Presidency GroupCameron Hood

Caroline JamiesonJohn Planas

The President

• An overview • As Commander-in-Chief• In terms of the War Powers Act• Bush and Operation Desert Shield• Clinton and Operation Joint Endeavour• Different individuals, different choices, in the

same role• Overlaps and divergences

Evaluation of the Presidency

• In this presentation, we are going to evaluate the President’s influence in foreign policy, specifically looking at two cases: Bush and his role in the Persian Gulf War, and Clinton and his role in the Bosnian conflict

• We will be examining their roles through four lenses1. Leadership style on foreign policy and decision-making2. Their relationships with advisors, Congress, the military,

and the media and public3. The timing of the operations4. External pressures that factored into the President’s

decisions

Commander-in-Chief

• Presidency designed to have broad authority over the armed forces

• Historically there has been significant variance in terms of presidential assertion of authority over military affairs

Commander in Chief

• However, does the President have the power to initiate hostilities?

• The Constitution does not address this, saying only that the President, as CIC, must direct the war effort should Congress declare war

• The answers to this question have been used to justify a wide range of presidential actions involving military engagements

War Powers Act

• Attempted to curb the vast range of powers Congress deferred to the President in the wake of Vietnamese escalation

• Requires President to notify Congress within 48 hours of initiating hostilities

• Limits military engagements to 60 days if Congressional approval of military action is denied

• However, is “Congressional approval” the same as a “declaration of war”?

Bush v. Clinton

• Different individuals• Different leadership styles• Different advisors and

differing relationships with them

• Different interventions• Different international

environments• But are there similarities

throughout all this?

Operation Desert Shield• Operation Desert Shield- August 1990• Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait- wanted

control of Kuwait’s oil• Hussein threatens Saudi Arabia and the U.S.

decides to build up troops in Saudi Arabia for defense. Bush proclaims the invasion “would not stand”

George H.W. Bush Presidency

• The Bush administration's involvement and influence in Operation Desert Shield will be evaluated through the following:– 1. Leadership– 2. Relationships– 3. Timing– 4. External Pressures

Leadership- Foreign Policy

• From the presidential perspective, why were we involved in the Persian Gulf?

• Bush wanted to stop aggressors, concerns about stability in Middle East, and control of oil. – “Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait completely, immediately, and

without condition. Kuwait's legitimate government must be restored. The security and stability of the Persian Gulf must be assured.”

– "Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective – a new world order – can emerge: a new era – freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace. An era in which the nations of the world, East and West, North and South, can prosper and live in harmony....”

Leadership- Collegial Decision-making• Bush was initially unsure over course of action• Once Bush decided that Saddam Hussein

needed to be stopped, he committed himself to a course of action.

• Bush made definitive decisions • Military background

Relationships

• The following actors had varying levels of influence for Bush in Operation Desert Shield:– Advisors– Congress– Military– Media/Public

Advisors

• Bush was initially reliant on advisors, particularly Arabists. • Secretary of Defense: Dick Cheney• Secretary of State: James Baker• Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Colin

Powell- interested in sanctions• Overall, advisers worked around Bush once he

made his decisions

Congress

• Bush faced a democratic majority in both the House and Senate.

• Bush sent over 500,000 U.S. troops to Iraq before he received congressional approval

Congressional Approval

• Bush called joint session for Congress

• President Bush said that as commander-in-chief he did not need Congressional authorization to use military force against Iraq and that his request for a Congressional joint resolution was merely a courtesy

• Joint Resolution to authorize the use of US Armed forces pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 678- Jan 14, 1991

• Congress authorizes the use of military force, with asset goal of returning control of Kuwait to the Kuwaiti government

Military• Did not originally support Bush’s decision to

militaristically intervene• Nevertheless, they worked with him and were

willing to provide troops. • More helpful to Bush than they were to

Clinton during Operation Joint Endeavor• Bush’s militaristic background

Media/Public• Public still traumatized from Vietnam War. • Public didn’t want to go to war over oil “Hell

no, we won’t fight for Texaco”• Protesters• Became impressed after success of Operation

Desert Storm

Timing• Very rapid timeline• Occurred much faster than Operation Joint

Endeavor• August 2, 1990- March 3, 1991• Bush’s decision to intervene was quick

External Pressures• Bush was able to get over 30 countries to

financially or militaristically support the United States’ efforts in the Persian Gulf- largest alliance since WWII

• Other leaders supported Bush including Margaret Thatcher and Mikhail Gorbachev

Background – Operation Joint Endeavor

• Dissolution of Soviet Union and the Yugoslav federation in the early 1990’s leads to war in the Balkans.

• Largely a territorial conflict• Serbs and Croats in Bosnia wanted to annex land• NATO imposes a cease fire after 4 years of conflict • Dayton Peace Accords – November 21, 1995, the

presidents of Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia reached a peace agreement ending the war in Bosnia.

• Peace agreements were led by Richard Holbrooke and Warren Christopher

Bridging on Sava River• Following the Dayton Peace

Accords, NATO implementation force (IFOR) peacekeeping troops sent to Bosnia.

• 20,000 of the ultimate 60,000 troops were U.S. soldiers

• Troops were delayed in their cross from Croatia into Bosnia due to the flooding of the Sava river, which was bridged over the next three days

01, January. "U.S. Soldiers Finally Finish Bridge to Bosnia." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, 01 Jan. 1996. Web. 02 Feb. 2015.

December 31, 1995

Operation Joint Endeavor

• 1. Enforced the cease fire• 2. Facilitated the creation of new boundaries

between the conflicting countries• 3. Enforced the demilitarization of the war

zone

• Operation was given one year, from December 20, 1995 – December 20, 1996

"Military." Operation Joint Endeavor. N.p., n.d. Web. 02 Feb. 2015.

Clinton Presidency

• The Clinton administration’s involvement and influence in the NATO commitment to Bosnia will be evaluated through the following:– 1. Leadership– 2. Relationships– 3. Timing– 4. External Pressures

Leadership – Foreign Policy

• From the presidential perspective, why were we involved in Bosnia?

• Clinton has been referred to as a the “Globalization President”.– "We must remember that the real challenge of foreign policy is

to deal with problems before they harm our national interests," – “Everything from the strength of our economy, to the safety of

our cities, to the health of our people depends on events not only within our border but half a world away”

• Humanitarian and peacekeeping operation

Shogren, Elizabeth. "U.S. Must Be World Player, Clinton Says." Los Angeles Times. Los Angeles Times, 27 Feb. 1999. Web. 02 Feb. 2015.

Leadership – Collegial Decision Making

• Clinton was inexperienced and initially uncomfortable in dealing with foreign policy.

• He relied heavily on his advisors, especially early in his presidency, to deal with foreign policy matters.

• When he did begin to involve himself more in his cabinet’s foreign policy, it was an informal discussion setting similar to JFK’s

• Did not have the tendency to make definitive decisions

George, A., & Stern, E. (1998). Presidential Management Styles and Models. In A.

George, & J.George, Presidential Personality and Performance (pp. 241-263). Boulder, CO:Westview Press

Relationships

• The relationships that the president had with key actors had great influence over the eventual outcome in operation joint endeavor– Advisors– Congress– Military

Advisors• The roles of Secretary of State

Warren Christopher and NSC advisor Anthony Lake were to “not let foreign policy get in the President’s way as he focused on domestic policy.”

• Often relied upon expert advisors for his foreign policy. The two most significant in this situation:– Warren Christopher– Richard Holbrooke

• Policy in Bosnia was headed by the National Safety Council Principals Committee

George, A., & Stern, E. (1998). Presidential Management Styles and Models. In A.

George, & J.George, Presidential Personality and Performance (pp. 241-263). Boulder, CO:Westview Press

National Security Council

• Doves: Against the use of force – Warren Christopher– Les Aspin/ William Perry– David E Jeremiah

• Hawks: Pro Force

– Al Gore– Madeline Albright– Anthony Lake

George, A., & Stern, E. (1998). Presidential Management Styles and Models. In A. George, & J.George, Presidential Personality and Performance (pp. 241-263). Boulder, CO:Westview Press

Congress• Clinton faced a republican majority in

Congress that was idealistically opposed to his liberal internationalist foreign policy.

• He saw support of Congress in just 22 percent of cases

• His response to this was the extensive use of the veto to control congress

Conley, Richard S. “President Clinton and the Republican Congress, 1995-2000: Political and Policy Dimensions of Veto Politics in Divided Government”. August 2001

Congress

• Despite the congressional opposition to his presidency, Clinton was able to facilitate the U.S. participation in IFOR.

• The President debated on whether or not he would approach congress about military intervention in Bosnia, in the end he did approach congress.

• He asked for “an expression of support.”

• Clinton was adamant that the President could commit troops without congressional approval under the War Powers Act

• Again, he asked for support "so that we secure the widest support possible for peace."

• The role of congress was almost ceremonial in this situation

Molotsky, Irvin. "Clinton to Ask For Support On Bosnia." The New York Times. The New York Times, 20 Oct. 1995. Web. 02 Feb. 2015.

Congress• Ted Stevens, the chairman of the 1995 Senate

Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense was quoted saying “I oppose this deployment… (but) it is not our prerogative to debate… here with the President… the President has ordered the deployment… we have no way to prevent that.”

Banks, William C. "A New Imperial Presidency? Insights from U.S. Involvement in Bosnia." Political Science Quarterly 114.2 (1999): 195-217. JSTOR. Web. 01 Feb. 2015.

Military• From the start the Clinton administration had

a poor working relationship with the military– Criticized for his successful circumvention of the

Vietnam draft– “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”– The 1993 Battle of Mogadishu• 18 soldiers were killed in a conflict not understood or

supported by the U.S. public

Perlez, Jane. "For 8 Years, a Strained Relationship With the Military." The New York Times. The New York Times, 27 Dec. 2000. Web. 03 Feb. 2015.

Military – Why NATO?

• Failure of the U.N.• Lack of a “mission” people could get behind• NATO involvement would appease the

American people’s desire to see multilateral intervention

Timing • It took the Clinton

administration over three years to come to a policy decision in Bosnia. Why?

• Clinton entered the presidency with harsh criticism of Bush’s weak stance in Serbia.

• 1. The style of foreign policy initially employed by Clinton led to his advisors debating the correct course of action for several years without resolution.

• 2. Clinton was hesitant to again use ground troops considering his relationship with the military. Considered bombing runs instead.

George, A., & Stern, E. (1998). Presidential Management Styles and Models. In A. George, & J.George, Presidential Personality and Performance (pp. 241-263).

Boulder, CO:Westview Press

Timing - Sarajevo

• The tipping point for the Clinton administration came following the Serbian bombardment of U.N. safe zones

• “Biggest risk was in doing nothing”• Two major options were considered– 1. Airstrikes against Serbs– 2. Lifting the arms embargo (what the president

preferred)

George, A., & Stern, E. (1998). Presidential Management Styles and Models. In A. George, & J.George, Presidential Personality and Performance (pp. 241-263). Boulder,

CO:Westview Press

Timing• Continued Serbian attacks against U.N. safe

zones brought NATO bombing runs• The decision was then made to send 20,000

U.S. troops to aid NATO intervention

Influence of the President Clinton

• The influence of President Clinton on the U.S.’s involvement in the NATO commitment to Bosnia was limited in terms of the decision that was made, but instrumental in the application of that decision.

• The ability for the president to commit ground troops to Bosnia unilaterally demonstrates how the powers of the presidency have greatly expanded over time.