preventing nuclear proliferation chain reactions · preventing nuclear proliferation chain...

Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions:

Japan, South Korea, and Egypt

January 2008

AuthorsElizabeth Bakanic, Mark Christopher, Sandya Das, Laurie

Freeman, George Hodgson, Mike Hunzeker, R. Scott Kemp, Sung Hwan Lee, Florentina Mulaj, Ryan Phillips

Project Advisors

Robert Einhorn, Frank von Hippel

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Preventing Nuclear Proliferation Chain Reactions: Japan, South Korea, and Egypt

Table of Contents

Abbreviations and Acronyms 3

Executive Summary 4

About the Report 7

Part I: Introduction 8

Part II: Northeast Asia 9

Japan 9 Nuclear History 9 Constraints on Developing Nuclear Weapons 9 Recent Developments in Japan’s Strategic Environment 10 Factors Likely to Affect Japan’s Nuclear Decision Making 11

South Korea 12 Nuclear History 12 Constraints on Developing Nuclear Weapons 13 Recent Developments in the Strategic Environment 13 Factors Likely to Affect Nuclear Decision Making 15

Policy Recommendations: Northeast Asia 15 RECOMMENDATION 1: Strongly reaffirm the U.S. commitment to a nuclear weapon-free Korean Peninsula and Japan 15 RECOMMENDATION 2: Engage South Korea in discreet contingency planning for a possible North Korean collapse scenario 15 RECOMMENDATION 3: Manage tensions with Japan and South Korea to ensure that the U.S. alliances with and assurances to them remain robust 16 •DemonstrateJapan’scontinuedimportancetotheUnitedStates 16 •PrepareforapotentialreviewofwartimeOPCONtransferwiththenewSouth Korean administration 16 RECOMMENDATION 4: Promote multilateral mechanisms for addressing regional security issues 16 RECOMMENDATION 5: Encourage reconciliation between South Korea and Japan 17 •SupportregionalforumsthatbringtogetherJapanandSouthKorea 17 •Maintainanimpartialstanceonterritorialdisputesandotherhistoricalissues between Japan and South Korea 17 RECOMMENDATION 6: Resume U.S.-North Korea negotiations to reduce Pyongyang’s ballistic missile threat 17

PART III: MIDDLE EAST 18

Egypt 18 Nuclear History 18 Constraints on Developing Nuclear Weapons 18 Recent Developments in the Strategic Environment 19 Factors Likely to Affect Nuclear Decision Making 20

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Policy Recommendations: The Middle East 21 RECOMMENDATION 7: Declare a new regional security doctrine 21 RECOMMENDATION 8: Strengthen the regional nonproliferation regime 22 •DemonstrateU.S.commitmenttoaWeaponsofMassDestruction-FreeZone (WMDFZ)intheMiddleEast 22 •EndorseaFuelCycle-FreeZoneasafirststeptowardaMiddleEastWMDFZ 22 RECOMMENDATION 9: Restart the Middle East Security Forum 22 RECOMMENDATION 10: Provide conditional support for Egypt’s drive to build a civilian nuclear energy program 23 RECOMMENDATION 11: Strengthen the U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship and bolster Egypt’s leadership role in the region 23 •EstablishaU.S.-EgyptFreeTradeAgreement(FTA) 23 •EncourageEgypttoplayaleadingroleinregionalinitiativessuchasIsrael-Palestine peace talks and a revived regional security forum 23

PART IV: THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 24

Policy Recommendations: Nonproliferation Regime 24 RECOMMENDATION 12:RaisethecostofwithdrawalfromtheNPT.Ensure that any withdrawal is automatically examined by the full UN Security Council underChapterVIIoftheUNCharter 24 RECOMMENDATION 13:StrengthentheIAEAverificationsystem 25 •ContinuetoseekuniversaladherencetotheAdditionalProtocol,beginninginthe United States 25 •PushtheIAEAtoincreasethefrequencyandqualityofitsinspectionsofresearchreactors 25 •EncouragetheIAEAtoextendsafeguardstotheinputofalluraniumhexafluoride (UF6)productionfacilities 25 •IncreasetheIAEASafeguardsBudget 26 RECOMMENDATION 14:Takefurtheractiontowardsirreversibleandverifiable disarmament 26 RECOMMENDATION 15:WithdrawGlobalNuclearEnergyPartnership(GNEP) support for pyroprocessing in South Korea 26

APPENDIX A: INDIVIDUALS INTERVIEWED 28

APPENDIX B: INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH PAPER TOPICS 32

Table of Contents

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACRS: Arms Control and Regional Security

BMD: Ballistic Missile Defense

CFC: Combined Forces Command (U.S.-ROK)

CTBT: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

DPRK: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea)

EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone

FMCT: Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

FTA: Free Trade Agreement

HEU: Highly Enriched Uranium

IAEA: International Atomic Energy Agency

KAERI: Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDP: National Democratic Party (in Egypt)

NDPO: National Defense Program Outline

NPT: Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

OPCON: Operational Control

PLA: People’s Liberation Army

PLAN: People’s Liberation Army Navy

QIZ: Qualified Industrial Zone

ROK: Republic of Korea (South Korea)

START: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty

SORT: Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty

TIFQ: Trade and Investment Framework Agreement

UN: United Nations

WMD: Weapons of Mass Destruction

WMDFZ: Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone

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Executive Summary

Nuclear activity in North Korea and Iran presents numerous challenges to the global nonproliferation regime.

Not least among these challenges is the possibility that the pursuit of nuclear weapons or a nuclear option by

these or other countries could cause neighboring states in Northeast Asia and/or the Middle East to revisit their

own nuclear postures. This report looks at the nuclear calculus facing three key U.S. friends and allies: Japan,

South Korea, and Egypt. It identifies the push factors that might induce each to consider developing nuclear

weapons, as well as the significant barriers each would have to overcome were it to pursue such a course.

The authors of this report deem it unlikely that South Korea, Japan, or Egypt will choose to pursue nuclear

weapons in the foreseeable future. The barriers to doing so are too high. That said, it remains in the U.S.

national interest to further reduce these countries’ incentives to develop weapons, particularly in light of nuclear

activity in Iran and North Korea. Toward this end, the report recommends country-specific, regional, and non-

proliferation regime-wide policies that the United States should pursue to reduce the likelihood that any of these

three countries would pursue a nuclear weapons option.

With regard to U.S. policy toward Northeast Asia, the report recommends the following:

1. Reaffirm the U.S. commitment to a nuclear weapons-free Korean Peninsula and Japan. The United States

should publicly and privately reiterate its opposition to new nuclear weapon states, including friends and al-

lies. It should continue to make clear that it will not tolerate the continued presence of nuclear weapons in

North Korea.

2. Engage South Korea in discreet contingency planning for a possible North Korean collapse scenario. Con-

tingency planning—initially between the United States and South Korea, and perhaps later involving China as

well—would help to mitigate both the dangers of loose nuclear materials and of nuclear inheritance by South

Korea.

3. Manage tensions with Japan and South Korea to ensure that U.S. alliances with and assurances to them

remain robust. Perceptions that U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea are strong contribute to the cred-

ibility of U.S. security assurances, including extended deterrence. Conversely, a lack of confidence in these

alliances raises the risk that Japan and South Korea might pursue nuclear weapons. To allay Japanese concerns

about neglect, the United States should look for both substantive and symbolic opportunities to demonstrate

that Japan remains a key U.S. partner. It should also commit to resolving the abductee issue in the context of

the Six Party Talks. To allay South Korean fears of U.S. disengagement, the United States should be prepared

to revisit discussion of the timetable for transferring wartime operational control of South Korean forces,

should the new South Korean administration so request.

4. Actively promote multilateral mechanisms for addressing regional security issues. The six-party forum

should, once North Korea has been denuclearized, evolve into a permanent regional security institution. The

United States should also support other forums for regional security discussions, involving China where ap-

propriate.

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5. Encourage reconciliation between South Korea and Japan. The United States should promote greater

consultation and coordination between South Korea and Japan by encouraging them to cooperate with one

another in regional forums. At the same time, the United States should maintain impartiality on territorial

disputes and historical issues between Japan and South Korea.

6. Resume U.S.-North Korea negotiations to reduce Pyongyang’s ballistic missile threat. The United States

should reengage in talks with North Korea on limiting North Korea’s missile capabilities, perhaps including

Japan where appropriate.

With regard to the Middle East, the report recommends the following:

7. Declare a new U.S. security doctrine in the Middle East. In order to allay security fears that could lead to

proliferation, the United States should declare a new security doctrine that clearly defines U.S. policy toward

the dominant threats—both conventional and non-conventional—in the Middle East. This doctrine should

declare as U.S. policy the following three commitments: 1) to protect access to strategic resources and keep

open shipping lanes in the region; 2) to take all necessary steps to defend U.S. friends and allies in the region

in the face of military aggression by another regional state; and 3) to affirm that the United States would

consider any threat or use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East as a threat to its own vital security interests

and would respond to such a threat by any means necessary. To lend credibility to this new security doctrine,

the United States should maintain a robust regional military presence and increase military cooperation with

its friends in the Middle East.

8. Strengthen the regional nonproliferation regime. A new round of nonproliferation and arms control efforts

in the Middle East could increase regional stability while decreasing Egypt’s incentives to develop nuclear

weapons. This endeavor should consist of two elements: commitment to an eventual Middle East WMD-Free

Zone (WMDFZ), and pursuit of a regional Fuel Cycle Free Zone as a step toward that goal.

9. Restart the Middle East Security Forum. The forum should aim to improve security through confidence-

building measures between states in the region. It could be modeled on the Working Group on Arms Control

and Regional Security (ACRS) of the early 1990s. Iraq, Syria, and Iran should be encouraged to participate.

10. Provide conditional support for Egypt’s drive to build a civilian nuclear energy program. The United

States should offer technical and financial support for a civilian nuclear energy program in Egypt in return for

a commitment from Cairo to support a Fuel Cycle Free Zone in the Middle East and to adhere to the Addi-

tional Protocol.

11. Strengthen the U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship and bolster Egypt’s leadership role in the region. The

United States should establish a bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Egypt and increase Egypt’s profile

by giving it a leading role in regional initiatives such as the Middle East peace process and a revived regional

security forum.

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Finally, the report provides recommendations for strengthening the nonproliferation regime in ways that would

have particular relevance to the three countries studied:

12. Raise the cost of withdrawal from the NPT. At the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the United States should

propose automatic review by the UN Security Council, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, of a state’s

withdrawal from the NPT. The United States should also support the proposal that a withdrawing state

should give up any facilities, materials, equipment and technology that it acquired while a party to the NPT.

13. Strengthen the IAEA verification system. The United States should press for universal adherence to the Ad-

ditional Protocol. It should encourage more frequent inspections of research reactors and pressure the IAEA

to apply material balance safeguards at UF6 production plants. To help fund these measures, the United

States should pledge to increase its voluntary contribution to the IAEA’s safeguards budget.

14. Take further action towards irreversible and verifiable disarmament. Both the United States and Russia

should pursue deeper irreversible cuts in their nuclear arsenals beyond their current commitments.

15. Withdraw GNEP support for pyroprocessing in South Korea. The United States should withdraw GNEP

support for South Korea’s pyroprocessing research and development program.

Executive Summary

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This report is the product of research conducted by a team of ten graduate students at Princeton University’s

Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs during the fall of 2007.

Team members traveled to Japan, South Korea, Egypt, and Israel, where they interviewed government officials,

academics, scientists, and other experts. The group also conducted research in the United States, including

interviews with diplomats from Japan, South Korea and Egypt and discussions with officials from the U.S.

Government.

A full list of the interviewees is provided in Appendix A. Many officials spoke candidly about sensitive issues on

the condition that their comments remain off the record; in accordance with their wishes, attribution of opin-

ions and insights has been restricted where necessary.

Each member of the team also produced a research paper on a topic relevant to this report, a list of which can be

found in Appendix B.

We express our thanks to all who gave generously of their time to meet with us. We are grateful also for the fi-

nancial support of the Woodrow Wilson School, without which this report would have been impossible. Above

all, we would like to thank Robert Einhorn and Frank von Hippel, who conceived of this project and offered in-

valuable advice and expertise throughout. Responsibility for any errors or omissions contained herein, however,

remains with the authors.

About the Report

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The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 injected a new urgency into U.S. efforts to counter the spread of

nuclear weapons. In pursuing this aim, Washington has understandably focused on states believed to be actively

seeking nuclear weapons. But countries that have thus far chosen not to develop nuclear weapons also merit at-

tention. A given state’s decision to forego nuclear weapons is not permanent. Domestic political developments,

newly emerging threats, changes in the strategic environment, or perceived shifts in nonproliferation norms can

all cause states to reconsider their commitments to remaining non-nuclear.

This report examines the factors that could lead Japan, South Korea, and Egypt—three currently non-nuclear

allies or close friends of the United States—to re-consider their nuclear options. It then proposes policies that

the United States should pursue to help reduce the likelihood of their doing so.

The focus on Japan, South Korea and Egypt is not meant to imply that these are the only countries facing the

pressures associated with proliferation chain reactions, nor that they are the states most likely to acquire nuclear

weapons. A number of other countries—notably Saudi Arabia, Syria, Taiwan and Turkey—could provide

similarly fertile ground for analysis of this kind. Nonetheless, Japan, South Korea and Egypt merit particular

attention for several reasons. First, each faces the threat of nuclear activity by an unfriendly neighbor: North

Korea in the cases of Japan and South Korea, and Iran in Egypt’s case. Second, the United States plays a critical

role in the security calculations of each. Japan and South Korea are formal U.S. treaty allies, while Egypt and

the United States enjoy a longstanding security relationship. Third, each of the three countries has in the past

either considered developing nuclear weapons (Japan), or actually attempted to do so (South Korea and Egypt).

Finally, each of the three has been a staunch supporter of the global nonproliferation regime. The acquisition of

nuclear weapons by any one would deal a damaging if not fatal blow to the accepted norms of nonproliferation.

The report does not argue that proliferation chain reactions are inevitable. Such a suggestion would not only be

mistaken but also counter-productive, since public predictions about which countries are next in line to acquire

nuclear weapons weaken the normative restraints on the pursuit of such weapons and risk becoming self-ful-

filling prophecies. Rather, the following analysis highlights the complexity of each country’s nuclear calculus,

including the significant barriers to developing nuclear weapons that each faces. Nonetheless, as the report

notes, Japan, South Korea and Egypt do face pressures to develop nuclear weapons. Given the stakes involved,

pursuing policies that mitigate these pressures is firmly in the U.S. strategic interest and will remain so for the

foreseeable future.

The report is divided into four parts ̀ Part I is the introduction. Part II, on Northeast Asia, is divided into

subsections on Japan and South Korea. Each subsection provides background information on the country’s past

interest in nuclear weapons and technology, assesses the institutional and structural barriers the country would

face in developing nuclear weapons, looks at recent developments influencing strategic and nuclear calculations,

and suggests future conditions that might lead the country to reconsider its non-nuclear status. The section

concludes by proposing country- and region-specific recommendations for reducing incentives for Japan South

Korea to acquire nuclear weapons. Part III mirrors the structure of Part II but deals with Egypt and the Middle

East. Part IV discusses the overall nuclear nonproliferation regime and suggests regime-wide policies that the

United States should pursue to counter proliferation chain reactions, particularly in the three countries covered

in this study.

Part I: Introduction

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Japan

Nuclear History

As a direct result of the World War II nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan developed a strong

aversion to nuclear weapons. Yet, this nuclear allergy notwithstanding, Japan has in the past explored the nu-

clear weapons option. Japanese leaders have studied the desirability and feasibility of acquiring nuclear weapons

twice: first after China tested nuclear weapons in 1964, and then again in 1994 while formulating the country’s

post-Cold War global strategy. On both occasions, Japan concluded that becoming a nuclear weapons state

was not in its interests.1 As part of its robust civil nuclear energy program, however, Japan has developed both

enrichment and reprocessing capabilities. Some have suggested that this is part of a hedging strategy that would

give Japan the ability to produce fissile material quickly should it ever decide to develop a nuclear weapon.2

Following North Korea’s ballistic missile tests in 1998 and 2006 and its nuclear test in 2006, the Japanese gov-

ernment and people have shown more willingness to discuss publicly the possibility of acquiring nuclear weap-

ons. At present, the discussion remains essentially a debate on whether to have the debate, but even this level of

discourse indicates a significant increase in Japanese tolerance of the subject.

Constraints on Developing Nuclear Weapons

Japan’s relationship with the United States, its longstanding commitment to nuclear nonproliferation, its de-

pendence on uranium imports for power, its established policies, and Japanese public opinion all discourage the

country from pursuing nuclear weapons.

The U.S.-Japan alliance is a key variable in Japan’s calculus on nuclear issues. Pursuing nuclear weapons would

severely damage if not destroy Japan’s alliance with the United States, on which Japan relies for security guaran-

tees including extended nuclear deterrence.

Japan has long been a vocal supporter of the nonproliferation regime. Given the rigorous and intrusive inspec-

tions regime to which Japan subscribes under the Additional Protocol of the NPT, the country could not easily

pursue a covert nuclear weapons program. As a result, any decision to pursue nuclear weapons would likely take

place openly and involve withdrawing from the NPT. Reneging on its NPT obligations would severely damage

Japan’s international reputation.

Japan’s arrangements with uranium suppliers strictly prohibit Tokyo from using imported uranium for purposes

other than fueling its civil nuclear energy program. Were Japan to launch a weapons program, uranium

1 Llewelyn Hughes , “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet),” International Security, vol.31, no.4, Spring 2007. The 1994 report conclud-ed that, even under the “worst-case scenario,” wherein the U.S.-Japan alliance no longer existed and the multilateral nonproliferation regime had disintegrated, Japan should still not develop its own nuclear deterrent. See Hughes, pp. 78-9.2 Hajime Izumi and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “Not Going Nuclear: Japan’s Response to North Korea’s Nuclear Test,” Arms Control Today, June 2007, p. 6.

Part II: Northeast Asia

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imports would be suspended. Given that nuclear energy accounts for approximately one-third of Japan’s elec-

tricity production,3 suspension of uranium imports would take a heavy toll on Japan’s economy.

Japan’s standing policy on nuclear weapons is summarized by the “three no’s”: no manufacturing, no possession,

and no introduction of foreign nuclear weapons into Japanese territory. While these principles are not legally

binding, they attract significant political support. Tokyo has discussed dropping or amending the third “no” to

allow U.S. nuclear-armed vessels to visit Japanese harbors, but any changes would spark intense public debate

and considerable opposition.4 The 1955 Basic Law on Atomic Energy also strictly limits Japan’s use of nuclear

energy to peaceful purposes; changing this law would require action by the Diet. Finally, Article 9 of Japan’s

constitution prohibits the country from developing offensive military capabilities. Many Japanese leaders—

including current Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda and his immediate predecessor Shinzo Abe—have stated that a

nuclear option could be considered a defensive capability and is thus compatible with Japan’s constitution, but

putting this interpretation into practice would likely spark a constitutional debate.5

Japan is undergoing something of a generational shift on nuclear issues. Many Japanese policymakers take as

axiomatic that younger Japanese, those without firsthand experience of the WWII nuclear bombings, tend to be

less opposed than older generations to the idea of acquiring nuclear weapons.6 Still, the majority of the public

continues to view the nuclear option unfavorably, and debate on the topic—while more open than in previous

years—remains stifled. In short, Japan’s “nuclear allergy” is still strong.

Recent Developments in Japan’s Strategic Environment

North Korea: The 1998 “Taepodong shock,” in which a North Korean missile on a test flight over-flew Japan

and landed in the Pacific Ocean, rattled Japan and led it to start cooperating with the United States on a ballistic

missile defense (BMD) research program. However, it took the renewed North Korean nuclear crisis in 2002 to

crystallize Japan’s interest in BMD and convince it to procure off-the-shelf BMD technology from the United

States.7 Since North Korea’s October 2006 nuclear test, Japan has stepped up its investment in BMD, acquiring

both upper- and lower-tier BMD systems from the United States.8

Pyongyang’s missile and nuclear tests in 2006 also sparked discussions among Japanese leaders about the pos-

sibility of launching preemptive strikes with conventional weapons against North Korean missile bases. Soon

after the tests, then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe made the argument that, given the absence of alternative

3 Federation of American Scientists, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/japan/nuke>4 Llewelyn Hughes, “Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet),” International Security, vol.31, no.4, Spring 2007, p.88.5 Howard French, “Taboo Against Nuclear Arms is Being Challenged in Japan,” New York Times, 9 June 2002.6 Interviews with Japanese officials and academics, 28 October-2 November 2007. 7 Daniel Kliman, Japan’s Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006) pp.93-107. Previous inhibitions about the unconstitutionality of collective defense appear to be giving way to an expanded reinterpretation of self-defense, at least as it relates to BMD. The “inadvertent” use of Japanese BMD assets to defend U.S. territory and the exchange of theater-area sensor information, which had previously been deemed prohibited, is now seen as permissible.8 The upper-tier system is the sea-based Navy Theater Wide Defense (NTWD). The lower-tier is the PAC-3. Christopher Hughes, Japan’s Re-emergence as a “Normal” Military Power, Adelphi Paper 368-9, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), p.109.


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options for preventing a missile attack, attacking the missile bases could be considered self-defense, permissible

under Japan’s constitution.9

China: After repeated Chinese incursions into Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)10 and the discovery of a

Chinese nuclear submarine off Okinawa in 2004, Japanese leaders have become increasingly wary of the secu-

rity threat posed by China. In a departure from its longstanding practice of avoiding the explicit designation

of China as a threat, Japan’s 2004 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) discussed the modernization of

China’s nuclear forces and missile capabilities. The 2005 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee Joint

Statement included in its list of common strategic objectives “encouraging China to improve the transparency

of its military affairs.”11 Japan is also concerned about the role China plays in propping up the North Korean

regime and how China might respond in the event of North Korean collapse.

U.S.-Japan alliance: Overall, the U.S-Japan alliance remains strong. Japan and the United States have increased

their strategic and tactical military cooperation over the past ten years within the framework of an alliance trans-

formation process encouraging a more robust defense posture for Japan.12 At the same time, difficulties have

also surfaced, notably over the issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea.13 Washington has indicated

that it may be willing to remove North Korea from its list of state sponsors of terrorism before the abduction

issue has been settled, leading Japan to doubt U.S. commitment to resolving the issue. The perception that

Washington does not take seriously an issue that is of paramount importance to Tokyo causes resentment and

exacerbates a more general concern that the United States takes Japan for granted.

Fraying ties with South Korea: Relations between Seoul and Tokyo, already rocky as a result of historical ani-

mosity, have noticeably soured in recent years. Divergent perceptions of the threats posed by North Korea and

China have compounded the existing tensions over history and seabed rights between the two countries.

Factors Likely to Affect Japan’s Nuclear Decision Making

No one event would be enough to convince Japan to consider developing nuclear weapons. For the country

to do so would require a “perfect storm” of more than one of the following factors. Common to any plausible

scenario in which Japan were to seriously consider pursuing weapons would be a severe deterioration in Japan-

U.S. relations.

9 Martin Fackler, “Tokyo talks of military strike on North Korea; Debate rises over revising Constitution,” The International Herald Tri-bune, 11 July 2006.10 Even though China’s naval incursions into Japan’s EEZ are legal under international law, China’s search for oil and natural gas there is not.11 Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee, 19 February 2005 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm12 Some recent examples include the collocation of the US Army I Corps headquarters with the Ground Self Defense Forces°Ø new rapid reaction force headquarters at Camp Zama, and the establishment of the joint BMD and airspace control center at Yokota.13 The issue surrounds the fate of several Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea during the 1970s and 1980s. To date, North Korea has admitted to abducting 13 Japanese citizens. Japan believes that more have been abducted and remains unsatisfied with North Korea’s explanation of their fates.

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Erosion of confidence in the U.S.- Japan security alliance: The strength of the U.S-Japan alliance and the cred-

ibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella are critical to Japan’s sense of security. A perceived U.S. failure to live up to

its obligations, especially in a regional crisis situation, would undermine Japanese confidence in the alliance and

could drive Japan to consider seeking security through its own nuclear capabilities. Such a fracture might arise if

the United States failed to provide adequate support to Japan in a potential conflict with China, if it sided with

South Korea over possession of the Dokdo/Takeshima islands14 or in other historical disputes, or if it undertook

major regional security decisions (e.g. significant troop reductions or realignments) without first consulting

Tokyo.

Failure to denuclearize North Korea: A U.S. failure to prevent additional North Korean nuclear or missile tests

could cause Japan to feel more vulnerable and consequently to think more seriously about developing its own

nuclear deterrent. A permanent settlement that fell short of completely eliminating North Korea’s nuclear pro-

gram could have a similar impact.

A unified Korea with nuclear weapons: The deep historical tensions between Japan and South Korea could cause

Japan to seek its own nuclear weapons if a unified Korea were to inherit North Korea’s nuclear weapons, or if a

post-unification Korean government decided to develop nuclear weapons on its own.

Excessive Chinese military buildup: China’s military transformation has intensified in recent years. For the most

part, China has focused on modernizing the Peoples’ Liberation Army and the Peoples’ Liberation Army Navy.

Many of these improvements have been driven by the fear that China’s armed forces are being left behind by a

high-tech “revolution in military affairs.” China has also begun investing heavily in strategic and power-projec-

tion capabilities, including its nuclear arsenal, ballistic missile inventory, and blue water navy.15 These develop-

ments are of concern to Japan, and could, if they continue, cause Tokyo to rethink its non-nuclear stance.

South Korea

Nuclear History

South Korea today is non-nuclear and committed to supporting the nuclear nonproliferation regime, but it has

not always taken this position. In 1974, amid fears of abandonment following President Nixon’s withdrawal of

an infantry division from Korea, President Park Chung Hee authorized a clandestine nuclear weapons program.

South Korea attempted to purchase reprocessing equipment from France and Belgium and a heavy water reactor

from Canada. The program was, however, quickly uncovered by a concerned United States, which succeeded

in convincing Park to suspend it in 1976.16 More recently, in its first declaration under the Additional Protocol

in 2004, South Korea informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that the Korea Atomic Energy

14 South Korea currently controls the islands, but they are also claimed by Japan.15 See Department of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the People’s Republic of China, 2007, Chapters 1, 4 and 5. For a detailed examination of China’s naval modernization efforts, refer to the Office of Naval Intelligence’s report China’s Navy: 200716 It has been reported that, as late as 1989, Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff presented a proposal for an all-out effort to acquire nuclear weap-ons. President Roh Tae-Woo is said to have rejected the plan in 1991. Selig Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and US Disengagement, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 250.


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Research Institute (KAERI) had performed laboratory-scale experiments in the 1980s and in 2000 to study

the enrichment of uranium and separation of plutonium, ostensibly without the government’s authorization.

Although the IAEA found no indication that the experiments had continued, it expressed “serious concern”

about the nature of these activities and Seoul’s failure to report them promptly in accordance with its safeguard

obligations.17


Not unlike Japan, South Korea would face a number of barriers were it to pursue nuclear weapons, including its

relationship with the United States, its dependence on uranium imports, and its commitment to nonprolifera-

tion, especially on the Korean peninsula.

Any move by South Korea to acquire nuclear weapons would damage the country’s relationship with the United

States. Such a decision would jeopardize the U.S. security assurances, including extended deterrence, that form

the bedrock of South Korea’s security calculations.

South Korea maintains bilateral agreements with uranium suppliers that prevent it from using imported ura-

nium for non-peaceful purposes. Given that South Korea relies on imported uranium fuel, and that nuclear

energy accounts for about 40 percent of its electricity,18 the suspension of uranium imports would deal a heavy

blow to the South Korean economy.

South Korea is a party to the NPT and the Additional Protocol, and has ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban

Treaty. Furthermore, although North Korea has violated both the spirit and letter of the 1992 Joint Declaration

on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea remains committed to it, including its prohibi-

tion of enrichment and reprocessing activities.

Recent Developments in the Strategic Environment

North Korea’s nuclear detonation and U.S. security assurances: Despite North Korea’s 2006 missile tests and

nuclear explosion, most South Koreans do not believe that nuclear weapons in the North are directed against

them. Neither the missile tests nor the explosion has swayed Seoul from trying to engage Pyongyang. Newly

elected South Korean President Lee Myung Bak has expressed his intention to pursue a somewhat tougher line

toward the North; the extent of actual policy changes remains to be seen.

Transformation of the U.S.- South Korea alliance: The United States and South Korea have recently made some

of the most significant changes to their military alliance since the end of the Korean War, agreeing to transfer

wartime operational control (OPCON) of Korean forces from the United States to South Korea by 2012, to

reduce U.S. force levels in South Korea to around 28,000, and to consolidate remaining U.S. troops in two

large bases south of Seoul, away from the demilitarized zone. Many South Korean conservatives have misgiv-

17 Report by the IAEA Director General, “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Republic of Korea,” GOV/2004/84, 11 November 2004, p 8.18 Nuclear Power in Korea, Australian Uranium Association, Briefing Paper no. 81, December 2007, <http://www.uic.com.au/nip81.htm>.

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ings about these changes, fearing that they signal (including to Pyongyang) U.S. disengagement.19 As a result

of these fears, the new conservative administration in Seoul may ask Washington to revisit the timetable for

OPCON transfer.

The rise of China: The rise of China is dramatically changing South Korea’s strategic environment. China has

become South Korea’s largest trading partner and the top destination for South Korean overseas investment. At

the same time, China’s economic interests in North Korea have also grown significantly.20 Many South Koreans

fear that China might not support reunification of the Korean Peninsula, or that Beijing might try to play an

unacceptably large role in influencing a post-unification political arrangement.

Many South Koreans also fear being torn between China and the United States. As the U.S.-South Korea al-

liance evolves to provide U.S. forces in Korea with greater “strategic flexibility”— i.e. the ability to respond to

contingencies beyond the Korean Peninsula—Seoul may find it increasingly difficult to balance between South

Korea’s only ally and its largest trading partner. Many South Koreans are concerned about the dilemma they

would face in the event of hostilities between the U.S. and China over Taiwan, particularly if the United States

sought to respond using forces stationed in Korea.

Normalization of Japan’s Military: South Korea is uneasy about the prospect of Japan’s becoming a more “nor-

mal” military power. It sees reason for concern in Japan’s decision to elevate its Defense Agency to a cabinet-

level ministry, its debates over constitutional revision, its continued attempts to procure offensive strike capabili-

ties from the United States, and its nascent debate on nuclear options,. Washington has long urged Japan to

upgrade its military capabilities, but more explicit U.S. support for Japan’s acquisition of offensive capabilities

risks unsettling the U.S.-South Korea alliance.

Nuclear energy issues: South Korea is the world’s sixth largest producer of nuclear power. In accordance with the

1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, South Korea possesses neither ura-

nium enrichment nor spent fuel reprocessing capabilities. Japan has been allowed to develop both technologies.

The asymmetry rankles. South Korea also has a mounting nuclear waste management problem. Its nuclear

establishment has begun researching pyroprocessing as a means of reducing the volume of high-level nuclear

waste. With the 1974 civil atomic energy cooperation agreement between the United States and South Korea

due to expire in 2014, some in South Korea have suggested that any new agreement should help South Korea

gain mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle, possibly by granting South Korea blanket permission to pursue certain

types of fuel cycle research.21

19 Song Dae-Sung, “Change in U.S. Forces in Korea and Korea’s Security,” Sejong Policy Research, vol. 3, no. 1, 2007, pp. 42-46 (in Korean).20 Since 2001, North Korea’s trade with China has increased from roughly US $700 million to $1.6 billion, while trade with South Korea has risen from $400 million to just over $1 billion. See Ministry of Unification, Republic of Korea, <www.unikorea.go.kr>21 Interview with staff of UDNP members of the South Korean National Assembly, October 2007.


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Factors Likely to Affect Nuclear Decision Making

A number of factors could push South Korea toward developing nuclear weapons. As is the case for Japan, a

major shift in Korea’s nuclear weapons policy would require a combination of factors, one of which would have

to be a severe weakening of the country’s alliance with the United States.

A loss of confidence in the United States as a security partner: A number of scenarios could weaken South Korea’s

confidence in its partner. Possible examples include a unilateral U.S. attack or U.S. acquiescence in a Japanese

attack against North Korea, breakdown of the Six Party Talks due to a rift between Seoul and Washington over

North Korea policy, a U.S. failure to consult with South Korea over future changes in the posture or use of U.S.

forces on the Peninsula, or the perception that the United States was siding with Japan in territorial or historical

disputes with South Korea.22

Japan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons: A nuclear-armed Japan would likely trigger Seoul to consider a nuclear

option. Short of Japanese nuclear armament, development by Japan of conventional weapons capable of strik-

ing targets on the Korean Peninsula could also exacerbate South Korean security concerns.

A serious strategic disadvantage arising from nuclear asymmetry vis-à-vis North Korea: Pyongyang’s use of its

nuclear capability to coerce or intimidate South Korea could push South Korea to consider acquiring nuclear

weapons to offset the imbalance.

Policy Recommendations: Northeast Asia

It is unlikely that either Japan or South Korea will decide to pursue nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future.

The likely costs of doing so are too great, and the benefits too few. However, given the high stakes involved, it

is important to reduce further the likelihood of Japan’s or South Korea’s developing nuclear weapons. With this

objective in mind, we put forth the following policy recommendations:

RECOMMENDATION 1: Strongly reaffirm the U.S. commitment to a nuclear weapon-free Korean Peninsula and Japan

The United States should actively counter speculation in Japan and South Korea that it might be willing to

tolerate a nuclear-armed North Korea. It should also restate its commitment to keeping both the Korean Pen-

insula and Japan free of nuclear weapons, including in the event that Korean reunification takes place before the

elimination of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.

RECOMMENDATION 2: Engage South Korea in discreet contingency planning for a possible North Korean collapse scenario

22 The United States currently avoids involvement in these disputes.

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Collapse of North Korea before denuclearization could allow the country’s nuclear materials to fall into the

hands of terrorists or hardliners, unsettling its neighbors (particularly Japan) and increasing instability in the

region. South Korea would obviously be a key player in any collapse scenario. Contingency planning, initially

between the United States and South Korea, and perhaps later involving China as well, would help to mitigate

the dangers. South Korea has thus far been reluctant to engage in such planning for fear of upsetting Pyong-

yang. The United States should urge the new administration in Seoul to reconsider, with the understanding

that any planning that occurs must be undertaken with all possible discretion.

RECOMMENDATION 3: Manage tensions with Japan and South Korea to ensure that the U.S. alliances with and assurances to them remain robust

Maintaining the strength of the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea is critical to the credibility of U.S.

security guarantees. Neglect or coercion of these allies, or a failure to work with them in a spirit of partnership,

lowers their confidence that the United States will support them, especially on issues that are seen as only of

peripheral importance to Washington. Decreased confidence in Washington’s continued support heightens the

risk that Japan or South Korea might seek other means of ensuring their own security, possibly including nuclear

weapons. In order to maintain the strength of its alliances with these two countries, the United States should

pursue the following policies:

Demonstrate Japan’s continued importance to the United States

The United States should continue to hold regular high-level meetings with Japanese officials and look for

opportunities, both substantive and symbolic, to demonstrate that Japan remains an important ally in address-

ing Northeast Asian issues. The United States should also reassure Japan of its commitment to resolving the

abductee issue with North Korea in the context of the 6-Party Talks.

Prepare for a potential review of wartime OPCON transfer with the new South Korean administration

Disallowing the possibility of discussing the timetable for OPCON transfer could unnecessarily alienate the new

administration in Seoul, which is otherwise enthusiastic about improving the bilateral relationship. One option

for Washington, should President Lee formally request that the timetable be pushed back, would be to propose

that a bilateral, blue ribbon panel conduct a full technical review of the existing transition roadmap, includ-

ing progress to date. Such a review could further demonstrate that the transfer will not result in an erosion of

necessary capabilities, with the added benefit of providing President Lee with political maneuvering room on the

issue.

RECOMMENDATION 4: Promote multilateral mechanisms for addressing regional security issues

Contingent upon success in persuading North Korea to abandon its nuclear program, participants in the Six

Party Talks have discussed expanding the forum into a wider framework for addressing regional security issues.

The United States should support this goal. Additionally, the Washington should promote broad participation

in other regional forums (see Recommendation 5). In pursuing these policies, the United States should contin-

ue to welcome China’s increased participation in regional affairs and multilateral institutions and avoid creating

the perception that such groupings are meant to contain China.


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RECOMMENDATION 5: Encourage reconciliation between South Korea and Japan

U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea form the bulwark of Washington’s security strategy in Northeast

Asia, yet these two allies continue to view one another with apprehension, if not outright hostility. Indeed,

both Japan and South Korea would see the development of nuclear weapons by the other as a potential trigger

for their own pursuit of nuclear weapons. Improving Japan-South Korea relations would have myriad benefits

for Northeast Asian stability, including reducing tensions that could lead to nuclear proliferation. The United

States therefore should pursue the following measures:

Support regional forums that bring together Japan and South Korea

To help promote consultation and coordination between Japan and South Korea, the United States should

encourage the new South Korean administration to participate in the ministerial-level U.S.-Japan-Australia stra-

tegic dialogue. The United States should also seek to reinstate the U.S.-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Coordina-

tion and Oversight Group (TCOG), with a view to broadening the group’s agenda beyond North Korea issues.

Maintain an impartial stance on territorial disputes and other historical issues between Japan and South Korea

Bilateral problems between Japan and South Korea risk stoking dangerous nationalist passions in both coun-

tries. Perceived U.S. bias towards one country or the other would only exacerbate these tendencies. Washington

should continue to avoid direct comment on or involvement in these matters, so as not to damage its relation-

ship with either country. The United States should continue to encourage interaction, confidence-building

measures, and amicable resolution of differences between its allies.

RECOMMENDATION 6: Resume U.S.-North Korea negotiations to reduce Pyongyang’s ballistic missile threat

North Korea’s missile program is particularly alarming for Japan, since a missile would be the most likely way

for North Korea to strike Japan with either a conventional payload or weapons of mass destruction. The United

States could help to address concerns in Japan and elsewhere by restarting negotiations on limiting North Ko-

rea’s missile capabilities.23 These negotiations could include Japan, which might be willing to offer North Korea

financial or other incentives to comply. Negotiations should address all aspects of research and development,

production, and export of medium- and long-range missiles. Any such negotiations should proceed in parallel

to the Six Party Talks, with progress in one not necessarily contingent upon the other.

23 Following the1998 missile tests, the United States engaged with Pyongyang to address North Korea’s missile threat. This process culminated in its September 1999 moratorium on long-range missile tests. The United States also came close to negotiating a framework for freezing elements of North Korea’s indigenous missile program and ending all missile-related exports. The seventh and last round of negotiations on North Korea’s missile program took place in November 2000. The United States formally suspended talks in March 2001. Since the development of the nuclear crisis, missile negotiations have remained on the back burner.

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Egypt

Nuclear History

Egypt’s longtime interest in nuclear energy dates back to a research program launched by President Gamal

Abdel Nasser in the early 1950s.24 Nuclear energy never emerged as a national priority, however, and after the

Chernobyl disaster in 1986, President Hosni Mubarak suspended the fledgling program. In 2006, President

Mubarak announced his intentions to revive it, but any significant progress on such venture would be heavily

dependent on foreign financing and technology.

In addition to researching nuclear power, Egypt also pursued a short-lived nuclear weapons program. In

response to Israel’s public unveiling of its nuclear reactor at Dimona in 1960,25 President Nasser launched an

Egyptian weapons program, which included sending physicists abroad for training, researching fuel-cycle

technologies, and attempting (unsuccessfully) to purchase nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union and China.26

The program did not come to fruition. In 1967, the Six Day War placed such significant economic burdens on

Egypt that it effectively ended its nuclear weapons program, shifting its focus to reclaiming territory lost in the

war, establishing peace with Israel, and improving relations with the United States.

In the early 2000s, speculation surfaced that Egypt had been involved in secret nuclear weapons-related ac-

tivities, including possible contact with the A.Q. Khan network.27 In an unrelated 2004 incident, the IAEA

concluded while preparing an evaluation report on Egypt that certain research activities demanded further

investigation.28 Egypt cooperated fully with the IAEA, admitting that it had failed to report several past research

experiments but maintaining that the experiments were allowed under the NPT. Ultimately, the IAEA con-

cluded that Egypt had conducted unreported nuclear research, but that the research did not appear to be aimed

at developing nuclear weapons and did not include uranium enrichment.29


Pursuing nuclear weapons would jeopardize the privileged relationship with the United States that Egypt has de-

veloped since the 1978 Camp David accords. Egypt receives approximately $2 billion worth of U.S. foreign aid

24 For a history, see Robert Einhorn, “Egypt: Frustrated but Still on a Non-Nuclear Course,” in The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider their Nuclear Choices, Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).25 In December 1960, in the face of intense media speculation, Prime Minister Ben Gurion confirmed what his government had previously denied: that Israel was building a nuclear reactor at Dimona. For more information, see: Jim Walsh. “Bombs Unbuilt: Power Ideas and Institutions in International Politics.” MIT PhD dissertation. p. 147, <http://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/1721.1/8237/1/50305557.pdf>.26 Einhorn, p. 46.27 Allegations were made that A.Q. Khan had traveled to Egypt on several occasions and that clandestine nuclear cooperation between Egypt and Libya had taken place. These allegations were never substantiated.28 Various open-source documents prepared under the auspices of the Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority (AEA) suggested that certain nuclear material, activities, and facilities in Egypt relating to uranium extraction and conversion, irradiation of uranium targets and repro-cessing had not been reported to the IAEA. For more details, see: IAEA Report. “Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Arab Republic of Egypt.” February 14, 2005, <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/static/npp/Egypt_Feb_2005.pdf>.29 Ibid.

Part III: Middle East

19


per year, making it the second largest U.S. beneficiary after Israel. The Egyptian military also enjoys closer ties

with its U.S. counterpart than other Arab states, including through regular training programs and Operation

Bright Star, a biennial multilateral coordination exercise hosted by Egypt. In addition to military cooperation,

Cairo hopes to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States within the next decade. A decision

by Cairo to pursue nuclear weapons would imperil both the economic and military aspects of the U.S.-Egypt

relationship.

In terms of nuclear capabilities, Egypt is the least technologically advanced of the three countries analyzed in

this report. Unlike South Korea or Japan, Egypt lacks the scientific and technological base for the development

of nuclear weapons. Any nuclear weapons program that Egypt attempted to pursue would be heavily dependent

on equipment, material and technology from abroad.

Recent Developments in the Strategic Environment

Iran’s nuclear program: Despite Iran’s insistence that its nuclear facilities are strictly for peaceful civilian purposes,

Egyptian officials remain skeptical. Egypt is particularly worried that a nuclear-armed Iran could embolden

radical forces in the region, including Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran

has amply demonstrated its ability to undermine regional stability through proxy forces. Egyptian officials are

concerned that a nuclear-armed Iran would become even more assertive.

Nuclear energy and economic development: Egyptian leaders have recently made a concerted public effort to link

nuclear energy and economic development, claiming that Egypt needs nuclear energy to diversify its energy

supply and promote energy security. In September 2006, President Mubarak’s son Gamal Mubarak announced

plans to build a first 1,000-megawatt plant at Al-Dabaa, to be followed by three additional power plants by

2020.30 In October 2007, President Mubarak confirmed Egypt’s commitment to its nuclear energy program.31

To date, the government has not announced any plans to develop nuclear fuel cycle facilities. It has, however,

refused to forego the right to do so. It has also refused to ratify the Additional Protocol, which would require it

to declare a much broader range of nuclear-related activities than it currently does, and to allow IAEA inspec-

tions to check the completeness and accuracy of such declarations.32

The U.S.-Egypt relationship: The post-9/11 security environment and the Iraq war have caused new strains in

the bilateral relationship. The U.S. government’s announcement of its new “Freedom Agenda” in 2005, along

with U.S. pressure for democratic reforms in Egypt, have also caused serious tension. Egypt has rejected the

calls for reform as ‘unacceptable interference’ in Egyptian affairs.33 In 2006, ties began to improve as the United

States toned down its demands for reform and expressed its commitment to maintaining its military assistance

30 Gamal Mubarak made this announcement at the September 2006 National Democratic Party (NDP) Annual Conference.31 Andrew England, “Egypt announces nuclear energy plans,” Financial Times, 29 October 2007.32 “Egypt won’t sign nuclear deal protocol, Minister,” Reuters, 11 December 2007, <http://africa.reuters.com/wire/news/usnL11697190.html>.33 Nadia Abu Al-Magd. “Egypt criticizes U.S. after congressional delegation meets with Muslim Brotherhood lawmaker.” Associated Press Worldstream, 27 May 2007.

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program with Egypt for the next ten years.34 Although the relationship now appears to be on solid ground once

more, these recent bumps show that it is not unshakable.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the 2005 election: President Mubarak is concerned about the growing influence

that Islamic organizations wield in Egypt. Although the Muslim Brotherhood has been outlawed since 1954,

it managed to win 20 percent of the parliamentary seats in 2005 by running candidates as independents. The

Brotherhood is now one of the most visible Islamic organizations in the region and the largest opposition bloc in

Egypt. The political platform of the Brotherhood openly advocates a nuclear-weapons program, and it is widely

accepted within Egyptian government circles that a supermajority of Egyptians (the figure often given is 90

percent) would support the acquisition of nuclear weapons.35 Given the apparently extensive public support for

an Egyptian bomb, Mubarak’s ruling National Democratic Party may find it increasingly difficult to maintain its

firmly non-nuclear position.

Factors Likely to Affect Nuclear Decision Making

A nuclear-armed Iran: Relations between Egypt and Iran since Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution have been dif-

ficult.36 Diplomatic contact has remained frozen, and Sunni Egypt has become increasingly suspicious of Shiite

Iran’s regional ambitions. Already dealing with its own brand of Islamic militancy, Egypt fears Iran’s revolu-

tionary influence. If faced with a nuclear-armed Iran, Cairo would be forced to reevaluate its national security

policies.

Declaration by Israel of its nuclear weapons capability: Any public acknowledgement by Israel of its nuclear weap-

ons capability would increase the pressure on Egypt to pursue its own nuclear deterrent.

Egypt’s upcoming presidential transition: President Mubarak, who will turn 80 in May 2008, is scheduled to step

down in 2011. It is unclear who will succeed him. While Gamal Mubarak is seemingly being groomed as a

successor, he lacks support among the military and general public. Both father and son have ruled out familial

succession.37 No matter who ultimately becomes the next president, the looming transition creates uncertainty

and raises questions about whether Mubarak’s successor will be as committed to or as successful as he has been

in resisting pressures to pursue nuclear weapons.

Regional Leadership Role: Egypt has long regarded itself as the natural leader of the Arab world. If future Egyp-

tian governments are unable to demonstrate regional leadership through peaceful means, the Egyptian public

34 Since the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace treaty in 1978, the U.S. has provided Egypt with an average of $1.3 billion in military aid per year. The 2006 promise of $13bn over 10 years maintains this support in nominal (i.e., non-inflation adjusted) terms. See CRS Issue Brief for Congress, “Egypt-US relations,” 15 June 2005, pp. 9-10, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/IB93087.pdf>.35 Conversations with Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials, October 2007.36 Hostility between Egypt and Iran has been fueled by a number of events in the Middle East during the past two decades, including the Iran-Iraq War, the First Gulf War, the Second Gulf War, Iran’s opposition to the Egypt-Israel Camp David Accords, and Iran’s support of anti-government movements in the region.37 Michael Slackman, “Son of Mubarak eyes succession,” International Herald Tribune, 19 September 2006, <http://www.iht.com/ar-ticles/2006/09/19/news/egypt.php>. See also Maggie Michael, “Mubarak’s son denies succession move,” ABC News, 5 November 2007, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=3824190>.


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will likely press the government to re-establish its leadership role by becoming the first Arab nuclear weapons

state.

Increasing security threats combined with weaker security assurances: Egypt’s relationship with the United States has

been strained since the Iraq war. A bilateral relationship characterized by disagreements and sporadic tensions

is unlikely by itself to change Egypt’s nuclear calculus, but if coupled with greater security threats, a strained

relationship with the United States could push Egypt toward nuclear weapons.

Policy Recommendations: The Middle East

As noted above, Iran’s actions are a key variable in the nuclear calculus of Egypt and other states in the region. It

is beyond the scope of this report to consider the Iran nuclear issue in detail, but a few points do bear particu-

lar relevance to nuclear calculations in Egypt, Japan, and South Korea. In view of Iran’s past massive violation

of the NPT with its secret nuclear program, the United States should be ready to push for further multilateral

sanctions or to tighten its own, should Iran continue to defy the UN Security Council’s demand that it halt its

enrichment and heavy-water reactor programs. Strong action is needed to demonstrate the continued viability

of the nonproliferation regime. At the same time, the United States should indicate its commitment to finding

a negotiated solution by dropping the condition that Iran suspends its enrichment program before direct nego-

tiations between the United States and Iran can begin.

With regard to Egypt specifically, we deem it unlikely that Egypt will decide to pursue nuclear weapons in the

foreseeable future. Yet, as is the case with Japan and South Korea, it remains important for the United States to

reduce further the likelihood of Egypt’s developing nuclear weapons. To help allay Egypt’s security concerns, we

submit the following recommendations for U.S. policy:

RECOMMENDATION 7: Declare a new regional security doctrine

A number of America’s friends in the Middle East have questioned whether the United States has an overarch-

ing strategy for containing Iran and promoting stability in the region, particularly given its difficulties in Iraq.

To address these concerns, the United States should declare a new security doctrine that addresses the dominant

threats—both conventional and non-conventional—to the region’s stability. This doctrine should declare as

U.S. policy the following three commitments: 1) to protect access to strategic resources and keep open ship-

ping lanes in the region; 2) to take all necessary steps to defend U.S. friends and allies in the region in the face of

military aggression by another regional state; and 3) to affirm that the United States would consider any threat

or use of nuclear weapons in the Middle East as a threat to its own vital security interests and would respond to

such a threat by any means necessary.

In order to lend credibility to this new security doctrine, the United States should maintain a robust military

presence in the region and increase its bilateral and multilateral military cooperation. In this vein, the United

States should return its participation in Operation Bright Star to pre-2003 levels once a drawdown of U.S.

forces in Iraq makes additional troop commitments possible. The United States should also increase its Prolifer-

ation Security Initiative cooperative activities in the Persian Gulf. Finally, Washington should continue to work

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with friends in the region to increase multilateral cooperation on air and missile defense, including networking

of capabilities among countries.

RECOMMENDATION 8: Strengthen the regional nonproliferation regime

As a result of Iran’s ongoing interest in nuclear technology and the continued nuclear asymmetry between Egypt

and Israel, Cairo has become increasingly dissatisfied with the nuclear nonproliferation regime. A new round of

nonproliferation and arms control efforts in the Middle East could increase regional stability and decrease pres-

sure for Egypt to develop nuclear weapons. Such an endeavor should include the following two elements:

Demonstrate U.S. commitment to a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East

Egypt has in recent years stepped up its campaign for a WMDFZ in the Middle East, an objective it has advo-

cated since 1974. Given the presence of nuclear weapons in Israel and suspected chemical and biological pro-

grams in a number of Middle Eastern countries, a comprehensive WMDFZ is not a realistic goal in the near fu-

ture.38 However, the United States should demonstrate its commitment to an eventual WMD-free Middle East

by endorsing phased regional arrangements and non-nuclear confidence building measures. Interim agreements

such as a fuel cycle-free zone (see below) could serve as realistic, concrete steps toward an eventual WMDFZ. In

the meantime, the United States should support and lobby on behalf of Egypt’s WMDFZ proposal at the 2010

NPT Review Conference.39 In doing so, the United States would reaffirm Egypt’s role as a regional leader in

nonproliferation efforts and help situate it more firmly on the side of nuclear abstinence.

Endorse a Fuel Cycle-Free Zone as a first step toward a Middle East WMDFZ

As an interim measure on the way toward a WMDFZ, some key states in the region—notably Egypt and

Israel—might be willing to accept the creation of a regional fuel cycle-free zone. Such a plan would not require

Israel or Iran to shut down their nuclear reactors, but it would require that Israel cease reprocessing plutonium

at Dimona, and that Iran halt construction on its enrichment facility at Natanz. Although Israel would certain-

ly rather operate its nuclear program unfettered, it might support a fuel cycle-free zone as a means of addressing

Iran’s enrichment program without giving up its own existing deterrent capabilities. Egypt, for its part, would

prefer that Israel fully adhere to the NPT, but it might see a fuel cycle-free zone as a means of both constraining

Iran and beginning to limit Israel.

RECOMMENDATION 9: Restart the Middle East Security Forum

The United States should help create a Middle East Security Forum to build confidence between and among

states in the region. This forum could be modeled on the Working Group on Arms Control and Regional

Security (ACRS) of the early 1990s. Ideally, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, which did not join the ACRS talks, would

participate. Even without these three, though, a forum could create opportunities to help to reduce the regional

tensions that lead to insecurity and so increase the attractiveness of nuclear weapons.

38 Israel’s policy to date is that it will not participate in a WMDFZ without first achieving comprehensive peace in the region, while other states demand that Israel first denuclearize before they will participate in peace talks.39 The United States supported Egypt’s proposal for a WMDFZ in the Middle East at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review and Extension Conferences, but not at the 2005 Conference.


23


RECOMMENDATION 10: Provide conditional support for Egypt’s drive to build a civilian nuclear energy program

The United States has said that it is prepared to work with Egypt on its planned nuclear energy program.40

Washington’s aim should be to establish Egypt as a regional leader in the responsible use of nuclear energy. One

way to purse this aim would be to offer assistance on nuclear energy in exchange for Egypt’s commitment to

forego fuel-cycle facilities and to adhere to the Additional Protocol. Washington could put forward a package

consisting of several elements, including technology transfer, affordable financing, guaranteed—and possibly

subsidized—access to fuel, and assistance with waste management, possibly including removal of spent fuel.

RECOMMENDATION 11: Strengthen the U.S.-Egypt bilateral relationship and bolster Egypt’s leadership role in the region

The United States should reinforce ties with Egypt and bolster Cairo’s standing as a regional nonproliferation

leader in the following ways:

Establish a U.S.-Egypt Free Trade Agreement (FTA)

Since the late 1990s, U.S. policymakers have discussed creating a free trade agreement with Egypt. In 2003,

President Bush proposed establishing a Middle East Free Trade Area (MEFTA) by 2013,41 and in 2006, the

Bush Administration argued that both bilateral FTAs with countries in the Middle East and the MEFTA were

closely linked to America’s national security interests.42 A bilateral FTA with Egypt would reduce Cairo’s nuclear

incentives in two ways. First, an FTA would boost Egypt’s economy, reducing discontent and support for radi-

calism that might otherwise contribute to domestic political pressure for nuclear weapons.43 Second, it would

bind Egypt’s economy more closely to the United States, thereby increasing the potential economic costs of

pursuing nuclear weapons against the wishes of the United States and the international community.

Encourage Egypt to play a leading role in regional initiatives such as Israel-Palestine peace talks and a revived

regional security forum

Providing Egypt with constructive opportunities to exhibit regional leadership is vital to keeping Egypt non-nu-

clear. Since the 1978 Camp David peace accords, Egypt has been instrumental in advancing Israeli-Palestinian

negotiations. President Mubarak has hosted several peace conferences and encouraged other Arab states to sup-

port U.S. peacemaking efforts. The current U.S. focus on the Middle East peace process provides a valuable op-

portunity for Egypt to reassume its regional leadership position, especially if the U.S. gives it the symbolic honor

of hosting future talks. The Middle East security forum proposed above (recommendation 9) could provide

another opportunity to give Egypt a leading stake in efforts to promote regional security.

40 Sally Buzbee, “Egypt announces plans to build nuclear plants—latest in Mid East rush,” Associated Press, 30 October 2007.41 George W. Bush, “Remarks in Commencement Address at the University of South Carolina,” 9 May 2003, <www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/20497.htm>.42 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, p. 26.43 It is estimated that an FTA would increase Egyptian GDP by approximately 3 percent and help solidify domestic economic reforms ini-tiated since 2004. For details, see: Ahmed Galal and Robert Lawrence. Anchoring Reform with a U.S.-Egypt Free Trade Agreement. Institute of International Economics. Washington, DC. May 2005.

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The global nonproliferation regime has facilitated the establishment of export controls and nuclear weapon-

free zones, the reversal of nuclear weapon programs in several countries, and the roundup of “loose nukes” in

Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan after the collapse of the Soviet Union.44 At the core of the regime is the Nu-

clear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which partially alleviates pressure to acquire nuclear weapons by binding

its non-weapon state members to nuclear non-possession. Over the past decade, the regime has been expanded

through the Additional Protocol and UN Security Council Resolution 1540.45

Making the NPT work requires effective verification and enforcement. Verification serves to assuage concerns

of other states, as well as to detect misuse of nuclear technology. Enforcement entails punishments that deter

members from pursuing weapons and persuade violators to return to compliance.

Selective enforcement and slower-than-expected progress towards disarmament following the end of the Cold

War have collectively taken a toll on the NPT’s legitimacy and efficacy. These challenges present serious long-

term threats to the regime. The spread of certain technologies associated with nuclear energy creates other

challenges. Article IV of the NPT permits the peaceful use of nuclear energy, but many elements of the nuclear

fuel cycle can also be used to pursue weapons. Uranium-enriching gas centrifuges are central to the global

nuclear fuel market yet have the potential to undermine the nonproliferation regime. They can be used to make

highly enriched uranium for weapons and are difficult or impossible to detect if covertly deployed. At the back

end of the fuel cycle, reprocessing of spent fuel poses a different threat. The process separates weapon-usable

plutonium from otherwise self-protecting spent fuel.46 Interest in reprocessing has seen something of a revival in

recent years, with advocates suggesting it may offer a solution to some nuclear waste problems by decreasing the

volume of hazardous material requiring permanent disposal. In truth, the value of reprocessing is questionable.

Over the long-term, reprocessing merely postpones the need to establish a permanent nuclear waste repository.

In the short- to medium-term, storing spent fuel at reactor sites in dry casks is a safer, more economical, and

more proliferation-resistant option than attempting to reprocess.

Policy Recommendations: Nonproliferation Regime

The legitimacy and viability of the non-proliferation regime are central to nuclear weapons decisions in Japan,

South Korea, and Egypt. While there are many possible ways by which the nonproliferation regime could be

strengthened, the following actions would have a particularly strong impact on the three countries in this study.

RECOMMENDATION 12: Raise the cost of withdrawal from the NPT. Ensure that any withdrawal is automati-cally examined by the full UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter

44 For a review, see: “Successes of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime.” Tariq Rauf. Center for Non-Proliferation Studies., 8 October 1999.45 The Additional Protocol provides for a more intrusive inspections system. Resolution 1540 establishes binding obligations on all UN member states under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to take and enforce effective measures against the proliferation of WMD, their means of delivery, and related materials.46 Nuclear material is considered “self-protecting” if it is too radioactive to be manipulated without killing the handler. Material of this kind poses minimal proliferation risks; its lethality renders it nearly impossible to steal or divert.

Part IV: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

25


Making withdrawal more difficult would raise the costs of leaving the regime, binding Japan, South Korea,

and Egypt more tightly to the system. It would also increase these countries’ confidence that other states will

continue to adhere to their nonproliferation commitments. Washington has shown itself keen to strengthen the

cost of withdrawing from the NPT, including through specifying more clearly the role of the Security Council

in such a situation. But the United States appears reluctant to push for automatic review of a withdrawal by the

Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, backing instead a weaker review proposal, “depending

on the circumstances.”47 Automaticity would not prevent a permanent member of the Security Council from

using its veto to shield a friend or ally from international pressure (as did China when North Korea withdrew

from the NPT in 2003), but it would ensure that the issue be discussed at an appropriately high level.

In addition to supporting automatic Security Council review, the United States should back the proposal that

withdrawing states be forced to forfeit the use of materials, facilities, equipment, and technology they acquired

while a party to the treaty, either by returning them to the supplying state or dismantling them under interna-

tional oversight.

RECOMMENDATION 13: Strengthen the IAEA verification system

The IAEA’s ability to verify that states remain in compliance with their nonproliferation obligations is crucial to

the regime’s continued success. The United States should pursue a number of concrete measures to strengthen

the IAEA’s verification capabilities.

Continue to seek universal adherence to the Additional Protocol, beginning in the United States

Additional Protocol measures have proven effective in detecting activities related to nuclear weapons programs.

Although the U.S. Senate ratified the Additional Protocol in 2004, it is not yet in force in the United States.

Washington should complete the implementing regulations and deposit its instrument of ratification with the

IAEA, and should actively encourage other parties to do likewise.

Push the IAEA to increase the frequency and quality of its inspections of research reactors

Research reactors can be used to produce plutonium covertly that can then be diverted to nuclear weapons pro-

grams. More stringent IAEA oversight of research reactors would create even greater barriers for states attempt-

ing to pursue covert weapons programs.

Encourage the IAEA to extend safeguards to the input of all uranium hexafluoride (UF6) production facilities

At present, the IAEA begins its safeguard measures at the output end of the facilities that convert uranium oxide

into uranium hexafluoride for enrichment by uranium gas centrifuges. Diverting UF6 from these plants before

it falls under IAEA safeguards would be relatively easy. This omission makes it possible for states to produce

more UF6 than they declare, or to purchase UF

6 from another country covertly, for use in an undeclared

enrichment plant. The IAEA could make such acquisition of UF6 more difficult by applying material balance

47 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, “Article X of the NPT: Deterring and Responding to Withdrawal by Treaty Violators,” 2 February 2007, <http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/80518.htm>.

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safeguards to UF6 and UF

6 production plants.48 The IAEA has determined that these safeguards are permitted

under the terms of the NPT safeguards agreement (INFICIRC/153).49 Such measures might prove especially

helpful in reducing Iran’s potential for covert highly enriched uranium (HEU) production.

Increase the IAEA Safeguards Budget

In order to ensure that the IAEA can undertake these additional efforts, the United States should pledge to in-

crease its voluntary contributions to the IAEA’s safeguards budget.50 The United States should not make funds

contingent on whether other countries “pay their share.” Rather, Washington should set an example on this

issue and thereby encourage other donors to increase their own contributions. Even absent funding from other

countries, additional money spent on IAEA safeguards would demonstrate a renewed U.S. commitment to the

nonproliferation regime and would be a worthwhile investment in U.S. security.

RECOMMENDATION 14: Take further action towards irreversible and verifiable disarmament

Differing compliance standards for nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states remain a significant

source of tension among signatories to the NPT. To reduce this tension follow through with NPT disarma-

ment obligations, and maintain the legitimacy of the regime, both the United States and Russia should agree

to replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I), which expires on 5 December 2009, with a legally

binding agreement to reduce their nuclear forces to levels well below those provided for in the Moscow Treaty

of 2002.51 Russia has already expressed a desire to reduce its arsenal further and would likely welcome a U.S.

proposal for further reductions.52

Deeper irreversible cuts in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals would have a particularly positive impact on

Japan, a country that closely identifies with the normative principles underlying the nonproliferation regime and

positions itself as a champion of nonproliferation.53 If the regime is strong and legitimate, Japan will have in-

centives to continue this policy; if the regime is weakened, Japan’s incentives for compliance will weaken as well.

RECOMMENDATION 15: Withdraw Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) support for pyroprocessing in South Korea

48 Preliminary studies suggest that region-specific, wide-area environmental monitoring might be able to verify the absence of covert UF6 production facilities. See: R.S. Kemp, Initial Analysis of a Method for Detecting Clandestine Enrichment and UF6 Conversion Plants (http://www.princeton.edu/~rskemp).49 See IAEA “Policy Paper 18: Safeguards Measures Applicable in Conversion Plants Procesing Natural Uranium. Date of Entry Into Force: 2003-06-17.” Safeguards Manual, SMR 2.18, October 2003.50 The IAEA’s safeguards budget was about $109 million in 2006, a small sum considering the importance of this task. About a third of IAEA’s budget comes from U.S. contributions, both assessed and voluntary.51 The Moscow Treaty requires the United States and Russia to reduce deployed strategic warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 each. It does not have a verification framework, but the United States and Russia are using the verification provisions in the START Treaty to as-sess compliance. 52 Wade Boese, “Arms Issues Divide U.S. and Russia,” Arms Control Today, September 2007, < http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2007_09/USRussiaArms.asp>.53 During interviews, Japanese officials and experts indicated their belief that the United States could reduce its arsenal to approximately 1000 warheads without compromising the credibility of its extended deterrent.

Part IV: The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

27


Pyroprocessing, or pyrometallurgical reprocessing, is a technique currently being researched in South Korea

as a way of reducing the volume of high-level radioactive waste of which it must dispose. The United States

supports South Korea’s research program through GNEP, on the basis of its belief that pyroprocessing is signifi-

cantly more proliferation resistant than conventional PUREX reprocessing.54 Studies have shown, however, that

fissile material could be extracted from the products of pyroprocessing.55 Additionally, spent fuel that has been

pyroprocessed loses many of its self-protecting qualities. Pyroprocessing arguably breaches South Korea’s 1992

commitment not to carry out reprocessing on the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, it does not offer significant ben-

efits. In the long-term, it does not solve the problem of high-level radioactive waste disposal; and in the short-

to medium-term, it compares unfavorably to alternatives such as dry cask storage at reactor sites. The United

States should therefore withdraw GNEP support for pyroprocessing.

54 U.S. Department of Energy press release, “Department of Energy Welcomes the Republic of Korea to the Global Nuclear Energy Part-nership,” 11 December 2007, <http://www.gnep.energy.gov/gnepPRs/gnepPR121107.html>.55 R.G. Wymer, H.D. Bengelsdorf, G.R. Choppin, M.S. Coops, J. Guon, K.K.S. Pillay and J.D. Williams, An Assessment of the Proliferation Potential and International Implications of the Integral Fast Reactor, report # K/IPT-511 prepared for the Departments of State and Energy by Martin Marietta Energy Systems, Oak Ridge, TN, 1992, p. 80.

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The team of graduate students from Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs

conducted interviews with policymakers, academics, journalists, scientists, and other experts in Japan, South

Korea, Egypt, Israel, and the United States. Listed below are the individuals with whom we spoke, including

their titles, organizational affiliations, and the interview locations. Interviews outside the United States were

conducted between 26 October and 4 November 2007.

Japan

Name Professional Affiliation, Place of MeetingYusuke Arai Principal Deputy Director, First North America Division,

North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo

Yutaka Arima Principal Deputy Director, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division,

North American Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo

Nobumasa Akiyama Associate Professor, Hitotsubashi University, School of International

and Public Policy, Tokyo

Robert Cekuta Minister/Counselor for Economic Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo

Ronald Cherry Energy Attaché, Director, U.S. Department of Energy, Japan Office,

U.S. Embassy, Tokyo

Bart D. Cobbs Unit Chief, Environment, Science and Technology Unit, Economic

Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo

Joseph R. Donovan Minister, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo

Amb. Tetsuya Endo Advisor to Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo

Raymond F. Greene Chief, Political-Military Affairs Unit, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo

Takuya Hattori President, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Tokyo

Tomiko Ichikawa Director, Non-Proliferation, Science and Nuclear Energy Division,

Disarmament, Non-Proliferation and Science Department, Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, Tokyo

Masafumi Ishii Minister, Head of Political Affairs Section, Embassy of Japan to the

U.S., Princeton

Nobuo Ishizuka Senior Managing Director, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, Tokyo

Nobukatsu Kanehara Director, Policy Coordination Division, Foreign Policy Bureau,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo

Dr. Masahiro Kikuchi Director, Planning Division and Development Division, Nuclear

Material Control Center, Tokyo

Marc E. Knapper Deputy Director, Political Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo

Amb. Takeshi Nakane Director-General, Disarmament, Nonproliferation and Science

Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo

Dr. Masashi Nishihara President, Research Institute for Peace and Security, Tokyo

Dr. Shinichi Ogawa Director of Research Department, National Institute for Defense

Studies, Tokyo

Amb. Shotaro Oshima International Economic Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo

Appendix A: Individuals Interviewed

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Masakatsu Ota Staff Correspondent, Foreign News Section, Kyodo News, Tokyo

Junichiro Otaka Principal Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Division,

Disarmament, Non-Proliferation, and Science Department, Ministry

of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo

Prof. Gil Rozman Musgrave Professor of Sociology, Princeton University, Princeton

Amb. Yukio Satoh President, Japan Institute of International Affairs, Tokyo

Kiyoshi Serizawa Director, Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation Division, Ministry of

Defense, Bureau of Defense Policy, Tokyo

Tatsujiro Suzuki Visiting Professor, University of Tokyo, Graduate School of Public

Policy, Tokyo

Masa Takubo Independent consultant on nuclear policy issues, Tokyo

Hitoshi Tanaka Senior Fellow, Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo

Dr. Kunihiko Uematsu Senior Advisor, International Affairs, Japan Atomic Industrial Forum,

Tokyo

Col. Paul H. Vosti Director, Plans and Policy, U.S. Forces, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo

Amb. Shunji Yanai Director, Mitsubishi Electric Corporation, Japan Atomic Industrial

Forum, Tokyo

Fumihiko Yoshida Editor, Asahi Shimbun, Tokyo

South Korea:

Name Professional Affiliation, Place of MeetingCharles Atkinson Second Secretary, Political Section, U.S. Embassy, Seoul

Dr. Young-Koo Cha Former Deputy Minister of National Defense for Policy, Lieutenant

General (Ret.) ROK Army, Seoul

Dr. Soon Heung Chang Provost, Professor of Nuclear and Quantum Engineering, Korea

Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Seoul

Dr. Kwan-Kyoo Choe Director of Nuclear Control Policy Division, Korea Institute of Nuclear

Nonproliferation and Control, Daejon

Dr. Chaesung Chun Associate Professor of International Relations, Seoul National

University, Seoul

Yung-Woo Chun Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Peace and Security Affairs,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul

Dr. Sung-Joo Han Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, President of Korea University, Seoul

Jin-Ha Hwang Member of the National Assembly (Grand National Party), Lieutenant

General (Ret) ROK Army, Seoul

Dr. Jae-Guk Jeon Deputy Minister of National Defense for Policy and Public Affairs,

Seoul

Dr. Jung-Min Kang Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford

University, Seoul

Dr. Hak-Joon Kim President and Publisher, The Donga-A Ilbo Daily, Seoul

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Dr. Sung-Han Kim Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Korea University,

Seoul

Dr. Jae-Chang Kim Co-Chairman, Council on South Korea –U.S. Security Studies, General

(Ret.) ROK Army, Seoul

Sang-Min Kwak Political Secretary to National Assemblyman Hwa-Young Lee, Seoul

Dr. Kwang-Seok Lee Director/Principal Researcher, Nuclear Policy Research Center, Korea

Atomic Energy Research Institute, Seoul

Tae-Sik Lee Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to the U.S., Princeton

Dr. Jung-In Moon Professor, Yonsei University, Ambassador for International Security,

Seoul

Young-Han Moon Visiting Professor, Korea Military Academy, Major General (Ret.) ROK

Army, Seoul

Chul-Min Park Director of Disarmament and Nonproliferation, Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and Trade, Seoul

Dr. Jin Park Member of the National Assembly (Grand National Party), Seoul

Dr. Seong-Won Park Vice President, Sustainable Nuclear System Development, Korea

Atomic Energy Research Institute, Daejon

Young-Min Park Adviser to National Assemblywoman Myeong-Sook Han, Seoul

Yong-Ok Park Chief Executive Vice President, Hallym Institute of Advanced

International Studies, Seoul

Amb. Evans J.R. Revere President, The Korea Society, New York

Sung-Won Shin Director of North America Division II, North American Affairs Bureau,

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Seoul

Dr. Young-Sun Song Member of the National Assembly (Grand National Party), Seoul

Amb. Alexander Vershbow U.S. Ambassador to South Korea, Seoul

David J. Wolff Chief, Political Military Unit, U.S. Embassy, Seoul

Byung-Se Yoon Senior Secretary to the President for Foreign Affairs and National

Security, Seoul

Dr. Young-Kwan Yoon Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Professor of International

Relations at Seoul National University, Seoul

Egypt:

Name Professional Affiliation, Place of MeetingMakram M. Ahmed Journalist, Al-Musawwar newspaper, Cairo

Abdel Monem Said Ali Director, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo

Wael Al-Assad Director, Department of Multilateral Relations, Arab League, Cairo

Amb. Nabil Fahmy Ambassador of Egypt to the U.S.

Lisa Kenna Officer for Political and Military Affairs (U.S. Embassy), Cairo

Amb. Daniel Kurtzer Ambassador in Residence, Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton

Ahmed Hassan Mariy Professor, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, Cairo

Appendix A: Individuals Interviewed

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Ziad Moussa Researcher, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo

Hatem Seif An-Nasser Assistant Foreign Minister for American Affairs Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, Cairo

Amb. Francis Ricciardone Ambassador to Egypt, U.S. Embassy, Cairo

Mohammed Kadry Said Military Advisor, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies,

Cairo

Mostafa Elwi Saif Chairman of Political Science department, Cairo University, Egyptian

Council for Foreign Affairs, Cairo

Mohammed Abdel Salam Director, Regional Security and Arms Control, Al-Ahram Center for

Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo

Ali Serri Director, Disarmament Affairs Department, Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, Cairo

Sayed A. Shalaby Executive Director, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, Cairo

Mohammed Shaker Vice Chairman, Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, Cairo

William Stewart Minister Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs, U.S. Embassy,

Cairo

Abeer Yassin Researcher, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo

Israel

Name Professional Affiliation, Place of MeetingUzi Arad Chairman of The Atlantic Forum of Israel, Tel Aviv

Shlomo Brom Institute for National Strategic Studies, Jaffee Center, Tel Aviv

Benny Dagan Head of Middle East Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Jerusalem

Amnon Efrat Director, Regional Security Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Jerusalem

Mark Heller Institute for National Strategic Studies, Jaffee Center, Tel Aviv

Ephraim Kam Institute for National Strategic Studies, Jaffee Center, Tel Aviv

Ariel Levite Former Deputy Director General of Policy, Israel Atomic Energy

Commission, Tel Aviv

Israel Tkiochinski Arms Control Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem

Merav Zafary-Odiz Director, Policy and Arms Control, Israel Atomic Energy Commission,

Tel Aviv

Amb. Miriam Ziv Ambassador & Director General of Strategic Affairs, Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem

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Elizabeth Bakanic Japan’s Nuclear Choices in a Changing Environment

Mark Christopher International Nuclear Fuel-Supply Arrangements

Sandya Das The Israel Factor: The Impact of Israel’s Nuclear Capability on

Egypt’s Nuclear Decision-Making

Laurie Freeman Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime

George Hodgson Preventing Proliferation Chain Reactions: South Korea

Mike Hunzeker Eight Ways to Reassure an Ally: Military Options for Reducing

Security Concerns

R. Scott Kemp Technological/Industrial Base for Pursuing Nuclear Weapons

Sung Hwan Lee North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program: Status, Threats, and

Motivations

Florentina Mulaj Approaching Iran’s Nuclear Program

Ryan Phillips Egypt and Non-Proliferation in the Middle East

Appendix B: Individual Research Paper Topics

preventing nuclear proliferation chain reactions · preventing nuclear proliferation chain...

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