POSC 2200 – POSC 2200 – Modern Modern ConflictConflict

Russell Alan WilliamsRussell Alan Williams

Department of Political ScienceDepartment of Political Science

Unit Five: Modern Conflict Unit Five: Modern Conflict

Required Reading:Required Reading: Globalization of World PoliticsGlobalization of World Politics, , Chapters 14, 15 and 23.Chapters 14, 15 and 23. Joseph Jockel & Joel Sokolsky, “Canada and the war in Joseph Jockel & Joel Sokolsky, “Canada and the war in

Afghanistan: NATO's odd man out steps forward, Afghanistan: NATO's odd man out steps forward, Journal of Journal of Transatlantic StudiesTransatlantic Studies, 6:1, (2008), Pp. 100-115. , 6:1, (2008), Pp. 100-115.

Outline:Outline: IntroductionIntroduction What is What is ““WarWar””?? What Causes War?What Causes War? Traditional Approaches to National SecurityTraditional Approaches to National Security New ProblemsNew Problems

Unit Analytical Questions:Unit Analytical Questions:

1) Is conventional war becoming obsolete?1) Is conventional war becoming obsolete?a.a. Number of Number of ““warswars”” declining since 1991 declining since 1991b.b. Number of deaths decliningNumber of deaths declining

=The =The ““obsolescence of warobsolescence of war”” thesis . . . . thesis . . . . Explanations?Explanations?

““Democratic peaceDemocratic peace”” has spread has spread ““GlobalizationGlobalization”” has made interstate war to costly has made interstate war to costly

to pursue, or to tolerateto pursue, or to tolerate Changes in the Changes in the ““balance of powerbalance of power””

Role of Nuclear Weapons?Role of Nuclear Weapons? Role of the Role of the ““Revolution in Military AffairsRevolution in Military Affairs””

1) Introduction:1) Introduction:

Unit Analytical Questions:Unit Analytical Questions:

2) Why is modern war a mainly 2) Why is modern war a mainly ““southernsouthern”” phenomenon?phenomenon?

a.a. Ideological and political factors?Ideological and political factors?b.b. Power?Power?

1) Introduction:1) Introduction:

2) What is 2) What is ““WarWar””??A murky concept? A murky concept? Should be easy to judge when Should be easy to judge when wars occur, but wars occur, but ““WarWar”” is a more problematic concept is a more problematic concept than we think . . . . We donthan we think . . . . We don ’’t even know how to count t even know how to count them(!)them(!)

““WarWar”” = = ““An act of force intended to compel our An act of force intended to compel our opponents to fulfill our willopponents to fulfill our will”” (Von Clausewitz)(Von Clausewitz) War is an extension of normal politics amongst War is an extension of normal politics amongst

statesstates – Clausewitz lived in a – Clausewitz lived in a ““WestphalianWestphalian”” world world = only interstate war.= only interstate war.

““WarWar”” = = ““Organized violence among political Organized violence among political unitsunits”” (Contemporary definition)(Contemporary definition) Includes interstate war, civil war, asymmetrical Includes interstate war, civil war, asymmetrical

civil wars and maybe terrorism.civil wars and maybe terrorism.

Organized violence must be large scale = at Organized violence must be large scale = at least 1,000 deathsleast 1,000 deaths

3) What Causes 3) What Causes ““WarWar””??

==Most important concern in IRMost important concern in IR

Practical? Decisions by one or more states (or Practical? Decisions by one or more states (or groups) to use violence as a political strategygroups) to use violence as a political strategy

Caused by underlying conflicts over resources, land Caused by underlying conflicts over resources, land and ideas . . . .and ideas . . . .

Theoretical? Many different answers, but all Theoretical? Many different answers, but all theories only explain some wars and not otherstheories only explain some wars and not others

Need to think about all three Need to think about all three ““levels of analysislevels of analysis”” E.g. Kenneth Waltz E.g. Kenneth Waltz ““Man, State and WarMan, State and War””

““Individual LevelIndividual Level”” - factors that make war & - factors that make war & conflict more likelyconflict more likely

Character of individual leaders Character of individual leaders E.g. Realist view of human natureE.g. Realist view of human nature

Many examples . . . . Aggressive behavior may be Many examples . . . . Aggressive behavior may be ““naturalnatural”” and yet not all leaders decide to go to war . . and yet not all leaders decide to go to war . . . hard to generalize. hard to generalize

MisperceptionMisperceptionE.g. Suddam Hussein and the E.g. Suddam Hussein and the

invasion of Kuwait (1991)invasion of Kuwait (1991) Thought US would let him do it(?)Thought US would let him do it(?) Thought UN was ineffective(?)Thought UN was ineffective(?)

““State LevelState Level”” - factors that make war & - factors that make war & conflict more likelyconflict more likely

Political, social and economic factors Political, social and economic factors internalinternal to to statesstates

a) Ethnicity: Multination states = more civil wara) Ethnicity: Multination states = more civil war

b) Political Structure: Democracies more peaceful b) Political Structure: Democracies more peaceful to one anotherto one another

E.g. Liberal “E.g. Liberal “Democratic PeaceDemocratic Peace” Theory” Theory

c) Political Structure – Governments lacking c) Political Structure – Governments lacking legitimacy more likely to engage in warlegitimacy more likely to engage in war

E.g. E.g. ““Diversionary WarDiversionary War””: Theory that : Theory that leaders start war to divert attention from leaders start war to divert attention from domestic problemsdomestic problems

E.g. National unity in event of international E.g. National unity in event of international conflictconflict

Britain (Falklands War 1982)Britain (Falklands War 1982) Pakistan (Wars with India)Pakistan (Wars with India)

d) Economic Structure – Capitalist states more . . .?d) Economic Structure – Capitalist states more . . .?

Radicals = Capitalism makes states violentRadicals = Capitalism makes states violent

Liberals = Capitalism makes states peacefulLiberals = Capitalism makes states peaceful

““International System LevelInternational System Level”” - factors that - factors that make war & conflict more likelymake war & conflict more likely

““NeorealismNeorealism” – focus on anarchy” – focus on anarchy=Makes disputes over practical concerns more =Makes disputes over practical concerns more

likely to lead to warlikely to lead to war No authority to resolve practical problems No authority to resolve practical problems

E.g. E.g. ““Power Transition TheoryPower Transition Theory””: War occurs : War occurs when challenger states acquire more capabilities when challenger states acquire more capabilities relative to existing powersrelative to existing powers

Many interstate wars caused by this dimension?Many interstate wars caused by this dimension? E.g. JapanE.g. Japan’’s wars in Asias wars in Asia

Russo-Japanese War (1904-5)Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) First and Second Sino-Japanese Wars (1895 First and Second Sino-Japanese Wars (1895

& 1931 & 1937-1945& 1931 & 1937-1945

E.g. E.g. ““Security DilemmaSecurity Dilemma””: Realist focus on the : Realist focus on the relative distribution of power.relative distribution of power.

Rationality suggests others must respond by Rationality suggests others must respond by acquiring new capabilitiesacquiring new capabilities

Leads to a Leads to a spiral of insecurityspiral of insecurity

E.g. E.g. Arms racesArms races which ultimately may cause a which ultimately may cause a warwar

““Security DilemmaSecurity Dilemma””: British-: British-German Naval Race 1906 – 1914!German Naval Race 1906 – 1914!

Makes existing navies obsoleteMakes existing navies obsolete Creates opportunity for Germany to Creates opportunity for Germany to

challenge British naval dominancechallenge British naval dominance

1906: 1906: Great Great Britain builds first Britain builds first ““DreadnaughtDreadnaught””

““Security DilemmaSecurity Dilemma””: British-: British-German Naval Race 1906 – 1914!German Naval Race 1906 – 1914!

By 1914:By 1914:•Great Britain had 38 dreadnoughts Great Britain had 38 dreadnoughts •Germany had 24 dreadnoughts Germany had 24 dreadnoughts

Implications:Implications:•Britain less secure then before HMS Dreadnaught (!)Britain less secure then before HMS Dreadnaught (!)•British state and public become increasingly anti-German – British state and public become increasingly anti-German – contributed to WWI?contributed to WWI?

No explanation works in all cases . . . .No explanation works in all cases . . . .

Most wars caused by variety of factorsMost wars caused by variety of factors WWI not caused by WWI not caused by ““Security DilemmaSecurity Dilemma””

alone . . .alone . . .

However . . . .However . . . .

Theoretical perspectives do help explain why some Theoretical perspectives do help explain why some states choose war and others do not . . .states choose war and others do not . . .

Theoretical perspectives have influenced national Theoretical perspectives have influenced national security strategies(!)security strategies(!)

4) Traditional Approaches to National 4) Traditional Approaches to National Security:Security:

Realist analysis: Realist analysis:

1)States may miscalculate, but a rational, or wise state 1)States may miscalculate, but a rational, or wise state focuses on the relative focuses on the relative ““balance of powerbalance of power””..

2) Acquire offensive military capabilities2) Acquire offensive military capabilities

E.g. E.g. ““structurestructure”” matters - In practical terms this leads to matters - In practical terms this leads to very specific policiesvery specific policies

E.g. Mearsheimer and the E.g. Mearsheimer and the end of the Cold War - end of the Cold War - Predicted new threats Predicted new threats would arise as states would arise as states returned to more returned to more predatory predatory ““balance of balance of powerpower”” behavior = re-arm! behavior = re-arm! There is no There is no ““peace peace dividenddividend””

Liberal Approaches:Liberal Approaches: Emphasize Emphasize ““RegimesRegimes””

E.g. E.g. ““Collective SecurityCollective Security”” E.g. E.g. ““DisarmamentDisarmament”” and and ““Arms ControlArms Control””

Critical Approaches:Critical Approaches: Reject realism – Reject realism – ““MilitarismMilitarism”” is the real problem is the real problem

E.g. States acquire military capabilities to control E.g. States acquire military capabilities to control their own people as much as to pursue national their own people as much as to pursue national securitysecurity

E.g. Security is an individual human characteristic – E.g. Security is an individual human characteristic – not something belonging to the state.not something belonging to the state.

Ideas influence choices in military Ideas influence choices in military ““capabilitiescapabilities””

Why do states acquire military capabilities?Why do states acquire military capabilities? Deterrence and/or CompellenceDeterrence and/or Compellence (???) (???) Non military functions:Non military functions:

Peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, criminal Peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, criminal surveillance, snow removalsurveillance, snow removal

Controlling domestic dissent!Controlling domestic dissent!

Each state/group must weigh the importance of these functions in Each state/group must weigh the importance of these functions in choosing military capabilitieschoosing military capabilities Some capabilities not useful for some tasksSome capabilities not useful for some tasks

E.g. Nuclear weapons will not help you maintain domestic E.g. Nuclear weapons will not help you maintain domestic political control . . . .political control . . . .

Some states have different values (?)Some states have different values (?)

A) Traditional Types of Capabilities:A) Traditional Types of Capabilities: 1) 1) ““Conventional ArmiesConventional Armies”” = Infantry soldiers, = Infantry soldiers,

artillery and landmines . . . .artillery and landmines . . . .

Strengths?Strengths? Defense of territoryDefense of territory Maintain order - Maintain order - ““boots on the groundboots on the ground””

Drawbacks?Drawbacks? Expensive – effective infantries require Expensive – effective infantries require

exhaustive trainingexhaustive training People are not normally willing to fight and die . . .People are not normally willing to fight and die . . .

Deterrence, but less effective at compellenceDeterrence, but less effective at compellence Domestic problems? Political influence of large Domestic problems? Political influence of large

army!army!

2) Power Projection Capabilities: Necessary to use 2) Power Projection Capabilities: Necessary to use military force beyond national borders – military force beyond national borders – closely closely associated with theassociated with the ““Revolution in Military Affairs Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)(RMA)””

=Navies, air forces, modern missiles, logistics, =Navies, air forces, modern missiles, logistics, surveillancesurveillance

Strengths:Strengths: Compellence = Compellence = ““Gunboat DiplomacyGunboat Diplomacy”” Lower casualties! Lower casualties!

Drawbacks:Drawbacks:=Extremely =Extremely expensive $$$$$$expensive $$$$$$

Technology has widened gap between most armies and Technology has widened gap between most armies and those with power projection capabilitiesthose with power projection capabilities

Communications technology, precession Communications technology, precession targeting/stand-off weaponry and stealthtargeting/stand-off weaponry and stealth

The The ““Revolution in Military AffairsRevolution in Military Affairs”” . . . . . . (A.K.A (A.K.A ““TransformationTransformation””))

Based on the lessons of the 1991 Based on the lessons of the 1991 Gulf War Gulf War – – the UNthe UN’’s s ““bloodlessbloodless”” victory victory

Iraq had been perceived as a major military Iraq had been perceived as a major military power with a large, well equipped army . . . (!)power with a large, well equipped army . . . (!)

Technology seemed to have tipped the balance Technology seemed to have tipped the balance of power decisively in favor of the U.S. . . . of power decisively in favor of the U.S. . . . at at least in the formal phase of combat.least in the formal phase of combat.

=New form of military intervention requiring =New form of military intervention requiring few soldiersfew soldiers Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Libya Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Libya 20112011

=New types of defense spending(?)=New types of defense spending(?)

Defense Spending & the RMA – Defense Spending & the RMA – Who can Who can keep up with the U.S. ???keep up with the U.S. ???

Defense Spending & the RMA – Defense Spending & the RMA – Who can Who can keep up with the U.S. ???keep up with the U.S. ???

Is the RMA & Power Projection Is the RMA & Power Projection ““Worth ItWorth It””??

Good for limited, international interventions, but less effective for maintaining control and order over territory?

US mission to IraqUS mission to Iraq(1990-1991)(1990-1991)

600,000 + Soldiers600,000 + Soldiers

US mission to US mission to Vietnam (1968)Vietnam (1968)

800,000 + Soldiers800,000 + Soldiers

US mission to IraqUS mission to Iraq(2003)(2003)

130,000 + Soldiers130,000 + Soldiers

US investment in RMA equals insufficient resources to wage conventional war and control territory????? Implications? Only fight wars

with limited objectives?

2) Power Projection Capabilities: Necessary to use 2) Power Projection Capabilities: Necessary to use military force beyond national borders – military force beyond national borders – closely closely associated with theassociated with the ““Revolution in Military Affairs Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)(RMA)””

=Navies, air forces, modern missiles, logistics=Navies, air forces, modern missiles, logisticsStrengths:Strengths:

Compellence – other states avoid conflict(!)Compellence – other states avoid conflict(!) Lower casualties!Lower casualties!

Drawbacks:Drawbacks:=Extremely =Extremely expensive $$$$$$expensive $$$$$$

Technology has widened gap between most armies and Technology has widened gap between most armies and those with power projection capabilitiesthose with power projection capabilities

Communications technology, precession Communications technology, precession targeting/stand-off weaponry and stealthtargeting/stand-off weaponry and stealth

ProblemProblem: Can : Can ““middlemiddle”” or or ““smallsmall”” powers afford powers afford these weapons over the long termthese weapons over the long term

B) Alternative capabilities – B) Alternative capabilities – ““war on the war on the cheapcheap””

1) 1) ““Asymmetric warfareAsymmetric warfare””: War between parties of : War between parties of unequal strength in which weaker party avoids unequal strength in which weaker party avoids major confrontationsmajor confrontations More common given imbalance in modern More common given imbalance in modern

forces?forces? TechniquesTechniques::

““Guerrilla warfareGuerrilla warfare””: Approach to war favored : Approach to war favored by by ““irregularirregular”” militaries militaries

= = ““Hit and runHit and run”” tactics - relies on concealment tactics - relies on concealment among civilian population among civilian population

Increase occupation costs for conventional armiesIncrease occupation costs for conventional armies Now common (Vietnam Now common (Vietnam Iraq Iraq Afghanistan)Afghanistan)

Asymmetric warfareAsymmetric warfare – Strengths – Strengths Low cost . . .Low cost . . .

Asymmetric warfareAsymmetric warfare – Weaknesses – Weaknesses High risk for supporters???High risk for supporters??? Effectiveness???Effectiveness???

-Improved -Improved ““counterinsurgencycounterinsurgency”” techniques techniques (COIN) reduce effectiveness of these strategies(COIN) reduce effectiveness of these strategies

Case Study: Canadian Choices in Case Study: Canadian Choices in Capabilities and National Security?Capabilities and National Security?

Jockel and Sokolsky: Jockel and Sokolsky: ““Canada and the War in Canada and the War in Afghanistan: NATOAfghanistan: NATO’’s Odd Man Out Steps s Odd Man Out Steps ForwardForward”” – – Assesses the impact of CanadaAssesses the impact of Canada ’’s s ““unexpected warunexpected war””

What is CanadaWhat is Canada’’s strategy?s strategy? Before Afghanistan?Before Afghanistan? After Afghanistan?After Afghanistan?

Case Study: Canadian Choices in Case Study: Canadian Choices in Capabilities and National Security?Capabilities and National Security?

Jockel and Sokolsky: Jockel and Sokolsky: ““Canada and the War in Canada and the War in Afghanistan: NATOAfghanistan: NATO’’s Odd Man Out Steps s Odd Man Out Steps ForwardForward””– – Assesses the impact of CanadaAssesses the impact of Canada ’’s s “unexpected war”“unexpected war”

What is CanadaWhat is Canada’’s strategy?s strategy? Before Afghanistan?Before Afghanistan? After Afghanistan? After Afghanistan? = heavy emphasis on = heavy emphasis on

transformation/RMAtransformation/RMA

The RMA responds The RMA responds to changing ideas to changing ideas about the about the ““BattlespaceBattlespace”” (?) (?)

Traditional Traditional Security problems Security problems ““TerrorismTerrorism”” ““CyberwarfareCyberwarfare”” suggest the suggest the environment is environment is more complex and more complex and requires different requires different responses.responses.

5) New Problems:5) New Problems:

E.g. US Homeland E.g. US Homeland Security costs:Security costs:

Meeting the challenge of Meeting the challenge of ““TerrorismTerrorism””!!

““TerrorismTerrorism””: Use of : Use of ““illegitimateillegitimate”” violence by violence by sub-state groups to inspire fearsub-state groups to inspire fear

Tactic: Tactic: -Attack civilians/non-combatants-Attack civilians/non-combatants

Goals: Goals: -Raise awareness of grievances-Raise awareness of grievances-Provoke counterproductive -Provoke counterproductive responses from authorities responses from authorities

Types:Types: Ideological Terrorism Ideological Terrorism Ethno-Nationalist TerrorismEthno-Nationalist Terrorism Religious or Sacred TerrorismReligious or Sacred Terrorism

““TerrorismTerrorism”” has a long history but many argue has a long history but many argue ““globalizationglobalization”” has increased the risks (?) has increased the risks (?)

Globalization may cause increased terrorismGlobalization may cause increased terrorism E.g. Religious or sacred terrorists are often responding to some E.g. Religious or sacred terrorists are often responding to some

form of secular, cultural imperialismform of secular, cultural imperialism E.g. Economic inequalities highlighted by globalization may E.g. Economic inequalities highlighted by globalization may

increase peoplesincrease peoples’’ willingness to use the tactic willingness to use the tactic

Globalization likely facilitates terrorism, or at least Globalization likely facilitates terrorism, or at least our awareness of itour awareness of it

E.g. New opportunities for mobility or lethality E.g. New opportunities for mobility or lethality ““SkyjackingsSkyjackings”” have been common since the 1960shave been common since the 1960s

E.g. Increased media awareness?E.g. Increased media awareness?

However, most important change is However, most important change is the rise of the rise of ““State-Sponsored State-Sponsored TerrorismTerrorism”” – a new tactic in – a new tactic in asymmetric warfare?asymmetric warfare?

““TerrorismTerrorism”” is particularly difficult to is particularly difficult to combat . . . .combat . . . .

It is an It is an ““easyeasy”” low cost tactic low cost tactic It imposes significant public costs, challenging It imposes significant public costs, challenging

the principles of liberal democratic societiesthe principles of liberal democratic societies

Is it effective?Is it effective?

““TerrorismTerrorism”” is particularly difficult to is particularly difficult to combat . . . .combat . . . .

It is an It is an ““easyeasy”” low cost tactic low cost tactic It imposes significant public costs, challenging It imposes significant public costs, challenging

the principles of liberal democratic societiesthe principles of liberal democratic societies

Is it effective?Is it effective? Like warfare generally . Like warfare generally .

. . violence often . . violence often ““workworkss”” – it is a major source – it is a major source of political change.of political change.

Is it Is it ““legitimatelegitimate””??

Argument: The “ends” justify the means . . . . Argument: The “ends” justify the means . . . . Terrorism is no worse than more formal types Terrorism is no worse than more formal types of military aggression!of military aggression!

It is a It is a ““logicallogical”” response to the RMA response to the RMA What difference does it make if the aggressors are non-state What difference does it make if the aggressors are non-state

actors?actors? Context matters – Context matters – ““freedom fightersfreedom fighters”” versus versus ““terroriststerrorists””

Argument: Terrorism is worse!Argument: Terrorism is worse! Often lacks broad legitimacy even in the community it claims to Often lacks broad legitimacy even in the community it claims to

supportsupport It usually involves the deliberate targeting of non-combatantsIt usually involves the deliberate targeting of non-combatants The “means” are not proportionate to the threats they respond toThe “means” are not proportionate to the threats they respond to

Only effective in very limited long term instances – In the interim Only effective in very limited long term instances – In the interim the human cost is highthe human cost is high

5) For Next Time . . .5) For Next Time . . .

Unit Five: Unit Five: Modern ConflictModern Conflict

“Managing Insecurity, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention”

Globalization of World Politics, 31. Crsitina Badescu and Linnea Bergholm, “The Responsibility

to Protect and the Conflict in Darfur: The Big Let-Down,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 40 no. 3, June 2009, Pp. 287-309. (Available from e-journals, or from the instructor).