primary conditions for the success of cavalry in the next european war

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This article was downloaded by: [Carnegie Mellon University] On: 27 October 2014, At: 22:12 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Royal United Services Institution. Journal Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi19 Primary Conditions for the Success of Cavalry in the Next European War Lieut.-General von Pelet-Narbonne Published online: 11 Sep 2009. To cite this article: Lieut.-General von Pelet-Narbonne (1906) Primary Conditions for the Success of Cavalry in the Next European War, Royal United Services Institution. Journal, 50:337, 326-334, DOI: 10.1080/03071840609416771 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840609416771 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan,

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Page 1: Primary Conditions for the Success of Cavalry in the Next European War

This article was downloaded by: [Carnegie Mellon University]On: 27 October 2014, At: 22:12Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK

Royal United ServicesInstitution. JournalPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rusi19

Primary Conditions for theSuccess of Cavalry in the NextEuropean WarLieut.-General von Pelet-NarbonnePublished online: 11 Sep 2009.

To cite this article: Lieut.-General von Pelet-Narbonne (1906) Primary Conditions forthe Success of Cavalry in the Next European War, Royal United Services Institution.Journal, 50:337, 326-334, DOI: 10.1080/03071840609416771

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071840609416771

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness,or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and viewsexpressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, andare not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of theContent should not be relied upon and should be independently verified withprimary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for anylosses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly orindirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of theContent.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan,

Page 2: Primary Conditions for the Success of Cavalry in the Next European War

sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone isexpressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found athttp://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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Page 3: Primary Conditions for the Success of Cavalry in the Next European War

PItIAlflltY COND1’I‘IONS FOR THE SUCCESS O F

‘I,eclure g iven be/orfi the Berlin M&tary Gociety by Lietit.-General ~ o i t I’ELET-A’A R B O J X E .

I

Translated by pcimission.

THE Russo-Turkish W a r of 1877-78 _affords food for sonic rcflcc- tions of spccial interest. It was possible to fccl quite an cscitcinent at t h e prospective perforniauces of the Russian cavalry in this campaigu, since only a short time before-in September, 1876-great strate icd cavalry nianmuvres had taken place in Poland; these had &e:n initiated before any other Army had attempted them, and operations on such a scale had never been carried out before or since repeated. They had aroused univeisal attention, aud (according to Russia11 sources) had been a brilliant success.

By the Impserial orders, tho cavalry was given tlie following problems to solve: ‘I To intcrrupt tlie mobilisation of isolated portions of a hostile army; to effect tho seizure of lines of railway and-points of importance in order either t o desjroy them,or to secure their possession; to cover thc mobilisation and railway centres against operations by hostile cavalry ; t o reconnoitre wide stretches of country as well as special localities and liostile forces; and above all to practise the duties of covcning tlic ariliy and obtainiug iuformation.”

It was thought tha t t he Russian cavalry would have extracted spccial value from tliesc manmuvres, and- would liavc made tho results of their experience apparelit in the nes t campaign ; however, it did not fulfil t h e espectatioiis which lind bccii formed of it.

Russian writers are their own keenest critics. General Kuro- patkin, wlio was then Chief of the Staff to General Skobclcf, gave the following opinion on t h e pcrformances of the Russian cavalry in September, 1877, when it should have covered the investment of Plevna, and when. ellergetic action wm specially desirable’:-“ In

1 Kritischo Rucliblickc auf dcn Russisli-turkisclicn Iirieg ron 1877-56, Ucrlili, ~::icli nufskitzc~i roli K u ~ O p d l i i ~ ~ , bcnrlrcitct roll Obcrst Krnlinicr.

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SUCCESS OF CAVALRY IN THE HLXT EUROPEAN WAR: 347

conclusion,” he writes, “ tlicre is only this to be said : that 90 Russiaii and Roumanian squadrons and sotnias ouglit to have beci: masters of the wholo of the country round Plcvna, with good leadership on one side and on tlie other tlie comparatively dcfcctive composition of the Turkish cavalry. Our horsemen should, by coiistant readiness for hand-tdiand fighting, havc fotced the enemy’s Regular cavalry and Circassians to flce whenever t h y appeared, and should have becii invulnerable to the Turlcisli infantry, had they only avoided becom- ing involved in a fire action. Uad they bcen quite confident that, in tliese days as liad almost invariably bccii the case in tlic past, a bold and resolute attack ynder favournble conditions upon an infantry detacbmcnt on the march, on ail escort to a convoy, or by an attack upon tlic flank or rear, or a surprise $tack on an infantry biv/ouac, would have achieved certain success a t a small loss, our cavalry would Ii.ave developed a great power and have bcconie a valuable source of assistaiice t o tho other arms. The least movenient of the enemy in the tl&atre of war would have quickly become known, aiid the arrival of supplics or reinforcc- mcnts of any kind liave been entirely prevented or seriously hindered. As a matter of fact, our cavalry mas not employed to advantage. The duties of rcconnaissalicc were either inefficiently per- formed or not ca’rricd out a t all.”

I n proof of this last statement, Kuropatkin relatcs several es- trmrdinary instances, and amongst others gives tho following : - “ After the cavalry of General Losclikarcf had reached tlie Sofia road ou September Stli, communiqtion was not established with t h o cavalry of the left wing either on the Stli, 9th, or loth, althougli only a. fcw kilometrcs separated onc force of 34 squadron3 from another of 18 sotnias.”

As a reason for the small value of the cavalry operations in tlie days prcceding thc assault on Plevna, Kuropatkin gives :- “ Disinclination of commanders to undertake operations which were well within their powers, but which might bring them in contact with the Turkish infantry, and so run the risk of suffering loss.” Later on Kuropatkin speaks of the fundamental mistake which the Russiafis made in regard to thc employmht of cavalry. “ N a n y commanders,” lie says, “ be!icved that with the improvemeiit in firo- arms the rble of cavalry on the battlefield was played out, so long as victory or defeat yet hung i n the balance. They were persuaded that cavalry attacks during pn action would be of no value, as they offered 110 clianccs of success.” Kuropatkin tlien furthcr adds:-“ As of old, so even in these days, a comparatively unimportant though frcsli idfort, either from our side or that of the enemy, which brings a reserve of cavalry, artillery, or infantry into action, can yet decide tho issue. A t this decisive moment to hold back the cavalry is absurd, no matter what lo&a they may suffer. Were even a whole division of cavalry to be sacrificed, this must be endured if, by their annihilation, victory is snatched from the hands of the enemy, or our army is savcd from defeat. ‘ I n pence time, cnrcrlry must be educnttd to l i re for that stibtinie moment when strcli a sncrifice is dem-indcd.’ ( W e must remember that in war the gaining of time often inclines victory to ono side, and that in a successful attack cavalry losses are gcnerally insignificant.) ”

Kuropatkin demands, therefore, “ tlurhig pcace a training iii self-sacrifice.” This can only be done by means of manocuvres, and

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328 SUCCESS OF CAVALRY IX TllE NEST EUROPEAN 1VAR:

here, so far as circumstances allow, must we teach cavalry to chargo home. I have nothing to add to Kuropatkin's words; I have alreaay myself said something of the samo kind,l and would refer to what has been already mentioned in regard to our owu csperieiices in tho last war.

In spite of the poor performaiiccs and consequent small IOSSCS of the cavalry frcm tlie enemy's fire, tlic streiigtli of the 14 .cavalry regiments concentrated bcforc Pleviia had been reduced by 5,000 horses through the increaked strain thrown on outpost duty by the exaggerated precautions against surprise. The t.roops numbered only 7 and 8 files. .In this manner thc costly arm " shrank away without having been of any real use. A weak cavalry force \vould have com- pletely disappeared .from mere attrition, and cavalry should therefore be kept up to a certain stxengtli, so that it may be able on occasioii to endurP loss. '

Only one Russian uiiit-t.lie. Brigade of Cossacks of tlic Caucasu- distinguished itself in tlic Balkan rampaign', and, a9 cavalry, engaged tlie Turkish infantry with success. A t Loftclin. on Scptcmbcr 3rd, 1877, two complete Turkisli battalions were entirely dispersed by this brigade, and the ciicmy were pursued until nightfall. , It \ws here demonstrated what even Cossn.cks, who are n o t trained' to tho cliarge, can do wlien attacking infantry.' Tlie brigade commpider, Colonel Tutolmin, was, ho\t-evcr, a. distinguislied qvalry officer, while tlic superior commanders, Gciicrals ICryloff aFd Loschkaref, were, on the other hand, not up to tlieir work. TlIo last-named officer is mentioned by Kuropatliiq as having, when ordered 011 September 21st., to move rapidly to tlic assistan& of I<ryloff's cofps, only started on tlic fol1on:iiig day, n y d tnkcn an liour to cover tiyo kilometres,-so tlint when a t last lie came upon tlic corps lie found it alreaUy retiring.

Coloiiel Baykoff passes the same judgment as Kuropatkin apoli the work of the cavalry i n tliis campaign. He says tha t the idea of cavalry officers, young and old, was:--"Wlinb can cavalry do against iiifantry with the modern rifle? If the cavalry vere given R riflo and bayonet, i t wonld lie a different matter; but without' t l iac, cavqliy cannot ciigagc infantry :'--and tlic cavalry acted accordingly. If cavalry met with infantrj, i t either retired altogether or dismounted ' to figlit 011 foot. To what an extent tliis w\..?s tlie case, tlic expenditure by t.lie cavalry of one and a quarter million rounds of ammunition is tlic best proof. Things indeed \vent so far that patrols left their liorses bcliind slid marched several vdrsts on foot (in one case it was five). Again, a t Tirnova, Russian cavalry of the advance guard were-seen

1 Die .\ussiclitcii dcr I<nvnllcric in1 Iiaiiipf gcgcii die Infniiteric iiiicl clic Artillcric. Vortrag, gclinltcn in dcr i\lilitiirisclic Gcscllscliaft ~ I I

nerliii niii 3 Xovciii1)cr 1607, roil Grnf r. I'elct-S~rbonnc, Gcncrnl Licii- tciinnt z. D. Rcilicft ziiiii Jli l i t~r-~~'~cl icnhlntt , 1609, 3. Hcft. ,

* Die Knuknsisclic Iinsnkcnbrigndc in Tlnlknnfcldziig. 1877-58. ' Icricgs- gcschiclitliclic Studic roil Tliilo \-on Troth, Dcrlin, 180-1.

3 Ann-cndiing iind .\usfiiliriing dcs Fiiss-gcfcclits clcr russisclicn I<n\-nllcric. ' Aiif Griind dcs I~cglcnicnts fiir dic ;\bgcscsscncn Tcilc . dcr I\nvallcric iiiid dcr I<asnkcii voni Jalirc, 1831, h i t isicrrnd bcarbcitct roil l?ngkolf, J<. R. Obcrst ini Gcncrnlstnbc. Uclcrsctzt yon Trost, Obcrlt., Ilcrlin, 16sL

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SUCCESS OF C.\VALllP IN TIIE NEST EU?OPL\;\N \\'An. 339

to dismouut and form square in order to protect themselves agaiust attack by 300 Turkish horsemen, after which the cavalry fought as iiilantry. These men liatl lost all the cavalry spirit; and had dc- veloped into inferior mouiitcd iiifantrj-and why 1 They had been taught ercrything possible exc-pt to charge home! Colonel Baykoff, lioitcver, does not fail tq appreciate tlie nccessity for arming the cavalry with a good firearm, for h e says:-"Tlic cavalry firearm sllould be in no way iiiferior to tha t of tlic infantry, ant1 all futurc tecliiiical improvements in regard to tlic rillc sliould bc employed by the cavalry." Aud in nnotlicr place lie remarks :-" It is uii- questionably important tha t the whole of tlie cavalry has been traiiicd to fight on foot, and arnierl with a long-rangc, accurate rifle with bayonet. It may be said tha t this has untied its liands and increased its indepcndcncc and freedo-m " ; further, " The loiig-raiige niaqazint, rifle gives the initiative much greater .value and sets tlie cavalry frec., according to circumstauces, eitlicr to attack mounted or to reccivc. the enemy with firc from leliiiid cover."

But-aud this is Baykoff's proviso-if thc dash of the cavalryman is to bc maintained, lie must iiot allow himself t o get into tho way of a faulty and too frequent use of dismountcd action. Baykoff, \dio had many incidciits of 1877-78 in his mind, holds, t ha t d i s mounting easily degenerates into an impulse of self-preservation, and for this reason some meu take to i t more kindly tliaii to a cool daring on horseback-men who wear the cavalry uniform but who do not possess tlic dashing cavalry spirit.

I agree altogctlicr with tlic utterances of this Russian writer. We may draw from them tlic lesson tha t in arming cavalry with a good firearm, care must be taken tha t t he cavalry spirit does;not Waporate, and wo should tliereforc stick to tlie liard and .fast i ~ i l c tliat cavalry may only dismount ~vlicn tlic terrctin does not admit of tlieir attaining tlieir objcct niountcd, aiid when their o\vn infantry is not at hand.

The campaign of 1897 between Turkey and Greece offcrs no occasion for remark, and I turn t o t h e Soutli African War of

The importancc of this war, in relation to tlie development of tactics, was at first greatly over-ratcd, aiid only lately has this bccii recognised. Especially iii regard to cavalry has this t u n i d out to be tlie case. A t first too littlc account was takcil of conditions totally opposed to tliosc found in Europe. The fighting took placc on a theatre of war aiid, SO far as thc Eiiglish were concerned, against aii enemy, both differing completely from what would bc niet with in Europc. Tlie experleiices gained can tlicrcfore only be useful for Colonial wars, and cspccially for such a one as ours now going on in South-Wcst Africa; but they offer no real reason for making any alteration i n European tactics. Bu t still, there are intcresting conclusions to be drawn from the coursc of the campaign, and wc find in them confirmation of what wc linve always lield to be correct.

So far as tlie English cavalry is concerned, it should be borne in mind, i n order propcrly to understand their poor performances in the early part of tlic war-up to Lord Roberts takiiig over coni- mand - t h a t they had been till tlicn criielly split up, aiid wccc

1899-1 902.

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330 SUCCESS OF CAVALRS IN T l I E N E S T EUROPEAN IVhR.

iiever cornmaiided or constitutcd ;IS a body. When, later on, this was changed, and a cavalry division was organised and placed under command of the enterprising General French, the cavalry contributed considerably to the success of tlie operations-in spite, too, of the grave defects which. still clung to tlicm. Wliatever was achieved, however, was, in t!ie main, due to the personality of the leader, who must get the credit for it.

The English cavalry had been solely trained to shock action. They performed practically none of the duties of reconnaissance or covering the army; even anioiig the oficcrs an absolute disinclinatioii for this work was apparent. Tile discipline, too, and iiiterior economy left much to be desired. This was evidciit from the fact that ouiiig to tlic careless seat df the men, which was not looked after by their officers, a very large number of horses were galled and rendercd un- workable, and hoisemastcrship, which did liot appear to be under- stood, was \vkolly neglected.

In several cases, where the cavalry might liave obtained a brilliant succcss, they wcrc liiiidercd by the complcte esliaustioii of tlic horses, due either to want of forage or to oppoi-tuhities for watering being. either not made use of o r not being forthcoming. This lattcr mis. fortune-a peculiarity of thc tlieatrc of war-will never +die itself apparent to the same estent in Europe, and an unfailiiig water siipply is even more important than the issue of sufficient foraie. I n dis- mounted fighting the cavalry did little. On February 16th, in the action a t Drieput, tho dismounted men of two brigades, assisted by niounted infantry and four guns, failed to turn a Boer rear guard of some 100 men out of a good position.

The great defects of this cavalry (which appeared a t that time t o be tlie least valuable, as regards training, of the cavalries of the great Powcrs) could not be remedied even by a man of the energy and entcrprisc of French; but the campaign again teaches us that cavalry can still play an important .part on active service, even when opposed to a redoubtable foe.

In regard to tho so-called attnck of tlic cavalry division a t Nodder River on February 15th, 1900, I cannot attach the same importance to it as is giveu in Vol. 111. of the ~riegs,oeschichtlicheu Eingelsch- .riften,' for tlie superiority of the cavalry was out of all proportion, since the attack was made against some 900 Boers only, who, with 3 giiiis, were distributed over a' position four liilonictres in lengtli, while the attack was prepared for the Britisli by 9 batteries and 2 heavy guns. The casualties-I9 killed and wounded, besides 33 horses-were, moreover, particularly small. I f , then, to an English officer who rode in the charge, " our chances a t first seemed quite hope- less," and who, csprcssing the general opinion of tlie otlicr officers, says < I' Few of us can come out of it alive," this, to me, is merely a proof of " to u4nt p e r t w t e d und harinfid itlens the false t ench i iq 01 t r o o p niny It is, however, interesting fo record that the moral

'I~ricgsgcscliiclitliclio I:iiizc16cliriften licraus gcgcbrn v o i ~ grossen Gciicralstabc, I~ricgsgescliiclitliclie .\bthcilung, 1, Heft 111. Erfalirungen ausscreuropiiischcr Kriegc ncucster Zeit. 1. Aus dcni sudafrilranischen Iiricrre, 1899-1902. 2. Operatinncii iiiitcr Lord Ilolcrts l is ziir Eiiiiishme von l3loemfo1iteii1, nerlin, 1004.

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SUCCESS OF CAVALRY IN TltE NEXT EUROPEAN +AR: 331

effeFt of tlic charging Iiiasscs oi iiorscineii was a trciiieiidous ono upou the hitherto phlegmatic Boers, who had, however, alrcady endured a licavy artillery hre, and that it esercised a depressing influence upon the Boers who were with the laager in rear.

N e v e r t h e h , tlie resulting relief of Kimbcrlcy is a great feather in tho cap for the cavalry division, which should then have been in a position to end the campaign liad not French, in following a side issue by pursuing thc retreating besiegers of Kimberley, broken tho cavalry down through great strain without consequent gain, instead of devoting himself to the real object of preventing the cGipe of Cronje’s force. All the same, he succeeded in heading off the Boers 011 February 17th a t Koedpesdrift, and in holding them tlicrc with liis horsc artillcry batteries and about 1,000 dhnounted men for a whole day uutil the iiifaiitrx came up. Siuce the horses, as au attcmpt proved, were too done up to charge, thc result which led finally to tlie surrender of Cronjc must be ascribed purely to tlie emplbyment of dismounted action, which was successful here on the defensive, ivhilo in tho offensivo at Drieput, by the same means, nothing was achieved. Once morc i n the fighting at Paardeburg ox tlic following day the dismounted cavalry again took part and prevented the advancc bf a hostile force.

On the resumption of the advance on Dloemfontein, after Cronje’s surrender, tlie cavalry was again directed against the line of retreat . \Vhen thc position a t Poplar Grove was stormed by tlie Eng Faulfd isli infantry, aud the Boer of the Boors \die were still standing their

retreat becamc a rout, French, who was only 5 kilometres away from their line of retreat, could easily have overwhelmed them if his horses-which, in spite of a comparatively long rcst after Cronjc’s sur- render, werc completely done up-had been able to move forward even a t a trot. Hc was obliged, hov;ever, to contcnt liimsclf with following the Doers up slomly, and was not able to keep even a patrol in actual touch with them. Had it bccn this day possible for the cavalry to strikc in the right place, the capture of thc last Boer forcc thcii in the field, as well as of President Kruger, who accompanied it, would probably have been effected and thc mar would have beai cnded considerably earlier.

Owing to there being no hostile cavalry, the work of the English horsemcn was much lightened. The Boers-so far as they were mounted-can only be looked on a.s mounted infantry. Nevertheless, i t is worthy of note t l i i t a mounted force likc tha t uiiller Delarey, charging, and keeping u p a hot fire a t the same time, succccded 011 Narch 7th, 1902, a t Treebosch, in putting to flight an Biglish forcc of 1,200 men, including 900 mounted men, under Lord IIcthucn, and in captuiing much booty.

From this consideration of incidents embracing IL period of over 90 years, my audience will already have partly drawn their conclusions. It is now ncccssary to bring all these into linc and to sclect from among the details of modern battle that which seems desirable for our arm. I include general conditions, and not only those of our own Iiomc service.

Tho great importance of the personality of the commander has been repeatedly iiisistcd upon, and I shall thcreforc not mention i t again. The same with regard to tlic various csperieiiccs as to the

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333 SUCCESS OF C.\VALI:T IN TlIE NEST EUROPE.\N WAR.

necd for so training cavalry tl!at they will ucjt shrink from sacrifice. ‘Tho uecd, too, for a really stroiig force of cavalry is apparent.’

In regard to organisation, we must cling to the important asiom that effective work in the first line cannot be expected of Landmehr cavalry. The same-may be said of Line cavalry, when, through a too high percentage of registered IioIscs, they acquire something of tlie character d Landwehr cavalry; the efficicncy of this arm depends

’less on men than on horses. I n the second rank stands the demand for armament with R lon6-range, quick-firing rifle to be attached to tlic rider. It must Le sighted to a t least 1,800 metres, since the fireaction of cavalry will often Le carried on at long rather than a t short ranges, as, for instance, in demonstrations, harrying the enemy, forcing the adversary to disclose his plans, etc. Cavalry must therefor0 be specially trained to the use of loiigrange sights, in rapidly pickiiig up its target, in judging distance, even when riding a t a gallop; but on the other hand, snal’”liooting-since thcrc is no time to turn out marksmen-is only in so far valuable that it gives the rider con- fidence in his weapon. A plentiful supply of cartridges, to be casily drawl from a pouch belt, is an absolute necessity. A bayonet, t o be worn on the ridei’s hip as a short sidearm, is mucli wantcd, in order to give tho dismounted fight an offensive character.

Cavalry must be quite a t home in the fize-fight, and its im- portance must be cmphasised by inspectioiii 4eing regularly made to test their efficicncy in this by sonic high authority; ant1 by care being talccn. that i t is practised by large units. The t i q e for thorough grounding in tliis can only be arranged mlien field requirements are constantly kept ‘in mind. . Rapid dis- mounting and formation of h i n g lines, speedy remounting-?nd form- ing into groups, mouiitcd work in a11 kinds of country, so as to bc ready to fight dismounted, are all important t h i n g to be practised. With all tliis, the principle must, however, be maintained, that tlic mounted attack with the nrtne Ilnnchc is tho main thing for cavalry, and that dismounted action is only to be resorted to when the object cannot be attained on a horse. The more importance is attached to the non-avoidance of the dismounted fight, the more is irnportancc to be laid upon the maintenance of the bold cavalry spirit and of (]erring do. For such tlie lance, too, mill servo-tlic weapon which I look upon as the weapon p r excdlence for attack; tlic lance which gives the man wieldiiig i t in fight a feeliug of superiority over tho man with tlie sword. A t tlic same time,’ however, I do not deny tha t the lanco is an awkward weapon mlieu men dismount to fight on foot..

Cavalry must be trained to fight both mounted and on foot, to suit their formations to the ground. The uniform of the liorscman must be made to conform to thc conditions of tlie fight on foot;. high heavy boots are in the way, head-dresses which, like tlinsc of cavalry, can be clistinguished from a long distancc, arc unsuitable. Uniforms of conspicuous colours should disappear from the Army 011 account of the long range of modern fire-arms ; showily-dressed regi- ments mill draw upon themselves an enemy’s fire sooner than others;

1 Cornparo “ 3lclir Knmllcrie.” Ein JInl~nrl~f iln Intercsse Vnn Deiitschlnnds L3itdcs-rrrtcitli~~in~ roil V. Prlrt-Snrlinnnc, Gciicrnllicu- tennnt z. D. niit zwci K’artcn. Berlin, 1903.

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SUCCESS OF CAVALRY I N THE NEXT EUROPEAN WAR. 333

i t will be impossible for patrols so clotlied to do their work. Reasonable allowance can be mado for tradition only wheu the object for the employment of the arm does not suffer.’ , Tho cavalry division of 6 regiments with 24 squadrons has a suitable strength. A reduction below 20 squadrons would so diminish its fighting power that vf ten there would bc no force sufficient to perform its most important work. That this organisation is already of advantage in peacc time has been so often proved that I refrain from any more allusion to it. Cavalry corps can be evolved as required on mobilkation. I consider as th e most important estension of organisation for cavalry , that they should obtain through their composition and training the character of absolutely self-contained fighting bodies, able to maintain an action, unaided, against a force of the three arms, and equipped with all technical appliances to tbor- ouglily perform any work whjch may be entrusted to them. I n tho light of this matter of organisation, such mcre tactical questions as, for instance, whether the formation for attack be flugclweise or trefenweise‘ is therefore of small importance.

Twelve horse artillery -guns in three batteries are a suitable number for a cavalry division, with, in addition, a machine. gun de- tachment and mounted pioneers with each regiment, viz., a non- commissioned officer and 30 men, distributed among the squadrons, carrying neither lance .nor carbine, but only sword and revolvek; to be trained entirely as pioneers, and not to be employed on purely cavalry duties. Esperiencc has taught us well enough that pioneers who do not actually accompany the troops are never at hand when wanted-evcn to follow close in rear is not cnougli.

All wagons which follow the cavalry with bridging, signalling, or demolition materials, should have’the same mobility as the guns; 3 or 4 bicycles accompanying each squadron may, under certain cir- cumstances, materially help to ease and save the horses; there is never likely to be any lack of men who know how to ride them.

To attach a battalion of mountcd infantry to the cavalry division would increase Feat ly its fightingvalue. I mould only suggest tha t qreaf results might be expected from Jager battalions mounted on cobs with snaffles only-nich as we sent to South-West Africa.

Tlie addition of ordinary infantry, even if they fdllowed on wagons, would bc a drag on the cavalry division.

Hitherto we have .not succeeded in devising a satisfactory com- prased, easily carried foraFe as an “iron ration” for cases of emergency, by means of which we might be able to sustain our horses, mere it only for a few days. It is to be hoped tha t the experiments which mere made soon after the last war have not finally miscarried.

I remember on the day of Sedan seeing right across tho wido battlo field n s n y to tho woods on tlio Belgian frontier, a partol of thc Ilussars of tho Guard riding at a distance where any differently dressed rider would liave been unnoticcd. Tho uniform of our.Protectorate troops is an ideal one for ercn European conditions.

* Flilgelweise is when tho 0.0.C. the Caralrg Division has ordered m e brigade to form the 1 s t Line, and tlio other two brigades behind one or both wings of that line,hnd all initiative ns regards distancc and intcrvnls i3 left to tho wing commanders. Trefeniceise is when the brigades nrc formed into three lines, one behind the other, n t regular intervnls.

YOL. L. S

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334 SUCCESS OF cA\-.unT IN TIIE NEST EUROPEAN WAR.

That the cavalry supply. wagons must, if they.are to fulfil their purpose, be able to move as quiclily as the troops, has been already laid down by General von Bernliardi.in his " Our Cavalry in Future Wars."1

The cavalry stands at an important point in its development. By m a n s of the 2ld .methods i t can no longer satisfactorily perform the work of modern war. For an organisation and training far broader and more elastic than of old, the expensive arm must pay the piper, and then-but then only-will the words of General Carl von Schmidt come true:-"I -hope that in future battlcs one may be able to reckon with cavalry as with infantry divisions."

I would refer you to it.

- 'Zeite auflage, Berlin, 190?.

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