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life-long stress concerning what Keynes’ analyses was really all about. Here, we also recognize her belief that a proper understanding of Keynes must also include Piero Sraffa, Nicholas Kaldor and Michal Kaleki. This is a book that takes us back to our roots and reminds us that the essential questions are about those roots and where we have gone with those roots, rightly or wrongly-to Robinson, wrongly.

The book is organized around the major intellectual contributions of Robinson to economic thought. It starts with her early years at Cambidge, England, and her professional relations with Keynes, Kalecki, Sraffa and R.F. Kahn during those “years of high theory” at Cambridge University. This early period includes the development of her The Economics of Imperfect Competition and the reactions of Edward Cham- berlin to it. There is a series of chapters on the development of Keynes’ economics on both sides of the Atlantic and the ultimate “bastardization” of Keynes in the United States. Following is an analysis of her The Accumulation of Capital and the “capital reswitching” controversy between the two Cambidges, involving primarily Robert Solow and Paul Samuelson on this side of the Atlantic and Robinson on the other. Robinson’s later years of criticism of economics and its failures are brought out through discussion of her well known 1977 Journal of Economic Literature article, “What Are The Questions?’ as well as her much earlier Economic Philosophy.

These Robinson roads are well worth traveling or retraveling; The author success- fully reminds the reader of these controversies and their general relevance to us and to economics. Here are the roots of the successes, failures, high hopes and disappoint- ment of economics within this century from the point of view of one of economics’ great minds-a that was attempting to liberate economics from the constraints of general equilibrium theory, perfect competition, mathematical sophistry and to rein- troduce into economics politics, class conflict (via imperfect competition), history and uncertainty. To this writer, this is not only useful. It is crucial.

The book served to re-focus my own thoughts as well as my own professional conscience. It shows us what Robinson was and how she thought and how economists have failed to utilize her insights and the insights of the Cambridge “age of high theory” which she so well represented. Her works honored our profession more than our profession has so far enabled itself to realize. Turner, in her analysis of Robinson, shows us the roads that economics must travel, but has not yet. The book reads the reader as the reader is reading it. The roads taken make the journey a worthy one.

Radical Institutionalism: Contemporary Voices Edited by William M. Dugger New York: Greenwood Press, 1989, 150 pp., $39.95

Reviewed by Thomas R. DeGregori, University of Houston.

Radical Znstitutionalism is a bold and vigorous statement of a set of principles shared by the several authors of this volume. Some of these principles stated broadly are common denominators of all institutionalists namely such concepts as Commons’ idea of the economy as an instituted process, inhibitory cultural institutions, and the power that some groups derive from them, instrumental philosophy and a fundamental

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belief in democracy and human equality. How one interprets or operationalizes these can define a rather broad spectrum of differences. The editor’s stated necessity for a “radical transformation” rather than merely an “incremental adjustment” to the “current capitalist dispensation” is one that clearly differentiates “radical institution- alist” from institutional practice that has been largely one advocating incremental changes (page ix).

“Radical institutionalism is a first cousin to Marxism.” Thus states Dugger in a position that is reiterated by other authors and is reflected in the fact that these essays were originally papers for a Radical Institutionalism symposium at the Union for Radical Political Economists. It is also according to Dugger a close kin to existentialism and more derivative from Veblen than from Veblen’s disciple, C. E. Ayres. The Exis- tentialism that Dugger compares to Veblen is not that of Kierkegaard, Unamuno, Heidegger, or Jaspers but that of Sartre and the other post-World War II French philosopher pessimists. The absurdite of Sartre that Dugger finds earlier in Veblen is part of the creation and realization of the self out of the void (neant) and the anguish (angoisse) from the realization of these origins and of the necessity for choice. It is not a theory of history as blind drift as Dugger maintains and misses Sartre’s concept of engagement or commitment or an act of will in the social process. One strains to find anything even remotely similar in Veblen. The comparison trivializes both Veblen and the Existentialists. For that matter, Dugger’s assertion of the Institutionalist instrumental values is hardly kin to the absurdist evocation of subjective values. Fortunately, Dugger rises above these nugatory comparisons to Marx and Existen- tialism and proceeds to a solid, substantial exposition.

Dugger describes Ron Philips’ essay in this volume on the Texas School of Economics as “the first serious history of the Texas School to be published.” That it may be, but in its brevity (13 pages plus bibliography), it is highly subjective and selective. The best part of the chapter are the thumbnail biographical sketches of its leading figures. C.E. Ayres, E.E. Hale, Bob Montgomery, Ruth Allen, and Alton

Wiley. To use the term Radical Institutionalism to describe E.E. Hale, is a designation that neither Hale nor his colleagues would have found to be accurate. Both in graduate and undergraduate classes, I was present in the early 1960’s when students tried to get Hale to state his school of thought. Unlike Ayres, he was extremely and effectively eva- sive. However, before we heard or read a word of his, we all “knew” he was a Marxist.

William Waller’s Methodological Aspects of Radical Institutionalism is a truly fine piece of work. If one dropped the last page of this essay, one could also drop the word radical from the title. In an original reading and in a superficial re-reading as this is being written, I as an Institutionalist of the Texas School could find nothing which I would disagree or even emit, except for the last section. It is as clear and cogent a statement of basic Institutional theory as I have read, and most Institutionalists would subscribe to these tenets. Waller’s statement that properly done, all Institution- alism is inherently radical because it challenges the status quo would also find wide acceptance but it would not entail acceptance of Radical Institutionalism as defined in more detail elsewhere in this book.

James Dietz critiques the previous authors in his essay, Radicals and Institutionalists, and proceeds to discourse on the blend of Marxism and Institutionalism. Dietz began as a Marxist and his blendings follows his historical progression in incorporating

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Institutionalist insights into his analysis. From Institutionalism he has assimilated the use of processural analysis, the understanding of internal cultural factors as inhibitors of change, and the significance of technology. But when it comes to understanding the political element, namely the role of the state, he is clearly within the Marxist firmament.

Doug Brown returns to the theme of Institutional Economics being Existential Economics. Brown gives us what Veblen would call a conspicuous display of erudition in exploring the similarities between Veblen’s and the Existentialist’s consciousness theory. Veblen and the Existentialists are both opposed to Cartesian dualism. Beyond that, the similarities are not as obvious. When Brown brings in German Phenomenologists such as Husserl he is in reality in serious trouble. Unmentioned is the substantial impact of Jacques Loeb’s psychology on Veblen (as often revealed by his use of the term “tropism”) and the strong rejection of this type of mechanistic explanation by the German Phenomenologist. Brown recognizes in passing that the phenomenology Sarte and Merleu-Ponty used was considered by the authors them- selves to be considerably different from that of Husserl and Heidegger. The series of specific similarities that are cited are sufficiently forced that what is really being said is that they are similar because neither is solipsistic. Despite these criticisms, I found this chapter interesting. But in the end, I had to ask, So what? Even if we accept the arguments, what new insights are gained into Institutionalism, Existen- tialism, economics, and the economy, or philosophy. The answer to that inquiry was definitely negative.

J. R. Stanfield’s piece on Recent U. S . Marxist Economics in Veblenian Perspective is a fine presentation on the subject. The case he makes is good that contemporary U.S. Marxist and radicals have in many instances made analyses of current problems that have similarities to Institutional analysis. Conceding this fact, where does it lead us other than the continuing benefits from interaction and reading one another’s literature. Being an Institutionalist, I still don’t know what I should think or do differently because of these similarities.

William M. Dugger closes with a Research Agenda (reprint of an earlier Journal of Economics Issues article) and a Conclusion. He reiterates the basic statement of Radical Institutionalism which is “Radical Institutionalism is a processional paradigm focused on changing the direction of cultural evolution and changing the outcome of social provisioning in order to promote the full participation of all.” It is a worthy

definition and one that the authors strove to fulfill. To Dugger, Radical Institutionalism is instrumentalism but it is not pragmatism in the popular usage of “getting along by going along.” One can admire the idealism and courage of Dugger and his associates. Further, no one wishes to endorse crass expediency. However, one can still challenge the proposition that instrumentalism and institutionalism are not also incrementalism in approach to solving many of society’s ills. This purism raises some fundamental questions about the book and the positions taken. To whom are Radical Institutionalists talking? If your stated purpose is democratic participatory social change, then presum- ably your discourse should be aimed at persuading others. Over the last few years, I have been increasingly frustrated with rhetorical jargon-ridden works written for other Institutionalists and in this case some radical and Marxist economists and presumably no one else. Even more important, who is listening to Institutionalists, particularly

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the radical variety? Given all of the difficulties that dissent from orthodoxy always entails self-ghettoization does not seem to be an intelligent plan of action. An incremen- talist approach so much criticized, does offer the possibility of influencing the outcome of actions more in terms of principles enunciated in Radical Institutionalism.

The root and branch purism of Radical Institutionalism is a clarion call to do nothing but write ringing declarations while waiting for the millennium. While reading this volume, there was a nagging sense of the 1960’s and of those radicals who have now become reactionaries. The thought must have struck Dugger also when on the next to last page he asserts that “radical institutionalists have no intention of becoming the Norman Podhoretzes of the 1990s”. Neither, of course, did the radicals of the 1960s so intend for the 198Os, but many did. If one is preaching a message of radical inaction, it is as easy in academia to do it from the right as from the left. This transition is easier than it appears because many of our anti-technology elitists today proclaim a concern for humanity.

There is an audience for Institutionalism. Among development practitioners there is a frequently stated dissatisfaction with neoclassical economics and many are recep- tive to Institutional thinking. Unfortunately there are only a few of us out there addressing the issues of incremental change with which they are dealing. It may not meet the standards of purity of these authors but we do occasionally get some things done in terms of making people less poor.

The world is replete with issues that call for the analysis of institutional economics. Some of them are raised by Dugger in his Research Agenda. What other work than Veblen’s Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution (1915) so clearly saw the possibility of technological leadership passing from the United States to Japan? The world today faces crises that cry out for analysis, insights and policies of Institutional economics. From World War II to the late 1970s or early 198Os, extraordinary progress was made throughout most of the Third World in lowering infant mortality, extending life expectancy, stabilizing food production and generally advancing levels of living. All this is understandable in terms of the Veblen-Ayres conception of the enormous potential of science and technology for promoting change. Since the early 1980s as advances in science and technology continue and even accelerate, numerous countries find their economic fortunes declining and their people suffering. The causes of the decline are many and varied such as the burden of indebtedness; all are fundamentally institutional in nature. What more classic illustration is there of a conflict between technology and institutions with horrendous consequences? Those Radical Institu- tionalists who have been denying both the positive changes that did occur and the existing potential of technology have little to say on this crisis that has any chance of being implemented. Domestically the debate is increasingly between the alternative technology, organic foods and other cultists who seemingly want to ban everything and the super-orthodox free marketeers who wish to regulate nothing.

Lost in the middle is the traditional incrementalists’ institutionalist understanding of the benefits of technology, its potential misuse and the need for instrumental criteria in its regulation, use and occasional rejection. At a time when parties and their leaders in power with impeccable Socialist histories and credentials are pursuing privatization and monetarist policies, the advocacy of Socialism as a stated goal of the authors has little substantive meaning. A truly radical theory would be to try to bring Institu-

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tionalism to the forefront in addressing issues which impact upon the lives of hundreds of millions of people. It would clearly proclaim the benefits that science and technology such as that of the Green Revolution have brought to the world’s population. It would have a standard by which to measure the loss by the failure of these benefits to continue. On the first page, Dugger places the flow of goods and services to poor people as the top priority. However hard the authors try, the rest of the book doesn’t follow through. It is not that the authors have not worked hard, or are not well intentioned or capable. The book is an outstanding statement of the Radical Institu- tionalist position. The fault lies not in the book but in increasing trends among a sub-set of anti-technology Institutionalists. Among its many virtues, let us hope that its main one is to provoke a debate on these critical issues.

The Logic of Social Welfare: Conjectures and Formulations Edited by Brij Mohan New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988, 148 pp., $39.30

Reviewed by Alvin L. Sallee, New Mexico State University.

At a time when social welfare issues are being highly debated by policy makers, this book attempts to build a philosophical and intellectual argument for Judeo-Christian values and Mortimer Adler’s six great ideals; liberty, truth, goodness, beauty, equality and justice, based upon the premise that human well-being is a societal responsibility. The author ties these great ideas, not only to United States policy, but to global issues as well. This collection of thoughts, lectures and papers is an attempt to underscore the salience of realities that concern social welfare theory and practice. The stated premise is to support the individual’s responsibility to society. The current problem with social welfare is viewed as a socialization of narcissistic hedonism and the dehumanization of repressive systems. While the book certainly builds a philosophical argument for social welfare policies and develops the beginning stages of new theory, it falls far short of suggesting new practices to policy makers. The review of social welfare literature should be of interest to social workers, economists as well as those in government. The philosophical implications for social policy are suggested but not fully developed.

The main theoretical contribution of the book is the conceptualization of the logic of social welfare. Social systems is defined with two compartments, the state of well-being and the criteria of validity. The relationship between the state of well-being and the criteria of validity appears complex and, according to the author, is not totally unpredictable. Under the state of well-being are the sub-parts of social praxis, the human condition, and social justice. The criteria of validity includes social response, ideology and political system. The social system is framed by liberty, quality, and justice. While this new conceptualization appears to have promise, the author fails to adequately explain the linkages or how this theory would be applied in practice. Rather, we get a list of economic and sociological quotes.

The chapter on social work entitled “Crisis of Social Work: A Search for Excellence”