regionalism, nationalism and realpolitik in central asia

University of Glasgow

Regionalism, Nationalism and Realpolitik in Central AsiaAuthor(s): Paul KubicekSource: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Jun., 1997), pp. 637-655Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/153717 .Accessed: 18/12/2013 08:50

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EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, Vol. 49, No. 4, 1997, 637-655

Regionalism, Nationalism and Realpolitik in Central Asia

PAUL KUBICEK

Wake up and unite, you generation of Turan! You, man born between two rivers, People of Turan, the motherland calls you. Uzbek, Tajik, Kirghiz, Kazakh, Turkmen, Give your hands to each other as five fingers.1

THEMES OF DISINTEGRATION AND INTEGRATION recently have assumed new prominence in world politics. These issues are epitomised in the emerging relationships within and among the states of the former Soviet Union. During 1990-92 the pendulum swung in the direction of the centrifugal forces of nationalism, contributing to the collapse of the Soviet empire. Despite the fact that these forces have not completely receded, there is recognition that complete disintegration must be avoided lest more imbroglios result. Although the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established to foster cooperation among post-Soviet states, in many circles it has limited credibility since it is perceived as Russian-dominated and an interlude to a return to empire. For this reason, various non-Russian republics have begun to look towards each other in attempts to resolve common dilemmas as well as move away from the orbit of Moscow.

This article will investigate the forces pushing the new Central Asian states- Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan-towards cooperation and possible integration and those that limit the chances for the emergence of a new 'Turkestan'. All of these states face a legion of daunting problems that seriously threaten their future. These include ethnic turmoil (real or potential), the need to restructure and moderise the economy, state-building from scratch, and severe environmental and public health problems. In addition, their security environment is distinctly questionable, owing in large part to uncertainty over the future policies of their northern neighbour. Alone, each of these states is weak, has an uncertain future and is ripe for exploitation by rapacious neighbours. Together, either in a more formal union or through multilateral cooperation, they could solve many of their common problems and create a more stable and secure environment.

Will this be possible? Despite the numerous imperatives that make sustained cooperation an attractive option, this article will argue that multilateral cooperation among Central Asian states, let alone integration, will remain an elusive goal, at least for the foreseeable future. This can be partially explained by Realpolitik: Russia's power in the region and interest in preventing Central Asian unity. However, domestic

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political imperatives, namely the need to construct a state and a distinct national (as opposed to regional) identity, are also important and diminish the appeal of multilateral institutions to would-be state-builders in Central Asia.

To that extent, one could say that the needs of internal integration are paramount; external arrangements, regardless of potential benefits, will be subordinated to these more immediate domestic considerations. The implication is that a prerequisite of successful integration is the existence of a viable state with a secure national identity, so that the state, and in particular its leaders, can be confident that they will not simply be consumed by supranational structures. For this reason, putting forward schemes for integration, in Central Asia as well as perhaps in a variety of other regions, would be putting the cart before the horse. Much to the chagrin of the proponents of regionalism, it would appear that such schemes cannot be the solution for weak states, which must first establish themselves before making serious invest- ments in multilateral political structures.

Before exploring these issues in greater detail, let us first consider what factors might foster the emergence of regional structures in Central Asia.

Factors promoting regional cooperation and integration

International relations theory offers a rich selection of different approaches to explain cooperation and integration among states.2 These include theories of power distribution, interdependence, constructivist theories, and domestic political explanations.3

One of the best known schools of thought focusing on the distribution of power is neorealism. Neorealist theories make a number of assumptions about international politics: states are unitary, rational actors, the world system is anarchic, and the distribution of capabilities among states is a primary determinant of state behaviour. Traditionally, neorealists have tended to de-emphasise both cooperative efforts among states and the importance of international institutions.4 They have, however, specified some conditions under which international cooperation is likely to emerge. Treating all forms of interstate cooperation like military alliances, they posit that small states will collaborate in the face of common, preponderant threats. In such a situation, inter-state rivalries become pointless and unity is preferred.

The applicability of this notion should be clear with respect to Central Asia. All of these states live in the shadow of Russia, and fears about possible Russian expansion or intervention make many very uneasy. Therefore, according to the neorealist, the rational action would be to work together to counterbalance the common threat. This logic does enter into many of the arguments of those Central Asians who push for stronger regional structures.

Neorealists also argue that weaker states may use multilateral institutions or integration as a means to counterbalance potential intra-bloc threats, which is in a sense bandwagoning with a bigger power by locking the larger state into a structure that can contain it. One neorealist, for example, explains the push towards European Monetary Union (EMU) as an effort by smaller states to limit German power, since the EMU mechanism will give them greater 'voice opportunities' than prior or alternative arrangements.5

This neorealist amendment can be applied to Central Asia. Although there is no

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clear dominant power, as Germany is within Europe, Uzbekistan is well positioned to become the 'anchor state' in the region.6 It has the largest population of the five states, is in a central and strategic location, and has the only army that is a usable arm of state policy. Moreover, because ethnic Uzbeks live in all the other states, Uzbekistan could make irredentist claims on its neighbours. Because of fears of possible Uzbek expansionism, other states may desire to foreclose this option by entangling Uzbekistan in regional institutions.

Another structural explanation for cooperation is that of hegemonic stability. In brief, this theory suggests that the presence of a state with a preponderance of resources is necessary to establish and perhaps even sustain international cooperation. This 'privileged actor' or 'external federator' is able to overcome collective action problems by assuming the costs of establishing international regimes or other forms of cooperation.7 In contrast to neorealist theory, this theory predicts that states will bandwagon with a preponderant power in the hope of receiving benefits from the more powerful state.

In Central Asia the only candidate for regional hegemon is Russia, which is formally outside the region but casts a very long shadow. Hegemonic stability theory would predict that Russia would take the initiative in promoting inter-state cooperation, and consequently one would expect that arrangements involving Russia, such as the CIS, would supersede any attempts to cooperate among the Central Asians themselves. Russia, however, may not choose to be the benign hegemon implicit in the theory itself. Russia could easily use the CIS for its own purposes, or could spurn multilateral cooperation altogether since it could use its dominant position to manipulate a series of bilateral relationships. What Russia-or any would-be hegemon- chooses to do with its power is clearly not determined by existing power relationships, but depends upon particular circumstances, including domestic politics. To the extent that Russia tends to impose itself in the region, one could question Russia's role as a facilitator of genuine cooperation among equally sovereign states.

Interdependence theories, in contrast to realist ones, strive to explain cooperation among states. Their basic premise is that growing economic interdependence, the diffusion of new technology and ideas, and awareness of common transnational problems diminish the importance of borders and create transnational actors and a demand for international cooperation.8 In short, states can no longer solve a number of issues through unilateral action. Common problems demand a pooling of resources, and even institutions to help sustain cooperation. Often this may occur regionally, since nations in the same region may share a variety of concerns, possess similar cultures and social structures, and have greater contact with each other.

Central Asian states share a variety of problems, some of which, such as environmental degradation in the Caspian and Aral Seas or water resource manage- ment, demand an intraregional response. Others, such as transport and economic restructuring and modernisation, could be amenable to multilateral cooperation. Security concerns are also linked together, and this could be approached through regional institutions. Of course, as the experience of African states demonstrates, common problems often are not enough to produce well-developed cooperative efforts. Moreover, much of the interdependence in Central Asia is more potential than

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real, since these states were more closely integrated with Moscow than with each other.

This observation points to one of the most fundamental challenges facing Central Asian states: dependence upon Russia. All of these states were integrated into the Soviet economy, were assigned a particular niche by central planners, and were heavily dependent upon subsidies from the centre. Although some of these ties have been broken by the collapse of the old union, their legacy remains, as all states depend upon Russia for imports of industrial products, consumer goods and food. Russia is also the largest export market, and overall accounts for over half of the trade of each Central Asian state.9 Moreover, Central Asia is dependent upon Russia for its security, as Russian troops guard CIS borders and agreements with Russia are the cornerstone of each state's security policy.

One would expect that dependence, which could also be understood as limited sovereignty, would work against cooperative efforts among Central Asians. Like other post-colonial states that tried to form blocs (the Group of 77), these new Central Asian states lack the wherewithal to survive on their own, and often will find the allure of cooperation with more powerful or richer countries more enticing than relying primarily upon cooperation among themselves. Moreover, because of the sheer power and proximity of Russia, as well as its singular dominance, Moscow is in a prime position to shape the foreign policies of Central Asian states.

Turning to another set of variables, one finds constructivist theories of integration. These focus less on structural conditions and more on subjective feelings of regional awareness, or what could be labeled cognitive interdependence. This derives from social communication, common principles and norms, and changing material incen- tives. Their focus is not on the rational state actor but on the dynamics of identity formation within collectivities and the growth of transnational civil societies. Cooper- ation is predicated in some measure upon feelings of mutual sympathy or even a transfer of loyalty to a broader community beyond the state.10

These theories may have relevance for Central Asia. In an effort to bolster a sense of regional identity, state leaders agreed to rename the area 'Tsentral'naya Aziya', scrapping the old Russian label of 'Srednyaya Aziya i Kazakhstan'. Beyond seman- tics, this change reflected a statement of unity, a belief that the region shared a common fate.T" This subjective feeling has also taken hold of opposition movements and many Central Asian transnational actors. Some discuss the possibility of regional integration based upon a supposed common identity, and this movement often is viewed as some sort of inevitable, historical conclusion.12 However, it is nonetheless clear to many that identity in Central Asia is still rather nebulous, as there is no consensus on what a Central Asian (or, for that matter, an Uzbek, Kazakh or Kyrgyz) 'is'. Debates involving competing definitions or visions of Central Asia could easily weaken integration efforts.

Finally, there are a number of domestic-level explanations that touch on prospects for international cooperation. One focuses on states' cultural similarity: states with similar cultures are more apt to form blocs with each other.13 Another considers the type of domestic political regime. One well known finding is that democracies do not fight wars with each other.14 Presumably, this might imply that they are more willing to engage in cooperation, and one could argue that the shared attribute of democracy

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bolsters the European Union and may now make inter-state cooperation more likely in areas recently democratised.

These ideas have some implications for Central Asian states. These states share a common history and religion, and four of the five claim a Turkic heritage and speak similar languages (Tajiks speak a tongue related to Persian). This area, which one could extend to the Xinjiang province in China, has a claim to be a distinct cultural and historical unit, and calls for pan-Turkism or pan-Islamic unity could find resonance as a solution to the colonial legacy of the region. Memories of the great medieval period of Central Asian civilisations, as well as the struggles of 19th-century reformers and Muslim communists in the 1920s, could legitimise a push for unity. However, as the experience of the Arab world shows, a common religion, language, history and proximity can just as easily harbour rivalries. As for regime type, all Central Asian states, to varying degrees, are saddled with authoritarian rulers.15 This feature has arguably not contributed to cooperation among these states, and opposition leaders claim that only with the emergence of democratic governments can any movement be made toward creation of a Turkestan.16

What is notable about these theories is the relative lack of discussion of domestic imperatives and political choices by leaders and how these affect prospects for cooperation and integration. These are often portrayed as an automatic process, driven by external, structural factors or subjective group affinities. Political agency is therefore de-emphasised. This is unfortunate because leaders must make choices in complicated environments with conflicting pressures, and it becomes difficult to predict how various domestic determinants and the logic of integration will be reconciled. These issues have clearly confronted students of European integration, and posed a significant problem to integration theory.17 An important task is to find a means to explain the interaction among external and internal pressures and constraints and preferences of state elites.

Cooperation and integration: the Central Asian experience Since 1991 Central Asian leaders have met on numerous occasions to promote cooperation and the creation of multilateral institutions, both within and apart from the CIS structure. Progress, however, has been limited, as these states continue to look towards Russia and face the imperative of securing their own independence.

These states were not well prepared for independence, and their leaders, former stalwarts of the Communist Party, were distinctly uncertain about their prospects after the demise of the USSR. In December 1991, three days after the Slavic states of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus formed the CIS, the leaders of Central Asia met in Ashgabat to develop their response. While various schemes for regional cooperation were discussed, the various leaders opted not to press for a Central Asian alternative to the CIS. Rather, they lobbied their former compatriots to include them in the CIS. This event was to set an important precedent in the sense that links to Russia have consistently been put above blueprints for a greater Central Asia, and it has been bemoaned by many as a lost opportunity for integration.

However, there have been more gatherings, agreements, and some tentative steps towards greater unity. At a summit in Bishkek in April 1992 agreements were signed

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to coordinate economic reforms and price policies and create multilateral institutions for monetary and investment cooperation. Scholars in Uzbekistan proposed to create a common language from the various Turkic tongues spoken in the region, and received initial backing from President Islam Karimov. In December 1992 the Central Asians joined the Economic Cooperation Organisation (ECO), formed by Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, and aimed at promoting economic links and development. In early 1993 more concrete discussions were held about creating a Central Asian economic cooperation area, since the promises of the CIS on the economic front were not bearing fruit. This laid the groundwork for creation of a 'common economic space' and inter-governmental council in 1994 among Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and more ambitious proposals for a European Union-style common market by the year 2000. These states have also engaged in discussions about trilateral military cooperation. In September 1995 their leaders reported satisfactory progress on their integration, and left the door open for Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Azerbaijan to join them. According to the chairman of the inter-governmental council, Central Asian states have recognised an 'objective' need to cooperate and integrate in order to foster economic growth, security and political stability.18

Although these efforts and the accompanying rhetoric might make one sanguine on prospects for cooperation in the region, a unified Central Asia remains, in the words of a prominent Kazakh poet and political figure, a 'paper construct' and if implemented will only lead to 'unpleasantness'.19 Another observer noted that 'very little' stands behind these 'gestures' of cooperation.20 Behind the various pronouncements of total unity are a variety of forces that militate against cooperative outcomes.

One source of problems is the economic structure of these states. Some claim that Central Asian states have highly diversified and complementary economies that could facilitate trade and greater economic coordination.21 Certainly, there is a mixture of agriculture and industry in the region, and these states also possess vast stores of fossil fuels and industrial minerals. Yet it would be a mistake to claim that this region could be a viable and cohesive economic unit. These states lack diversification and a dense network of economic ties, the preconditions for export specialisation (as in the Middle East), or huge investment resources (a hegemon) from one of the partners (as in the case of NAFTA). They also continue to depend upon other states, especially Russia, for many essential goods. Although there has been some reorientation since 1991, trade with Russia still accounts for over half the total to and from the region, whereas intra-regional trade constitutes less than 10%, far lower than the 60-70% intra-bloc trading found in the European Union. Moreover, since 1991 the absolute volume of intra-Central Asian trade has plummeted, as old ties among the republics were severed and leaders chose to protect domestic markets. Intergovernmental trade targets, one of the primary steps taken to develop common economic ties, have not been met.22 Moreover, because the infrastructure (railways, pipelines, etc.) is so linked together, continued integration with Russia, for the foreseeable future, holds more prospects than any Central Asian common market.

Throughout the region, in fact, it has been the promise of the CIS that has captivated Central Asian leaders far more than calls for a new Turkestan. Debates over creation of a ruble zone are a case in point. Kazakhstan's President Nursultan Nazarbaev and Uzbekistan's Karimov, in particular, took an early lead in calling for

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a common currency and customs union to preserve the flow of goods from Russia at the discounted prices to which Central Asia had grown accustomed. This option, however, proved untenable because Moscow refused to relinquish control over the ruble and continued to print money to counter price increases. The result, hyperinflation, hit Central Asian states hard, leading to trade deficits and further economic collapse. Trade barriers were put up, and Kyrgyzstan finally broke ranks and introduced its own currency in May 1993, prompting denunciations from its neighbours. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan attempted to stay in the ruble zone, leaving in November 1993 only after Russia began to impose harsh conditions on them that whittled away at their nascent sovereignty. What is interesting is that Central Asian states did not succeed in putting forward a unified position vis-a-vis Moscow, undertook no efforts to introduce a common currency that could have strengthened intra-regional economic ties, and clung to the ruble like a life-preserver. Even more ironic, perhaps, is that the idea of rejoining the ruble zone is still very much alive, since the new national currencies have not been immune to hyperinflation.

The same sort of phenomenon holds true for trade. Whereas growing deficits prompted some to erect barriers to Russian goods, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have recently joined a customs union with Russia and Belarus, and Uzbekistan (among other former republics) is also interested in joining. One can surmise that these states, despite problems with Russia, have found that going it alone or trying to forge new ties among themselves is an even worse option. Hence they have been drawn back towards Moscow by economic reality.

This is not to say that these states have not tried to broaden their ties to the world economy. Ties with the West, as well as neighbouring states such as Turkey, Iran and China, have been pursued with modest success. These states are all sources for aid and capital, which are desperately needed by Central Asian states. Yet these new ties are still of small consequence, and cooperation in organisations such as the ECO may be a non-starter.23 Moreover, even if they do grow, expanding international ties could just as easily draw states into different spheres of influence, such as Turkmenistan's modest tilt to Iran, and competition for capital could fan rivalries among Central Asian states, as economic gain would weigh more heavily than geography or fraternal ties.

Finally, economic imperatives of the post-communist transformation, although similar throughout the region, also work against cooperation. Leaders from each state want to find their own path, and extensive cooperation will limit freedom of choice and could instigate conflict as states would find it easy to blame their difficulties on neighbours pursuing 'irresponsible' policies. For example, currency coordination would be difficult because excessive spending in one state could undermine more austere programmes in others. Intra-Central Asian loans, credits, or price concessions are not likely because all states need funds for themselves.24 More generally, each state has tried to create its own niche for itself-Turkmenistan will be the region's Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan the Switzerland,25 Kazakhstan the bridge between Europe and Asia26 and so on-and as a consequence they have different, often non-complementary policies. For example, Kyrgyzstan has embarked upon the most ambitious liberalisation programme in the region, while Uzbekistan and, to a greater extent,

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Turkmenistan are more reluctant to experiment with free market reforms. Moreover, any reforms will need to be tailored to internal preferences and demands, and creating economies of scale where economies are in need of a massive overhaul will arguably cause more difficulties than it solves. Indeed, since independence there has been no rush to link the region's economies together, and intra-regional economic ties in general have been given more rhetorical support than sustained attention on a concrete level. In short, varied economic demands and opportunities have contributed to growing disunity among the region's economies, as states have pursued their own paths and looked for partners more capable of helping them reconstruct their economies.27

The idea of 'niche' development, of course, also has ramifications for culture and identity. If Kyrgyzstan is to be the Switzerland of the region, its citizens will have to possess a different outlook than those of Turkmenistan, where the leadership is intent on preserving patriarchical and clan relations. Different symbols and value structures will be nurtured in each state, and in many cases they will be incompatible. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan can draw upon a rich tradition of Islam, but a similar approach would be divisive in multi-confessional Kazakhstan, and may not even resonate with ethnic Kazakhs, traditionally nomads with weaker Islamic traditions. The point is that as each state begins to create its own identity, Central Asians may find they have less in common than they originally thought.

This represents a core problem for would-be Central Asian integrationists: even if the myriad of more 'objective', material difficulties could be overcome, there is a profound tension between nation-building and region-building. Before creating a Turkestan for Turkic peoples, overlooking for a moment the fate of Tajikistan, there needs to be a Turkmenistan for Turkmen, Uzbekistan for Uzbeks, etc. While particular aspects of domestic difficulties and nation-building are tied to the current leadership, this is a problem better conceived as one of new nations without a tradition of statehood.

State and nation building in Central Asia

One must be wary of making too much of the similarities among Central Asian states. While there are aspects of a common culture and identity, Central Asia is also an ethnodemographic mosaic composed of a variety of peoples not living in historical nation-states. Leaders in these states are also trying to carve out their own space, literally in the case of boundaries, but also in terms of internal political legitimacy and economic development. They need to imbue their states with a distinct national flavour, differentiating themselves from their neighbours and, hopefully, giving birth to a sense of common identity. This requires the revival, re-writing or even creation of a 'national' history, myths and symbols, as well as promotion of the titular group's own culture and language.

This is a perfectly natural process in the evolution of modem states. As Anthony Smith notes, 'for recently created states, ethnic homogeneity and cultural unity are paramount considerations. Even where societies are "plural" and there is ideological commitment to pluralisms and cultural toleration, the elites are compelled to forge new myths and symbols of their political culture'.28 Donald Horowitz addes that, in

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times of rapid change, ethnic affinities and appeals to ethnicity respond to some basic needs, provide a basis for interpersonal trust and affection, and attach people to political institutions that might otherwise enjoy dubious legitimacy.29

How do these imperatives help to limit prospects for regional cooperation? First, one must recognise the ethnic diversity of the region and the fact that republic borders, established with a certain degree of caprice by Soviet officials, paid little respect to the local ethnic composition. This result, combined with Slavic migration to the area, has created multiethnic states. Data from the most recent official census (1989) are presented in Table 1.

TABLE 1 ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF CENTRAL ASIAN STATES (%)

Ethnic group Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Russians 37.8 21.5 6.7 9.4 8.4 Uzbeks 2.0 12.9 23.5 8.9 71.4 Kazakhs 39.7 - - 2.5 4.1 Kyrgyz - 52.4 1.3 - - Tajiks - -62.3 - 4.7a Turkmen - - - 71.4 Othersb 20.5 13.2 6.2 7.8 11.4 Total population 16 464 464 4 257 755 5 092 603 3 552 117 19 810 077

-Less than 1%. aThis figure is disputed by many, who claim that Tajiks may make up as much as 20% of Uzbekistan's population. Includes Ukrainians, Germans, Tatars, Koreans, Baltic Peoples, Jews, etc.

Source: 1989 All-Union Census, reported in Vestnik Statistiki, 1990-1991.

These data reveal that there are two predominant diasporas in Central Asia: Russians and Uzbeks. Russians are concentrated in northern areas of Kazakhstan and in cities throughout the region. They constitute the bulk of the technical intelligentsia and skilled labour force, and of the officer corps in the army. Out-migration, which became a serious problem in 1990-94, has therefore been a worry for Central Asian leaders as it negatively affects prospects for economic development.30 Meanwhile, issues such as the status of the Russian language and dual citizenship have been thorny dilemmas for all states.

The Russian question is most acute in Kazakhstan, the target of some irredentist claims by those who feel that Slavic-dominated northern Kazakhstan is part of Russia, not Central Asia. Indeed, this region is more closely integrated with Western Siberia and the Russian military-industrial complex than with the southern part of the country around the capital, Almaty. Nazarbaev is well aware of his need to handle the Russian question delicately, lest any action provoke Moscow. As a consequence, Nazarbaev has been one of the most enthusiastic supporters of the CIS, launched his own initiative in 1994 for a more federal 'Eurasian Union', and in early 1996 signed a series of agreements with Moscow on further military and socioeconomic integration. Similarly, Nazarbaev has been very careful on the question of Islam, as any hint of Islamic influence in Kazakhstan would make Russians on both sides of the border nervous. In June 1993 Moscow's sharp reaction to Central Asian participation in ECO

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prompted Nazarbaev to suggest that Russia join to counter suspicions of a new Islamic alliance against the CIS. Overall, Kazakhstan requires good relations with Moscow in order to maintain stability and independence, and its leaders have tried to present the state as a bridge between Europe and Asia.

Uzbeks are the other major diaspora in the region. They constitute sizable minorities in both Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where they have caused serious problems. In the former case, violence between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in the Osh region claimed hundreds of lives in 1990, and Kyrgyz leaders are wary of a repeat of this episode and possible Uzbek intervention to defend their co-ethnics or goad them towards secession. Ethnic troubles have contributed to the virtual disintegration of Tajikistan, where the government of Rakhmanov is under significant Uzbek influence. Should the situation there deteriorate further, Uzbek irredentist claims on parts of Western Tajikistan are a strong possibility. At the same time, Tajik nationalist intellectuals dream of regaining the lost Tajik lands of Samarkand and Bukhara in Uzbekistan. There are also possible areas of conflict involving Uzbeks living in southern Kazakhstan and in Turkmenistan.

While Uzbekistan has been the most fertile ground for Pan-Turkic proclamations, other states worry that a new Turkestan may be a cover for a Greater Uzbekistan. Karimov's own rhetoric-his claims of responsibility for all Uzbeks and poorly hidden contempt for the leaders of Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan-only fans the flames, but fears of possible Uzbek expansionism are not grounded exclusively on these pronouncements. The tenuousness of states' internal and external legitimacy, the lack of consensus on political norms, and little history of prior cooperation-in all cases the opposite of those in contemporary Europe-make it unlikely that Central Asians will be able to manage their 'giant' by tying it to regional institutions.

Throughout the region, nationalism has been the easiest means for the new elite to legitimise themselves and their states. The basis for nationalist resurgence has roots in the Brezhnev era, when Central Asian republics were turned into virtual fiefdoms by communist officials, and this was abetted by Gorbachev's decentralisation efforts, which gave greater latitude for local elites to devise 'national' solutions. Moreover, the disparity between ethnic and state boundaries, a shrinking economic pie, difficult questions of property distribution, and the presence of economic scapegoats (Rus- sians, occasionally Uzbeks) arguably have made it easier for nationalism to emerge. While no state is yet rabidly nationalist, leaders nonetheless must make concessions to nationalists in order to bolster their legitimacy. New 'national' symbols and myths are needed. Prominent examples include the year-long celebration of the millenium of Manas, the legendary warrior-founder of the Kyrgyz people, Tamerlane as a founding father of the Uzbeks, the rediscovery for various 'national' writers, historians and scientists, as well as the Stalinesque promulgation of President Sapurmarad Niyazov of Turkmenistan as Turkmenbasi, or Father of all Turkmen. The cultivation of an inter-regional identity works against the establishment of national identity by dimin- ishing 'national' accomplishments or fanning rivalries among the states themselves. As a result, there have been efforts to limit the political influence of neighbouring states, lest foreign ideas contaminate efforts to find a truly 'national' path appropriate for Turkmen, Uzbeks, etc. 'We-ness', promoted by cross-national cultural and historical ties, therefore gives way to an 'us' versus 'them' approach that fuels rivalry

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and intolerance. State-led nationalism, each with its own cast, has been the norm and has received much more focus than regional integration projects.

This upsurge in nationalism, however, is a natural process necessary to state- building projects. Students of Central Asian history have noted that there are three levels of identity in the region: sub-national, supra-national, and national.3' What is notable is that the last is the least developed and therefore in need of cultivation from above if these states are to remain viable; local (mahalla) affiliations remain stronger even than nationality (natsional'nost') as defined by Soviet authorities.32 Clannish ties complicate policy implementation and institution building because personal loyalties are more important among elites than abstract concepts like state or nation. State authorities have tried to penetrate this fabric through the use of local prefects (hakim) who are appointed from the centre and charged with managing former communist- controlled property.33 However, these efforts may also entail costs, as the construction of a truly national identity could prompt social mobilisation that could be potentially disruptive, or necessitate action to break up entrenched local ties. Failure to act on this issue, however, could risk the integrity of the state. Hence the need for a state-led nationalism, which, regionally at any rate, has proved to be a divisive force.

Supra-national identity is the basis for constructivist theories of integration, and its existence could contribute to closer cooperation among Central Asian states. This, however, has not been the case because of a conflict between supra-national and national identities. Pan-Turkism, despite its historical basis, has not met with much enthusiasm outside Uzbekistan, and in particular makes Tajiks uneasy. The other source of supra-national identity, Islam, now freed from Soviet shackles, is experienc- ing a renaissance in the region.34 This, however, has been very carefully managed by state leaders, who are afraid of foreign (especially Iranian) influence and the rise of a non-state source of political activism and loyalty. The struggle in Tajikstan, which has a strong religious element, has served as a warning for other states. For this reason, all leaders profess secularism and have generally eschewed ties to fundamen- talist movements. The Islamic Renaissance Party, for example, has been banned in Uzbekistan, as has the similar Alash movement in Kazakhstan. Efforts have also been made to co-opt imams through state-controlled religious boards. Finally, it is worth noting that Islamic influence is rather weak in both Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan owing to nomadic traditions, and that common religious ties have not prevented intra- Muslim violence in the region. Hence it may be rather facile to imagine Islam as the tie that binds Central Asia together.

More generally, each state has moved along its own path of post-communist development. Tajikistan's, thankfully, has not been followed by the others, and the resulting chaos and Russian intervention have left it ill-prepared to consider any regional integration schemes. Turkmenistan, for different reasons, has largely spurned cooperation with its neighbours, frequently failing to be represented at regional meetings. Counting on the country's gas and oil reserves, Niyazov has been a most unenthusiastic CIS partner, rejecting its supra-national elements for fear of renewed dependence.35 He is wary of close cooperation with the rest of Central Asia as well, since these states are not a source of capital or a lucrative export market, and their influence could undermine the authoritarian stability and personality cult that he has established in Turkmenistan.36 Moreover, some may view Turkmenistan, as Iraq did

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Kuwait, as an easy and tempting target. As a consequence, Niyazov has tended to emphasise close bilateral ties with Russia, particularly for security. Overall, he has stated that it is too soon to talk of any confederation among Central Asian states, since 'each is preoccupied with resolution of its own vital problems and the process of establishing authentic statehood has only just begun'.37

The other three states have begun to establish a closer relationship, but significant obstacles impede greater progress. Some of these are tied to underlying economic and material conditions, others to political rivalries between the leaders of these states. However, what should be emphasised is that a variety of factors work against close integration. Owing to demography and geography, Kazakhstan, the bridge between Asia and Europe, must orient its policies in the appropriate manner. This means that Nazarbaev has emphasised ties with Russia much more than ties with his southern neighbours. This, not surprisingly, is not always to the liking of others, and an official Uzbek paper called Nazarbaev's ideas of a Eurasian Union 'sheer gibberish' that, if implemented, would resurrect the old USSR.38 Uzbekistan, for its part, is decidedly more Islamic, and Uzbek history and literature are the most developed in the region. Its elites therefore are likely to seek to legitimise themselves by appealing to Islamic and Uzbek history and symbols. An example is the declaration of 1996 as the Year of Tamerlane. However, given the barbarous record of this 'Uzbek hero', one might wonder what appreciation of his legacy means for non-Uzbeks. Kyrgyzstan, the most liberal state in the region, has tried to use its reputation to differentiate itself from its neighbours (and attract foreign aid) and therefore would find close integration with more authoritarian states difficult to countenance. Moreover, owing to its lack of natural resources, insecurity and dependence upon Russia, it has tended to emphasise relations with Moscow.

On the whole, one finds that while there is talk of more multilateral cooperation and integration, basic questions such as 'What is Central Asia?' or 'Whose vision of Central Asia should we adopt?' are unanswered. Ties between the states are along narrow functional lines, and any political spillover remains elusive. Perhaps, as some predict, if Central Asian states all become democratic, a consensus on basic questions can be found, leading to something akin to the European Union. This, however, remains a big 'if', since there is little sign that democratic movements have much strength in most of these states.

Moreover, this assumes that Central Asian states will be able to work out these problems on their own, in conditions of complete sovereignty. This, however, is not the case, since Russia casts a very long shadow over the region.

Russia's pull on and towards Central Asia

Russia's influence, due to geographical, demographic, economic and military factors, remains immense in the region. Russians from across the political spectrum have asserted that the variety of Russian interests in the region means that Russia must play a 'special' role.39 In effect, a new 'Monroe Doctrine' is being asserted by Moscow over the lands once part of the Soviet Union. Understandably, this makes many Central Asians nervous.

What has been their response? Realist theories predict that when states are faced

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with a threat, they are likely to ally against it.40 Concern about Russia should therefore prompt more cooperation and possibly integration among Central Asian states. This is how one observer assesses incipient multilateral cooperation in the region; it is a move to counter Russian hegemony through the CIS.41 Yet any sort of Central Asian 'alliance' against Moscow is little more than a house of cards, as Central Asian states themselves have been pulled towards Moscow and continue to make moves to placate the Russian bear. This is not something that neorealist theories would predict, mainly because they de-emphasise (inter)dependent relationships among states.

Demographic and economic forms of interdependence have already been discussed, and clearly they constrain the choices made by Central Asian leaders. Antagonising Russia by making explicitly hostile moves against local Russians would only play into the hands of Russian nationalists and provide a perfect pretext for fraternal intervention. This has helped check nationalist policies, especially in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Economically, these states simply need Russia, and as a consequence the CIS holds much more promise than a Central Asian Common Market. Hence in 1996 one saw moves by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan towards greater integation with Russia in a wide range of areas. Even the leaders of those states that have been more eager to assert their independence, such as Niyazov and Karimov, have oriented their foreign policies towards Russia as a way to guarantee both their state's security and their own careers.42

There is also an important security dimension that necessarily draws Russia into the affairs of Central Asian states. These states have found it difficult to create national armies, because they lack funds, equipment and manpower. The latter problem is a result of the fact that the Soviet troops on Central Asian soil were commanded by a predominantly Russian officer corps. Needing to maintain internal order, fearing overzealous neighbours (Uzbekistan? Iran? China?) and the spread of the conflict in Tajikistan, and having no means of controlling their external borders, these states, with the exception of Turkmenistan, have signed a CIS collective security agreement, which preserved the integrated Soviet (redefined as CIS) defence space and ensured de facto, if not de jure, Russian control over CIS borders and military installations. Moreover, all the states have formed joint military contingents with the Russian army, which are dominated by Russian officers. The Russians, meanwhile, have opposed moves to make the CIS military command more multilateral, such as in NATO, and instead have maintained operational control of forces in the region. Perhaps the most obvious example of security dependence of Central Asians on Russia is Russian control over 'peacekeeping' forces in Tajikistan, a circumstance countenanced by Central Asian leaders whose states are in no position to supply the funds needed for the operation. Overall, one sees a significant derogation of Central Asian control in favour of a strong Russian presence. Limits on state sovereignty in this field obviously work against regional cooperation schemes that aim to be exclusively Central Asian.

So far, we have considered aspects of Russian policy that exist by default or those that are favoured by Central Asian leaders themselves, who are loathe to see a rapid Russian pull-out creating economic chaos and a security vacuum. In other words, we have looked at relatively benign aspects of Russian hegemony, and implicitly

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assumed that Moscow is concerned with the pursuit of mutually-held objectives, such as inter-ethnic and economic stability. Even in these cases, however, one sees that Russia is eager to draw the Central Asian states back towards itself either through the CIS or through bilateral ties, and is at best ambivalent about plans for exclusively Central Asian cooperation, out of concern about a hostile alliance along its southern border.

This, of course, does not completely describe the entire state of affairs with respect to Russian involvement in Central Asia. While certain aspects of Russian policy are inevitable or even necessary, others may lead one to wonder whether influential circles in Russia hope to re-establish empire or institutionalise a form of suzerainty over Central Asia. Examples of more malevolent designs on Central Asia can be seen in efforts to win special status or even territorial changes for ethnic Russians, moves to ensure control over fuel resources and the means of transporting them to markets,43 as well as general pronouncements that repudiate the break-up of the Soviet Union.

Much of this is spurred by domestic political considerations, and ultimately the fate of Central Asia may rest upon which factions within Russia gain political power. Recalling the division between Westerners and Slavophiles, several observers of post-Soviet Russia have pointed to the emergence of rival Euro-Atlanticist and Eurasian blocs.44 The former, ascendant in the immediate break-up of the old union, sees Russia's future as linked with the West and is more reticent about pursuing aggressive, neo-imperialist policies in the 'near abroad', the term used in Russia to denote the former Soviet republics. This group, composed of pro-reform, democratic elements, tends to see Central Asian states as authoritarian backwaters and a burden on the Russian economy.45 More recently, particularly after Zhirinovsky's strong showing in the December 1993 parliamentary elections, the Eurasians have gained prominence. Core ideas from this group, composed of hard-core nationalists, industrial groups, communists, and pragmatists concerned about Russian security, have been adopted (in large part for domestic political reasons) by erstwhile Euro- Atlanticists such as former Foreign Minister Kozyrev and President El'tsin. The appointment in 1995 of Evgenii Primakov as Foreign Minister was perhaps the clearest sign of this group's ascendancy.

'Eurasians' favour an active Russian role in the 'near abroad' and largely consider control over Central Asia-either de jure or de facto-as a necessity and even Russia's 'natural right'. This group opposes regional integration in Central Asia since it could undermine Russia's position and create a possible security threat on Russia's southern border. One former El'tsin adviser flatly declared that the 'near abroad' was Russia's sphere of influence and that the former republics had best not try to form alliances among themselves or with foreign powers. They would have to submit to Russia's dominion.46 Another, Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the Duma Committee on International Affairs, suggested that Russia should create a series of relationships with her neighbours in which they would remain secure in return for recognising the special interests and influence of their larger neighbour. Relations among Russia's 'partners' and 'friends' are expected to remain qualitatively lower than relations between Russia and her friends.47 In short, Russia is expected to come first. Aleksandr Panarin, a leading exponent of Eurasianism, is even more frank about the goals of his group. 'Eurasianism today is, above all, a pseudonym for aspirations to restore the

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integrity of the post-Soviet space... the key question concerns the conditions under which the Muslim peoples of Eurasia would like to become part of a unified Russian state'.48 Obviously, statements like these are cause for alarm for Central Asians intent on preserving their independence.

Reflecting the position that some sovereign states are more equal than others, the Russian leadership, especially since 1993, has embarked upon a more interventionist policy vis-a-vis Central Asia. Views typically at odds with the wishes of Central Asians began to find their way into various pronouncements and policies. Examples include the declaration that Russia could not 'leave' Central Asia without jeopardis- ing its soft 'underbelly', and the belief that Russia cannot make its borders with Central Asian states secure, which means that Russia should maintain control over all CIS borders. The new 'Eurasian' policy of Moscow also emphasised the bolstering of economic ties, including free trade, customs and common currency zones. Moreover, Russian leaders have repeatedly been loathe to transform the CIS into a true multilateral organisation or embrace schemes such as Nazarbaev's Eurasian Union, a confederative plan establishing equality among participant states.49 In general, Rus- sian policy has emphasised bilateral relationships, in which Russia can use its position to extract significant concessions. Examples include a myriad of security arrangements that in effect merge Central Asian military structures with those of Russia, economic cooperation, and, more recently, energy policy. With respect to the latter, one observer claimed that Russia is able to 'hold Kazakhstan hostage' by obstructing capital flows, allocating the volume of oil exports through existing pipelines, and delaying new projects.50 The result is that Russia has a veritable chokehold over the region' s economies.

It is still difficult to predict how far Russia will go in re-asserting control over the region. Certainly there are real fears that what sovereignty Central Asian states do have will come under greater attack. Karimov, for one, has chastised both Niyazov and Nazarbaev for relying too heavily upon Russia, which may extract a high price for its 'help'. The repudiation of the break-up of the USSR by the Duma obviously does not augur well. Some fear the customs union with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan will grant Russia even more control over these states. The problem, as Karimov himself has recognised, is that there simply is no alternative to the CIS.

While Russia's eventual orientation hinges upon a number of factors outside their control, Central Asians have tried to assuage Russian fears so that there will be no incident to provoke hostile action from the north. Consequently, the question of the status of Russians living in Central Asia has been handled gingerly, Russia's lead on security issues has been followed, no formal alliance has been sought with outside powers, and projects for Turkestan, which could feed Russian fears about security threats from the south as well as encourage separatism among Turkic peoples within Russia, have been de-emphasised. All Central Asian leaders have affirmed Russia's right to play a leading role in the region, while at the same time they plead for recognition as equal partners.

Overall, what we find in Central Asia is that the demands of Realpolitik conform neither to those of neorealist theory nor to those of the theory of hegemonic stability. In the former case, the expectation is that states act to counterbalance threatening powers. Clearly this is not the case; 'bandwagoning' more accurately describes the

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actions of Central Asian states. Stephen Walt, in a common-sense amendment to neorealism, finds that states may bandwagon with a larger power if there are no other potential allies and the threatening state is geographically proximate.51 This corre- sponds well with what we find in Central Asia. Randall Schweller adds that states may also bandwagon in an effort to fend off rival domestic groups which threaten the survival of the state's leadership.52 This explanation, which could be used to explain Tajik, Kazakh and Kyrgyz fears of ethnic Russian and/or Uzbek irredentism, as well as Uzbekistan's courting of Moscow to ensure regional stability, could apply to Central Asia. More generally, however, factors such as (inter)dependence, limited sovereignty, and shared history-not the power exigencies emphasised by neorealists-better explain Central Asia's relations with Russia. In short, exclusively regional cooperation or integration is not viable; Russia's role is too important, and relations with Russia assume top priority.

Russia, for its part, however, shows little intention of being a benign hegemon, one that ensures a stable environment for its 'allies' and encourages multilateral cooperation among them. Russia is not sitting aside idly; it is actively reconstructing relations frayed by the collapse of the old union, and it is engineering its policies in ways that favour bilateral relations or cooperation in the Russian-dominated CIS. While it would be unfair to characterise every Russian action as an assault on Central Asian sovereignty, Russia nonetheless seeks to orchestrate much of what occurs in Central Asia, limiting opportunities for Central Asian unity. In short, the preponderance of Russian power tells us little about the content of Russian policy. Other factors that must be considered are patterns of asymmetrical interdependence, the economic and physical security of the hegemon, forms of government, ideological or national beliefs, and shared histories and demographic ties.

Conclusion

How can one best make sense of the evolution of Central Asian states' foreign policy, in particular with respect to the still unrealised dream or promise of regional integration? One concept that captures well the medley of different forces is that of an overlapping and simultaneous, or nested, game.53 In other words, the dynamics of political relationships on multiple levels alter the pay-offs and opportunities available to actors. The fate of regional integration in Central Asia is dependent upon outcomes on four different levels: domestic politics within Russia, relations between Russia and the other states, relations among the states themselves, and relations within the states between current elites and their challengers. Each 'game' affects play at the other tables, and Central Asian states in particular are vulnerable to reverberations from their northern neighbour because of their dependence, poorly institutionalised state structures, and the fact that cultural, social, and in some cases physical boundaries are not yet well demarcated or universally respected. For the moment, Russia's interest and ability to manipulate the course of events in Central Asia sets the table for the framing or 'master game'. Fears of Uzbek hegemony also play a role on the inter-regional level. Finally, domestic political considerations-above all to establish national and state legitimacy-help stack the deck against plans for regional integration or extensive cooperation.

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653 REGIONALISM AND NATIONALISM IN CENTRAL ASIA

Visions of a new Central Asian bloc therefore have been pushed off all of these tables, as Central Asians have worked for the necessary and possible-nation and state building-while placating a very interested Russia. What is perhaps most interesting is that these two objectives are not mutually complementary, as there are inherent tensions between the internal and external demands on Central Asian states. Fulfilment of one could create problems with respect to the other. Those leaders who overcultivate nationalism, respond to popular sentiments against Russia, or attempt to break from Russia's orbit could cause regional instability and compel Russia to take more overt action to re-assert its position. On the other hand, continual prostration before Moscow will complicate efforts to gain internal legitimacy, as well as risk reabsorption into a new empire. Finding a way to balance the requirements of state consolidation with the interests of Russia, and hence preserve stability and independence, will continue to be a dominant theme in the political development of post-Soviet Central Asia.

Kof University 1 Poem by Nusrat Karim in independence brochure of the Writers' Union of Uzbekistan, cited

in Anthony Hyman, 'Moving out of Moscow's orbit: the outlook for Central Asia', International Affairs, 69, 2, 1993, p. 297. 2 Cooperation and integration, of course, are not equivalent. The former occurs when states adjust their behaviour in accordance with the actual or perceived preference of others. It does not require institutions, a balanced distribution of gains, or shared norms, and may be strictly functional and not sustainable over time. Integration occurs when states forego individual decision making and delegate powers to supra-national organs. A central role in integration theory has been played by neofunctionalism, which posits that rising levels of interdependence require functional cooperative efforts that eventually lead to political and legal spillover and the erosion of exclusive national identities. Shared norms and a commitment to international institutions underlie integration. 3 An excellent review can be found in Andrew Hurrell, 'Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics', Review of International Studies, 21, 4, 1995, pp. 331-358.

4 The locus classicus remains Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA, 1979). 5 Joseph M. Grieco, 'The Maastricht Treaty, Economic and Monetary Union and the neo-realist research programme', Review of International Studies, 21, 1, 1995, pp. 21-40.

6 See Kadir Alimov, 'Uzbekistan's Foreign Policy: In Search of a Strategy', in Roald Sagdeev & Susan Eisenhower (eds), Central Asia: Conflict Resolution, and Change (Chevy Chase, MD, 1995); Henry Hale, 'Islam, State-building and Uzbekistan Foreign Policy', in Ali Banuazizi & Myron Weiner (eds), The New Geopolitics of Central Asia and Its Borderlands (Bloomington, 1994); and Rajan Menon, 'In the Shadow of the Bear: Security in Post-Soviet Central Asia', International Security, 20, 1, 1995, pp. 149-181. The only possible regional leader is Kazakhstan, but this state is severely constrained by a large Slav population (over 40% of the total) that will force its leaders to continue to look to the north before undertaking political initiatives.

7 Robert Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton, 1984); Charles Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929-1939 (Berkeley, 1973); Timothy McKeown, 'Hegemonic Stability Theory and 19th Century Tariff Levels in Europe', International Organization, 37, 1, 1983, pp. 73-91.

8 The seminal source remains Robert Keohane & Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence (Boston, 1977).

9 Data on Central Asian trade are difficult to calculate, owing to problems of determining true exchange rates and the prevalence of barter. Nonetheless, all reports indicate the predominance of Russia as a trade partner. Trade figures are regularly available in Economist Intelligence Unit reports as well Eurasian File, published by Turkish International Cooperation Agency. 10 The pioneering work in this field is that of Karl Deutsch, Political Community in the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, 1957). Also see Alexander Wendt, 'Collective Identity Formation and the International State', American Political Science Review, 88, 2, 1994, pp. 384-396. 1l Martha Brill Olcott, 'The Myth of Tsentral'naia Aziia', Orbis, 38, 4, 1994, p. 549.

12 In the words of Pulat of Uzbekistan's Birlik (Unity) Party, 'In the historical plan, these states


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are doomed to integrate in economic, social, cultural, and other spheres. This in turn will unavoidably lead to integration in the political sphere'. See Abdurakhim Pulat, 'Turkestan: po puti k integratsii', Tsentral'naya Aziya (Sweden), 1995, 1, p. 12.

13 The best known statement of this viewpoint is Samuel Huntington, 'Clash of Civilizations', Foreign Affairs, 72, 3, 1993, pp. 22-49.

14 This issue has been the topic of numerous works. One premier source is Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, 1993).

15 The exception was commonly thought to be Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan. However, in late 1995-early 1996 he began to follow the course of other leaders in the region and acquired constitutional powers that may call into question the existence of democratic government that is able to check the power of the president.

16 Pulat, 1995, pp. 11-15. 17 See Stanley Hoffman, 'Obstinate or Obsolete?: The Fate of the Nation-State and the Case of

Western Europe', Daedalus, 95, 4, 1966, pp. 862-915, and Ernst Haas, The Obsolescence of Regional Integration Theory (Berkeley, 1975).

18 Serik Primbetov, 'Integratsiya v tstentral'noi azii: problemy i perspektivy', Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo, 3, 4, 1995, pp. 3-10.

19 Olzhas Suleimenov, 'Raspad sovetskogo soyuza-tragediya dlya nas', Tsentral'naya Aziya, 1995, 1, p. 10.

20 Boris Rumer, 'Disintegration and Reintegration in Central Asia: Dynamics and Prospects', in Boris Rumer (ed.), Central Asia in Transition: Dilemma of Political and Economic Development (London, 1996), p. 45.

21 See Sergei Lounev & Glerii Shirokov, 'Central Asia as a New Region in World Politics', and Alexander Akimov, 'Central Asia as a Region in the World Economy', in Sagdeev & Eisenhower (eds); and Ntiket Kardam, 'Structural Changes in Multilateralism: Emerging Institutions in Central Asia', paper for International Symposium on Sources of Innovation in Multilateralism, United Nations University, Lausanne, 1994.

22 Reliable data for recent years are difficult to find, in large part because it is unclear how exchange rates and barter should be calculated. However, there is a consensus that trade has in fact dropped. See Primbetov, 'Integratsiya' and Postsovetskaya Tsentral'naya Aziya: strategiya i prior- itety ekonomicheskogo razvitiya (Almaty, 1994), pp. 262-263; and Rumer (ed.), p. 44.

23 Rubenstein notes that the ECO has no funds, no secretariat, no credible economic or political agenda, and is beset with divisions between its founding members. See Alvin Rubenstein, 'The Geopolitical Pull on Russia', Orbis, 38, 4, 1994, p. 580.

24 As evidence of how financial pressures inhibit maintenance of cooperation and political goodwill, Uzbekistan stopped gas deliveries to Kyrgyzstan in January 1996 because of the latter's failure to pay.

25 T. Buchuev & A. Brudnyi, Nezavisimyi Kazakhstan: tretii put' (Bishkek; Ilim, 1993). 26 Kasymzhomart Tokaev, 'Vneshnyaya politika: vremya razmyshlenii, vremya deistvii',

Kazakhstan i mirovoe soobshchestvo, 1995, 2(3), pp. 3-9. 27 Akimov, 'Central Asia...'. 28 Anthony Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Nations (London, 1986), p. 147. 29 Donald Horowitz, 'How to Begin Thinking Comparatively About Soviet Ethnic Problems', in

Alexander Motyl (ed.), Thinking Theoretically about Soviet Nationalities (New York, 1992), p. 10. 30 Data for 1990-94 show that net out-migration totalled 612 181 from Kazakhstan, 231 944

from Kyrgyzstan, 229 345 from Tajikistan, 394 063 from Uzbekistan and 45 791 from Turkmenistan. Ethnic Russians make up about two-thirds of these totals (Goskomstat, Rossiiskii Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik, 1995), pp. 42-43. By 1995 out-migration had significantly slowed, and some Central Asian officials told me that they suspected that net immigration was occurring.

31 Alexandre Bennigsen & Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union (London, 1967).

32 This has been reported by many researchers using sociological surveys. See Yaacov Ro'i (ed.), Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies (London, 1995), p. 312. 33 Olcott, 'Emerging Political Elites', in Banuazizi & Weiner.

34 Ahmed Rashid, The Resurgence of Central Asia: Islam or Nationalism? (London, 1994) and Mehrdad Haghayeghi, 'Islam and Democratic Politics in Central Asia', World Affairs, 156, 4, 1994, pp. 186-198. 35 Komsomol'skaya pravda, 29 January 1993.

36 John Anderson, 'Authoritarian political development in Central Asia: the case of Turk- menistan', Central Asian Survey, 14, 4, 1995, pp. 509-527.

37 Turkmenskaya iskra, 8 August 1992, cited in Anderson, 'Authoritarian. . .', p. 523.

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38 Narodnoe slovo, cited in Rumer (ed.), p. 51. 39 Menon, 'In the shadow...', especially pp. 158-160, and Irina Zviagelskaia, The Russian Policy Debate on Central Asia (London, 1995).

40 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, 1987). 41 Hale, pp. 151-152. 42 Hale; Anderson. 43 For details of the pipeline politics of Central Asia, see Rosemarie Forsythe, The Politics of

Oil in The Caucasus and Central Asia (Oxford, 1996). 44 The most extensive treatment is in Andrew Zagorsky & Michael Lucas, Rossiya pered

evropeiskim vyzovom (Moscow, 1993). A review can be found in George Hudson, 'Russia's Search for Identity in the Post Cold War World', Mershon International Studies Review, 38, 1, 1994, pp. 235-240. See also Vyachseslav Belokrenitsky, 'Russia and Greater Central Asia', Asian Survey, 34, 12, 1994, pp. 1093-1108; Zviagelskaia; Menon. 45 Zviagelskaia, p. 5.

46 Andranik Migranyan, 'Rossiya i blizhnee zarubezhe', Nezavisimaya gazeta, 18 January 1994. 47 Vladimir Lukin, 'Rossiya v dal'nikh i blizhnikh krugakh', Segodnya, 3 September 1993. 48 Aleksandr Panerin, 'Evraziistvo: za i protiv, vchera i segodnya', Voprosyfilosofii, 1995, 6, pp.

8, 11. 49 Martha Brill Olcott, 'Sovereignty and the "Near Abroad" ', Orbis, 39, 3, 1995, pp. 353-367. 50 Forsythe, p. 15. 51 Walt. However, since neorealism can predict both balancing and not balancing, one may be

tempted to argue that neorealism appropriates every tenable position so that it becomes non- falsifiable.

52 Randall Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In', International Security, 19, 1, 1994, pp. 72-107. 53 This notion was originally put forward by Jack Synder, 'Organizing Political Space in the Former Soviet Union', paper prepared for the Carnegie Project on Political Order, Conflict and Nationalism in the Former Soviet Union, 1995.

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Issue Table of ContentsEurope-Asia Studies, Vol. 49, No. 4 (Jun., 1997), pp. 561-760Front Matter [pp. 561 - 565]Eastern Enlargement of the European Union: Macroeconomic Effects in New Member States [pp. 567 - 590]Capital Flight from Post-Soviet Russia [pp. 591 - 615]Redefining Centre. Regional Relations in the Russian Federation: Sverdlovsk Oblast' [pp. 617 - 635]Regionalism, Nationalism and Realpolitik in Central Asia [pp. 637 - 655]The Economic Cooperation Organization: Current Status and Future Prospects [pp. 657 - 667]Croatia's Economy after Stabilisation [pp. 669 - 691]Unearthing a Root Cause of Soviet Economic Disintegration [pp. 693 - 703]A Further Test of Podkaminer's Hypothesis: The Case of Post-Liberalisation Bulgaria [pp. 705 - 709]Reviewsuntitled [pp. 711 - 712]untitled [pp. 712 - 715]untitled [pp. 715 - 716]untitled [pp. 716 - 718]untitled [pp. 718 - 719]untitled [pp. 719 - 720]untitled [pp. 720 - 723]untitled [pp. 723 - 727]untitled [pp. 727 - 728]untitled [pp. 729 - 730]untitled [pp. 730 - 732]untitled [pp. 732 - 733]untitled [pp. 733 - 735]untitled [pp. 735 - 736]untitled [pp. 736 - 738]untitled [pp. 738 - 740]untitled [pp. 740 - 741]untitled [pp. 741 - 743]untitled [pp. 743 - 744]untitled [pp. 744 - 746]untitled [pp. 746 - 747]untitled [pp. 748 - 749]untitled [pp. 749 - 751]untitled [pp. 751 - 753]

Books Received [p. 755]Back Matter [pp. 757 - 760]

regionalism, nationalism and realpolitik in central asia

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jstor terms

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