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Synergy Between MaterialSynergy Between MaterialAccountancy/ControlAccountancy/Control

andandPhysical Protection SystemsPhysical Protection Systems

K.L. RamakumarK.L. RamakumarIndiaIndia

Regional Training Course on Physical Protection of Regional Training Course on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and facilitiesNuclear Material and facilities

IndiaIndiaApril 16-27, 2007April 16-27, 2007



Presentation SequencePresentation Sequence

IntroductionIntroduction

Importance of NMA&C and PPSImportance of NMA&C and PPS

Basic elements and structure of NMA&CBasic elements and structure of NMA&Cand PPSand PPS

Interface between NMA&C and PPSInterface between NMA&C and PPS

NMA&C and PPS integration (safety !!)NMA&C and PPS integration (safety !!)

ConclusionsConclusions



Nuclear Material Accounting & Control (NMA&C)Nuclear Material Accounting & Control (NMA&C)

IAEA StatuteIAEA Statute Pursuant to Article II of its Statute the AgencyPursuant to Article II of its Statute the Agencyhas the task of seeking "to accelerate and enlargehas the task of seeking "to accelerate and enlargethe contribution of atomic energy to peace,the contribution of atomic energy to peace,health and prosperity throughout the world".health and prosperity throughout the world".

The same Article of the Statute provides that theThe same Article of the Statute provides that theAgency "shall ensure, so far as it is able, thatAgency "shall ensure, so far as it is able, thatassistance provided by it or at its request orassistance provided by it or at its request or

under its supervision or control is not used inunder its supervision or control is not used insuch a way as to further any military purpose".such a way as to further any military purpose".(INFCIRC/66/Rev.2)(INFCIRC/66/Rev.2)



INFCIRC/153INFCIRC/153

suggests that the purpose for a State tosuggests that the purpose for a State tomaintain an NMA&C system is only:maintain an NMA&C system is only:

“ “ to enable the Agency to verify…that to enable the Agency to verify…that there has been no diversion of nuclear there has been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive weapons or other nuclear explosive devices…” devices…” (paragraph 7).(paragraph 7).



Measurement of fissile nuclear materialsMeasurement of fissile nuclear materials

Cornerstone of the Nuclear MaterialCornerstone of the Nuclear MaterialAccounting and Control (NMA&C) edifice.Accounting and Control (NMA&C) edifice.

Verification represents key elements oVerification represents key elements ointernational nuclear materials Safeguards.international nuclear materials Safeguards.

Basis of NMA&C is to state with confidence,Basis of NMA&C is to state with confidence,“no significant amount of nuclear material“no significant amount of nuclear materialhas been diverted.”has been diverted.”



Safeguards in the entire Nuclear fuel cycleSafeguards in the entire Nuclear fuel cycle

NMA&C in allNMA&C in all

Stages of NFCStages of NFC



Categorisation of nuclear material (from INFCIRC/225/Rev.4)

≤ 1 kg or less > 15g< 10kg > 1kg ≥ 10 kg

< 5 kg > 1kg ≥ 10 kg

≥ 5 kgUnirradiated- uraniumenriched to ≥ 20% 235 U- uraniumenriched to10% ≥ 235 U <20% 235 U- uraniumenriched >natural <10% 235 U

Uranium-235

≤ 500 g >15 g

< 2 kg >500 g

≥ 2 kgUnirradiatedPlutoniumUranium-233

Category IIICategory IICategory IFormMaterial



1 YEAR1 YEARorder of 1order of 1yearyear

UnirradiateUnirradiateddFresh FuelFresh Fuel

LEU and ThLEU and Th

33MONTHSMONTHS

few monthsfew months(1 -3)(1 -3)

InInirradiatedirradiatedfuelfuel

Pu, HEU or UPu, HEU or U-233-233

1 MONTH1 MONTH

few weeksfew weeks

(1 -3)(1 -3)

In scrapIn scrapPu, HEU or UPu, HEU or U

-233-233

few weeksfew weeks(1 -3)(1 -3)

Non-Non-irradiatedirradiatedfresh fuelfresh fuel

MOXMOX

few weeksfew weeks

(1 -3)(1 -3)Oxide (UOOxide (UO 22 ))Pure HEU or U –Pure HEU or U –

233 compounds233 compounds

few weeksfew weeks(1 -3)(1 -3)

OxideOxide(PuO(PuO 22 ))

Pure PuPure Pucomponentscomponents

few days (7few days (7-10)-10)

MetalMetalPu, HEU or UPu, HEU or U-233-233

IAEAIAEATimelineTimeline

ssssGoalsGoals

ConversionConversionTimeTime

MaterialMaterialFormForm

NuclearNuclearMaterialMaterial



20 t thorium20 t thoriumThoriumThorium

75 kg U-235 (or 10 t75 kg U-235 (or 10 tnatural U or 20 tnatural U or 20 tdepleted U)depleted U)

LEU (<20% U-235LEU (<20% U-235including natural Uincluding natural Uand depleted U)and depleted U)

25 kg U-23525 kg U-235HEU (=>20% U-235)HEU (=>20% U-235)

8 kg U-2338 kg U-233U-233U-2338 kg Pu8 kg PuPu (<20% Pu-238)Pu (<20% Pu-238)

SQ in kgSQ in kgNuclear MaterialNuclear Material



Security C & S PPS NMA&CSecurity C & S PPS NMA&C

SafeguardsSafeguards

SafeguardsSafeguards SafeguardsSafeguards

SafeguardsSafeguards

Holistic View of Safeguards ConceptHolistic View of Safeguards Concept

NM



NMA&C in a FacilityNMA&C in a Facility

Provide assurance that all materialProvide assurance that all materialquantities are accounted forquantities are accounted for

Provide timely detection of a material lossProvide timely detection of a material loss

Determine the amount and location of anyDetermine the amount and location of anylossloss

If it is concluded that the loss is due toIf it is concluded that the loss is due to

unauthorised diversion, then NMA&C has aunauthorised diversion, then NMA&C has aphysical security role to play along withphysical security role to play along withPPS and C&S systems. (Integration)PPS and C&S systems. (Integration)



Objectives and NMA&C DesignObjectives and NMA&C Design

•• Any NMA&C system should reflect itsAny NMA&C system should reflect itsdesign objectives with respect to adesign objectives with respect to afacility where it is implemented.facility where it is implemented.

•• Basic structure and approach areBasic structure and approach are broadly similar among different broadly similar among differentinternational NMA&C systems withinternational NMA&C systems withminor differences in design andminor differences in design andimplementation strategies.implementation strategies.



Considerations in NMA&C DesignConsiderations in NMA&C Design

Implementation of facility NMA&C systemsImplementation of facility NMA&C systems

should consider the necessary requirement andshould consider the necessary requirement andsupport of other facility systems.support of other facility systems.

Support from facility infrastructure (e.g.,Support from facility infrastructure (e.g.,space, power) and personnel (for trained NMA&Cspace, power) and personnel (for trained NMA&C

workers).workers).Support from security (e.g., response).Support from security (e.g., response).

Each interface to another system should beEach interface to another system should be

defined, designed and understood for optimumdefined, designed and understood for optimumperformance for each particular facility.performance for each particular facility.

Generally they complement each otherGenerally they complement each other



Consideration of PPS ObjectivesConsideration of PPS Objectives

INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, §3.1INFCIRC/225/Rev. 4, §3.1

The objectives of the State’s physical protectionThe objectives of the State’s physical protectionsystem should be:system should be:

To establish conditions which would minimizeTo establish conditions which would minimizethe possibilities forthe possibilities for unauthorized removal unauthorized removal of of nuclear material and/or fornuclear material and/or for sabotage sabotage ; and; and

To provide information and technical assistanceTo provide information and technical assistancein support of…[locating and recovering] missingin support of…[locating and recovering] missingnuclear material and…minimizing the radiologicalnuclear material and…minimizing the radiologicalconsequences of consequences of sabotage sabotage ..



Minimise theMinimise thepossibilities forpossibilities forunauthorized removalunauthorized removal of of nuclear material;nuclear material;

Provide support base forProvide support base forlocating and recoveringlocating and recoveringmissing nuclear materialmissing nuclear materialand minimising theand minimising theradiologicalradiological

consequences.consequences.

Assurance that allAssurance that allmaterial quantities arematerial quantities areaccounted for.accounted for.

Timely detection of aTimely detection of amaterial loss andmaterial loss anddetermine the amountdetermine the amountand location of any loss.and location of any loss.

PPSPPSNMA&CNMA&C

Two foremost components of SafeguardsTwo foremost components of Safeguards



Common features of NMA&C and PPSCommon features of NMA&C and PPS

Have common goal of deterring and detectingHave common goal of deterring and detecting

unauthorised removal of nuclear materialunauthorised removal of nuclear materialNot mutually exclusiveNot mutually exclusive

Complement and support each otherComplement and support each other

Both require appropriate security environmentBoth require appropriate security environmentfor protecting their functions from subversion.for protecting their functions from subversion.

Proper interface between NMA&C and PPS andProper interface between NMA&C and PPS andalso Integration mechanisms for NMA&C andalso Integration mechanisms for NMA&C andPPSPPS

Help in realising both the goals of NMA&C andHelp in realising both the goals of NMA&C and

PPSPPS



Organisation of a Typical Nuclear FacilityOrganisation of a Typical Nuclear Facility

With respect to NMA&C and PPSWith respect to NMA&C and PPS

Defined roles and responsibilities (at timesDefined roles and responsibilities (at timesaugmenting each other)augmenting each other)

Identification of processes conditions andIdentification of processes conditions andprocesses themselvesprocesses themselves

Locations for NMA&C and PPSLocations for NMA&C and PPS

Past experiencePast experience

Auditing proceduresAuditing proceduresQuality assurance activitiesQuality assurance activities

For implementing NMA&C and PP systems andFor implementing NMA&C and PP systems andtheir particular or specialized functionaltheir particular or specialized functionalelements.elements.



Basic Accountancy Functions of NMA&CBasic Accountancy Functions of NMA&C

The accounting systemThe accounting system

Information on inventories and transfersInformation on inventories and transferssufficient to establish a complete audit trailsufficient to establish a complete audit trailfromfrom receipt through disposition.receipt through disposition.

Materials balance = initial inventory + transfers inMaterials balance = initial inventory + transfers in- transfers out - final inventory- transfers out - final inventory

Mechanisms to identify discrepancies andMechanisms to identify discrepancies andmeetmeet reporting needs.reporting needs.

A physical inventory systemA physical inventory system

Methodologies to demonstrate materials areMethodologies to demonstrate materials arepresent.present.



Basic Accountancy Functions of NMA&CBasic Accountancy Functions of NMA&C

A material transfer systemA material transfer system

to manage internal & external transfers.to manage internal & external transfers.FlowFlow measurements at KMPs in an MBAmeasurements at KMPs in an MBA

A measurement systemA measurement system

to establish and verify inventory andto establish and verify inventory andtransfer quantities. Includestransfer quantities. Includes measurementmeasurement

controls and KMPs in ancontrols and KMPs in an MBA.MBA.



Basic Material Control Functions of NMA&CBasic Material Control Functions of NMA&C

A material containment systemA material containment system

Structural features of a facility, containersStructural features of a facility, containersor equipment used to establish the physicalor equipment used to establish the physicalintegrity of an area or items.integrity of an area or items.

A material surveillance systemA material surveillance systemFor detecting unauthorized activities.For detecting unauthorized activities.

An access control systemAn access control systemTo prevent undetected access to, orTo prevent undetected access to, or

movementmovement of, nuclear material.of, nuclear material.A detection & assessment systemA detection & assessment system

For timely detection and assessment of For timely detection and assessment of unauthorized removals of nuclear materials.unauthorized removals of nuclear materials.



Basic PPS FunctionsBasic PPS Functions

A detection systemA detection system

To detect entry attempts of unauthorisedTo detect entry attempts of unauthorisedpersons. (alarm assessment and reporting)persons. (alarm assessment and reporting)

A delay and access control systemA delay and access control system

Enough Time delay for a response force toEnough Time delay for a response force totaketake necessary steps. (A combination of necessary steps. (A combination of detect anddetect and delay elements and physicaldelay elements and physical

barriers). barriers).

A response systemA response system

Trained response force adequately staffedTrained response force adequately staffedand equipped to deal with aforementionedand equipped to deal with aforementionedevents.events.



Interface between NMA&C and PPSInterface between NMA&C and PPS

A holistic approach desirable at the design stageA holistic approach desirable at the design stage

of nuclear facility.of nuclear facility.Savings in terms of economy, time, andSavings in terms of economy, time, andmanpowermanpower

Basic functional elements of NMA&C and PPSBasic functional elements of NMA&C and PPShelps in visualising Interfacinghelps in visualising Interfacing

Security system design and operationalSecurity system design and operationalCommand & Control Command & Control informationinformation

Discrepancy or contingency resolutionDiscrepancy or contingency resolutionMaterial movement, material containmentMaterial movement, material containment

Access controls (authorization information)Access controls (authorization information)

Detection of unauthorized removalsDetection of unauthorized removals



Design Information InterfaceDesign Information Interface

•• Physical Protection System design, evaluationPhysical Protection System design, evaluation

and operation requires knowledge of and operation requires knowledge of

What is to be protected:What is to be protected:

Nuclear material with isotope, mass,Nuclear material with isotope, mass,composition, attributes, andcomposition, attributes, and

containerizationcontainerization informationinformationPossible vulnerability scenarios (NuclearPossible vulnerability scenarios (Nuclearsystems, monitors, storage locations)systems, monitors, storage locations)

Loss consequence metricsLoss consequence metrics

Location informationLocation information

A facility NMA&C program can provideA facility NMA&C program can providemuch of this information.much of this information.



Design Information Interface FacilityDesign Information Interface FacilityCharacteristicsCharacteristics

Other types of information necessary for PPSOther types of information necessary for PPSdesign include:design include:

Hours of operationHours of operationNumber of authorised peopleNumber of authorised people

Number of types of vehicles allowed entryNumber of types of vehicles allowed entry

Construction and maintenance requirementsConstruction and maintenance requirements

Waste stream informationWaste stream information

Applicable laws and regulations for contingencyApplicable laws and regulations for contingencyneeds (temporary entry permits, visitors, allowedneeds (temporary entry permits, visitors, allowedimplements)implements)



Design Changes Information

Calls for re-look into interface requirementsCalls for re-look into interface requirements

Changes in the facility operational state orChanges in the facility operational state ordesign must be shared with appropriatedesign must be shared with appropriate

organizations. For example:organizations. For example:

Changes in nuclear material status shouldChanges in nuclear material status should be integrated such that, NMA&C, PPS and be integrated such that, NMA&C, PPS andresponse force deployment requirementresponse force deployment requirement

can be suitably managed and altered.can be suitably managed and altered.Timeliness results in economyTimeliness results in economy



Triggering Events within NMA&C or PPSTriggering Events within NMA&C or PPS

Unexpected events or anomalous conditions mustUnexpected events or anomalous conditions mustresult in each other’s notification.result in each other’s notification.

A PPS alarm might trigger an unscheduled PIV.A PPS alarm might trigger an unscheduled PIV.

An inventory inconsistency or broken seal mightAn inventory inconsistency or broken seal mightresult in a retrospective analysis of recorded PPSresult in a retrospective analysis of recorded PPS

data.data.A perimeter alarm during on site SNM movementA perimeter alarm during on site SNM movement

may result in dispatch of response forces.may result in dispatch of response forces.

Nuclear material shows up unexpectedly at aNuclear material shows up unexpectedly at acontrol point or is left uncontrolled.control point or is left uncontrolled.

Authorised person is not allowed entry (EntryAuthorised person is not allowed entry (EntryPass does not work !!)Pass does not work !!)



PPS during Material MovementPPS during Material Movement

Material movements that cross controlled-areaMaterial movements that cross controlled-area

boundaries requires notification, approvals and boundaries requires notification, approvals andcoordination.coordination.

In addition to inter-MBA transfer procedures andIn addition to inter-MBA transfer procedures andapprovals, the following PPS actions must beapprovals, the following PPS actions must beconsidered:considered:

Confirmation of right to transport and schedulingConfirmation of right to transport and scheduling

Route establishmentRoute establishment

Escort assignmentEscort assignmentGuard and response force notificationGuard and response force notification

Temporary authorization for carriage of nuclearTemporary authorization for carriage of nuclearmaterial through access control pointsmaterial through access control points



Areas surrounded byAreas surrounded byphysical barriers (delay)physical barriers (delay)with intrusion detectionwith intrusion detectionsystemssystemsAccess points where allAccess points where allshipments (in and out) canshipments (in and out) can

be controlled be controlled

Control points as input andControl points as input andoutput flow KMP)output flow KMP)On current materialOn current material

balance (inventory KMP) balance (inventory KMP)

PPS use controlled areasPPS use controlled areas(e.g.,(e.g., protected protected oror vital vital ))

NMA&C uses aNMA&C uses a Material Material Balance Area Balance Area

PPSPPSNMA&CNMA&C

Boundary Control Interfacing betweenBoundary Control Interfacing betweenNMA&C and PPSNMA&C and PPS

MBA flow key measurement points should relate to PPSMBA flow key measurement points should relate to PPSaccess control pointsaccess control pointsProper interfacing to relate MBA boundaries to PPSProper interfacing to relate MBA boundaries to PPScontrolled area boundaries (delay elements)controlled area boundaries (delay elements)



C id i f i l l f iliC id i f i l l f ili



Consideration of a typical nuclear facilityConsideration of a typical nuclear facilityfor NMA&C and PPSfor NMA&C and PPS

E.g. A typical commercial reprocessing plantE.g. A typical commercial reprocessing plantconsisting of consisting of

AA spent fuel areaspent fuel area in which spent fuel isin which spent fuel isreceived and storedreceived and stored

AA process areaprocess area in which spent fuel isin which spent fuel isprocessedprocessed to recover plutonium nitrateto recover plutonium nitrate

AA storage areastorage area for plutoniumfor plutonium storagestorage

AA conversion areaconversion area in which the plutoniumin which the plutoniumnitratenitrate receivedreceived throughthrough pipingpiping isis

converted into oxideconverted into oxide

AA storage areastorage area for plutonium oxidefor plutonium oxide

A radioactive wasteA radioactive waste storagestorage areaarea



NMA&C and PPC in a typical reprocessingNMA&C and PPC in a typical reprocessingplantplant

A single huge complex housing differentA single huge complex housing differentareas under theareas under the same roof same roof

Cluster of individual areasCluster of individual areas

NMA&CNMA&CMBAs and KMPsMBAs and KMPs

PPSPPSControlled access areas, physical barriersControlled access areas, physical barriers

(multiple barriers)(multiple barriers)Integration and interfacing of bothIntegration and interfacing of both

for efficient and effective safeguards withfor efficient and effective safeguards withcost effectivenesscost effectiveness



MBA’s

Portal

Vehiclegate

PPS integrated with MBA

A fully-interfaced system would have all structures andtechnical controls—and contingency plans and procedures—used by NMA&C to establish and maintain MBA boundariesto be consistent with and tied into the surrounding PPS.



Management or Organizational IntegrationManagement or Organizational Integration

•• Integration of management or organizations atIntegration of management or organizations atthe facility level would be effected through:the facility level would be effected through:

PPS and NMA&C plans and procedures governingPPS and NMA&C plans and procedures governingthe interaction of personnel during normal orthe interaction of personnel during normal orroutine and emergency situationsroutine and emergency situations

Integrated risk assessmentIntegrated risk assessment

Integrated performance assessments and auditsIntegrated performance assessments and audits

Consistent training programsConsistent training programs



Incident ResponseIncident Response

Support IntegrationSupport Integration

•• It is envisioned that during emergency situationsIt is envisioned that during emergency situations(natural or man made) that it will be important for(natural or man made) that it will be important for

crisis management teams (CMT) to be kept abreastcrisis management teams (CMT) to be kept abreastof the status of nuclear material.of the status of nuclear material.

•• Developing an integrated view from a NMA&C andDeveloping an integrated view from a NMA&C andPPS perspective will improve the ability of thePPS perspective will improve the ability of the

CMT (which is generally overloaded withCMT (which is generally overloaded withinformation) to handle the situationinformation) to handle the situation



Performance TestingPerformance Testing

•• Performance testing is used to provide operationsPerformance testing is used to provide operations

assurance.assurance.•• Performance testing is a controlled set of checks,Performance testing is a controlled set of checks,inspections, tests, and analyses that answer specificinspections, tests, and analyses that answer specificquestions about the state of a system.questions about the state of a system.

Is the NMA&C and PPS equipment functioning?Is the NMA&C and PPS equipment functioning?

Are the procedures in place working?Are the procedures in place working?

Are the personnel properly trained?Are the personnel properly trained?

Is the interaction of personnel and equipment effective?Is the interaction of personnel and equipment effective?

Are the interfaces managed?Are the interfaces managed?

•• NMA&C and PP systems that are interfaced and integratedNMA&C and PP systems that are interfaced and integratedin various ways must be tested in an integrated fashion inin various ways must be tested in an integrated fashion inorder to insure the interactions work as intended.order to insure the interactions work as intended.



Integration SummaryIntegration Summary

An integrated NMA&C and physicalAn integrated NMA&C and physicalprotection systemprotection system

Can increase the effectiveness of facilityCan increase the effectiveness of facilitysecurity efforts in combating threatssecurity efforts in combating threats

Can reduce human-factorCan reduce human-factorconsiderations during decision-makingconsiderations during decision-makingprocesses, and so reduce one of the mainprocesses, and so reduce one of the maincauses of nuclear material lossescauses of nuclear material losses

Can be cost effectiveCan be cost effective



ConclusionsConclusions

Safeguarding nuclear facilities and nuclearSafeguarding nuclear facilities and nuclear

materials require holistic approachmaterials require holistic approachNMA&C, PPS, C&S, Security are the fourNMA&C, PPS, C&S, Security are the fourimportant components of efficient and effectiveimportant components of efficient and effectiveSafeguards implementationSafeguards implementation

Proper interfacing and integration of theseProper interfacing and integration of thesecomponents is essential results in optimisationcomponents is essential results in optimisationof a number of parametersof a number of parameters

timeliness of detectiontimeliness of detectionensuring safety and securityensuring safety and securityManpower reductionManpower reductionSharing of implementsSharing of implementsEconomyEconomy

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