preparing europe's space future

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Viewpoint Preparing Europe's space future Bertrand de Montluc Europe has already acquired and demonstrated its capabilities in all the more traditional areas of space ex- ploration except for manned flights (and military applications). At the Hague in 1987 Europe decided to acquire the capability to conduct man- ned missions and to obtain a working knowledge, under certain conditions, of how people live and work in space. This Viewpoint looks at the prospects for this initiative in the light of recent international developments. Bertrand de Montluc is a policy analyst and Chef de Service des Analyses Econo- miques et Politiques, CNES, 2 Place Maurice Quentin, 75039 Paris, Cedex 01, France. The technical solution to the Euro- pean political ambition of discovering how people live and work in space has been pursued in the Ariane, Hermes and Columbus programmes, which are aimed at acquiring and using the rudiments of orbital operations, orbi- tal rendezvous, re-entry, life in space, orbital maintenance and associated ground segments. Overall, these programmes consti- tute the basic minimum (it is import- ant to emphasize this, and to resist the seemingly easy options favoured by those with a taste for the sensation- al) required for any more ambitious plans which may be established later on, such as humans as the explorer of the Solar System, as workers in low Earth orbit or as planners and provid- ers of future automatic facilities. Such a programme gives Europe the flexi- bility it needs to react to any inter- national initiative. It is not a substitute for the need to consolidate the more traditional space activities. Quite the reverse. This moderate, ongoing approach, for which France is largely responsi- ble, and which has always served Europe so well, now finds itself faced with an unstable international en- vironment, and a change in attitudes whereby Soviet and US space policies are being revised and in some cases even questioned. Witness the prog- ramme difficulties encountered by Freedom and the doubts over the future of Buran, reinforced in the USA by the technical problems with the Shuttle. Europe thus finds itself in a position where the traditional lead- ers, far from pushing back the fron- tiers of technology and embarking upon ever more ambitious schemes, are asking themselves whether these efforts are really justified, and at times even seem to be questioning the age- old fundamental concepts (humans in space) which Europe is planning to adopt. Yet is this shift in attitudes really the deadly threat it seems, or is it in fact a window of opportunity? As the deadline set at the Hague in 1987 approaches, Europe owes it to itself to assess its programmes and confirm or reject its chosen objectives, in the light of this new context. As the barriers finally begin to come down after decades of stability and the notion of deterrence - traditionally the cornerstone of space policies - becomes increasingly blurred, it is tempting to think that the world is about to withdraw into its terrestrial shell and give up the quest to conquer space. That would be a mistake. The barriers have no more been abolished on Earth than they have in the sky: alongside the various national, physi- cal borders which are indeed shifting, there are intellectual, technological and economic barriers, which, in terms of space travel, have never been more crucial. Besides, no one can say with any certainty what tomorrow's global political and military scene, the basis of any space strategy, will be like. One naturally assumes that the new order which is rising out of the ashes of the old, the embodiment of our hopes, will come with time and SPACE POLICY November 1991 285

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Page 1: Preparing Europe's space future

Viewpoint

Preparing Europe's space future

Bertrand de Montluc

Europe has already acquired and demonstrated its capabilities in all the more traditional areas of space ex- ploration except for manned flights (and military applications). At the Hague in 1987 Europe decided to acquire the capability to conduct man- ned missions and to obtain a working knowledge, under certain conditions, of how people live and work in space. This Viewpoint looks at the prospects for this initiative in the light of recent international developments.

Bertrand de Montluc is a policy analyst and Chef de Service des Analyses Econo- miques et Politiques, CNES, 2 Place Maurice Quentin, 75039 Paris, Cedex 01, France.

The technical solution to the Euro- pean political ambition of discovering how people live and work in space has been pursued in the Ariane, Hermes and Columbus programmes, which are aimed at acquiring and using the rudiments of orbital operations, orbi- tal rendezvous, re-entry, life in space, orbital maintenance and associated ground segments.

Overall, these programmes consti- tute the basic minimum (it is import- ant to emphasize this, and to resist the seemingly easy options favoured by those with a taste for the sensation- al) required for any more ambitious plans which may be established later on, such as humans as the explorer of the Solar System, as workers in low Earth orbit or as planners and provid- ers of future automatic facilities. Such a programme gives Europe the flexi- bility it needs to react to any inter- national initiative. It is not a substitute for the need to consolidate the more traditional space activities. Quite the reverse.

This moderate, ongoing approach, for which France is largely responsi- ble, and which has always served Europe so well, now finds itself faced with an unstable international en- vironment, and a change in attitudes whereby Soviet and US space policies are being revised and in some cases even questioned. Witness the prog- ramme difficulties encountered by Freedom and the doubts over the future of Buran, reinforced in the USA by the technical problems with the Shuttle. Europe thus finds itself in

a position where the traditional lead- ers, far from pushing back the fron- tiers of technology and embarking upon ever more ambitious schemes, are asking themselves whether these efforts are really justified, and at times even seem to be questioning the age- old fundamental concepts (humans in space) which Europe is planning to adopt. Yet is this shift in attitudes really the deadly threat it seems, or is it in fact a window of opportunity? As the deadline set at the Hague in 1987 approaches, Europe owes it to itself to assess its programmes and confirm or reject its chosen objectives, in the light of this new context.

As the barriers finally begin to come down after decades of stability and the notion of deterrence - traditionally the cornerstone of space policies - becomes increasingly blurred, it is tempting to think that the world is about to withdraw into its terrestrial shell and give up the quest to conquer space. That would be a mistake. The barriers have no more been abolished on Earth than they have in the sky: alongside the various national, physi- cal borders which are indeed shifting, there are intellectual, technological and economic barriers, which, in terms of space travel, have never been more crucial. Besides, no one can say with any certainty what tomorrow's global political and military scene, the basis of any space strategy, will be like. One naturally assumes that the new order which is rising out of the ashes of the old, the embodiment of our hopes, will come with time and

SPACE POLICY November 1991 285

Page 2: Preparing Europe's space future

Viewpoint

'Uncertainty has spawned the belief that the aerospace strategies of the major powers are going to be radically affected'

with no interruptions. There is little doubt, however, that the post-Cold War world will be different from that of recent years, which saw unprece- dented strides in the quest to conquer space. Tomorrow's world will be a multipolar world, made up of compet- ing blocs, equipped with powerful tools used for specific ends - military (in the case of the USSR), economic and financial (in the case of Japan, Germany and perhaps Europe if it reaches maturity), demographic (Chi- na, India) and ideological (Muslim countries). Only the USA stands any real chance of acquiring a combination of economic and technological pro- ductive power which could form the core of an organization made up of several circles. Whether or not such an order ever comes about will depend on the ability of each of the poles involved to organize itself internally (by dealing with its social ills and problems as and when they arise) and to cooperate sufficiently closely to prevent conflicts, imbalances and dis- tortions. Such is the nature of the political, military, technological and economic challenge now facing Europe.

The uncertainty surrounding the establishment of East-West and North-South balances of power is very important, but needs to be carefully assessed. This uncertainty has spawned the belief that the aerospace strategies of the major powers are going to be radically affected; the theory being that the race to colonize low-Earth orbit (Space Station, Mir) will suffer the same fate as that of strategic weapons. The economic, so- cial and even cultural problems cur- rently besetting both the USA and the USSR can only reinforce the trends towards a space moratorium.

According to this scenario, NASA, entangled in both technical and orga- nizational difficulties, will no longer be able to use the various interadmi- nistration divisions (Department of Commerce, DOT, DOE, DoD) and will suffer from the lack of synergy between the administration and Con- gress. Both Wall Street and the eco- logists, who represent a powerful lob- by, will point to the inefficiency of the space administration, its blunders with

the programme and the political futil- ity of turning manned space missions into a feature of everyday life. The Moon-Mars initiative itself will mere- ly have served to underline young people's disaffection with the quest to conquer new planetary frontiers, a quest for which the USA, with its lack of suitable technical facilities (eg prop- ulsion), will in any case be ill pre- pared. Faced with such a situation, NASA will soon discover that the only way out of its confrontation with the administration is to rely on the good- will of Congress.

Since the most obvious solution to the US deadlock - large-scale coop- eration with the USSR in the field of space - would not be in keeping with the USA's basic objectives (to streng- then security and continue with the policy of containment), one would have to expect a break in the US space programme, giving it time to reorga- nize NASA, contemplate the future and make the necessary political and budgetary preparations for outlining the future planetary exploration prog- ramme. Such a lull would give the USA the opportunity to focus on the issue of useful space exploration and to provide R&D facilities specifically geared to this purpose.

On the Soviet side, the picture is rather bleaker: a foundering, out- sized, badly managed space program- me, power struggles, total lack of consistent programming, and a virtual refusal to cooperate with the USA in the only technical area where the USSR still carries any weight.

The upshot of the uncertainty sur- rounding the two superpowers would be a worrying gap, with Europe being seen as naively voluntaristic, and hence politically reckless.

Those who take the rational view are often proved wrong. In this par- ticular case, their conclusions are patently incorrect. First, it is hardly likely that, at the very time when the USA has shown that in spite of its financial, social and cultural difficul- ties, it is still a power with the econo- mic and military clout to pave the way for a new world order, it will renounce its ambitions in space. Granted, a little more discipline is needed as regards the internal organization of its space

286 SPACE POLICY November 1991

Page 3: Preparing Europe's space future

'Europe is emerging as a centre of competitiveness and cooperation'

1According to the vote taken in the House of Representatives on 6 June 1991.

policy - note the differences between the National Space Council (NSC) and the Augustine Commission. The actual strategy itself needs to be more clearly targeted, according to both long-term objectives (Moon-Mars) and the main issues at stake (military applications, the environment), but there is no question of abandoning the programme altogether. Congress has decided to channel NASA's technolo- gical ambitions according to the funds available (a 10% increase per year, which is quite remarkable) and ex- isting technical facilities; NASA has thus managed to escape tougher mea- sures of the sort favoured by the NSC or certain members of the scientific community. The basic priorities of the US space programme remain firmly entrenched, insofar as they have been incorporated in a well-ordered, 'in- cremental ' approach (gradual growth, as part of an ongoing effort). This ongoing effort involves the construc- tion of a station in low-Earth orbit, deployed with a view to planetary exploration - the details of which are admittedly sketchy, and which hardly seems credible in the short term, but which is nevertheless consistent with the US ideal. The August 1990 deci- sions by the two US chambers clearly point the way: the Freedom program- me will go ahead, albeit in a slightly rearranged form.1

The situation in the USSR defies speculation. It is hard to see, however, why the Soviets would want to get rid of or sell off the ultimate symbol of their 'modernity ' . As chaos spreads, the military-industrial base of which the space complex forms part looks as if it might just survive. It may be somewhat battered but basically it is still intact. Today it is fighting a hard battle in order to protect its own interests and safeguard the tools of production. The real question con- cerns the hard core which remains: will it be the sort of useful space exploration (science, services) which lends itself easily to takeovers or, as seems more likely, the quest for major technological advances? Whatever the outcome, when it comes to coping with the latest developments, the USA and Europe have different in- terests, starting as they do from a

Viewpoint

situation of unequal power. Given these circumstances, we work

on the premise that large-scale space programmes will continue world-wide, accompanied in the case of the two superpowers by a reorganization phase aimed at building internal strategies for more efficient adminis- trative and industrial organization and sorting out their ultimate aims around three main objectives: security (mastering technology, making space freely accessible), economics (com- mercial exploitation of space) and exploration (traditional, dependable motive).

Europe, meanwhile, is emerging as a centre of competitiveness and coop- eration and must take heed and not be seen to be passive or overly ready to give up at the first sign of trouble. The downgrading of US and Soviet ambi- tions brings with it an opportunity to alter the balance in Europe's favour, in that it gives Europe a unique chance to acquire the necessary capabilities by the year 2000. For Europe, such a strategy is justified as part of a broad- er mission: to extend its sovereignty and control access to space in new areas.

In conclusion, we should realize that space travel is marked both by its planetary nature - which leads to close links between the programmes of the major powers, the USA, the USSR and Europe (soon to be joined by Japan) - and by high risks which can involve accidents and, consequently, disruptions. Such disruptions invari- ably have an impact on the program- mes of the various powers involved, among which there tends to be a certain degree of interaction.

In the current climate of political and economic instability, we cannot overlook the fact that space strategies, in both the USA and the USSR, are going through a period of uncertainty, or at least debate. Given these circum- stances, it is vital that Europe, like its US and Soviet counterparts, should decide what is really important, iden- tify what remains, beyond all the unknown factors, and retain its own fundamental objectives. For it is the broader mission which in turn deter- mines strategy. This is why, despite the current changes in rhythm,

S P A C E P O L I C Y N o v e m b e r 1991 287

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Europe must not lose sight of its objectives and must stick to its strategy and seek a greater degree of flexibility.

Changing our objectives would only add to the confusion! They should only be changed if the ultimate mis- sion is itself called into question. Instead of seeking to control access to space, for example, Europe could take the cheaper route and content itself with consolidating its gains and reap- ing the benefits of cooperation, eg with the USSR in the field of orbital infrastructures, since it has a reliable working system. The choice is a poli- tical one. In the past, before the start of the Ariane programme, this choice could have been proposed, but it was not, it was never even considered. Our competitors even envied France and Europe for their voluntaristic approach, the continuity and coher- ence of their policy, which they them- selves so often lacked. They would be surpised if today we were to turn our backs on what has always been our major strength in favour of easier options. What is more, while our Soviet or US counterparts are ex- periencing serious social problems which have prompted them to slow the pace and take a breather, if not a full-scale moratorium, the same clear- ly cannot be said of Europe - which has yet to complete its construction as a single entity.

While the mission which Europe has set itself since the Ariane decisions of Rome and the Hague undoubtedly remains - to make space more accessi- ble, to master the relevant technolo- gies, to assimilate humans in space - the strategy needs to be adequate. We cannot afford just to sit back and reap the economic benefits of other peo- ple's investments. Policy makers may be feeling the need for a momentary pause and trying to steer clear of oversized projects (a continuously

manned multifunction station at the end of the decade), but they are by no means abandoning their fundamental ambitions. Witness the situation in the USA, where in spite of a massive deficit, the space budget is set to rise over the next few years.

In the field of useful space activities, applications and economic ventures linked to the development of space programmes, we can probably move quite safely towards more open poli- cies according to the various industrial imperatives (the opening up of East- ern European markets, the acquisition of Soviet technology, or transatlantic alliances in the satellite or services industry). As far as large-scale de- velopments are concerned, however, reciprocal arrangements and coopera- tion (except in the field of space stations) look set to pose more of a problem because of the highly political nature of the stakes involved. As the difficulties mount, each superpower will tend to concentrate on what it considers to be the object of its own vital interests: hence the new leitmotiv 'America first'.

Against a background of serious domestic problems, the policies of the major powers will primarily seek to safeguard the essentials. For the space agencies, be they US, Japanese, Euro- pean or Soviet, this means not getting caught up in what is seen to be a purely political debate. The only way for these countries, moreover, will be to rely on each other in order to convince their respective politicians that 'nominal ' programmes are not negotiable.

Such an approach - which is not unlike that of Europe - could give Europe the extra flexibility it needs, providing it does not get distracted and bogged down in endless debates, and providing it does not expect to receive any insight from external sources, insight which can only come from analysis of its own needs.

288 SPACE POLICY November 1991