promoting commitment to process safety
TRANSCRIPT
Promoting Commitment to Process SafetyRussell A Ogle Andrew R Carpenter and Sean J DeeExponent Inc 4580 Weaver Parkway Warrenville IL 60555 rogleexponentcom (for correspondence)
Published online 18 September 2013 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrarycom) DOI 101002prs11633
Successful implementation of process safety management(PSM) typically requires the use of a combination of physicaland procedural safeguards Ideally these safeguards must bemaintained in a constant state of readiness throughout thelife of the process facility The management system providesthe framework for maintaining and sustaining these safe-guards but the critical ingredient that ensures that the workgets done is the individual employeersquos commitment to PSMGame theory provides a useful framework for understandinghow an organization can foster cooperation between manage-ment and its employees toward the common goal of safetyUsing a specific game-theoretical model known as the repeatedPrisonerrsquos Dilemma it is shown how cooperative behavior isthe natural consequence of a balanced system of rewards andpenalties Here the term ldquobalancedrdquo means that both employ-ees and their managers are subject to this system of rewardsand penalties By implementing a balanced framework forfeedback an organization can promote a commitment to pro-cess safety by fostering cooperation between both the employeesand the managers VC 2013 American Institute of Chemical
Engineers Process Saf Prog 32 319ndash321 2013
Keywords process safety management safety culturegame theory
INTRODUCTION
Successful implementation of process safety management(PSM) typically requires the use of a combination of physicaland procedural safeguards Ideally these safeguards must bemaintained in a constant state of readiness throughout thelife of the process facility The management system providesthe framework for maintaining and sustaining these safe-guards but the critical ingredient that ensures that the workgets done is the individual employeersquos commitment to PSMThe social sciences especially psychology and organizationalbehavior can provide valuable insight towards understand-ing the management of employee commitment to safetyHowever other fields of study can make useful contributionsto our understanding Game theory is one of these tools
Game theory is the scientific study of interactive decision-making and is especially useful in understanding the inter-play of conflict and cooperation between different stakehold-ers Consider the interaction between the individualemployee and the management organization The objectiveof both management and the individual employee is tosecure a strong commitment to process safety But there aremany time and attention demands placed on the individualemployee and numerous financial pressures on management
There can be a strong temptation to cut corners and sacrificeoperational discipline in favor of simplifying a task and get-ting it done faster or cheaper In game theory this situationis known as the Prisonerrsquos Dilemma The Prisonerrsquos Dilemmais one of the simplest models of the conflicts that can arisebetween the goals of an individual and an organization
Game theory provides the tools which can help an orga-nization to understand how to foster cooperation betweenmanagement and its employees to achieve the common goalof safety Using a specific game-theoretical model known asa repeated Prisonerrsquos Dilemma it is shown how cooperativebehavior is the natural consequence of a balanced system ofrewards and penalties Here the term ldquobalancedrdquo means thatboth employees and their managers are subject to this sys-tem of rewards and penalties By implementing a balancedframework for feedback an organization can promote acommitment to process safety by fostering cooperationbetween both the employees and the managers
SEEKING COMMITMENT TO PROCESS SAFETY
The effective control of the risks associated with a chemi-cal process requires more than just physical and proceduralsafeguards It requires people who demonstrate a continuouseffort to sustain these safeguards In short it requires com-mitment to process safety at all levels of the organizationemployees supervisors and managers The fundamental roleof commitment to successful PSM is discussed at length inthe book Guidelines for Risk Based Process Safety by theCenter for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) a directorate ofthe American Institute of Chemical Engineers [1] The CCPSrisk based process safety paradigm is based on four pillars
Commit to process safety Understand hazards and risk Manage risk Learn from experience
The first component the commitment of the organizationto process safety is perhaps the most fundamental It is ourthesis that a useful measure of this commitment is throughthe individualrsquos operational discipline in executing theirassigned process safety responsibilities
Why is commitment to process safety important Commit-ment is important because it is the individualrsquos personalpledge to perform their assigned responsibilities There arealways going to be unanticipated or non-routine aspects toany work assignment Individual commitment to processsafety transcends simple compliance with a written workorder or procedure When confronted with the unexpectedit is the individualrsquos commitment to process safety that spursthem to ask the important questions (1) What can go wrong(2) How bad is it (3) How likely is it (4) What can we doto manage the risk
This article was originally presented at the 9th Global Congress onProcess Safety San Antonio TX 29 April to 1 May 2013
VC 2013 American Institute of Chemical Engineers
Process Safety Progress (Vol32 No4) December 2013 319
A true commitment to process safety introduces a difficultchallenge for the employee and her supervisor Commitmentto process safety requires extra effort beyond simply gettingthe work assignment done Commitment to process safetyrequires additional planning and thinking before the work isstarted It requires a collaborative work approach with col-leagues who are busy with their own work assignmentsAnd to be perfectly frank it requires paperwork
How is commitment achieved with employees supervi-sors and managers The behavior-based safety literature tellsus that what gets rewarded is what gets done [23] Individu-als at all levels of the organization need to believe that theywill be rewarded for their commitment to process safety andfurthermore that they will be penalized if they fail in thatcommitment This requires a sustained effort by upper man-agement to observe evaluate and administer feedbackmdashrewards or penaltiesmdashto the supervisors of the employeesThe supervisors in turn must also observe evaluate andadminister feedback To successfully create and maintain acommitment to process safety from the front-line employeesthe employees must see that this commitment will berewarded and that a failure in commitment will be penal-ized Game theory is a tool that can inform management onhow to develop a balanced system of rewards and penaltiesto achieve this commitment at all levels of the organization
THE REPEATED PRISONERrsquoS DILEMMA
Game theory applies mathematical modeling to under-stand the payoffs and costs associated with two or more indi-viduals making interactive decisions [4] By understandingthe net cost benefit of an individualrsquos actions given the avail-able information regarding the potential decisions of theother players one can develop strategies and predict behav-ior based on the mathematical results and basic humaninstincts In particular the application of game theory hasbeen useful in studying interactions between parties who arein conflict but would benefit from employing a cooperativestrategy While the mathematics can become very compli-cated valuable insights can be gained without heavy relianceon the more complex mathematical modeling componentsThe exercise of identifying players considering each playerrsquospotential decisions and determining the payoffs and costsassociated with the various outcomes can provide significantinsight in solving problems involving conflict and structuringoptimized solutions
When considering commitment to process safety individ-ual employees are left to optimize a multivariable problemFrom an organizational level multiple constraints areimposed on individual employees with respect to their jobFirst and foremost employees are expected to perform theirjobs tasks adequately and when posed with the additionalrequirement of performing the job safely an employee mustsacrifice labor attention and thought that could otherwisebe spent on their other responsibilities It is then temptingfor an employee to ignore or shirk their commitment toprocess safety The benefit from shirking is twofold First ashirking employee does not need to invest the effort into thePSM program But additionally if the other employees con-tinue to put in the effort associated with maintaining a supe-rior process safety program the shirking employee alsogains the additional benefits that all the employees realizewith having a safe workplace Since commitment to processsafety is often an investment to prevent future loss associatedwith system failures the benefits of a safe work environmentcan seem less relevant to an individual employeersquos day-to-day time and effort However if all employees shirk theirresponsibility then the PSM program becomes ineffectiveand all the employees only reap the benefit of the additionaltime and effort that is not spent on their commitment to pro-
cess safety In the long run this makes the employees moresusceptible to accidents and the high costs associated withnot having an adequate safety management program Man-agement has often turned to incentive reward and penaltyprograms to reinforce individual commitment to processsafety The field of psychology is often used to developthese programs [56] This type of problem has also beenextensively discussed in the game theory literature relating toeconomics and social sciences Using game theory manage-ment can better understand strategic programs to reaffirmand promote commitment to process safety
This type of problem where an individual can benefit bydefecting from the beneficial collective action of a group butstill reap the grouprsquos collective benefits is known in GameTheory as the free rider problem From the perspective ofthis work the free rider problem involves an individual (freerider) who reaps the benefit of a safe work environment(communal resource) without putting in any effort to gener-ate that benefit A free rider problem can be constructed as atwo player game referred to as the prisonerrsquos dilemma Onone axis the individual employee has the opportunity toCommit to or Defect from the process safety culture whilethe rest of the collective group is represented as a singleplayer on the second axis [7] The payoffs for committing ordefecting for the individual player are represented by thenumbers in the two-by-two matrix below There associatedpayoffs for the collective group represented by the secondplayer have been omitted for simplicity
Individual
EnoughemployeesCommit
Not enoughemployeesCommit
Commit Reward 5 3 Sucker 5 0Defect Temptation 5 5 Penalty 5 1
The four possible outcomes for the individual employee inthis game construction are Reward Temptation Sucker andPenalty Reward corresponds to both the individual employeeand enough other employees cooperating to maintain a supe-rior safety management program The Temptation provides thehighest payout for the individual employee because in additionto reaping the safety benefits there are no costs (time effort) tothe defecting employee as others pick up the slack But if aninsufficient number of other employees carry out their organiza-tional safety responsibilities then no one including the individ-ual employee receives the benefits associated with goodoperational discipline Instead there is a smaller payout (pen-alty) associated with shirking that represents the employee notinvesting time or effort into organizational safety Additionallyif an employee cooperates and fulfills their responsibilities butfew others cooperate then the individual receives the lowestpayout and can be termed as a Sucker
The payoff values shown in the matrix are for illustrationonly The rankings are intentionally ordered such thatTemptationgtRewardgtPenaltygt Sucker1 The evaluation ofpayoffs in terms of expected utility is an important subjectbut it is quite involved We refer the reader to decision anal-ysis texts for a discussion of practical strategies for the evalu-ation of utilities [9] For our purposes the ranking of thepayoffs is sufficient In addition to the payout rankings
1For technical reasons it is typically assumed that the payoffs are structuredsuch that Rewardgt 1=2 (Sucker 1 Temptation) This relation ensures that contin-ued cooperation results in a higher total payout than alternation of cooperationand shirking which simply means that the dilemma cannot be beaten by playerstaking turns receiving the temptation payout See Appendix B in the book by Axel-rod [8]
DOI 101002prs Process Safety Progress (Vol32 No4)320 December 2013 Published on behalf of the AIChE
another key concept associated with the prisonerrsquos dilemmais the appearance of a dominant strategy Regardless ofwhether the collective group chooses to commit or defectthe individual employee will also have a higher payout ifthey defect (5gt 3 1gt 0) Hence the strategy of Defectstrictly dominates the strategy of Commit
Repeated interaction has a strong influence on the abilityto coordinate the actions of multiple players In the previ-ously discussed matrix one would predict the individualemployee to defect However if there are repeated iterationsof the prisonerrsquos dilemma it stands to reason that the defectstrategy would soon dominate the entire population result-ing in the penalty payout In this situation one can use thepromise of prolonged reward payouts in the future to out-weigh the incentive to defect in the present This idea offostering cooperation and coordination to maximize the ben-efit for all employees is effective as long as the promise offuture interaction is credible If the game is played a finitenumber of times the employee can benefit from shirkingwhen the promise of future interactions has dwindled Ifhowever the employee believes that the game will beplayed repeatedly without end then the reward of continuedcooperation minus the threat of future penalties outweighsthe benefit of shirking It makes more sense for theemployee to cooperate
When the reward for continued cooperation outweighs theincentives to defect the coordination of action becomes self-enforcing This is not only true mathematically but it has alsobeen demonstrated in laboratory and field work associatedwith the social sciences [8] Furthermore as discussed inSchneierrsquos book the importance tangible meaningful rewardsand penalties to foster coordination out of dominant strategiesis critical [10] Commitment to process safety is more than justa mission statement or a policy It requires active participationfrom players at all levels (employee and management) to rein-force the message To provide credibility to the programrewards and penalties must be directly tied to performance asmeasured by leading indicators of process safety
PROMOTING COMMITMENT THROUGH COOPERATION
At facilities that handle highly hazardous chemicals mostemployees have process safety responsibilities in their job Itis essential that those responsibilities are defined and meas-ures of success are communicated and documented Supervi-sors should then conduct observations both scheduled andrandom to verify that these responsibilities are being imple-mented Studies have shown that the conduct of supervisoryobservations leads to higher levels of voluntary employeeparticipation [11]
Process safety observations gathered by the supervisorshould be classified into compliant and non-compliant catego-ries Employees should be rewarded for their compliance withtheir process safety responsibilities Rewards should be con-sistent with the organizations value system and do not need tobe expensive Simple frequent rewards like public recogni-tion a free lunch or a gift certificate can contribute signifi-cantly to the employeersquos motivation for continued success[1213] The key point is that regardless of the type of rewardused it must be delivered in a genuine manner with publicrecognition Taken to its ultimate conclusion employees whoare leaders in demonstrating their commitment to processsafety should receive special consideration for promotion overthose who fail in this commitment And serious considerationshould be given to rewarding the employeersquos supervisor
For those who fail in their commitment to process safetymust feel the sting of penalties The penalties should be con-sistent with the organizations values and should be delivered
privately Only in exceptional circumstances should a penaltybe delivered publicly The idea of the penalty is to encour-age the employee to change their behavior Penalties demon-strate the organizationrsquos commitment to process safety as anorganizational value [14] And just as with rewards depend-ing on the seriousness of the situation consideration shouldbe given to exacting a penalty on a supervisor with employ-ees who fail to demonstrate the desired level of commitmentto process safety
CONCLUSIONS
Individual commitment is a cornerstone to a successfulPSM program This commitment must be maintained at theemployee supervisor and manager levels to ensure thesafety and well-being of all those involved with hazardousprocesses Additionally this commitment requires continualreaffirmation and improvement However at times the com-mitment to safety can be in direct conflict with financial con-straints deadlines or production goals This conflict can leadto individuals to shirk their commitment and make decisionsbased on factors that are not consistent with the safety man-agement program In these instances the use of reward andpenalties can reinforce the importance of process safety andchange behavior in impactful ways Particularly from a gametheory perspective it is possible to create scenarios wherethe incentives to ignore onersquos commitment are discounted tolevels that make them insignificant in the day to day opera-tions of a chemical process By reinforcing positive safetyhabits and correcting unsafe behavior it is possible toimprove plant wide process safety
LITERATURE CITED
1 Center for Chemical Process Safety Guidelines for RiskBased Process Safety American Institute of ChemicalEngineers New York 2007
2 RE Medina TE McSween R Rost AM Alvero Behav-ioral safety in a refinery Professional Saf August 200936ndash40
3 ES Geller Social influence principles Professional SafOctober 2002 25ndash31
4 J Watson Strategy An Introduction to Game Theory 2ndEd WW Norton amp company New York (2008) p 1
5 ES Geller The Psychology of Safety CRC Press BocaRaton Florida 1998
6 TE McSween The Values-Based Safety Process WileyNew York 2003
7 L Fisher Rock Paper Scissors Game Theory in Every-day Life Basic Books New York (2008) pp 61ndash68
8 R Axelrod The Evolution of Cooperation Revised Edi-tion Basic Books New York 2006
9 RT Clemen Making Hard Decisions An Introduction toDecision Analysis 2nd Ed Duxbury Press Belmont Cali-fornia Chapters 13 and 14 1996
10 B Schneier Liars and Outliers Enabling the Trust that Soci-ety Needs to Thrive Wiley New York (2012) pp 1ndash14
11 S Cook and TE McSween The role of supervisors inbehavioral safety observations Professional Saf October2000 33ndash36
12 TR Krause Motivating employees for safety successProfessional Saf March 2000 22ndash25
13 PM Gendinning Employee safety incentives a bestpractices survey of human resource practitioners Profes-sional Saf February 2001 22ndash24
14 LI Perkinson Discipline in the extremes ProfessionalSaf April 2005 31ndash35
Process Safety Progress (Vol32 No4) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 101002prs December 2013 321
A true commitment to process safety introduces a difficultchallenge for the employee and her supervisor Commitmentto process safety requires extra effort beyond simply gettingthe work assignment done Commitment to process safetyrequires additional planning and thinking before the work isstarted It requires a collaborative work approach with col-leagues who are busy with their own work assignmentsAnd to be perfectly frank it requires paperwork
How is commitment achieved with employees supervi-sors and managers The behavior-based safety literature tellsus that what gets rewarded is what gets done [23] Individu-als at all levels of the organization need to believe that theywill be rewarded for their commitment to process safety andfurthermore that they will be penalized if they fail in thatcommitment This requires a sustained effort by upper man-agement to observe evaluate and administer feedbackmdashrewards or penaltiesmdashto the supervisors of the employeesThe supervisors in turn must also observe evaluate andadminister feedback To successfully create and maintain acommitment to process safety from the front-line employeesthe employees must see that this commitment will berewarded and that a failure in commitment will be penal-ized Game theory is a tool that can inform management onhow to develop a balanced system of rewards and penaltiesto achieve this commitment at all levels of the organization
THE REPEATED PRISONERrsquoS DILEMMA
Game theory applies mathematical modeling to under-stand the payoffs and costs associated with two or more indi-viduals making interactive decisions [4] By understandingthe net cost benefit of an individualrsquos actions given the avail-able information regarding the potential decisions of theother players one can develop strategies and predict behav-ior based on the mathematical results and basic humaninstincts In particular the application of game theory hasbeen useful in studying interactions between parties who arein conflict but would benefit from employing a cooperativestrategy While the mathematics can become very compli-cated valuable insights can be gained without heavy relianceon the more complex mathematical modeling componentsThe exercise of identifying players considering each playerrsquospotential decisions and determining the payoffs and costsassociated with the various outcomes can provide significantinsight in solving problems involving conflict and structuringoptimized solutions
When considering commitment to process safety individ-ual employees are left to optimize a multivariable problemFrom an organizational level multiple constraints areimposed on individual employees with respect to their jobFirst and foremost employees are expected to perform theirjobs tasks adequately and when posed with the additionalrequirement of performing the job safely an employee mustsacrifice labor attention and thought that could otherwisebe spent on their other responsibilities It is then temptingfor an employee to ignore or shirk their commitment toprocess safety The benefit from shirking is twofold First ashirking employee does not need to invest the effort into thePSM program But additionally if the other employees con-tinue to put in the effort associated with maintaining a supe-rior process safety program the shirking employee alsogains the additional benefits that all the employees realizewith having a safe workplace Since commitment to processsafety is often an investment to prevent future loss associatedwith system failures the benefits of a safe work environmentcan seem less relevant to an individual employeersquos day-to-day time and effort However if all employees shirk theirresponsibility then the PSM program becomes ineffectiveand all the employees only reap the benefit of the additionaltime and effort that is not spent on their commitment to pro-
cess safety In the long run this makes the employees moresusceptible to accidents and the high costs associated withnot having an adequate safety management program Man-agement has often turned to incentive reward and penaltyprograms to reinforce individual commitment to processsafety The field of psychology is often used to developthese programs [56] This type of problem has also beenextensively discussed in the game theory literature relating toeconomics and social sciences Using game theory manage-ment can better understand strategic programs to reaffirmand promote commitment to process safety
This type of problem where an individual can benefit bydefecting from the beneficial collective action of a group butstill reap the grouprsquos collective benefits is known in GameTheory as the free rider problem From the perspective ofthis work the free rider problem involves an individual (freerider) who reaps the benefit of a safe work environment(communal resource) without putting in any effort to gener-ate that benefit A free rider problem can be constructed as atwo player game referred to as the prisonerrsquos dilemma Onone axis the individual employee has the opportunity toCommit to or Defect from the process safety culture whilethe rest of the collective group is represented as a singleplayer on the second axis [7] The payoffs for committing ordefecting for the individual player are represented by thenumbers in the two-by-two matrix below There associatedpayoffs for the collective group represented by the secondplayer have been omitted for simplicity
Individual
EnoughemployeesCommit
Not enoughemployeesCommit
Commit Reward 5 3 Sucker 5 0Defect Temptation 5 5 Penalty 5 1
The four possible outcomes for the individual employee inthis game construction are Reward Temptation Sucker andPenalty Reward corresponds to both the individual employeeand enough other employees cooperating to maintain a supe-rior safety management program The Temptation provides thehighest payout for the individual employee because in additionto reaping the safety benefits there are no costs (time effort) tothe defecting employee as others pick up the slack But if aninsufficient number of other employees carry out their organiza-tional safety responsibilities then no one including the individ-ual employee receives the benefits associated with goodoperational discipline Instead there is a smaller payout (pen-alty) associated with shirking that represents the employee notinvesting time or effort into organizational safety Additionallyif an employee cooperates and fulfills their responsibilities butfew others cooperate then the individual receives the lowestpayout and can be termed as a Sucker
The payoff values shown in the matrix are for illustrationonly The rankings are intentionally ordered such thatTemptationgtRewardgtPenaltygt Sucker1 The evaluation ofpayoffs in terms of expected utility is an important subjectbut it is quite involved We refer the reader to decision anal-ysis texts for a discussion of practical strategies for the evalu-ation of utilities [9] For our purposes the ranking of thepayoffs is sufficient In addition to the payout rankings
1For technical reasons it is typically assumed that the payoffs are structuredsuch that Rewardgt 1=2 (Sucker 1 Temptation) This relation ensures that contin-ued cooperation results in a higher total payout than alternation of cooperationand shirking which simply means that the dilemma cannot be beaten by playerstaking turns receiving the temptation payout See Appendix B in the book by Axel-rod [8]
DOI 101002prs Process Safety Progress (Vol32 No4)320 December 2013 Published on behalf of the AIChE
another key concept associated with the prisonerrsquos dilemmais the appearance of a dominant strategy Regardless ofwhether the collective group chooses to commit or defectthe individual employee will also have a higher payout ifthey defect (5gt 3 1gt 0) Hence the strategy of Defectstrictly dominates the strategy of Commit
Repeated interaction has a strong influence on the abilityto coordinate the actions of multiple players In the previ-ously discussed matrix one would predict the individualemployee to defect However if there are repeated iterationsof the prisonerrsquos dilemma it stands to reason that the defectstrategy would soon dominate the entire population result-ing in the penalty payout In this situation one can use thepromise of prolonged reward payouts in the future to out-weigh the incentive to defect in the present This idea offostering cooperation and coordination to maximize the ben-efit for all employees is effective as long as the promise offuture interaction is credible If the game is played a finitenumber of times the employee can benefit from shirkingwhen the promise of future interactions has dwindled Ifhowever the employee believes that the game will beplayed repeatedly without end then the reward of continuedcooperation minus the threat of future penalties outweighsthe benefit of shirking It makes more sense for theemployee to cooperate
When the reward for continued cooperation outweighs theincentives to defect the coordination of action becomes self-enforcing This is not only true mathematically but it has alsobeen demonstrated in laboratory and field work associatedwith the social sciences [8] Furthermore as discussed inSchneierrsquos book the importance tangible meaningful rewardsand penalties to foster coordination out of dominant strategiesis critical [10] Commitment to process safety is more than justa mission statement or a policy It requires active participationfrom players at all levels (employee and management) to rein-force the message To provide credibility to the programrewards and penalties must be directly tied to performance asmeasured by leading indicators of process safety
PROMOTING COMMITMENT THROUGH COOPERATION
At facilities that handle highly hazardous chemicals mostemployees have process safety responsibilities in their job Itis essential that those responsibilities are defined and meas-ures of success are communicated and documented Supervi-sors should then conduct observations both scheduled andrandom to verify that these responsibilities are being imple-mented Studies have shown that the conduct of supervisoryobservations leads to higher levels of voluntary employeeparticipation [11]
Process safety observations gathered by the supervisorshould be classified into compliant and non-compliant catego-ries Employees should be rewarded for their compliance withtheir process safety responsibilities Rewards should be con-sistent with the organizations value system and do not need tobe expensive Simple frequent rewards like public recogni-tion a free lunch or a gift certificate can contribute signifi-cantly to the employeersquos motivation for continued success[1213] The key point is that regardless of the type of rewardused it must be delivered in a genuine manner with publicrecognition Taken to its ultimate conclusion employees whoare leaders in demonstrating their commitment to processsafety should receive special consideration for promotion overthose who fail in this commitment And serious considerationshould be given to rewarding the employeersquos supervisor
For those who fail in their commitment to process safetymust feel the sting of penalties The penalties should be con-sistent with the organizations values and should be delivered
privately Only in exceptional circumstances should a penaltybe delivered publicly The idea of the penalty is to encour-age the employee to change their behavior Penalties demon-strate the organizationrsquos commitment to process safety as anorganizational value [14] And just as with rewards depend-ing on the seriousness of the situation consideration shouldbe given to exacting a penalty on a supervisor with employ-ees who fail to demonstrate the desired level of commitmentto process safety
CONCLUSIONS
Individual commitment is a cornerstone to a successfulPSM program This commitment must be maintained at theemployee supervisor and manager levels to ensure thesafety and well-being of all those involved with hazardousprocesses Additionally this commitment requires continualreaffirmation and improvement However at times the com-mitment to safety can be in direct conflict with financial con-straints deadlines or production goals This conflict can leadto individuals to shirk their commitment and make decisionsbased on factors that are not consistent with the safety man-agement program In these instances the use of reward andpenalties can reinforce the importance of process safety andchange behavior in impactful ways Particularly from a gametheory perspective it is possible to create scenarios wherethe incentives to ignore onersquos commitment are discounted tolevels that make them insignificant in the day to day opera-tions of a chemical process By reinforcing positive safetyhabits and correcting unsafe behavior it is possible toimprove plant wide process safety
LITERATURE CITED
1 Center for Chemical Process Safety Guidelines for RiskBased Process Safety American Institute of ChemicalEngineers New York 2007
2 RE Medina TE McSween R Rost AM Alvero Behav-ioral safety in a refinery Professional Saf August 200936ndash40
3 ES Geller Social influence principles Professional SafOctober 2002 25ndash31
4 J Watson Strategy An Introduction to Game Theory 2ndEd WW Norton amp company New York (2008) p 1
5 ES Geller The Psychology of Safety CRC Press BocaRaton Florida 1998
6 TE McSween The Values-Based Safety Process WileyNew York 2003
7 L Fisher Rock Paper Scissors Game Theory in Every-day Life Basic Books New York (2008) pp 61ndash68
8 R Axelrod The Evolution of Cooperation Revised Edi-tion Basic Books New York 2006
9 RT Clemen Making Hard Decisions An Introduction toDecision Analysis 2nd Ed Duxbury Press Belmont Cali-fornia Chapters 13 and 14 1996
10 B Schneier Liars and Outliers Enabling the Trust that Soci-ety Needs to Thrive Wiley New York (2012) pp 1ndash14
11 S Cook and TE McSween The role of supervisors inbehavioral safety observations Professional Saf October2000 33ndash36
12 TR Krause Motivating employees for safety successProfessional Saf March 2000 22ndash25
13 PM Gendinning Employee safety incentives a bestpractices survey of human resource practitioners Profes-sional Saf February 2001 22ndash24
14 LI Perkinson Discipline in the extremes ProfessionalSaf April 2005 31ndash35
Process Safety Progress (Vol32 No4) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 101002prs December 2013 321
another key concept associated with the prisonerrsquos dilemmais the appearance of a dominant strategy Regardless ofwhether the collective group chooses to commit or defectthe individual employee will also have a higher payout ifthey defect (5gt 3 1gt 0) Hence the strategy of Defectstrictly dominates the strategy of Commit
Repeated interaction has a strong influence on the abilityto coordinate the actions of multiple players In the previ-ously discussed matrix one would predict the individualemployee to defect However if there are repeated iterationsof the prisonerrsquos dilemma it stands to reason that the defectstrategy would soon dominate the entire population result-ing in the penalty payout In this situation one can use thepromise of prolonged reward payouts in the future to out-weigh the incentive to defect in the present This idea offostering cooperation and coordination to maximize the ben-efit for all employees is effective as long as the promise offuture interaction is credible If the game is played a finitenumber of times the employee can benefit from shirkingwhen the promise of future interactions has dwindled Ifhowever the employee believes that the game will beplayed repeatedly without end then the reward of continuedcooperation minus the threat of future penalties outweighsthe benefit of shirking It makes more sense for theemployee to cooperate
When the reward for continued cooperation outweighs theincentives to defect the coordination of action becomes self-enforcing This is not only true mathematically but it has alsobeen demonstrated in laboratory and field work associatedwith the social sciences [8] Furthermore as discussed inSchneierrsquos book the importance tangible meaningful rewardsand penalties to foster coordination out of dominant strategiesis critical [10] Commitment to process safety is more than justa mission statement or a policy It requires active participationfrom players at all levels (employee and management) to rein-force the message To provide credibility to the programrewards and penalties must be directly tied to performance asmeasured by leading indicators of process safety
PROMOTING COMMITMENT THROUGH COOPERATION
At facilities that handle highly hazardous chemicals mostemployees have process safety responsibilities in their job Itis essential that those responsibilities are defined and meas-ures of success are communicated and documented Supervi-sors should then conduct observations both scheduled andrandom to verify that these responsibilities are being imple-mented Studies have shown that the conduct of supervisoryobservations leads to higher levels of voluntary employeeparticipation [11]
Process safety observations gathered by the supervisorshould be classified into compliant and non-compliant catego-ries Employees should be rewarded for their compliance withtheir process safety responsibilities Rewards should be con-sistent with the organizations value system and do not need tobe expensive Simple frequent rewards like public recogni-tion a free lunch or a gift certificate can contribute signifi-cantly to the employeersquos motivation for continued success[1213] The key point is that regardless of the type of rewardused it must be delivered in a genuine manner with publicrecognition Taken to its ultimate conclusion employees whoare leaders in demonstrating their commitment to processsafety should receive special consideration for promotion overthose who fail in this commitment And serious considerationshould be given to rewarding the employeersquos supervisor
For those who fail in their commitment to process safetymust feel the sting of penalties The penalties should be con-sistent with the organizations values and should be delivered
privately Only in exceptional circumstances should a penaltybe delivered publicly The idea of the penalty is to encour-age the employee to change their behavior Penalties demon-strate the organizationrsquos commitment to process safety as anorganizational value [14] And just as with rewards depend-ing on the seriousness of the situation consideration shouldbe given to exacting a penalty on a supervisor with employ-ees who fail to demonstrate the desired level of commitmentto process safety
CONCLUSIONS
Individual commitment is a cornerstone to a successfulPSM program This commitment must be maintained at theemployee supervisor and manager levels to ensure thesafety and well-being of all those involved with hazardousprocesses Additionally this commitment requires continualreaffirmation and improvement However at times the com-mitment to safety can be in direct conflict with financial con-straints deadlines or production goals This conflict can leadto individuals to shirk their commitment and make decisionsbased on factors that are not consistent with the safety man-agement program In these instances the use of reward andpenalties can reinforce the importance of process safety andchange behavior in impactful ways Particularly from a gametheory perspective it is possible to create scenarios wherethe incentives to ignore onersquos commitment are discounted tolevels that make them insignificant in the day to day opera-tions of a chemical process By reinforcing positive safetyhabits and correcting unsafe behavior it is possible toimprove plant wide process safety
LITERATURE CITED
1 Center for Chemical Process Safety Guidelines for RiskBased Process Safety American Institute of ChemicalEngineers New York 2007
2 RE Medina TE McSween R Rost AM Alvero Behav-ioral safety in a refinery Professional Saf August 200936ndash40
3 ES Geller Social influence principles Professional SafOctober 2002 25ndash31
4 J Watson Strategy An Introduction to Game Theory 2ndEd WW Norton amp company New York (2008) p 1
5 ES Geller The Psychology of Safety CRC Press BocaRaton Florida 1998
6 TE McSween The Values-Based Safety Process WileyNew York 2003
7 L Fisher Rock Paper Scissors Game Theory in Every-day Life Basic Books New York (2008) pp 61ndash68
8 R Axelrod The Evolution of Cooperation Revised Edi-tion Basic Books New York 2006
9 RT Clemen Making Hard Decisions An Introduction toDecision Analysis 2nd Ed Duxbury Press Belmont Cali-fornia Chapters 13 and 14 1996
10 B Schneier Liars and Outliers Enabling the Trust that Soci-ety Needs to Thrive Wiley New York (2012) pp 1ndash14
11 S Cook and TE McSween The role of supervisors inbehavioral safety observations Professional Saf October2000 33ndash36
12 TR Krause Motivating employees for safety successProfessional Saf March 2000 22ndash25
13 PM Gendinning Employee safety incentives a bestpractices survey of human resource practitioners Profes-sional Saf February 2001 22ndash24
14 LI Perkinson Discipline in the extremes ProfessionalSaf April 2005 31ndash35
Process Safety Progress (Vol32 No4) Published on behalf of the AIChE DOI 101002prs December 2013 321