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Press Briefings,Foreign Press Center Japan

August 9, 2017

Preventing Nuclear Terrorism and Japan’s Contribution

Yosuke NAOIIntegrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security

Japan Atomic Energy Agency

ISCNISCNOutline

1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security: an Overview

2. International Framework for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security

3. Nuclear Security4. Japan(JAEA)’s Contribution

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1. Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security: an Overview

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ISCNISCNNon-proliferation and Nuclear Security

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Nuclear Security: The prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances, or their associated facilities.

Nuclear Nonproliferation: To curb and prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, their delivery means, and related materials and technologies.

Owner Controlled Area

Protected Area

Vital Area

Access Control Points

Protected Area Double Fence

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Nuclear Security Threats

Theft of nuclear weapon

Theft of nuclear material to produce improvised nuclear explosive device

Theft of nuclear material to produce “Dirty Bomb” or RED

Sabotage* of Nuclear Facility or transport

Threats of Nuclear Security by IAEA(Picture from MoFA website)

* A deliverable act which could release radioactive material or cause exposure to radiation.

ISCNSerious Threat of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Terrorism

North Korea’s AggressiveNuclear Program

After secret development of nuclear power and withdrawal from NPT, North Korea declared its plan to develop nuclear weapons and conducted five underground nuclear tests. Also, the country confirmed its uranium enrichment activities.

Threat of Nuclear Terrorism

Since 9/11 attack in 2001, nuclear terrorism has been realistic threat for international society. For example, Theft of nuclear and radiological materials is a serious threat.

Nuclear Black MarketIn February 2004, Dr. A. Q. Khan

from Pakistan affirmed his activities to secretly exported uranium enrichment technologies to Libya, Iran and North Korea.

Nuclear Weapons outside of NPT and Other Proliferation Concerns

NPT recognizes US, UK, France, Russia, and China as Nuclear-Weapon States. India, and Pakistan also possess nuclear weapons, and Israel is believed to possess nuclear weapons as well. Other immediate proliferation concern is North Korea.

ISCNImpact of Nuclear Terrorism• Direct Harm or Loss

Loss of property (e.g. human life, and a building) caused by an explosion Contamination by radiological material

• Social and Economic Damage Malfunction of social system and transportation infrastructure Harmful rumor (secondary damage)

⇒ Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant accident illustrates potential nuclear sabotage consequence

– Release of radiological materials into the environment - contamination– Power shortage– Wide area of evacuation– Declining export of agricultural and marine products and other food products– Damage on tourism

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8Source: World Nuclear Association, World Nuclear Performance Report, 21/06/2016

Global Nuclear Generation and Construction

ISCNISCNTwo Trends

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High expectation for nuclear energy as power source

• Increased interest in the introduction of nuclear power (Middle East and South East Asia)

• Expansion of nuclear power generation (China, India and Russia)

• Nuclear Renaissance (Europe and U.S.)

Increased concern about nuclear security• Strong interests for nuclear terrorism

by the violent extremists• Actual security incidents• Less secured radiological materials

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Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

time

Concern about Nuclear security

should be decreased

should be increased

•Physical protection•Information security•Cyber security•Export control•Border control …

Nuclear Terrorism Other malicious acts

Nuclear Renaissance

Nuclear Power Growth(US, China, India, Russia, etc.)

Cut Ties between Two Emerging Trends

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2. International Framework for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Security

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Treaty etc. for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Nuclear Security

Export control Regime for Nuclear Non-Proliferation

International Framework for 2S

NPT1970 in force

Convention of PP of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and

its Amendment2016 in force

International Convention for the

Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

2007 in force

RegionalTreaties

IAEA Safeguards Agreement

Additional Protocol

UNSC Resolutions

Bilateral Nuclear

Cooperation Agreements

Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

-London Guideline –Part-1: Nuclear use (1978)Part-2: Dual-use (1992)

Zangger Committeeestablished 1974

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Non-binding framework: IAEA guidelines, Code of Conducts, Communiqués & Action Plans of Nuclear Security Summits, international initiatives, etc.

ISCNFive International Organizations against Nuclear Terrorism

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Global Partnership

GPGlobal Partnership

against the Spread of Weapons and Materials

of Mass DestructionSince 2002

UNUnited Nations

(ICPO)International Criminal

Police Organization

Global Initiative toCombat Nuclear

TerrorismSince 2006

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3. Nuclear Security

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ISCNNuclear Security

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Prevention Detection Response

of/to Theft Sabotage* unauthorized access illegal transfer other malicious acts

involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities

* A deliverable act which could release radioactive material or cause exposure to radiation.

Photo: NPA

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• Nuclear and other radiological materials• Nuclear facilities

Reactor core Systems necessary for nuclear safety Systems necessary for containment and consequence mitigation Functions necessary for physical protection

• Information which could lead to theft of nuclear materials or sabotage Paper, digital IT system personnel

• Transport of nuclear and other radiological material

wikipedia

IAEA

IAEA

Potential Targets to be protected

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• Eminent Threat: shift from “the potential” to “the real” threat– Real cases, plans, failed attempts: armed attack on nuclear

facility, intrusion, theft of materials, illicit trafficking, black-market

– Explicit interests by the violent extremists: attack nuclear facilities, acquire nuclear weapons/materials, build “dirty-bombs”

– Global trends on terrorism

• Severe consequence: impacts beyond the borders– Strengthen each state’s effort– Need international cooperation

Global Efforts on Nuclear Security

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• 1950s – 60s: tools for nuclear non-proliferation Safeguarding against conversion: secure nuclear materials “physical protection”

• 1980s – 80s: growing threat of terrorism Strengthening physical protection measures

• 1990s: collapse of the Soviet Union Nuclear technology transfer, theft/illicit trafficking of materials

• 2000s: 9.11 terrorist attacks Huge impact, international attention at the highest level Extremists’ strong interest in targeting nuclear weapons, materials,

and nuclear facilities Comprehensive approach to “nuclear security” to include

radiological materials

Historical Development of Nuclear Security• Long history of international efforts• High priority issue at the international arena

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ISCNImportance of Global Efforts

The responsibility for the establishment, implementation and maintenance of a nuclear security regime within a State rests entirely with that State.

– Legislative and regulatory framework, assignment of nuclear security responsibilities, allocation of resources, etc.

Effectiveness of a State’s nuclear security measures will be affected by those of other countries

– International transport of materials– Transnational threats: trafficking, piracy, organized crime, international

terrorist groups, etc.– Radiation does not respect the national borders

Global efforts are essential19

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Conventions, TreatiesConvention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM)2005 Amendment to CPPNM Internatinoal Convention for the Suppression of terrorist Bombings International Convention on Suppression of the Act of Nuclear

Terrorism (ICSANT)Regional Agreements and Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) Treaties

UN Security Council ResolutionResolution 1373 (2001): Threats to International peace and security

caused by terrorist actsResolution 1540 (2004): Nonproliferation of weapons of mass

destruction

International guidelines, Code of Conducts IAEA Nuclear Security Series (recommendation, implementation guide,

technical guide)Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources

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International Nuclear Security Framework (1)

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Nuclear Security Summit• 2010 (US), 2012 (Republic of Korea), 2014 (the Netherlands),

2016 (US)• Highest level of political commitment: more than 50 national

leaders

Other InitiativesGlobal Initiative for Combating Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)IAEA Incident Trafficking Database (ITDB)Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI)Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials

of Mass Destruction (GP)Container Security Initiative (CSI)Megaport Initiative (MI)Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

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International Nuclear Security Framework (2)

ISCNCurrent International Activities for Nuclear Security

1. Reduction of stocks of HEU and separated Plutonium2. Physical protection of nuclear material and facility3. Transport security4. Protection of Radiological materials5. Prevention of illicit trafficking6. Cyber (computer) security7. Nuclear Security Culture8. Training and education

ISCNReduction of stocks of HEU and separated Plutonium

Reducing risk through minimizing or eliminating nuclear materials with high consequence

– HEU: reduction, conversion to LEU– Separated Plutonium: reduction, conversion to MOX

fuel

Example: Japan removed over 500 kg of HEU and separated plutonium from JAEA facility in 2016 – the largest project by a country to remove nuclear materials through the Nuclear Security Summit Process.

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Image of Physical Protection of Nuclear Facility

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• Security of nuclear materials during transport: international/domestic/facility level

• CPPNM and its Amendment 2005• If not secured, material transport is not allowed

• Moving target with limited protection: harder than the fixed facility to protect– Minimizing the total time of transport– Limiting advance knowledge of transport information

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Transport Security

Images: Nuclear Fuel Transport Co.,Ltd.

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• Nuclear Security: protection of nuclear and other radiological materials as well as facilities

• Universal application: medicine, construction, agriculture, research, academics, etc.

• Possible ingredients for building “dirty bombs”

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Protection of Radiological Materials

Photo: IAEA

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Total 2,939 cases of nuclear security events reported to IAEA Illicit (Incident) Trafficking Data Base (ITDB) between 1995 and December 31, 2016Nuclear Security Events : ①Unauthorized possession and movement of materials related to criminal activities, ②Thefts and losses, ③Other unauthorized activities and events

Data Source : Mr. Jose GARCIA SAINZ, Nuclear Security Information Officer, Information Management Section, Division of Nuclear Security, Department of Nuclear Safety and Security, International Atomic Energy Agency 27

Incident Trafficking Data Base

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27 3451

72 7668 72

104

160

184

280

237

177169

177

156

191 193

168

149 146

0

30

60

90

120

150

180

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

Aggr

egat

ed S

tate

Par

ties

Num

ber o

f inc

iden

ts

Year

Number of incidents

Aggregated State Parties

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Preventing Illicit Trafficking (2) • Strengthening customs, border control and

monitoring• Technology development on nuclear/radiological

material detection • Nuclear forensics: technological support to attribute

nuclear materials – identify where the materials are originated, when/where it was produced, etc.

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Computer (cyber) Security • Protection of computer systems for safety and

security of the facility Systems for reactor protection, process control, physical

access control, document management, etc. • Not only IT security (normal office IT security), but

Industrial Control System (ICS) security is• If compromised, it could lead to theft of nuclear

materials or sabotage• Sensitive information protection

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Nuclear Security Culture • Effectiveness of nuclear security measures depends

on people’s behavior and actions

Security Culture: assembly of behavior and attitudes of individual/organization which serves as means to support and enhance nuclear security

Example: Everyone understands the threats to nuclear security, recognizes s/he has responsibility for security, and knows what s/he is expected to do.

• Efficient management system to support good performance of personnel

• Committed leaders

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Education and Trainingnuclear nonproliferation and security human capacity building -urgent matter

National, bilateral, regional, international effortsfor nuclear human capacity building

• IAEA training courses• Training courses provided by the Center of Excellence (or

Nuclear Security Support Center): national, regional or international courses

• IAEA NSSC network for coordination of COE/NSSC efforts• INSEN (International Nuclear Security Education Network):

higher education in nuclear security

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4. Japan’s (JAEA’s) Contribution

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Sector of Fukushima

R&DPromoting the use ofresearch facilities and

advanced computationalscience

Safety and RegulatoryCompliance

Sector of Nuclear Safety Research and

Emergency Preparedness

Sector ofDecommissioning

andRadioactive Waste

Management

Sector of Nuclear Science

Research

Sector of Fast Reactor

Research and Development

Dissemination ofresults/collaboration

withindustry-academia-

government

Securing public trust

in nuclear energy

IntegratedSupport Center

for NuclearNonproliferation

andNuclear Security

InternationalCooperation

andNuclear Power

TrainingSafety research

and contribution to nuclear safety

JAEA Profile

R&D for restoration from the accident of TEPCO’s Fukushima

Daiichi NPP

Fundamental research and human resources development

R&D for fast reactor

R&D for nuclear fuel cycle and disposal of

radioactive waste

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Japan’s National Statement at 2010 Nuclear Security SummitEstablishment of an integrated support center for nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security in JAEAto contribute to strengthening nuclear security in Asia and other regions and development of technology related to measurement and detection of nuclear material and nuclear forensics based on international cooperation

Establishment of Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN)

Establishment of ISCN in JAEA: December 27, 2010Conduct of the first nuclear security training course: October 2011

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A tangible asset of the Nuclear Security Summit process

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Example of a COE: ISCN

Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN)

Establishment and ActivitiesEstablishment: December 27, 2010 Purpose: Strengthening nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security mainly in Asian nuclear emerging countries

Main Activity: Capacity building assistance throughhuman resource development including training and education

Nuclear Security

International Nuclear Nonproliferation Framework

Safeguards and SSAC

Japan Atomic Energy Agency

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ISCN: Training on Nuclear Security

Lectures Group Exercises PP Exercise Field Virtual Reality System

<For Effective Learning>

- Needs-oriented courses to targeted participants

-Domestic, International/regionaland Bilateral coursesOther

Cybersecurity

Nuclear Security Culture Regional/national workshop Dispatch of lecturers to domestic facilities

Physical Protection Physical Protection for Nuclear Material and Facilities IAEA guidelines including INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 Physical Protection Detection System Performance Testing Insider Threats PP Measures against Sabotage PP training for government agencies

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①Development of Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence NDA Technology Measurement and Detection of Nuclear Material

238U243Am0+ 0 0+ 0 0+ 0

1 680

21761+

Absorption

Absorption

Emission

Emission

24101

12245

++

Energy [keV]

Flux of gamma-rays

Tunable

235U7/2-

1733

18152003

239Pu1/2+

21432423

237Np0 0

938977933 -

Nondestructive Detection using NRF

Electron Laser photon

Scattered photon(LCS X-ray /Gamma-ray)

Laser Compton Scattering

Generation of high intensity monochromatic X-ray /γ-ray beam (dE/E ~ 1%) using collimator

Interrogation of monochromatic γ-ray beam to the target

Nuclear material ?

γ-ray beam

NRF- γ-ray

detector

NRF=Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence

Strong penetration of γ-ray Isotope specific detection No further radioactivation 37

Technology Research and Development

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Development of Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence NDA Technology Measurement and Detection of Nuclear Material

LCS Demo-system based on ERL (@KEK)Electron Beam = 20 MeV, 57 μA

3000 5000 7000 9000 110000

2000

4000

6000

Measured spectrumE=6.91 keV, dE/E=0.5％

Demonstration of High Intensity Monochromatic X-/γ-rays Generationby LCS in March 2015 at Tsukuba (KEK)

Intensity ; 9 x 108 ph/s/mA[~100 times higher than the world highest ]

Laser Osc.

Electron Beam

Laser Enhancement Cavity(LCS Point)

γ-ray Beam

Examples of Possible Applications of NRF NDA System using LCS γ-rays

ERL (Energy Recovery Linac)

A Detection System of NMin Cargo Container

A Future LCS Gamma-ray Source with 3-loop ERL

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Yosuke Naoi (Mr.)

Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) of Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA)E-mail: naoi.yosuke@jaea.go.jp

ISCN Website

http://www.jaea.go.jp/04/iscn/index.html

Thank you for your attention.

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