Rejection of Reason

A report based on a mission to Iraqi Kurdistan

The Human Rights Alliance and the UK Parliamentary Human Rights Group

August 1995

'If pursuing disadvantage after the disadvantage has become obvious is irrational, the rejection ofreason is the prime characteristic of folly'.

Barbara Tuchman, The March of Folly

I Introduction

1. This report is based on a mission to Iraqi Kurdistan between July IS and 21, 1995. The participantswere Dr Mahmoud Osman, elder statesman and one time colleague of General Barzani; Mr BakhtiarAmin, independent Kurdish personality based in Paris; Mrs Kathryn Cameron Porter, President of theUS Human Rights Alliance, and Lord Avebury, chairman of the UK Parliamentary Human RightsGroup.

2. T^e delegation were extremely grateful to all those who facilitated the mission: to the government ofSyria, for allowing it to cross their border into the region; to the leaders of the Kurdistan DemocraticParty, (KDP) Mr Masoud Barzani and of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, (PUK), Mr Jalal Talabani,for being so generous with their time; to the leading figures of both parties, for their insights into themany problems confronting them; to the INC and the other political parties, for their own perspectiveson the conflict and their assistance in crossing the front line between Salahaddin and Arbil, and to allthose who entertained us with their traditional Kurdish hospitality in the midst of their preoccupations.Without the whole-hearted co-operation of our Kurdish friends, it would have been impossible toconduct two meetings with the main party leaders, and many others with their senior officials, with theminor parties, and with independent personalities, in the space of less than a week, and the welcomewe received showed that almost all concerned are genuinely interested in peace.

3. The obstacles in the way of an agreement are nevertheless formidable, and to overcome them willrequire an act of political will by the party leaders, and the commitment by the internationalcommunity to further involvement in the peace process. There is a level of distrust and suspicionbetween the warring factions, that makes it difficult to negotiate. A number of cease fires have beenbroken; signed agreements have been repudiated, and each side accuses the other of seeking a militarysolution, whilst agreeing that outright victory is unlikely because of the even balance of population andresources. The neighbouring powers all have an interest in prolonging the conflict, and their balefulinfluence can be seen in the ready availability of arms and ammunition; the incursions by the Turkisharmed forces; the attempts to coerce the parties into alignments with Iran and Turkey; the presence offoreign agents, and the widespread allegations that each power has some individuals on its payroll.

4. The west, on the other hand, has an equally strong interest in the promotion of orderly governmentin the Kurdish entity. A democratic role model in Kurdistan would be a vital component of anystrategy to replace Saddam Hussain with a democratic system in the whole of Iraq. The stability ofKurdistan, and its ultimate re-incorporation in a federal Iraq, could be the key to solving the conflictbetween the Turkish Kurds and Ankara's Kemalist unitary state. It could also help to encouragepolitical solutions to the Kurdish problems in Syria and Turkey. Apart from these practicalconsiderations, the west also has a powerful moral responsibility towards the Kurdish people. PresidentBush encouraged them to rebel against Saddam Hussain during the Desert Storm operation to evictIraqi forces from Kuwait, and the safe havens policy, coupled with the demands in Resolution 688 thatIraq immediately end the repression and allow immediate access by international humanitarianorganisations to all those in need, are pledges by the intemational community not to abandon the Kurdsto chaos and oppression, whether home made or imported.

II Recent past history.

6. After the defeat of Saddam Hussain by the allies in February 1991 in operation Desert Storm, withthe encouragement of President George Bush the Kurds of northern Iraq and the Shi'as of southern Iraqrose in revolt against Baghdad. The Iraqi armed forces were able to regain control of both regions,however, and hundreds of thousands of Kurdish refugees fled into Turkey and to a lesser extent Iran.On April 5, 1991, the UN Security Council passed resolution 688, which called on Iraq (inter alia) toend the repression of the Iraqi civilian population, and later in the month the allies launched operationProvide Comfort, which established a 'safe haven' in the Kurdish region, and established a 'no-fly' zonefor Iraqi aircraft north of the 36th parallel.

7. In October 1991, the Iraqi forces withdrew from most of the Kurdish region, but retained control ofKirkuk, which has been systematically Arabised since. Saddam Hussain imposed an intemal blockadeon the Kurdish entity, which has remained in force ever since, gratuitously imposing severe hardshipon the people.

8. The Iraqi Kurdistan Front, an umbrella organisation of opposition parties which had been formedoriginally to co-ordinate the opposition to Saddam Hussain, had continued to function after DesertStorm, and attempted to negotiate a Kurdish autonomous region. The discussions were virtuallysuspended in August 1991 and were formally broken off in January 1992, when the IKF announcedthat elections would be held for a Kurdish Parliament. These elections were held in May 1992 andresulted in a wafer-thin majority of votes for the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) of MasoudBarzani over the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) of Jalal Talabani. The parties decided that eachshould have 50 seats, as part of a power-sharing agreement.

9. Under the power-sharing agreement, any Minister belonging to one party had a deputy from theother, and this led to paralysis because the deputies invariably challenged and attempted to fhistiate thedecisions of their nominal superiors. The 50-50 policy was extended to administrative as well asMinisterial appointments, and at every level each party tried to block the decisions of the other.

10. In November 1992, the Turkish army invaded Iraqi Kurdistan with a force of 15,000 men,advancing up to 25 km into the territory in an attempt to deter military operations by the KurdistanWorkers' Party (PKK), an armed opposition group in Turkey, from mounting operations into Turkeyfrom bases across the frontier. Ankara wanted the KDP and PUK themselves to take effective measuresto disarm the PKK and stop their incursions into Turkey. The Turks had more success with the KDP,whose long frontier with Turkey and greater vulnerability both to military and economic pressure bythe Turks made them more receptive to the Turkish demands than the PUK. This became an additionalcause of tension between the parties.

11. The two main parties, and the Islamic Movement in Iraqi Kurdistan (IMIK) each maintainedcontrol of its own private armed forces, and the region was divided into territories, within f^arh ofwhich the administration of justice and the maintenance of law and order were largely under thecontrol of the party and not the central government. This trend has been accentuated since May 1994,when the ICDP started to collect and retain large sums of money by levying 'taxes' on the movement ofgoods from Turkey to Iraq and vice versa. This has given the KDP the ability to pay salaries to publicservants and armed fighters ('peshmergas') within their own area, while starving the centralgovernment of revenues that properly belonged to it.

12. A series of armed clashes between the various factions was inaugurated with a two-week conflictbetween the PUK and the IMIK in December 1993, which caused several hundred deaths andwidespread destruction of houses, mosques and public buildings. In May 1994, conflicts eruptedinvolving the PUK, KDP and IMIK, and fighting continued spasmodically into June and July. In July,delegations from the two main parties met in Paris at the invitation of Mme Mitterand under the semiofficial auspices of the French government. The Turks protested to France, seeing the Paris Agreementas tantamount to a declaration of an independent Kurdish state, and they refused to allow the leaders ofthe parties to travel to Paris for the formal signature which had been planned to ratify the agreement.

13. On August 16, 1994, the two leaders, Mr Jalal Talabani and Mr Masoud Barzani, entered intosolemn undertakings before the Parliament and in the presence of three Parliamentary delegates fromthe UK, one of whom was also a member of the present delegation, not to resort to armed force and towork together for the rule of law and the construction of civil society. The "Public Statement" issuedby the Parliament is given as Annex I to this report. The following week, however, there were renewedclashes, and the UK delegates wamed the party leaders, in a letter printed as Annex II, of theconsequences of their failure to make peace and compose their political differences.

14. On November 21, 1994, yet another agreement was reached between the two leaders. This AllianceCovenant, (see Annex III) as it was called, prohibited and criminalised the use of armed force betweenthe parties, and provided for political and legal reforms designed to prevent further conflict. In

December, however, the war started anew, amid bitter recriminations from both sides. By now theKurdish entity had been effectively divided into two mini-states governed by the hostile parties,entrenched behind their grievances and apparently incapable of compromise or manoeuvre.

15. In January 1995 Mr David Litt of the US State Department, accompanied by other US and Turkishofficials, visited both party leaders and discussed peace formulas with them. Each party produced adraft agreement, but Mr Litt was unable to arrange a meeting between the leaders to see whether thegap between the drafts could be bridged. He left, warning the leaders that if they resumed fighting, theUS would abandon its efforts to help them settle their differences.

16. Predictably, Mr Litt's initiative was no more successful in the medium term than any of theprevious attempts. However, in April a 3 month cease fire was agreed, to end on July 15. Before itcame to an end, the Iranians called the party leaders to Tehran, and tried to persuade them to extend thecease fire for one month. In the meanwhile, no progress had been made on any of the substantivepolitical questions, and there had been, allegedly, a very large number of small violations of the ceasefire.

17. On July 9, the smouldering conflict burst out into a full scale war, in which hundreds if notthousands of troops were involved in each engagement, together with heavy artillery and multiplerocket launchers. It was at this point that the present mission was about to arrive.

II Activities of the mission.

18. The mission assembled in Damascus on the evening of July 12, 1995, were entertained to dinner byMr Talib Shbib, former Iraqi Foreign Minister, and met representatives of a number of Iraqi oppositiongroups and independent intellectuals.

19. On the following day, July 13, the mission held talks with Mr Ali Hassan, KDP; Mr Dana AhmadMjeed, PUK; Dr Hamid, Iraqi Communist Party; Mr Kadir Aziz, Leader of the Kurdistan Toilers'Party, and Mr Abdul Khaliq Zangana, Member of the Politburo (PB) of the Toilers' Party andPresident, Human Rights Advocacy Association. The mission was told that since May 1, 1994,mediation efforts had continued between the two major parties. On June 1, 1995, there had been anagreement to extend the cease fire until July 15. Mr Talabani had wanted the KDP to withdraw theirforces from Shaqlawa, Salahaddin and Masif, and to hand over the customs revenue they had collectedto an independent body. In return, the PUK forces would withdraw from Erbil. The seven small partiesand the Iraqi National Congress (INC) would administer the whole area, under the authority of a newcabinet to be agreed. However, the KDP insisted that the PUK should withdraw from Erbil fu^t, sincein their view the occupation of Erbil had been a breach of faith. No agreement was reached on thesematters, and there was a serious outbreak of fighting on July 9, following a long series of minorviolations of the cease-fire in previous weeks.

20. On Friday, July 14, the mission had a discussion with Mr Abdullah Ocalan, Chairman of the PKK.The discussion centred mainly on the situation in south-eastern Turkey, but Mr Ocalan did commenton the Turkish invasions of northem Iraq, which he said were breaches of international law. He saidthat in the first operation, the Turks had lost 210 men, to the PKK's 12. He denied that the PKK hadbeen mounting, or intending to mount, armed assaults over the border. Why should the PKK do this, heasked, when they already had their forces 500 km inside Turkey? But the PKK does have a role withinIraqi Kurdistan, he said, in trying to develop a third front, in opposition to the classic tribal warbetween the KDP and the PUK.

21. On Saturday, July 14, the team flew to Qamishli where they were met by the PUK representative inthe town, who arranged car transport to the river crossing, which is almost at the point where thefrontiers of Turkey, Iraq and Syria meet. The local KDP representative arranged the river crossing, andprovided transport to Duhok, the capital of the govemorate of Duhok province.

22. In Duhok the mission was welcomed by the Governor, Mr Abdul Aziz Taieb, who spoke about theTurkish invasions. He said that in the first onslaught, 104 villages had been affected, with the loss of21 people killed, and 120 houses and a bridge destroyed. 60 people were wounded and had beenregistered with NGOs. Nine schools had been affected. Some villagers are still afraid to go back; theTuritish soldiers had used strong arm tactics with people. They did not come to the centre of town butsearched houses on the outskirts. Detailed records were said to have been kept of the damage done andthese were promised to the mission, though none were delivered.

23. In the second invasion, 9 villages were destroyed, all 7,500 inhabitants fled, and 150 cattle werekilled. A child was killed and two women were wounded by shelling. Much agriculture was ruined,because this was the time of harvest. The Turks accused the governor of being a member of PKKbecause he gave an accurate assessment of the damages. The chief victims were neither the PKK northe Turks but the local civilian population

24. The Governor referred to the incident in which 7 shepherds were killed, five of them brothers andtwo others who were their cousins. The men had been arrested by the Turks with four women alsoshepherds. The responsible officer for the area, Mr Shukri Nerway went to see the Turkish General andpleaded for the release of the detainees. The Turks released the women, but the mutilated bodies of themen were found the next day. The Governor said that it was certain this atrocity was committed by theTurkish army.

25. According to A1 Hayyat of July 13, Turkey declared that on Tuesday after sue days the operationin northern Iraq had ended and foreign ministry spokesman, Omar Iqbal, had rejected allegations thatthe Turkish army harmed Iraqi civilians. Three thousand troops were said to be involved and AFPreported that Turkey claimed 167 guerrillas had been killed for the loss of 20 soldiers in four sectors.The previous operation had claimed the lives of550 PKK fighters. According to the PKK, 210 Turkishsoldiers were killed for the loss of 13 PKK, while 13 Kurdish villages had been destroyed andthousands of villagers had fled their homes.

26. After staying overnight in Duhok, the delegation travelled to Salahaddin on July 16. On theirarrival, they were greeted by senior KDP officials including Mr Sami Abdurrahman. Mr Hoshiar Zibariand Mr Jawhar Namiq. They also had meetings with Mr Shamsaddin Mufti, independent personalityand lawyer, and with Professor Kamal Khoshnaw, member of the board of Kurdistan Watch.

27. The Minister of Justice, Mr Kader Jabary told the delegation that the Ministry of Justice wasparalysed. Although Judges appointed by the Ministry were still operating in Arbil, the PUK had alsoappointed a military Judge, Mr Kadem Mohammed Jan, who had been chief of security in Arbil. Hewas dealing with any cases he specified, taking them out of the hands of the normal civil courts.Similarly a military Judge, Mr Salah Aziz, had been appointed in Suleimaniyeh.

28. Under the law, Mr Jabary continued, any person sentenced to death could apply to the RegionalGovemor for clemency, and since there are no Regional Governors, it was to be expected that allsentences would be suspended until governors could be appointed. Indeed, before ̂ e armed conflictbegan, no death sentences were in fact carried out, but now, dozens of people were being executed inthe PUK area, some without Judicial process.

29. The former Govemor of Arbil, Mr Khurshid Shera, told the delegation that it would be possible tosecure law and order in Arbil with a neutral force of fewer than 2,000 men, who could be recruitedfrom the smaller parties and the INC. He thought the cost of such a force would be no more than$50,000 a month.

30. In the evening, the delegation met Mr Masoud Barzani, who welcomed them as follows: "1 amdelighted you are here and appreciate the trouble you have gone to and your sincerity in helping us toovercome a difficult situation. I wish you all success in your efforts. The conflict has become morecomplicated and I am not optimistic. I had been hopeful that we have laid the foundation for a solutionbut that has now collapsed. On July 9 the other side launched the largest and most intense attack,violating the cease-fire. The secretary general of the PUK had said only two days earlier that the nextstage would be "normalisation" in Duhok".

31. He continued: "We welcome a!! international mediation efforts by the US - UK, etc. and we made aclear commitment to the solution. Unfortunately, the other side have blown up all the hopes we had.If they had been committed to a peaceful settlement, the last three months of truce would have been agolden opportunity. Now we have no choice but to defend ourselves, and you will concede that wehave the right of self-defence. Because of the lack of trust and confidence, 1 can imagine noguarantees that would ensure the maintenance of any cease-fire. That last cease-fire gave people hope.When Mr Deutsch was here, he presented us with some proposals for a leader to leader to meetingoutside Kurdistan. We said we had to make the right start by holding preparatoiy talks at the politburolevel. We gave a commitment that the cease-fire wouldbe maintained until the start of the talks and in the absence of the cease-fire it is doubtful that talks

would serve any purpose".

32. Mrs Porter and Lord Avebury then spoke, emphasising that neither side could gain an outrightmilitary victory and that sooner or later, the parties would have to come to the conference table. Theyurged that the sufferings of the civilian population, and the further diversion of resources away fromdevelopment into the armed conflict, should be taken into consideration, and they pointed out that theKDP would be seen as the main obstacle to peace if the PUK accepted the US invitation, and the KDPdeclined.

33. Dr Osman then said: "We have discussed this conflict before and I recognise the problems are noteasy to overcome, arising as they do out of the SO-50 arrangements. I know that Mr. Barzani doesn tlike conflict from my experience at the 1991 negotiations with Saddam. So what we are after is apermanent political settlement and we think the cease-fire didn't wodc because there was no politicalmovement But it could be argued that the violation of the cease-fire has strengthened the KDP bothmilitarily and politically. Peace is easier to make when you are the stronger party. This conflictinvolves the whole of the people and we have a responsibility to them; we need to make sacriflces forthem. Any steps you take will produce a response from the other side, because this attack was then-last throw. I remember when Arbil was occupied by thePUK, I told them this was a wrong decision, and I told them it was a mistake to assume that it wouldforce the KDP to make concessions. Now I think the military setbacks the PUK are reported to havesuffered will make them more tolerant towards a settlement. Whether you like it or not, people are notinterested in apportioning blame; they are holding everyone responsible. We know how you dislikewar, so we hope you will re-emphasise the hope for a peaceful settlement, particularly with USguarantees. I think it is necessary to involve a third party in view of the failure of previous bilateralagreements. 1 have seen the KDP peace proposal and I find it positive. I am aware of the talks withBob Deutsch and they are also positive. I hope this conflict will not deflect you from the opportunitywhich now presents itself, and which may never recur. The four of us came with some ideas which wehave formulated and we will present them after meeting the other side. Let us pool all our resources tomake peace and to see the US participate in the resolution of this crisis with their guarantees. For thepast 40 years, we have struggled for a land of our own and to intemationalise our cause. Now there issome hope but with the manoeuvring of regional powers there is also great danger".

34. Mr Barzani replied: "Honestly, when we see friends like you making these requests we feelextremely embarrassed. We appreciate your efforts. We have our own constituencies, our own publicopinion and they refuse to accept that the other side should be able to decide whether we have war orpeace. The seriousness of this fighting is such that the aggressor should be identified, particularly asthey have undermined a very important opportunity. For us it is difficult to overlook. Terrorism suchas the car bomb at Zakho and another attempt with 700 kilos of explosives in Duhok. (Rahman: Andthe deliberate shelling of civilians in Kastnazan) Despite all this I agree with you that every war has toend at the conference table. But we draw the line at being asked to reward the aggressor". [Note bythe delegation: the car bomb explosion at Zakho, which killed 80 people in the marketplace onFebruary 27,1995, was attributed to a PUK agent, as was an attempted bombing in Duhok. However,the PUK strongly denied responsibility and called for an independent investigation of the crime. TheTurkish authorities refused to permit any experts to enter the territory via Turkey, and this may be anindication that Ankara was not keen for the truth to be uncovered].

35. The following morning, July 17, the delegation met senior officials of the KDP, and someindependents. Those attending were as follows:Hoshyar Zebari, Foreign Relations, Politburo memberSami Abdurrahman, Politburo Member, Ex-Minister in IraqMuhsin Dizaye, Politburo Member, Ex-Minister in IraqJawhar Namiq, Speaker of Parliament, KDP Politburo MemberRoj Nuri Shaweys, Deputy Prime Minister, KDP Politburo MemberKadir Jabari, Minister of Justice of Kurdish Parliament, KDP Central CommitteeSheren Amedi, KDP Central Committee, President, Kurdistan Women s UnionFaiek Alddin Kakayi, KDP Central Committee MemberShamsaddin Mufti, lawyer and independent, uncle of Adnan, one of the original founders of KDP in1940s

Hussein Sinjari, cousin of Sami, poet, academic lecturer in London, visiting, Ex-Vice Member ofKurdish Parliament, former PUKAbdullah Agreen, KDP Central CommitteeKhurshid Shera, Ex-Govemor of ArbilAzad Barwari, KDP Politburo Member

36. Mr Sami Abdurrahman began by saying that Mr. Barzani had left doors open but the situationshould not be over simplified. The cease fire had been declared on April 7 and extended by MrBarzani fi-om July 8. All the fighting has been going on in formerly KDP held areas, a clear indicationof who was the aggressor. The violation of the cease-fire was preceded by a fiery and aggressivespeech by Mr Talabani on July 5, when he spoke about the occupation of Duhok. The other side haddestroyed the regional government and Parliament. Mr Talabani had appointed a militaiy governor inArbil. In this stage, he intended to clear the rest of Arbil province and the KDP felt that no externalpower would stop him. Nor did they want the Kiudish problem to be regionalised or to giveneighbouring powers the excuse for intervening. "Their agenda is to complete their interrupted coupd'dtat", Mr Abdurrahman continued. "They would not agree to settle differences by means ofelections. Our agenda is to stop the fighting, evacuate Arbil, reconvene Parliament and establish abroadly based regional government to collect the revenues and enforce security. The two differentagendas are clearly set out in the respective peace plans. The issue for us is whether Arbil can becomeonce again the seat of regional government. And Aat is the key".

37. Mr Hoshiar Zibari then observed that the mission had to get the two sides together and to deal withthe two contentious issues of Arbil and the revenues. The KDP regarded the occupation of Arbil asillegal and they said the revenues belonged to the government when it is formed by mutual agreementof the two political parties. The PUK felt, he said, that if they leave Arbil it would cause them internalproblems. But the KDP could not accept the PUK prime minister. "When we initiated the limitedcease-fu-e", he added, "they accepted it, but it was no substitute for a political settlement If you expectimmediate results, you will be disappointed. But the intention of the US to play a more active role isimportant. The sixty-seven NGOs working in Kurdistan will all tell you who broke the cease-fire. Theneed is now for confidence building measures. But we believe Mr Talabani has abandoned the idea ofa peaceful settlement. We on our side are ready to respond to the US peace initiative".

38. Following the above meeting, the delegation crossed the front line to Arbil, and were met there bythe Prime Minister, Mr Kosrat Rassoul. Almost immediately after their arrival, at about 11.00, theyheard explosions, and were told that the city was being shelled by the KDP and the Iraqis. Later theywere informed of the names of the persons killed and injured at Hai Ulama, as follows:Killed:

Hiwa Aziz Mohammad, age 16Zarian Hawez Hamad, age 26, both unmarriedInjured:Haikim Hussein Muhamad, age 17Jamal Rasoul Salih, age 23Miryam Sabir, age 43Ahmad Rasoul Salih, age 18, marriedAbdulla Rasoul Salih, age ISSartip Hussein Ahmad, married, age 28

The 16 year old was killed in a house facing immediately onto the street where the shell landed. Thedelegation inspected the house, which was severely damaged, and they were told that the other victim,Mr Hamad, 26, was blown apart on the street, where he had been selling watennelons from a cart. Thedelegation met Mr Stafford Cleary, head of UNDCI, who said that his task was to record the attacks oncivilians and to report them to the United Nations via Baghdad, but not to make any assessment ofresponsibility. Although it was suggested later by the KDP that the PUK had shelled Arbil themselves,they had no doubt, from the testimony they received, that the KDP were responsible.[Not for publication: On Thursday, July 20,1995, Mr. Allen Jensen, UNDCI, acting commandingofficer of UNDCI (telephone 24208) said. There is no doubt that KDP was shelling the area in thesouth of Arbil. And Mr. Nabeel Moswai, deputy representative of the INC saw the shells passing overthe last KDP check point before Arbil from Salahaddin and had actually been warned by the securityguard to stop there because the shelling was about to begin.]

39. The Deputy head of UNDCI, Mr Alan Jensen, told the delegation that according to the NGOEmergency, based in Salahaddin, 400 people had been killed and more than 1,000 wounded since thefighting erupted on July 9. He said that all the heavy weapons used by both sides were Russian,including some 120 mm artillery with a range of 18 km. All this materiel had to come through Turkeyor Iran, except for a very limited quantity which may have been captured from the Iraqi forces. Themandate of UNDCI was limited, and any change had to be negotiated with Baghdad, becausetechnically this was still Iraqi territory.

40. In the afternoon of July 17, the delegation travelled to Suleimaniyeh, accompanied by the Ministerof Justice, Mr Mohammed Tofiq.

41. On the morning of July 18, the delegation had their first meeting with Mr Jaial Talabani, at QalaChualan. He began by explaining that he had received delegations from both Iraq and Iran the previousevening, and this was the reason why the meeting had had to be deferred ovemigftt. "Turkey issupporting Mr Barzani and encouraging him to continue this conflict. After the Paris agreementHoshiar Zibari took the text to Ankara and Turkey protested to France. Mr Barzani obeyed a Turkishorder not to go to Paris and sign the agreement. He threatened that he would use the Islamic movementand negotiate with Baghdad".

42. "The Turks attempted to show that Kurds are incapable of governing themselves", Mr Talabanicontinued. "The main purpose of Mr. Barzani s strategy is to keep his grip on the $180K plus 10-12million dinars a day which he gets from the border taxes. The dollars are going into US banks for thebenefit of the families of Mr. Barzani and Nechervan. Ibrahim Khalil collects the money for them".(Note; another source told the delegation that the money had been transferred to German and Swissbanks about 5-6 weeks earlier, probably for greater security. The source felt that the CIA knew aboutthis).

43. "The Iranians asked us to evict all the Iranian Kurdish parties", Mr Talabani said. "We had to agreethat we would not allow them to use our territory either as a military base or for broadcasting back toIranian Kurdistan. The MKO (Mujahideen Khalq Organisation, one of the parties in the NationalCouncil of Resistance of Iran (NCRl)) have not had bases in Iraqi Kurdistan since 1991. The Iraniansasked the KDP to publish a declaration at the end of March that on the request of Teheran they agreedto a cease fire. Both Mr Barzani and I sent delegations to Teheran at the invitation of the Iraniangovernment. But the KDP delegation refused to sit down and talk with the PUK. The KDP said thatMr Barzani had agreed to extend the cease-fire but on July 9, he sent a telegram to his commanders ofwhich I can give you a copy, saying that the cease-fire was at an end. That was also announced on theKDP radio. Over the two months prior to the ending of the cease-fire, there were 120 violations by theKDP forces. They believe that with their money and with the support of both Turkey and Iraq, theycould achieve a military victory".

44. "The last US proposal", continued Mr Talabani "was that on July 24, delegates from each side go toLisbon, then on August 1, the leaders meet there. We are ready to attend both meetings. If the UScould persuade Turkey to pressure Mr Barzani, there could be an agreement. We would like it to bemonitored by the smaller parties, the INC and others. On July 2, the seven minor parties, includingIslamics and Communists, gave us proposals and we agreed to them, so it can be done".

45. "About December 19 last year, there was agreement on a new cabinet", he said. "And it shouldhave been ratified by the Parliament on December 23. But after the fighting, the KDP repudiated theagreement We said, let the Iraqi Kurdistan Front meet; let the Committee of the Parliament meet; letthe 17 parties meet. But Mr Barzani would not agree because he had made a deal with Iraq andTurkey. He has no desire to solve any of the problems. And that is why the Paris agreement, theParliament agreement, etc. have not worked".

46. The total amount of money collected on the Turkish border in the 14 months from May 1, 1994 tothe end of June 1995 was $25 million plus 3,000 million Dinars", Mr Talabani claimed. "At themoment the rate of collection is some SlSOk a day. When the committee of Parliament tried to claimthe money in December, they were told that Nachevan had withdrawn it Bob Deutsch said that if theparties were not able to reach an agreement, the US would review its policy for the region. But whathe should have said is that they would review their policy for the party which prevents agreement".

47. "We are ready to talk and negotiate", said Mr Talabani. "We are for peace and direct negotiations.We accept Bob Deutsch's proposals. We cannot solve this conflict alone and we cannot accept thatIran, Iraq and Turkey should have any role to play. But what can we do if we are ready to talk and theother side will not? You have to persuade them to step forward for peace. Yet, I am afraid there is aconspiracy between Ankara, Baghdad and the KDP to obstruct the peace process. What are theconsequences of all these proposals? He has said that he will use three cards. The first is that theworld commimity will lose interest but if there is a meeting, it will be possible to clear eveiything andverify the situation. If one is insisting on fighting and the other doesn't want to fight, it is clear wherethe responsibility lies. Last year, we evacuated Shaqlawa and they occupied it. They destroyed myhouse and library as the Kurdish Communist party confirms. Openly they co-operate with the Turkishoppressors of the Kurds in that country. Nevertheless, we must look for a solution. First, serious USpressure must be exerted to make them come to the conference table. Second, a real position fi'omthose concerned. The facts of the matter should be set out by the intemational community. The civilservants in our areas have not been paid, though Mr Barzani has received his salary from centralrevenues. They started personal attacks, and when we replied, they wanted the propaganda war tostop".

48. Following the first round of meetings with Mr Barzani and Mr Talabani, the delegation produced aset of confidence building measures and action proposals, based on what was considered possible, anddesigned, not to produce an instant solution, but to serve as an agenda for the forthcoming meetingsconvened by the US State Department. The texts of these documents are given as Annex IV and AnnexV.

49. On the morning of July 19, the delegation travelled from Sulaimaniyeh to Arbil, where they metleaders of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI): Mr Abdullah Hasanzadeh, Secretary-General, Mr Salam Azizi, PB member, Mr Abdurrahman Kajayee, cadre of the Secretariat, and MrMohammed Hasanpour, cadre of the Secretariat. Mr Hasanzadeh began by saying that in Iran, thesituation of the government was good, but that of the people was bad. "This is because Westerngovernments look after their own interests, and after the US took the good decision to place anembargo on Iran, the Europeans started to fill the gap. For instance, two m months ago. PresidentClinton vetoes a deal with Conoco and last week TOTAL took their place. [This concerns thedevelopment of the Sirri A and Sirri E oil and gas fields.] European countries say they are ready tonormalise relations with Iran if Teheran promises not to kill Rushdie on their territory, but the Fatwa ofKhomeini cannot be reversed. The Europeans are looking for an excuse to co-operate with Iran".

50. In answer to a question, Mr Hasanzadeh said that the Kurdish question in Iran is not separate fromother questions in the country. He continued: "The silence of the world on Iran's crime and thecompetition from other countries gives Iran freedom to support terrorism, not only at home but alsoabroad. And as you know, Iran still aspires to be a nuclear power. They have a large list of terroristprograms for the funire. The KDPI has some information about the nuclear program but we want tocomplete our knowledge and will then give it to countries abroad. This terrorist program is notdirectly only toward our organisation but also others and especially those who are involved in activitiesin Kurdistan. This is a plan of a house in Arbil rented in the name of the Supreme Council of Iraqi

Revolution, which is used as a cover for clandestine activities. It collects information about USorganisations such as OFDA, World Food Program, WOL, SNI, and European organisations likeOxfam and especially the French organisation such as Frances Libert^, M^dteins Du Monde, AmedicalInternational"

51. "A month ago", Mr Hasanzadeh said, "the Iranians sent two brothers to explodetwo bombs at the offices of the KDPI Revolutionary Branch at Dora Raba but they werecaught in the act. One of the bombers was hanged by the Party, a man named Shearko. The other twoconspirators, his brother and his wife, are still detained by the party in their private prison. I don't knowwhether they have yet been sentenced. Theauthorities here didn t want to make a fuss about it, and in a lot of cases where terrorists are caught andhanded over to officials nothing happens. About six months ago we handed over an agent who wasfilming our headquarters and a week later they released him. He admitted he was taking these picturesfor Iran. In another incident, an agent took pictures of the headquarters in Koisinjat and the Iraniansused them to build a model and thus to rehearse an air attack which was made in November 1993. One

woman, Ms Howsat Osman, age 39, was killed and 3 other people were wounded".

52. "Families in Iranian Kurdistan known to have relatives on this side are being threatened that if theydon t persuade the relatives to return, they themselves will be expelled", Mr Hasanzadeh continued."People known to have relatives in the Peshmerga are made to pay extra taxes". He mentioned the caseof Mr Firuz Mariwani, from Mariwan, who burned himself to death about 6 weeks ago when he wasrefused entry to the university, despite having passed the entrance exams with flying colours, on thesole grounds that his brother was in the Peshmerga.

53. From 1991 to 1993, claimed Mr Hasanzadeh, 125 terrorist acts had been planned or actuallyperpetrated by the Iranians in Iraqi Kurdistan. "The government of Iraqi Kurdistan has its heart with usbut their heads with the Iranians", he said. "Suspects are arrested and are then let go".

54. "Last summer, we were told that those crossing into Iraqi Kurdistan frequently had ̂ imily membersheld until the others agreed to inform during their stay in Kurdistan. They send relatives of peoplefrom Iran to take back their sons who are here as Peshmergas or activists. If they do not, they arepunished. They take family members, expel them to Kurdistan and will not allow them to returnwithout their sons, husbands. On the border, mines are laid, and thousands of people have beenexpelled without compensation to create a cordon sanitaire".

55. Asked how the internal fighting in Iraqi Kurdistan had affected Iranian Kurds, Mr Hasanzadehreplied: "The fighting is threatening Iranian Kurds and indeed all people in Kurdistan. It has somedirect influence on us, because while the supporters of the KDPI are inside Iran, the leadership is herein Iraqi Kurdistan and all the activities, military, political, information, are carried out from this side.One effect of the conflict is that both parties are trying to prevent us from communicating with ourmembers inside Iran, or carrying out our activities. Attacks have been carried out on us by bothparties. A radio station, which survived for 15 years, in spite of being attacked repeatedly by theIranians, was closed down by the PUK. We had a headquarters in Harir. This camp at Basrama wasattacked by an armed KDP force under Wasta Fattah using heavy artillery. Mr Fattah was promoted tothe rank of Brigadier. The closing of the radio station and the Basrama attack were examples of thecompetition between the parties to please Iran. 80 families were expelled from Basrama camp by KDPto Arbil, and about 38 families still have no place to stay and are in effect homeless without water,electricity and basic necessities. The UNHCR do not help these people, they are depending on thecharity of local residents in Baharka".

56. According to Mr Hasanzadeh, the Kurds in Iran number about 10 million, 16-17% of thepopulation but occupying only 7% of the land area. Iranian Kurds were deprived of all administrative,legal and human rights. Nearly all public employees at higher levels in Iranian Kurdistan are non-Kurds. In a few small towns and villages, there are Kurdish collaborators, a few mayors for instance.There has been a genocidal war against Kurds in Iran for the past 16 years. "We are asking for basicrights in Iranian Kurdistan, we asked for autonomy within the framework of Iran. Over the last 16years, more than 40 thousand, mostly unarmed women and children, have been killed by shelling,bombing and armed attacks. Thousands of families were expelled into other areas of Iran. And

10

thousands of others became refugees in Iraqi Kurdistan. They live in a very harsh situation. Apartfrom 26,000 who live in a camp in Altash, an Arabic part of Iraq, who get some help fromorganisations, there are about 1,000 families in Iraqi Kurdistan who are in a very bad situation andneed help desperately. Those people were getting 300 dinars a month but are now being given nothing.Half of them would prefer to go back to Iran, they prefer to die there rather than Iraq".

57. "We tiy as much as we can abroad to bring the attention of Western governments to our Kurds, butthey don't listen to us", said Mr Hasanzadeh. "Dr Ghassemlou [a previous General Secretary of theKDPl, assassinated by Iranian secret agents in Vienna on July 13,1989] used to say we don t attractthe attention of the outside world because we are not terrorists, we do not kidnap, kill or terrorise.From the begirming, we did not accept violence but look for a peaceful way of solving our problemswith the Iranian government They took advantage of us and assassinated Dr Ghassemlou and DrAbdallah Ghaderi at the conference table when they had been brought to negotiate and sign a peaceagreement. Iranian history is full of these kinds of treachery".

58. Asked about contacts between the Kurdish and Azeri minorities in Iran, Mr Hasanzadeh said theywere in touch with the Organisation of Revolutionary Democracy in Azerbaijan, but this was a smallbody with very few members.

59. The delegation then met the President of the University, Dr B K Maulood, and two of hiscolleagues. They told the delegation that both parties fully accepted that the university should beallowed to conduct its operations without interference; that all staff should remain at their posts, andthat no party political meetings should be allowed under the auspices of the university. Some 38 staffmembers had left because of the situation, but some had been replaced, and the President had justreturned from a tour of the Turkish universities, where he had been successful in persuading someacademics to come to Arbil on visiting professorships. He would be visiting UK universities in the firsttwo weeks of October, and hoped to attract further short-term recruits, particularly in engineering andmedicine. The university had about 11,000 students. No foreign journals had been received since 1988,and the facilities were grossly inadequate. The President mentioned computing, where the universityhad no modem facilities whatsoever.

60. At 16.00 on July 19, the delegation met representatives of the seven independent parties, asfollows:

Kurdistan Communist Party - Iraq(Mulla Hasan)Kurdistan Social Democratic Party(Khorshid Hormaziar)Assyrian Democratic (Shmael Benyamen)Islamic Movement in Kurdistan(Salim Osman)Kurdistan Toilers Party(Bahman Hussain)Kurdistan Islamic Union(Abdulrahman Sidiq)The representatives said they had worn out three pairs of shoes going back and forth between theparties in mediation attempts. They referred to the current attack on the town of Rawanduz by theKDP, which had resulted in the death and wounding of many civilians, and the destruction of over 100dwellings. The whole population of the town, some 15,000 to 20,000 people, had fled to themountains. Addressing Dr Osman, they told him that since his previous visit, they had tried hard tomake peace but achieved little. "To be honest", the spokesman said, "their response was not up to thelevel of our mediation and at times we felt our efforts were not appreciated. In the recent cease-firethere was the particular need to get the harvest in, and the end of year exams in the university. Butthere was no political progress and we came to the conclusion that unless the leaders met, nothingcould be achieved. We were asking for a permanent peace, because that was what the people wanted,yet in each lull they rearmed and prepared for renewal of the war. There were serious human rightsviolations, and each side discriminated according to party affiliation. The propaganda became worseand was accompanied by intemperate language".

61. "On July 8", the spokesman continued, "we asked for a response to our latest memorandum. ThePUK agreed to our proposals, but the KDP referred it to their Politburo. On July 9, the PUK attacked,using the excuse that the KDP were gathering their forces and the fact is that both sides were doing thesame. We suspended all our mediation activities between parties because we had not achievedanything since the Parliament meeting where they kissed each other as if nothing happened. Things

II

started to go down hill after that meeting with cease-fire violations and each side accusing the other.To stop all these incidents on the front line we suggested our Peshmergas be placed there as observers.The PUK agreed unconditionally, but the KDP refused, saying that the dead body count wouldestablish clearly who was at fault. It seemed to us that neither side is ready to stop the fighting, nor dothey appreciate our mediation. We had no force to compel them, and some preferred to depend on theIranians or the Turks, who possess the power of states".

62. The same spokesman continued: "The Turks tried to mediate because they were afraid that thePKK would step into the vacuum. But at the same time they were trying to persuade the parties to sitdown together and negotiate with Saddam. We think that the regional powers took advantage of thecircumstances to increase their power in Kurdistan and establish intelligence bases in Kurdistan. Bothof them want to get rid of their opponents based here. The Iraqi govemment also took what they sawas an opportunity, by offering to negotiate with us, but only on the basis of the unacceptable scheme of1991. They are not ready to give anything new or to have some consideration for the Kurds. Just theopposite, after starting the fighting in December, they tightened the embargo, creating shortages of fueland food. During this round of fighting, food and everything else has become much more expensive.Commercial movement and economic life is almost paralysed and there is a risk of another famine.Security is very bad in the cities and the villages. Many people have been killed, robberies and lootinghave increased, and human rights violations are rife. This has severely affected the morale of thepeople and we feel that international pressure must be exerted on these parties since they are deaf tologic. On both sides there are people who benefit fi-om the conflict, and even if they do agree to acease fire, it is always fragile and temporary".

63. A second representative of the seven parties told us: "We could withstand lack ofelectricity, water and other resources. Our people have accepted these terrible conditions, but theycannot put up with the political manoeuvring. In these sensitive circumstances, we want you topersuade your governments not desert us, because if they do, we will be at the mercy of the fourregional powers. Do not equate the Kurdish nation with the PUK and KDP. We are a peaceful nation,and the policies of these two parties do not express at all our spirit. If anything bad takes place, thePUK and KDP are at fault, and the Western governments are also at fault for not pressuring them tostop". [In answer to a question] "Yes, there have been demonstrations against the fighting, but there isno licence for those activities, and they may be stopped with bullets".

64. A third representative said that because of the low level of economic activity, many people joinedthe militias as a means of supporting themselves and their families. One step towards a solution was toincrease the support given to employment generation projects, to persuade men to leave the militiasand start working productively.

65. Late in the afternoon of Wednesday July 19, the delegation crossed the front line again toSalahaddin. Since Mr Barzani was out of town, they took the opportunity of visiting Shaqlawa andtalking to several people in the shops there. All said that the fighting had had a disastrous effect ontheir business. While en route to Shaqlawa, they were passed in the opposite direction by a convoy of14 identical new Toyota Land Cruisers. The delegation could not avoid reflecting that the leaders didnot have to share the hardships and suffering endured by the ordinary people.

66. At 00.45 on the morning of July 20, Mr Barzani saw the delegation for the second time. Theypresented him with the confidence-building measures and political ideas (see Annexes 111 and IV)which they had drafted after the initial round of meetings, and expressed the hope that as much aspossible of these ideas could be agreed between the leaders, so that they could provide a framework forthe discussions proposed by the US State Department. Mr Barzani observed that if the KDP did go to ameeting, they would like to see a fiamework designed in advance. He was very insistent on the need toidentify the PUK as the aggressors who broke the cease fu-e on July 9, and he said that Arbil was thekey to a peaceful solution of the conflict. He also mentioned the $14 million which he said was in thebanks at Arbil when the city was occupied by the PUK, the thousands of personal cars appropriated bythe PUK, and the looting of property belonging to Ministers. He said that the US State Departmentshould identify the aggressor and apportion blame for other wrongs done.

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67. The delegation said they were not in Kurdistan to act as judges in deciding who was responsible forbreaking the cease-fire, or for any other violations of the many agreements made in the past betweenthe parties. If they wanted an exercise of that kind, it was up to the parties to agree on the appointmentof a qualified person to hear evidence, make a statement of findings, and quantify damages if that waswhat was required. This was a matter which they suggested might be put on the agenda for the StateDepartment meeting, but the delegation felt certain that the State Department itself would not wish toget involved in such an inquiry. Mr Barzani concluded the meeting at 03.00 by undertaking to considerthe delegation's proposals and let them have a reply in the morning.

68. The following morning, July 21, the delegation met the KDP Politburo and received the text of MrBarzani's reply to their proposals. In general, he had accepted the ideas as a basis for discussion, butfelt that priority should be given to several of them. He had reiterated his view that the party which hadviolated the cease-fire should be identified, and he said that the KDP had responded positively to theUS State Department peace initiative. The full text of Mr Barzani's response is given as Annex V.

69. The delegation then set off again for Suleimaniyeh, stopping in Arbil on the way for lunch with thePrime Minister. Among the guests were Mr Muhamad Haji Mahmoud Secretary-General of KurdistanSocial Democratic Party and other senior officials of the Party. They also met the INC DeputyRepresentative in Arbil, Mr Nabil Al-Moussawi.

70. Arriving in Suleimaniyeh, the delegation proceeded to the headquarters of Mr Talabani at QalaCholun, where they presented him with their proposals. After studying the documents, Mr Talabanisaid that he accepted the proposals unconditionally, and he subsequently confirmed this in writing. AnEnglish translation of his memorandum is given as Annex VI. Mr Talabani also said that he would beprepared to accept some form of commission to investigate responsibility for breaking the cease-fire.He pointed out that numerous breaches of the cease-fire had occurred prior to July 9, for example atPenjwin, Arbil etc, and expressed reservations about the value of simply extending the cease-fire,without making any progress on the political differences between the parties. He wanted permanentrenunciation of violence, but he felt that there was a momentum towards further attempts at a militarysolution, which was being encouraged by the regional powers for their own ends, and fuelled by thesupply of military hardware to the KDP from Turkey. He had discussed this with the Turks and theyhad not denied it. He particularly drew attention to the use of heavy weapons against the town ofRawanduz, which had resulted in many civilian casualties but no change in the military situation. MrTalabani said that he was ready to accept the invitation from the US State Department to attend talks,both at Politburo and leader-to-leader level, and that he was determined to exhaust every possibility ofreaching a political solution.

4. Analysis

71. The prospects for a lasting peace and a stable political settlement in Iraqi Kurdistan are not good,and will remain doubtful as long as they depend on agreements between Masoud Barzani and JalalTalabani. Mr Barzani, son of the great hero of the Kurdish rebellion of the 1960s and 70s, MullaMustapha Barzani, sees himself as the legitimate heir to the tradition of leadership based on family andtribal connections. Jalal Talabani, on the other hand, created the PUK out of reformist elements whoseceded from the KDP in 197S, when the Kurdish rebellion collapsed on the withdrawal of support bythe US and the Shah's Iran. Mr Talabani's was a more ideologically motivated party, based onmodernisation and leR-orientated policies. It has to be noted, however, that not a single one of theleaders and intellectuals we met referred to any ideological difference between the two main parties asa barrier to peace. The struggle has become intensely personal, and it is not a reflection of realdifferences of opinion among the Kurdish people.

72. The harmful influence of the regional powers has been noted. The Kurdish region is surrounded byTurkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria, all of which have good reason to obstruct and sabotage the Kurdishdemocratic experiment. There is no countervailing influence from western powers, because the allieshave acted strictly in accordance with Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter, which provides that:

13

"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matterswhich are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members tosubmit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice theapplication of enforcement measures under Chapter Vll".

This principle has prevented the west from doing anything which could imply a lack of respect forIraq's sovereignty over the region such as, for instance, compliance with the recommendation by theUN Special Rapporteur on Iraq, Mr Max van der Stoel, that human rights observers be stationed in theterritory pending agreement on their access to the remainder of Iraq.

73. The Charter has not deterred Turkey from mounting three invasions of Iraqi Kurdistan. The largestof these, in March 1995, was reported to have involved as many as 70,000 troops, and was criticised inwestern Europe, but endorsed by the US administration as a legitimate act of self-defence. It seems tous doubtful whether, in any circumstances, a state is entitled to send large forces into the territory of aneighbouring state without the authority of the Security Council, and the precedent established byTurkey may have weakened the safeguards for peace in general. The right of self-defence, contained inArticle 51, ought not to be extended to pre-emptive strikes against armed groups operating fromanother state without permission.

74. There is circumstantial evidence to show that Turkey has also been supplying heavy weapons andammunition to one of the parties to the conflict. The delegation felt that these allegations should beexamined and reported on by the UN Secretary-General, in exercise of his powers under Article 99 ofthe Charter, which provides that

'The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in hisopinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security'.

75. The territory of Iraqi Kurdistan is divided into two quasi-state entities, administered by the PUKand KDP respectively. The parliament and government which were established after Kurdistan becamede facto independent in the autumn of 1991 are no longer functional. The disastrous 50-50 power-sharing arrangements, described above, have collapsed, and both parties appear to agree that if theunity of Kurdistan is to be preserved, a new provisional government will have to be formed, based on amuch wider distribution of portfolios, pending the holding of new elections. It is also agreed that theparties have to be demilitarised, and we were mildly encouraged by the ready assent of both sides toour proposal that heavy weapons should be impounded, subject to international supervision.

76. The problem is, as it always has been, the sequence of moves which have to be made to get fromtwo militarised party enclaves, to one unified entity with a monopoly of armed power. Merewithdrawal of forces from territory occupied during the successive armed clashes, without a genuineagreement on the transfer of their control to a new authority exercising state power over the whole ofKurdistan, would simply alter the odds slightly for the next round of the conflict

77. Any new administration would be unable to function, however, unless it had control of revenues,and particularly of the $180k a day being collected on the Turkish border. As a preliminary to anywider agreement, these sums, and other amounts collected by either side, including the money from thebanks in Arbil, should be held in escrow by trustees, pending the appointment of a new provisionalgovernment. The trustees could be empowered to pay out any sums attributable to the costs ofcollection, and the arrears of salaries due to employees of the former administration.

78. Unfortunately, the golden avalanche of the customs revenues accruing to the KDP gives them astrong incentive not to reach a political settlement, since that would mean not only handing over allfuture receipts to a new provisional government, but having to account for the alleged $25 millionalready collected since May I, 1994.

79. The Iranians, who were offering their services as 'mediators', were told plainly to stay out byWashington, and this gives Tehran a particular reason for wanting to fhistrate the US-sponsoredmeeting of August 9 and the ensuing leader-to-leader meeting in September, in addition to the generalpolicy of Tehran to counter American influence wherever they can. Iran also has more influence over

14

the PUK, which can be blackmailed by threats to cut ofT its only access to the outside world via theIranian border, than it would have over a regional authority with a choice of outlets in theory, viaTurkey, Iraq and Syria as well as Iran. Tehran can more easily control the Iranian Kurdishorganisations when they are confined within the PUK area, as their success in persuading Mr Talabanito close down the KDPI radio station demonstrates.

80. Turkey has several reasons for not wanting to see a settlement. First, the continued fratricidalconflict in Iraqi Kurdistan gives credence to policy of denying even limited forms of self-governmentto their own Kurdish minority. Second, Ankara has made a deal with the KDP to police the border,thus reducing, or so they believe, the level of cross-border military operations by the PKK. Third,Ankara and the KDP are engaged on sanctions-busting on a grand scale, engaging in a lucrative tradewith Saddam Hussain which might come under unwelcome scrutiny if the Americans get involved inthe settlement. Fourth, Ankara wants the sanctions to be lifted altogether, and they see hope of a dealbetween the KDP and Baghdad, creating a favourable political environment for opening the oilpipeline which runs from Mosul through KDP territory into Turkey.

81. Iraq obviously does not want to see the creation of a strong Kurdish entity, fi^ of internalpreoccupations, and willing to act as a base for political and military operations against Baghdad byany opposition coalition.

82. The west, on the other hand, must aim to promote a democratic administration in Iraqi Kurdistan,for exactly the opposite reasons. It should be welcomed as part of a strategy - which has never existed -to destabilise and ultimately overthrow the evil Saddam regime; it would have enormous value as arole model for the other regional powers with Kurdish minorities, and it could act as an importantbuffer against the spread of Iran's extremist ideology, which is very much out of tune with the Kurds'traditional religious tolerance and pluralism.

83. The delegation were extremely concerned to leam that, after a short lull in the fighting, on July 29,the KDP again shelled Arbil, hitting a number of civilian targets including the Children's CareHospital, a mosque and a number of residential properties. This again looks like an attempt to sabotagethe proposed meetings, and indicates a lack of will to engage in dialogue rather than violence. Weundertook this mission in the hope that our efforts, as friends of the Kurdish people throughout manyyears, would be reciprocated by a new commitment on the part of their leaders to refiain fromviolence, particularly against non-combatants, and to sit down at the conference table with adetermination to reach a permanent peace and political settlement of their differences. We know thatthis is what the people want and they expect no less.

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Annex I 'Public Statement' issued by the Kurdish Parliament on August 16,1994, and acceptedby the leaders of the KDP and PUK in the presence of the Parliament and the UK delegation.

We condemn the fighting and we prohibit the use of force, violence and terror as means of solvingproblems, which should be dealt with by democratic debate.

We condemn all kinds of violations of the principles of democracy, pluralism, freedom of expression,freedom to withdraw labour, and freedom to demonstrate; we condemn arrests and threats made forpolitical reasons; we condemn the occupation of headquarters or offices of parties, and we call for theabolition of party jails and the release of all prisoners held by them.

We condemn interference with officials and government departments, offices and institutions in theperformance of their duties.

We demand the speeding up of the normalisation process, with the return of all headquarters of partiesto normal.

We call on all parties to abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other internationalinstruments.

We demand respect for the separation of powers between the legislature, the executive and thejudiciaiy, and the cessation of interference by the political parties.

We demand respect for the principles of law and order.

We demand protection of, and absence of interference with, the work of the legislative body, and theprotection and freedom from political pressures of the judiciaiy.

We call for a review of the two-party system and the 50-50 principle.

We demand the recognition of the Parliament building and its neighbourhood as an aims-free zone; theprovision of security to MPs and to the Parliament building, and the removal of political partyheadquarters from the zone.

We call for the return of all civil servants to their original government posts; the payment of arrears ofsalaries, and the cancellation of illegal or unauthorised orders.

We demand the abolition of the militias, and the implementation of the laws on weapons and onpolitical parties.

We call for the reform of the administrative system and security; the introduction of legislation tocreate a Central Financial Monitoring Authority and a Central Economic Planning Board, and thereview of other laws.

We call for a Constitution for the region.

We call for a review of the law on elections, the preparation of a new electoral register, and the holdingof new elections.

We decide to initiate a study of new methods for improving the welfare of the people andreconstructing the infrastructure.

We declare that the press should be orientated towards spreading the principles of democracy, humanrights and national unity, and that a National Media Authority should be established.

We call for respect for Parliament at all times and in all circumstances.

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Annex III: Alliance Pact between Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and Kurdistan Democratic Party

The experience of our people, and the latest sad events, has proved an important fact, which should becomprehended and learn from it, is that the fighting between the PUK and the KDP is a suicide act forboth parties and the annihilation of the Kurdistan liberation movement as well as a waste of ourpeople's achievement. It discredits the reputation of the two parties and the Kurdish movementregionally and intemationally. These events asserted again that the advancement of Kurdistanmovement, existence of the Regional government of Kurdistan, the parliament and the Kurdistan Frontis very much tied to the unity and co-operation between the PUK and the KDP and to the unity of allthe other sides in Kurdistan Front and the participation of all other political groups in the democraticmovement existing in Kurdistan presently. It is visibly clear that both the national interest makes itnecessary for both to find the best normal and working relationship. This is the only way to ensureboth parties to remain popular and operate for the benefit of the people. Because of these reasonsmembers of the PUK and the KDP political bureaus, in the presence of Messrs Masoud Barzani andJalal Talabani, met. After discussions and exchange of views they have unanimously decided on thefollowing:

Firstly:

Fighting between political parties and forces is forbidden, and is criminalised especially between thePUK and the KDP and regarding it a national crime which must not be committed. A campaign mustbe waged to influence members and cadres of the two parties against internal fighting by informingthem and teaching them the spirit of democracy and belief in co-operation, political and peacefuldialogue in solving their differences and problems. To condemn use of violence, fighting, murder andhatred to promote their views and positions or to use these acts in solving their problems which ariseduring their journey of national struggle and democracy which is currently under way in IraqiKurdistan. To forbid and criminalise using foreign powers against each other in internal conflicts or touse the country's wealth in this regard. Emphasis must be made on solving all problems and differencesbetween the two parties, their organisations and members by peaceful means and mutual respect foreach others' views. Even just the thought of resorting to arms in these circumstances must be avoidedand regarded as repressive. In the event a local dispute or conflict erupted it must be brought undercontrol and stopping it from spreading. This must be regarded as a duty by the leadership of bothparties in general and by Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani in particular. To teach all the members ofnecessity of working together and realising that a victory or defeat of one side is victory and defeat forthe other. It is imperative that both sides work for the promotion of the principle of human rights andcivilised behaviour to solve their natural and acceptable views. Both sides should work together tohonour parliament's law which forbade and criminalised internal fighting.

Secondly

To avoid the creation of friction and encounter between the two sides the following should beconsidered:

1. Election

Speed up the implementation of the census by the government committee so that it is fmalised beforethe end of the present parliamentary session.

To hold a free and fair election and to prepare for it by carrying out the census and normalise thesituation totally and to provide all facilities to ensure that the election is not tampered with.

To endeavour to form a coalition government which include the two parties and other national groupsaccording to the outcome of the election.

Election machinery should be studied according to the agreement.

Agreement should be reached regarding the establishment of professional institutions such asEngineering, Medical etc.

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Agreement between all the parties should be reached to avoid friction during election time of theseinstitutions and have the election carried out in a democratic atmosphere and to abide by it.

2. Freedom of political parties, institutions and organisations should be available to all and no one sideshould monopolise these activities. Rivalry in attracting the public should be conducted in a civilisedway and by offering the public their views and services in a civil and fair competition.

3. The two parties should provide each other help in order to accomplish their duties and tasks in everyaspect.

4. Party members and Peshmergas are not allowed to switch from one party to another.

5. Participation in administration and the authorities on an equal basis until the election is held.Monopolisation in the government and semi-government offices is forbidden. The agreement on theestablishment of government institution, as laid out in the Paris agreement, should be speeded up tobegin their duties (Finance, Planning,....)

6. The two parties will agree to unite their position in respect of the tribes and other past privatemilitias according to the laws passed by the parliament equally on all of them. They will be forbiddencontacts with foreign persons perceived to be of suspicious nature. They will not be allowed to playdouble games and blackmail towards the government or the two parties. (This item will remain secretand a joint committee of professionals should be prepared to study the like of the above people).

7. Joint position towards:

Kurdistan political parties in Iraqi Kurdistan Region (IKR) according to the Paris Agreement.

Islamic tendencies in IKR on a democratic basis and according to the laws laid down by theParliament.

8. Invigoration and enlargement of the Kurdistan Front after amending its agenda and broadening itssphere to enable it to take its role.

9. Formation of a Joint co-ordination committee to supervise and guide the media to serve the allianceand co-operation, and to check provocation, offence, insult and everything which may damage therelationship of the two parties.

10. Co-ordination in the field of regional and international relations and to unify policies towards theseaspects as it has been outlined in the Paris agreement.

Thirdly

Formation of a joint political command which includes Messrs Barzani and Talabani and the twopolitical bureaus which meets regularly to implement all the agreements and to supervise the policiesagreed upon. To promote the spirit of brotherhood and co-operation between the two parties and todirect policies relating to regional and international concern.

Fourthly

To honour the Paris Agreement pending the signing of it by Messrs Barzani and Talabani.

Fifth

Genuine effort to implement the Paris Agreement totally and until this is achieved the two sides agree:

Restricting the number of Peshmergas not to reach more than 15,000 each and to review this matter atthe begirming of the coming year.

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An amount of IS million Dinars will be allocated to both PUK and KDP monthly to provide help fortheir Peshmeiigas. This matter to be reviewed at the beginning of the coming year.

All militias to return to their previous jobs and occupations in a gradual way.

Co-ordination between the commands of the parties' Peshmergas and to be used as a defensive forceagainst the enemies and to guard the borders of the IKR. Also to guide the Peshmergas to have a spiritof brotherhood and collaboration to defend the country.

Retreating the forces from the cities and major roads and to place them in appropriate areas fordefensive purposes only.

Other Peshmerga forces will be paid on the previous basis.

Sixth

Help for the families of the martyrs.

Providing for the families of the martyrs is regarded as a main objective agreed by all the parties andother national forces and it has been agreed by all to reserve financial help to these fiamilies on apermanent and orderly basis as follows:

Reservation of a salary for the martyrs' families according to a legal fnunework and for the relevantinstitution to pay each family a monthly salary of 500 dinar until their case is finalised.

Forming a committee consisting of the Mayor, his deputy and the representative of both the KDP andthe PUK to audit all the accounts locally.

All the martyrs' affairs must be finalised within three months of signing of this agreement.

Each side to prepare a list ISO of their senior martyrs and each of these families will be allocated asalary of2,500 dinar monthly.

Seventh

Establishment of the Executives and Legislators on a democratic and civilised basis and remote fromduality and nepotism.

Principle of shared responsibility will be adopted in the case of the office of the leader of theparliament and the prime minister and equal authority will be enjoyed by the leader and his deputywith the usual consideration for protocol.

Deputy minister will be a professional person. His authorities will be determined by the minister.

Both parties agree that a full co-operation should be adopted between the head of the parliament andthe prime minister so that all important decisions are agreed jointly, (note this item will remain secret).

Eighth

Adoption of a strategic plan to include political, economic, legal, development areas as well asrelations of Kurdistan with the central govemment and the regional and international governments.Steps to be taken to improve the livelihood of the civilian population, rehabilitation of agriculture andrestoration of factories and agricultural institutions. Enhanced efforts in the field of international aidand allocation of part of these towards development projects and exploitation of petroleum and othermineral resources of the country.

Ninth

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Start of a concerted political and media effort to show that federalism which we adopted is againstseparatism and it consolidates the unity of Iraq and its sovereignty. Both sides adhere to the unity ofIraq and refute chauvinistic allegation that federalism is a step towards separatism.

Tenth

As soon as the two organisations are combined (Zaniari and Special organisation) and placed under theauthority of the government, co-operation and co-ordination will be carried out between the heads ofthese two organisations. The two organisations will not carry out any activities against each other orany other political forces. The two organisations will concentrate their effort against the enemy andtheir agents and to expose their espionage and subversive activities. All subversive, assassination andespionage activities are forbidden and criminalised.

Eleventh

The two sides will have a joint position towards the INC and the other opposition forces outside thecountry and towards the activities aimed at rescuing Iraq from the dictatorship and for theestablishment of an alternative parliamentary democratic regime.

Twelfth

Assure the national and democratic rights of the Turkomans and Assyrians within the OCR constitution

Dated November 21,1994.

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Annex IV: ACTIONS:

Cease-fire.

Respond positively to the invitation by US State Department to the politburo meeting of July 24 andleaders meeting of August I.

Demilitarisation of Arbil and surroundings except for a neutral mutually agreed police force.

Transfer of funds accumulated from customs and all other revenues to an escrow account held in the

name of Trustees to be agreed by the parties pending the formation of a new Cabinet.

Payment of arrears of salaries to public servants without discrimination.

Formation of a new caretaker cabinet to hold office pending new elections, the key appointments to beheld by qualified independent persons agreed by both Parties and approved by the Parliament.

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Annex V: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES:

Initiate mutual balanced reduction of forces.

Withdraw heavy weapons to designated areas. Eliminate use of weapons of mass destruction againstcivilian population.

Restore communications between respective party areas.

Appoint peace commission to meet on the frontier to discuss alleged infractions.

Establish committee of the Parliament which would include independent assessors to monitor humanrights violations and publish reports on abuses.

Create Women s Commission to investigate and report on rape and other violations of women s rights.

Cease all intimidation and terror tactics, deportation of families of private citizens, and fighting inrefugee camps, towns and villages.

Refr-ain from interruption of essential services such as water and electricity.

Support academic institutions and intellectual freedoms at all universities, and provide adequateresources for their operation.

Allow free movement of goods and persoimel of NGOs and stop intimidation and harassment of theirstaff.

End internal taxation or embargoes on goods moving from one zone of Kurdistan to another.

Exercise full respect for traditional funeral, mourning traditions and procedures.

Release all prisoners of war.

Cease personal media attacks.

Prevent extrajudicial executions, kidnapping and torture and mutilation.

Observe Article 3 of Geneva Conventions which prohibits armed action against civilians and full cooperation with the ICRC.

Examine the Lebanon model, with a view to agreeing special extra-statutoiy powers to be exercised bya provisional government, including legislative powers to be delegated by the Parliament.

Annex VI: KDP response to the delegation's proposals

The measures are generally acceptable to us. However, in terms of priorities we feel that some shouldtake precedence. The most important CBM in the current conflict are:

Cease media attack and the promotion of war culture in the media.

Cease all intimidation and terror tactics, deportations of families of private citizens, and fighting inrefugee camps, towns and villages.

Release of war prisoners and prisoners of conscience.

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Withdrawal of heavy weapons from civilian areas to designated areas.

A public declaration by the leadership to prevent extrajudicial executions, kidnapping, torture andmutilation. To observe Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions (which prohibits armed action againstcivilians) and full co-operation with the ICRC.

To restore telephone communications between respective party areas.

On Action proposals:

1. - The party that violated the cease-fire should be identified, stop the fighting fust and withdraw itsforces from occupied areas to the positions of 8 July 1995

2. - We have responded positively to the US State Department peace initiative and recommendedpreparatory talks at Polit-bureaus level first. We are awaiting a response from the USSD to outline theframework and venues of the talks. The contagious issues of demilitarisation of Arbil, the issue ofrevenues, the restoration of the political process in the region as well as leader-to-leader meeting willbe decided in the preparatory talks.

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Annex VI: CHRONOLOGY OF THE MISSION

July 12,1995

Arrived in Damascus late afternoon; dinner with Iraqi opposition groups and independent intellectualsgiven by Mr Talib Shbib, former Iraqi Foreign Minister

July 13

Meeting with Mr AH Hassan, KDP, Mr Dana Ahmad Mjeed, PUK, Dr Hamid, Iraqi Communist Party,Mr Kadir Aziz, leader, and Mr Abdul Khaliq Zangana (President Human Rights AdvocacyAssociation), PB member, Kurdistan Toilers Party.

July 14

Meeting with Mr Abdullah Ocalan, Leader of the PKK.

July 15

Damascus to Qamishli 08.00. Met by PUK representative in Qamishli. The KDP facilitated the rivercrossing. Meeting with Governor of Duhok, Abdulaziz Tayieb, and several KDP senior ofiicials.Stayed in Duhok.

July 16

Travel to Salahaddin. Meeting with KDP senior officials including Sami Abdurrahman, Jawhar Namiq,ex-Speaker etc. Meeting with Mr Shamsaddin Mufti, independent personality and lawyer. Meetingwith Professor Kamal Khoshnaw, member of the board of Kurdistan Watch. First meeting with MrMasoud Barzani

July 17

Meeting with KDP Politburo in the moming. Travel to Arbil. Received by Prime Minister Mr KosratRassoul in Arbil. Visit to site of shelling and hospital. Meeting with Mr Stafford Cleary, head of theUNDCI.

July 18

Travel to Sulaimaniyeh. Meeting with KDPI at Koisinjaq: Abdullah Hasanzadeh, Secretary-General,Hassan Sharafi, PB member, Salam Azizi, PB member Baba All, PB member.

First meeting with Mr Jalal Talabani in Qalacholun. Others present Mr Najad Aziz, former Vice-Chairman of the National Assembly and Mr Muhamed Tawfiq, member of PUK Central Committee.

Lunch with Mr Talabani at which others present were Dr Kamal Fouad, PB member, Mr Omar SeyyidAli, Central Committee member, Mr Najad ex-vice chairman of the National Assembly. Mr FattahKawiyan and Mr Hashin Kerimi, PB members of the KDPI Revolutionary Branch.

Dinner with members of PUK Politburo members Mr Omar Abdulla, Mr Kadir Haji Ali, Mr MuhamedTawfiq (who also accompanied the delegation from Erbil to Sulaimaniyeh and back), Mr FaraydoonAbdul Kadir and Mr Omar Fattah.

July 19

Travel from Sulaimaniyeh to Arbil. Meeting with KDPI in Arbil: Salam Azizi, PB member. QasimQaramani, representative in Arbil, Abdurrahaman Kajayee, cadre of the Secretariat, MohammedHasanpour, cadre of the Secretariat.

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Meeting with the President of the University of Salahaddin, Dr Bahram Khadir Maulood and the twoVice-Presidents Dr Nazim and Dr Sherzad. Lunch with Mrs Hero Talabani. Meeting with seniorrepresentatives of the seven minor parties.

Cross front line to Salahaddin under escort of the Toilers Party.

Meeting with KDP Politburo.

Second meeting with Mr Barzani 00.43 to 03.00 to discuss delegation's proposals.

July 20

Meeting with KDP Politburo at which they gave the delegation the KDP s response to the delegation'sproposals.

Travel to Arbil, where the Prime Minister entertained the delegation to lunch. Among the guests wereMr Muhamad Haji Mahmoud Secretary-General of Kurdistan Social Democratic Party and other seniorofficials of the Party.

Meeting with the INC Deputy Representative in Arbil, Mr Nabil Al-Moussawi.

Travel to Qala Cholan. Second meeting with Mr Talabani, together with Mr Muammad Tawfiq, DrKhasraw, senior official of PUK. Ended 01.30

July 21

Left Sulaimaniyeh 07.30, arrived Arbil 10.00. Met by Prime Minister. Crossed to Salahaddin for finalmeeting with KDP Politburo. Left Salahaddin 13.30. Meeting with representatives of the refugees inAtrush camps. Arrived Duhok 17.15, met Governor. LeftDuhok 18,00, arrived border 19.00 (18.00Syrian time). Met by KDP representative from Qamishli. Arrived Qamishli 21.00 Syrian time.

July 22

Qamishli to Damascus 10.00

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