realizing socialist dreams through national unification ... · web viewibid., 178. see also hoang...
TRANSCRIPT
In Tuong Vu and Wasana Wongsurawat, eds. Dynamics of the Cold War in Asia: Ideology,
Identity, and Culture (New York: Palgrave, 2009)
Chapter 3
“To Be Patriotic is to Build Socialism”: Communist Ideology in Vietnam’s Civil War
Tuong Vu, University of Oregon
Introduction
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was the instigator and victor in the
Vietnamese civil war (1959-1975). It was led by a communist party (the Vietnamese Workers’
Party or VWP) that had displayed a particularly sharp binary worldview since at least the 1940s.1
To communist leaders, the world was divided into two opposing camps. The socialist camp was
imagined as a paradise in which peace, happiness and good will ruled. In contrast, the capitalist
or imperialist camp symbolized everything that was bad, including war, sufferings and
exploitation. The interests of the two camps were fundamentally opposed and war of mutual
destruction between them was inevitable. Yet because history was viewed as following a linear
progressive path and the socialist camp represented progress, this camp was expected to triumph
in such a war.
This binary worldview of Vietnamese communists was remarkably consistent throughout
the 1940s. As reality did not conform to what was imagined, it was modified but never
abandoned. Regardless of what happened, communist leaders enthusiastically identified
themselves with the revolutionary camp. In darkest moments when no support from this camp
was forthcoming, they did not cease associating themselves mentally with the Soviet Union,
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imagining about it and displaying their admiration for it. Their loyalty explains why, when the
Cold War arrived in Asia in the late 1940s, DRV leaders volunteered to fight it on the front line
for the socialist camp, disregarding the looming threat of American intervention. Their earnest
appeals and Mao’s personal pleading helped persuade an uninterested Soviet Union to recognize
the DRV in early 1950, extending the battle line of the Cold War into Indochina.
The question is: What happened to this ideological loyalty during the subsequent civil
war between North and South Vietnam? The war was framed from the communist side as “the
resistance against America to save the country” [khang chien chong My cuu nuoc], making it
sound as if it were simply a war for national liberation and unification between the independent-
minded Vietnamese and American invaders. The standard version in the literature depicts a
fierce Vietnamese desire for national unification and independence that ran opposed to American
determination to stop communism from expanding into Southeast Asia.2 Vietnamese communists
are viewed as being driven by deep patriotic sentiments as descendants of a people who had
repeatedly fought off foreign invasions in history. Alliance with the Soviet camp was only for
political expediency. Even when VWP leaders’ strong adherence to communism is
acknowledged, it is often argued that they placed national liberation and unification higher than
ideological goals.3 Alternatively, when ideology is discussed, this is often done in the context of
factional conflict.4 Ideological conflicts in this line of analysis merely reflected power struggle.
Based on newly available documents and other primary sources, this chapter comes to the
opposite conclusion that Vietnamese communists never wavered in their ideological loyalty
during the period when key decisions about the civil war was made (1953-1960). They accepted
Soviet and Chinese advice to sign the Geneva Agreements but continued to perpetuate their
propaganda war against the US. Under various pennames, Ho Chi Minh published sharp
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commentaries in Vietnamese newspapers, viciously attacking American policy and its capitalist
culture and society. Although North Vietnamese leaders expected elections to be held in 1956,
they pressed on with rural class struggle and their goal to build a “people’s democracy.” They
did not shy away from defending communism when the Saigon regime attacked the doctrine. As
previously, they never abandoned their binary worldview despite serious disputes within the
Soviet bloc in the late 1950s. The VWP was not of one mind in how to cope with discord within
the bloc, but its leadership worked hard to preserve bloc unity. As it launched an armed struggle
in South Vietnam, the Party did not downplay socialism but in fact boldly promoted it with the
new formulation “to be patriotic is to build socialism.” Party leaders sometimes spoke openly
that they wanted to build socialism in South Vietnam once the North won the civil war. The
1 Tuong Vu, ‘“From Cheering to Volunteering’: Vietnamese Communists and the Arrival of the
Cold War,” in Connecting Histories: The Cold War and Decolonization in Asia (1945-1962), ed.
Christopher Goscha and Christian Ostermann (Stanford University Press, 2009).
2 George Kahin, Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam (New York: Alfred
Knopf, 1986); Marilyn Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York: HarperPerennial,
1990); Mark Bradley, Imagining Vietnam & America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam
1919-1950 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); George Herring, America’s
Longest War, 4th edition (New York: Mc Graw-Hill, 2002).
3 W. R. Smyser, Independent Vietnamese: Vietnamese Communism between Russia and China,
1956-1969 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1980).
4 Martin Grossheim, “Revisionism in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam: New Evidence from
the East German Archives,” Cold War History 5, no. 4 (November 2005): 451-77; Sophie
Quinn-Judge, “The Ideological Debate in the DRV and the Significance of the Anti-Party Affair,
1967-68,” Cold War History 5, no. 4 (November 2005): 479-500.
65
evidence suggests that a modernizing socialist ideology rather than a mere desire for national
unification was driving the Vietnamese civil war from the north.
“Class struggle under the appearance of a nationalist struggle”
Existing literature rarely discusses the DRV’s negotiations at Geneva in tandem with its
domestic policy. Most accounts also begin in 1954 when the negotiations started.5 In this section,
I start in 1953 when the ground was laid for the decision to negotiate in 1954. A brief
examination of the decision to launch the land reform campaign made at the same time also
illuminates the mindset of DRV leaders in this obscure period.
Stalin published his short book titled Economic Problems of Socialism in 1952 at about
the same time with the 19th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. The year also marked the
third year of the Korean War in which a stalemate was reached between Allies’ and communist
forces. In China, the Chinese communist government had just completed its land reform
campaign in 1951 and was poised to take the rural revolution to the next step, i.e.
collectivization.6
These events revived the optimism of the DRV government after an unsuccessful military
campaign in 1951. In his speech to open the Fourth Plenum of the VWP’s Central Committee in
January 1953, Ho Chi Minh recounted these developments with pride and joy. After
summarizing the contents of Stalin’s book, Ho said that the book taught Vietnamese communists
“how to assess the future of the world correctly;” now they could be “assured of the ultimate
victory waiting them.”7 Ho then turned to China and enthusiastically presented an array of
statistics about the success of socialist building there. For example, the land reform in China was
5 Pierre Asselin, “Choosing Peace: Hanoi and the Geneva Agreement on Vietnam, 1954-1955,”
Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 2 (Spring 2007): 95-126.
6 Yang Dali, Calamity and Reform in China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).
66
said to have redistributed 700 million acres of land to farmers, raising production by 40 percent
in 1952. The percentage of poor farmers fell from 70 percent to around 10 to 20 percent.
Between 60 and 80 percent Chinese farmers were already organized either in mutual aid teams or
in collectives. Forty-nine million children of farmers were now enrolled in schools. If real, these
statistics were impressive.
In contrast to the great progress made by “the democratic camp” [phe dan chu], Ho
described the US which led the imperialist camp [phe de quoc] as being “on its last leg” when it
used biological weapons in Korea.8 This act led to “great outbursts” of world opinion against the
US. Because the US had to concentrate all its forces to prepare for war, the American economy
was in shambles and Americans became more impoverished. Ho called for continued vigilance
against imperialists: “We have to keep in mind that colonizing backward countries and
exploiting their people are one of the basic characteristics of monopoly capital. French and
American imperialists crave for our rich reserves of raw materials such as rice, rubber, coal and
tin. They also want to conquer and use our country as a military base to invade China.” Ho’s
perceptions of Vietnam’s chief enemy were derived largely from Lenin’s theory of monopoly
capital with the logic going backwards: Imperialism originated from the need of monopoly
capital for markets and raw materials; America was an imperialist; America must desire Vietnam
because Vietnam could be made into a market for American goods and a supplier of raw
materials for American companies. Strategically, the goal of the US was assumed to be invasion,
7 “Ve tinh hinh truoc mat va nhiem vu cai cach ruong dat” [On the situation and our task of land
reform], January 25, 1953. Dang Cong San Viet Nam (Vietnamese Communist Party), Van Kien
Dang Toan Tap v. 14 (Collection of Party Documents, hereafter VKDTT): 18.
8 Ibid., 14-9.
67
not containment, of China. An offensive imperialist goal clearly fitted better with Ho’s two-camp
worldview than a defensive one.
VWP Secretary General Truong Chinh who gave the main report at the same Plenum
quoted Stalin at length about the “vast chasm” [mot troi mot vuc] between the basic principles of
modern capitalism and those of socialism. Whereas the former was characterized by
“exploitation,” “impoverishment,” “enslavement,” “profiteering” and “war-making”, the latter
was said to be based on “the effort to satisfy to the greatest extent the material and spiritual needs
of the whole society by continuously improving production based on advanced technology.”9
Stalin offered just another exegesis of the two-camp doctrine that Chinh espoused.
But Truong Chinh was most impressed with Stalin’s “invention” [phat minh] of the
dialectic logic of the predicted economic crisis in the capitalist camp. According to Stalin, the
imperialist countries’ economic blockade against the Soviet Union and other “people’s
democracies” led to the latter forming a market among themselves in which they “collaborated
closely and equally and helped each other sincerely.”10 The unified world market that had existed
up to then was broken into two opposing economic blocs. The development of the socialist camp
had been so rapid that soon socialist countries would not need goods thus far supplied by the
capitalist camp. This, Stalin predicted, would shrink the markets in capitalist countries and throw
their economies into deep crises. These crises in turn would further weaken world capitalism;
capitalist countries would have to cling to their colonies at any cost; the conflict among
imperialists would deepen; and war would break out among them.11 Because of this coming war
within the imperialist camp, war might not occur between the two camps for the time being. As
9 “Bao cao cua Tong Bi Thu Truong Chinh” [Report by Secretary General Truong Chinh],
VKDTT 14: 32.
68
Truong Chinh paraphrased Stalin, the Second World War had shown the imperialists that
attacking the Soviet Union was a risky business. While fighting among imperialists would only
affect their relative status within the capitalist camp, war with the Soviet Union would endanger
capitalism itself.
While being vigilant against “imperialists’ plots,” Truong Chinh cited three reasons for
Vietnamese communists to support the Soviet policy of protecting peace. First, protecting peace
for the time being was necessary for the Soviet Union and the people’s democracies to develop
their forces while imperialist forces declined. Second, one should not encourage wars among
imperialists because these wars by themselves would not destroy imperialism. Imperialism
would be destroyed only when the people in imperialist countries overthrew their rulers, or when
socialist armies liberated them (as the Soviet Union did in World War II). Finally, the people in
imperialist countries wouldn’t need imperialist wars to make revolution. Many revolutions in
history had occurred in the absence of such wars. While believing Stalin that peace was possible,
Truong Chinh also quoted the Soviet leader’s point that peace was only temporary and war was
inevitable in the long run because imperialism still existed.
The significance of this Plenum cannot be exaggerated. First, the analysis of world
situation formed a critical background to the most important decision made at the Plenum, which
was to launch a Chinese-style land reform in 1953. The VWP had been vigorously debating this
policy for many years and the achievements of the socialist camp, especially in China and Korea,
clearly inspired them to take this long awaited radical step. The new situation, Truong Chinh
10 Ibid., 32-4.
11 For discussion of Stalin’s ideas in this book, see John Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold
War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).
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argued, made irrelevant the experience of the Chinese Communist Party during 1937-1945 when
this party pursued rent reduction but not land redistribution:
We do not want to apply [that] Chinese experience mechanically. At that time, the
Chinese Communist Party was collaborating with Chiang Kai-shek to fight the Japanese.
Chiang was the representative of feudal landowning and comprador capitalist classes. He
did not want land redistribution and he had a government and an army. Now we are not
collaborating with such a powerful partner. So we can make a [bolder] step forward.
Also, at that time China was under siege by feudal and imperialist forces. Today our
country has formed one single bloc with [lien mot khoi] the socialist and democratic
camp and is connected to a big people’s democracy which is China.12
Truong Chinh’s reasoning led him to a concise theoretical formulation that effectively
solved a longstanding debate among Vietnamese communists. As he said, “Nationalist
democratic revolutions are [essentially] peasant revolutions. Wars of national liberation are
essentially peasant wars… Leading peasants to fight feudalism and imperialism is class struggle
and nationalist struggle at the same time. It is class struggle within a nationalist struggle and
under the appearance of a nationalist struggle.”13 The debate up to then had pitted radicals like
Truong Chinh against those who feared that land reform would break up the national coalition in
the struggle for independence.14 Given the favorable international and domestic conditions,
Chinh had now succeeded in persuading his comrades to go along. Land reform from then on
was viewed as complementing, not contradicting, nationalist goals. Land redistribution assumed
12 Ibid., 52-3.
13 Ibid., 53-4.
14 Tuong Vu, Accommodation vs. Confrontation: State Formation and the Origins of Asia’s
Developmental States (Book manuscript, 2008): chapter 5.
70
an importance equal to national liberation. As we will see later, Le Duan and others would make
a similar move in the late 1950s to infuse class struggle objectives into the fight for South
Vietnam.
Second, with the help of Stalin’s book, the Plenum also accepted the theoretical
justifications for another key decision to be made later in the year, which was to negotiate with
the French at Geneva. Several factors have been put forward to explain the DRV’s acceptance of
the Geneva Agreements, including the priority given to reconstructing the North, the belief in the
legality and practicality of the accords, war fatigue, and the pressure from the Soviet Union and
China.15 While all these factors played some role, Party documents published in 1953 reviewed
here suggested that ideology was also a factor. In particular, their loyalty to the socialist cause
and desire to coordinate policy with the Soviet camp led Vietnamese communists at the time to
accept uncritically Stalin’s policy of preserving peace. There was no doubt raised at the Plenum
about Stalin’s policy. VWP leaders even made an effort to justify the policy in doctrinal terms
even though at points they were simply paraphrasing Stalin. While there was internal dissent
about Geneva, top VWP leaders felt proud that they were acting on behalf of the camp in the
interests of not just their revolution but also world peace.16
The undeclared propaganda war: “civilized” Soviets vs. “stinking” Americans
Ever since officially joining the socialist camp in 1950, the propaganda machine of the
DRV had been busy spreading the two-camp view among Vietnamese people. Propaganda took
15 Nguyen Vu Tung, “Coping with the United States: Hanoi’s search for an effective strategy,” in
The Vietnam War, ed. Peter Lowe (London: MacMillan Press, Ltd., 1998): 39.
16 “Thong tri cua Ban Bi Thu ve loi tuyen bo cua Ho Chu tich voi nha bao Thuy Dien” [Party
Secretariat’s Circulation on Chairman Ho’s talk with Swedish journalist], December 27, 1953.
VKDTT 14: 555.
71
many forms: publications of pamphlets17 and newspaper articles, organization of “Friendship
Month” [Thang huu nghi],18 and visits for government officials and intellectuals to China, North
Korea and the Soviet Union. On their return, travelers gave speaking tours around the country to
talk about their positive experiences.19
In this propaganda war to inculcate loyalty to socialism and incite hatred against America
and American imperialism, Ho Chi Minh played an active role as a satirist and commentator.
From 1951 to 1956, he authored nearly 100 short articles under a few pen names (Tran Luc, T.L.,
C.B., D.X., and Chien Si) published on the VWP’s newspapers Nhan Dan [The People] and Cuu
Quoc [National Salvation]. Most articles were about 500-word long and were published during
1953-1955, or about one every other week. They were written in simple style for the ordinary
readers but the language was sharp, concise and idiomatic. The topics ranged from the story of
an ordinary farmer in the Soviet Union to the evolution of the Soviet Communist Party over the
years. In these articles Ho often cited sources from foreign newspapers, presenting himself as a
well-read and objective observer who wanted to educate his people about those foreign lands
through hard facts (statistics) and interesting vignettes. The stories about the Soviet Union
17 See, for example, Ty Tuyen Truyen Van Nghe Yen Bai [Yen Bai Art Propaganda Department],
Chuc Tho Mao Chu Tich Sau Muoi Tuoi [Celebrate Chairman Mao’s 60th birthday] (Yen Bai,
1953).
18 See Dang Xa Hoi Viet Nam [Socialist Party], Thang Huu Nghi Viet-Trung-Xo voi nguoi tri
thuc Vietnam [Vietnamese-Chinese-Soviet Friendship Month with Vietnamese intellectuals]
(Viet Bac, 1954).
19 For example, see Hoang Quoc Viet, Chung toi da thay gi o nuoc Trung hoa vi dai [What we
have seen in Great China] (Hoi Huu Nghi Viet-Trung Lien Khu 5, 1953).
72
conveyed the happy life, advanced technology, economic success and progressive society there.
In a typical piece, the author wrote the following about a 147-year-old farmer named Aivazov:
“Communist Youth” is the name of a collective farm in Azerbaijan (the Soviet Union).
This farm was organized by Mr. Aivazov decades ago, when he was more than 120 years
old. He named the farm “Communist Youth” because he considered himself a young
man. Indeed, although he is now 147, he is still healthy and likes to do such things as
keeping sheep, raising chicken, planting, carpenter and blacksmith work…20
Although Vietnamese leaders fully supported Stalin’s policy of preserving peace as
mentioned above, they never underestimated the American threat. They concluded the Geneva
Agreements on the advice of their Soviet and Chinese comrades, but they were in many ways
preparing for war. During the Geneva talks, they intensified their propaganda to counter the
tendencies of “fearing and admiring America” among Vietnamese. About two-thirds of the
articles (67) written by Ho were about the US (the rest were about the Soviet Union). Most of the
pieces about the US were in satirical form, in which the author adopted a mocking tone to
criticize American society from its decadent culture to racist practices, from its crime-infested
society to its oppressive government. The author wanted to make Vietnamese not to admire, trust
or fear the US because it was morally, socially and politically corrupt. A typical piece discussed
the hypocrisy of American policy as follows:
America brings money and medicine to help people in other countries. At the same time,
how do Americans live? On July 5, the American president said, there are 32 million
Americans without doctors. Last year more than 1 million Americans died of intestinal
20 C.B., “147 tuoi ma van thanh nien” [Still a young man despite being 147 years old], Nhan Dan,
October 17, 1965. Reprinted in C.B. (Ho Chi Minh), Lien Xo Vi Dai [The Great Soviet Union]
(Hanoi: Nhan Dan, 1956): 26-7.
73
diseases. More than 600,000 Americans had mental disorder (insanity), more than 25
million had this or that disease. The great majority of Americans have no money to see
doctors or to buy medicine… So you see, the American people live such miserable lives
but American reactionaries are throwing money to help French colonizers, [Vietnamese]
puppets, Chiang Kai-shek, [and] Rhee Syngman to help spread American “civilization”
to the Asian people! How crazy. Even crazier are those who admire America, trust
America, fear America.21
Ho’s biting criticism was not limited to American policy or American government, but
was as often directed against American leaders as against American (capitalist) culture and
society. He viewed the struggle not only in political terms but also in cultural realms. As he
translated for readers materials from American newspapers in mid-August 1954,
‘Phoenix has 25,000 residents. Casinos, cocaine shops and brothels open freely.
Gangsters can be hired to kill people: the cost to kill a person is 12,000 francs [sic].22 A
merchant wanted to organize a self-defense group; his house was bombed to the ground
the next day. A local paper reported this case; the paper was raided and two
correspondents were critically beaten. A judge wanted to investigate the case; his house
was also bombed. Another judge declared he would wage war on crimes; he was
21 D.X., “Mo cha khong khoc, khoc mo moi” [They care about strangers but not their own people;
literally, they cried not at their father’s grave but at a pile of dirt], Cuu Quoc, October 12, 1951.
Reprinted in C.B. et al. (Ho Chi Minh), Noi Chuyen My… [Talking about America] (Hanoi:
Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1972): 31. (This is a collection of articles written by Ho Chi Minh under
various pennames such as C.B. and D.X.).
74
assassinated a few days later. Criminal gangs control the city. The government and the
police are their puppets…Phoenix is a small city; what about big ones? New York…’23
Ho then asked his readers: “Is [America] a civilized country? Or is it a disgusting and stinking
place [hoi tanh ron nguoi]? Ho’s technique was to pick an isolated story and present it as typical
of America:
Capitalist magazine Newsweek (January 30, 1956) reported, “Frist (?), 22, was executed
in Oklahoma for killing a policeman. When Frist was 18 months old, his uncle was
executed for murder. A year later, his mother (who had left his father for another man)
shot to death her new husband. She was absolved from this case because she was
“defending” herself from her husband who threatened to kill her. Later she killed her
third husband and spent 5 years in jail for this crime. Frist’s brother is serving 10 years
for theft. His uncle received a life sentence for repeated crimes. Frist’s girlfriend is
serving time in Virginia for stealing a car. Frist’s father is in a Texas prison because of
theft…What a model family of America!24
It is impossible to know for sure whether these articles represented Ho’s true worldview
or whether he was merely producing propaganda. It is likely that Ho believed in what he wrote
for three reasons. First, his view of American society of the 1950s was consistent with that in the
1920s when he was a young man, and it fitted with his broader two-camp worldview shared by
his comrades at the same time.25 Second, he was not writing these columns to make a career or a
22 Apparently Ho read the news story in the French media.
23 C.B. (Ho Chi Minh), “My ma: Phong khong thuan, tuc khong my,” [America: Coarse and ugly
customs], Nhan Dan, September 1, 1954.
24 C.B., “Mot ‘gia dinh guong mau’ cua My” [A model family of America], Nhan Dan, February
16, 1956.
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living. He had a full-time job as President of the DRV and of his party and he was at the top of
his career. In other words, he was writing out of mere enthusiasm and his awareness of the need
to educate his people about the dark side of America. Third, what Ho wrote was not fabricated
but contained only half truths. We may think of his articles as mere propaganda but he would
probably disagree. He may have dismissed as imperialist lies anything positive about US society
in Western media. The extremely negative images of the US, which conformed to Marxist-
Leninist teaching, may have been accepted as the whole truth.
While his true belief is hard to ascertain, there is no question Ho was a talented satirist
who liked to play with words and to make short verses. In Vietnamese, “America” is called
“My” (from Chinese “Mei guo”). “My” also means “beauty.” Ho pointed this out, warning
Vietnamese that the name of the country suggested beauty and goodness but its actions were just
the opposite.26 Another example is Ho’s transliteration of General Douglas McArthur’s name
into Vietnamese as Mat-Acte (“Cruel Face” in Vietnamese).27 As a cultural entrepreneur, Ho was
subtly and skillfully revising the popular image of the US in Vietnam. Due to the lack of
information we can only speculate about the impact of his writings. The intensity of the contents
and the frequency of their appearance suggested possible impact on their readers. At least the
25 See “English ‘colonization’” (1923), “Lynching, a little known aspect of American
civilization” (1924) and “The Ku-Klux-Klan” (1924), reprinted in Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works,
v. 1 (1922-1926) (Hanoi: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1960).
26 D.X., “My la xau” [America means ugliness], Cuu Quoc, November 3, 1951. Reprinted in C.B.
et al, Noi Chuyen My: 30.
27 C.B., “Dao duc cua My”[American morality], Nhan Dan, June 14, 1951. Reprinted in C.B. et
al., Noi Chuyen My: 97.
76
articles made the idea of fighting the most powerful but also most corrupt superpower not that
daunting and even justified.
Defending communism and building an “essentially people’s democracy” at home
Vietnamese leaders fully agreed with Stalin’s call to preserve peace. They followed
Soviet and Chinese “socialist brother-countries” in signing the Geneva Agreements in July 1954
despite some dissent within their ranks. But, as we have seen, they watched closely every US’
move. Even before signing the Agreements, they had noted American efforts to create a new
Southeast Asian military alliance and warned that,
Since the beginning of the resistance, our forces have become stronger and the enemy’s
weaker… Yet we should not look down on our enemies. Our victory [at Dien Bien Phu]
has wakened American imperialists. They are adjusting their plots and plans to prolong
the war, internationalize it, wreck the Agreements, kick the French out to take over
Indochina, turn Indochinese people into their slaves, and create more tension in the
world.28
The DRV’s strategy at the time was to exploit the conflict between the US and France in
the imperialist camp. By late 1954, after a series of US success in consolidating the anti-
communist bloc, they already sensed that this strategy would fail.29 This new development
created a besieged mentality. At the 8th Central Committee Plenum in March 1955, party leaders
reviewed the balance of forces between two camps and were concerned that Vietnam was the
weaker outpost of the socialist camp compared to the other three (East Germany, North Korea
28 Ho Chi Minh, “Bao cao tai Hoi nghi lan thu sau” [Report at the Sixth Central Committee
Plenum], July 15, 1954. VKDTT 15: 165.
77
and China).30 They were worried about possible US attacks on the Soviet Union, China and other
Southeast Asian countries.31 They predicted that the US and the Saigon government were likely
to delay or refuse to carry out elections as proposed in the Geneva Agreements.32
On this occasion, Ho Chi Minh and Truong Chinh appeared to differ in their assessment
of the world situation. First, Ho viewed the US and the Soviet Union as more or less equal in
force capabilities, but the latter was ultimately stronger because it represented a just cause.33
Speaking after Ho, Chinh noted that the Soviet Union was helping some “people’s democracies”
to build nuclear-fueled electricity plants. Compared to the US which was still trying to test
nuclear weapons, he argued that the Soviet Union was clearly superior in nuclear technology and
science.34 Second, Chinh chided the Party propaganda department for praising India and Burma
too much, “causing the people to be confused about the political stand and goals of those
[capitalist] countries.”35 In contrast, Ho counted India and Indonesia as forces for peace,
suggesting that those countries could be allies of the socialist camp.36 These differences
confirmed the well-known fact that Truong Chinh was among the most radical of the VWP.
29 This refers to the Manila conference (September 3, 1954), the Paris Agreement (October 23,
1954) and the US-Taiwan Relations Act (December 2, 1954).
30 “Ket luan cuoc thao luan o Hoi nghi Trung uong lan thu bay” [Conclusions to the discussion at
the 7th Plenum], March 3-12, 1955. VKDTT 16: 177.
31 “Tinh hinh hien tai va nhiem vu truoc mat” [Current situation and upcoming tasks], Truong
Chinh’s report at the 7th plenum (March 3-12, 1955). VKDTT 16: 97, 128.
32 Ibid. 184.
78
These differences aside, all VWP leaders largely ignored the bustling diplomacy by governments
of the emerging non-aligned bloc. The Asian conference to be held in India and the Asia-Africa
Conference to be held later in Bandung, Indonesia were mentioned only once in one sentence.37
These activities clearly did not fit Vietnamese leaders’ two-camp worldview.
In response to the rising intensity of the Cold War, Vietnamese communists still
considered the need to preserve peace as being more urgent than Vietnam’s unification even
though they paid greater attention to the latter now.38 Diplomatically, the VWP wanted to further
consolidate Vietnam’s “solidarity” with the Soviet Union, China and other people’s democracies.
Ideologically, the Party wanted to educate the masses more about proletarian internationalism.39
This call for mass indoctrination indicates a consistent pattern of behavior that will be seen again
and again. This pattern was that, whenever life became more difficult, the Party would resort to
ever more rigorous indoctrination of the masses.40 The reason was that Party leaders never
33 “Loi khai mac cua Ho chu tich” [Chairman Ho’s opening remarks], March 3, 1954. VKDTT
16: 92.
34 “Tinh hinh hien tai va nhiem vu truoc mat,” VKDTT 16: 100.
35 Ibid., 166.
36 “Loi be mac cua Ho chu tich” [Closing speech of Chairman Ho], March 12, 1955. VKDTT 16:
222.
37 “Tinh hinh hien tai va nhiem vu truoc mat,” VKDTT 16: 100. Chinh mentioned these events in
his speech; Ho did not.
79
blamed their doctrine for what went wrong. Marx and Lenin were always right but cadres
(including the top leaders themselves) did not understand these masters correctly, which was
why more ideological study and training were required.
By late 1955, it became clear to VWP leaders that things were not right. Ngo Dinh Diem
declared that he would not honor the Geneva Agreements because his government did not sign
them, and because free elections as stipulated in the Agreements would not be possible in North
Vietnam under the communist dictatorship. Ngo also organized a poll to oust Emperor Bao Dai
and to make himself President of a new Republic of Vietnam. He named communism as one of
the three enemies of his regime, together with feudalism and colonialism.41 In the wake of Ngo’s
attack on communism, party leaders decided that not to defend the doctrine was a serious right-
leaning mistake.42 They launched a propaganda campaign designed to show Vietnamese more
clearly the superiority of the socialist camp over its imperialist enemy. Party members were
mobilized to fight against the “enemy camp’s slanders and lies about our regime and the regimes
38 Ibid., 178. See also Hoang Quoc Viet, “Dau tranh de thong nhat nuoc nha tren co so doc lap va
dan chu, bang phuong phap hoa binh” [Struggle to unify the country based on independence and
(socialist) democracy by peaceful means], Hoc Tap (December 1955): 41-3.
39 “Tinh hinh hien tai va nhiem vu truoc mat,” VKDTT 16: 159.
40 To be sure, there were times when indoctrination campaigns were used to intimidate dissidents
within the Party. See Grossheim, “Revisionism in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.”
80
in our socialist brother-countries.”43 The goal was to make “the people, especially the working
people, to enthusiastically support communism and actively defend communists.”
This unfavorable international situation generated internal debate among VWP leaders
about the ongoing violent land reform campaign.44 Some argued that the rural class struggle in
the North could alienate the upper classes in South Vietnam, making it more difficult to unify the
country. Hoang Quoc Viet, a Politburo member in charge of united front work, asserted that any
successful united front must be based on the alliance of workers and peasants and must meet
their “basic demands.” This essentially meant class struggle should go on. In his report at the 8th
Central Committee Plenum in August 1955, Truong Chinh pushed for sustaining the land reform
but nevertheless argued that calling for rapid socialist industrialization in the current
environment was a “left-leaning mistake.”45 He mentioned the word “socialism” only twice in his
59-page report.
The Plenum resolution reflected some uncertainty but the radical view adopted since
1953 still held sway. On the one hand, the Party decided that the North was to take “gradual but
firm steps toward socialism,” and that the political regime in the North must essentially be a
“people’s democracy.” On the other hand, the regime in appearance was allowed to retain
certain characteristics of “old-style democracy,” and it would be acceptable if the speed to
41 “Bai phong, da thuc, diet cong” (Oppose feudalism, fight colonialism and destroy
communism).
42 “Thong tri cua Ban Bi Thu so 48-TT/TW” [Party Secretariat’s Circulation], July 21, 1955.
VKDTT 16: 459.
43 Ibid., 460-1.
44 Hoang Quoc Viet, “Dau tranh de thong nhat nuoc nha”: 40.
45 “Bao cao cua dong chi Truong Chinh” [Comrade Truong Chinh’s report]. VKDTT 16: 524.
81
socialism in North Vietnam would be slower than that in other people’s democracies.46 This
confusing formulation essentially meant that class struggle would continue but must be
conducted in a way that would not appear harsh from outside. There were thus different views
among Party leadership about the speed of the socialist revolution but not about socialism itself.
No Party leaders expressed any reservations about the need to publicly and proudly defending
communism.
“No other way out but revolution”
Khrushchev’s denunciations of Stalin and his policy of peaceful coexistence in early
1956 shook the VWP. Given the VWP’s worship of Stalin and the failure of the Geneva
Agreements, Khrushchev’s policy touched on sensitive nerves in Hanoi. In response, Vietnamese
leaders accepted Khrushchev’s overall argument but denied its full utility in their case. First, they
argued that VWP had been practicing collective leadership and personality cult was not a big
problem in their party.47 VWP Politburo pledged to strengthen collective leadership, but also
warned about committing right-leaning mistakes such as “extreme democracy” [dan chu cuc
doan] and the wholesale refutation of the role of individual leaders in revolution.48 It was stressed
that Ho Chi Minh’s role must still be elevated.
Second, VWP Politburo took exceptions to Khrushchev’s new calls for peaceful
coexistence on two grounds. Clearly with South Vietnam in mind, VWP leaders asserted that,
although it was possible to prevent war, imperialism by its economic nature was war-oriented.49
46 “Nghi quyet Hoi nghi Trung uong lan thu 8” [Resolution of the 8th Central Committee
Plenum], August 1955. VKDTT 16: 577.
47 “Bao cao cua Bo Chinh Tri” [Politburo’s Report at the 9th Central Committee Plenum], April
19-24, 1956. VKDTT 17: 158-62.
48 Ibid., 165-6.
82
Until the day when imperialism was totally destroyed, the threat of war remained and “people of
the world” [nhan dan the gioi] must always be on guard. Also, while it was possible for some
countries to advance to socialism by peaceful means as Khrushchev argued, in cases where the
capitalist class still controlled the coercive apparatus and were determined to suppress revolution
with force, the proletarian class must be prepared to take up arms if they were to win. Although
the VWP pledged to continue its peaceful unification policy toward the South, they publicly
distanced themselves from Khrushchev’s stand.
VWP leaders formulated a clearer assessment of their Southern policy by the end of 1956
as they convened the 10th Central Committee Plenum. They noted that the international
environment had become more favorable to the socialist camp.50 The Soviet Union was at the
forefront of the world movement to curb the arms race. Soviet-Yugoslavian talks improved unity
in the socialist camp while US-led military alliances in Europe, Asia and the Middle East
encountered internal friction. Domestically, the VWP finally concluded that the land reform and
“organizational rectification” campaigns in the North had committed serious errors. This
conclusion would lead to the resignation of Secretary General Truong Chinh at the end of the
Plenum.
In South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem had categorically rejected the Geneva Agreements.
July, the month that national elections were supposed to take place to unify the country, passed
without such events. This confronted VWP leaders with the problem of how to explain this
failure to their followers. In this sense Le Duan’s 42-page analysis from the South came as a
49 “Nghi quyet cua Hoi nghi Ban chap hanh Trung Uong lan thu chin mo rong” [Resolution of the
expanded 9th Central Committee Plenum]. VKDTT 17: 169.
50 “De cuong bao cao cua Bo Chinh tri tai Hoi nghi Trung uong lan thu 10” [Draft report of the
Politburo at the 10th Plenum], August 25-October 5, 1956. VKDTT 17: 418-9.
83
timely blessing (although conventional scholarship views this only as a criticism of central
leadership). In this document, Duan as the third-ranking party leader in charge of the Party office
in the South called for a new policy of revolutionary struggle to defeat the Ngo Dinh Diem
regime.51 Duan presented the harshest and most doctrinal analysis of the Saigon regime to date,
calling it “a neo-colonialist regime under the control of an aggressive imperialist—the US,” and
“a cruel and clever fascist dictatorship.”52 He eloquently asserted that revolution was the only
way out in the South, pushing central policy toward, if not a more radical, then a sharply clarified
position.53
Either out of respect for the general policy of the socialist camp or out of strategic
analysis of military balance in the South, Le Duan accepted that the revolution could proceed for
the time being as a “political struggle” but not yet an “armed struggle.” At the same time, he
stressed that political struggle should be based on mass forces in opposition to the Saigon
government, not on mere legal or constitutional demands. Here Duan implicitly dismissed as
misguided the central policy to demand the implementation of Geneva Agreements. To Duan,
the goal of the struggle from then on must be “revolutionary,” i.e. to eventually overthrow the
Saigon government and to implement communism.54 Duan offered a lengthy analysis of the
history of the Vietnamese revolution to conclude that the revolution must give equal priority to
51 Le Duan, “Duong loi cach mang mien Nam” [Our revolutionary line in the South], August
1956. VKDTT 17: 783-825.
52 Ibid., 787-8.
53 At the 10th Plenum which met without Duan who was still in the South, the Politburo claimed
that the idea of revolution in the South was not new to them although they admitted to failure in
clarifying the idea, in researching the Southern situation and in pursuing a corresponding policy.
“De cuong bao cao cua Bo Chinh tri tai Hoi nghi Trung uong lan thu 10,” VKDTT 17: 423.
84
both class struggle and national struggle to ensure its success.55 We have seen that this was
exactly what Truong Chinh had argued since 1953.
As before, the 10th Plenum did not blame land reform mistakes on the doctrine. Instead,
the leaders humbly blamed themselves for failing to apply Marxist-Leninist theories correctly.56
At the same time, Party leaders were concerned about many new, post-land reform problems in
the countryside, including “right-leaning” errors and the revival of capitalism among upper-
middle peasants.57 In response to the new situation, Party leaders called for more rigorous study
of the doctrine (for the leaders) and for more systematic indoctrination (for the rank and file).58
The Party and the people must study harder so that they could combine patriotism and
proletarian internationalism harmoniously in their belief system. The idea that Vietnam could be
a neutral country between the two camps must be denounced. People must believe in the socialist
camp led by the Soviet Union and China, and must work hard to strengthen Vietnam’s solidarity
with the socialist brother-countries, friendship with neighboring nations, and support for the
peace and democratic movement.59 Party leaders vowed that, “regardless of circumstances,”
North Vietnam must be strengthened to make “gradual steps toward socialism.”
54 “Duong loi cach mang mien Nam,” VKDTT 17: 805-6. The implementation of communism
was referred to indirectly as Le Duan vowed that victory would eventually come for the causes
of unification, independence and communism.
55 Ibid., 806-22.
56 “De cuong bao cao cua Bo Chinh tri tai Hoi nghi Trung uong lan thu 10,” VKDTT 17: 449.
57 Ibid., 480-2.
58 Ibid., 486-98.
59 Ibid., 496.
85
Existing analyses discuss socialist construction in the North and unification of the
country as conflicting goals in the thinking of VWP leaders. If this had indeed been the case, it
was no longer true by 1956 in the minds of these men. Both regions were assigned tasks that
together would take Vietnam on the path to socialism. This formulation created ideological
consistency but it also required clarifying that the upcoming war in the South was not just a war
for national liberation but also as a step on the long road to socialism. Le Duan’s analysis of the
Southern situation in clear doctrinal terms as a neo-colony under imperialist rule was a crucial
step to prepare for new conceptualizations of the war to be developed over the next two years.
Defending the “universal truths” of Marxism-Leninism abroad
Internal conflict within the socialist bloc during 1957-1960 tested Vietnamese
communists’ commitment to their two-camp doctrine. Khrushchev’s active pursuit of peaceful
coexistence was a wedge in Sino-Soviet relations. But China and the Soviet Union had numerous
other disputes, including Soviet invasion of Hungary, Soviet aid to China, Soviet normalization
with Yugoslavia, China’s border war with India, and the Albanian challenge to the Soviet Union.
How did VWP leaders think about the new developments? At the 13th Plenum of the
VWP in December 1957, First Secretary-designated Le Duan lambasted “modern revisionism”
although he did not mention Tito and Khrushchev. Duan charged that this doctrine promoted
national communism, criticized Stalin, denied the “universal truths” [chan ly pho bien] offered
by Marxism-Leninism, slighted the value of Soviet revolutionary experience, questioned the
necessity of proletarian dictatorship, failed to see the enemy’s plots, doubted the motives of
Soviet aid, rejected Soviet leadership, and advocated incorrect views about peaceful
coexistence.60
86
The two-camp worldview of Vietnamese leaders assumed two unified camps with
fundamentally opposed class interests seeking to destroy each other. The existence of two camps
was believed to be an “objective truth and the result of a historical process.”61 The nature of the
two camps was fundamentally different like paradise versus hell. The socialist camp came into
being with the birth of the Soviet Union in 1917 and expanded with the emergence of many
“people’s democracies” after World War II. The formation of many “nationalist countries” such
as India and Indonesia after World War II did not change the two-camp reality because these
countries were essentially capitalist. Within the socialist camp, the national interests in each
“brother-country” were identical to those of the entire camp because they all were based on the
interests of workers and the working people. There should not be conflict within the socialist
camp. Soviet leadership of the camp was also the result of a historical process: the Soviet Union
was the first socialist country whose experience was relevant to all others; Soviet military forces
were most powerful and provided the security for the whole bloc; and the Soviet Union had
proven to be a great leader since its birth.
But why did conflict break out among socialist countries? Vietnamese leaders chose to
blame “imperialist forces” and remnants of the capitalist class in the new people’s democracies
for stirring up the troubles.62 They imagined a dialectic process as follows. As the socialist camp
60 Le Duan, “Thong nhat tu tuong, doan ket toan Dang day manh hoan thanh nhiem vu cong tac
truoc mat” [Unite our thoughts and all Party’s actions to fulfill our upcoming responsibilities],
report at the 13th Plenum, December 1957. VKDTT 18: 762-3. Also, Le Duan, “Nhung nhiem vu
lich su cua phong trao Cong san quoc te” [The historical responsibilities of the international
communist movement], Hoc Tap (December 1957).
61 Minh Nghia, “Tang cuong doan ket va hop tac trong phe Xa hoi chu nghia” [Increase solidarity
and collaboration in the socialist camp], Hoc Tap (March 1957): 26-32.
87
grew, comprador capitalists and imperialist powers became increasingly desperate and sought
every means to destroy socialist regimes and to reinstate their rule. These enemy forces
organized uprisings and tried to divide the socialist camp. They exploited ancient national
sentiments generated in past conflicts caused by exploiting classes. They slandered the “generous
and sincere assistance of the Soviet Union and distort Soviet relationships with the people’s
democracies.”63
The DRV’s diplomatic maneuvers in response to the Sino-Soviet disputes have been well
covered in other accounts.64 Here I wish to focus on the ideological dimension only. From this
perspective, several questions emerge about the VWP’s behavior in this difficult period. First,
why were they so obsessed with the unity of the camp and willing to act as mediator despite the
risks of being entangled in the disputes between their bigger brothers?65 In the Soviet-Albanian
dispute, why did they defend Albany that could not offer them aid, and defied the Soviet Union
that could? Smyser66 speculates that the VWP’s obsession with the unity of the camp stemmed
62 Le Duan, “Nhung nhiem vu lich su cua phong trao Cong san quoc te”: 19.
63 Minh Nghia, “Tang cuong doan ket va hop tac trong phe Xa hoi chu nghia”: 32.
88
from their traditional mentality, which considered the ideal socio-political order to be a
harmonious organized community. But we have seen how zealous many top Vietnamese
communist leaders were about class struggle; their alleged preference for harmony simply
contradicts the evidence here. Ideological loyalty to world socialism offers a much better
explanation. Unity would give the greatest strength to the bloc and to world revolutionary
movement in order to defeat the ever clever and cruel imperialists.
Second, VWP leaders are known to be very concerned about preserving their
independence from foreign countries but they supported Soviet military intervention into
Hungary in 1956.67 Echoing the Kadar government’s line,68 Le Duan criticized those who did not
see imperialist plots and who believed in the theory that the uprising in Hungary was caused by
64 Smyser, Independent Vietnamese; Ilya Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War
(Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1996); Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina
Conflict, 1954-1963 (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center, 2003); Zhai Qiang, China &
the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Ang
Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists’ Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict,
1956-1962 (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1997); Ang Cheng Guan, “The Vietnam War, 1962-64:
The Vietnamese Communist Perspective,” Journal of Contemporary History 35, no. 4 (October
2000): 601-18.
65 Smyser, Independent Vietnamese: 44.
66 Smyser, Independent Vietnamese: 12.
67 Ibid.
68 Mark Pittaway, “The Education of Dissent: The Reception of the Voice of Free Hungary,
1951-1956,” in Across the Blocs: Cold War Cultural and Social History, ed. Rana Mitter and
Patrick Major (London: Frank Cass, 2004).
89
resentment toward socialism and by its leaders’ mistakes: “Even if we didn’t make any mistakes,
they would keep plotting against us,” for that was imperialist nature. The Hungarian leadership
may have committed some mistakes, but this would at most have caused some disorder but not
an uprising. While Le Duan was not paranoid,69 he could not have failed to see that the principle
of national independence was at stake here. Ironically, the VWP welcomed Soviet invasion of
Hungary, first, for the camp’s unity, and second, because they considered the Hungarian
communist party had committed heresy and thus forfeited their right to independence.70
Ideological loyalty was again the dominant factor in this decision.
Third, why did VWP leaders defend Stalin who was dead and challenge Khrushchev who
was the incumbent leader and who could offer them aid for their struggle in the South?71 Because
Ho’s personal relationship with Stalin was poor, there could only be two other possible reasons.
First, Vietnamese leaders could be afraid of the ramifications of Khruschev’s criticisms of Stalin
for the unity of their own party. We still know little about internal politics of the VWP Politburo,
but they appeared to cope with the issue of personality cult very well in their 9th Plenum in
March 1956. The report to the Plenum was written by the entire Politburo, indicating broad
unanimity. The Politburo even saw Khrushchev’s report as giving an opportunity for them to
correct their mistakes, if any.72 Second, as VWP leaders claimed, it was due to their belief that
69 For US clandestine political warfare in Eastern Europe, including the impact of the Radio Free
Europe on the Hungarian event, see Kenneth Osgood, “Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional
Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 4, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 85-107.
70 Smyser, Independent Vietnamese,123.
71 Le Duan, “Thong nhat tu tuong, doan ket toan Dang day manh hoan thanh nhiem vu cong tac
truoc mat.” VKDTT 18: 769-71.
72 Smyser, Independent Vietnamese: 11.
90
“Stalin was a loyal follower of great Marxism and Leninism; his entire revolutionary career was
great; his achievements were fundamental while his mistakes were marginal; his written work
will remain in the treasures of Marxism-Leninism.”73 We do not have to trust VWP leaders’
claim; yet this is a clear case where their actions contradicted their practical interests and could
be explained only by ideological loyalty.
“To be patriotic is to build socialism”
We have seen that Vietnamese communists found innovative discursive formulations to
justify class struggle even at the height of the nationalist struggle. They translated Marxist-
Leninist arguments into concise Vietnamese formulations such as “class struggle within a
nationalist struggle.” As they launched an armed struggle in the south, they did not relax but in
fact intensified their socialist goals. By 1958 they no longer talked simply about “strengthening
the North” but planned for “socialist industrialization.” In this section, I trace the process in
which new definitions of “patriotism” were invented to justify the radicalization of the struggle
in both North and South.
Prior to 1957, VWP leaders talked of “patriotism” [chu nghia yeu nuoc] and proletarian
internationalism [tinh than quoc te vo san] as two separate things.74 Patriotism was defined as
loving the fatherland. Proletarian internationalism meant support for the socialist camp and for
the international working class movement. VWP leaders frequently stressed the need to educate
their cadres and the masses about these two isms. By 1957, as they debated the approaches to
economic development in the North and national unification, a new formulation that tied these
two concepts together gradually emerged.
73 Ibid., 669-70.
74 An example is To Huu’s report on thought work [cong tac tu tuong] at the 10th Plenum in
August 1956. VKDTT 17, 495-7.
91
In an article on the Party theoretical journal Hoc Tap, Hoang Xuan Nhi, a professor of the
Party school, attempted to elaborate on the standard Marxist-Leninist proposition that “the
national problem” was reducible to class struggle.75 He argued that patriotism was a historical
phenomenon that had different class contents in each different historical period. In feudal times,
patriotism was understood as loyalty to the king. In the struggle against feudal classes, capitalists
claimed to represent nations but their nationalism was ultimately made to serve their class
interests, not those of the working people. Nhi claimed that among all classes, workers loved
their country the most. Through their [manual] labor, generations of workers produced material
goods and created cultures, languages, writing systems and other national traditions. While they
loved their country, their patriotic senses were spontaneous and easily manipulated. As Nhi
argued, only when led by a vanguard party armed with Marxism-Leninism could they develop
“genuine patriotism” [chu nghia yeu nuoc chan chinh]. Genuine patriotism combined passionate
love for one’s country with one’s clear political consciousness [nhan thuc chinh tri] about the
goals of class struggle. Because the VWP represented the interests of the working class in North
Vietnam, patriotism also meant support for the Party and its rule in all aspects of society. While
Nhi’s theoretical discussion was so blatantly directed to serve the Party’s need to mobilize
popular support for its socialist agenda, he showed an early effort of Party theorists to find new
ideological expressions for the old concept of patriotism.
Throughout 1957, all Party members were required to study Marxism-Leninism.76 This
was the first systematic organization of mass study sessions, which aimed to strengthen
75 Hoang Xuan Nhi, “Boi duong chu nghia yeu nuoc, tang cuong chu nghia quoc te vo san trong
nhan dan ta [Inculcating patriotism and strengthening proletarian internationalism in our people],
Hoc Tap (January 1957): 34-45.
92
members’ theoretical understanding, loyalty to the causes of the proletariat, and belief in the
Party and the socialist camp. In the previous year, a series of international and domestic events
seriously eroded popular support for the VWP.77 As Party theorists sought to quell heretical ideas
within their ranks, they had to clarify their concepts and sharpened their arguments. According to
a report of the campaign, among the topics studied was the approach to unification.78 A major
target of criticism was the notion that Vietnam could be unified faster had it taken the neutral
path like many Asian and African countries. This notion obviously contradicted the two-camp
worldview and was thus criticized as “completely mistaken.” First, it was argued that
revolutionary victory could only result from a long and difficult class struggle but would never
be granted by imperialists. Second, “independence and unification were not abstract and empty
concepts but embodied class contents. Independence and unification meant the liberation of the
working people, and for this reason, could only be brought by the Party of the proletariat.” Third,
the neutral countries were formed thanks to the growth of the socialist camp and the mass
movements in those countries, but not due to a random process. Again, here was another
clarification of what patriotism should mean in the new era—“the era when socialism was
winning on the global scale.”
It was Pham Van Dong, the Premier and a Politburo member, who produced a succinct
formulation that would acquire the status of a new doctrine of patriotism. The formulation was
“to be patriotic is to build socialism.”79 Dong came to this formulation after a lengthy but
eloquent recount of the world revolutionary movement from its success in Russia in 1917 to its
current status in Vietnam in 1958.80 He boldly stated that “our era is the era when patriotism
meets socialism.” He imagined Russia’s October Revolution to be “the result of two great
struggles: one by Russian workers and peasants led by the Bolshevik party, and the other by the
93
nations under Czarist rule.” The encounter of patriotism and socialism was a key factor
determining the success of that revolution. As he described passionately,
The Soviet Union, the product of the October Revolution, is the first model image of a
state comprising many nations who live together in an equal and friendly relationship and
who together build socialism. [In this society] all nations enjoy the conditions required to
develop their capacity to build their happy lives while contributing to the prosperity of
the entire Soviet Union. “The prison of all nations” has been replaced by “the Fatherland
of 100 brother-nations.”81
After reviewing the history of the Vietnamese revolution, he made a similar claim that it
was also “the history of the marvelous, inevitable and productive encounter between patriotism
and socialism.” It was the meeting of patriotic forces with the leadership of a working class’s
Party. But to Dong this meeting only reached its “highest level” in North Vietnam since 1954. In
76 High-ranking cadres studied “Marxist-Leninist theories” whereas lower ranking cadres studied
basic concepts in historical materialism. See Nguyen Hoi, “Ket qua cua dot hoc tap duy vat lich
su vua qua” [Results of the study sessions in historical materialism]. Hoc Tap (March 1958): 53-
62.
77 These events included mistakes in the land reform, rural unrest, the surge of intellectual
dissent, Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin, and Hungarian and Polish revolts.
78 Ibid., 59.
79 A later variant of this formulation is, “to love your country means to love socialism” [yeu nuoc
la yeu chu nghia xa hoi].
80 Pham Van Dong, “Chu nghia yeu nuoc va chu nghia xa hoi” [Patriotism and Socialism], Hoc
Tap (August 1958): 6-17.
81 Ibid., 9.
94
this current context, Dong asserted that the encounter was the agreement between patriotism and
socialism over the goal of the revolution: “to be patriotic is to build socialism; to build socialism
is to be patriotic.”82 In South Vietnam, the “people’s struggle …must be accompanied by their
enthusiastic and determined support for the socialist North… The patriotic movement in the
South and the construction of socialism in the North [joined to form] an image of that encounter
between patriotism and socialism in the revolutionary process.” This encounter, Dong concluded,
would “lead to unification and to the favorable development of socialism in all of Vietnam. In
our contemporary world, this path was inevitable; nothing could prevent it from taking place”
(italics added).
The significance of this formulation is that for the first time Vietnamese communists
raised “socialism” in the public discourse to the level of “patriotism.”83 “Patriotism” was a much
older and more popular concept than “socialism.” No Vietnamese had ever questioned patriotism
but socialism had always been controversial.84 As communist leaders contemplated the
revolutionary paths in the North and the South, they found a formulation that placed the two
apparently separate paths in each region in one single phrase that expressed the dialectic
relationship between them: to struggle in the South meant to build socialism in the North and
vice versa. The war in the South was no longer viewed as being limited to unification; it was tied
to socialist construction in the North and in all of Vietnam eventually. To win the war the Party
must aggressively and publicly promote socialism rather than restrain or hide it under a
nationalist appearance as in 1953. The new formulation paved the way for the subsequent
82 Ibid., 14.
83 In their internal discourse, Vietnamese communists talked far more about socialism than about
patriotism.
84 Vu, Accommodation vs. Confrontation: chapter 8.
95
revision of the Party Constitution in which the class base of the Party was changed from “the
working class and the working people” to “the working class” only. This change was followed
by a newly inserted phrase pledging “to organize the teaching of Marxist-Leninist principles to
Party members and to the people in a broad and systematic way…”85 The new formulation of
patriotism and socialism would later be included in the new national Constitution approved in
1960.86
Conclusion
This paper examines how Vietnamese communists’ ideological beliefs evolved during
1953-1960 as they struggled with international and domestic challenges. I hope to show that they
never wavered in their communist ideology. While they accepted Stalin’s call to preserve peace,
they rejected Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence with the imperialist camp. An
examination of their propaganda indicated that war continued in this sphere, and a war of words
with the “stinking” Americans for the hearts and minds of Vietnamese began long before the US
made serious commitments to the Saigon regime. They never allowed their enemies to freely
attack communism as a doctrine. They never blamed Marxist-Leninist theory for problems that
occurred during policy implementation. The consistent pattern of their responses was to blame
themselves and to organize ever more rigorous and systematic study and indoctrination of
Marxism-Leninism.
85 Le Duc Tho, “Viec sua doi Dieu le Dang,” [Revising the Party Constitution], Hoc Tap (May
1960): 23.
86 The Party leadership discussed and decided to proclaim in the new national Constitution that
the North would take the path of socialism. See “De cuong bao cao ve Hien phap sua doi” [Draft
report about the revised Constitution]. VKDTT 21: 834-7.
96
When the Soviet bloc split, Vietnamese communists worked hard to preserve its unity
despite the risks of being entangled in one side of the dispute. Their international behavior often
did not correspond to their narrow interests in “liberating” South Vietnam; rather, it was
motivated by larger ideological principles that continued to underlie their two-camp worldview.
They defended communist orthodoxy when it was criticized in its very homeland, for no obvious
practical benefits. They defended a dead communist dictator when he was abandoned by his very
successors, at the risk of antagonizing the incumbents. They sided with a small power against the
leader of the bloc in the interests of bloc unity. At the same time, they supported a superpower’s
invasion of its small ally when this ally committed heresy. Their ideological loyalty paid off
handsomely as far as their strategic goals were concerned: if the Soviet Union and China in 1954
discouraged them from continuing to fight imperialists, by late 1964 they were competing to
supply North Vietnam with men and weapons!
The VWP leadership was not a monolithic group being of one mind on all ideological
matters. Their worldview and strategic understanding of the environment were not fixed and
continued to be debated and clarified during the period examined here. Yet they generally
achieved consensus; at the crucial points of 1953 and 1957,87 the radicals among them won the
internal debates, which suggested that the majority of VWP leaders leaned to the far left when it
came to doctrinal questions. During this period, class struggle was never downplayed vis-à-vis
nationalist goals although occasional efforts were made to create a moderate appearance to
outsiders. Party leaders tirelessly sought doctrinal justifications for every policy move and
worked hard to construct innovative ideological formulations when confronted with political
challenges. Socialism was promoted, not delayed or denied, after 1956, precisely at the time
87 These points were also the low points in terms of their military situation, although I do not
suggest a necessary correlation.
97
when a new struggle for national unification was decided. By 1959, the Party was no longer
reticent about its ultimate goal of building socialism in the whole country, even though they did
not expect victory in the South in the near future. In the theoretical formulations that these men
finally achieved, patriotism was made to serve socialism, not vice versa.
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