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ENCLOSURE (3)

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583022 Apr 11

CONFIDENTIAL--Unclassified upon removal of enc losure (73)From:To:

.Subj :

b7c I= Deputy Commander, u.s. Naval Forces Afr i c aPRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE (LPD IS)

Ref: (a) JAGMAN

Encl :

(b) SECNAVINST 1610.2A, DON Pol icy on Hazing(c) OPNAVINST F3100.6J , Chapter 5 - OPREP-3 Navy Uni t

SITREP Repor t s o f 22 Dec 2009(I) Deputy Commander, U.S. Naval Forces

Ser CNE-CNA-C6F/707 o f 16 Apr 11(2) U.S. F l ee t Forces I n spec to r Genera l

of 14 Apr 11(3 ) USS PONCE Command Phi losophy

Afr i c a ltr 5830Hot l ine Complaint

(4 ) Voluntary s ta tement o f r l - - - - - - - - - - b ~ 7 c - - - - - - - - - - ~ 1 of18 Apr 11

(5 ) Voluntary s ta tement o f bte I of 19 Apr 11(6 ) Voluntary s ta tement o f bIe I of 18 Apr 11(7) Voluntary s ta tement o f b7c I of. 19 Apr 11(8) Voluntary s ta tement o f I bIe I of

20 Apr 11(9 ) Voluntary s ta tement o f I b7c lo f19 Apr 11

(10) Voluntary s ta tement of b7e of20 Apr 11

( I I ) Voluntary s ta tement of b7c lo f20 Apr 11(12) Voluntary s ta tement of b7e l o f

20 Apr 11(13) Voluntary s ta tement of = = = = = = ~ b ~ 7 e ~ = = = = ~ _ O ~ f 19 Apr 11(14) Voluntary s ta tement o f I b7c I of

19 Apr 11(IS) Voluntary s ta tement o f I hle l o f19 Apr 11(16) Voluntary s ta tement o f I bIe o f

20 Apr 11(17) Voluntary s ta tement of I bIe lo f

19 Apr 11(18) Voluntary s ta tement o f I bIe of 20 Apr 11

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Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE (LPD 15)(19) Voluntary s t a t emen t of bZe of 20 Apr 11(20) Voluntary s ta tement of tw: lo f20 Apr 11(21) Voluntary s t a t emen t o f bZ.:: '" of 20 Apr 11(22) Voluntary s t a t emen t of tjic of

20 Apr 11(2 3 ) Voluntary s t a t emen t of I !;!7s;: lo f 19 Apr 11(24) Voluntary s t a t emen t of bZe of

20 Apr 11(25) Voluntary s ta tement of bZe lo f19 Apr 11(26 ) Voluntary s t a t emen t of bZIt:, of 20 Apr 11(27) Voluntary s ta tement o f bZc l o f

20 Apr 11(28) Voluntary s t a t emen t of I bZ" o f 19 Apr 11(2 9 ) Voluntary s ta tement of I bZc :z o f 19 Apr 11(3 0 ) Voluntary s ta tement of I bZ" I of19 Apr 11(31) Voluntary s ta tement of bZ" I of19 Apr 11(32) Voluntary s ta tement of b7c of20 Apr 11(33) Voluntary s ta tement of bZc o f

20 Apr 11(34) Voluntary s ta tement of I bl: o f20 Apr 11(35) Voluntary s ta tement of I b7s;: lo f

20 Apr 11(36 ) Art i c l e 31(b) Rights Advisement of bZe I(37) Summary o f in terv iew with I bZe l o f19 Apr 11(38 ) Art i c l e 31(b) Rights Advisement o f I bZc(39) Summary of in terv iew with I bZc lo f

20 A pr 11(4 0 ) A r t i c l e 31(b) Rights Advisement of I bZe

I bZe I(41) Summary of in terv iew with I b7c lo f20 Apr 11(42) Art i c l e 31(b) Rights Advisement o f LCDR Kurt

612(43) Summary of in terv iew with LCDR Kurt Boenisch of20 Apr 11

(44) Art i c l e 31{b) Rights Advisement of CDR Et ta Jones(45) Summary of - interview with CDR Et ta Jones of

21 Apr 11(46) Excerpts from NTRP 3-07 .2 .2 , o f Aug 2003

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Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE (LPD 15)(47) PONCEINST 5530.1F, Force Protect ion Aler t andSecur i ty Aler t Bi l l , Enclosures (6) and (10), of2 Jun 10(48) USS PONCE Deck Log for 13 Apr 11(49) USS PONCE 252155Z Feb 11 [UNIT SITREP 11-002repor t ing al leged assaul t between E-8 and E-5 on 23Feb 2011](50) USS PONCE 012359Z Mar 11 [UNIT $ITREP 11-002-Afollow-up report](51) Non-Judicial Punishment proceedings ICO hIe

hZe I of 28 Feb 11(52) Non-Judicial Punishment proceedings ICOGte I of 28 Feb 11(53) CDR Etta Jones E-mail to I b7e I of28 Feb 11

(54) DAPA Brief from Command DAPA of 19 Apr 2011(55) Port Brief fo r Aqaba, Jordan(56) Major I I j te I E-mail of 21 Feb 11(57) USS PONCE 162100Z Mar 11 [UNIT SITREP 11-003repor t ing a l leged assau l t o fE-4 on 16 March 2011](58) USS PONCE 212305Z Mar 11 [UNIT SITREP 11-003Afollow-up report](59) Preliminary Inquiry into al leged assaul t of E-4 on15 and 16 March 2011(60) Non-Judicial Punishment Proceedings ICOI hIe I of 26 Mar 11(61) PONCEINST 1640.21 dtd 14 Mar 11: Extra MilitaryInstruct ion, Withholding of Privileges , andExtension of Working Hours

(62) PONCEINST 1640.21-CH.l dtd 01 Apr 11(63) Extra Military Assignment fo r ~ 1 - - - - - - - - - ~ h ~ 7 ~ c - - - - - - - - - - ' 1 of30 Mar 11(64) Extra Mili tary Assignment for I b7c of30 Mal: 11(65) Extra Military Assignment for ____________ ~ h 7 ~ r . ____________of 30 Mar 11(66) Assault Craf t Unit TWO Commanding Officer ' s StandingOrder Nine of 1 Sep 09

(67) Memorandum of Agreement between Commanding Officer ,USS PONCE (LPD 15) and Commanding Officer , AssaultCraf t Unit TWO of 22 Oct 10(68) LCU 1661 Deck Logs of 22 Nov 10(69) CDR Etta Jones E-mail to ~ - - - - - - ~ h z ~ e - - - - - - . - - - ~ I (reInvestigation of Weapons Incident , of 28 Mar 11(70) I b7e I E-mail to I ,tI7e I ereBerthing Altercation) of 21 Apr 11

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Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE {LPD IS}{71} b7c 1 E-mail to 1 gZc ereFollow-up on SITREP} of 21 Apr 11(72) h Ie _ I E-mail to 1'""1----:tJ-=z,....c----.1 ere Unit

SITREP - Berthing Altercat ion) of 21 Apr 11{73} 1 bZc 1 E-mail to CDR Etta Jones ereFollow-up on SITREP} of 20 Mar 11 {C}(74) CDR Etta Jones E-mail to I hIe = (re Reportof Confrontat ion Follow up Part IV) of 27 Feb 11(75) USS PONCE {LPD IS} Deck Log of 12 Apr 11(76) MWR Receipts from Green Bay Packers Visi t(77) USS PONCE 241945Z Mar 11 [UNIT SITREP 11-004report ing accidental f i r ing of M500 Shotgun on24 Mar 11](78) USS PONCE 220115Z Apr 11 [Navy Blue 11-006 repor t inghazing on 15 Mar 11]Preliminary Statement

1. As directed by enclosure ( I ) , a preliminary inquiry wasconducted in accordance with reference (a) into the al legedmisconduct by the Commanding Officer , USS PONCE (LPD 15). Theal legat ions stem from an anonymous complaint f i led with the U.S.Fleet Forces Inspector General 's off ice , enclosure (2).Findings of Fact

1. A hotl ine complaint was lodged through the U.S. Fleet ForcesInspector General website on 14 Apri l 2011, al leging misconductto include creat ing a hos t i l e work environment, humiliation ofsubordinates, preferent ia l t reatment, abuse of power and verbalabuse by the Commanding Officer (CO) of USS PONCE. (Encl 2)2. The CO of USS PONCE i s CDR Etta Jones. CDR Jones has beenin cotmualld since 24 October 2010. (Enel 44, 45)3. The Executive Officer (XO) of USS PONCE i s LCDR KurtBoenisch. LCDR Boenisch has been onboard since January 2010.(Encl 42, 43)4 .. The Command Master Chief (CMC) of USS PONCE i s 1 bZc 11 b7G I. CMDCM has been onboard for three years . (Encl 40, 41)Preferent ia l Treatment5. Several PONCE off icers and Chief Petty Officers hold theperception tha t the CO gives preferent ia l t reatment to the

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Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE (LPD 15)

female off icers over the male off icers . (Encl 4-6, 8, 9, 12, 13,15-20, 36, 37)6. The CO has conducted female-only off ice r meetings in herstateroom, invi ted the female off icers to her stateroom fo rmovie and popcorn night , has offered the use of the CO's sedanwhen in por t and has bought female off icers gi f t s . (Encl 4, 8,9 , 1 2 , 1 5 , 1 7 , 4 3 ) ,7. Some of the recipients of the CO's preferent ia l t reatmentfee l uncomfortable and s ta te tha t it affects the i r cred ib i l i tywithin the wardroom. (Encl 15, 38, 39)8. Several off icers and Chief Petty Officers bel ieve the COt r ea t s cer ta in male off icers worse than others ; these off icersinclude I bIc I, I bie I , I hZe and 1 b7c I.(Encl 6, 9, 13, 20, 25 ,43)9. While the ship was in por t Bahrain, RDML Klein (Commander,Expeditionary Strike Group Five) requested an "a l l gir ls" photoand invi ted a l l of the female off icers to dinner a t her home.(Ericl 8, 15, 17, 18, 39)10. The CO considered regret t ing the invi ta t ion fo r the dinnerhosted by RDML Klein, but was advised to accept by the XO andCMC. (Encl 37, 41, 43)11. The male off icers were not invi ted to the dinner a t RDMLKlein 's residence and several f e l t th i s to be a dis t inc tprofessional disadvantage. (Encl 15, 18)12. Several off icers and enl is ted share the perception tha t theCO gives preferent ia l t reatment to I hZe ! . b7e hasnot I!Itood Office:r of the Deck (OOD) since she quall.fl.ed inOctober 2010, and has been standing Engineering Officer of theWatch Under Ins t ruc t ion (EOOW U/I) since mid-October 2010 andfai:led to qual i fy unt i l 22 April . She has repor tedly missed U/Iwatches frequently and without repercussions. (Encl 4, 6, 9, 14,15, 18, 20, 25)13. I bI c has been referred to as the CO's "daughter ,""god-child," or "CO's Special gi r l . " (Encl 5, 9, 20, 39, 43)14. The former 1 b7c 1 ( ..._--""b7""",c_--,I)" was nat required toq u ~ l i f y as EOOW. (Encl 9)

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15. b7c I was put in for a Navy-Marine Corps CommendationMedal (COM) as an end-of- tour (EOT) award; several of the crewbelieved tha t more deserving off icers received only Navy-MarineCor,ps Achievement Medals (NAMs). (Encl 4, 13, 16, 20, 25)16. Several male off icers have been given counseling sheets forshowing up a few minutes la te fo r assigned watches. (EncI18)17. Several off icers perceived tha t I btc I, the formerI I, was also shown preferent ia l t reatment by the CO; towit, the CO bought her gluten-free pizza and had it prepared inthe wardroom on pizza night . (Encl 12, 17, 18, 20)18. Sometimes the CO would buy food fo r the ent i re Wardroom.(Encl 8, 12)19. On one occasion, I b7c I and I h7c I accompanied theCO on l iber ty in Seychelles. These off icers f e l t they had nochoice but to accompany the CO. (Encl 39)20'. The CO created a group of second-tour division off icerstha t she has dubbed the "gatekeepers." This group i s in chargeof murder boards fo r upcoming OODs and Combat Information CenterWatch Officer (CICWOs). (Encl 5, 14, 19, 37, 39, 45)21. At the gatekeeper meetings, the CO s ta ted tha t she knewthese private meetings were driving the XO and department heads"crazy" because they did not know what was occurring. (Encl 6,14)22. The CO f requent ly tasks division off icers and Chief PettyOff icers direc t ly without going through or informing the chainof command. (Encl 6, 14, 37)23. The Captain frequently reminds the off icers tha t th is i sher ship. (Encl 24)24. I h1c I s ta ted the CO appears to have l i t t l e or noregard fo r input from senior leadership onboard the ship. Hisbe l ie f i s tha t senior leadership has perpetuated th i senvironment by not taking fu l l ownership and responsib i l i ty andrel inquishing the i r authori ty to the CO because of conf l ic t .(Encl 24)25. In teract ions between the CO and the embarked USMC and USAFsenior leadership were conducted with proper respect for rank

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and posi t ion. There was an i ssue of wardroom protocol with theUSAF off icers tha t was resolved in an appropria te manner. (Encl32, 43)26 . . PONCE has published a command philosophy, which i savai lable on the in t ranet homepage, and i s posted outside theAdmin Office. The philosophy encourages Sai lors to "Do theRight Thing." (Encl 3)Abuse of Power27. While in por t Aqaba, Jordan, I b7G - ' was assigned OOD inpor t . He received a ca l l from I bIe I asking i f he wanteq. togo on a dive t r i p with the CO, responded tha t he was on watch,but f e l t he could not say "no" to the CO so he found a re l ie fand went with her. The cost of the dive t r ip was $100. (Encl 4,18)28. The CO purchased several boxes of cigars to se l l during the"beer on the pier" event in Aqaba. (Encl 12, 17, 43, 45 )29. Some of the cigars tha t the CO purchased were CUban and shebrought them onto the ship fo r storage between sa les evehts.(Encl 45)30 : Officers f e l t they had to se l l the cigars because they wereasked by the CO. The proceeds from the sales were given back tothe. CO. There was no accountabil i ty for th i s money. (Encl 12,17)31. The CO purchased popsicles and directed the Food ServicesOfficer to place them for sale in the sh ip ' s store f reezer .Sales of these i tems were processed through a separate account.ThE! proceeds fLolli the sale went to the s h ~ p ' s dependents daycruise and were not comingled with those of the Ship's Supplydepartment accounts. The CO was not reimbursed fo r her costs .(Encl 17, 45)32. There i s no evidence of Commissary/Exchange runs fo r thebenef i t of the CO. The CO s ta ted she did not direc t sh ip ' scompany to conduct such runs. (Encl 17, 23, 41, 45 )33. The CO authorized the use of MWR funds to purchase commandcoins and beverages for dist inguished vis i tor s from the GreenBay Packers on 23 February 2011. (Encl 12, 76) .

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34. The CO purchased M&Ms to be used as an incent ive fo r ara f f l e held to defray cos ts for the Tiger Cruise. Two M&Mra f f le s have been held on the ship . The money fo r the M&Ms camefrom the CO and she was paid back from the sa le . (Encl 4, 6, 7,45)Abusive Behavior35. The f i r s t nigh t the CO was in command, she had an a l l khakimeeting in the wardroom and explained how many CO's had beenrel ieved in recen t years but t ha t "she would not go down alone."(Encl 14)36. Several off i ce rs bel ieve the morale of the sh ip ' s crew hasgrea t ly decreased s ince the CO has taken over command. (Encl 7,14, .18, 19, 41)37. Several off i ce rs and crew have s ta ted the CO i s a micromanager and "gets in the weeds" on many things. (Encl 6, 12,24, 39, 43)38. The CO "loves a ton of information." (Encl 27, 43)39.. The CO ins t i tu ted mandatory Saturday night of f ice r dinners .At some of the dinners , movies were played. At one dinner ,several off i ce rs perceived they were directed to watch the"Caine Mutiny." (Encl 4, 6, 13, 14, 17, 37)40. After the viewing of the "Caine Mutiny," several junioroff icers s ta ted they were required to climb the mast fo r a lo f tt ra in ing . (Encl 4, 6, 13, 14, 18, 37)41. The CO said I bI chelp with h is socia l sk i l l s . i s a "puddle of shi t" and needsCEncI 17)42. b7c L s ta ted the CO to ld her to "take off herglasses ," and the CO "smacked" the forehead of I hleplayful ly . The CO ca l led her a "dumb ass" fo r standing in l ineto buy an MWR tour t i cke t since she i s the sa les of f ice r .b7c did not welcome t h i s physical conduct. (Encl 17)43 . The CO s ta ted she -never cal led I hZe I a "dumbass ," but t ha t she " l ight ly touched" her on the forehead, andt ha t I blc I laughed aloud. The CO s ta ted her commentsand act ions were a l l in j e s t . (Encl 45)

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44. While I bZe L was s tanding OOD on the bridge, the COt o ld him: " In t e r ru p t me again and I wi l l take a gigan t ic s h i ton you." This was in f ron t o f sev e ra l o f f i c e r s and en l i s t edp resen t on t he b r idge and embarrassed the o f f i ce r . (Encl 4, 12,1 4 ~ 1 6 , 18, 24, 37, 41, 43, 45)45. CDR Jones has re fe rred to females as "lumpy people ." Thisterm led to th e opinion t h a t "lumpy people" go t t r ea t edd i f fe ren t ly . (Encl 12)46. The CO has s t a t ed a t meetings with Off icers and Chiefs t h a tif they disobey her o rders , t h a t she wi l l "crush" o r "des t roy"them. (Encl 4,6,17,18,25,41,43)47. The CO descr ibes ce r t a in of f ice r s as "sp ec i a l ," " i d i o t s" o r"dumb." (Encl 4, 39)48. The CO has descr ibed the l eaders on the ship as "fuckedup." (Encl 5, 6, 8, 18)49 .. The CO's ac t ions and words cause per sonne l to second guessthemselves. (Encl 5, 6, 9, 16, 25)50. The CO of ten y e l l s and bera tes subordinates over th ecommand common on th e hydra. (Encl 4, 6, 12, 14, 41)51. The CO overuses th e 1MC and hydra so much t h a t she crea tesconfus ion and th e crew of ten t u rn s it o ff o r down so as not tol i s t e n to her . (Encl 9, 12, 25)52. I b7r.., I (OPSO) formerly wrote a l l the watch b i l l s .The CO requested to review them and would change themcomplete ly , so she took over th e t ask of wri t ing the watchb i l l s .(Enel 4, 12)53. There i s a percep t ion of an unfa i r d is t r ibu t ion o f watchesamongst o f f i ce r s . The of f i ce r s th e CO does not l ike rece ive twoto three watches, while others s t and none. (Encl 4)54. Some Department Heads have the percep t ion they have noi npu t in the rankings fo r th e DIVOs/junior o f f i c e r s in t h e i rdepar tments . (Encl 4, 6)55. The CO d i r ec t ed t h a t 24 hour g r a f f i t i watches be s tood inthe heads by th e F i r s t Class Pe t t y O f f i ce rs . The doors wereremoved in some heads by order o f the XO . The crew was

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"pissed." (Encl 17, 41)5 6 : Several male junior off icers s ta ted the CO said she would" t ie the i r nuts" in a knot i f they continue to mismanage herexpectations. (Encl 5, 9, 25, 41)57. The CO has denied making th is statement about " t ie the i rnuts" . (Encl 45)58.USS41,59.45)

MalePONCE43)

The

off icers s ta ted the CO commented tha t the men on boarddo not respect her because she has " t i t s . " (Encl 4-6,

CO has denied making th is comment about " t i t s . " {Encl

60. Several off icers claim the CO commented that the Navy haskept passing her over for command because she i s a "sp l i t t a i l . "(Ericl 6, 41)61. The CO has denied making th is comment about "sp l i t t a i l . "(Encl 45)Ship Handling/Safety62. The CO has created a s t ress fu l work environment fo r someoff icers . (Encl 14, 16, 18, 24)63. The XO senses tha t the responsiveness of the watch team i sa " l i t t l e worse" than under the previous CO. (Encl 41, 43)64. When the CO i s on the bridge, she diver ts the watchstanders at tent ion from the i r dut ies to focus direct ly on her.(Enel 18)65. The CO has created safety concerns amongst the off icers andcrew. (Encl 14, 16, 18, 19, 24, 25)66. While I b7c I was standing OOD, the CO directed him toorder the Conning Officer to use a r ight 5 degree rudder whilethe sea painter was connected to the 7 meter RHIB on the por tquarter of the ship during recovery. I b7c t recommendedagainst her order fo r fear tha t it would cause the s tern of theship to swing in the direct ion of the ~ I B . I b7C I wasdirected by the CO to never disobey her orders and to follow thel a s t order given. (Encl 18)

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67. During a gun shoot, I b7e t was directed by the CO toorder green range despite his report of a contact within therange. (Encl 18)68. Chiefs, Officers and the crew t ry to avoid the CO out offear and not wanting to be yel led a t . (Encl 18)69: While navigating the Suez Canal a t night with heavyshipping t ra f f ic , the CO came to the bridge and ordered the 000to explain why her laptop had been closed. (Encl 14)70. During an underway replenishment with USS PEARY, the PEARYstated over bridge- to-br idge she would be ready in f ive minutes.ROMEO was a t the dip. After f ive minutes, the CO directed PONCEto make the approach with USS PEARY even though ROMEO was notclosed up. This was directed by the CO and the bridge watchteam fe l t they could not point out th i s mistake. The XOintervened and the ship reposi t ioned. (Encl 4, 12, 19, 43)71. In a separat ing maneuvering s i tua t ion, the ship closedPEARY to within approximately 300-400 yards as a resu l t of theconning Officer ' s confusion regarding PEARY's speed. (Encl 43)72: The CO incorrec t ly ordered the OOD to ca l l amber deck andmaneuver the ship while a t amber deck. The OOD ident i f ied theincorrect order of maneuvering the ship while a t amber deck andhe was ordered to maneuver anyway. The ship i s prohibited tomaneuver during amber deck. (Encl 12, 75)73. Despite the in tens i ty of preparat ions for emergency f l ightquarters , the CO entered the p i lo t house and questioned the OODu j ! as to why some watch standers were de-bloused, as shemandates tha t everyone be in the same uniform on the bridge.When the OOD U/I t r i ed to correct the s i tua t ion, the co tola himtha t he should have conferred with the OOD because she out ranked him. (Encl 24)74. During the debrief ing of the 7-meter RHIB launchingevolution, the CO corrected the helmsman but indicated amisunderstanding of the concept of bare steerageway. (Encl 12)75. During well deck operat ions, the CO directed an LCU tolaunch on one engine even though th is procedure violated SOP andwas against the c ra f t master 's recommendation. (Encl 25, 26, 43,66-68)

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Sunj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE (LPD 15)

76. The CO thought it was perfec t ly safe fo r an LCU to opera teon one engine. The SOP (MOA) requirement specifying two engineswere needed was not discussed with the CO. (Encl 43)77: While off of Kuwait, 1 h7e(I bIe I) to marry-up thethe night . Between 2200 and 2300,c ra f t should en te r the well becauseseas) . At 0130, LCU s tar ted up andThe two-hour delay was considered aI b k I Chief Petty Off icer . (Encl

was directed by 1 hZeLCU with the s tern gate fo rI bZe I recommended tha t theof sea s ta te (up to s ix- footgot underway from well deck."near miss" by the I hZe 1

25, 26)78.' During the s tern gate marriage inc ident , the CO kicked

'61e (the former I bI e I) off of the bridge. (Encl 20)79. The CO i s not considered a good ship handler by several ofthe crew. The XO considers the CO an "average" shiphandler .The CO considers herse l f a "good" shiphandler . (Encl 6, 12, 18,19, 25, 43, 45)80.' There i s a perception t ha t the crew has los t confidence inthe CO. (Encl 12, 14)Negligent Discharge81. During a gun shoot on PONCE's deck, di fferent ca l iberweapons were used, and- three to four personnel were on thef i r ing l ine . 61e I had h is weapon pointed down andnegligent ly discharged h is weapon, and the buckshot ricochetedo ff the deck coaming. hZe 1 and 1 hZe 1 received buckshotwounds. The incident was the subject of a preliminary inquiry.(Encl 69, 77)HaBiag ( lS/16 MarGa)82. A preliminary inquiry was completed on 18 March 2011 byI hZe II bI e I involving incidents on 15 and 16 March 2011.(Encl 5,9, 59)83. On 15 March 2011, I b7e I went to the Auxil iar iesDivision Office (A-Div) to pick up h is mail. 61c' , Icol lec ted h is mail and s tar ted to walk out the door when he wasjumped by I 6i; 1 and I hZe I. They put him down onh is stomach, held both of h is hands to h is back, t ied h is feetwieh rope, and then hung him over the l igh t . They struck himwith a be l t . (Encl 28, 59)

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Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE (LPD 15)84.. hZe I had previously been involved in several otherhazing incidents (Divisional t r ad i t ions ) , including severalbir thday beat ings, divisional wars, r i t e of passage beatings,and going away beat ings. (Encl 59)85. After the incident on 15 March 2011, several Sai lors talkedto I h1e' , I, and recal led he was joking and smiling about theincident . (Encl 59)86. On 16 March 2011, Gte I went in to A-Div ber thing fo r ahai rcut . hZ;; and I bZe I began to wrest le ; [:QCj

hI e I h i t h is head on a clothes hamper and star ted to bleed.(Encl 59)87 . I bZc I to ld I b7e I tha t he had been jumped and wasbeaten up in ber thing. (Encl 5)88. hZ c l and hie I sta te tha t "smack talking"and horseplay between the three was common. (Encl 59)89. Members of the Engineering Department s ta te tha t wrestlingand horseplay between divis ions or departments in ber thing warsi s a common occurrence. (Encl 59)90., Hazing has been occurring on board PONCE in the Engineeringdepartment since May 2010, with multiple reports made up thechain of command. (Enol 59)91. hZe I d bZe I Leading Petty Officer) was seenwrest l ing with one of h is sa i lor s , I Gte I . I b7e toldI bZ" I tha t his behavior was inappropr ia te . (Encl 59)92 On 16 March, I b16 ! sus tained eo t:teouuratic blow to h ishead resu l t ing in a fu l l thickness lacerat ion with ar te r ia lbleeding to his poster ior scalp and a mild concussion. (Encl 59)93. hZe was t ranspor ted to Naval Hospital Sigonella.The bleeding could not be controlled in the Emergency Room sosurgery was required. (Encl 59, 70)94., I bZc I was admitted to ora l maxil lofacial surgery forwound explorat ion, a r te r i a l l iga t ion , a r te r i a l cauterizat ion andwound closure under general anesthesia. (Encl 59)95 . __ ~ b ~ 7 c ~ __ was admitted to the hospi ta l overnight and

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Subj : PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE (LPD 15)

re leased in s tab le condition the following morning, 17 March.(Encl 57-59)96 . Upon I b7c I return to the ship, he remained Sick inQ u a r t ~ r s (SIQ) in the medical ward for three days, which wasfollowed by seven days of l igh t duty. (Encl 59)97.- The I b7c I doctor, I b7c I, s ta ted tha t permanentinjury and/or disab i l i ty was not ant icipated from I hlPin jur ie s . (Encl 59)98 . No of f i c i a l l ine of duty inves t igat ion was completed for

hZe in jur ies . (Encl 8, 43)99. I I, the Investigating Officer , concluded therewas considerable evidence to substant iate both incidents as actsof hazing. (Encl 9, 59)100. 67c told the CO tha t the incident in the "A"Division shop was "def in i te ly hazing", according to theinstruct ion. (Encl 9)101. On 18 March, the b7c I assembled theAUXO, LCPO, and the 18 Auxil iar ies Division sai lors on the messdecks. He read them a section from the SECNAVINST regardinghazing. Then the sh ip ' s CMAA read them a l l the i r r ights underorders from the CO for suspicion of hazing. {Encl 18, 28}102. Five Sailors went to DRB, 3 sai lors went to XOI and 1sa i lor went to Mast. (Encl 5, 18, 28, 59)1 0 ~ . At Captain 's Mast, the CO asked the chain of command i fthey had anything to add when I b7c (the I bZe I)went to speak up, the CO to ld him 80M hie 0iZC:J t ha t they were i l lth is s i tua t ion because of the i r poor leadership and they werelucky not to be a t Mast because she would "end them./I (Encl 18,28)104. The CO threatened off icers with detachment for cause {DFC}and Let ters of Instruct ion (LOI). She considered the incidenthazing and s ta ted there was no difference between skylarking andhazing. (Encl 5)105. Three Sai lors were given Extra Mili tary Instruct ion (EMI)to include tha t the Auxil iar ies Division shop door would remainopen a t a l l times, the had to copy the SECNAVINST on hazing

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Subj : PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE (LPD 15)ten times by hand, create a power point and give divisionalt raining on hazing, host an MWR sumo wrest l ing event and createa t raining video. All EMI,has been completed except fo r thed i ~ i s i o n a l t ra in ing and the playing of the video. (Encl 5, 9,18, 60-65)106. There has been no command-wide hazing t raining. (Encl 18,28, 45)107. In hindsight , the CO fe l t tha t she did not ful ly discloseto the chain of command the incident in the A Division off ice ,anq reasoned tha t she was "wrapped up" in the ber thing incident .The CO fee ls tha t she fai led to punish the Sai lors tha t hazed

bIe I, but fee ls tha t I b7 c was held accountable.(Encl 43, 45, 70-74)108. NO SITREP fo r hazing was sent a t the time of the incident .A NAVY BLUE SITREP was sent fo r the 15 March hazing incident on22 Apri l . (Encl 43, 45, 78 )Beer on the Pier - 23 Pebruary 2011109. Because of few l iber ty opportunit ies in Aqaba, Jordan,"beer on the pier" was made an option fo r the crew. Libertyguidance included direct ion to watch out fo r Shipmates andreturn them to the ship i f there was a problem. (Encl 43)11Q. Some people on the ship heard a rumor tha t two femaleoff icers (i hi e I and I b7 e I) had been kiss ing onthe pie r . (Encl 4, 5, 9, 13, 18)111. b7c I and I b7e I were intoxicated on the ' pier ,and "made out" in front of other off icers , Sailors and Marines.(Enel 5, 13, 1'1, 18 , 33-35, 39, 56)112. The kiss ing was face to face and occurred while the twowere standing and s i t t ing down. The kiss ing l as tedapproximately ten minutes. (Encl 18)113. I b7e I was s i t t ing in I b7c lap a t somepoint while they were kiss ing. (Encl 18, 34)114. The CO was present a t the beer event and was in thevic ini ty of the inappropriate behavior. The CO stated she didnot see any inappropr ia te physical contact . (Encl 18, 45)

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115 . According to ! hZ e I, the CO knocked on her door toreport tha t I hZe L was drunk and asked I bIe t to checkon her. The CO denies t e l l i ~ g I bZe I th i s . (Encl 39 , 45)116 . bZe I was the Staf f Duty Officer that evening. Sheapproached the two off icers and requested they separate.

bZ, J to ld her it was "OK" because they were off icers . Sheins is ted and they f ina l ly separated. (Encl 35)117. bZe I, I bZe I of Troops for CombatLogist ics Batta l ion 26, emailed the XOof PONCE to a l e r t him tothe inappropriate behavior of I bIe I and! hZc onthe p ie r in front of junior Sai lors and Marines. (Encl 56)118 . I bZG I was also seen f l i r t ing with enl is ted Sai lorsand reported kissed one Sai lor on the cheek. (Encl 18)119 . b7e L was counseled by the XO under the CO'sdi rec t ion. (Encl 43)120 . bIG I was counseled for h is act ions by hisCommanding Officer , I b k I, the next morning. (Encl 32,33)121. I b7eCO. (Encl 32) did not discuss th is incident with the PONCEFigh t on the Pie r - 23/24 Feb 2011122 . Beer on the Pier in Aqaba was not considered l ibe r ty sothere was no buddy system in place. (Encl 5, 55)123 . At approximately 0030, 24 February 2011, I bZ,arr ived a t the pie r and heard a group of Saiiol:s competing witheach other in a rap contest . hZ e I observed I b7e Iuse gang language, syIDbols and very profane language towards

bZ , I. (Encl 51)124 . hZc I stood between hZG I and I bZGand to ld them to ta lk it out . I hZG t began makingdisrespectful and provoking comments t o ~ , who told him tostop; became more disrespectful and s tar ted to move tab lestowards r:::::tiiC:J. (Enc I 51)125 . C : = = ~ h ~ 7 ~ C : = = = ~ 1 punched L...-_--W,jbz...,__ .... . (Enc I 41, 49 - 52 , 74 )

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126. b7e L talked to I b7e I about thes i tua t ion then went to bed. (Encl 51, 74)127. The incident was not reported to the CDO or XO. (Encl 5,43, 53)128. The 0iiCJ saw 1 b7e l a t e r tha t night and he did notappear in jured. heard tha t I b7e I was in a subsequentf ight . (Encl 41)129. The was aware tha t the assaul t had occurred tha tevening/early morning and did not report it to anyone. (Encl 43)130. The XO believes tha t the did not report the assaul tbecause he was t rying to keep it a t his level . The XO was notnot i f ied unt i l the next afternoon. (Encl 43)131. b7e l saw I b7e I two days l a t e r with scarsand open cuts, which he believes were not caused by h is singlepunch. (Encl 51)13 t . We s ta tes tha t he did not say or do anything toprovoke __ ~ b w 7 e _ _ _ _ to s t r ike him. (Encl 51)133. The physical contact was not brought to the at tent ion ofthe chain of the command un t i l the next day. The CO wasnot i f ied by the once he became aware of the incident . TheCO was most displeased with her CPO Mess with regards to th i sevent . (Encl 74).134. The CDO, I b k I, heard about the f ight from the CO theday af te r around lunch. He heard there was also a f ight in thewell deck the previous evening. (Encl 5)135 . 'l'fte 0iZCJ directed I b7ethe Mast packages. (Encl 28 ) I to take s ta tements and. prepare136. I We and ~ 1 - - - - ~ W ~ e - - - - ~ went to Captain 's Mast on 28February 11. (Encl 51-53)137. I We I was charged with violat ions of Art ic le 28(Assault) and Art ic le 92 (Failure to obey the l iber ty brief) .He was found gui l ty and awarded an oral reprimand, forfe i turesof $1152.20 for two months, and ext ra duties fo r 45 days. (Encl51, 53 )138. __ ~ b ~ 7 e ~ __ was charged with viola t ions of Art ic le 91

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Subj: PRBLIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPBCTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 RBGARDING ALLBGBD MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICBR, USS PONCE (LPD 15)

(Disrespectful language toward a NCO), Artic le 92 (Failure toobey the l iber ty br ie f ) , and Art ic le 128 (Assault by pushing thetables) . He was found gui l ty and awarded forfe i tures of$1152.50 fo r two months, reduction to pay grade of B-4(suspended fo r 6 months), and ext ra duties for 45 days. (Bncl52 , 53)139. This event was not documented as an alcohol re la tedincident . (Bncl 41, 49, 50, 54)140. The XO stated the incident .should have been consideredalcohol re la ted . (Bncl 43)141. A SITRBP was draf ted for th is incident but there wasnearly a 48 hour delay in it being re leased. The ISIC routinelychops the SITREPs before they are sent off the ship. (Encl 4,43, 49)Securi ty Aler t - 13 Apri l 2011142. The CO keeps a 9mm pis to l in her stateroom in a lockedsafe. The weapon and ammunition were issued to her by theWeapons Department. (Encl 14, 3 ~ . , 45)143'. blc I completes the maintenance on the CO's weaponwhen required. He has been her l ine coach and she has completedtwo to three gun shoots since she has arr ived. hZes ta tes the CO understands safety considerat ions, and knows howto operate the weapons. Per the GO, she had t ra in ing pr ior tobeing issued the weapon but not since. (Encl 3D, 45)144. Safety procedures s ta te tha t personnel must ensure tha tthe safe ty remains in the safe pos i t ion unt i l immediately pr iorto f i r ing. They also s ta te tha t the shooter must be sure of thetal :get , what i s beyead the t a rge t , and th e maxim'Wll rangecapabi l i t ies of the weapon being used. (Bncl 46)145. Before t ransferr ing a weapon to another person, safetyprocedures s ta te tha t the pis to l should be grasped firmly in thef i r ing hand, ensuring the p i s t o l i s on safe , remove themagazine, lock the s l ide to the rear and catch the round ( i fthere i s a round in the chamber), and visual ly inspect themagazine well and chamber to ensure they are empty, and keep themuzzle pointed a t an upward 45-degree angle and in a safedi rec t ion. (Bncl 46)146. L...-_.IoI.Jb1u.c_--I l e t 1-1 ..... wlcll.....-----I borrow three IBD t ra in ing devices

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SUbj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE (LPD 15)

for USMC t ra in ing . On 13 April , I.., bIn j l e f t them in front ofbZc. I off ice . bZe I brought two of the three t rainingaids to I b U 1 in the laundry. The l a s t t ra in ing aid was

l e f t unattended. (Encl 28)1 ~ 4 ~ 7 ~ . ~ = = ~ b ~ 7 ~ C ~ ~ saw the lED t ra in ing device and cal led the OODd b7c I) to report i t . (Encl 11, 14, 21, 22)148. The OOD secured the hydras during the a le r t . (Encl 21)149. The OOD not i f ied the CO and was directed to ca l l away"Securi ty Alert ." (Encl 11, 21, 22)150. The Secur i ty Aler t was cal led away a t 1659. The CO was onthe bridge fo r approximately 5 minutes. (Encl 48)151. The CO repor ted to the bridge and appeared to be veryexcited/anxious about the a le r t . (Encl 4, 21, 22, 30)152. bm I found the lED t ra in ing aid under the f i res ta t ion on the mess decks. (Encl 30)153. bt e 1 cal led the OOD on the bridge to report tha t hehad the t ra in ing a id and tha t it was a fa l se alarm. The COs ta ted tha t she did not care because she did not sign off on anyt ra in ing packages. (Encl 4, 30)154' . b7c I brought the t raining aid to the Bridge and gaveit to the CO. (Encl 10, 11, 21, 22, 30)155. The CO grabbed the t ra in ing device from I b7c I arids ta ted , " this i s evidence" and "I'm using th is fo r Captain 'sMast." (Encl 22)156. The CO maintained possession of the t ra in ing device. {Encl4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 13, 21, 22}157. The CO s ta ted over the hydra the event was not a dr i l l andtha t it would be t reated as a rea l event. (Encl 4, 13, 14, 30)158. The CO demanded tha t I b7cthe securi ty a le r t . (Encl 14, 21).

I ac t as her armed escort for

159. Neither I bZe I nor the previous CMAA had previouslybeen asked to serve as the CO's escor t during a Secur i ty Aler tdr i l l . {Encl 28}19roR 9FFICIAL UBi: E>NL (F9U9)

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Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE (LPD 15)160. b7e ~ w a s s t i l l armed from the gun shoot and offeredto escort the CO to her stateroom. She refused s ta t ingI hZe I was to escor t her . The CO eventual ly s ta ted , "Fuck th i s ,I wil l get my own gun." (Encl 30)161. I bIe to ld the CO tha t the a le r t should be stood downbecause the crew was walking around with Condition 1 weapons.(Encl 30)162. The CO stated on the bridge tha t whoever comes to hercabin "bet ter knock and ident i fy themselves or I wil l cap the i rass." (Encl 11, 14, 21, 22)163. The CO went to her cabin and removed her 9mm from hersafe. (Encl 8, 15, 45)164. hZe I and I 61e I, as members of the back-upreaction force, repor ted to the armory when they heard thesecuri ty a le r t sound. They both armed up and were directed toreport to the CO's stateroom to serve as her armed escor ts .(Encl 29, 31)165. b7 c I and I:l;::::=E1ZCe==:::J1 have received no t ra in ing to ac tas the CO's securi ty escor t . (Encl 29 ,31)166. I b7c I and Iand believed th i s waswas open; I h7estateroom. (Encl 29,

bZe I reported to the CO's stateroom,a rea l securi ty a le r t . The stateroom doorknocked, said "Ma'am," and entered the31)

167. When hZe and I bZe I entered the CO's stateroom,they cleared the room and saw no one other than the CO. Theirweapons weLe in Condition 1 (sl ide forward, magasine ias8lrtea.,round chambered, safe ty on) with the weapons pointed down. (Encl29, 31)168. The CO had her weapon out and pointed a t the door. Shedid not immediately lower the weapon when she saw I bIe I andI b7 c I enter. She was ta lking with her hand and gestur ingwith the gun. The CO then se t the weapon on her desk. (Encl 29,31)169. The CO to ld I bZe I and I b7e L tha t she i s "oldschool" and wants to keep the gun "locked and ready to go".(Encl 29, 31)

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Subj : PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE (LPD 15)

170. bI!O I and I bZc I were not aware tha t the CO had aweapon in her stateroom. (Encl 29 , 31)171. bZc I knocked then entered the CO's stateroom andta lked to the CO. (Encl 29)172. The CO to ld I b7c I to take her weapon and clear it inthe armory. When I bk L reached for the CO's weapon, bothhe and 1__ 0 EIlr..___1 real ized that the safe ty was of f . I ble Iplaced the gun on safe . (Encl 29, 31)173. The CO did not recognize the gun's safety was in the offpos i t ion . She did not react when I bZc to ld her the safe tywas off , and s ta ted it was in Condition 1. (Encl 29, 31)174. Gte I and 1= bie I went to the armory and clearedthe i r weapons and the CO's. (Encl 29 , 31)175 . bIe..., I I b7e I and I bZe I were outsidethe CO's stateroom door. (Encl 14, 29-31)176. PONCEINST 5530.1F s ta te s tha t the securi ty a le r tprocedures underway fo r the Commanding Officer are to remain inor proceed to her cabin to await the Command Master-at-Arrns asan escor t . (Encl 47)177. The ship had not previously conducted t ra in ing on anunderway securi ty a le r t . (Encl 4, 28-30, 41, 43)178. There was no debr ief and no SITREP following the securi tya le r t . (Encl 4, 29, 41, 43)

Opinions1. The USS PONCE crew was responsive to a l l requests forinformation. They were open, profess iona l and eager to helpthroughout the course of th is preliminary inquiry . (FOF 4-45)2. The CO has shown pre fe ren t i a l treatment to several off icersonboard the ship, most notably the females. She has done th i sby having female only of f ice r meetings in her stateroom,offer ing the use of the CO's sedan when in por t , and by buyingthem g i f t s . (FOF 5, 6, 8, 9, 12-17, 19-21)

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3. The CO has made it ~ p p a r e n t - by word and deed - who herfavori te off icers are . This i s well known aboard the ship . (FOF5, '6 , 8 , 12-17, 19-21)4. Preferent ia l treatment has caused the rec ip ients to beuncomfortable. I t has a lso c rea ted a divide in the wardroombetween those favored and those who are not . (FOF 7, 11, 12-17,19, 21)5. The CO's confrontat ional manner,' use of demeaning language,name-call ing, and obsceni t ies have created a host i le workenvironment. (FOF 41-51, 56-64)6. The CO's micromanagement and intrusive leadership s tyle hadan adverse effec t on the motivation of the crew. (FOF 37-40, 52-55, 63)7. The morale aboard the ship has declined appreciably as aregul t of the CO's int imidat ing behavior. (FOF 36, 62)8. The CO has in t imidated off icers into doing things tha t theywould not normally agree to i f it were not fo r her pos i t ion (FOF27, 30, 31, 33, 34)9. The CO has diminished the author i ty of her chain of commandto lead by di rec t ly tasking subordinates instead of using thechain of command. She fur ther degraded the i r profess iona lc redib i l i ty and author i ty by bel i t t l ing them to the i rsubordinate off i ce rs . (FOF 44, 46, 49-54, 56, 62-64)10. The CO has made some questionable decis ions with regards tousing MWR funds to pay fo r g i f t s fo r the Green Bay Packers whenthey were aboard, allowing subordinates to use the CO'sgoveunu:ent eedaft fo r personal 6zozoana.s, pl1rcbasjng Cuban cig:arsto ' r ese l l a t the beer on the p ie r event, and f ront ing money fo rM&Ms fo r sa les re la ted to ra f f l es aboard the ship . (FOF 27-34)11. I t was improper fo r the CO to "smack" a subordinateoff i ce r , even i f it was done in a joking manner. (FOF 42, 43)12. The XO was aware t ha t the CO had made derogatory commentsto the junior off icers and was showing pre fe ren t i a l treatment tocer ta in off icers . He should have taken aff i rmative act ion toput an end to such t rea tment and corrected such percept ion whennone exis ted . (FOF 6, 8, 13, 44, 46, 58)

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13. The XO snould have addressed the CO's inappropr ia tebehavior with her . I f the XO did not receive any posi t iveresponse' from the CO then he should have brought the issue tothe a t tent ion of the ISIC. (FOF 6, 8, 13, 44, 46, 58 )14. The Officers and Sailors have los t respect for CDR Jones asthe CO of the ship. (FOF 21, 22, 50, 51, 62-65, 79, 80)15. The CO's int imidating and i r ra t iona l behavior has createdan environment in which members of the off icers and crew aredis t rac ted from the i r duties, and reluctant to provide forcefulsupport to the CO. (FOF 35-65)16. The incidents that occurred on 15 March and 16 Marchbetween I ble t, I bZc b, and I bIG I were haz ing .(FOF 82-88, 92-97, 99, 100, 104, 107, 108)17. The Sailors and chain of command involved in the hazingincidents should be held accountable for the i r actions orinactions in not intervening in these s i tua t ions . (FOF 82-108)18. Elements of the Engineering chain of command were awaretha t hazing incidents (wrestl ing, f ighting) were taking placewithin the department and did nothing to correct these improperactions . (FOF 83, 84, 88-91)19 : I b7c I in jur ies were of such a severe nature tha tthey kept him out of work for several days. A l ine of dutyinvest igat ion should have been conducted. (FOF 92-98)20. A UNIT SITREP should have been sent regarding the hazingincidents of 15/16 March. (FOF 99, 100, 108)21. The, hazing i ao ieea t s were se severe 6_6 6M Sail:ersinvolved should have been punished so the crew could learn fromthe i r mistakes. The EMI awarded was inadequate to serve th ispurpose. (FOF 99-107)22. Only the went to Mast for the hazing incidents , not theSailors tha t were involved in the incident . Those Sailorsshould have been held accountable. (FOF 99-105)23. The XO should not have dismissed the cases of the Sailorstha t stood before him a t XOI, and the CO should never haveagreed. He should have recognized the severi ty of hazing andensured that those part ic ipants were appropriately punished.

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(FOF 99-105)24. The should have used the DRB as more of aninv.est igative process in th is case. He should have determinedwhat was going on wi thin I hI e I and pushed those cases up thechain for appropr ia te punishment. (FOF 99-105)25. The Xo and CO should have held the engineering chain ofcommand accountable fo r the incident tha t had occurred and theenvironment tha t they have fostered to allow th is type ofbehavior to continually occur. (FOF 83, 84, 88-91, 99-105)26. Documented command-wide hazing t ra in ing with re su l t sreported to the ISIC should have been conducted immediatelyfollowing the inc ident . (FOF 99, 100, 105, 106)27. The Commanding Officer chose not to not i fy Commander,Amphibious Squadron FOUR tha t hazing had occurred in PONCE whenclear evidence of such hazing was provided her by thePreliminary Investigating Officer . (FOF 99, 100, 107, 108)28. The Commanding Officer del ibera te ly withheld pert inentinformation from her ISIC regarding the events of 15 and 16March, which were made known to her no l a t e r than 18 March.Subsequent emails to her ISIC and the UNIT SITREP closing outthe I hZe I ber thing incident were wri t ten to minimize theseveri ty of the hazing vic t im 's medical condition andconstrained to discussion and analysis of the ber thing incidentas a "singular event." (FOF 98-108)29. The XO and should have developed and ins t i tu ted a planto guarantee tha t the EMI assigned to these Sailors was followedthrough on in a t imely manner. (FOF 98-108)30. The Commanding Officer and Executive Officer were aware ofthe a l leged inappropr ia te behavior by a female off i cer and amale Marine off i cer during the "beer on the pier ." The COshould have directed a formal inves t igat ion to determine thescope of these al legat ions. (FOF 114-120)31. The CO wasbehavior tha t Itake suff ic ient115")

aware pr ior to the alleged inappropr ia tehie I had had too much to drink but did notaction to remove her from the pier . (FOF 114-

32. The XO verbal ly counseled ____ ~ h l ~ c ~ ~ 1 af te r th i s incident24FOR OVViCiAL g S ~ OHL (FOgO)

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Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE (LPD 15)without conducting formal invest igat ion. This perpetuated theperception tha t the CO was allowing her favori te off icers tocommit misconduct without repercussions. (FOF 118-120)33. The should have promptly reported his knowledge of thef ight between I b? e I and I h7ii I to the CO. (FOF 128-130)34. The invest igat ion into the assaul t on I We twasinadequate. In par t icular , the invest igat ion into al legat ionstha t I hZe I was involved in subsequent f ight ing throughoutthe ship was poorly executed. Review of statements associatedwith the invest igat ion show them to be lacking in depth andfollow-up. (FOF 129-141)35. The SITREP for th is incident should have been publishedwithin 24 hours of the incident . (FOF 83 , 108)36; The crew of USS PONCE was not adequately t rained andprepared for the securi ty a le r t tha t took place while underway.(FOF 155-178)37. As a resu l t of inadequate t raining, Sai lors fa i led to actin accordance with ship 's ins t ruc t ion during the underwaysecuri ty a le r t because they were unaware tha t PONCE hadpublished procedures for th is s i tua t ion. hle I andI b7 e I responded on the i r own in i t i a t ive , acting as CommandingOfficer securi ty escorts without specific t ra ining and for thef i r s t time in what they believed to be a genuine threa ts i tua t ion. They were unfamil iar with the procedures by whichthey were to gain authorized access to the CO's cabin and wereunaware tha t the CO possessed a weapon. These elementsincreased the r i sk for a weapons accident or misapplication ofdeadly force. Incredibly, the CO was unaware un t i l t h i sinvest igat ion tha t t h ~ ship possessed published procedures forunderway securi ty a le r t , having taken no in i t ia t ive toinvest igate in the aftermath of th is incident . (FOF 153-178)38. The Commanding Officer unsafely and improperly handled her9 sidearm during the securi ty a le r t of 13 April , c o n t r ~ r y toshipboard and Navy directives. Specifical ly , a f t e r I htedel ivered the t ra ining device to her in the p i lo t house andrecommended standing down from secur i ty a le r t , she should havedone so immediately. Understanding tha t no threa t exis ted, sheshould not have removed her weapon from the cabin safe, norshould she have placed the weapon in Condition 1. Once in

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Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE (LPD 15)Condit ion 1, she should have kept the weapon under pos i t ivecontrol ra ther than placing it on her desk. She should not havepointed the weapon toward the open cabin door, regardless of thepos i t ion of the safe ty . She should not have given the weapon to,_ 6$ , fo r clearance, but should have done so herse l f .Once she chose to do so, she should have spec i f i ca l ly confirmedthe safe ty was on pr io r to handing him the weapon. The CO wasunable to o f fe r an explanation fo r fa i l ing to c lea r her ownweapon. (FOF 144-174)39. The Commanding Off ice r ' s unfamil iar i ty with publishedd i rec t ives , i n s u f f ~ c i e n t t ra in ing , improper weapons handling,and care less ac t ions placed members of her crew a t r isk duringthe secur i ty a le r t . By ins i s t ing t ha t the secur i ty a le r tproceed as i f it were genuine in the absence of a legi t imateth rea t , she increased the r i sk of a weapons accident or mistakenappl ica t ion of deadly force. (FOF 153-178)40. Most of the sh ip ' s crew interviewed did not demonstrateconfidence in the CO's operat ional and profess iona l ab i l i t i e s .(FOF 35, 80)41. The shipboard inves t igat ive process would benef i t from theuse of commissioned off i ce rs and cnief pe t ty o f f i ce rs asinves t igat ing off i ce rs , with the act ing CMAA in support , fo revery al leged vio la t ion of the UCMJ. This would be ofpar t i cu la r value during inves t igat ions of senior personnel andin cases cross ing departmental boundaries. Addit ionally, theac t ing CMAA should have an act ive ro le in the sh ip ' s l ibe r tyr i sk program. (FOF 101)42. The i s comfortable expressing himself openly andforcefu l ly to the Commanding Officer . The provides advicet h a t i s sometimes heeded by the eo, but:: he supports hel:decisions unwaveringly once f ina l . (FOF 128-130)43. The Executive Officer could have performed be t te r insupport of command decision-making and ident i f ica t ion/correc t ionof command climate shortcomings. I t i s apparent, however, tha tthe XO's counsel - although re l ied upon during shiphandlingevolutions - i s much l e ss f requent ly sought or taken in toaccount in other areas of shipboard management and leadership .(FOF 98, 102, 107, 108, 119, 127)44. The Commanding Officer was unable to provide a c lea r andconcise account of the events surrounding the shipboard secur i ty

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a le r t of 13 Apri l . She repl ied t ha t she did not rememberde ta i l s of the events essen t i a l to decis ion making tha t had beencorroborated by br idge watch s tanders and personnel respondingto the a le r t . She could give no reason fo r handing over" herCondition 1 sidearm to I hIe L, nor could she c lea r lya r t icu la te a t imeline fo r her personal movements. (FOF 142-173)

RecommendationsAfter a thorough review of the fac ts , I recommend the following:1. The Commanding Officer be rel ieved for loss of confidence inher abi l i ty to command, based on the following:

Fai lure to ident i fy and repor t hazing and take propercorrect ive ac t ion. Fostering a host i le work environment through verbalabuse, demeaning t rea tment of subordinates, ac tua l andperceived favori t ism / gender discr iminat ion,capricious micromanagement, and res is tance tosubordinate attempts to provide forceful backup. Unprofessional conduct. Intemperate language andunwanted physical contact . Demonstrated lack of judgment during secur i ty a l e r t :improper placing of 9rnrn in Condition 1 ; muzzling ofwatch s tanders responding to the dr i l l , turning over aCondition 1 weapon with the safe ty off , contrary toNTRP 3-07.2.2. Failure to thoroughly inves t igate a l legat ions of

of f ice r misconduct. Creating the appearance of impropriety by purchasingcigars to be sold on the p ie r , providing M&Ms to besold and used as par t of a shipboard ra f f l e , granting

author i ty to other off i ce rs to use her governmentsedan fo r personal errands, and at tempting to use MWRfunds to purchase gi f t s for sh ip ' s v i s i t o r s . Profess ional c redib i l i ty damaged by observed

unfamil iar i ty with operat ional procedures andperceived lack of professional exper t ise .27POR OFFICIAL 9SE (FOgO)

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Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE (LPD 15) ,

2. The Executive Officer be re l ieved for loss of confidence inhis abi l i ty to execute duties and responsibi l i t ies , based on thefollowing:

Failure to provide suf f ic ien t forceful support duringhazing invest igat ion and subsequent correct ive ac t ion . Failure to thoroughly invest igate al legat ions ofoff i cer misconduct. Failure to ac t to mit igate and/or correct perceptionsof CO favorit ism and gender discr iminat ion. Failure to ac t to correct , mitigate CO misbehavior. Failure to apprise the ISIC of CO misconduct.

3. The I We I be adminis trat ively cautioned butcontinue in his posi t ion as based on the following: Failure to promptly report CPO misconduct. Failure to properly ident i fy and correct hazing;fa i lure to provide forceful backup to command indevelopment and execution of corrective action.

4. Non-judicial Punishment (Violat ion of Art ic le 92, Hazing)should be held fo r I Gte' I, I bfci I, and I b7efor the "tying up" incident of 15 March and the "berthingwrestl ing" incident of 16 March.5. '!'he l!:ngineeLillg CiIain of command: strould be a d m ~ n i s t r a t ~ v e l y cautioned fo r the i r fa i lure to properly ident i fy hazing and takethe appropriate preventive and correct ive act ion, to include thefollowing:

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6. Ship convene a formal invest igat ion to examine the shipboardsecuri ty a le r t of 13 Apri l 2011 and ident i fy specificshortcomings and correct ive ac t ion .7. Ship convene a l ine of duty invest igat ion ICO I Wein tur ie s suffered during the hazing incident of 16 March.8. COMPHIBRON 4 conduct a shipwide hazing standdown in PONCEconsis t ing of deta i led s i tuation-based t ra in ing . Issuance ofpage 13s to document th i s t ra in ing for every PONCE Sailor, to becompleted NLT 30 Apri l . PHIBRON 4 JAG should approve andoversee th is t ra in ing .9 .. Training should be conducted for underway securi ty a le r t s inorder to ensure a l l personnel know the ins t ruct ion andunderstand the i r ro les for such s i tua t ions .10. Recommend ISIC Judge Advocate provide legal t ra in ing for.the legal off i cer and master a t arms and conduct a thoroughreview of pas t legal proceedings.

b7e Assessment

1. Commanding Off icera. Commander Jones professes adherence to high standards of

performance and i s regarded by several off icers and chief pet tyoff icers to have good in tent ions. Despite th is , her abusiveb e ~ a v i o r , confrontat ional leadership s tyle , and micromanagementof shipboard operations and administra t ion have rendered herwatch eams and supervisors unable or unwill ing to provideeffec t ive support to command and rendered many leaders , to .include the Executi17e Officer , fa r l e s s effect i l re than theyotherwise could be. She has los t the respect of her seniordepartment heads, several of whom expressed disregard fo r herprofessional abi l i ty , and through word and deed has fostered anenv.ironment in which cer ta in off icers are widely understood toreap tangible benef i t s from her good opinion and others areident i f ied as public t a rgets of scorn and r i d i c u l ~ .

b. Her performance during the .13 Apri l securi ty a le r t wasa t bes t i r respons ib le and a t worst, dere l ic t . Disturbingly, shewas unable or unwill ing to recount the sequence of events orsa t i s fac tor i ly explain the decision-making process which led herto .draw her personal weapon from her safe and place the weapon

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Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE (LPD 15)in a ready- to- f i re condition, nor could she explain why shehanded over the weapon to a watchstander to clear it ra ther thandoing so herself . She could not , even days a f t e r th is event,explain the ship 's procedure fo r underway securi ty a le r t .

c. Except as noted above, Commander Jones provided detai ledcontextual answers when questioned a t interview. Review ofselected email communication with her ISIC indicates tha t she i scapable of providing comprehensive assessments of conditions andevents in the ship and of art iculat ing the way ahead in issueresolution. Despite th i s , CDR Jones fai led to repor t - via anymeans - the hazing event of 15 March to higher author i ty or toaccount for it in her overal l assessment of shipboard cul ture.Details of th is event were reported to her several days beforeshe t ransmitted the f ina l SITREP on the 16 March berthing"wrestling" event and before she provided a wrap up report toCommander, Amphibious Squadron FOUR. Based on my observation ofher in te l lec t and review of her correspondence, I can onlyconclude tha t she del iberately withheld th i s information as itwas a t odds with the shipboard "picture" and way ahead she hadalready se t t l ed upon and begun to socia l ize with higherauthori ty. At worst, she purposefully concealed th i sinformation; a t best , her judgment in this area i s unacceptablypoor.2. Executive Officer

a . The Executive Officer , while a capable shiphandler,fai led to provide the forceful support to the Commanding Officernecessary for her to succeed in command. Despite his experiencein PONCE and h is unique posi t ion of authori ty , t r u s t and access,he permitted the CO's micromanagement and confrontat ionalleadership s tyle to divide the wardroom and disenfranchise the&il8n:.i.or leaders iB tae ship. He neve:t took affiLlIIaLive action tocorrect ac tual or perceived favorit ism by the CO, and he failedto 'ensure tha t every off icer in the Wardroom. was held to auniform standard of performance and behavior.b. He re l inquished his t radi t ional role as the shipboardtask master to the CO and fai led to take proper charge ofcorrecting what she considered s ignif icant deficiencies inshipboard adminis trat ion. When interviewed, he was unable to

art iculate - more than a month a f te r the event - the s ta tus ofimmediate and long term corrective act ions fo r the berthing"wrestling" incident of 16 March, despite the seriousness of thein jury to the Sai lor involved and the frequency and in tens i ty of30POR OPPICIAL G8E OmYi ( F ~ )

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Subj: PRELIMINARY INQUIRY INTO INSPECTOR GENERAL HOTLINECOMPLAINT OF 14 APRIL 2011 REGARDING ALLEGED MISCONDUCTBY COMMANDING OFFICER, USS PONCE (LPD 15)ISIC discussions of the event. He fai led to provide aneffective independent assessment of the nature of the hazingevents of 15 and 16 March, and he cooperated in excluding the"tying up and hanging" event from the t r iad ' s reports of theseevents to the ISIC and in minimizing the ser iousness of theSai lor ' s 16 March in jury, the detai l s of which appeared unknownto him a t the time of our interview.

c. Most recently, he fa i led to thoroughly invest igate andassess the CO's i rresponsible behavior of 13 April , taking a tface value her explanation without personal ly interviewingwatchstanders and responders associated with the secur i ty a le r t .In general, the XO has appeared more f requent ly as an apologis tfor the CO's behavior than an independent and forceful member ofthe command t r i ad .3 . bIc

a . The I hZe f , much l ike the XO, fa i led toconsistent ly provide suff ic ient forceful support to theCommanding Officer , although there i s evidence from the CO'soff-sh ip correspondence tha t the provided candid feedbackand did not always simply acquiesce to her pol ic ies . Theindicates tha t he took some s teps to correc t perceptions offavorit ism by the CO, but interviews suggest tha t he wasunsuccessful in el iminat ing tha t perception or understandingamong the CPOs.b. Like the XO, the I bIc I fai led to providean effect ive independent assessment of the nature of the hazingevents of 15 and 16 March, and he took no act ion to ensure the"tying up and hanging" incident was properly considered for NJP

or reported up the chain of command, even though the detai l s ofthe 15 March e"v"ent were known to hilli. Mis failUre to promptlynot i fy the Commanding Officer of misconduct appears to stemm o ~ e from neglect than nefar ious in tent .

c. Most recently, he interviewed responders to the 13 Aprilsecuri ty a le r t , but fa i led to grasp the seriousness of the CO'srole in the event. In general, the appears to haveregistered his object ions when strongly held, then carried outthe CO's di rec t ion .

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