profil concurenta

1George Soros, Noua paradigm a pieelor financiare. Criza creditelor din 2008 i implicaiile ei 2George Soros, The new paradigm for financial markets.The credit crisis of 2008 and what it means 3Radu A. PUN

Cea mai mare amend aplicat de Comisia European n domeniul antitrust reacii i comentarii 8Highest fine ever applied by the European Commission in the field of antitrust reactions and comments 9Georgeta GAVRILOIU

Orientarea ctre o abordare mai economic a politicii n domeniul concurenei n Europa 16A more economic approach to competition policy in Europe 17Maria ALEXANDRUOana STANCIU

Testul monopolistului ipotetic un instrument de lucru n domeniul concurenei 24The hypothetical monopolist test a working tool in the field of competition 25Ionu DRGOI

Diferenieri semnificative ntre reglementrile americane i cele comunitare n materie de concuren 30Significant differences between US and EU competition laws 31Ana IVAN - ILIESCU

Preuri de exploatare i preuri excesive de excludere - abordare din perspectiva Uniunii Europene 40Exploitative prices and exclusionary excessive prices European Unions perspective 41Loredana COMNESCU

Modificri recente ale legislaiei comunitare n domeniul concentrrilor economice. Nouti privind msurile corective 46Recent amendments to the European Commission mergers legislation. Changes regarding remedies 47Alina LPDAT

Analiza conceptual a sustenabilitii fiscale 52Investigating the concept of fiscal sustainability 53Emilia CMPEANU

Nouti n domeniul concurenei i ajutorului de stat 58News in the competition and state aid field 59Carmen BUCUR

CUPRINS/CONTENTS

2Aa cum o arat i titlul, cartea de fa propune onou paradigm, util, conform autorului, pentruo mai bun nelegere a ceea ce se ntmpl astzipe pieele financiare. Merit subliniat de la nceputfaptul c aceast teorie a fost enunat de GeorgeSoros nc din 1987, ea constituind una dintre temele principale ale crii Alchimia finanelor2,i c teoria propus poate avea o arie mai larg deaplicare, nefiind limitat la pieele financiare.

Paradigma enunat de Soros pune la ndoialpresupunerile pe care se bazeaz teoria competiieiperfecte, n principal aceea c participanii pepia beneficiaz de cunoatere perfect. Sorosafirm c agenii de pe pia i bazeaz deciziilepe propriile percepii, subiective i limitate, i cgndirea acestor participani joac un dublu rol:pe de o parte, actorii ncearc s neleag situaian care se gsesc (pentru aceasta autorul folosetetermenul funcie cognitiv), iar pe de alt parte,aceeai actori ncearc s schimbe situaia n carese gsesc spre beneficiul propriu (autorul numete acest lucru funcie manipulatoare).Ideea central a acestei teorii este c cele doufuncii descrise mai sus acioneaz n direcii diferite, dar c, n anumite circumstane, ele potinterfera, Soros numind aceast interaciune reflexivitate interferenial.

Aceast teorie a reflexivitii a lansat un curentde adepi la lansarea din 1987, dar nu a fost luatn serios n mediul academic. Criza financiar, aprut la finele lui 2007 i aflat n plin desfurare

n aceste zile (decembrie 2008), i ofer lui Sorosmediul perfect pentru a ncerca validarea i recunoaterea teoriei sale, magnitudinea deosebita crizei financiare, comparabil doar cu cea a anilor 30, conducnd la o dorin avid de posibileexplicaii i soluii pentru aceasta.

nc de la nceputul crii, George Soros vrea sse asigure c cititorul nelege felul n care teoria reflexivitii se aplic la actuala criz financiar.Autorul afirm c, contrar teoriei economice clasice, care presupune o cunoatere perfect dinpartea actorilor de pe pia, participanii (incluzndaici i autoritile monetare i fiscale) nu i potbaza deciziile doar pe cunoatere. Raionamentelei concepiile greite afecteaz preurile pieei i,chiar mai important, preurile pieei afecteaz larndul lor aspectele fundamentale pe care tocmaiele ar trebui s le reflecte. Soros susine c preurile pieei nu se formeaz n mod aleatordintr-un echilibru teoretic, aa cum susine paradigma actual. Din contr, ntruct opiniileparticipanilor i ale celor ce dirijeaz piaa nu corespund strii de fapt, autorul susine c pieele nu pot ajunge la echilibrul postulat de teoriaeconomic. n plus, ntre percepie i realitateexist o legtur reflexiv n ambele sensuri, carepoate genera procese dezvoltare-declin de tipbalon, procese care iniial se autosusin, urmnd apoi s se autodistrug. Fiecare astfel debalon este format dintr-un curent i un raionamentgreit care interacioneaz ntr-o manier reflexiv.

* Cartea a fost publicat n 2008 de editura Litera Internaional, Bucureti. Versiunea n limba englez (George Soros, The new paradigm forfinancial markets. The credit crisis of 2008 and what it means) a fost publicat n 2008 de editura Public Affairs, New York, i a fost tradusde Graal Soft cu sprijinul de specialitate acordat de Cristina Bob i Ovidiu Pocan de la Capital Partners.1 Inspector de concuren, Direcia Cercetare Sinteze.2 Versiunea n limba englez, George Soros, The alchemy of finance: Reading the mind of the market, a fost publicat n 1987 de editura Simon& Schuster.

PROFIL: CONCURENA NR.4/2008

GEORGE SOROS, NOUA PARADIGM A PIEELOR FINANCIARE. CRIZA CREDITELOR DIN 2008 I IMPLICAIILE EI*

Recenzie de Radu A. PUN1

3As its title indicates, the book at hand proposes anew paradigm, which may be useful, accordingto its author, in offering a better understandingof what is happening today on financial markets.It is worth mentioning from the beginning thatthe theory has been proposed by George Sorosas early as 1987, being one of the main ideas ofthe book The alchemy of finance4, and that thetheory can have a wider range of application, notlimited to financial markets.

The paradigm Soros states questions the assumptions on which the theory of perfect competition rests upon, mainly the one that marketparticipants have perfect knowledge. Sorosmaintains that market participants make their decisions based on their own perceptions, subjective and limited, and that the participantsthinking plays a dual function: on the one hand,the actors seek to understand their situation (forthis the author uses the term cognitive function),while, on the other hand, the same actors try tochange their situation for their own benefit (theauthor calls this manipulative function). The central idea of this theory is that the two functions described above work in opposite directions and that, under certain circumstances,they can interfere with each other, this interactionbeen named by Soros interference reflexivity.

This theory of reflexivity acquired a cult followingwhen it was launched in 1987, but was not takenseriously in academic circles. The financial crisis, which unfolded at the end of 2007 and

which is probably in full development these days(December 2008), provides Soros with the perfect environment for validation and recognitionof his theory, the impressive magnitude of the financial crisis, comparable only with that of the30s, leading to an avid search for possible explanations and solutions for it.

Even from the beginning of his book, GeorgeSoros wants to make sure that the reader understands the way in which the theory of reflexivity can be applied to the current financialcrisis. The author claims that, contrary to theclassical economic theory, which assumes perfectknowledge of the actors, market participants (including monetary and fiscal authorities) cannotmake decisions based solely on knowledge.Their misjudgments and misconceptions affectmarket prices, and, even more importantly, marketprices in turn affect the fundamentals that theythemselves are supposed to reflect. Soros statesthat market prices are not reached in a randommanner following a theoretical equilibrium, asthe current paradigm holds. On the contrary,given that the opinions of participants and marketregulators do not represent the actual situation,the author claims that markets never reach theequilibrium postulated by economic theory. Inaddition, there is a two-way reflexive connectionbetween perception and reality, which can giverise to initially self-reinforcing but eventuallyself-defeating boom-bust processes, or bubbles.Every bubble consists of a trend and a misconceptionthat interact in a reflexive manner.

* The book was published in 2008 by Litera Internaional, Bucharest. The original English version (George Soros, The new paradigm for financial markets. The credit crisis of 2008 and what it means) was published in 2008 by Public Affairs, New York, and was translated in Romanian by Graal Soft, with the help of Cristina Bob and Ovidiu Pocan from Capital Partners.3 Competition inspector, Synthesis Research Directorate.4 George Soros, The Alchemy of finance: Reading the mind of the market, published in 1987 by the Simon & Schuster publishing house.


GEORGE SOROS, THE NEW PARADIGM FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS. THE CREDIT CRISIS OF 2008 AND WHAT IT MEANS*Referral and translated by Radu A. PUN3

4Soros confirm existena unui balon pe piaa locuinelor din Statele Unite ale Americii, darafirm c actuala criz nu a nsemnat doar spargerea acestui balon, ea fiind mult mai ampldect crizele financiare periodice ntlnite de-alungul ultimelor decenii. Toate aceste crize facparte, potrivit autorului, dintr-un proces reflexivpe termen lung ce a generat un super-balon.Astfel,n ultimii douzeci i cinci de ani, extinderea creditelor, curent predominant n Statele Unite,dar nu numai, s-a suprapus unei concepii greite, fundamentalismul de pia (potrivit creia pieele ar trebui s aib mn liber).Soros susine c actuala criz financiar constituieun punct de cotitur ce demonstreaz inaplicabilitateaacestor abordri.

n prima sa parte, cartea conine o descriere succint a contextului n care a aprut criza financiar, declanat n mod oficial n august2007, dar care, potrivit lui Soros, putea fi anticipatde la finele anului 2000, atunci cnd a avut locspargerea unui alt balon, cel al tehnologiei i internetului. Urmeaz apoi o prezentare amnunita teoriei reflexivitii, prezentare ce depete limitele sferei pieelor financiare i pe care ceiinteresai doar de criza curent ar putea-o gsimai greu de parcurs. Aceti cititori vor aprecians capitolul imediat urmtor, care descrie aplicareateoriei reflexivitii n situaia concret a pieelorfinanciare.

Aceste piee constituie un bun laborator de testarea teoriei ntruct majoritatea preurilor, ct i alte informaii, sunt publice i cuantificabile. Darprincipalul avantaj al pieelor financiare ca laborator de testare, potrivit autorului, este acelac teoria reflexivitii se afl n contradicie clarcu o teorie nc larg acceptat, potrivit creia pieele financiare tind spre echilibru. Soros susinec cele dou teorii se exclud reciproc, astfel nctvaliditatea uneia dintre ele implic invalidareaceleilalte.

A doua parte a crii se bazeaz att pe o laturconceptual, ct i pe experiena lui GeorgeSoros ca manager al unui fond de hedging5, ambele menite s clarifice ntructva situaia curent. Autorul afirm c actuala criz financiar

reprezint sfritul unei epoci, deosebindu-sefundamental de crizele ultimelor decenii, ce aufost generate de prbuiri i eecuri izolate. Pentru a susine aceast afirmaie, Soros propuneipoteza existenei unor super-baloane, generatede baloane locale, cum a fost cel imobiliar n Statele Unite, evolund intrinsec cu acestea, darfiind mai complexe i avnd o dezvoltare pe termen mai lung.

Potrivit lui George Soros, punctul de plecare alacestui super-balon l-a constituit ncrederea excesiv n mecanismele pieei (ceea ce el numete fundamentalism de pia), acesta fiindprincipiul de baz al anilor 80, atunci cnd Ronald Reagan a ajuns preedinte n StateleUnite, iar Margaret Thatcher prim-ministru nRegatul Unit6. Super-balonul mbin trei tendine majore, fiecare fiind afectat ns de celpuin un defect. Prima tendin este una pe termenlung, strns legat de existena balonului imobiliar:extinderea accelerat a creditelor, avantajat ide inovaiile financiare, mai ales de crearea unorinstrumente sintetice din ce n ce mai sofisticate.A doua tendin este globalizarea pieelor financiarecare, potrivit lui Soros, favorizeaz Statele Unitei alte cteva state dezvoltate n detrimentul economiilor mai puin dezvoltate. A treia tendin,observat pe parcursul ultimelor decenii, o reprezintliberalizarea, nlturarea progresiv a reglementrilorfinanciare.

n timp ce prima parte a crii include un capitolautobiografic sugestiv intitulat Autobiografiaunui filozof ratat, a doua parte include un capitolntructva paralel dar n egal msur relevant,intitulat Autobiografia unui speculant de succes.Cartea continu cu prognoza lui George Soros,n principal n ceea ce privete anul 2008, dar ipe termen mai lung. Abordarea este similar cucea din Alchimia finanelor, unde Soros realizeazun experiment n timp real ce i permite s testezecalitatea prediciilor sale.

n final, autorul prezint cteva recomandri deprincipiu. Soros susine c sectorul financiar nutrebuie scpat de sub control ntruct aceasta aravea efecte dezastruoase asupra economiei.


5 Fond speculativ cu grad nalt de risc.6 Fundamentalismul de pia are rdcini mult mai adnci, nfipte n teoria competiiei perfecte expus de Adam Smith i de economitii clasici.

5Soros confirms the existence of the housing marketbubble in the United States, but claims that thecurrent crisis is not merely the bursting of thisbubble, it is much bigger than the periodic financial crises experienced in the past decades.According to the author, all those crises are partof a long-term reflexive process which has generated a super-bubble. Thus, in the lasttwenty-five years, credit expansion, which wasthe trend especially in the United States, but notonly there, overlapped with a prevailing misconception, market fundamentalism (accordingto which markets should be given free rein).Soros maintains that the current financial crisis represents a turning point, one which demonstratesthe failure of this approach.

In its first part, the book contains a brief description of the context in which the financialcrisis appeared, the outbreak of which can be officially fixed as August 2007, but which, according to Soros, could have been anticipatedat the end of 2000, when the technology and internet bubble burst. This description is then followed by a detailed presentation of the theoryof reflexivity, presentation which exceeds thelimits of financial markets, and which may befound hard going by people interested solely inthe current crisis. However, these readers willvalue the following chapter, which describes theapplication of the theory of reflexivity for theconcrete case of financial markets.

These markets offer a good laboratory to test thetheory because most of the price and other infor-mation are public and quantifiable. According tothe author, the main advantage of financial mar-kets as a testing laboratory is that the theory of reflexivity is in direct contradiction of a theorywhich is still widely accepted, according towhich financial markets tend to equilibrium.Soros maintains that the two theories are mutuallyexcludable, such that ones validity implies theinvalidation of the other.

The second part of the book is based both on aconceptual side, and on George Soros experienceas a hedge7 fund manager, both trying to somewhat clarify the current situation. The

author claims that the present financial crisis represents the end of an era, being fundamentallydifferent from the crises experienced in the pastdecades, which were generated by isolated failures and crashes. In order to support thisstatement, Soros proposes the hypothesis ofsuper-bubbles, generated by local bubbles, suchas the housing one in the United States, evolvingintrinsically with these, but being more complexand developing over a longer term.

According to George Soros, the starting point ofthis super-bubble was the excessive reliance onthe market mechanism (which he calls marketfundamentalism), which was the dominant creedin the 80s, when Ronald Reagan became presidentin the United States and Margaret Thatcher primeminister in the United Kingdom8. The super-bubblecombines three major trends, each containing atleast one defect. The first is a long-term trend,closely connected with the housing bubble: theaccelerated credit expansion, spurred by financialinnovations, especially by the creation of moreand more sophisticated synthetic instruments.The second trend is the globalization of financialmarkets which, according to Soros, favors theUnited States and several other developed countriesand penalizes the less-developed economies. Thethird trend, observed in the past decades, is liberalization, the progressive removal of financialregulations.

While the first part of the book contains an autobiographical chapter suggestively entitledAutobiography of a failed philosopher, the secondpart contains a somewhat parallel but equally relevant chapter entitled Autobiography of a successful speculator. The book continues withGeorge Soros forecast, particularly for 2008, butfor a longer term as well. The approach is similarto the one in The alchemy of finance, whereSoros conducts a real-time experiment which allows him to test the quality of his predictions.

In the end, the author presents several broad recommendations. Soros claims that the financialsector should not be left unleashed as this wouldhave devastating effects on the economy.


7 High risk speculative investment fund.8 The market fundamentalism has much deeper roots, stuck into the theory of perfect competition propounded by Adam Smith and the classicaleconomists.

6Stpnirea acestui sector nu ar trebui s se facns printr-o reglementare strict i excesiv ntruct i aceasta ar duna dezvoltrii economice.De aceea, potrivit lui George Soros, ntoarcereala politicile care au funcionat dup cel de-al DoileaRzboi Mondial ar fi o mare eroare. O alt recomandare se refer la reglementarea pieelorfinanciare: cei care se ocup de aceast activitatetrebuie s aib o imagine clar asupra inovaiilorn domeniu i s nu permit practici pe care nu leneleg n totalitate. n plus, aa cum experiena aartat, ideea c managementul riscului poate filsat n totalitate pe seama juctorilor din piaeste o aberaie; anumite riscuri sistemice trebuiegestionate de autoritile de reglementare.

Potrivit lui Soros, cea mai important lecie cetrebuie nvat din criza curent este aceea cautoritatea monetar ar trebui s fie preocupatnu doar de controlul fluxului de moned, ci i deacordarea de credite. El susine c autoritilemonetare trebuie s se implice ntr-un joc delicatde gestionare a ateptrilor, joc n care pot (i trebuie) s foloseasc toate trucurile tehnicilor demanipulare, aceasta fiind mai mult o art dect otiin propriu-zis.


7However, the control of this sector should not beexercised through strict and excessive regulationsince this would also hurt the economic development. Therefore, according to GeorgeSoros, a return to the conditions that prevailedafter World War II would be a big mistake. Another recommendation relates to the regulationof financial markets: those in charge of this haveto have a clear image on the innovations in thefield and ought not allow practices they do notfully understand. In addition, experience hasshown that the idea that risk management can beleft completely to the market players is an aberration; some systemic risks need to be managed by the regulatory authorities.

According to Soros, the most important lesson tobe learned from the current crisis is that the monetary authorities have to be concerned notonly with controlling the money supply, but alsowith credit creation. He maintains that monetaryauthorities have to enter in a delicate game ofmanaging expectations, game in which they can(and should) use all the tricks involved in the manipulative techniques, and this is more of anart than it is science.


8Introducere

Practicile sancionate de Comisie s-au desfuratntre anii 1998 i 2003 i au vizat piaa geamurilorcu destinaie auto11 . Cele patru companii implicaten acest cartel deineau mpreun cca.90% din

piaa european a geamurilor auto. Gravitatea deosebit a practicilor sancionate, durata cartelului,mrimea companiilor implicate, precum i calitatea de recidiviti a unora dintre participaniau condus la urmtoarele valori ale amenziloraplicate: (Tabelul 1).


9 Inspector de concuren Direcia Relaii Externe i Integrare European.10 Textul Tratatului de instituire a Comunitii Europene (varianta consolidat) este disponibil n limba englez la adresa: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:pdf (01.12.2008).11 n aceast categorie intr: parbrizele, lunetele, geamurile laterale, precum i plafoanele vitrate. 12 Comunicatul de pres al Comisiei Europene nr. IP/08/1685, Antitrust: Commission fines car glass producers over 1.3 billion for marketsharing cartel, (Bruxelles, 12 noiembrie 2008).

Rezumat

Pe data de 12 noiembrie 2008, Comisia European a amendat patru companii productoare de geamuri auto. Companiile Saint-Gobain (Frana), Asahi (Japonia), Pilkington (Marea Britanie) iSoliver (Belgia) au fost sancionate pentru nclcarea art.81 din Tratatul CE10 , prin implicarea ntr-uncartel avnd ca obiect fixarea preurilor, mprirea pieelor, alocarea clienilor i schimb de informaiistrategice.

Sanciunile aplicate n acest caz stabilesc un dublu record, fiind vorba despre cea mai mare amendtotal aplicat vreodat pentru nclcarea regulilor de concuren comunitare (1,38 miliarde de euro) i, n acelai timp, cea mai mare amend aplicat unei companii individuale (896milioane de euro, pentru compania francez Saint-Gobain).

Decizia Comisiei Europene a generat numeroase reacii i comentarii, care au pus n discuie justeea aplicrii unor asemenea amenzi i chiar eficiena sanciunilor utilizate de Comisie n domeniul concurenei.

Cuvinte-cheie: cartel, geamuri auto, articolul 81, Saint-Gobain, Asahi, Pilkington, Soliver.

CEA MAI MARE AMEND APLICAT DE COMISIA EUROPEANN DOMENIUL ANTITRUST REACII I COMENTARII

Georgeta GAVRILOIU9

Sursa: Comisia European12.

Tabelul nr. 1. Valoarea amenzilor aplicate de Comisia European membrilor cartelului de pe piaa geamurilor cu destinaie auto

Reducere n baza Comunicrii privind politica de clemen

(%)

Reducere n baza Comunicriiprivind politica de clemen

(EUR)

Amenda(EUR)

Saint-Gobain (Frana)

Asahi/AGC Flat Glass (Japonia)

Pilkington (Marea Britanie)

Soliver (Belgia)

Total

0

50

0

0 0

0

113.500.000

0 896.000.000

113.500.000

370.000.000

4.396.000

1.383.896.000

9Introduction

The practices sanctioned by the Commissiontook place between 1998 and 2003 and coveredthe market of automotive glass16. The four companies involved in this cartel held together

about 90% of the European market. The particulargravity of the practice, the duration of the cartel,size of the involved companies combined withthe position of some of the participants as repeated offenders, have resulted into the following values of fines (Table 1):


Abstract14

On the 12th of November 2008, the European Commission fined four producers of automotive glass.The companies Saint-Gobain (France), Asahi (Japan), Pilkington (United Kingdom) and Soliver (Belgium) were sanctioned for the infringement of Article 81 of the EC Treaty15 by participating in a cartel for price fixing, market sharing, customer allocation and exchange of strategic information.

The sanctions applied in this case set a double record: the highest total fine ever applied for a violation of the EC competition rules (1.38 billion EUR) and, at the same time, the highest fine everapplied to an individual company (896 million EUR, for the French company Saint-Gobain).

The European Commissions decision has generated many reactions and comments that questioned thecorrectness of the application of such fines and even the overall efficiency of the sanctions used bythe Commission in the field of competition.

Keywords: cartel, automotive glass, Article 81, Saint-Gobain, Asahi, Pilkington, Soliver.

HIGHEST FINE EVER APPLIED BY THE EUROPEAN COMMISSIONIN THE FIELD OF ANTITRUST REACTIONS AND COMMENTSGeorgeta GAVRILOIU13

13 Competition inspector Directorate for External Relations and European Integration.14 Translated into English by Georgeta Gavriloiu.15 The text of the Treaty establishing the European Community (consolidated version) is available in English at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:321E:0001:0331:EN:pdf (01.12.2008).16 This category includes: windshields, rear windows, side windows and glass roofs.17 European Commissions press release no. IP/08/1685, Antitrust: Commission fines car glass producers over 1.3 billion for market sharingcartel, Brussels, 12th of November 2008.

Source: European Commission17.

Reduction under the Leniency Notice

(%)

Reduction under the Leniency

Notice ()Fine ()

Saint-Gobain (France)

Asahi/AGC Flat Glass (Japan)

Pilkington (United Kingdom)

Soliver (Belgium)

Total

0

50

0

0 0

0

113.500.000

0 896.000.000

113.500.000

370.000.000

4.396.000

1.383.896.000

Table no.1. Value of fines applied by the European Commission to members of the cartel on the market of car glass

10

Amenda aplicat firmei Saint-Gobain a fost majorat cu 60% deoarece compania mai fuseseamendat de Comisie n trecut pentru practici similare. n acelai timp, amenda aplicat companiei japoneze Asahi a fost diminuat cu50%, ca recompens pentru cooperarea cu instituia european n contextul programului declemen aplicat de Comisia European n domeniul cartelurilor.

Reacii i comentarii

Comentnd decizia Comisiei, doamna NeelieKroes, comisarul european pentru concuren, aprecizat: Aceste companii au nelat industriaauto i cumprtorii de autovehicule vreme de 5ani, pe o pia care, n ultimul an al cartelului, valora 2 miliarde de euro. Amenzile totale suntmari datorit cotelor de pia ridicate, a gravitiicazului i din pricina antecedentelor companieiSaint Gobain. Comisia a impus asemenea amenziridicate deoarece nu poate i nu va tolera un asemenea comportament ilegal. Apoi, n stilul careo caracterizeaz, doamna comisar a adugat:Conducerea i acionarii companiilor care producdaune consumatorilor i industriei europene prinparticiparea la carteluri trebuie s i nvee foratlecia dac triezi, vei primi o amend foartemare.18

ntr-o prim faz, prile s-au limitat la confirmareatirii i la anunarea inteniei de a ataca deciziaComisiei n faa Tribunalului de Prim Instan(TPI), dup care s-au grbit s-i liniteasc investitorii cu privire la impactul amenzii asuprarezultatelor financiare ale companiilor respective.

Spre exemplu, pe data de 13 noiembrie a.c., unreprezentant al companiei britanice Pilkingtonanuna c, anticipnd decizia de sanciune, compania i fcuse deja provizioane de cca. 250de milioane de lire sterline. n realitate, amendaaplicat de Comisia European a fost cu o treimemai mare dect valoarea anticipat de Pilkington.n plus, aceste declaraii linititioare aveau s fiecontrazise, la mai puin de 24 de ore, de reprezentanii companiei-mam a firmei Pilkington,grupul japonez Nippon Sheet Glass, care, pe datade 14 noiembrie, anuna revizuirea n sens negativa prognozei financiare a grupului pentru perioada

1 aprilie 2008 31 martie 200919. Aprecierea monedei japoneze i condiiile dificile de pia, dar iamenda aplicat de Comisia European companieiPilkington sunt cauzele invocate de grupul japonezpentru aceast revizuire. Comunicatul oficial menioneaz, printre altele, o scdere considerabil avenitului estimat, de la 41,15 yeni/aciune la 13,47yeni/aciune. Cu siguran, aceasta nu este o vesteprea bun pentru investitorii gigantului japonez. Dealtfel, acetia au reacionat imediat la anunul Comisiei, cotaia aciunilor Nippon Sheet Glass labursa de la Tokio nregistrnd, pe data de 13 noiembrie, o scdere cu 8,4% fa de valoarea lanchidere din ziua precedent.

n aceeai situaie s-a aflat i productorul japonez Asahi care, chiar dac a beneficiat declemena Comisiei Europene, nu a scpat totuide sanciunea investitorilor, aciunile grupuluila bursa de la Tokio scznd pe 13 noiembrie cu6,1% fa de nivelul din ziua precedent. Trenduldescresctor al valorii aciunilor celor doi productori s-a meninut i n zilele urmtoare.

Cu privire la impactul amenzii asupra valorii aciunilor companiei franceze Saint-Gobain, o primremarc ar fi c, spre deosebire de piaa asiatic,bursa de la Paris a reacionat cu o oarecare ntrziere.Astfel, pe 13 noiembrie, prima zi de dup anunareaamenzii, aciunile Saint-Gobain au nregistrat o scdere de doar 0,10%, ns pe 14 noiembrie, aciunilecompaniei franceze valorau la nchidere cu 4,23%mai puin dect n ziua precedent.

Scderea cursului aciunilor Saint-Gobain a continuat i n zilele imediat urmtoare, chiardac productorul francez a anunat acumulareaunor provizioane de 650 milioane euro, destinateplii amenzii. Ca i n cazul firmei Pilkington,aceast sum s-a dovedit fi insuficient pentru aacoperi ntreaga amend aplicat de Comisie(896 milioane euro).

Trebuie menionat c aceast amend-recordaplicat companiei Saint-Gobain n urm cu cteva zile urmeaz dup o alt amend, de 133,9milioane de euro, aplicat de Comisie la sfritulanului 2007 pentru implicarea ntr-un cartel european pe piaa sticlei plane20.


18 Comunicatul de pres al Comisiei Europene nr. IP/08/1685.19 Comunicatul de pres al Grupului Nippon Sheet Glass Group NSG Group announces Revision of Forecast, 14 noiembrie 2008,http://www.nsggroup.net/press/2008/1114.html (14.11.2008).20 Decizia Comisiei Europene din 28.11.2007 n Dosarul nr. COMP 39.165.

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The fine applied to Saint-Gobain was increasedby 60% because the company had been fined inthe past for similar offences. At the same time,the fine for the Japanese company Asahi was reduced by 50% as a reward for the companyscooperation with the Commission in the frameworkof the leniency programme applied by the Europeaninstitution in cartel cases.

Reactions and comments

Commenting on the Commissions decision,Mrs. Neelie Kroes, the European commissionerfor competition declared: These companiescheated the car industry and car buyers for fiveyears in a market worth two billion euros in thelast year of the cartel. The overall fines are highbecause of the large market, the seriousness ofthe case, and Saint-Gobain's earlier offences.The Commission has imposed such high fines because it cannot and will not tolerate such illegalbehaviour. Then, in her style, she added: Management and shareholders of companiesthat damage consumers and European industry byrunning cartels must learn their lessons the hardway if you cheat, you will get a heavy fine.21

Initially, the parties have only confirmed thenews and announced their intention to appeal theCommissions decision in front of Court of FirstInstance (CFI) and then rushed to give assurancesto their investors about the likely impact of thefine over the companies financial results.

For example, on the 13th of November, a representativeof the British company Pilkington announcedthat, foreseeing the sanctioning decision, thecompany had already made provisions of approximately 250 million pounds. The actualfine was one third higher than the value anticipatedby Pilkington. Moreover, these reassuring declarationswere to be contradicted, within less than 24hours, by the representatives of Pilkingtonsmother-company, the Japanese group NipponSheet Glass. On the 14th of November, NipponSheet Glass announced the negative revision ofthe groups financial forecast for the period 1April 2008 31 March 200922. The yens appreciation and difficult market conditions,

together with the fine applied to Pilkington by theEuropean Commission were the causes invokedby the Japanese group for this revision. The officialannouncement mentions, among others, a significantreduction of the expected income, from 41.15yen/share to 13.47 yen/share. Surely, these arenot good news for the groups investors. Anywaythey reacted immediately at the Commission sannouncement and this made the value of NipponSheet Glass at Tokyo Exchange drop on the 13thof November by 8.4% as compared to the closingvalue in the previous day.

The situation of the Japanese producer Asahi wassimilar. Even though the group benefited fromthe European Commissions leniency, the groupdid not escape the sanction applied by its investors. The value of the groups shares atTokyo Exchange fell by 6.1% as compared to thelevel in the previous day. For both producers, thedecreasing trend continued also in the next days.

A first remark about the impact of fine over theshares value in case of the French companySaint-Gobain would be that unlike the Asianstock market, the Paris Exchange reacted with acertain delay. Thus, on the 13th of November, thefirst day after the fine was announced, Saint-Gobains shares decreased only by 0.10%but on the 14th of November, at closing, theFrench companys shares valued 4.23% less thanin the previous day.

In the next days, the decreasing trend continuedalso in case of Saint-Gobains shares, despite thefact that the French producer had announced theaccumulation, in view of the fine, of provisionsof 650 million EUR. Just as in Pilkingtons case,this sum proved to be insufficient to cover theentire fine applied by the Commission (896 million EUR).

It is worth mentioning that the record-fine applied to Saint-Gobain comes after another fine,of 133.9 million EUR, applied by the Commissionat the end of 2007 for the companys involvementin another European cartel, on the market of flatglass 23.


21 European Commissions press release no. IP/08/1685.22 Nippon Sheet Glass Groups press release: NSG Group announces Revision of Forecast, 14th of November 2008, http://www.nsggroup.net/press/2008/1114.html (14.11.2008).23 Commission Decision of 28.11.2007, in case COMP 39.165.

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Cursa infernal

n toate domeniile exist un aa-numit prag psihologic, o limit care pare de neatins, darcare odat depit pentru prima dat, devinerapid un simplu reper din trecut. Spre exemplu,alergarea distanei de 100 de metri n mai puinde 10 secunde a fost vreme de mai bine de multedecenii un astfel de prag. ns dup ce Jim Hinesdevenea, n 1968, primul atlet din istorie, carereuea s doboare aceast barier, parcurgnd cei100 de metri n 9,95 secunde, muli ali alergtoriaveau s reueasc performane similare. n prezent, aceast rezultat este considerat mediocrun competiiile de atletism la cel mai nalt nivel.

Fcnd o paralel (destul de forat, ar ziceunii!), s-ar putea spune c, prin amenda aplicatproductorilor de geamuri auto, Comisia a sparto barier pshihologic. De altfel, dup ce, anultrecut Comisia a aplicat productorilor de lifturii scri rulante amenzi n valoare total de992.312.200 de euro, muli s-au ntrebat ct aveas treac pn la aplicarea de amenzi de peste unmiliard de euro.

Dup cum rezult din declaraiile oficialilor Comisiei, aplicarea unei amenzi de o asemeneavaloare nu a fost i nu este un obiectiv n sinepentru instituia european. Totui, mesajul transmisde Comisie prin aceast amend este unul ct sepoate de clar.

Evoluiile recente au demonstrat c instituia european poate da dovad de flexibilitate ipoate utiliza regulile existente ale politicii deconcuren pentru a rspunde rapid i n modadecvat la criza financiar. Astfel, autorizarea nregim de urgen a unor operaiuni de concentrareeconomic implicnd societi din sectorul bancarsau chiar autorizarea rapid a unor ajutoare destat pentru salvare acordate unor bnci (aproapeo erezie n urm cu doar un an!) sunt doar douexemple n acest sens. Totui, n mod evident, tolerana fa de carteluri nu se numr printredomeniile n care Comisia dorete s i exersezeexibilitatea.

Efecte i implicaii

Contextul economic actual, dominat de criza financiar, nu le este tocmai favorabil productorilorde geamuri auto sancionai, n condiiile n careprincipalul lor beneficiar, industria de autovehicule,este, la rndul su, grav afectat de criza financiar. Scderea dramatic a vnzrilor reduce considerabil ansele ca amenzile s fierecuperate rapid de la cumprtorii de autovehicule.

n plus, impactul financiar al unei asemeneaamenzi nu este deloc de neglijat. Un calcul simplu evideniaz faptul c amenda aplicat deComisie n cazul n discuie reprezint nu maipuin de 1% din bugetul total al Uniunii Europenepe anul 200824 i, n acelai timp, este de 16 orimai mare dect bugetul alocat la nivel comunitarpentru aplicarea politicii n domeniul concurenei.

Mrimea amenzilor la care s-a ajuns n acest domeniu reflect, indirect, puterea financiar afirmelor implicate n asemenea practici anticoncureniale. Trebuie subliniat c, n asemenea cazuri, amenzile aplicate nu pot depi10% din cifra de afaceri a contravenienilor. nacelai timp, valorile din ce n ce mai mari suntdovada eforturilor Comisiei Europene de a transformacartelurile pan-europene n nite afaceri (ct) maipuin profitabile pentru participani.

De altfel, n actualul stadiu al integrrii europene,aplicarea unor amenzi uriae este singurul mijloc ct de ct eficient de care dispune ComisiaEuropean pentru a descurajara cartelurile. i totui, cnd reprezentanii companiilor anun cunonalan acumularea de provizioane de sute demilioane de euro n vederea plii amenzilor pecare se ateapt s le primeasc, nu poi s nu tentrebi ct de mari sunt profiturile nete ale unuicartel de asemenea anvergur!

ntr-un comunicat de pres al firmei Saint-Gobainse arat, printre altele, c persoanele vinovate deimplicarea n cartel au fost demise. Doar att? Ceconvenabil! Aa cum subliniaz i ali comentatori,pentru persoanele vinovate, ameninarea unorsanciuni privative de libertate ar fi un factor dedescurajare mult mai serios. Spre exemplu, n


24 Bugetul general al UE pe anul 2008 este de 129,149 de miliarde de euro. Partea din bugetul Comisiei alocat pentru politica de concureneste de 78.282.819 euro.

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Running a race!

In every field of activity there is a so-called psychological threshold, a limit that seems unreachable but once it is overcome for the veryfirst time becomes quickly just a simple past landmark. For example, running 100 meters in lessthan 10 seconds was, for many decades, such athreshold. Nevertheless, after, in 1968, Jim Hinesbecame the first athlete in the history that brokethis barrier and ran the 100 meters in 9.95 seconds, many others obtained similar performances.Nowadays this is considered only a second-rateresult in the high level athletic competitions.

To make a comparison (quite forced, as somemight say!) one could consider that with the fineapplied to the automotive glass producers, theCommission broke such a psychological barrier. Anyway, in 2007 when the Commissionapplied to producers of elevators and escalatorstotal fines of 992,312,200 EUR, many commentatorsasked how long was before the one billion eurofine was applied.

It results from the Commission officials declarations that the application of a fine havingsuch a high value was not and it is not an objectivein itself for the European institution. However,the message sent by the Commission with thisfine is very clear.

Recent evolutions have demonstrated that theEuropean institution can be flexible and use theexisting rules of the competition policy to respond rapidly and adequately to the financialcrisis. Thus, the rapid authorization of mergersin the banking sector and even the authorizationof rescue State aid for banks (almost a heresyonly one year ago!) are just two examples in thisrespect. However, obviously, tolerance for cartels is not one of the areas where the Commission is willing to exert its flexibility.

Effects and implications

The current economic context, dominated by financial crisis is not quite favorable for the automotive glass producers, taking into accountthe fact that their main beneficiary, the automotiveindustry, is also heavily affected by financial crisis.The dramatic decrease of sales in the automotivesector reduces considerably producers chancesto have their fines recovered from the customers.

At the same time, the financial impact of such afine cannot be neglected. A simple calculationshows that the fine applied by the Commissionin this case represent not less than 1% of the totalEU budget for 200825 and, at the same time, it is16 times higher than the budget allocated by theEuropean Commission for the competition policy.

The level of fines reached in this field shows indirectly the financial power of the companiesinvolved in anti-competitive practices. It shouldbe underlined that, in cartel cases, fines cannotexceed 10% of the offenders turnover. At thesame time, the bigger and bigger fines are theproof of the Commissions efforts to turn pan-European cartels into less profitable business.

On the other hand, in the current stage of the European integration, the application of hugefines is the Commissions only tool somewhat efficient in fighting against cartels. Even so,when the companies officials announce nonchalantlythe accumulation of hundreds of millions of euroas provisions for envisaged fines, one cannothelp wondering how big the net profits of a cartelof this size are!

Saint-Gobain declares, in a press-release, that thepersons culpable for the involvement in the cartelwere dismissed. Is that all? How convenient! Asother commentators suggest, for the culpablepersons, the threat of imprisonment would be amore serious deterring factor. For example, in the


25 The EU general budget for 2008 is of 129.149 billion EUR. The share of the Commissions budget allocated for the competition policy isof 78,282,819 EUR.

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Statele Unite, participarea la un cartel este considerat ofens federal, iar succesul n luptampotriva acestor practici anticoncureniale secuantific nu doar n sute de milioane dolariamend, ci i n muli ani de nchisoare. Pesteocean, preedinii de companii i managerii trimii dup gratii sunt trofeele de vntoareale oficialilor anti-cartel.

n schimb, n Uniunea European, dei existdeja cteva state membre ale cror sisteme dedrept cuprind sanciuni penale pentru persoanelefizice care particip la conceperea sau funcionareaunui cartel (Romnia fiind unul dintre acestestate!), n practic, mecanismul aplicrii de sanciuni penale nu este folosit. n acest domeniu,aciunea la nivel naional este inexistent, iar lanivel comunitar este imposibil, deoarece, n prezent, competenele Uniunii n materie penalsunt aproape simbolice.

n aceste condiii, aplicarea de amenzi rmne,totui, o soluie prin care se realizeaz, n ultiminstan o redistribuire, chiar dac discutabil, aunei pri din profiturile obinute de membrii cartelurilor ctre cetenii europeni, ca beneficiarifinali ai bugetului UE26.

n loc de concluzii

Productorii de geamuri auto au anunat c vorataca decizia Comisiei n faa TPI. Totui, dacne gndim la hotrrea pronunat de TPI ncazul BASF27 la sfritul anului 2007, perspectivelenu sunt tocmai ncurajatoare pentru viitorii reclamani. n cazul respectiv, ntr-o aciune ndreptat mpotriva deciziei prin care Comisiaimpusese o amend pentru nclcarea art.81 dinTratatul CE, tribunalul, avnd n vedere comportamentul companiei BASF, a dispus, pentru prima oar, majorarea valorii amenzii cefusese aplicat de Comisie!

Fr ndoial, va fi interesant de urmrit felul ncare instana comunitar va aprecia conduitacompaniilor implicate n cazul de fa, mai alesal celor care ar putea deveni oricnd titulare aleunui card de fidelitate oferit de Comisia European pentru participarea consecvent nprocedurile de investigaie din domeniul antitrust.


26 Amenzile aplicate de Comisia European n domeniul concurenei se fac venit la bugetul Uniunii Europene.27 Hotrrea TPI pronunat pe 12.12.2007 n Dosarele conexate nr. T-101/05 i nr. T-111/05 BASF AG i UCB SA contra Comisiei Comunitilor Europene.

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United States, participation to cartels is a federaloffence and authorities success in the fightagainst such anti-competitive practices is quantifiednot only in hundred of million US dollars butalso in days of imprisonment. On the other sideof the ocean, CEOs and managers sent behind thebars are the hunting trophies of the anti-cartelofficials.

In contrast, in the European Union, even thoughthere are a few Member States (including Romania!)whose legal system provide for criminal sanctions for the natural persons that participatein conceiving or running a cartel, in practice, themechanism of criminal sanctions is not used. Inthis field, action at national level is inexistent andat EU level it is impossible since, at present, theUnions competencies in the field of criminal laware almost symbolic.

In these circumstances, the application of finesremains a solution that in the end leads to a reallocation (even though arguable), of a partfrom the profits acquired by the cartel membersto the European citizens, as the final beneficiariesof the EU budget28.

Instead of conclusions

The producers of automotive glass have announced that they will challenge the Commissionsdecision in front of CFI. However, if we considerthe judgment pronounced by CFI at the end of2007, in the BASF29 case , the perspectives arenot quite encouraging for the future appellants.In the BASF case, in an action against the Commissions decision imposing fines for the infringement of Article 81 EC Treaty, the court,taking into account the conduct of BASF company, decided for the first time to increasethe fine that had been applied by the Commission.

It will be interesting to see how the Communitycourt will evaluate the conduct of the participantsin this case, especially of those of them whomight become, at any time, holders of a fidelitycard offered by the European Commission forthe consequent participation in the investigationprocedures in the antitrust field.


28 The fines applied bz the European Commission in the field of competition become revenue to the EU budget. 29 CFI judgement of 12.12.2007, in Joined cases T-101/05 and T-111/05 BASF AG and UCB SA v. Commission of the European Communities.

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nc din 2001, Mario Monti afirma cu privire la viziunea Comisiei Europene n domeniul aplicriipoliticii de protecie a concurenei c, n ultimiiani, abordarea noastr cu accentul pe latura economic a politicii concurenei a aezat definireapieei n centrul procesului de aplicare a regulilorconcurenei n UE.32 Nellie Kroes, actualul Comisarpentru concuren, a intensificat, la rndul ei, procesul abordrii economice a politicii concurenei,declarnd: Indiferent dac vorbim de aciuni abuziveale firmelor dominante pe pia, sancionareacartelurilor, controlul fuziunilor sau evaluarea ajutoarelor de stat potenialul efect negativ asupraconsumatorilor va constitui, ntotdeauna, obiectivulprincipal al activitii noastre. Aplicm acest standard al bunstrii consumatorului printr-omai bun utilizare a analizei economice. Aceastabordare economic ajut Comisia European s-iconcentreze activitile spre cele cu adevrat importante pentru consumatorii europeni.33

Un punct important pe agenda european a ultimilor ani, impus de necesitatea adaptrii lanoile condiii create de ultimele valuri de extindere,ct i de realizarea unei aplicri mai eficiente iconsecvente a politicii de concuren n ntreaga Uniune, l-a constituit reforma legislativ i procedural.

Caracteristica acestor modificri este orientareactre o abordare mai economic, prin aplicareamai accentuat a analizei economice i interpretareacorect a teoriilor i datelor empirice.

Reformarea politicii de concuren, cu accent sporitpe latura economic, mbuntirea cadrului juridici procedural s-au datorat ntr-o msur semnificativi pierderilor suferite n justiie de ctre autoritateade concuren a UE, ntr-o serie de cazuri din domeniul controlului concentrrilor precum Airtours/First Choice34, Schneider Electric/Legrand35,Tetra Laval/Sidal36. Astfel, Comisia a modificat


Rezumat

Reforma ampl n domeniul aplicrii politicii concurenei din Europa ultimilor ani poate fi caracterizat drept o orientare ctre o abordare mai economic. Rolul i sfera analizei economices-au schimbat, s-a reformulat modul n care aceasta este asimilat aplicarii efective a politicii de protecie a concurenei, mai ales prin interpretarea corect a teoriilor i a datelor empirice.

Schimbarea politicii de concuren, cu accent sporit pe latura economic s-a concretizat prin mbuntirea cadrului juridic i procedural.

Cuvinte cheie: concurena, analiz economic, reform, abordare economic.

ORIENTAREA CTRE O ABORDARE MAI ECONOMIC A POLITICII N DOMENIUL CONCURENEI N EUROPA

Maria ALEXANDRU30Oana STANCIU31

30 Director Direcia Cercetare-Sinteze.31 Inspector de concuren - Direcia Cercetare-Sinteze.32 Mario Monti, fost Comisar european pentru concuren, Speech on Policy Market definition as a cornerstone of EU Competition Policy - Workshop on Market Definition - Helsinki Fair Centre Helsinki, 5.10.2001.33 Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Making consumers' right to damages a reality: the case for collective redress mechanisms in antitrust claims - Conference on collective, redress for European consumers, Lisbon, 9 th November 2007.34 Airtours v. Commission,[2002] ECR II-2585.35 Schneider v. Commission,[2002] ECR II-4071.36 Tetra Laval v. Commission,[2002] ECR II-4381.

17

Since 2001, Mario Monti has announced withreference to European Commission vision in thearea of competition policy enforcement that inrecent years, our increased economic approachto competition policy has put market definitionat the centre of the process of application of thecompetition rules in the EU.40 CommissionerNellie Kroes has improved the economic approach of competition policy, declaring:Whether we are talking about abusive actionsby dominant companies, breaking up cartels, vetting mergers, or assessing State aid - the potential harm to consumers is always at theheart of what we do. We are applying this 'consumer welfare standard' throughout ourwork, through a better use of economic analysis.This economic approach helps the EuropeanCommission focus on the activities really importantfor the European consumers.41

The legislative and procedural reform has beenan important point on the European agenda of thelast years, due to the necessity of the adjustmentto the new conditions generated by the last wavesof enlargement and by the achievement of an effective and consistent implementation of thecompetition policy throughout the Union.

The characteristic of these changes is the orientation towards a more economic approach,through the focused application of the economicanalysis and the correct interpretation of the theories and empirical data.

The adjustment of the competition policy, with emphasis on economics, the legislative and proceduralframework improvement were also a result of thelosses in the legal battles which the competition authority suffered in court, in a series of merger controlcases, such as Airtours/First Choice42, SchneiderElectric/Legrand43, Tetra Laval/Sidal44.Thus, the


Abstract39

The comprehensive reform in the implementation of the competition policy in Europe in the recentyears may be characterized as one towards a more economic approach. The role and the scope ofthe economic analysis has been changing, the way how the economic analysis is used for effectiveenforcement of the competition policy enforcement has been reformulated, especially through correct interpretation of the theories and empirical data.

Competition policy amendment, with emphasis on economics led to an improvement of the proceduraland legal framework.

Keywords: competition, economic analysis, reform, economic approach.

A MORE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO COMPETITION POLICY IN EUROPE Maria ALEXANDRU37Oana STANCIU38

37 Director Research and Synthesis Directorate.38 Competition inspector - Research and Synthesis Directorate.39 Translated into English by Oana Stanciu.40 Mario Monti, former European Commissioner for Competition, Speech on Policy Market definition as a cornerstone of EU CompetitionPolicy - Workshop on Market Definition - Helsinki Fair Centre Helsinki, 5.10.2001.41 Neelie Kroes, European Commissioner for Competition Policy, Making consumers' right to damages a reality: the case for collective redressmechanisms in antitrust claims - Conference on collective, redress for European consumers, Lisbon, 9 th November 2007.42 Airtours v. Commission,[2002] ECR II-2585.43 Schneider v. Commission,[2002] ECR II-4071.44 Tetra Laval v. Commission,[2002] ECR II-4381.

18

cadrul legislativ privind acordurile verticale, a elaborat Cartea Verde privind controlul concentrrilor,a adoptat noul regulament privind concentrrileeconomice i Orientrile privind evaluarea concentrrilor neorizontale45, ce completeazorientrile existente privind concentrrile orizontalecare se refer la fuziunile societilor concurentepe aceleai piee.

O alt latur a mbuntirii cadrului procedural aconstituit-o elaborarea unor linii directoare ce stabilesc reguli simple, care corespund unui numrmare de circumstane. Aceste linii directoare nupot exemplifica, n ntregime, analiza economiccare se va efectua n contextul unui anumit caz, cifurnizeaz ndrumri privind tipul de analize teoretice i empirice ce pot fi realizate.

Reforma politicii n domeniul ajutorului de stat avizat i fundamentarea economic a deciziilorluate n domeniul controlului ajutoarelor de stat,att n sensul operaionalizrii unei analize maiamnunite a distorsionrii concurenei, ct i alutilizrii conceptului de eec al pieei. Eecurilepieei reprezint un argument n favoarea acordriide ajutoare de stat, dar necesit o analiz economicadecvat i minuioas, i deci utilizarea de instrumente econometrice.

Pentru a oferi o fundamentare economic deciziilorComisiei n materie de concuren, n cadrul Direciei Generale Concuren s-a instituit oechip special de economiti. Rolul Economistuluief i al Grupului condus de acesta (GE) n cadrul direciei este din ce n ce mai important.

Obiectivele lor principale sunt:

consultan pe probleme metodologice de economie i econometrie pentru aplicarea regulilorconcurenei;

activitatea de sprijin: un membru GE este inclus n cadrul echipei de lucru, raportnd ins

Economistului ef. n acest fel, GE este implicatndeaproape att n activitatea zilnic a echipei delucru, ct i n investigaii, din stadii incipiente,oferind consultan pe probleme economice i asisten metodologic;

contribuie consistent la dezvoltarea instrumentelorde politic general cu coninut economic;

instrumentarea unor cazuri de antitrust mailaborioase.

Rolul si sfera analizei economice, utilizate n cadrul aplicrii politicii de protecie a concurenei,s-au schimbat n Europa ultimilor ani. Concurena,procesul care oblig firmele s rspund dorinelorconsumatorilor privind preul, calitatea si varietateaproduselor, acioneaz n acelai timp ca un mecanism selectiv prin care firmele mai eficientele nlocuiesc pe cele mai puin eficiente. Concurenaeste deci un element cheie n promovarea uneicreteri economice europene rapide, orientatctre consumator i mai competitiv.

Din punct de vedere al orizontului de timp, utilizarea principiilor i a analizelor economice naplicarea politicii concurenei se poate clasifica nanalize ex-post i ex-ante. Analizele ex-post se faccu scopul de a afla n ce mod deciziile luate n domeniul antitrust, ajutor de stat i concentrri auafectat pieele. Principala dificultate a cercetrii oreprezint stabilirea posibilelor consecine asuprapieei, n cazul n care s-ar fi adoptat o decizie alternativ, consecine pe se pot obine folosindmodele i/sau analize econometrice. O alt dificultate const n identificarea altor factori carear fi putut influena piaa, cu scopul stabilirii impactului deciziei nsi. Cunotintele despre industrie i piaa sunt cruciale n aflarea exact afactorilor implicai. Importana analizelor ex-postnu trebuie subestimat, acestea reprezentand singurajustificare logic a eficacitii unei decizii.


45 Concentrrile neorizontale includ concentrrile verticale, care implic societi ce acioneaz la diferite niveluri ale lanului de aprovizionare.De exemplu, atunci cnd fabricantul unui anumit produs ("societatea din amonte") fuzioneaz cu unul dintre distribuitorii si ("societatea dinaval") i concentrrile conglomerale ce reprezint concentrri ntre firme care se afl n relaii care nu sunt nici orizontale (n calitate de concureni pe aceeai pia relevant), nici verticale (n calitate de furnizori sau de clieni). n practic, obiectul prezentelor orientri l reprezintconcentrrile economice ntre societi care acioneaz pe piee strns legate (de exemplu concentrri care implic furnizori de produse complementare sau de produse care aparin aceleiai game).

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Commission has changed the legislative frameworkfor the vertical agreements, has developed theGreen Book for merger control and has adoptedthe new merger control regulation and the Guidelineson the assessment of non-horizontal mergers46,which follow the current guidelines related to thehorizontal mergers that refers to the fusion of thecompanies competing on the same markets.

Another area of improvement of the legislativeframework was the development of the guidelineswhich establish simple rules, to cover a largenumber of circumstances. These guidelines cannotexplain in detail the economic analysis in thecontext of one case but offers guidance regardingthe sort of theoretical and empirical analysis thatcan be performed.

The political reform in the state aid area aimedalso the economic assessment of the decisionstaken in the area of the state aid control, both interms of operationalizing a more explicit analysisof the distortions of competition, as well as theuse of the concept of market failures. The marketfailures represent an argument towards grantingstate aids, but a detailed economic analysis byusing econometrical instruments is required.

To offer an economic foundation of the Commissions decisions, within the DG COMP aspecial team of economists was established. Therole of the Chief Economist and the Chief EconomistTeam (CET) at DG COMP is more and more important.

Their basic objectives are:

consultancy on economic and econometricalmethodology for the competition policy enforcement;

support function: one member of the CETgets assigned to the case team, reporting to theChief Economist. In this way, the CET is closely

involved with the day-to-day work of case teams,getting involved early on in the investigation,giving economic guidance and methodologicalassistance;

consistent support for the development of thegeneral policy instruments with economic content;

investigation of several more difficult antitrust cases.

The role and scope of economic analysis in competition policy in Europe has been changingin the last years. Competition, the process forcingcompanies to respond to the consumers requestsregarding price, quality, and diversity of products,acts in the same time as a selective mechanism,by which more efficient companies replace theless efficient ones. Competition is therefore, akey element in promoting a rapid European economic growth, more competitive and consumer-oriented.

From time horizon point of view, the use of economic principles and analysis in competitionpolicy can be differentiate in: ex post and ex anteanalysis. The purpose of the ex post analysis is tounderstand how antitrust, state aid and mergersdecisions have affected markets. The main difficultyof the research is to establish the possible consequences on the market if some alternate decision had been taken instead, effects whichcan be derived from theoretical models and/oreconometric analysis. Another problem is to establish other factors that might have had an influence on the market, in order to identify theimpact of the decision itself. Industry and marketknowledge is crucial in order to understand theprecise factors involved. The importance of expost analysis cannot be underestimated. The expost analysis is the only logical justification forthe effectiveness of a decision.


46 Non horizontal mergers include vertical mergers which involve companies operating at different levels of the supply chain. For example,when a manufacturer of a certain product (the "upstream firm") merges with one of its distributors (the "downstream firm") and conglomeratemergers that are mergers between firms who are in a relationship which is neither horizontal (as competitors in the same relevant market) norvertical (as suppliers or customers). In practice, the focus of the present guidelines is on mergers between companies that are active in closelyrelated markets (e.g. mergers involving suppliers of complementary products or products that belong to the same product range).

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Analizele ex-ante, cum ar fi monitorizarea pieei,reprezint analizele anterioare unei posibile aciuni antitrust. n cazul monitorizrii pieei sunt greude identificat situaiile n care pieele nu funcioneaz,cum ar fi comportamentul anticoncurenial sau barierele la intrare. Contribuia tiinei economiceo reprezint i definirea unui set de indicatori caresemnaleaz probabilitatea existenei unei probleme concureniale specifice pe pia. Analizeleex-ante pot fi folosite la identificarea situaiilor ncare efectul probabil al unui pretins comportamentanticoncurenial sau al existenei unei pretinse bariere la intrarea pe pia este redus. Pe baza analizelor ex-ante se stabilesc prioritile autoritiide concuren. Astfel, resursele vor trebui alocatecazurilor i activitilor cu efectele probabile celemai duntoare asupra consumatorilor.

Prin abordarea economic a politicii n domeniulconcurenei se realizeaz dou obiective complementare. Primul obiectiv este identifica-rea incalcarii prevederilor legale prin comporta-mente anticoncureniale. Prin concentrarea peefectele aciunilor companiei mai curnd dect peforma pe care o pot lua aceste aciuni, o abordare eco-nomic face mai dificil pentru companii sustra-gerea de la constrngerile politicii concurenei, nncercarea lor de a obine acelai rezultat final fo-losind diferite practici comerciale. n acelai timp,aceast abordare ofer o modalitate mai logic deanaliz a diferitelor practici, deoarece fiecare prac-tic specific este evaluat n funcie de rezultat idou practici ce conduc spre acelai rezultat finalvor fi analizate n acelai mod.

Al doilea obiectiveste garantarea faptului c prevederilestatutare nu blocheaz stategiile pro-competitive. Oanaliz bazat pe efecte ia n considerare posibilitateaca practicile de afaceri similare s poat avea rezultatediferite n circumstane diferite: distorsionarea concurenei n anumite cazuri i promovarea eficieneii inovaiei n altele. O abordare a politicii n domeniulconcurenei care compar direct acest dualism va asigura protecia consumatorilor (prin prevenireacomportamentului care i prejudiciaz) i va promova,n acelai timp, productivitatea crescut i dezvoltarea(deoarece firmele nu vor fi descurajate n ncercrilelor de sporire a eficienei).

Definirea pieei este un instrument utilizat pentrua identifica i a descrie graniele concurenei (perimetrul n interiorul cruia se desfoar concurena) ntre companii. Acest instrument permite stabilirea cadrului n care este aplicat politica de concuren. Conceptul de pia relevant este diferit de alte concepte de pia,adesea folosite n alte contexte. De exemplu, companiile folosesc adesea termenul de pia pentrua descrie zona n care ii vnd produsele sau pentrua se referi n sens larg la industria sau sectorul ncare activeaz.

O etap important pentru consolidarea analizelorn aplicarea politicii de concuren o constituieNota Comisiei privind definiia pieei relevante47,adoptat n decembrie 1997 i publicat n JurnalulOficial C 372, 09/12/1997. Nota ofer un cadrujuridic, bazat pe principii economice, care ar trebuis asigure consisten i transparen sporite naplicarea legislaiei concurenei.

O abordare economic a analizei practicilor anticoncureniale implic evaluarea fiecrui cazspecific pe baza analizei efectelor anticoncurenialegenerate de practica de afaceri i nu pe baza formeispecifice a respectivei practici (de exemplu distribuieexclusiv, vnzri legate), evaluare ce nu se poateface dect printr-o analiz economic temeinic.

De exemplu, n evaluarea acordurilor verticale seine cont de impactul actual sau potenial al acordului asupra pieei. Stabilirea structurii pieeieste esenial n determinarea impactului pe careeventualele acorduri verticale le-ar putea avea asupraconcurenei. Restricionarea concurenei este unpericol doar n cazul unei insuficiente concureneintermarc, i dac exist un anume grad de putere pe piaa respectiv. Restriciile verticalesunt, n general, mai puin periculoase dect restriciile orizontale precum fixarea preurilor saumprirea pieei, dei pot avea o varietate deefecte atat asupra firmelor implicate ct i asuprapieei pe care acestea opereaz. nchiderea pieeipentru posibilii concureni este cea mai periculoasi semnificativ urmare asociat cu acest tip deacorduri.


47 Nota menioneaz: Scopul principal al definirii pieei este identificarea, n mod sistematic, a constrngerilor competitive crora ntreprinderile implicate trebuie s le fac fa. Obiectivul definirii pieei att sub aspectul produsului ct i n dimensiunea geografic estede a identifica acei concureni ai firmelor capabili s constrng comportamentele celorlali i s i mpiedice s se comporte independent deorice presiune concurenial eficient. Din aceast perspectiv, cotele de pia pot oferi informaii utile pentru obiectivul de a estima dominana.. Exist o serie de teste cantitative concepute special pentru a descrie piaa. Aceste teste constau n diverse abordri econometricei statistice: estimri ale elasticitilor i ale elesticitilor ncruciate n funcie de pre pentru cererea produsului, teste bazate pe similaritateavariaiilor de preuri n timp, analize tip cauz efect dintre seriile de preuri i similitudinea intre nivelurile de pre i/sau convergena lor.-http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/relevma_en.html.

21

The ex ante analysis, such as market monitoring,is the analysis taken prior to a possible antitrustaction. In the case of market monitoring it is difficult to identify the situations when marketsdo not function, such as anticompetitive conductor the existence of entry barriers. One contributionof economics is also to define a set of indicatorsthat signal a particular competition problem on themarket. The ex ante analysis can be used to identifysituations where the likely impact of alleged anticompetitive conduct or entry barrier is small.Based on ex ante analysis, the competition authoritiesare setting priorities. Thus, the resources shouldbe devoted to cases and activities where the expected harm to consumers is highest.

Two complementary objectives are achievedthrough the economic approach to competitionpolicy. The first objective is identification of theviolations of the legal provisions through anticompetitive behaviours. Focusing on the effects of the actions of one company rather thanon the form of these actions, an economic approach makes more difficult for the companiesto avoid the competition policy constraints intheir attempt to obtain the same final result usingdifferent commercial practices. In the same time,this approach gives a more logical method ofanalysis of different practices, because every specific practice is evaluated based on the result,and two practices leading to the same result willbe evaluated in the same way.

The second objective is ensuring that legal provisions do not prevent pro-competitive strategies. An effect-based analysis considers thepossibility that similar business practices maylead to different results under different circumstances: distortion of competition in certaincases and promoting efficiency and innovationin other cases. An approach of the competitionpolicy which compares directly this dualism, willensure consumers protection (by preventing aharmful behaviour), and in the same time, willpromote increased productivity and development(because companies will not be discouraged intheir attempts to improve efficiency).

Market definition is a tool to identify and definethe boundaries of competition between firms. Itallows establishing the framework within whichcompetition policy is applied. The concept of relevant market is different from other conceptsof market often used in other contexts. For instance, companies often use the term market torefer to the area where it sells its products or to referbroadly to the industry or sector where it belongs.

An important phase for the consolidation of theanalyses in the implementation of the competitionpolicy is the Commission Notice on the definitionof the relevant market48, adopted in December1997 and published in the Official Journal C 372,09/12/1997. The Notice gives a legal frameworkbased on the economic principles, which shouldensure an increased consistency and transparencyin the implementation of the competition policy.

An economic approach of the analysis of the anticompetitive behaviors involves the evaluationof every specific case based on the analysis of theanticompetitive effects generated by the businesspractice and not based on the specific form of therespective practice (for instance exclusive dealing, tying). This evaluation can only be performedthrough a comprehensive economic analysis.

As an example, when evaluating vertical agreementswe account for the actual or likely impact of theagreement on the market. To determine the impact of the potential vertical agreements mayhave over the competition, it is essential to establish the structure of the market. Restrainingthe competition is dangerous only when the inter-brand competition is insufficient and if acertain degree of power exists on the respectivemarket. Generally, vertical restrictions are lessdangerous than horizontal restrictions like pricefixing or market allocation although they may havea variety of effects both on the involved companiesand on the market in which these companies operate.The most dangerous and significant consequenceassociated with this type of agreements is the marketclosure for potential competitors.


48 The Notice specifies: The main purpose of market definition is to identify in a systematic way the competitive constraints that the undertakings involved face. The objective of defining a market in both its product and geographic dimension is to identify those actual competitors of the undertakings involved that are capable of constraining their behavior and of preventing them from behaving independentlyof an effective competitive pressure. It is from this perspective, that the market definition makes it possible, inter alia, to calculate market sharesthat would convey meaningful information regarding market power for the purposes of assessing dominance There are a number of quan-titative tests that have specifically been designed for the purpose of delineating markets. These tests consist of various econometric and statistical approaches: estimates of elasticities and cross-price elasticities for the demand of a product, tests based on similarity of price movementsover time, the analysis of causality between price series and similarity of price levels and/or their convergence. -http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/relevma_en.html.

22

ns, acordurile verticale sunt adesea necesarepentru creterea eficienei. n aceste cazuri, efectelepozitive ale restriciei exced pe cele negative, pertotal beneficiind att firmele din industria respectiv,ct i consumatorii. Exist dou exemple clasicereferitoare la efectele pozitive ale acordurilor verticale: dubla marj49 i problema pasageruluiclandestin50. Legislaia comunitar prevede o seriede situaii n care acordurile verticale pot fi exceptate n bloc deoarece beneficiile rezultate depe urma acestora sunt mai mari dect eventualelecosturi, ele fiind favorabile att sporirii eficieneiproductorilor, ct i consumatorilor. Atunci cndprile implicate n asemenea restricii verticaledein o putere considerabil de pia, analiza seface de la caz la caz.

Att la nivel european dar i la nivel naional, rolulanalizei economice n politica de protecie a concurenei ctig din ce n ce mai mult importan.O abordare mai economic implic ns necesitateaasigurrii ca analiza economic asigur siguranadin punct de vedere legal. n plus, o analiz economicextensiv necesit timp i aceasta poate prelungiperioada necesar desfaurrii procedurilor.

Un impediment major al utilizrii mai intense aanalizei economice n procesul decizional din cadrul politicii concurenei l constituie dificultateaeconomistilor de a comunica cu non-economistii,reprezentai n principal de juriti. Capacitatea economitilor de a-i prezenta ntr-un mod comprehensibil i concis prerile, precum i rezultatele analizelor empirice este crucial la ambele niveluri cel al autoritii de concurentct i n justitie.

n Romania, Consiliul Concurenei urmeaz liniaComisiei Europene de orientare ctre o abordaremai economic a politicii concurenei. Astfel, capacitatea instituional s-a ntrit prin nfiinarea,n cadrul Direciei Cercetare Sinteze a unui grupde analiz economic. Grupul ofer consultanpe probleme de analiz economic i econometrie,va efectua studii de pia i va utiliza instrumentemoderne de analiz economic n definirea pieeirelevante.

Bibliografie

Roller, L.(2005): Economic Analysis an CompetitionPolicy Enforcement n Europe -http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2005_011_en.pdf;

* * * (2007): Raport privind politica n domeniul concurenei pentru anul 2007, Comisia European -http://www.ec.europa.eu-competition;

Kroes, N.(2007): Making consumers' right to damagesa reality: the case for collective redress mechanisms inantitrust claims - http://ec.europa.eu/commission_bar-roso/kroes/speeches_en.html;

Cabral, L. (2000): Introduction to industrial organization,MIT Press;

* * * http://www.ec.europa.eu-competition/publication;

* * * http://www.biblioteca.ase.ro.


49 Dubla marj situaia n care integrarea pe vertical a dou sau mai multe firme conduce la o mbuntire, nu numai la nivelul ofertei, cii la nivelul consumatorilor. Teoretic, pentru a demonstra avantajul integrrii verticale prin intermediul acordului se calculeaz beneficiile realizate de firme n cazul separrii verticale i apoi n cazul integrrii. n cazul separrii verticale, fiecare agent economic va lua decizia demaximizare a preului n condiii de monopol. Dac singurul instrument contractual pe care cei doi l pot folosi este preul cu ridicata, atuncifiecare firm va adauga marja sa de pre peste costul marginal, rezultatul final fiind un nivel de pre mai mare dect n cazul n care doar ofirm ar fi deinut poziia de monopol. Drept urmare, profiturile combinate ale celor dou firme sunt mai mici dect atunci cnd cele dou firmear fi fuzionat/integrate. Mai mult, i surplusul consumatorului este mai mic n cazul separaiei verticale, deoarece preul pltit n final de consummator este mai mare dect preul de monopol. - Cabral, L. (2000), Introduction to industrial organization, MIT Press, Chapter 11.50 Conceptul pasagerului clandestin cazul concurenei intramarc, n care civa detailiti vnd acelai produs, iar unii dintre ei beneficiazde investiiile unui alt distribuitor n publicitate, service sau instruire. Consumatorii caut informaii la magazinul cu serviciul tehnic de calitatei apoi cumpr produsul n cauz de la un magazin care ofer un pre mai mic. Soluiile posibile de rezolvare a problemei pasagerului clandestin sunt: fixarea unui pre minim de revnzare pentru a ncuraja concurena prin calitate, restricionarea numrului de distribuitori saufurnizarea/distribuirea excusiv care asigur recompensarea efortului (n.a. stabilirea unui pre minim sau fix de revnzare este considerat practicanticoncurenial); cazul concurenei intermarc, acelai detailist vinde produse concurente pe pia. Conceptul pasagerului clandestin reprezintsituaia n care ali productori beneficiaz de investiiile unui alt productor n publicitate, lista clienilor sau instruire. Soluia posibil de rezolvare a problemei pasagerului clandestin este distribuia exclusiv. - Cabral, L. (2000), Introduction to industrial organization, MIT Press,Chapter 11.

23


However, vertical agreements are often requiredfor efficiency increases. In such cases the positiveeffects of the restrictions exceed the negative effects both companies in the respective industryand the consumers benefiting overall. There aretwo classical examples with reference to the positive effects of the vertical agreements: double-markup51 and the free-rider problem52.The EU legislation anticipates several situations,in which vertical agreements may be blockexempted, because the resulted benefits are higher than the potential costs, these being favorable for the increased efficiency of the manufacturers and for the consumers. When theinvolved parties in such restrictions have a considerable power on the market, the analysisis performed on a case-by-case basis.

Both at the European and national level the roleof the economic analysis in the competition policy gains more importance. A more economicapproach however, implies the requirement thatthe economic analysis ensures legal certainty. Inaddition, an extensive economic analysis requirestime and this may extend the length of the proceedings.

A major impediment of using economic analysismore intensely in the decisional process withinthe competition policy enforcement is the difficultyof the economists to communicate with the non-economists, represented mainly by legal representatives. The capability of the economiststo present their opinions and the results of theempirical analysis in an understandable and concisemanner is crucial at both levels - competition authority and justice.

In Romania, the Competition Council follows theEuropean Commission orientation, towards amore economic approach of the competition policy. Thus, the institutional capability was enhanced by establishing a group of economicanalysis within the Research and Synthesis Directorate. The group offers consultancy oneconomic analysis and econometrics, will performmarket research and will use modern economicanalysis instruments when establishes relevantmarket.

Bibliography

Roller, L.(2005): Economic Analysis an CompetitionPolicy Enforcement n Europe -http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2005_011_en.pdf;

* * * (2007): Report on Competition Policy 2007,European Commission - http://www.ec.europa.eu-com-petition;

Kroes, N.(2007): Making consumers' right to damagesa reality: the case for collective redress mechanisms inantitrust claims http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/kroes/speeches_en.html;

Cabral, L. (2000): Introduction to industrial organization, MIT Press;

* * * http://www.ec.europa.eu-competition/publication;

* * * http://www.biblioteca.ase.ro.

51 Double-markup the situation when the vertical integration of two or more companies leads to an improvement not only at the offer level,but also at the consumers level. Theoretically, to demonstrate the advantage of the vertical integration through the agreement, we calculatethe benefits of the companies when they are vertically separated and then when they are integrated. When vertically separated, each companywill decide to maximize price under monopoly conditions. If the only contractual instrument that both companies can use is the wholesale pricethen every company will add its markup on top of the marginal cost, the end result being a price level higher than if one company only wouldhave had the monopoly position. As a result, the combined profits of the two companies are lower than if the two companies would bemerged/integrated. Moreover, the consumers surplus is lower in the case of the vertical separation because the final price paid by the con-sumer is higher than the monopoly price. - Cabral, L. (2000), Introduction to industrial organization, MIT Press, Chapter 11. 52 Free-rider - the case of intrabrand competition, when several retailers are selling the same product and some of them benefit from one dis-tributors investments in terms of advertisement, service or technical training. The customers seek advice from shop with good service andthen buy from a discounter. Possible solutions to resolve the free-riding problem are: setting a minimum resale price to encourage competi-tion in terms of quality, restrict the number of dealers or excusive supply/distribution to ensure reward for effort (a.n. setting a minimum or afix resale price is deemed as an anticompetitive practice); the case of interbrand competition, when same retailer is selling competing goods.The free-rider concept represents the case when other manufacturers benefit from one manufacturers investments in terms of client lists,technical training or advertising. Possible solution to resolve the free-riding problem is excusive dealing. - Cabral, L. (2000), Introduction toindustrial organization, MIT Press, Chapter 11.

24

Adesea activitatea autoritii de concuren necesit identificarea pieei relevante (n analizaconcentrrilor economice ncheiate sau n cursde realizare sau n investigaiile cu privire la abuzulde poziie dominant). Identificarea pieei relevante nu reprezint un scop n sine ci mai degrab un punct de plecare ce face posibil calculul cotelor de pia ce ar permite o mai bunviziune asupra puterii de pia n cadrul evaluriiunei poziii dominante sau a unei concentrri.Piaa relevant are dou componente: piaa relevant a produsului i piaa geografic relevant.

Piaa relevant a produsului cuprinde toate produsele pe care consumatorul le consider interschimbabile sau sustituibile, datorit caracteristicilor, preurilor i utilizrii creiaacestea i sunt destinate.

Piaa geografic relevant cuprinde zona n careagenii economici sunt implicai n oferta i cererea de produse sau servicii n cauz, n carecondiiile concureniale sunt suficient de omogene i care poate fi distins de zonele cu

care se nvecineaz pe baza condiiilor concureniale diferite.

n 1982, n cadrul Instruciunilor privind concentrrile economice, departamentul de justiieal Statelor Unite ale Americii au introdus Testulmonopolistului ipotetic (testul SSNIP) ca onou metod de definire a pieelor i de msuraredirect a puterii de pia. n Uniunea Europeantestul a fost utilizat pentru prima dat n 1992 ncazul Nestl/Perrier i a fost recunoscut oficialde ctre Comisia European n 1997 n Not aComisiei privind definirea pieei relevante.

Testul SSNIP ncearc s identifice cea mai restrns pia pe care un monopolist ipotetic arputea practica n mod profitabil o cretere micdar semnificativ i non-tranzitorie a preului io consider ca fiind piaa relevant. Testul monopolistului ipotetic adreseaz urmtoarea ntrebare: Ar fi profitabil pentru monopolistulipotetic s practice, n acea arie geografic, pentruprodusul (produsele) respectiv (respective), unpre mai mare cu 5% fa de nivelul competitiv,pe o perioad de cel puin un an?.


Rezumat

Elementul central i probabil cel mai important al oricrei aciuni / investigaii a autoritii de concuren l reprezint definirea pieei relevante. O metod de definire a pieelor i de msurare direct a puterii de pia este testul monopolistului ipotetic. Testul monopolistului ipotetic sau testul SSNIP definete piaa relevant prin verificarea profitabilitii creterii preului de vnzare alprodusului (n general cu 5-10%) de ctre un monopolist ipotetic, pe o period de cel puin un an.

Cuvinte cheie: concuren, pia relevant, testul SSNIP, elasticitate critic a cererii, pierdere critic.

Clasificare JEL: D4, L4.

TESTUL MONOPOLISTULUI IPOTETIC UN INSTRUMENT DE LUCRU N DOMENIUL CONCURENEI

Ionu DRGOI53

53 Inspector de concuren, Direcia de Cercetare-Sinteze.

25

Competition authority work often requires adetermination of the relevant market (in litigationchallenging a proposed or consummated horizontal merger or in the investigations withregard to abuse of dominant position). Determinationof the relevant market is not a goal in itself.Rather it is only a starting point which makespossible to calculate market shares that wouldconvey meaningful information regarding marketpower for the purposes of assessing dominanceor horizontal mergers. The relevant market hastwo components: the relevant product marketand the relevant geographic market.

The relevant product market comprises all theproducts which are regarded as interchangeableor substitutable by the consumer, by reason ofthe products' characteristics, their prices and theirintended uses.

The relevant geographic market comprises thearea in which the undertakings concerned are involved in the supply of products, in which theconditions of competition are sufficiently homogenous and which can be distinguished

from neighboring areas because the conditions ofcompetition are appreciably different in those areas.

In 1982 the U.S. Department of Justice MergerGuidelines introduced the Small but Significantand Non-transitory Increase in Price test (theSSNIP test) as a new method for defining markets and for measuring market power directly. In the EU it was used for the first timein the Nestl/Perrier case in 1992 and has beenofficially recognized by the European Commissionin its "Commission's Notice for the Definition ofthe Relevant Market" in 1997.

The SSNIP test tries to identify the narrow market within which a hypothetical monopolistcould impose a small but significant non-transitoryincrease in price and defines this as the relevantmarket. As a matter of fact it asks whether a hypothetical monopolist controlling a product ora group of products could sustain a price increaseof 5% for at least one year.


Abstract 55

The central and probably the most important element of any action / investigation of competitionauthorities is the relevant market definition. A method for defining markets and for measuring market power directly is the hypothetical monopolist test. The Hypothetical Monopolist or the SSNIPtest (small but significant non-transitory increase in prices) defines the relevant market by determining whether a given increase in product prices (usually between 5 and 10 percents) for atleast one year would be profitable for a hypothetical monopolist in the candidate market.

Keywords: competition, relevant market, SSNIP test, critical elasticity of demand, critical loss.

JEL Classification: D4, L4.

54 Competition inspector, Synthesis and Research Directorate.55 Translated into English by Ionu Drgoi.

THE HYPOTHETICAL MONOPOLIST TEST A WORKING TOOL IN THE FIELD OF COMPETITION

Ionu DRGOI54

26

Testul se aplic astfel:

se pornete de la cea mai restrns pia i se verific dac o cretere a preului cu 5% ar fi profitabil; dac rspunsul este afirmativ, piaa consideratreprezint chiar piaa relevant; n caz contrar, seconsider c agentul economic nu are suficientputere de pia pentru a crete preul; se va include cel mai apropiat produs substituientn piaa relevant i se repet testul pentru noul grupde produse; procedeul se va repeta pn cnd monopolistulipotetic poate practica o cretere profitabil a preului cu 5%; setul de produse sau de zone geografice astfeldeterminate consituie piaa relevant.

Pentru a verifica dac aceast cretere a preuluieste profitabil, n general se utilizeaz dou metode:

1. Elasticitatea critic a cererii

Testul SSNIP poate fi aplicat prin estimarea elasticitii critice a cererii. Elasticitatea critic acererii (e) reprezint acea valoare a elasticitii cererii pentru care creterea preului nu modificprofitul obinut. n cazul cererii liniare, pentru estimarea elasticitii critice a cererii este suficients cunoatem marja cost-pre. Marja brut (cunoscuti ca Indicatorul Lerner) se definete ca fiind diferena procentual dintre pre i costul marginal.Dac preul unei uniti de prdus este P iar costulmarginal este C, atunci marja cost-pre va fi:

n cazul n care creterea minim a preului considerat seminificativ (de obicei se considera fi de 5%) este t, atunci coeficientul de elasticitatecriti

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