romania-Ukraine-Republic of Moldova CBC programme, focused

specifically on the needs of local and regional governance and support to

civil society and local communities in the cross border area. The project

brought together the expertise of a city council in an EU member state,

Siret City Council in Romania, and a public institution in a neighbourhood

partner country – Zastavna District Central Hospital, Ukraine. Together,

these partners used the available co-financing to support health care

improvements in the cross-border region. This project had the tangible

outcome of improving the quality of services delivered to citizens in the

cross-border area, and therefore offers a potential showcase of how

interaction between LRAs in border areas at the fringes of Europe can have

a positive impact on the day-to-day lives of citizens.

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Overall, the project aimed to improve the medical infrastructure of the

region, by creating new networks for cooperation between actors based in

the local community on both sides of the national border. Its main focus

was to facilitate cooperation and exchange of expertise between

practitioners, in order to increase the level of medical awareness of

European standards of medicine and healthcare. In order to do this,

training sessions were provided with the ultimate goal of improving the

theoretical knowledge and practical skills of the target groups, in a number

of healthcare areas.

The project actions included a number of training initiatives for healthcare

professionals across the border region, with information (including 5000

brochures) on European standards in medical services being distributed at

these events. In total, 20 medical staff were trained. The project website

was established as a repository of information on European standards in

medical services, and this was maintained in three languages relevant to

the cross-border community and citizens. The project also financed one

major study into European standards of medical services.

This project ran for 12 months in 2010 and was funded by an ENPI CBC

grant of €132 028.

Initial assessments of the progress of this project found that it had been

very successful in two core areas; firstly, in supporting common planning

initiatives across the cross-border space, facilitating the exchange of

experience, and creating new knowledge and cooperation networks. The

project was also found to have been strong in the establishment of new

permanent social and cultural exchanges. Overall, however, as an example

of cross-border cooperation in action, this particular project was weaker on

the involvement of a wide range of bodies in the cooperation initiatives,

and had held only minimal outreach actions, that is, joint cultural events to

promote regional CBC identity. This programme indicator also suggests

that awareness campaigns can be of particular significance in this respect.

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Analysis of EU financial assistance programmes open

to local and regional authority partners in the EaP

countries

Baltic Sea CBC Programme Website: http://www.eu.baltic.net

Implementation procedures

Programme implementation structure

The Monitoring Committee (MC) is the main decision making body for the

Programme. It is composed of representatives of all eleven states that

participate in the Programme. The MC is responsible for ensuring the

effectiveness and quality of the Programme as well as for the selection of

projects. The work of the MC is supported by the national sub-committees.

The national sub-committees safeguard the information flow to regional

and local authorities, economic and social partners and non-governmental

organisations during the implementation of the Programme.

The Managing Authority (MA) is responsible for managing and

implementing the Programme on behalf of the participating states in

accordance with the relevant Community and national legislation. The MA

is also responsible for the tasks of the Joint Managing Authority defined in

the ENPI Regulations. The participating states have designated

Investitionsbank Schleswig-Holstein (IB) located in Kiel, Germany, to take

over both tasks. Investitionsbank Schleswig-Holstein has also been

designated to act as the Certifying Authority (CA) of the Programme. The

CA is responsible for certifying eligible expenditure to the European

Commission and Norway, as well as requesting payments to be made to the

beneficiaries from the European Commission and Norway.

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Project development, application and implementation

The Baltic Sea Region Programme 2007-13 is based on the lead partner

principle. This means that each project appoints one organisation to act as

a lead partner to be responsible for the entire project. The lead partner

organisation is located in an EU member state within the Programme area

or, in duly justified cases, in Norway. The lead partner takes full financial

and legal responsibility for the implementation of the entire project,

including all the project partners.

Each project has to involve at least three financially contributing project

partners from three different countries of the Programme area: the lead

partner and at least two project partners. From these two project partners

at least one has to be located on the territory of a EU member state in the

Programme area.

Applications for funding and calls for applications are launched by the JTS.

The admissibility check based on minimum technical requirements is

carried out by the JTS on behalf of the Managing Authority. The assessment

of the strategic relevance of project applications is undertaken by the

Monitoring Committee.

Practical difficulties

The national approval procedure of Belarus was considered to be

cumbersome for the Programme. By 2011 only four out of the eight

projects with ENPI funds approved in June and September 2009 passing

the national approval procedure. Furthermore, none of the five projects

approved under the third call in June/September 2010 had passed the

national approval procedure by the beginning of 2011. Subsequently, the

project start-up in Belarus and involvement of Belarusian partners was

significantly delayed.

During quality assessment, special attention was paid to the evaluation of

the use of ENPI funding by the EU project partners. The lead partners of all

approved projects with ENPI funding were asked to specify if and how the

ENPI funds will be utilised by the EU partners for the benefit of Belarus. All

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Belarusian partners from the projects approved by the Monitoring

Committee were required to pass the Belarusian national approval

procedure of the partners by the Government of Belarus. In Belarus, this

provides a legal basis for the implementation of the project activities as

well as for receiving and using ENPI funding. In order to facilitate the

approval procedure the Managing Authority sent a letter to the

Government of Belarus informing about the projects with partners from

Belarus approved by the Monitoring Committee. In addition, lead partners

and Belarusian project partners received support from the JTS when

preparing for the Belarusian national approval procedure.

The JTS informed the lead partners of concerned projects about the

Belarusian national approval procedure and notified them that ENPI co-

financing was to be transferred to the lead partners’ accounts only after

their Belarusian partners will have passed successfully the national

approval procedure.

Out of the 46 first and second call approved projects 11 projects involving

19 Belarusian project partners with ENPI funding were approved. The

national approval procedure of three first call approved projects took

approximately six months. Until the end of 2009, none of the eight projects

with ENPI funds approved in June and September 2009 had passed the

national approval procedure. Subsequently, the project start-up in Belarus

was delayed as well.

An additional challenge arises from the limited interest and absorption

capacity of Belarusian stakeholders to participate in transnational

cooperation projects. This is partly caused by a lack of experience and

knowledge on the subject as well as by the limited possibilities to

participate in international and, in particular, Programme events where

potential project partners are usually found. Nevertheless, the number of

Belarusian partners applying for funding increased with each call.

Increasing numbers of Belarusian organisations are participating in EU

cooperation Programmes and projects. The successful implementation of

such projects requires advanced knowledge of relevant national and EU

legislation, which could be challenging for beginners. Many Belarusian

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beneficiaries have little experience in project implementation and it takes

them a lot of time to study all regulations and develop all the necessary

skills, which can postpone the start of project implementation in Belarus.

The JTS aims to improve the situation by organising more events in Belarus

to provide general information about the Programme, to facilitate partner

search, and to support project development and implementation

workshops. CORLEAP can act as an information multiplier in this

regard. Outreach seminars and workshops can be hosted both in-

country and with EU partners, in Brussels.

Costs and funds used

Funding sources

European Regional Development Fund: 208 million EUR

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument: 8.8 million EUR

Norway: 6 million EUR

Total: 222.8 million EUR

plus national co-financing from project partners.

Evaluation

The overall conclusions of the Strategic Evaluation in the Baltic Sea Region

Programme 2007-2013 are as follows:

• EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region.

There are certain limitations caused by some discrepancies between

the Strategy and the Programme. The BSR Programme has the

biggest potential to deliver useful results in all EUSBSR Priority Areas

except for Priority Area 15 (to decrease the volume of, and harm

done by, cross border crime). At the same time ERDF allocation of the

BSR Programme barely reaches 0.5 per cent of the total ERDF and

Cohesion Fund support available for the Strategy under cohesion

policy. Therefore, programmes in the BSR region, if not targeted at

specific areas, are likely to see the contribution of the Programme as

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too small to be visible and significant to the implementation of the

Strategy.

• Impact of the Programme in the Region.

The outcomes of projects funded by the Programme are most visible

in the field of transport (i.e., Priority 2 of the Programme), closely

followed by Priorities 3, 1 and 4. The approved projects were

considered to have a lower potential of capitalisation effect (added

value for development of BSR) compared to visibility since many of

them focus on softer types of preparatory measures for larger scale

investments (e.g., studies, analysis, business plans, investment

concepts, etc.) that do not provide immediate results and therefore

could not be fully assessed at the time of the evaluation.

• Participation in the Programme

The statistics of the first three calls for proposals of the Programme

reveal that:

• a typical lead partner of the Programme is an academic

organisation or a regional public authority with an average budget of

€350,653 from Germany OR a national or regional public authority

with a budget of €570,339 from Sweden;

• a typical partner of the Programme is a regional or local public

authority with an average budget of €191,642 from Sweden OR a

non- governmental organisation or public equivalent body with an

average budget of €218, 995 from Germany OR a nongovernmental

organisation or academic/scientific organisation with an average

budget of €224,455 from Poland.

Participation of public authorities in the BSR Programme has

decreased in comparison with the predecessor Programme

(INTERREG IIIB) (from 75 per cent to 58 per cent). This is primarily

on account of a more active involvement of academic institutions in

the projects funded by the Programme that seems to be consistent

with the macro-regional nature and desired impact of the

Programme.

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The main factors stimulating participation of public authorities in

transnational cooperation are access to knowledge through

international networks, developing of common solutions, raising

additional funds for the participating organisation, as well as

belonging to the BSR community.

• Problems

There were three distinct groups of factors that were considered to

have had an adverse impact on the participation of public authorities

in the Programme. They included: (1) financial issues related to

funding of project development, as well as pre- and co-financing of

activity implementation; (2) capacity in terms of available human

resources and management experience; and (3) administrative issues

surrounding the complex reporting procedures. In terms of the

ongoing global financial crisis, the impact has been more pronounced

in the Baltic countries and Poland, but overall has not affected the

Programme significantly. Measures like availability of seed funding,

availability of advance payments for certain beneficiary groups,

simplification of reporting requirements would encourage a more

active participation of public authorities as main beneficiaries in the

Programme.

• Programme Communication Strategy

A wide range of the Programme’s communication tools and activities

implemented during the first half (2007-2010) of the Programme

were considered to have been effective in raising awareness about

the Programme and have contributed to reaching the communication

aims. The implementation of the Programme communication

activities has been cost-efficient, whereas the communication

activities performed by the approved projects was often rather

expensive.

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Lithuania – Latvia – Belarus CBC Programme Website: http://www.enpi-cbc.eu

Implementation Procedures

Programme implementation structure

The following structures are involved in the management of the

Programme:

• Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC): supervising and monitoring the

Programme implementation;

• Joint Managing Authority (JMA): bearing overall responsibility for the

management and implementation of the Programme towards the

European Commission;

• Joint Technical Secretariat (JTS): the joint operational body, assisting

the Joint Managing Authority and the Joint Monitoring Committee in

carrying out their respective duties.

The following National Authorities (NAs) collaborate with the JMA for the

Programme preparation and implementation period, and are responsible

for the coordination of the programming process in Latvia and Belarus:

• National Authority in Latvia: Ministry of Regional Development and

Local Governments;

• National Authority in Lithuania: Ministry of Interior;

• National Authority in Belarus: Ministry of Foreign Affairs jointly with

National Coordinating Unit for the EU Technical Assistance

Programmes.

Project development, application and implementation

Partnerships should consist of at least one organisation from the Programme

area in Lithuania or Latvia, and at least one organisation from the Programme

area in Belarus.

Projects can be of one of three types:

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(1) an integrated project - where each partner carries out a part of the

activities of the joint action on its own territory;

(2) a symmetrical project - where similar activities are carried out in

parallel in the eligible territory of Latvia and/or Lithuania and in the

eligible territory of Belarus;

(3) a simple project - implemented mainly or entirely in the eligible

territory of Latvia and/or Lithuania or in the eligible territory of Belarus

but for the benefit of all or some of the eligible areas of the other countries

participating in the Joint Operational Programme.

Practical difficulties

Because no projects have been completed during the reported period, it is

difficult to identify challenges and difficulties reported by project

participants. Nevertheless, initial evidence does point to some commonly

reported mistakes made by applicants for funds as part of the project.

These include:

• Applicant or partner is a profit making organisation;

• Applicant or partner is not a legal body (registered operating office is

indicated as an applicant/partner in the application form, which is not a

legal body);

• Poor definition of the problem - detached from objectives, results and

activities;

• Target groups and final beneficiaries defined improperly;

• Absence of cross-border effect;

• Insufficiently detailed/chaotic description of activities;

• Involvement of partners not balanced;

• Absence of objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs) for outputs, results and

objectives;

• Sustainability of results not ensured;

• Exaggerated and unjustified costs;

• Unjustified extensive use of external experts.

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Costs and funds used

Any grant awarded under this Call for Proposals must fall between the

following minimum and maximum amounts:

• Minimum grant amount: EUR 50,000.

• Maximum grant amount: EUR 1,500,000.

• Maximum grant amount under Priority 1 Measure 1.5 “Strengthening of

social-cultural networking and community development” is EUR 225,000.

€ EC funding Co-

financing

Co-financing

rate

Total

funding

Priority 1 18,781,500 1,878,150 10% 20,659,650

Priority 2 18,781,500 1,878,150 10% 20,659,650

Technical

Assistance 4,173,666 1,177,188 22% 5,350,854

Total 41,736,666 4,933,488 11.82% 46,670,154

Not less than 10% of the total eligible costs of the action must be the

applicant’s and/or partner(s) contribution to the action and must be

financed from their resources or from sources other than the European

Community budget or the European Development Fund. The amounts of

such contribution are to be decided between the applicant and its partners

and their indicative distribution is to be indicated in the Application Form

and Partnership Statement.

Evaluation

As projects are still underway, evaluation has yet to take place.

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CUIDAD: Case Study for Ukraine (and Belarus)

Under its Interregional Action Programme 2008 Part III, the European

Union allocated EUR14 million to promote mutual understanding, dialogue

and cooperation between local actors in the EU and in the ENP partner

countries and territories. This was to be achieved through the provision of

capacity building for the modernisation and strengthening of local and

regional government with regard to the use of good governance principles

and, in particular, with regard to the achievement of sustainable, integrated

and long-term urban development planning. Following the Call for

Proposals organised in early 2009, a total of 21 projects have been

awarded a co-financing grant ranging from €400.000 to €650.000 for

projects lasting up to 48 months. The projects began to be implemented in

the first quarter of 2010, after the grant contracts with the European

Commission were signed.

Implementation Procedures

The CIUDAD Supporting Mechanism is a technical assistance project

designed to support the successful implementation of the 21 CIUDAD Grant

Projects. It does this through capacity building, cooperation and exchange

of experience, as well as by providing visibility and communication support

to participating teams and local actors in the EU and in the countries of the

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).

The CIUDAD Supporting Mechanism is tasked with providing support in 6

major areas:

• Supporting and advising the 21 grant beneficiaries in project performance,

e.g. by organizing conferences and workshops on EC procurement and

grant contract procedures, providing mentoring and helpline services,

developing implementation tools and helping identify and prepare a

projects pipeline for the Neighbourhood Investment Facility;

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• Coordination of grant management and implementation between project

beneficiaries, EC HQ, ECD, national governments and other relevant

stakeholders;

• Monitoring of grant projects and assisting with reporting requirements,

including design of a grants management and monitoring web-tools, and

undertaking regular monitoring missions;

• Ensuring dissemination and visibility by designing and implementing a

Dissemination and Visibility Strategy, CIUDAD visibility tools and materials,

and monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of communication

activities;

• Exchange of know-how and information by organising events such as

interregional workshops, thematic working groups and other appropriate

channels;

• Improving and enlarging networks by building national and regional

networks and linking to existing networks.

For the purpose of the project regional offices have been established in the

ENPI East (Kiev).

Project application and implementation

The grant beneficiary has to secure efficient and operational management

of the grant project. In addition to this, an accurate handling of the project

accounts is crucial to the project’s success. After signing the contract with

the Contracting Authority, the lead applicant becomes Beneficiary and

takes the responsibility for the entire project including activities carried

out by all partners. The lead applicant is responsible for timely and correct

reporting to the Contracting Authority. Therefore the lead applicant should

ensure that efficient administrative management and control systems are

established within the operation. The lead applicant is also responsible for

ensuring proper communication with the partners, ensuring that proper

financial management and control procedures are applied and that the EU

contractual procedures concerning financial management and control

(audit) and as well as procurement, information, communication and

visibility activities and rules are respected and observed, also by the

partners.

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For the Sustainable Urban Development Project (Georgia, Belarus and

Ukraine) the lead applicant is Ukrainka Town Council in Ukraine, with

Novolukoml City Council in Belarus as one of the partners. The latest

interim narrative report from the end of 2011 shows an assessment of

implementation of activities.60

Practical Difficulties

The new mayor of Horodok city (Khmelnitsky region) has been elected. The

newly elected city government was presented with the project, its goals

and objectives, and the status of the project in the city. The newly elected

Mayor positively assessed the project and supported its implementation

plan in the city, and approved the members of the working group. Thus,

problems in one of the key cities of the project were avoided. At the

beginning of the project it was unclear how the project would develop in

Novolukoml (Belarus) city in the context of domestic political events in

Belarus. There was a change of government after the local elections and, as

a result, an adjustment process as the project activity was delayed in

connection with obtaining all approvals from the local government (in

effect, though, the central government). The worsening political situation in

Belarus, as well as the legal conditions for the existence of NGOs in this

country, are generally not favourable for the project. The periodic

deterioration of relations between Belarus and the European Union forced

local authorities to be wary of their involvement in projects. In addition,

poor legal conditions for Belarusian NGOs led to the rejection of a grant

program for the non-governmental organizations of Novolukoml. Due to

the lack of financial resources required for the project, the Polish partner,

was proposed to be replaced by the partner from Jurmala City Council

(Latvia). Contract amendments propositions were submitted.

The Project Coordinator for Lublin Regional Center of Local Democracy

Foundation in Poland attended the meeting of project partners in Ukrainka

in April 2011. Unfortunately, the partner did not supply the necessary

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financial contribution. Subsequently, there were numerous attempts to

reach agreement on a joint plan of activities and conditions of financing for

the project through numerous telephone calls and correspondence

between the Board of Ukrainka city and Lublin Regional Center

Development Fund for Local Democracy. In this instance, negotiations were

conducted with representatives of the EU Delegation to Ukraine and

representatives of the CIUDAD programme. Unfortunately, a compromise

has not, so far, been reached and the Polish partner has been replaced.

Jurmala City Council (Latvia) agreed to participate in the project instead of

Lublin Regional Centre for Local Democracy Development Fund.

Costs and funds used

Duration: 36 months

Total budget: EUR 623,224

EU contribution: EUR 498,579

A grant is defined as:

– a project proposed by a potential Beneficiary

– with a co-financing from the Beneficiary of (generally 20 per cent) of the

total eligible costs;

– the EC contribution is for the reimbursement of the actual eligible costs

incurred;

– the Grant Beneficiary is autonomous and owner of the action & its results;

– funds cannot be released retroactively.

Evaluation

The first stage for the new CIUDAD Programme promoting cooperation

between local and regional governments in capacity building for improved

governance in sustainable urban development and planning was launched

in early 2009. As yet, no specific lessons have been learned in relation to its

implementation. However, consideration may be given to additional

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measures in order to emphasise the inter-regional (East-South) nature and

policy intent of the programme in relation to the promotion of thematic

cooperation in areas such as energy & environment; social cohesion; good

governance and urban planning. The implementation of CIUDAD

complements the actions of the CBC Programme as its aims to strengthen

capacity of local and regional authorities in sustainable and effective

development with particular emphasis on the transfer of knowledge and

experience in good governance, urban planning and accountability

mechanisms. It enables local authorities and regions to reach beyond

partnerships facilitated through CBC country and Sea Basin Programmes

by linking up with experienced inter-urban networks in the areas of key

policy interest.

Evaluation of project activities

The project is fully underway (i.e., the project team has been formed, the

constituent meeting of partners has been held, kick-off events have been

held in the cities participating in the project, all the necessary information

materials about the project have been prepared, the website of the Project

has been created and launched; and 4 cities in Ukraine have been selected

to participate);

The international workshop for representatives of local governments

(municipalities) of the participating cities has been held as well as the

study visit of representatives of local governments with selected small

towns and partner organizations to Poland and Ukrainka city (Ukraine).

12 trainers have been trained for conducting trainings in cities

participating in the project. A training programme has been developed and

six working groups for strategic planning have been formed in the cities

participating in the project. The training programme has been

implemented, under which each of the participating cities conducted four

training sessions.

The grant programme is running, during which the financial support for

their own projects was received by 17 public organizations in cities

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participating in the project (2 organizations of each Ukrainian city, 4 from

Ozurgeti city (Georgia), 5 from Ukrainka (Ukraine). The organizations that

were successful in obtaining funding have received funds and their projects

are in progress at present (although because of the difficulties noted above,

none in Belarus). In addition, expert consultations on strategic planning are

being held.

Work continues on the development of strategic plans of participating

cities. The work for the reporting period so far has focussed on developing

the ‘mission and vision’ for the future of cities participating in the project,

the definition of strategic and operational objectives, and the undertaking

of a strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats (SWOT) analysis for each

for the participating cities. So far, there have been five meetings of project

partners. Four issues of a project newsletter have been published and

posted on the official website of the project.61 An experience sharing and

dissemination of positive practice workshop is envisaged for 2012.

At the beginning of the project, strong links were established with national

and regional bodies of state power in Ukraine. Representatives of the

Ministry of Regional Development and Construction of Ukraine,

Department of Regional Development and Local Government Cabinet of

Ministers of Ukraine, regional state administrations in each of the selected

cities, representative of Embassy of Ukraine in Belarus took part in the

activities of the project.

The project is registered in the Ministry of Economy and a full set of

documents for registration in accordance with the laws of Ukraine has been

prepared, so there were no obstacles to the formal registration of the

project. So far, the projects have proceeded smoothly (with the exception of

Belarus) and this is cited as being a result of close cooperation between

local authorities participants and the state authorities. Local authorities

showed particular willingness to cooperate, especially the mayors of

participating cities. Representatives of local governments were included

into working groups that are working on creation of strategic plans.

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The relationship between the Project and public authorities has been

described as “partner and friendly.” Cooperation between beneficiaries and

target groups, such as employees of local government (municipal officials),

local NGOs, community activists, formal and informal community leaders

and the BSP was arranged. Representatives of all these groups are included

in the working groups that are working to create strategies for

participating cities. In addition, local NGOs were involved from this stage,

for which a call for applications for grants has been announced within the

project. As a result of this competition grants for projects were received by

17 non-governmental organizations.

Twinning Assistance - Case Study for Ukraine

Twinning is a form of direct technical co-operation for Ukraine, with

cooperation involving engagement between the public administrations and

mandated bodies of EU Member States and the beneficiary administrations

of Ukraine with the aim of transferring know-how and best practices

between public administrations of EU Member States and their Ukrainian

counterparts. Twinning projects in Ukraine focus on some elements

connected with the approximation of the acquis and also elements of

structural reform. Twinning is considered to be one of the most efficient

tools for implementing administrative reform. There are over fifty

completed projects, ongoing projects, and projects in the pipeline for the

future, with some envisaged to be focused on central state institutions.

Implementation Procedures

Each Twinning project has at least one Resident Twinning Adviser (RTA)

and a Project Leader. The RTA is seconded from a Member State public

administration or from another mandated body in a Member State to work

full time for a minimum of 12 months in the corresponding ministry in

partner country to implement the project. The Project Leader is

responsible for the overall thrust and coordination of the project. They are

supplemented by carefully planned and timed missions of other specialists,

training events, awareness raising visits, etc. to accompany the reform

process towards the targeted results.

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Operators of Twinning projects are non-profit organisations with less

experience of contractual relationship than consulting firms, although they

are becoming increasingly professional with each new Twinning project.

They face human resources constraints since Twinning projects have no

local and medium-term experts (except RTA assistants), although they do

have counterparts to Project Leader and RTAs from Beneficiary

Administrations.

The Twinning project cycle is more demanding in terms of preparation and

a specific competitive selection procedure is used for selection and

evaluation of the potential MS partners. Policy advice (including law

drafting, advice on organisational issues, awareness raising, etc.), training,

study tours and internships are among the activities eligible for Twinning

projects. These activities, together with eligible costs for the Twinning

project implementation and all relevant procedures are described in the

Twinning Reference Manual.62

The Programme Administration Office (PAO) is under the jurisdiction of

the National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service and is intended to manage

the procedural issues and general coordination of implementation of the

Twinning institution building instrument in Ukraine. The PAO has an

important role in the whole twinning cycle of the project, with its

responsibilities including:

• the drafting of the TORs of the Framework contracts (identification

missions) and the quality control of twinning fiches and contracts

• the PAO acts as the central point of communication between the

Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine and the Beneficiary

Administrations and between the MS Administrations and the

Beneficiary Administration;

• the PAO assists the Delegation to check that the detailed proposals

meet the required standards;

• the PAO checks that the good financial management of the Twinning

project is in compliance with EC rules;

62

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• the PAO receives and analyses twinning project quarterly, annual and

final reports.

Implementation of a Twinning Project

Project implementation commences on the day of receipt of a notification

letter from the Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine. The

Resident Twinning Advisor is supposed to arrive in the beneficiary country

within three months from the day of notification on signing of the project

contract. During this period, the beneficiary administration is to submit

documents for registration and accreditation of the project. The duration of

a Twinning project may be between 12 to 24 months.

After arrival of the Resident Twinning Advisor to the beneficiary

administration, the preparation process of the official launch of the

Twinning project starts. The official launch of the project is organized to

raise awareness among all Twinning project stakeholders.

The official launch of the project is organized and financed jointly by the

beneficiary administration and the partner administration from the EU

member state. Invitees to the official launch of the project include

stakeholders, such representatives of the Government, Secretariat of the

President of Ukraine, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, other governmental

bodies, representatives of the partner state, Delegation of the European

Commission to Ukraine, European Commission, CSOs, associations, mass

media, etc.

The Resident Twinning Advisor together with the partner in the beneficiary

administration organizes events under the Twinning project in accordance

with the Work Plan of the project. The Resident Twinning Advisor ensures

timely arrival of experts and coordinates their work. The beneficiary

administration ensures implementation of all obligations pursuant to the

Twinning contract.

To control implementation of the Work Plan and timely solution of

problems that emerge during implementation of a Twinning project, a

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Steering Committee is created. Members of the Steering Committee are

Project Leaders from the beneficiary state and the partner state, Resident

Twinning Advisor and his/her Counterpart, project manager from the

Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine and representatives of

the Program Administration Office. The Steering Committee holds

quarterly meetings.

The Project Leader from the partner state, together with the beneficiary

administration, prepare quarterly reports and submit them to the

Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine and the Program

Administration Office within a month after the end of the quarter. Project

Leaders from the partner state and the beneficiary state submit the final

project report to the Delegation of the European Commission to Ukraine

and the Program Administration Office before the end of the legal duration

of the Twinning contract.

At the working level, monthly meetings between the Resident Twinning

Advisor, his/her Counterpart and representatives of the Program

Administration Office in cooperation with the Delegation of the European

Commission to Ukraine are hold to monitor the course of project

implementation.

Problems encountered

Instead of collaborative, partnership-building, networking work-

approaches, administrative-bureaucratic–command-driven style of

management is still predominant in some institutions that are central to

the implementation of successful Twinning projects. This management

style is contradictory to the management style necessary for Twinning,

since it jeopardises self-driven collaboration, a key element for successful

Twinning development.

Due to frequent political changes, management and staffing of Ministries is

often changing, and the civil service has proven instable which creates

implementation and cooperation barriers in the Twinning processes.

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Twinning project preparation and implementation capacities are under

developed and/or sometimes lacking in many stakeholders. Problems of

governmental institutional capacities also have a negative impact on the

Twinning project potential.

A low level of motivation among governmental/ministerial staff charged

with implementation is also a problem for Twinning projects. The level of

knowledge of English (foreign) language is generally low and insufficient

for Twinning preparation and implementation. This creates a huge need for

translation and interpretation, and reduces positive impacts of direct

contacts or makes joint work impossible at all.

Moreover, beneficiaries often exhibit a low level of awareness regarding

their own obligations under Twinning projects. Networking and

partnership building to share knowledge and experience - a key component

of any Twinning arrangement - often insufficient or underestimated in

Ukraine.

The additional workload which is imposed by the demands of the Twinning

project participants from Ukrainian Administrations is not supported with

extra compensation. There is no additional person in the staff available for

preparing and implementing Twinning.

More broadly, the implementation of Twinning projects has faced deeper

challenges. These are of systematic nature and negatively affect the

development of partner relationships between Ukraine and EU member-

states. Cited problems include:

– Twinning projects do not enjoy priority and not do not always comply

with the activities of central executive government bodies;

– Public administrations sometimes simultaneously implement several

technical assistance projects with Twinning projects focused on reforming

the relevant public governance sphere. However, the absence of coherent

interaction between projects can hinder the correct sequencing of

structural changes;

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– Public administrations often lack capacity and therefore cannot

guarantee the performance of their commitments undertaken in the course

of Twinning project implementation;

However, in 2008-2009 many of the above problems were addressed. A

Twinning Programme Administration Office now monitors the preparation

of Twinning projects. With the support of the Delegation of the European

Commission to Ukraine and TACIS Project, several additional initiatives

were carried out, including the “Implementation of Twinning Operations in

Ukraine”, and the “Twinning in English / Professional Skills” training

course, which was launched in 2008. The goal of the course is to improve

civil servants’ language and communication skills to facilitate the smoother

implementation of Twinning projects, to and improve the quality of

innovative activities they perform to pursue project goals and objectives.”

Costs and funds used

Twinning may be implemented as a classic Twinning project (up to 24

months) or a light Twinning project (up to 6 months), with a budget of up

to 2 million euros.

The implementation period of a traditional Twinning project is at least 12

months and it envisages the presence of a RTA. Twinning Light projects, on

the other hand, are small scale projects lasting a maximum of 8 months.

The funding cannot exceed EUR 250,000 and it envisages only short term

or medium term experts (i.e., the absence of a RTA). Additionally there is

no detailed Work Plan to be jointly drafted by the partners. Instead, the

beneficiary institution drafts a Project Fiche, where project objectives and

activities are outlined. This approach facilitates the endorsement of the

project in a shorter period of time. There are neither private sector services

nor supplies allowed, except for translation and interpretation.

Consortiums of several Member States are also forbidden. The evaluation

of Twinning Light proposals is based entirely on the written documents

submitted.

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Ukrainian participants do not receive any financial resources directly. Since

they have initiated Twinning projects, they themselves bear some costs

during implementation of the Twinning projects (co-financing in a form of

equipped premises for RTA and STEs). It is however the EC that finances

the costs of involving European partners, as well as the costs of

participation for Ukrainian participants in the project, such as travel costs

to EU countries, costs of organisation of conferences in the EU and Ukraine,

etc. Twinning is thus very much a ‘joint venture’. Both parties are expected

to contribute resources and receive benefits.

Evaluation

A number of general conclusions and recommendations emerged from the

3rd Annual Conference of Twinning Operations in EaP countries in 2009. In

general it was stated that Twinning projects should attain a higher level of

effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability rather than focusing on

merely carrying out the planned activities. For this to happen, the following

recommendations were made:

Recommendations for beneficiary countries:

• Country priorities for foreign assistance application should be clearer.

The governments of Eastern Partnership countries have to set out their

positions and objectives with long-term perspective on the

prioritization of spheres for project implementation, including their

vision on projects’ compliance with wider reforms in the respective

countries;

• The absorption capacity of both current and potential beneficiary

institutions in the Eastern Partnership countries must be strengthened

through training and the involvement of professionals on project

management in public administration. All project participants should

have a clear understanding that Twinning is a two-way process and

should not resemble a teacher-student relationship;

• To ensure the quality of further implementation of Twinning projects

beneficiary administrations should, during the selection/evaluation

process, pay greater attention to assessing EU MS proposals;

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• Internal monitoring and evaluation of Twinning projects and country

programmes, as well as the dissemination of information and good

practices, including e-government initiatives should receive greater

attention in line with the requirements of the 2009 revised Twinning

Manual. Dissemination of information and past experiences of current

or former Twinning beneficiaries would be especially valuable for

‘newcomers’ to Twinning.

Recommendations for the CoR and CORLEAP:

• More efficient implementation of Twinning instruments requires a

reduction in the time required for project preparation. The period of 2-3

years could put the viability of projects at risk. To address the issue of

the extended period of projects’ preparation, large Twinning projects

should be planned with prolonged timeframes for projects and

additional resources of assistance (services, supplies, investments);

• To ensure the smoother adjustment of Twinning/TAIEX implementation

modalities related to the increased amount of assistance Eastern

Partnership countries should receive, more direct responsibility for

management of EU assistance should be assigned to partner institutions

(i.e., a decentralized management system should be created);

• To ensure better results in the implementation of projects Twinning

should be introduced at the regional level. Regional Twinning has to be

complimentary to the Twinning at the central level. CORLEAP can

champion this initiative, based on an understanding of the positive

impact of twinning actions at the national level in the Eastern

Partner countries.

Twinning Assistance: Case Study for Azerbaijan

Twinning is the institutional building instrument based on partnership

cooperation between public administrations of an EU Member State and

Azerbaijan, as a Beneficiary Country. Under Twinning, partners from the

Azerbaijani public institution and from the EU Member State institution

implement a Twinning project based on a jointly agreed work plan.

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Azerbaijan has shown particular interest in making increased use of

twinning and technical assistance. The first twinning Programmes were

launched under the TACIS instrument in late 2009 and there is a

considerable pipeline of requests which are being addressed over the

course of the programme period.

There are eight completed projects for 2008-2011, a further seven

currently being implemented, and another dozen in the pipeline for the

future. However, the weakness of local government in Azerbaijan means

that these projects are focused on central state institutions.

Implementation Procedures

Identification of projects

The Beneficiary Administration (the public institution in Azerbaijan)

identifies its needs within European Union (EU) policy orientations, and in

line with reform priorities of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and drafts

Twinning Fiches with the assistance of the EU Delegation in Baku through a

framework contract, and with the support of the Programme

Administration Office (PAO).

Calls for proposals

The circulation of Twinning fiches by the EU Delegation in Baku to Member

State (MS) National Contact Points highlight mandatory requirements.

Submission of proposals

Member States - alone or in a consortium - prepare and submit a proposal

with the designated Resident Twinning Adviser (RTA) and Project Leader

(PL) explaining the key features of their proposed approach to achieving

the targeted result.

Selection of a Twinning partner

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Azerbaijani Beneficiary Institutions and the EU Delegation in Baku assess

proposals and, following the presentation of a proposal by an MS RTA and

PL, make the final decision

Preparation and finalisation of a Twinning contract

Selected Member States and Beneficiary institutions, with the support of

the PAO, together draw up the Twinning contract with a detailed work plan

and budget.

Project implementation

The Twinning project should be implemented according to the work plan.

The RTA coordinates the execution of the project and is supported by the

PL, the RTA counterpart, the MS administration, and the PAO.

Monitoring and reporting

Progress is monitored by the EU Delegation and the PAO and is reported in

the Interim Quarterly Reports and a Final Report. The EU Delegation and

the PAO participate in Quarterly Steering Committees.

Audit

A Twinning Project may be audited by the European Commission Service

and by the Court of Auditors.

Twinning review missions

Six to twelve months after the Twinning project finalization, it is followed

by a Twinning Review Mission for an assessment of the project’s results,

sustainability, impact, and lessons learned from them.

Stakeholders

Project Leaders (PL): Project Leaders are high-ranking officials - one of the

EU Member State and one from Azerbaijan. They continue to work in their

administrations, but also devote a portion of their time to conceiving,

supervising and coordinating the overall thrust of the project. The EU

Member State Project Leader should devote to the project a minimum 3

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days a month, including a visit to the region every 3 months. Broad

knowledge of Twinning procedures and good leadership skills are required

to be a Project Leader. An Azerbaijani Project Leader acts as the

counterpart of the MS Project Leader and is charged with ensuring close co-

operation from the Azerbaijani side.

The Resident Twinning Adviser (RTA) and the RTA counterpart: The

Resident Twinning Adviser comes from a EU Member State, and should be

based in Azerbaijan for the whole period of the Twinning project. He must

be a civil servant or equivalent coming from the EU Member State

administration involved in the Twinning project. His main task is to

accompany the implementation of the Twinning project, to coordinate the

activities and to ensure the continuity of the implementation of the

Twinning project. The RTA counterpart is appointed by the Beneficiary

administration and he ensures close co-operation in the day-to-day

implementation of the Twinning project.

Programme Administration Office (PAO): PAO is an especially dedicated

unit set up in the Ministry of Economic Development of the Republic of

Azerbaijan to retain in cooperation with the Delegation of the EU the

overall coordination of Twinning projects.

Implementation and Monitoring Procedures

At the implementation stage, the key responsibility rests with the Twinning

Partners: the EU MS Administration and the Azerbaijani BA. They are

required to deliver mandatory results as set out in the Twinning Contract.

Both the EUD and PAO should provide organisational and administrative

support to the Twinning Partners.

Running parallel to implementation activities, stakeholders of a Twinning

project undertake monitoring of project implementation. EU MS and

Azerbaijani Twinning partners normally keep track of how they are

performing in meeting project targets. This check-up is performed through

quarterly reporting. The EUD Task Manager also monitors the

implementation of a Twinning project. In their capacity as the Contracting

Authority, the EUD pays particular attention to contractual, procedural and

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budgetary aspects of Twinning Contract implementation. Monitoring of

project implementation for ongoing Twinning projects constitute a

considerable proportion of PAO activities. However, from the PAO

perspective, the most important aspect is to be sure that the benchmarks

outlined in the original Twinning contract are met.

Practical Difficulties

As with the TAIEX programme and other EU-funded projects, Azerbaijan

has demonstrated slow implementation of the ENPI and experienced

delays in establishing the necessary structures for management of projects.

This is largely due to domestic political constraints and a wider

ambivalence towards European integration.

The Programme Administration Office was established in Azerbaijan at the

end of 2006 as a body to ensure an optimal and overall coordination of

Twinning, TAIEX and SİGMA activities in the country. Since late 2009 it has

been supported by the EU-funded project: “Implementation of Twinning,

TAIEX and Sigma Operations in Azerbaijan” (ITTSO) which entered a new

phase at the end of 2011 (this is also described in the other Azerbaijani

case study).

Capacity building via ITTSO has resulted in:

• Steady increase in the number of TAIEX, SIGMA and Twinning projects;

• The Azerbaijani Government including PAO, line ministries and other

public bodies now receive sufficient information and support on

successful identification, preparation and implementation of Twinning

projects, TAIEX and SIGMA events;

• Awareness increased in the use of the instruments and in the

achievements of EU cooperation towards Azerbaijan;

• Increased capacity of PAO to operate on its own.

Costs and funds used

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The budget for each twinning project is generally around EUR 1 million for

18-24 month projects (with an additional 12-18 months planning in

advance and 12-18 months evaluation and audit afterwards). Azerbaijani

partners do not receive any financial means directly. It is however the EC

that finances the costs of involving European partners as well as the costs

of participation of Azerbaijanis in the cooperation, such as travel costs to

EU countries, costs of organization of conferences in the EU and Azerbaijan

and others. Local officials are paid for their work within their own salaries

and other Azerbaijani incentives, but they are not paid additionally from

the Twinning project budget. They receive benefits in other ways, like

enhanced knowledge and experience, study visits to European countries

and bigger motivation to achieve progress.

Evaluation

A number of general conclusions and recommendations emerged from the

3rd Annual Conference of Twinning Operations in EaP countries in 2009. In

general it was stated that Twinning projects should attain a higher level of

effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability rather than focusing on

merely carrying out the planned activities. For this to happen, the following

recommendations were made:

Recommendations for beneficiary countries:

• Country priorities for foreign assistance application should be clearer.

The governments of Eastern Partnership countries have to set out their

positions and objectives with long-term perspective on the

prioritization of spheres for project implementation, including their

vision on projects’ compliance with wider reforms in the respective

countries;

• The absorption capacity of both current and potential beneficiary

institutions in the Eastern Partnership countries must be strengthened

through training and the involvement of professionals on project

management in public administration. All project participants should

have a clear understanding that Twinning is a two-way process and

should not resemble a teacher-student relationship;

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• To ensure the quality of further implementation of Twinning projects

beneficiary administrations should, during the selection/evaluation

process, pay greater attention to assessing EU MS proposals;

• Internal monitoring and evaluation of Twinning projects and country

programmes, as well as the dissemination of information and good

practices, including e-government initiatives should receive greater

attention in line with the requirements of the 2009 revised Twinning

Manual. Dissemination of information and past experiences of current

or former Twinning beneficiaries would be especially valuable for

‘newcomers’ to Twinning.

Recommendations for the EU:

• More efficient implementation of Twinning instruments requires a

reduction in the time required for project preparation. The period of 2-3

years could put the viability of projects at risk. To address the issue of

the extended period of projects’ preparation, large Twinning projects

should be planned with prolonged timeframes for projects and

additional resources of assistance (services, supplies, investments);

• To ensure the smoother adjustment of Twinning/TAIEX implementation

modalities related to the increased amount of assistance Eastern

Partnership countries should receive, more direct responsibility for

management of EU assistance should be assigned to partner institutions

(i.e., a decentralized management system should be created);

• To ensure better results in the implementation of projects Twinning

should be introduced at the regional level. Regional Twinning has to be

complimentary to the Twinning at the central level. Given the evidence

of learning at the nation state level, CORLEAP should press for an

extension of Twinning arrangements to the local and regional

authority level in the EaP.

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CUIDAD: Case Study for Moldova (and Ukraine)

Under its Interregional Action Programme 2008 Part III, the European

Union has allocated EUR 14 million to promote mutual understanding,

dialogue and cooperation between local actors in the EU and in the ENP

partner countries and territories. This is to be achieved through the

support for capacity building measures to assist in the modernisation and

strengthening of local and regional government so that they are able to act

according to good governance principles and, in particular, to ensure

sustainable, integrated and long-term urban development planning.

Following the Call for Proposals organised in early 2009, a total of 21

projects have been awarded a co-financing grant, ranging from €400,000 to

€650,000 for projects lasting up to 48 months. The projects began in the

first quarter of 2010, after signing of the grant contracts with the European

Commission.

One such project is the ‘Energy Efficient Municipalities’ project (Moldova

and Ukraine). The project is aimed at increasing the energy efficiency of

Chisinau and Sevastopol municipalities, and takes place in the framework

of the CIUDAD Programme (Cooperation in Urban Development and

Dialogue), funded by the European Commission. The overall purpose of the

project is to incorporate the energy efficiency perspective in the

administration of two municipalities (Chisinau, Republic of Moldova and

Sevastopol, Ukraine), institutionalize it, and prepare the ground for

infrastructure investments aimed at improving the energy efficiency, as

well as to create an immediate energy saving impact by improving

behaviour in the area of energy efficiency.

Objectives:

• To promote energy efficiency in the administration of beneficiary

municipalities (Chisinau and Sevastopol) and to institutionalize

efforts at improving energy efficiency;

• To facilitate the utilisation of energy efficient technologies by

improving the regulatory framework and adjusting the relevant

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policies, at the level of both local public authorities and central public

authorities;

• To undertake actions that would enable the municipal authorities to

attract investment in infrastructure with the aim of making them

more energy efficient;

• To promote energy efficient behaviour in public institutions,

especially schools;

• To inform citizens of the opportunities offered by modern energy

saving technologies and the use of renewable energy sources.

Results expected:

• An energy efficiency strategy for the Chisinau municipality will be

developed from scratch, and the legal framework to create better

conditions for investments in the increase of energy efficiency will be

improved;

• In order to promote best practices in energy conservation, a

competition for schools from Chisnau has been be organised, with the

winning institution receiving 100,000 euros for thermal insulation of

its building;

• Feasibility studies and investment plans for infrastructure

development projects will be carried out, as well as the pilot use of

insulation in residential buildings, street illumination and use of

renewable energy sources;

• Consumption of electric and thermal energy in target areas will drop

based on an increased awareness of energy efficiency.

Beneficiaries:

• Schools from Chisinau and Sevastopol municipalities;

• Local Public Authorities of Chisinau and Sevastopol;

• Individual consumers of the two cities who will learn how to save

energy.

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Implementation Procedures

The CIUDAD Supporting Mechanism is a technical assistance project

designed to support the successful implementation of the 21 CIUDAD Grant

Projects. It does this through capacity building, cooperation and exchange

of experience, as well as by providing visibility and communication support

to participating teams and local actors in the EU and in the countries of the

European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI).

The CIUDAD Supporting Mechanism is tasked with providing support in 6

major areas:

• Supporting and advising the 21 grant beneficiaries in project

performance, e.g. by organizing conferences and workshops on EC

procurement and grant contract procedures, providing mentoring and

helpline services, developing implementation tools and helping identify

and prepare a projects pipeline for the Neighbourhood Investment

Facility;

• Coordinating with regard to grant management and implementation

between project beneficiaries, EC HQ, ECD, national governments and

other relevant stakeholders;

• Monitoring of grant projects and assisting with reporting requirements,

including design of a grants management and monitoring web-tool and

undertaking regular monitoring missions;

• Ensuring dissemination and visibility by designing and implementing a

Dissemination and Visibility Strategy, CIUDAD visibility tools and

materials, and monitoring and evaluating the effectiveness of

communication activities;

• Exchange of know-how and information by organising events such as

interregional workshops, thematic working groups and other

appropriate channels;

• Improving and enlarging networks by building national and regional

networks and linking to existing networks.

For the purpose of the project regional offices have been established in the

ENPI East (Kiev). The grant beneficiary is responsible for securing efficient

operational management of the grant project. In addition to this, an

accurate handling of the project accounts is crucial to the project’s success.

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After signing the contract with the Contracting Authority, the lead applicant

becomes Beneficiary and takes the responsibility for the entire project

including activities carried out by all partners. The lead applicant is

responsible for timely and correct reporting to the Contracting Authority.

Therefore the lead applicant should ensure that efficient administrative

management and control systems are established within the operation.

The lead applicant is also responsible for ensuring proper communication

with the partners, ensuring that proper financial management and control

procedures are applied and that the EU contractual procedures concerning

financial management and control (audit) and as well as procurement,

information, communication and visibility activities and rules are

respected and observed, also by the partners.

For the Energy Efficient Municipalities project the lead applicant is

Chisinau City Hall in Moldova and the municipalities of Sevastopol in

Ukraine is one of the partners. Other partners include: the Institute for

Development and Social Initiatives “Viitorul” (Moldova); the ICLEI

European Secretariat GmbH (Germany); and the Union of Municipalities of

the Marmara Region (Turkey).

Practical Difficulties

Programme manager in Chisinau contacted for further details of problems

or lessons learned – no response to date.

Costs and funds used

Duration: 28 months

Total budget: EUR 672,965

EU contribution: EUR 538,372

Grants are disbursed on the basis that:

- a project is one proposed by a potential Beneficiary;

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- co-financing from the Beneficiary of (generally 20 per cent) of the total

eligible costs is required;

- the EC contribution is for the reimbursement of the actual eligible costs

incurred;

- the grant Beneficiary is autonomous and the owner of the action and its

results

Evaluation

The same general information that is used for the Ukraine Twinning case

can be used here. The programme manager in Chisinau was contacted for

any further details of assessment or evaluation, but, alas, there has been no

response to date.

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