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Problem Brokers and the Multiple Streams Framework

Åsa Knaggård, PhD Department of Political Science, Lund University

Box 52, S-221 00 Lund [email protected]

Paper to be presented at the ECPR General Conference, Panel P056, Glasgow, 3-6 September 2014 Abstract The paper develops John Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) through a theorization of how political problems come about. One important argument is that the framing of problems creates the context in which policy entrepreneurs try to get issues onto the political agenda. The way problems are framed creates possibilities or barriers for the coupling of specific policy proposals to problems. I argue that through the inclusion of the ‘problem broker’ in the MSF, the problem stream could be theorized. The problem broker frames conditions as political problems. Problem brokers can use different types of claims to convince their audience. These include claims based on logos – arguments based on knowledge and logic – and on pathos – arguments that appeal to emotions. The paper discusses how these two types of claims are used and mixed in the framing of problems, as well as what consequences this has for agenda-setting. THE MULTIPLE STREAMS FRAMEWORK AND THE PROBLEM BROKER The Multiple Streams Framework (MSF), as developed by John Kingdon (2003/[1984]), constitutes a powerful tool to understand policy processes, especially the early stages of such processes. It was developed to analyze agenda setting in the U.S. The MSF builds on the idea that the policy process consists of three parallel and mostly independent processes – a problem stream, a policy stream, and a politics stream. One of Kingdon’s main arguments is that policies are not developed as a response to certain problems, but that policies can exist long before the problem has been formulated. Policy entrepreneurs, the most important actors in the MSF, develop policy alternatives and couple them with problems. The policy entrepreneur works to present a ready package of problem and solution to policy-makers at the right moment in time. If the policy entrepreneur is successful, the problem will be placed on the political agenda. If the package is rejected by policy-makers, the policy entrepreneur might try to sell the same package at a later point or at a different venue, or try to couple the policy to a different problem. I argue that too little focus has been placed on the problem stream, by Kingdon and others, compared to on the policy stream. The policy entrepreneur is an important actor, but it is not the only actor that we need to pay attention to. In studies using the MSF the problem and policy streams are often conflated in the sense that the policy entrepreneur is seen as defining the problem through coupling it with certain policy alternatives (e.g. Zahariadis 2007, 70). I argue that this hides the importance of how issues become defined as public problems and who comes to define them.

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With public problems I mean problems that are seen as in need of political action, compared to problems that are seen to be better handled by, for example, the market or individuals. The study of problem definition has long been an important area in policy studies (e.g. Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Edelman 1985; Rochefort & Cobb 1994; Schön & Rein 1994; Stone 1989; Wood & Doan 2003). According to Rochefort and Cobb (1994, 4) problem definition is even the “most central topic of public policy analysis”. The important lesson from this research, completely in line with Kingdon’s framework, is that problems do not just appear. Just as policy-entrepreneurs tries to place packages of problem and policy on the political agenda, so too does someone define problems and try to get attention to them. The definition of a problem makes us think about it in specific ways. It also makes certain policies seem more plausible than others. Further, the definition of a problem determines which actors that will be attracted to it and what institutions will be involved in terms of policy-making. The main point is that every condition can be defined as a problem in a number of different ways. Thereby all problems can be seen as more or less ambiguous (see also Baumgartner and Mahoney 2008). Problems can therefore be redefined in order to make new constellations of problem and policies possible as well as create new coalitions of interests (e.g. Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Schattschneider 1960). In other words, the definition of a problem creates the stage on which policy entrepreneurs act. It does not mean that problems come first, but rather that the definition of problems and the generation of policies are separate processes. When these processes come together problem definitions fundamentally affect what policies are possible to push as well as what institutions will be interested. When several problem frames are present policy entrepreneurs can pick and choose the one that best fits their purposes. If there is only one problem definition present policy entrepreneurs have to adjust. It is important to point out that the separation between problem and policy stream is analytical. Thus, if we find that one actor is active both in the problem and the policy streams this does not question the separation as such, as the separation is about tasks and not primarily who performs these tasks. It will vary empirically how independent streams actually are. In some cases problem definition and coupling of problem and policy will be conducted by the same persons. In other cases there will be a major division of labor between actors defining problems and the ones that couple these with policies. My point is that by focusing mostly on policy entrepreneurs we risk to miss both how policy entrepreneurs are enabled or limited by the existing definitions and how these definitions affect agenda-setting and policy-making. The struggle for influence, thus, does not just take place in the policy stream, but just as much in the problem stream. If we delimit studies to what policy entrepreneurs do, the struggle for influence in the problem stream will most likely be missed. My argument is thus that we must pay better attention to what happens in the problem stream in order to understand agenda-setting. In this article I will analytically develop what happens in the problem stream. This will be done through the introduction of the role of the problem broker into the MSF. A problem broker is here understood as a role through which actors frame conditions as political problems and work to make policy-makers accept these frames. I will draw on the literatures on problem definitions, framing, and persuasion. This article will make an argument for and theoretically develop the role and tasks of the problem broker. Through this the social constructivist elements of the MSF will be strengthened. Before introducing the problem broker in depth, the problem stream in the MSF will be discussed. Thereafter, the concept of framing will be discussed and its importance in turning conditions into political problems. Then I will turn to an elaboration on the tools that are available to problem brokers. These will be discussed as based on knowledge and emotions. Finally, I will discuss how we can understand success in terms of problem brokerage.

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IN THE PROBLEM STREAM Before I present the role of the problem broker we need to consider how the problem stream is understood in the MSF. Kingdon was very much interested in the role of problem definitions. He asked (2003, 17): “how does a given condition get defined as a problem for which government action is an appropriate remedy?” This perspective is congruent with that found in for example Baumgartner & Jones (1993). Thus, problems do not exist but have to be defined by someone – in essence by constructed. Before they become problems they are simply conditions. The difference between a condition and a problem is that the latter is seen as something that we ought to do something about (Kingdon 2003, 109; c.f. Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Wildawsky 1979). Two aspects are important here: (1) how this is done, and (2) who is doing it. According to Kingdon (2003, 19) “people define conditions as problems by comparing current conditions with their values concerning more ideal states of affairs, by comparing their own performance with that of other countries, or by putting the subject into one category rather than another” (see also the discussion on pp. 110-113). To start this process indicators, focusing events, and feedback from enacted policies are crucial (Kingdon 2003, 90-100). Regarding the issue of who is doing the defining, Kingdon pointed out that activists and policy entrepreneurs are highly important for bringing “problems to public and governmental attention” (2003, 115). However, his focus was not primarily on problem definition as such or the people defining problems. Rather, he paid attention to people “in and around government” and why they become interested in certain problems (2003, 90). He argued that the source of ideas is less important for explaining why certain problems are placed on the agenda than “the climate in government or the receptivity to ideas of a given type” (2003, 72f). Kingdon emphasized the importance of coupling streams for agenda setting. It is when a problem is coupled to a policy alternative that policy entrepreneurs will be more likely to attract the attention of policy-makers. I do not wish to question this, but rather to expand on what is already there. My argument is that if it is possible to define every problem in a number of ways, and that these definitions will affect the scope for action, we need to expand on this in the MSF. In many studies policy entrepreneurs are seen, implicitly or explicitly, as the ones that define problems – to a large extent through coupling problems with solutions (e.g. Anderson Crow 2010; Baumgartner & Jones 1993; Houston & Richardson 2000; Lindquist, Mosher-Howe & Liu 2010; Zahariadis 2003). It is less of a problem in many of these studies, as they do not make an analytical separation between processes where problems and policy suggestions are generated. It is in fact this separation that makes it necessary to further elaborate on the problem stream. By leaving problem definition to the policy entrepreneur the analytical independence of streams break down. I will discuss both the issue of how problem definitions are made – here I will use the concept of framing – and that of who is doing this. Here I suggest the concept of problem broker. THE PROBLEM BROKER A problem broker is a role through which actors frame conditions as public problems and work to make decision-makers accept these frames. Problem brokers thus define conditions as problems. One aspect is especially important in this definition – that framing a condition as a public problem is done with the purpose of making policy-makers accept it and in the end do something about it. Problem brokering is thereby a strategic act. A range of actors could play the role of problem broker, from those inside government to those on the outside. One advantage of seeing the problem broker as a role that can be played is that focus is placed on what actors do rather than on who

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these actors are. The latter can be important in that can influence have successful actors are as problem brokers, which will be discussed later. There are a number of concepts used that try to capture the tasks I assign to the problem broker. It is common, as already stated, that scholars use the concept entrepreneur for this. In some studies different categories of entrepreneurs are established. One example is the information entrepreneur (Anderson Crow 2010). As already stated, the problem for the MSF is that the focus on entrepreneurs weakens the analytical interdependence of streams. Even when the entrepreneur is specified to one aspect, like information, problem broker is preferable as the risk for confusion in what different types of entrepreneurs do is large. Other concepts of relevance are epistemic communities (Haas 1992) and advocacy coalitions (Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993). Both of these concepts refer to groups of actors that share beliefs about a problem and its solution. The problem in this context is that the two concepts cannot separate between problem and policy stream. It would make it impossible to capture a group of actors that share their view of the problem, but do not agree on the solution. In sociology the concept of claims-maker is used (e.g. Best 2001; Stallings 1995, 35). A problem with this concept is that the claims-maker frames conditions as social problems, not as public problems. Due to this it is less suited for the MSF, which is focused on how conditions are defined as public problems and are placed on the political agenda. A further problematic is that it, just as the two concepts already discussed, does not, by itself, enforce an analytical separation between what is going on in the problem and policy streams. Policy entrepreneurs could be understood as making claims just as much as problem brokers, but claims about policies. Problem brokers signals a clear focus on the problem stream and places the role within the policy process. I therefore prefer the concept of problem broker. The difference between problem broker and policy entrepreneur is fine. Empirically we could argue that there in some cases are no differences – that the same actor is playing both roles. However, the differentiation has analytical significance, especially in maintaining the separation between streams. The problem broker makes it possible to independently investigate what is going on in the problem stream. For some types of cases the concept will also empirically be very useful. It is cases where problems are new or heavily dependent on scientific knowledge. In these types of cases there will likely be a phase where a condition is defined as a problem without reference to more specific policy suggestions beyond that something needs to be done by policy-makers. In this lies the major difference between problem brokers and policy entrepreneurs: Although pointing at a solution is in the literature often seen as part of the problem definition, it is possible to draw a line between suggestions that something needs to be done and suggestions of particular policies. It is from this difference that the need for the problem broker evolved. I have argued elsewhere for the inclusion of the role of the knowledge broker in the MSF (Knaggård forthcoming). This suggestion was based on a study of science-politics interrelations in climate change politics (Knaggård 2009, 2014). In that study it became apparent that some actors, foremost scientists, clearly advocated the problem as public, but still refrained from making any suggestions vis-a-vi policies. That is, they deliberately refrained from acting as policy entrepreneurs. It is not uncommon that scientists try to stay clear of what they see as politics in order to protect their perceived neutrality. Scientists that act as policy entrepreneurs expose themselves to criticism from others of being unscientific. It was also clear in the study that these actors played a significant role in determining how problems should be understood and thereby created opportunities for some policy entrepreneurs and made it more difficult for others. The concept of knowledge broker, as formulated by Litfin (1994), nicely captured what was going on. However, when generalizing from problems defined foremost by scientists to a larger span of problems, the concept of knowledge broker is too narrow. Therefore, here instead I argue for the inclusion of the wider concept of the problem broker.

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FRAMING Now we turn to what problem brokers do. As already stated, they define conditions as public problems. The process in which they do this can be understood as framing. The literatures on problem definition and framing overlap to a large extent. They share the basic premise that every problem can be defined, or framed, in a number of different ways, and that this has implications for policy-making. The reason for using framing instead of problem definition is that it is captures a wider array of processes that share the aspect of framing. In this sense both problem brokers and policy entrepreneurs are framing, but they focus on different things. Defining problems can therefore be seen as one form of framing. The literature on framing is divided along different line. Most importantly the focus shifts (cf. Druckman 2001). In one part of the literature scholars emphasize cognition and how individuals come to frame problems to make sense of them and their world, as well as how others’ frames affect the way individuals perceive of problems (e.g. Chong & Druckman 2007; Druckman 2001; Goffman 1974; Tversky & Kahneman 1981 ). In the other part, scholars focus on the role of framing as more of a collective process, either as the influence of media on the public (e.g. Entman 1993) or the influence of a number of different actors on agenda-setting and policy-making (e.g. Baumgartner and Mahoney 2008; Benford & Snow 2000; Kangas, Niemelä & Varjonen 2014; Schön & Rein 1994; Wolfe, Jones & Baumgartner 2013). It is the latter part of this literature that I use. As the literature is rather wide there are a number of different definitions, which often are rather vague. Here framing will be understood, in the words of Entman (2004, 5, italics removed), as “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation and/or solution”. To frame a condition as a problem thus means to highlight some aspects over other. It means to define the condition, not just as a public problem, but as a specific political problem. The categories that Kingdon talks about (2003, 111) can be perceived in this way. Entman’s definition is rather inclusive and refers to the general processes of framing. In the context of the problem broker framing can be understood to be about problem definition. The frames that problem brokers use, here referred to as problem frames, have as their most important component a definition of the problem. It includes what the problem is about, who is responsible (the public or someone else), and why we should do something about it (cf. Jasanoff & Wynne 1998; Schön & Rein 1994). These aspects are seldom explicitly stated, but are important underlying components of frames. The frame thereby entails much more than it expresses. Frames can thus be seen as shorthand for more elaborate stories (e.g. Stone 1989) or narratives (e.g. Patterson & Renwick Monroe 1998; Shanahan, Jones, McBeth 2011). Due to this, frames will come in many different forms and shapes, and it is not possible to determine one linguistic shape of frames. What form a frame takes will have to be established empirically based on the context. The process of framing conditions as public problems is an on-going one. There is a constant struggle over definitions. This is highlighted in discourse theory, by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and by Schattschneider’s concept of the mobilization of bias. Gusfield (1981, 15) states that “[t]he structure of public problems is … an arena of conflict in which a set of groups and institutions … compete and struggle over ownership and disownership, the acceptance of causal theories, and the fixation of responsibility”. With ownership he means a situation where the frame of a specific actor has come

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to dominate the understanding of a problem.1 This struggle can result in the reframing of a problem. This in turn can open up possibilities to couple the problem to new types of policy alternatives. Framing delimits the span of thinkable policies that can be attached to a problem. Reframing can change that span, so that what previously were seen as valid solutions no longer can be seen in that way. However, Wolfe, Jones and Baumgartner (2013) suggest that even if reframing is possible it is often unlikely. KNOWLEDGE AND EMOTIONS IN FRAMING Now we turn to the frames that problem brokers put forward, and especially to the different aspects of these frames – including knowledge-based elements and appeals to emotions. This corresponds to the logos and pathos aspects of framing. As already argued, all frames have to include an element of both. However, the balance between the two can differ depending on who acts as problem broker, what audience is targeted, and what the problem area is. Before expanding on this I will go more in depth in knowledge and emotions as tools that the problem broker can use. Knowledge There is no doubt that knowledge, although not necessarily scientific, is a crucial part of almost all framings. As discussed above, the empirical study on which my arguments rest pertains to the role of scientific knowledge in framing conditions as political problems. Even if we focus more broadly on framing, knowledge – especially scientific knowledge – plays a crucial role. Goodwin and colleagues (2001, 15) argue that “science is the dominant language of legitimation and persuasion in today’s liberal societies”. One reason for the high esteem of scientific knowledge is its connection to what Dahl (1991, 40) terms rational persuasion – that someone comes to understand a situation with help of “truthful” information. It is often seen as the most “humane and desirable” form of persuasion. The idea of scientists taking part in rational persuasion rests on the idea of science as neutral and in search for the ‘truth’. Therefore, the idea goes, scientists can lay their knowledge in front of policy-makers and thereby make them see reason. Research has shown that scientists and science as such cannot be seen as neutral in this ideal typical way (e.g. Latour & Woolgar 1979). Research has also shown that this type of instrumental influence on political decisions is rare (e.g. Weiss 1986). Further, Boswell (2012) argues that scientific knowledge is mostly used to substantiate existing political positions or to create legitimacy for an organization. Despite these research results scientists are still perceived to be neutral and possessing cognitive authority. In fact, it is precisely the fact that scientists are perceived as neutral that makes it possible for scientific knowledge to function as authoritative in problem frames. Pielke (2004) has shown that the debate around Lomborg’s book The skeptical environmentalist led to that by attacking the ‘soundness’ of climate science the political understanding of climate change could be put into question. It is thus not the truthfulness of scientists or other experts that is important, but the appearance of it. The point is that problem brokers can use the cognitive authority that science and scientific knowledge are seen to poses in order to strengthen the validity of their frames. Knowledge about a condition does not have to be scientific. Many of the problems in today’s society are rather framed through some form of professional knowledge. For example, problems in health care grounded in new policies and an aging population is to a large extent not framed by science, but by people working within health care. This can be seen as a form of what Kingdon (c.f. 2003, 90-100) would call bureaucratic knowledge, including routinely measured indicators and feedback on

1 Compare also with ‘policy monopolies’, defined by Baumgartner and Jones (1993, 7) as a situation where a problem is controlled by one institution with the aid of a ”powerful supporting idea”.

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enacted policies. I would argue that professional knowledge not only includes this aggregated understanding of the problem, but also includes perceptions of a lived reality. The experience of these professionals as they go about their work does influence the more general perception of the problem. Jasanoff and Martello (2004) refer to this as local knowledge. This can be understood as “situated” knowledge based in particular experiences.2 Due to that this type of knowledge has a lower status, compared to scientific knowledge, it will have lesser value for making persuasive framings. However, there are situations in which scientific knowledge is unavailable or unhelpful for substantiating a certain way of understanding a problem. Under these circumstances local knowledge can be used instead. Also, as resistance to already accepted frames local knowledge can be crucial. This can be the case when policy-makers base their decisions on a scientific understanding of the problem. Lay people that are affected by the effects of decisions might hold a different understanding of causal relationships that are based on their practical experience. Wynne (1996) has described one such case where sheep farmers in northern England brokered a frame that challenged the accepted and scientifically based frame. In efforts to reframe a problem local knowledge can point to alternative understanding of the problem, and through that open up for alternative solutions. Emotions What is apparent in the concept of framing is that knowledge is not enough for constructing a persuasive frame. Beyond aspects of logos – concerning the problem understanding and what can be done – it needs to contain aspects of pathos – connected to responsibility and the reasons of why we should care. This means that problem brokers, if scientists, professionals or others, have to connect their facts to values. All frames therefore contain elements of both knowledge and what can be termed emotions. Persuasion, therefore, can never be rational, or “intrinsically neutral”, in the sense that Dahl (1991, 45) suggests. Further, emotions should not be seen as, what Dahl (1991, 40f) terms, manipulative persuasion – that someone “intentionally distorts, falsifies, or omits aspects of truth known to [them]”. Adding a motivation to why we should care cannot simply be divided along lines of rational or manipulative persuasion, but has to be seen as another aspect of persuasion and framing. This is in line with the argument that there is no clear divide between facts and values, and that scientists cannot be seen as neutral. Emotions can however be used to distort, falsify, or omit information. This is the case when knowledge about a condition is omitted and this is hidden by framing a problem in a highly emotional way. Emotions can become the main part of frames when scientific or other knowledge is inconclusive or unhelpful. A clear case of this is the issue of abortion. Science has little possibility to give a limit in weeks of impregnation of when an abortion should be allowed. Scientific experts can give advice on the circumstances of when a fetus will survive outside of the womb. They can also say something about the effects on the woman going through with an abortion. However, science can offer no solution to when a life becomes a life. In framing unwanted pregnancies as a political problem, problem brokers need to rely more heavily on values and emotions. One important emotion is the sense of doing the right thing and respect for the woman or the fetus. Emotions are hard to pinpoint as an analytical category. One reason is because they are elusive. Goodwin and colleagues (2001 , 10) say that “[e]motions are part of the ‘stuff’ connecting human beings to each other and the world around them, like an unseen lens that colors all our thoughts, actions, perspectives and judgments.” Another reason for this difficulty is that it is a very inclusive concept, ranging from short-lived (e.g. shock) to long-term emotions (e.g. shame) and from very positive (e.g. love) to very negative ones (e.g. fear) (cf. Goodwin et al 2001, 10f). In analyzing how emotions are used in framings and the effects they have, we need to keep focus on the shared, or relational, aspect of emotion – the ‘stuff’ connecting human beings from the quote above. Individual

2 Jasanoff and Martello (2004) argues that all knowledge, even scientific, is situated.

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psychological processes are less important. It is surprising how little focus that has been placed on emotions in studies of framing, judging from the importance that most writers give to the aspect of why we should care. Most do not go further into emotions than discussing them in contrast to knowledge, rationality or instrumentality. For example Rochefort and Cobb (1994, 5) discuss how participation can be limited by a more technical definition, and widened by a definition relying more on value-laden concepts. These value-laden concepts could be seen as strongly connected to shared emotions like compassion and respect. In the context of framing, we can understand emotions as elements of frames that say something about how we as society should feel about a political problem – and through that why we should care. Some emotions are played on more heavily in the framing of conditions as political problems. Fear is an emotion that has a strong motivational force. We can see references to fear in frames of, for example, the terrorist threat and the threat of immigration. Framing issues in terms of fear generates as sense of urgency which can move issues higher on the agenda (cf. Buzan et al 1998). It also signals a sense of severity and crisis, which are important aspects of getting attention to an issue (cf. Rochefort & Cobb 1994). Research is needed to further empirically examine and theorize what emotions that are most commonly used in frames and their effectiveness of getting an issue onto the political agenda. Research is also needed to study how knowledge and emotions interplay in frames and how problem brokers choose between them. Comparative studies of different issue areas, countries as well as types of problem brokers are needed for this purpose. Problem brokers’ use of knowledge and emotions in framing In some sense the weighting of knowledge and emotions in framing is a subconscious process. Framing resembles what Stone (2002) calls telling a story. It contains information about the problem and about villains (why it is a problem) and heroes (what can be done). In this sense the emotional element is already there. The weighting of knowledge and emotions can however also be a conscious decision. Loseke (2003, 77) argues that problem brokers (or what she calls claims-makers) can rely on emotions rather than knowledge and frame conditions that “persuade audience members to be fearful about the condition and/or to feel sympathy for victims and/or anger towards villains”. The choice has to do with what audience the frame is directed at, but also with the problem broker. A scientist would rely more heavily on knowledge claims than on emotions. The reason is that there are strong expectations in society of them being neutral and relying on facts. Politicians are not bound in the same sense to logical arguments and can therefore rely more heavily on emotional claims. An illuminating example here is how the Swedish winter storm of 2005, called Gudrun, was framed by scientists and policy-makers (Knaggård 2009). In media the storm was quickly framed as caused by climate change. Despite the efforts by scientists to reframe the incident as ‘just a storm’ (the argument was that a single storm could not be attributed to climate change) policy-makers still accepted the media-frame. Several policy-makers used the frame connecting the storm to climate change in order to stress the importance of climate politics. They obviously did not feel bound by scientific correctness, but saw the possibility to use the storm to evoke emotions of urgency. How much freedom an actor enjoys to choose between knowledge-based and emotional claims also depend on how they have presented themselves. Interest organizations can, for example, present themselves as neutral experts. This would increase society’s expectations on their use of knowledge-based claims. Frames based foremost on knowledge claims are more difficult to challenge, as this has to be done through other claims that are perceived to have cognitive authority. Emotionally based frames are in some sense easier to challenge as everyone can do it. However, if an emotionally based frame takes

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hold it will probably be more difficult to reframe due to that it is about what we feel and not about what we think. The latter can always be challenged by new information. Emotions cannot be challenged in the same way. This was the case with the framing of the MMR vaccine. After a study published in 1998 that showed a connection between the vaccine against three childhood diseases and autism, vaccination became framed as something to be feared. The study was later proven wrong, but the highly emotional aspect of fear against causing autism in your child is still present in the debate (c.f. O’Dell & Brownlow 2005). As the example of the MMR vaccine shows, the emotional part of a frame can endure long after the knowledge part has been proven incorrect. THE INFLUENCE OF PROBLEM BROKERS AND THEIR FRAMES How then can we understand the success of a problem broker to persuade an audience to accept his or her frame? Three elements are important to study: the problem broker, the audience, and the frame. Here I will pay most attention to the problem broker and the relation to the audience. Before that I want to touch upon some aspects of the problem frame. Rochefort and Cobb (1994) have discussed what factors that will make a problem frame receive political attention. They list causality, severity, incidence, novelty, proximity and crisis. The first three of these factors can be seen as knowledge claims about what the problem is about. The latter three are more connected to emotional claims. What they do not discuss is how these aspects are mixed in framing. The reason why the framing of the MMR vaccine was so potent was its reliance on, firstly, scientific knowledge about the problem and the causality (even if this later was disproved) and, secondly, strong emotions about fear for harming once child. Here it is clear that persuasive framing needs to rely on both of these aspects.3 When we turn to the problem broker and what signifies a successful problem broker we can use Dahl’s discussion of political influence. He divides important factors into political resources, skill in using those resources, and the willingness to use them (1991, 35f). In the context of the problem broker the most important political resources are time, access, and credibility. Just as the case with policy entrepreneurs, persuading an audience to accept your frame can take time. Persistence is therefore crucial. Many studies on how problems have been defined show that it is often not easy to establish a certain frame (e.g. Harremoes et al 2001; Knaggård 2009). Just as the policy entrepreneur is softening up the system with repeated efforts to convince policy-makers to adopt a certain policy (Kingdon 2003, 128), so too do problem brokers need to soften up the system to their problem frame. A second crucial political resource is access to policy-makers. According to Kingdon (2003, 56), scientists with what he calls an “inner-outer career”, meaning a career both in academia and in the political system, will have an advantage over scientists that do not pursue such a double career. This also holds for other problem brokers, like people in interest organizations or business. Through a double career you establish networks in both systems, which you can utilize when brokering a problem frame. Knaggård (2014), in a study of Swedish climate change policy-making, has shown that it was problem brokers on the inside of government or with well-established contacts with the government that most easily could influence the problem frame. One reason for this could be that direct conversation and discussion facilitate the spread of knowledge (Nutley et al 2007) and through that rational persuasion. Another reason could be that a problem frame could have a more direct impact, not having to travel over media to get attention from policy-makers.

3 For a more developed discussion of what aspects of problem frames makes them persuasive, see Knaggård (forthcoming).

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A final resource for influence is the credibility of a problem broker, or ethos. High credibility of the actor brokering a frame can lend legitimacy to policy alternatives that become attached to it and the ensuing decisions. One common use of knowledge in politics is symbolic (cf. Boswell 2012). This means that the knowledge, or frame of which it is part, is used as legitimation of policies. Here it is not the quality of the knowledge per se that is important, but rather the credibility, or status, of the problem broker. Even when policy-makers are using knowledge in a more instrumental sense, credibility is important. If a policymaker becomes convinced that a problem frame is accurate, other aspects than strategic ones comes into play. According to Reynolds and Reynolds (2002, 427), for evidence to work persuasively the audience has to see it as legitimate. Here scientists have an advantage over others, as scientific knowledge is seen as more credible than local knowledge. Loseke (2003, 36) argues that there is a hierarchy among problem brokers, or claims-makers, where scientists are highest ranked. For certain issue, she argues, professionals could be higher ranked. This hierarchy is based on what I discussed above as the cognitive authority of science. Even if scientists are on top, this does not mean that all scientists hold such a position. There are struggles for ownership of problem framings also within science. The hierarchy of research fields will look differently for different issues. In the case of Swedish climate change policy-making this meant that scientists working within meteorology were listened to more extensively than scientists within the field of physical geography (Knaggård 2009). In the same way there is a hierarchy among problem brokers basing their frames foremost on emotions. This issue is, however, less studied and more research is needed. One possibility is that problem brokers that are perceived to be victims or heroes might have higher credibility. The second aspect of influence that Dahl highlights is the skill in using the political resources that one holds. One important aspect when it comes to problem brokers is to know the audience. It means to know who to talk to and how, as well as when to talk. Who to talk to is a complicated question. Politicians are the ones with decision-making power. However, decisions have often been set in processes involving other than politicians long before the actual decision is taken. Therefore, it might be better to approach high ranking civil servants. The important point is that problem brokering is most effective when the audience has real influence over how a problem should be understood in the political context. Depending on issue it could be civil servants at national agencies or within government. For some issues there could be a politician interested in the issue. Who to talk to is highly context specific. It depends among other things on the country and on the issue. A problem broker with an inner-outer career will have a better knowledge of how the system functions and who to talk to than problem brokers without experience from the inside. When the problem broker has decided on an audience a second aspect of the skill of using one’s political resources is to adjust the frame so that it fits that audience. According to Loseke (2003, 27) “[a]udiences are critical because a … problem is created only when audience members evaluate claims as believable and important”. This means that if a problem broker fails to do this, the frame will not take hold. Therefore it is crucial that the problem broker is able to adjust a frame to fit the intended audience. This is partly connected to what Kingdon terms the national mood. With national mood he means “that a rather large number of people out in the country are thinking along common lines” (2003, 146). Simply put, it is probably more difficult to get attention to a political problem if it is framed in a way that does not fit the national mood. For example, it is probably unwise to frame a problem as depending on policies to create jobs during an economic recession when people are foremost concerned about employment. The national mood can here also be compared to, what Benford and Snow (2000) refers to as, frame resonance. They argue that the resonance of a frame has to do with its mobilization potential. An important aspect of frame resonance is how well it corresponds to, what they call, “the targets’ cultural narrations” (2000, 622). Both the aspect of a national mood, which is the wider and more easily changed concept, and the cultural narrations, which is more enduring, is important here. It should be noted that if a problem broker wishes to

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challenge an existing frame it might not always be strategic to work within the existing national mood or cultural narration (cf. Ferree 2003). It is also important that the problem broker can frame the problem so that the audience can understand it. An overly technical language might be difficult to understand. Further, depending on audience the balance between knowledge and emotions has to be adjusted. If the audience consists of specialized civil servants a dependence on knowledge is called for, as they have the prerequisites for understanding that type of arguments and can use scientific claims to legitimate political action. If the audience consists of politicians, the media, or the public at large the emotional part of the frame needs to be boosted. It becomes more important why we should care than more explicit knowledge about the cause of the problem. A final skill is to know when to talk. A problem broker needs to be active long before the problem comes up for decision. If problem brokers try to influence an already existing problem frame shortly before the decision is taken, they will fail. One way to get ownership of a problem frame is to be first in framing that particular condition as a political problem. This would give the problem broker a first mover advantage. At the point when policy-makers already have accepted a frame it becomes hard to persuade them to accept a reframing (cf. Littoz-Monnet 2014). However, as already discussed, it might take a long time before a problem frame comes to be accepted. Carol Weiss (1986) argues that instrumental influence of scientific knowledge is less common than conceptual influence. She means that policy-makers are affected by knowledge in a general and long-term sense. This process she terms the enlightenment function of knowledge. The skill of knowing when to talk is also connected to the concepts of national mood and policy window in Kingdon’s vocabulary. It is crucial to have some feeling for the national mood, as it can open up possibilities as well as shut them done. Policy window is a concept that captures moments in time when it is possible for policy entrepreneurs to connect a policy to a problem and get attention from policy-makers. These policy windows could be regular events, like budget decisions or elections, but it can also be more random ones (Kingdon 2003, 166ff). The same type of logic is working also for problem framing. A problem broker needs to know when such windows, or access points, are coming up. They could take the form of for example hearings or committee work. The third aspect of influence is the extent to which one is willing to use ones political resources. Scientists often have advantages as problem brokers as they hold high credibility and can use the cognitive authority of science to persuade an audience. However, many scientists seem unwilling to act as problem brokers. One reason is that they need to use emotional claims as well as knowledge-based ones. Scientists are trained to make a clear distinction between facts and values. Further, they are trained to state only what they can prove. This implies that scientists often are unwilling to formulate problems as political ones as it entails ideas about what is seen as aspects of value. Research has shown that scientists that do frame issues as political ones can get accused of not doing ‘sound science’ (Pielke, 2004). If scientists can shy away from the emotional aspects of framing, policy-makers as well as interest organizations do not have such problems. Interest organizations often have fewer resources for getting attention to their frames, but that is to some extent outweighed by the time they can spend on it and their willingness to do it. Different actors hold different resources and skills in using them. They are also willing to use them to different degrees. The influence of a particular problem broker not only depends on these factors, but also on the competition from other problem brokers at a particular moment. Without competition from stronger problem brokers, even those with fewer resources might succeed in gaining acceptance for their frame. CONCLUSION

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I have argued that an inclusion of the role of the problem broker in Kingdon’s Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) would strengthen the approach. Further, it makes it possible to open up, what in the MSF almost is, the black box of the problem stream. Kingdon does not give much guidance to what happens in the problem stream. The role of the problem broker, as suggested here, is well in line with the clues that he does give. Kingdon, for example, emphasize that problems do not come about by themselves (2003, 94). He also states that categories are important for how we understand problems (2003, 111ff). In my account, the problem broker works to frame conditions, through knowledge-based and emotional claims, as political problems and tries to make an audience accept them. It is therefore problem brokers that transform indicators, focusing events, and feedback from already enacted policies (cf. Kingdon 2003, 90, 94f, 100) into a problem. A problem frame does not only say something about the problem and how it can be understood, but also what could be done about it and why we should care. Frames therefore have an important impact not only on how we understand a problem, but also on which policies that will be seen as relevant. The work done by problem brokers thereby structure the possibilities for policy entrepreneurs to couple a policy alternative to a certain problem. It is not uncommon that the same actor plays the role both of the problem broker and the policy entrepreneur. However, it is wrong to assume that this is always the case. Further, a blurring of what the two roles do will hide the importance of what happens in the problem stream. Through an analytical separation between what the two do, we can open up the black box of the problem stream and analyze the power that lies within problem framing. REFERENCES Anderson Crow, Deserai (2010). “Policy Entrepreneurs, Issues Experts, and Water Rights Policy

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