prohibiton mandamus full

7/28/2019 Prohibiton Mandamus Full

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G.R. No. 167409 March 20, 2009

RODOLFO B. GARCIA, Retired Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, Petitioner,

vs.

PRIMO C. MIRO, OMBUDSMAN-VISAYAS, Cebu City; DANIEL VILLAFLOR, PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, Bacolod City; HON.FRANKLIN M. COBBOL, Acting Presiding Judge, MCTC, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental; and JULIETA F. ORTEGA,

Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PERALTA, J.:

This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction. The petition seeks to impugnthe Orders dated November 23, 20041 and January 26, 20052 issued by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of

Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental.

The antecedents are as follows:

On January 31, 2003, Julieta F. Ortega (Julieta) filed a letter complaint3 before the Ombudsman-Vizayas, Primo C. Miro(Miro), charging Judge Rodolfo B. Garcia, then Presiding Judge of the MCTC, Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, andRicardo Liyage (Liyage), ambulance driver, Municipality of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, with the crime of murder andthe administrative offenses of grave misconduct and abuse of authority.

The complaint arose from the death of Julietas husband, Francisco C. Ortega, Jr., on November 12, 2002, as a result ofa vehicular mishap between a Toyota Land Cruiser driven by the petitioner and the motorcycle driven by thedeceased.4

The letter complaint was treated as two (2) separate criminal and administrative complaints docketed as OMB-V-C-03-0076-B and OMB-V-A-03-0051-B, respectively.

On February 21, 2003, Deputy Ombudsman Miro approved a Joint Evaluation Report5 dated February 12, 2003. In said

evaluation report, Graft Investigation Officer (GIO) Antonio B. Yap found the letter complaint to be sufficient in formand substance. He concluded that the offense charged is not related to the functions of petitioner as a judge and canbe the subject of preliminary investigation.6 With regard to the administrative aspect of the case, GIO Yaprecommended that the case be indorsed to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for appropriate action.7

GIO Yap also received information that it would be difficult on the part of the prosecutors to conduct the investigationbecause they regularly appear before the sala of petitioner for their cases. The Provincial Prosecutor of NegrosOccidental also manifested that they would inhibit if the case would be returned to them. Consequently, he deemedthat it would be more appropriate if the Office of the Ombudsman would conduct the necessary investigation.8


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Corollarilly, on March 8, 2003, petitioner compulsory retired from the service.9

After the preliminary investigation, GIO Yap found the existence of probable cause for the crime of RecklessImprudence Resulting to Homicide in OMB-V-C-03-0076-B. In a Resolution10 dated August 12, 2003, he recommendedthe filing of the corresponding charges against the petitioner but dismissed the charges against Liyage.11

On January 27, 2004, an Information12 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the petitionerbefore the MCTC Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, which was later docketed as Criminal Case No. 5982-C.

On March 1, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information13 on the following grounds: (1) that it does notconform substantially to the prescribed form; (2) that the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offensecharged and over his person; and, (3) that the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.14 Ultimatelypetitioner prayed that the information be quashed and be referred to this Court for appropriate action.

On August 25, 2004, the MCTC issued an Order15 granting the motion and, consequently, quashing the information.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the court granted in an Order16 dated November 23, 2004. Thecourt opined, among other things, that the case had nothing to do with the performance of petitioners officialfunctions and that an administrative complaint against him had already been filed, as such, the purpose of referringcases against judges and court personnel to the Supreme Court has already been served.17 Accordingly, the MCTC setaside its earlier order and denied petitioners motion to quash, the decretal portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the subject motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution is

granted. Accordingly, the order of this court dated August 25, 2004, granting the accuseds motion to quash theinformation is hereby reconsidered and set aside and, therefore, the accuseds motion to quash the information isdenied.

SO ORDERED.18

Petitioner then filed his Motion for Reconsideration,19 which was denied in the Order20 dated January 26, 2005.

Hence, the petition.

At the outset, it is apparent that the present petition was directly filed before this Court, in utter disregard of the ruleon the hierarchy of courts which, thus warrants its outright dismissal. In Vergara, Sr. v. Suelto,21 this Court stressedthat "[w]here the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals or a RegionalTrial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must be presented," thus:


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The Supreme Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assignedto it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task ofdealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called extraordinary writs should beexercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, thatjurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or beforeconstitutional or other tribunals, bodies or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by theCourt of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within the competence of the Court of Appeals ora Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writs procurement must bepresented. This is, and should continue, to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly

observe.22

Later, we reaffirmed such policy in People v. Cuaresma23 after noting that there is "a growing tendency on the part oflitigants and lawyers to have their applications for the so-called extraordinary writs, and sometimes even theirappeals, passed upon and adjudicated directly and immediately by the highest tribunal of the land." We stressed that -

[t]his Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeascorpus and injunction) is not exclusive. x x x It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with theCourt of Appeals x x x. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking anyof the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serveas a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for thatjudicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level x x xcourts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A directinvocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there arespecial and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is apolicy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devotedto those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket. x xx.1avvphi1

Notwithstanding the dismissibility of the instant petition for failure to observe the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts,

this Court will proceed to entertain the case grounded as it is on a pure question of law.

Petitioner argues that respondents violated this Courts pronouncements in Caoibes, Jr. v. Ombudsman,24 directingthe Ombudsman to refer all cases against judges and court personnel filed before his office to the Supreme Court;25and, in Fuentes v. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao,26 restricting not only the Ombudsman and the prosecutionarm of the government, but also other official and functionary thereof in initiating or investigating judges and courtpersonnel.27

Petitioners contentions are misplaced.

As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, the two cases cited by the petitioner involve the performance ofadministrative and professional duties of the judges that were involved. Caoibes concerns the judges dealings with hisfellow member of the Bench, while Fuentes touches on the acts of a judge in the exercise of his official functions,particularly the issuance of a writ of execution.

In Caoibes, two members of the judiciary got entangled in a fight within court premises over a piece of office furnitureOne of the judges filed a criminal complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman and an administrative complaintbefore this Court over the same incident. When the Ombudsman denied the motion of Judge Caoibes to refer the case


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to the Supreme Court, he filed a petition for certiorari before this Court seeking the reversal of the order. In grantingthe petition, the Court held that:

Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with exclusive administrativesupervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine foritself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter.The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to theSupreme Court for determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved therein.

x x x x

Maceda28 is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts and courtpersonnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk, it is onlythe Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance with all laws, and take the properadministrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrudeinto this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.29

In Fuentes, the issue was whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation over the acts of a judge in theexercise of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the absence ofan administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.30 According to this Court:

Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office againstpetitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The Ombudsman must indorse the case to theSupreme Court, for appropriate action.

Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over allcourts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.

Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the properadministrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No other branch of governmentmay intrude into this power, without running afoul of the independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separationof powers.

Petitioners questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a writ of execution were

done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order may be erroneous or void for lack or excess ofjurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of execution was valid under the given circumstances, must beinquired into in the course of the judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. "Noother entity or official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not anyfunctionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final and executory or not--andpronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative complaint for rendering an unjustjudgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts alone."31

Indeed, supervision over all inferior courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals tothe lowest ranked court employee, is vested by the Constitution in the Supreme Court. However, that prerogative only


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extends to administrative supervision. As such, the Ombudsman cannot encroach upon this Courts task to overseejudges and court personnel and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of thelaws of the land.

In the case at bar, the criminal case filed against petitioner was in no way related to the performance of his duties as ajudge. The Information reveals:

The undersigned Graft Investigation Officer of the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas, accuses JUDGE RODOLFO BGARCIA, of the crime of RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE, defined and penalized under ARTICLE 365OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of November, 2002, at about 5:15 o'clock in the afternoon, at Sitio Tunga, BarangayBantayanon, Municipality of Calatrava, Province of Negros Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, above-named accused JUDGE RODOLFO B. GARCIA, a public officer, being then the Municipal Judgeof the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calatrava-Toboso, Negros Occidental, with Salary Grade 26, then driving a LandCruiser Toyota bearing Plate No. FDB-193, along the road at Sitio Tunga, Barangay Bantayanon, Calatrava, NegrosOccidental, a public highway, did then and there drive or operate said vehicle in a reckless, negligent and imprudent

manner without taking the necessary precaution considering the grade, visibility and other conditions of the highway,nor due regard to the traffic rules and ordinances in order to prevent accident to persons or damage to property,thereby causing by such recklessness, negligence and imprudence the said vehicle to hit and bump the motorcycledriven by Francisco C. Ortega, Jr., bearing Plate No. FH-2324, with Josemarie Paghubasan as his backrider, therebycausing upon Francisco C. Ortega, Jr. the following physical injuries, to with [sic]:

x x x x

which injuries resulted to the death of Francisco C. Ortega, Jr.

CONTRARY TO LAW.32

From the foregoing, the filing of the criminal charges against the petitioner before the MCTC was warranted by theabove circumstances. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of reckless imprudenceresulting in homicide is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods ranging from two (2) years, four (4)months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of RepublicAct No. 7691,33 provides as follows:

SEC. 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in CriminaCases. Except in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of theSandiganbayan, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all violations of city or municipal ordinances committed within their respectiveterritorial jurisdiction; and


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(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) yearsirrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civiliability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amount thereofProvided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall haveexclusive original jurisdiction thereof.

As such, the jurisdiction of the MCTC over the case is beyond contestation.

Moreover, contrary to petitioners allegation, the administrative aspect of the case against him was endorsed by theOmbudsman-Visayas to the OCA for appropriate action.34 In addition, an administrative complaint against petitionerinvolving the same facts was filed by Julieta Ortega with the OCA. The case was docketed as Administrative MatterOCA IPI No. 03-1403-MTJ, and is still pending to date. Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact considering that hefiled a Comment and Answer to the Complaint-Affidavit of Mrs. Julieta Ortega,35 dated March 21, 2003. Thus, theCourts mandate, as laid down in Caoibes, was more than satisfactorily complied with.

To reiterate, the case filed against petitioner before the MCTC is a criminal case under its own jurisdiction asprescribed by law and not an administrative case. To be sure, trial courts retain jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of

offenses committed by judges of the lower courts.36

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Calatrava-Toboso, NegrosOccidental, is ordered to proceed with the trial of Criminal Case No. 5982-C with dispatch.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice

ROLANDO TAN, ELENA TAN G.R. No. 164966

and LAMBERTO TAN,

Petitioners, Present:

Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),

- versus - Austria-Martinez,

Chico-Nazario, and

Nachura, JJ.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS, HON. HERMES B.


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MONTERO, in his capacity as Promulgated:

Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and

the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Respondents. June 8, 2007

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the November 24, 2003 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74450 dismissing the petition for prohibition and injunction, which sought to enjoin the Presiding Judge ofthe Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 5, from further proceeding with Crim. Case Nos. 64381, 64383, 64385,64386 and 64387; and the July 14, 2004 Resolution[2] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

In a Letter-Complaint dated June 26, 2002, James L. King (King) charged Roderick Lim-Go, Lucy Go, Nelson Go, JohnDoe and Peter Doe with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) and Estafa involving two checks both datedJune 21, 2002, to wit: (1) United Overseas Bank Philippines (UOB) Check No. 00082597 in the amount of P20 Millionand (2) UOB Check No. 00082599 in the amount of P7.9 Million.

Subsequently or on July 10, 2002, King filed a Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit involving five additional checks, to wit:(1) UOB Check No. 0000082596 dated June 21, 2002 in the amount of P7 Million; (2) UOB Check No. 0000082598dated June 21, 2002 in the amount of P26.68 Million; (3) UOB Check No. 0000082434 dated June 23, 2002 in theamount of P2.6 Million; (4) UOB Check No. 0000082495 dated June 24, 2002 in the amount of P7 Million; and (5) UOBCheck No. 0000082494 dated June 24, 2002 in the amount of P18 Million. The complaints were docketed as I.S. Nos.02-5997-5999-F, 02-0827-B, 02-0827-C, 02-0827-D, 02-0827-E and 02-0827-F, respectively.

On August 1, 2002, King filed a Second Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit for Estafa impleading Grace Tan-Go, andherein petitioners Rolando Tan, Elena Tan, and Lamberto Tan, as additional respondents.

King averred that in February 2002, the spouses Roderick Lim Go and Grace Tan-Go (spouses Go) proposed to him abusiness transaction wherein the spouses Go would borrow cash from King in exchange for which Roderick Go wouldissue postdated checks corresponding to the amount borrowed plus interest. Roderick Gos parents, Go Tong Go andLucy Go, and brother, Nelson Go, assured King that whatever checks Roderick Go would issue would be funded ontheir due dates and that the checking account at the United Overseas Bank, Carbon Branch, Cebu City is their jointaccount. King agreed to the business proposal. Thereafter, Roderick Go started issuing checks, inclusive of interestin exchange for the cash given by King. The checks when presented for encashment were initially honored by thedrawee bank; consequently, King reposed his trust and confidence in spouses Go.


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On March 22, 2002, the spouses Go, together with herein petitioners Rolando Tan (father of Grace Tan-Go), Elena Tan(mother of Grace Tan-Go), asked P100 Million from King allegedly for the renovation of their movie houses in ButuanCity. However, King could only accommodate P40 Million, in exchange for which, Roderick Go issued several checksto King in the amount of P61.28 Million, inclusive of the interest for three months.

At first, the checks issued by Go were honored by the drawee bank when presented. However, on June 24, 2002, whenseveral of the checks he issued were about to fall due, Roderick Go requested King for a meeting. While at the agreedmeeting place, Roderick Go allegedly attacked King with a box cutter and told him that all the checks that he issuedwould be dishonored and for this reason he had to injure, kidnap and kill him. This incident is the subject of a separatecriminal case. Thereafter, all the checks dated June 21, 23 and 24, 2002 issued by Roderick Go were dishonored forhaving been drawn against insufficient funds. Despite repeated demands, no payment was made; hence, King filed acomplaint for violation of BP Blg. 22 and Estafa.

All the accused, except Roderick Go, submitted their counter-affidavits. In their Joint Counter-Affidavit[3] dated August8, 2002, petitioners denied meeting King on March 22, 2002; that only Roderick Go could be held liable for thebouncing checks considering that he alone issued the same; that Kings first supplemental complaint-affidavitcontradicted his second supplemental complaint-affidavit. In the first supplemental complaint-affidavit, Roderick Go,Lucy Go, Nelson Go, John Doe and Peter Doe were made respondents as co-conspirators relative to the issuance of thebouncing checks, while in the second supplemental complaint-affidavit, petitioners were made co-conspirators overthe same checks but under totally different circumstances. Thus, petitioners claim that the criminal cases filed againstthem were an afterthought and prayed that the same be dismissed.

The preliminary investigation of the subject criminal cases was initially assigned to 1st Assistant ProvinciaProsecutor/Officer-in-Charge Cesar Tajanlangit who voluntarily inhibited himself. On October 10, 2002, then Secretaryof Justice Hernando B. Perez issued Department Order (D.O.) No. 369,[4] designating public respondent 3rd AssistantProvincial Prosecutor Hermes Montero (Montero) to continue with the preliminary investigation of these cases, and, ifthe evidence warranted, to file the appropriate informations in court.

In a Joint Resolution[5] dated November 8, 2002, public respondent Montero found probable cause for the followingcrimes:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the following criminal Informations shall be filed against:

(1) Roderick L. Go, alias Edu Ting, for violation of B.P. 22 on seven (7) counts;

(2) Roderick L. Go, Grace Tan-Go, Go Tong Go, Lucy Go and Nelson Go, for estafa on two (2) counts anent (a) UOB

Check No. 00082597 dated June 21, 2002 in the amount of P20,000,000.00; and (b) UOB Check No. 00082599 datedJune 21, 2002 in the amount of P7,800,000.00;

(3) Roderick L. Go, Grace Tan-Go, Go Tong Go, Lucy Go, Nelson Go, [petitioners] Rolando Tan, Elena Tan andLamberto Tan, for estafa on five (5) counts anent (c) UOB Check No. 0000082596 dated June 21, 2002, in the amountof P7,000,000.00, (d) UOB Check No. 0000082598 dated June 21, 2002, in the amount of P26,680,000.00, (e) UOBCheck No. 0000082434 dated June 23, 2002, in the amount of P2,600,000.00, (f) UOB Check No. 0000082495 datedJune 24, 2002, in the amount of P7,000,000.00, and (g) UOB Check No. 0000082494 dated June 24, 2002, in theamount of P18,000,000.00.[6]


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On November 11, 2002, five informations for estafa under Article 315, 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code were filedagainst Roderick L. Go, Grace Tan-Go, Go Tong Go, Lucy Go, Nelson Go, and herein petitioners, docketed as CriminalCase Nos. CBU- 64381, 64383, 64385, 64386, and 64387 and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 of Cebu City.From the above-quoted adverse Resolution of public respondent Montero, only Roderick Go and Grace Tan-Goseparately appealed to the Secretary of Justice.

On November 18, 2002, before any warrant of arrest could be issued, petitioners posted bail. The following day or onNovember 19, 2002, they were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.

On December 17, 2002, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Prayerfor Temporary Restraining Order[7] before the Court of Appeals. They sought to restrain the trial court fromproceeding with the subject criminal cases against them and prayed that the same be dismissed.

On November 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit. Itfound that (1) petitioners failed to avail themselves of other plain, speedy and adequate remedies to challenge the

public prosecutors finding of probable cause; (2) the petition failed to establish that it falls under any of theexceptions to the general rule that the court will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final, toenjoin or restrain a criminal prosecution; (3) public respondent Montero was duly authorized by the Secretary of Justiceto conduct the preliminary investigation and, if the evidence so warranted, to file the corresponding informationsrelative to the subject criminal cases; (4) petitioners failed to prove that public respondents acted with grave abuse ofdiscretion; and (5) petitioners claims contesting the public prosecutors finding of probable cause are matters ofdefense that should be threshed out during the trial of the criminal cases and not through the extraordinary remedy ofprohibition.

After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners interposed the instant petition raising nine issues[8]revolving around the factual and legal bases of the finding of probable cause for estafa against them as well as the

authority of public respondent Montero to file the subject criminal cases with the trial court.

At the outset, it must be stressed that petitioners are asking us to review the Decision of the Court of Appeals whichdismissed their petition for prohibition. Therefore, the principal issue is whether resort to the extraordinary remedy ofprohibition was proper.

We rule in the negative.

Basic is the rule that the writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy to prevent the unlawful and oppressive exerciseof legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly administration of justice.[9] It is available only when there is noappeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and when the proceedings are donewithout or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner must allege in his petition andestablish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate.[10] A remedy is plain, speedy andadequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of that judgment and the acts of thetribunal or inferior court.[11] Further, the writ will not lie to correct errors of judgment but only errors of jurisdictionAs long as the tribunal acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion wilamount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment which are correctible by a timely appeal.[12] In determiningwhether a tribunal acted in grave abuse of discretion, mere abuse of discretion is not enough. There must be graveabuse of discretion as where the tribunal exercised its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion


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(1) To withdraw the informations filed in Court against all the respondents for Estafa.

(2) To file the corresponding Informations in Court against RODERICK LIM GO only, for violations of BP 22 on eight(8) counts and proceed with the prosecution thereof; and

(3) To submit to this Office, within ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution, the appropriate action or actions

taken.

SO ORDERED.[20]

When King moved for reconsideration of the above Resolution, petitioners participated in the proceedings before theSecretary of Justice by opposing the same together with Grace Tan-Go.[21] In a Resolution[22] dated February 112004, then Acting Secretary of Justice Merceditas N. Guitierrez granted Kings motion for reconsideration andreinstated public respondent Monteros Joint Resolution dated November 8, 2002. Grace Tan-Go then filed a motionfor reconsideration which was joined by petitioners through their motion for leave to join the motion for

reconsideration.[23] However, Acting Secretary Guiterrez denied the same in a Resolution dated August 18, 2004Thereafter, Grace Tan-Go filed a motion to resolve the second ground raised in her motion for reconsideration. In aResolution[24] dated December 17, 2004, Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez reversed and set aside the February11, 2004 and August 18, 2004 Resolutions of Acting Secretary Gutierrez, and reinstated former SecretaryDatumanongs Resolution dated December 23, 2003. Consequently, a motion to withdraw informations[25] was filedby the prosecution before the trial court.

By participating in the proceedings before the Secretary of Justice, petitioners have actively litigated the issuesregarding the factual and legal bases of the finding of probable cause against them as well as the authority of publicrespondent Montero to file the subject criminal informations. This is clearly borne by the tenor of the Resolution datedDecember 17, 2004 issued by the Secretary of Justice. Yet, these issues are exactly the same issues being raised by

petitioners before this Court through the instant petition which is separate and distinct from the proceedings beforethe Secretary of Justice whose aforesaid Resolution is not the one before us for review. To reiterate, what is before usfor review is the Decision of the Court of Appeals which dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by petitioners torestrain the trial court from proceeding with the criminal cases against them.

In effect, by taking these two distinct courses of actions, petitioners have pursued the same or related causes, prayedfor the same or substantially the same reliefs, and, in the process, have created the possibility of conflicting decisionsbeing rendered by the different fora upon the same issues which is precisely the evil that the rule on forum-shoppingseeks to prevent.[26] Doubtless, they have engaged in a form of forum-shopping. Their attempt to trifle with thecourts and abuse their processes must not be countenanced. As a consequence of petitioners violation of the ruleagainst forum-shopping and in order to preserve the laudable objectives of the rule against forum-shopping, the

dismissal of the petition for prohibition should be upheld.[27]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 24, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No74450 dismissing petitioners petition for prohibition, and the Resolution dated July 14, 2004 denying reconsiderationthereof, are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioners.


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G.R. No. 170656 August 15, 2007

THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANI FERNANDO as Chairman of the MetropolitanManila Development Authority, petitioners,

vs.

VIRON TRANSPORTATION CO., INC., respondent.

x --------------------------------------------- x

G.R. No. 170657 August 15, 2007

HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Executive Secretary, the METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and BAYANIFERNANDO as Chairman of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority, petitioners,

vs.

MENCORP TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM, INC., respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The following conditions in 1969, as observed by this Court:

Vehicles have increased in number. Traffic congestion has moved from bad to worse, from tolerable to critical. Thenumber of people who use the thoroughfares has multiplied x x x,1

have remained unchecked and have reverberated to this day. Traffic jams continue to clog the streets of Metro Manila,bringing vehicles to a standstill at main road arteries during rush hour traffic and sapping peoples energies andpatience in the process.

The present petition for review on certiorari, rooted in the traffic congestion problem, questions the authority of theMetropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to order the closure of provincial bus terminals along Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA) and major thoroughfares of Metro Manila.

Specifically challenged are two Orders issued by Judge Silvino T. Pampilo, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofManila, Branch 26 in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224.

The first assailed Order of September 8, 2005,2 which resolved a motion for reconsideration filed by hereinrespondents, declared Executive Order (E.O.) No. 179, hereafter referred to as the E.O., "unconstitutional as it


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constitutes an unreasonable exercise of police power." The second assailed Order of November 23, 20053 deniedpetitioners motion for reconsideration.

The following facts are not disputed:

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued the E.O. on February 10, 2003, "Providing for the Establishment of Greater

Manila Mass Transport System," the pertinent portions of which read:

WHEREAS, Metro Manila continues to be the center of employment opportunities, trade and commerce of the GreaterMetro Manila area;

WHEREAS, the traffic situation in Metro Manila has affected the adjacent provinces of Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, andRizal, owing to the continued movement of residents and industries to more affordable and economically viablelocations in these provinces;

WHEREAS, the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) is tasked to undertake measures to ease trafficcongestion in Metro Manila and ensure the convenient and efficient travel of commuters within its jurisdiction;

WHEREAS, a primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been the numerous buses plying the streets thatimpedes [sic] the flow of vehicles and commuters due to the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes;

WHEREAS, the MMDA has recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now locatedalong major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the

commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities that would integrate the existing transportmodes, namely the buses, the rail-based systems of the LRT, MRT and PNR and to facilitate and ensure efficient travelthrough the improved connectivity of the different transport modes;

WHEREAS, the national government must provide the necessary funding requirements to immediately implement andrender operational these projects; and extent to MMDA such other assistance as may be warranted to ensure theirexpeditious prosecution.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me

by law, do hereby order:

Section 1. THE PROJECT. The project shall be identified as GREATER MANILA TRANSPORT SYSTEM Project.

Section 2. PROJECT OBJECTIVES. In accordance with the plan proposed by MMDA, the project aims to develop four (4)interim intermodal mass transport terminals to integrate the different transport modes, as well as those that shallhereafter be developed, to serve the commuting public in the northwest, north, east, south, and southwest of MetroManila. Initially, the project shall concentrate on immediately establishing the mass transport terminals for the northand south Metro Manila commuters as hereinafter described.


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Section 3. PROJECT IMPLEMENTING AGENCY. The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), is herebydesignated as the implementing Agency for the project. For this purpose, MMDA is directed to undertake suchinfrastructure development work as may be necessary and, thereafter, manage the project until it may be turned-overto more appropriate agencies, if found suitable and convenient. Specifically, MMDA shall have the following functionsand responsibilities:

a) Cause the preparation of the Master Plan for the projects, including the designs and costing;

b) Coordinate the use of the land and/or properties needed for the project with the respective agencies and/or entitiesowning them;

c) Supervise and manage the construction of the necessary structures and facilities;

d) Execute such contracts or agreements as may be necessary, with the appropriate government agencies, entities,and/or private persons, in accordance with existing laws and pertinent regulations, to facilitate the implementation ofthe project;

e) Accept, manage and disburse such funds as may be necessary for the construction and/or implementation of theprojects, in accordance with prevailing accounting and audit polices and practice in government.

f) Enlist the assistance of any national government agency, office or department, including local government units,government-owned or controlled corporations, as may be necessary;

g) Assign or hire the necessary personnel for the above purposes; and

h) Perform such other related functions as may be necessary to enable it to accomplish the objectives and purposes ofthis Executive Order.4 (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

As the above-quoted portions of the E.O. noted, the primary cause of traffic congestion in Metro Manila has been thenumerous buses plying the streets and the inefficient connectivity of the different transport modes;5 and the MMDAhad "recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manilathoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting publicthrough the provision of mass transport terminal facilities"6 which plan is referred to under the E.O. as the GreaterManila Mass Transport System Project (the Project).

The E.O. thus designated the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project.

Pursuant to the E.O., the Metro Manila Council (MMC), the governing board and policymaking body of the MMDAissued Resolution No. 03-07 series of 20037 expressing full support of the Project. Recognizing the imperative to


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with the Public Service Act and the Constitution; and (3) provincial bus operators would be deprived of their reaproperties without due process of law should they be required to use the common bus terminals.

Upon the agreement of the parties, they filed their respective position papers in lieu of hearings.

By Decision18 of January 24, 2005, the trial court sustained the constitutionality and legality of the E.O. pursuant to

R.A. No. 7924, which empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manilas basic services including those of transportand traffic management.

The trial court held that the E.O. was a valid exercise of the police power of the State as it satisfied the two tests oflawful subject matter and lawful means, hence, Virons and Mencorps property rights must yield to police power.

On the separate motions for reconsideration of Viron and Mencorp, the trial court, by Order of September 8, 2005,reversed its Decision, this time holding that the E.O. was "an unreasonable exercise of police power"; that theauthority of the MMDA under Section (5)(e) of R.A. No. 7924 does not include the power to order the closure of Virons

and Mencorps existing bus terminals; and that the E.O. is inconsistent with the provisions of the Public Service Act.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied by Resolution of November 23, 2005.

Hence, this petition, which faults the trial court for failing to rule that: (1) the requisites of declaratory relief are notpresent, there being no justiciable controversy in Civil Case Nos. 03-105850 and 03-106224; and (2) the President hasthe authority to undertake or cause the implementation of the Project.19

Petitioners contend that there is no justiciable controversy in the cases for declaratory relief as nothing in the body ofthe E.O. mentions or orders the closure and elimination of bus terminals along the major thoroughfares of MetroManila. Viron and Mencorp, they argue, failed to produce any letter or communication from the Executive Departmentapprising them of an immediate plan to close down their bus terminals.

And petitioners maintain that the E.O. is only an administrative directive to government agencies to coordinate withthe MMDA and to make available for use government property along EDSA and South Expressway corridors. They addthat the only relation created by the E.O. is that between the Chief Executive and the implementing officials, but notbetween third persons.

The petition fails.

It is true, as respondents have pointed out, that the alleged deficiency of the consolidated petitions to meet therequirement of justiciability was not among the issues defined for resolution in the Pre-Trial Order of January 12, 2004.It is equally true, however, that the question was repeatedly raised by petitioners in their Answer to Virons petition,20their Comment of April 29, 2003 opposing Mencorps prayer for the issuance of a TRO,21 and their Position Paper ofAugust 23, 2004.22


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In bringing their petitions before the trial court, both respondents pleaded the existence of the essential requisites fortheir respective petitions for declaratory relief,23 and refuted petitioners contention that a justiciable controversy waslacking.24 There can be no denying, therefore, that the issue was raised and discussed by the parties before the trialcourt.

The following are the essential requisites for a declaratory relief petition: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy;(b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory reliefmust have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination.25

The requirement of the presence of a justiciable controversy is satisfied when an actual controversy or the ripeningseeds thereof exist between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and the declaration sought willhelp in ending the controversy.26 A question becomes justiciable when it is translated into a claim of right which isactually contested.27

In the present cases, respondents resort to court was prompted by the issuance of the E.O. The 4th Whereas clause ofthe E.O. sets out in clear strokes the MMDAs plan to "decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now locatedalong major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more convenient access to the mass transport system to the

commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

Section 2 of the E.O. thereafter lays down the immediate establishment of common bus terminals for north- and south-bound commuters. For this purpose, Section 8 directs the Department of Budget and Management to allocate funds ofnot more than one hundred million pesos (P100,000,000) to cover the cost of the construction of the north and southterminals. And the E.O. was made effective immediately.

The MMDAs resolve to immediately implement the Project, its denials to the contrary notwithstanding, is also evidentfrom telltale circumstances, foremost of which was the passage by the MMC of Resolution No. 03-07, Series of 2003

expressing its full support of the immediate implementation of the Project.

Notable from the 5th Whereas clause of the MMC Resolution is the plan to "remove the bus terminals located alongmajor thoroughfares of Metro Manila and an urgent need to integrate the different transport modes." The 7th Whereasclause proceeds to mention the establishment of the North and South terminals.

As alleged in Virons petition, a diagram of the GMA-MTS North Bus/Rail Terminal had been drawn up, and constructionof the terminal is already in progress. The MMDA, in its Answer28 and Position Paper,29 in fact affirmed that thegovernment had begun to implement the Project.

It thus appears that the issue has already transcended the boundaries of what is merely conjectural oanticipatory.lawphil

Under the circumstances, for respondents to wait for the actual issuance by the MMDA of an order for the closure ofrespondents bus terminals would be foolhardy for, by then, the proper action to bring would no longer be fordeclaratory relief which, under Section 1, Rule 6330 of the Rules of Court, must be brought before there is a breach orviolation of rights.


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As for petitioners contention that the E.O. is a mere administrative issuance which creates no relation with thirdpersons, it does not persuade. Suffice it to stress that to ensure the success of the Project for which the concernedgovernment agencies are directed to coordinate their activities and resources, the existing bus terminals owned,operated or leased by third persons like respondents would have to be eliminated; and respondents would be forced tooperate from the common bus terminals.

It cannot be gainsaid that the E.O. would have an adverse effect on respondents. The closure of their bus terminalswould mean, among other things, the loss of income from the operation and/or rentals of stalls thereat. Precisely,respondents claim a deprivation of their constitutional right to property without due process of law.

Respondents have thus amply demonstrated a "personal and substantial interest in the case such that [they have]sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of [the E.O.s] enforcement."31 Consequently, the established rulethat the constitutionality of a law or administrative issuance can be challenged by one who will sustain a direct injuryas a result of its enforcement has been satisfied by respondents.

On to the merits of the case.

Respondents posit that the MMDA is devoid of authority to order the elimination of their bus terminals under the E.O.which, they argue, is unconstitutional because it violates both the Constitution and the Public Service Act; and thatneither is the MMDA clothed with such authority under R.A. No. 7924.

Petitioners submit, however, that the real issue concerns the Presidents authority to undertake or to cause theimplementation of the Project. They assert that the authority of the President is derived from E.O. No. 125"Reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communications Defining its Powers and Functions and for OtherPurposes," her residual power and/or E.O. No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987. They add thatthe E.O. is also a valid exercise of the police power.

E.O. No. 125,32 which former President Corazon Aquino issued in the exercise of legislative powers, reorganized thethen Ministry (now Department) of Transportation and Communications. Sections 4, 5, 6 and 22 of E.O. 125, asamended by E.O. 125-A,33 read:

SECTION 4. Mandate. The Ministry shall be the primary policy, planning, programming, coordinating, implementing,regulating and administrative entity of the Executive Branch of the government in the promotion, development andregulation of dependable and coordinated networks of transportation and communication systems as well as in the

fast, safe, efficient and reliable postal, transportation and communications services.

To accomplish such mandate, the Ministry shall have the following objectives:

(a) Promote the development of dependable and coordinated networks of transportation and communicationssystems;


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(b) Guide government and private investment in the development of the countrys intermodal transportation andcommunications systems in a most practical, expeditious, and orderly fashion for maximum safety, service, and costeffectiveness; (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

x x x x

SECTION 5. Powers and Functions. To accomplish its mandate, the Ministry shall have the following powers andfunctions:

(a) Formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines for the preparation and implementation of integratedand comprehensive transportation and communications systems at the national, regional and local levels;

(b) Establish and administer comprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications, and forthis purpose, may call on any agency, corporation, or organization, whether public or private, whose developmentprograms include transportation and communications as an integral part thereof, to participate and assist in the

preparation and implementation of such program;

(c) Assess, review and provide direction to transportation and communications research and development programs ofthe government in coordination with other institutions concerned;

(d) Administer all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and communications; (Emphasis andunderscoring supplied)

x x x x

SECTION 6. Authority and Responsibility. The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of theMinistry and for the discharge of its powers and functions shall be vested in the Minister of Transportation andCommunications, hereinafter referred to as the Minister, who shall have supervision and control over the Ministry andshall be appointed by the President. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

SECTION 22. Implementing Authority of Minister. The Minister shall issue such orders, rules, regulations and otherissuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the provisions of this Executive Order

(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is readily apparent from the abovequoted provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, that the President, thenpossessed of and exercising legislative powers, mandated the DOTC to be the primary policy, planning, programming,coordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks oftransportation and communications. The grant of authority to the DOTC includes the power to establish and administercomprehensive and integrated programs for transportation and communications.


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As may be seen further, the Minister (now Secretary) of the DOTC is vested with the authority and responsibility toexercise the mandate given to the department. Accordingly, the DOTC Secretary is authorized to issue such orders,rules, regulations and other issuances as may be necessary to ensure the effective implementation of the law.

Since, under the law, the DOTC is authorized to establish and administer programs and projects for transportation, itfollows that the President may exercise the same power and authority to order the implementation of the Projectwhich admittedly is one for transportation.

Such authority springs from the Presidents power of control over all executive departments as well as the obligationfor the faithful execution of the laws under Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution which provides:

SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensurethat the laws be faithfully executed.

This constitutional provision is echoed in Section 1, Book III of the Administrative Code of 1987. Notably, Section 38

Chapter 37, Book IV of the same Code defines the Presidents power of supervision and control over the executivedepartments, viz:

SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships. Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in otherlaws defining the special relationships of particular agencies, administrative relationships shall be categorized anddefined as follows:

(1) Supervision and Control. Supervision and control shall include authority to act directly whenever a specificfunction is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission ofacts; review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; determine priorities in the

execution of plans and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided in the specific law governing therelationship of particular agencies the word "control" shall encompass supervision and control as defined in thisparagraph. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate, the President may act directly ormerely direct the performance of a duty.34

Respecting the Presidents authority to order the implementation of the Project in the exercise of the police power ofthe State, suffice it to stress that the powers vested in the DOTC Secretary to establish and administer comprehensive

and integrated programs for transportation and communications and to issue orders, rules and regulations toimplement such mandate (which, as previously discussed, may also be exercised by the President) have been sodelegated for the good and welfare of the people. Hence, these powers partake of the nature of police power.

Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonablelaws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for the good and welfare of the people.35 This powerto prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of thepeople flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex the welfare of the people is the supreme law.


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While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly beingdelegated.36 By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the President and administrativeboards37 as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local governments under an expressdelegation by the Local Government Code of 1991.38

The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation of theMMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basistherefor.

It bears stressing that under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which isauthorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President,although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through theinstrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotiondevelopment and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement aproject such as the Project in question.

By designating the MMDA as the implementing agency of the Project, the President clearly overstepped the limits of

the authority conferred by law, rendering E.O. No. 179 ultra vires.

In another vein, the validity of the designation of MMDA flies in the absence of a specific grant of authority to it underR.A. No. 7924.

To recall, R.A. No. 7924 declared the Metropolitan Manila area39 as a "special development and administrative region"and placed the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region under the MMDA.

Section 2 of R.A. No. 7924 specifically authorizes the MMDA to perform "planning, monitoring and coordinativefunctions, and in the process exercise regulatory and supervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services,"including transport and traffic management.40 Section 5 of the same law enumerates the powers and functions of theMMDA as follows:

(a) Formulate, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium and long-term plans and programs for thedelivery of metro-wide services, land use and physical development within Metropolitan Manila, consistent withnational development objectives and priorities;

(b) Prepare, coordinate and regulate the implementation of medium-term investment programs for metro-wideservices which shall indicate sources and uses of funds for priority programs and projects, and which shall include thepackaging of projects and presentation to funding institutions;

(c) Undertake and manage on its own metro-wide programs and projects for the delivery of specific services under itsjurisdiction, subject to the approval of the Council. For this purpose, MMDA can create appropriate projectmanagement offices;


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(d) Coordinate and monitor the implementation of such plans, programs and projects in Metro Manila; identifybottlenecks and adopt solutions to problems of implementation;

(e) The MMDA shall set the policies concerning traffic in Metro Manila, and shall coordinate and regulate theimplementation of all programs and projects concerning traffic management, specifically pertaining to enforcementengineering and education. Upon request, it shall be extended assistance and cooperation, including but not limitedto, assignment of personnel, by all other government agencies and offices concerned;

(f) Install and administer a single ticketing system, fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all kinds of violationsof traffic rules and regulations, whether moving or non-moving in nature, and confiscate and suspend or revokedrivers licenses in the enforcement of such traffic laws and regulations, the provisions of RA 4136 and PD 1605 to thecontrary notwithstanding. For this purpose, the Authority shall impose all traffic laws and regulations in Metro Manilathrough its traffic operation center, and may deputize members of the PNP, traffic enforcers of local government units,duly licensed security guards, or members of non-governmental organizations to whom may be delegated certainauthority, subject to such conditions and requirements as the Authority may impose; and

(g) Perform other related functions required to achieve the objectives of the MMDA, including the undertaking of

delivery of basic services to the local government units, when deemed necessary subject to prior coordination withand consent of the local government unit concerned." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The scope of the function of MMDA as an administrative, coordinating and policy-setting body has been settled inMetropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.41 In that case, the Courtstressed:

Clearly, the scope of the MMDAs function is limited to the delivery of the seven (7) basic services. One of these istransport and traffic management which includes the formulation and monitoring of policies, standards and projects to

rationalize the existing transport operations, infrastructure requirements, the use of thoroughfares and promotion ofthe safe movement of persons and goods. It also covers the mass transport system and the institution of a system ofroad regulation, the administration of all traffic enforcement operations, traffic engineering services and trafficeducation programs, including the institution of a single ticketing system in Metro Manila for traffic violations. Underthis service, the MMDA is expressly authorized to "to set the policies concerning traffic" and "coordinate and regulatethe implementation of all traffic management programs." In addition, the MMDA may install and administer a singleticketing system," fix, impose and collect fines and penalties for all traffic violations.

It will be noted that the powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation,implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro

Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local governmentunits, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to enact ordinances, approveresolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termedin the charter itself, a development authority. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies andcoordinating with the various national government agencies, peoples organizations, non-governmental organizationsand the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All itsfunctions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself, viz:

SECTION 2. Creation of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. . . .


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The MMDA shall perform planning, monitoring and coordinative functions, and in the process exercise regulatory andsupervisory authority over the delivery of metro-wide services within Metro Manila, without diminution of theautonomy of the local government units concerning purely local matters.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

In light of the administrative nature of its powers and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement theProject as envisioned by the E.O; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the President to undertake theProject. It follows that the MMDA cannot validly order the elimination of respondents terminals.

Even the MMDAs claimed authority under the police power must necessarily fail in consonance with the above-quotedruling in MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and this Courts subsequent ruling in Metropolitan ManilaDevelopment Authority v. Garin43 that the MMDA is not vested with police power.

Even assuming arguendo that police power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does not satisfythe two tests of a valid police power measure, viz: (1) the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from that ofa particular class, requires its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishmentof the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.44 Stated differently, the police power legislation must befirmly grounded on public interest and welfare and a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes and the

means.

As early as Calalang v. Williams,45 this Court recognized that traffic congestion is a public, not merely a private,concern. The Court therein held that public welfare underlies the contested statute authorizing the Director of PublicWorks to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control traffic on national roads.

Likewise, in Luque v. Villegas,46 this Court emphasized that public welfare lies at the bottom of any regulatorymeasure designed "to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a menace to public safety."47 As such,measures calculated to promote the safety and convenience of the people using the thoroughfares by the regulation

of vehicular traffic present a proper subject for the exercise of police power.

Notably, the parties herein concede that traffic congestion is a public concern that needs to be addressedimmediately. Indeed, the E.O. was issued due to the felt need to address the worsening traffic congestion in MetroManila which, the MMDA so determined, is caused by the increasing volume of buses plying the major thoroughfaresand the inefficient connectivity of existing transport systems. It is thus beyond cavil that the motivating force behindthe issuance of the E.O. is the interest of the public in general.

Are the means employed appropriate and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose. Are they notduly oppressive?

With the avowed objective of decongesting traffic in Metro Manila, the E.O. seeks to "eliminate[e] the bus terminalsnow located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and provid[e] more convenient access to the mass transportsystem to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities x x x."48 Common carrierswith terminals along the major thoroughfares of Metro Manila would thus be compelled to close down their existingbus terminals and use the MMDA-designated common parking areas.


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In Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. v. JAC Liner, Inc.,49 two city ordinances were passed by the SangguniangPanlungsod of Lucena, directing public utility vehicles to unload and load passengers at the Lucena Grand CentraTerminal, which was given the exclusive franchise to operate a single common terminal. Declaring that no otherterminals shall be situated, constructed, maintained or established inside or within the city of Lucena, the sangguniandeclared as inoperable all temporary terminals therein.

The ordinances were challenged before this Court for being unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, themeasures constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of theconstitutional prohibition against monopolies.

Citing De la Cruz v. Paras50 and Lupangco v. Court of Appeals,51 this Court held that the assailed ordinances werecharacterized by overbreadth, as they went beyond what was reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem in thecity. And it found that the compulsory use of the Lucena Grand Terminal was unduly oppressive because it wouldsubject its users to fees, rentals and charges.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights are exercisedwithin the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights.

A due deference to the rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of solutions to societaproblems.

From the memorandum filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod hadidentified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on thestreets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructingtraffic on the city streets.

Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright proscription againstthe existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary tosolve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus driversare compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonablespecifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which areunable to meet the specifications.

In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad thateven entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised terminal are barred from operating atall. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As in Lucena, this Court fails to see how the prohibition against the existence of respondents terminals can beconsidered a reasonable necessity to ease traffic congestion in the metropolis. On the contrary, the elimination ofrespondents bus terminals brings forth the distinct possibility and the equally harrowing reality of traffic congestion inthe common parking areas, a case of transference from one site to another.

Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of "colorum" buses, vans and taxis entering Metro Manila andusing the streets for parking and passenger pick-up points, as respondents suggest, might even be more effective in


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easing the traffic situation. So would the strict enforcement of traffic rules and the removal of obstructions from majorthoroughfares.

As to the alleged confiscatory character of the E.O., it need only to be stated that respondents certificates of publicconvenience confer no property right, and are mere licenses or privileges.52 As such, these must yield to legislationsafeguarding the interest of the people.

Even then, for reasons which bear reiteration, the MMDA cannot order the closure of respondents terminals not onlybecause no authority to implement the Project has been granted nor legislative or police power been delegated to it,but also because the elimination of the terminals does not satisfy the standards of a valid police power measure.

Finally, an order for the closure of respondents terminals is not in line with the provisions of the Public Service Act.

Paragraph (a), Section 13 of Chapter II of the Public Service Act (now Section 5 of Executive Order No. 202, creatingthe Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board or LFTRB) vested the Public Service Commission (PSC, now

the LTFRB) with "x x x jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public services and their franchises, equipment andother properties x x x."

Consonant with such grant of authority, the PSC was empowered to "impose such conditions as to construction,equipment, maintenance, service, or operation as the public interests and convenience may reasonably require"53 inapproving any franchise or privilege.

Further, Section 16 (g) and (h) of the Public Service Act54 provided that the Commission shall have the power, uponproper notice and hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations andexceptions mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:

(g) To compel any public service to furnish safe, adequate, and proper service as regards the manner of furnishing thesame as well as the maintenance of the necessary material and equipment.

(h) To require any public service to establish, construct, maintain, and operate any reasonable extension of its existingfacilities, where in the judgment of said Commission, such extension is reasonable and practicable and will furnishsufficient business to justify the construction and maintenance of the same and when the financial condition of thesaid public service reasonably warrants the original expenditure required in making and operating such extension.(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The establishment, as well as the maintenance of vehicle parking areas or passenger terminals, is generallyconsidered a necessary service to be provided by provincial bus operators like respondents, hence, the investmentsthey have poured into the acquisition or lease of suitable terminal sites. Eliminating the terminals would thus runcounter to the provisions of the Public Service Act.

This Court commiserates with the MMDA for the roadblocks thrown in the way of its efforts at solving the pesteringproblem of traffic congestion in Metro Manila. These efforts are commendable, to say the least, in the face of theabominable traffic situation of our roads day in and day out. This Court can only interpret, not change, the law,


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however. It needs only to be reiterated that it is the DOTC as the primary policy, planning, programmingcoordinating, implementing, regulating and administrative entity to promote, develop and regulate networks oftransportation and communications which has the power to establish and administer a transportation project like theProject subject of the case at bar.

No matter how noble the intentions of the MMDA may be then, any plan, strategy or project which it is not authorizedto implement cannot pass muster.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is, in light of the foregoing disquisition, DENIED. E.O. No. 179 is declared NULL and VOID forbeing ultra vires.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 174813-15 March 17, 2009

NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIO REPRESENTING JAYCEE CORSIO, and ERLINDAVILLARUEL REPRESENTING ARTHUR VILLARUEL, Petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE RTC JUDGE TEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of Justice, Quezon City, Branch 86, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a Petition for Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the Order dated 2 October2006 of respondent Judge Teodoro A. Bay of Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, which deniedthe Motion to Withdraw Informations of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.

The facts of the case are as follows.

On 15 December 2003, two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the crime of acts oflasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos, Jaycee Corsio, Arthur Villaruel and two others beforeBranch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, acting as a Family Court, presided by respondent Judge Bay. Thecases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284, No. Q-03-123285 and No. Q-03-123286. The Informationswere signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Ronald C. Torralba.


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On 23 February 2004, private complainants AAA1 and BBB filed a Motion for Reinvestigation asking Judge Bay to orderthe City Prosecutor of Quezon City to study if the proper Informations had been filed against petitioners and their co-accused. Judge Bay granted the Motion and ordered a reinvestigation of the cases.

On 19 May 2004, petitioners filed their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. Theyclaimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes charged.

On 10 August 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the reinvestigation affirming theInformations filed against petitioners and their co-accused in Criminal Cases No. Q-03-123284-86. The Resolution wassigned by Assistant City Prosecutor Raniel S. Cruz and approved by City Prosecutor Claro A. Arellano.

On 3 March 2006, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint Memorandum to Dismiss theCase as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution, reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding thatthere was lack of probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Informationsbefore Judge Bay.

On 2 October 2006, Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw Informations in an Order of even date.

Without moving for a reconsideration of the above assailed Order, petitioners filed the present Petition for Mandamus,bringing forth this lone issue for our consideration:

CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE CASE THROUGH A WRIT OFMANDAMUS BY VIRTUE OF THE RESOLUTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY FINDING NOPROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST THE ACCUSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION?2

Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or atsome other specified time, to do the act required to be done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects theperformance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or whenthe respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the latter is entitled, andthere is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.3

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not adiscretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the lawimposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act,

because it is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.4

In the case at bar, the act which petitioners pray that we compel the trial court to do is to grant the Office of the CityProsecutors Motion for Withdrawal of Informations against petitioners. In effect, petitioners seek to curb Judge Baysexercise of judicial discretion.

There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and discretion are beyond the reach of a writof mandamus, for such writ may be issued to compel action in those matters, when refused.5 However, mandamus isnever available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or reversal of an


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action already taken in the exercise of either.6 In other words, while a judge refusing to act on a Motion to WithdrawInformations can be compelled by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e.,to grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion to WithdrawInformations; he had already acted on it by denying the same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. Ifpetitioners believed that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying theMotion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a Petition for Certiorariagainst the assailed Order of Judge Bay.

Petitioners counter that the above conclusion, which has been argued by the Solicitor General, is contrary to a ruling ofthis Court, which allegedly states that the proper remedy in such cases is a Petition for Mandamus and not Certiorari.Petitioners cite the following excerpt from our ruling in Sanchez v. Demetriou7:

The appreciation of the evidence involves the use of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we do not find in thecase at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion.

The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special cases by thePresident of the Philippines. But even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor

does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict theaccused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.

The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion that will justify ajudicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in such a case the proper remedy to call for such exception isa petition for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition.8 (Emphases supplied.)

Petitioners have taken the above passage way out of its context. In the case of Sanchez, Calauan Mayor AntonioSanchez brought a Petition for Certiorari before this Court, challenging the order of the respondent Judge therein

denying his motion to quash the Information filed against him and six other persons for alleged rape and homicideOne of the arguments of Mayor Sanchez was that there was discrimination against him because of the non-inclusion oftwo other persons in the Information. We held that even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person againstwhom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima facie case. However, if there was anunmistakable showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the prosecutors in that case, Mayor Sanchez shouldhave filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel the filing of charges against said two other persons.

In the case at bar, the Petition for Mandamus is directed not against the prosecution, but against the trial court,seeking to compel the trial court to grant the Motion to Withdraw Informations by the City Prosecutors Office. Theprosecution has already filed a case against petitioners. Recently, in Santos v. Orda, Jr.,9 we reiterated the doctrine weestablished in the leading case of Crespo v. Mogul,10 that once a criminal complaint or an information is filed in court,

any disposition or dismissal of the case or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the jurisdictioncompetence, and discretion of the trial court. Thus, we held:

In Crespo v. Mogul, the Court held that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of thecase or dismissal or acquittal or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, anddiscretion of the trial court. The trial court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. A motion todismiss the case filed by the public prosecutor should be addressed to the court who has the option to grant or denythe same. Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the rule applies to a motion to withdraw the Information or todismiss the case even before or after arraignment of the accused. The only qualification is that the action of the courtmust not impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People or the private complainant to dueprocess of law. When the trial court grants a motion of the public prosecutor to dismiss the case, or to quash the


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Information, or to withdraw the Information in compliance with the directive of the Secretary of Justice, or to deny thesaid motion, it does so not out of subservience to or defiance of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but in soundexercise of its judicial prerogative.

Petitioners also claim that since Judge Bay granted a Motion for Reinvestigation, he should have "deferred to theResolution of Asst. City Prosecutor De Vera withdrawing the case."11 Petitioners cite the following portion of ourDecision in People v. Montesa, Jr.12:

In the instant case, the respondent Judge granted the motion for reinvestigation and directed the Office of theProvincial Prosecutor of Bulacan to conduct the reinvestigation. The former was, therefore, deemed to have deferredto the authority of the prosecution arm of the Government to consider the so-called new relevant and materialevidence and determine whether the information it had filed should stand.13

Like what was done to our ruling in Sanchez, petitioners took specific statements from our Decision, carefully cuttingoff the portions which would expose the real import of our pronouncements. The Petition for Certiorari in Montesa, Jrwas directed against a judge who, after granting the Petition for Reinvestigation filed by the accused, proceedednonetheless to arraign the accused; and, shortly thereafter, the judge decided to dismiss the case on the basis of a

Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The dismissal of the case inMontesa, Jr. was done despite the disapproval of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutors Resolution by the ProvincialProsecutor (annotated in the same Resolution), and despite the fact that the reinvestigation the latter ordered was stilongoing, since the Resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor had not yet attained finality. We held that thejudge should have waited for the conclusion of the Petition for Reinvestigation he ordered, before acting on whether ornot the case should be dismissed for lack of probable cause, and before proceeding with the arraignment. Thus, thecontinuation of the above paragraph of our Decision in Montesa, Jr. reads:

Having done so, it behooved the respondent Judge to wait for a final resolution of the incident. In Marcelo vs. Court ofAppeals, this Court ruled:

Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal case which takes cognizance of an accused's motion for review ofthe resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of thesaid motion must act on the resolution reversing the investigating prosecutor's finding or on a motion to dismiss basedthereon only upon proof that such resolution is already final in that no appeal was taken thereon to the Department ofJustice.

The resolution of Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Rutor recommending the dismissal of the case never became final, forit was not approved by the Provincial Prosecutor. On the contrary, the latter disapproved it. As a consequence, thefinal resolution with respect to the reinvestigation is that of the Provincial Prosecutor, for under Section 4, Rule 112 of

the Rules of Court, no complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without the priorwritten authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor. Also, under Section l(d) of R.A. No.5180, as amended by P.D. No. 77 and P.D. No. 911.14

As can be clearly seen, the statement quoted by petitioners from Montesa, Jr. is not meant to establish a doctrine thatthe judge should just follow the determination by the prosecutor of whether or not there is probable cause. On thecontrary, Montesa, Jr. states:


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The rule is settled that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition thereof, such as itsdismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. While the prosecutorretains the discretion and control of the prosecution of the case, he cannot impose his opinion on the court. The courtis the best and sole judge on what to do with the case. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss the case filed by theprosecutor before or after the arraignment, or after a reinvestigation, or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justicewho reviewed the records upon reinvestigation, should be addressed to the discretion of the court. The action of thecourt must not, however, impair the substantial rights of the accused or the right of the People to due process oflaw.15

In a seemingly desperate attempt on the part of petitioners counsel, he tries to convince us that a judge is allowed todeny a Motion to Withdraw Informations from the prosecution only when there is grave abuse of discretion on the partof the prosecutors moving for such withdrawal; and that, where there is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of theprosecutors, the denial of the Motion to Withd

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