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  • Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions:

    Japan, South Korea, and Egypt

    January 2008

    AuthorsElizabeth Bakanic, Mark Christopher, Sandya Das, Laurie

    Freeman, George Hodgson, Mike Hunzeker, R. Scott Kemp, Sung Hwan Lee, Florentina Mulaj, Ryan Phillips

    Project Advisors

    Robert Einhorn, Frank von Hippel

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    Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt

    Table of Contents

    Abbreviations and Acronyms 3

    Executive Summary 4

    About the Report 7

    Part I: Introduction 8

    Part II: Northeast Asia 9

    Japan 9 Nuclear History 9 Constraints on Developing Nuclear Weapons 9 Recent Developments in Japans Strategic Environment 10 Factors Likely to Affect Japans Nuclear Decision Making 11

    South Korea 12 Nuclear History 12 Constraints on Developing Nuclear Weapons 13 Recent Developments in the Strategic Environment 13 Factors Likely to Affect Nuclear Decision Making 15

    Policy Recommendations: Northeast Asia 15 RECOMMENDATION 1: Strongly reaffirm the U.S. commitment to a nuclear weapon-free Korean Peninsula and Japan 15 RECOMMENDATION 2: Engage South Korea in discreet contingency planning for a possible North Korean collapse scenario 15 RECOMMENDATION 3: Manage tensions with Japan and South Korea to ensure that the U.S. alliances with and assurances to them remain robust 16 DemonstrateJapanscontinuedimportancetotheUnitedStates 16 PrepareforapotentialreviewofwartimeOPCONtransferwiththenewSouth Korean administration 16 RECOMMENDATION 4: Promote multilateral mechanisms for addressing regional security issues 16 RECOMMENDATION 5: Encourage reconciliation between South Korea and Japan 17 SupportregionalforumsthatbringtogetherJapanandSouthKorea 17 Maintainanimpartialstanceonterritorialdisputesandotherhistoricalissues between Japan and South Korea 17 RECOMMENDATION 6: Resume U.S.-North Korea negotiations to reduce Pyongyangs ballistic missile threat 17

    PART III: MIDDLE EAST 18

    Egypt 18 Nuclear History 18 Constraints on Developing Nuclear Weapons 18 Recent Developments in the Strategic Environment 19 Factors Likely to Affect Nuclear Decision Making 20

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    Policy Recommendations: The Middle East 21 RECOMMENDATION 7: Declare a new regional security doctrine 21 RECOMMENDATION 8: Strengthen the regional nonproliferation regime 22 DemonstrateU.S.commitmenttoaWeaponsofMassDestruction-FreeZone (WMDFZ)intheMiddleEast 22 EndorseaFuelCycle-FreeZoneasafirststeptowardaMiddleEastWMDFZ 22 RECOMMENDATION 9: Restart the Middle East Security Forum 22 RECOMMENDATION 10: Provide conditional support for Egypts drive to build a civilian nuclear energy program 23 RECOMMENDATION 11: Strengthen the U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship and bolster Egypts leadership role in the region 23 EstablishaU.S.-EgyptFreeTradeAgreement(FTA) 23 EncourageEgypttoplayaleadingroleinregionalinitiativessuchasIsrael-Palestine peace talks and a revived regional security forum 23

    PART IV: THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 24

    Policy Recommendations: Nonproliferation Regime 24 RECOMMENDATION 12:RaisethecostofwithdrawalfromtheNPT.Ensure that any withdrawal is automatically examined by the full UN Security Council underChapterVIIoftheUNCharter 24 RECOMMENDATION 13:StrengthentheIAEAverificationsystem 25 ContinuetoseekuniversaladherencetotheAdditionalProtocol,beginninginthe United States 25 PushtheIAEAtoincreasethefrequencyandqualityofitsinspectionsofresearchreactors 25 EncouragetheIAEAtoextendsafeguardstotheinputofalluraniumhexafluoride (UF6)productionfacilities 25 IncreasetheIAEASafeguardsBudget 26 RECOMMENDATION 14:Takefurtheractiontowardsirreversibleandverifiable disarmament 26 RECOMMENDATION 15:WithdrawGlobalNuclearEnergyPartnership(GNEP) support for pyroprocessing in South Korea 26

    APPENDIX A: INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED 28

    APPENDIX B: INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH PAPER TOPICS 32

    Table of Contents

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    Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt

    Abbreviations and Acronyms

    ACRS: Arms Control and Regional Security

    BMD: Ballistic Missile Defense

    CFC: Combined Forces Command (U.S.-ROK)

    CTBT: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

    DPRK: Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (North Korea)

    EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone

    FMCT: Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

    FTA: Free Trade Agreement

    HEU: Highly Enriched Uranium

    IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

    KAERI: Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute

    NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

    NDP: National Democratic Party (in Egypt)

    NDPO: National Defense Program Outline

    NPT: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

    OPCON: Operational Control

    PLA: Peoples Liberation Army

    PLAN: Peoples Liberation Army Navy

    QIZ: Qualified Industrial Zone

    ROK: Republic of Korea (South Korea)

    START: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

    SORT: Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty

    TIFQ: Trade and Investment Framework Agreement

    UN: United Nations

    WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

    WMDFZ: Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone

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    Executive Summary

    Nuclear activity in North Korea and Iran presents numerous challenges to the global nonproliferation regime.

    Not least among these challenges is the possibility that the pursuit of nuclear weapons or a nuclear option by

    these or other countries could cause neighboring states in Northeast Asia and/or the Middle East to revisit their

    own nuclear postures. This report looks at the nuclear calculus facing three key U.S. friends and allies: Japan,

    South Korea, and Egypt. It identifies the push factors that might induce each to consider developing nuclear

    weapons, as well as the significant barriers each would have to overcome were it to pursue such a course.

    The authors of this report deem it unlikely that South Korea, Japan, or Egypt will choose to pursue nuclear

    weapons in the foreseeable future. The barriers to doing so are too high. That said, it remains in the U.S.

    national interest to further reduce these countries incentives to develop weapons, particularly in light of nuclear

    activity in Iran and North Korea. Toward this end, the report recommends country-specific, regional, and non-

    proliferation regime-wide policies that the United States should pursue to reduce the likelihood that any of these

    three countries would pursue a nuclear weapons option.

    With regard to U.S. policy toward Northeast Asia, the report recommends the following:

    1. Reaffirm the U.S. commitment to a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula and Japan. The United States

    should publicly and privately reiterate its opposition to new nuclear weapon states, including friends and al-

    lies. It should continue to make clear that it will not tolerate the continued presence of nuclear weapons in

    North Korea.

    2. Engage South Korea in discreet contingency planning for a possible North Korean collapse scenario. Con-

    tingency planninginitially between the United States and South Korea, and perhaps later involving China as

    wellwould help to mitigate both the dangers of loose nuclear materials and of nuclear inheritance by South

    Korea.

    3. Manage tensions with Japan and South Korea to ensure that U.S. alliances with and assurances to them

    remain robust. Perceptions that U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea are strong contribute to the cred-

    ibility of U.S. security assurances, including extended deterrence. Conversely, a lack of confidence in these

    alliances raises the risk that Japan and South Korea might pursue nuclear weapons. To allay Japanese concerns

    about neglect, the United States should look for both substantive and symbolic opportunities to demonstrate

    that Japan remains a key U.S. partner. It should also commit to resolving the abductee issue in the context of

    the Six Party Talks. To allay South Korean fears of U.S. disengagement, the United States should be prepared

    to revisit discussion of the timetable for transferring wartime operational control of South Korean forces,

    should the new South Korean administration so request.

    4. Actively promote multilateral mechanisms for addressing regional security issues. The six-party forum

    should, once North Korea has been denuclearized, evolve into a permanent regional security institution. The

    United States should also support other forums for regional security discussions, involving China where ap-

    propriate.

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    Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt

    5. Encourage reconciliation between South Korea and Japan. The United States should promote greater

    consultation and coordination between South Korea and Japan by encouraging them to cooperate with one

    another in regional forums. At the same time, the United States should maintain impartiality on territorial

    disputes and historical issues between Japan and

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