Jessica F. GreenPrinceton University

16 October 2009

Presented at University of Texas, Austin, LBJ School of Public Affairs

Public Goals, Private Actors:Private Authority in

Global Environmental Politics

Research QuestionsAre non-state (or private) actors

increasingly important in world politics?

Under what conditions do private actors project authority in world politics?

Outline1. Research Questions2. Previewing the argument3. Definitions4. Patterns of delegated authority5. A theory of private authority6. The Greenhouse Gas Protocol: a case of

entrepreneurial authority 7. Conclusions

Previewing the argumentConventional wisdom on the rise of private

actors is misleading.

Data show a power share rather than a power shift.

The full picture of private authority is incomplete unless we look at both delegated and entrepreneurial forms of private authority.

The theory presented here illustrates when we should expect private authority to emerge, and which form it takes.

DefinitionsPrivate authority: situations in which non-state

actors make rules or set standards to which other relevant actors in world politics defer. (This is distinct from lobbying states or influencing public opinion.)

Delegated authority: a conditional grant of authority from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on behalf of the former (Hawkins et. al 2006).

Entrepreneurial authority: a set of practices that governs the behavior of actors in world politics without explicit delegation of authority by states.

Delegated authority: the datasetNewly created dataset, using new software for

qualitative data.

152 multilateral environmental treaties (MEAs)

Treaty level data, 1902-2002

Sub-treaty data, 1949-2008

2 dependent variables:

actor(s) responsible for a given policy function

policy function delegated (or not)

5 policy functions: rulemaking, implementation, monitoring, adjudication, enforcement.

Figure 1: Policy functions delegated to private agents, treaty level, 1902-2002 (N=70)

Figure 2: Policy functions delegated to private agents, sub-treaty level, 1949-2008 (N=31)

Figure 3: Rates of delegation, treaty level

Table 1: Policy functions delegated solely to private agents

Treaty Subtreaty

Rulemaking 1% 0%

Adjudication 10% 0%

Implementation 11% 10%

Monitoring 4% 3%

Enforcement 0% 0%

Private agents are most often enlisted as “helpers”, when other actors (either states or IOs) are also charged with performing the same policy function.

Figure 4: More functions, and more actors responsible for them

Figure 5: Causal model of private authority

Existence of private expertise(scope condition)

Demand for benefits by states or by other actors

Deference to private actors: delegated or entrepreneurial authority

Demand for benefits

transforms private expertise

into private authority

Benefits of private authority

1. Reduced transaction costs2. Credible commitments3. First mover advantage4. Enhanced reputation

Theory: emergence of private authority

H1: Recognition of anticipated benefits in the form of reduced transaction costs, credible commitments, first mover advantage or improved reputation is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the emergence of private entrepreneurial authority.

Depending on who defers, benefits may accrue to either states or private actors, or both.

Theory: emergence of private authority

H1a: If presented with a public and private agent who can supply the same benefits (generally, an IO and a private actor), states will delegate to the IO.

In other words, states will delegate to private actors if they can provide benefits that IOs cannot.  

Theory: form of private authority

H2: Strong focal institution + Key states have similar preferences private delegated authority.  

H3: Lack of focal institution (or a weak one) + Key states disagree private entrepreneurial authority.

 Note: these hypotheses assume the existence of

private expertise and a demand for benefits.

Dependent Variables

Explanatory Variables

Emergence of Private authority

Reduced transaction costs Credible Commitments First mover advantage Improved reputation

Form of private authority

Preferences of powerful states (varies by issue) Existence / Capacity of Focal Institution

Table 2: Summarizing the theory

Part II: Entrepreneurial authority

Figure 6: Growth in FSC-Certified Forest area, 1995-2008

Source: FSC International

0

20,000

40,000

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

140,000

160,000

180,000

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

World total

World growth

Figure 7: ISO 14001 Certifications 1995-2007

Source: ISO Survey 2000, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2007

GHG Protocol in briefCreated by the World Resources

Institute (WRI) and the World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD).Extensive consultations with NGOs,

industry, government agencies.

Consultations began in 1998; first version published in 2001.

A set of standards to measure emissions at the firm level (as opposed to other efforts at national, project or facility level)

Uptake of the GHG ProtocolEmissions trading program: Chicago Climate

ExchangeVery high uptake in voluntary reporting

programs:

1. ISO-14064

2. Industry protocols in cement, paper, aluminum

3. The Climate Registry: 41 US states, 6 Mexican states, all Canadian provinces

4. US EPA “Climate Leaders” Program

5. National reporting programs in developing countries: Mexico, India, Brazil, China

Benefits provided by GHG-P

1. First mover advantage. Head start on reporting before national and intergovernmental rules were in place. (Kyoto was still not in force.)

2. Reduced transaction costs. Through provision of a “how-to guide”, software and technical support on reporting. Also, raised the possibility of avoiding switching costs in the future.

3. Reputational benefits. Early movers could portray themselves as responsible global citizens serious about climate change.

Heterogeneous state preferences

Whose preferences? EU and JUSCANZ. • Two key negotiating blocs, had opposing views

on emissions trading, even after Kyoto was signed.

What preferences? Emissions trading. • GHG accounting was widely viewed as a

precursor to trading, preparing for future regulation.

What consequences? No work on accounting. • States and IOs were not working on firm-level

measurement tools, since no one knew what the political outcome of the conflict would be.

Focal InstitutionLikely focal institution is the UNFCCC

Secretariat, which is tasked with supporting all implementation related to UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol.

Secretariat is focused on national level reporting (required under UNFCCC) and project-based accounting (precursor to the CDM) – but even these were thinly staffed.

No political mandate to work on developing firm-level tools.

ConclusionsTo understand the breadth of private

authority, must look at delegated and entrepreneurial forms: both types show growth over time.

Delegated authority in particular shows a power share, rather than a power shift.

Private authority occurs when private actors have existing expertise, and can provide benefits that states or IOs cannot.

The form of private authority depends on the preferences of powerful states, and the existence of a focal institution.

Beyond environmental politicsPrivate authority is present in many

other areas of world politics: Financial accounting, Bond and credit rating, Internet management, Privacy regulation, Labor practices, Security.

Challenge is to see whether there is systematic variation in the amount and form of private authority by issue area.

As global governance arrangements become more dependent on expertise, and more complex, we should expect to see more private authority.

THANK YOU

Jessica F. GreenPrinceton University

16 October 2009

Presented at University of Texas, Austin, LBJ School of Public Affairs

Public Goals, Private Actors:Private Authority in

Global Environmental Politics