rational actor, historic analogie and groupthink iraq 1990

8/7/2019 rational actor, historic analogie and groupthink Iraq 1990

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POLS 425 US Foreign PolicyProfessor Lim

explaining foreign policy

us decision-making & the persian gulf war


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a brief video introduction


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explaining foreign policyus decision-making & the persian gulf war

introduction: questionsWhy did Germany invade the Soviet Union in World War II?

Why did Pakistan support the U.S.-led war on terrorism

following the devastating September 11, 2001 terrorist

attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon?

How did the United States make the decision to

imposed tariffs on imported steel in 2002?How did the United States make the decision thattook it to war in the Persian Gulf in 1991, and why

did it choose war? (p. 1)


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introduction: questions

How does the author address such questions in

general and the question about the US

decision to choose war against Iraqin 1991 more specically?

discuss


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introduction: more questions how would you describe the authors basic approach to the

study of foreign policy? How does his approach relate to

what weve studied in class? what are the authors central arguments?


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introduction: central argumentsRAM: explains many things, but not everything about the

decision to go to warindividuals matter: focus on president bush

the interplay of the domestic and international: the best

explanation requires an examination of how domestic

and international forces comes together to produce

particular decisions and outcomes


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introduction: central argumentsRAM: explains many things, but not everything about the

decision to go to war illuminates the broader context of the crisis and of US-Iraq strategic

interaction, but only partly informs us about how decisions were made non-rational behavior was prominent

cognitive and group-centered factors must be considered


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introduction: central argumentsindividuals matter: focus on president bush war

Bush played a key role: his decisions were affected by cognitivefactors (analogical reasoning, cognitive dissonance)

Bush played key leadership role in shaping and decreasingchallenges to group consensus

Bush had personal attributes and good luck; must considerSaddams attitudes and perceptions, too


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introduction: central argumentsthe interplay of the domestic and international:

both an outside-in and inside-out approach are too limited:systemic pressures and incentives can shape the broad contours of

government behavior, but they are too broad to explain specicactions, or to explain a range of behaviors that appear irrational or are

motivated by non-national interests like individual, group, or

institutional goals


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the united states, iraq, and the crisiswhat were the key points from this chapter? consider the

following terms and events twin pillar strategy

Reagan doctrine iran-iraq war and the aftermath of the war

saddams meeting with april glaspie invasion of kuwait


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the united states, iraq, and the crisisalternative pasts and futures?

was the U.S.-led attack on Iraq a natural, logicalextension of Iraqs invasion of Kuwait and

subsequent developments? what other trajectories were possible?


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the united states, iraq, and the crisisalternative pasts and futures?

it is quite possible to fathom other trajectories in the historical

process. Saddam could have been offered a clandestine or public

carrot to withdraw from Kuwait, or U.N. economic sanctions against

Iraq could have been put in place much longer before moving to war

. Or the United States could have practiced punitive containment orsporadic bombing campaigns short of war. Saddam, for his part,

could have withdrawn partly from Kuwait, thus undermining U.S.-led

efforts to use force against him.why is the consideration of alternatives important?


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the rational actor model (RAM) the author tells us that the RAM is a faceless model that

black boxes what occurs inside states: what does

he mean and why are these observations signicant? what are the two essential components ofthe RAM model?


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the rational actor model (RAM)two essential components

decision-theoretic componentgame-theoretic component

decision-theoretic component

refers to how one actor selects

among various alternatives be

weighing the costs and benets

and by trying to choose the

alternative that maximizes utilitygame-theoretic component

assumes the same logic, but with

the added presumption that the

best alternative depends on what

other actors do: strategic

interaction


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the rational actor model (RAM)Thinkers who subscribe knowingly or unknowingly to the RAMs

assumptions will try to explain government behavior by asking

these questions: What were the objective facts of the situation?

What perceived national interests did behavior serve? How did the actor seek to maximize benets over costs compared

to other alternative approaches? What was the nature and effect ofstrategic interaction?

lets consider some of these questions


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the rational actor model (RAM)keypoints

the oil factor (and saudi arabia) fashioning a new era (the post-cold war period)

slow escalation: the arab formula

global diplomatic and economic pressure

drawing a line in the sand coalition vulnerability (iraqi maneuvers)


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the rational actor model (RAM)keypoints

nuclear, biological and chemical weapons edgling democracies

ramadan and strategic planning

unyielding iraqthe u.s. clearly had signicant interests at stake and, seemingly, a range of policy options

were tried (and failed): in this scenario, war seemed inevitable or predictable but


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the rational actor model (RAM) some critical questions remained unanswered

why did iraq not back down? why did iraq and the u.s. not prefer an alternative

other than war?

why, in other words, did the trajectories of iraqi

and u.s. preferences never cross? why was their bargaining range so limited?


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the cognitive compassWhile the RAM and cognitive perspectives are not mutually exclusive,

they do differ in key ways, thus offering a different lens through

which to view events (p. 58)

so, how do the RAM and cognitive perspectives differ?


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the cognitive compass what are the key elements of the authors argumentin this chapter? what, in other words, does the author

focus on in his discussion of cognitive factors in the

decision-making process?historical analogies

munich analogy vietnam analogy


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the cognitive compasshistorical analogies

how do you measure the effects of analogicalreasoning on the decision-making process?

does Yetiv provide way of doing this? does Yetiv provide a convincing case that

analogical reasoning mattered?


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constructing the threatthe domestic politics perspective

RAM and cognitive perspectives each tell us something important,butwe cannot assume that either perspectiveor both in

combinationfully explain the behavior of the Bush administration we must also consider the possibility that the Bush administration

purposely dramatized the Iraqi threat for political effect, or to meet

personal goals or goals having to do with domestic policy


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constructing the threatthe domestic politics perspective: key points

explains how domestic political concerns affect the plausibility of decisionalternatives as those alternatives are being generated, or at any later date

underscores the political motivations for some of the governsbehaviors that we observe

highlights the potential for non-consideration of alternatives at anypoint in the decision-making process

emphasizes that prior decisions and actions have lagged effects thatinuence the way that future decisions are made


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constructing the threatthe domestic politics perspective: assumptions

decision-makers place a high premium on domestic-level goals,

and in particular two types of goals:TYPE 1 GOALS: personal goals such as image enhancement and

electability; also includes institutional goals, for instance, party politics or

benets related to the military-industrial complexTYPE 2 GOALS: promotional goalsrevolve around preparing for or

promoting a potentially favored alternative or one already chosen: focus is

on selling a policy


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decision makers see the construction of international issues as useful in

achieving type 1 and 2 goals; in other words, much of what policy

makers do is to intentional construct the reality they would like

others to seeefforts to construct an event to meet either type 1 or 2 goals will

produce lagged effects (that is, they will continue to affect

the policy making environment even if the decision makerschange course)


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domestic considerations may inuence how decisions

are made at anytime this is a critical assumption: basically says that certain alternatives may be

rejected if they fail to meet a key domestic goal even while satisfying other,

seemingly more important goals


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what is key argument in the chapter? why does the author title the chapter, constructingthe threat? is the author using a social constructivist

framework in this chapter?


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is it clear that the Bush administration was stronglyconcerned with domestic goals?

did the Bush administration actually constructa new reality? did the author make a strong case on both

questions? what was his evidence?


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elements of groupthink the groupthink approach is important because, even a combination

of the three other perspectives (RAM, cognition, and DPM) still

leave potentially important gaps. one of these gaps can be found in

the decision-making process within the inner circle


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elements of groupthink it is important to recognize that inner circles do, in fact, exist: alladministrations have an inner circle of select decision-makers who

meet regularly and who clearly had an inuence on policy the key question, then, is whether the dynamics of the decision-

making process itself (i.e., groupthink) within the group had amaterial affect on the decisions made by the group


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elements of groupthinkin the theory of groupthink, it is important to understand, there are specic

criteria that need to be met for the process of groupthink to actually take

shape. these include: Strong group cohesiveness

Group insulation from outside sources of information and opinion thatwould challenge group beliefs

Lack of tradition ofimpartial leadership Lack of norms requiring methodical decision-making procedures

for considering evidence and alternative options Homogeneityof the members social backgrounds and ideology

In addition to these conditions, groupthink theory emphasizesthe importance of a provocative situational contexti.e., a crisis


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symptoms of groupthink overestimation of the group (illusion of invulnerability, belief in inherent

morality of the group) close mindedness (collective rationalizations, stereotyping of out-

groups) pressures toward uniformity (self-censorship, illusion of unanimity,

direct pressure on dissenters, self-appointed mind guards)


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symptoms of defective decision-making group does not adequately discuss alternatives (the most vital)

incomplete survey of objectives failure to explore the risks of decisions

inability to reappraise alternatives and others


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groupthink: conclusionThe theory of groupthink helps explain how President Bush could advance

the war option in a setting where key military ofcials, core members ofCongress, foreign leaders, signicant elements of the public, and

members of Bushs inner circle believed that other alternatives should be

given greater consideration does author make a compelling argument in this chapter?


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mirror, mirror on the wall what is this chapter all about?

whats with the title of the chapter?


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mirror, mirror on the wallkey points

the chapter provides a nice perspective from which to assess the benets ofusing an explicitly integrative approach to studying a major

foreign policy decision the authors approach forces us to evaluate our explanation in a systematicmanner: we examine a major foreign policy decision through a variety of

lenses searching for ways in which each of the ve perspectives tell us

something that one or a combination

of others do not


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mirror, mirror on the wallkey points

in a strongly related vein, this chapter tells us that there may not be onecorrect explanation of any major foreign policy decision, even when different

perspectives all offer, in their own ways,

plausible accounts the author demonstrates this by testing each of the ve approaches in his

integrative framework: he shows that, with the exception of the government

politics, each approach is right; but this also means that no one approach

can provide a complete explanation all by itself


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threading the talekey points

this is a very useful chapter in that it brings us face to face with one ofthe biggest questions in the study of American foreign policy, namely,

how important is the individual policy maker, especially

the president?

how does the author answer this question?


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threading the talehow important is the the president?

to answer this question, the author tells us we need to begin by focusingon a few basic questions: to what extent, did the president

Manifest special personal characteristics and capabilities? Take critical initiatives ahead of others?

Face and overcome opposition? Act over and above what his/her role or the situation required?

Surmount historical chance circumstances and factors?

rational actor, historic analogie and groupthink iraq 1990

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