political instution, public confidence in, empirical article

Declining Government Confidence and PolicyPreferences in the U.S.: Devolution, RegimeEffects, or Symbolic Change?*

CLEM BROOKS, Indiana UniversitySIMON CHENG, Indiana University

Abstract

No trend in U.S. public opinion has elicited more enduring concern among scholars,political commentators, and politicians than declininig levels of public confidence in thefederal government. Motivated by the possibility that this decline signals a crisis oflegitimacy or growing dissatisfaction with the overall direction of public policy, twogenerations of scholarly debates have yielded three conmpeting theoretical interpretationsof this phenomenon. While they provide divergent answers to imiportant questions aboutthe devolution of policy-makinigfrom thefederal government to subnational levels ofgovernment, competing hypotheses implied by these interpretations have not beensuccessfully evaluated. We seek to advance theory and research by investigating whethergovernmental confidence affects the public's willingness to supportfederal involvementivthin specificpolicy domains such as health care and eduation. Evaluating hypotheses

implied by competing interpretations of declininggovernment confidence, wefind thatthe relationship between government confidence and policypreferences is small and showsno evidence of trends. VWe discuss implications for competing interpretations ofgovernment confidence and the possible role of declining confidence in explainingcontemporary patterns of welfare state retrenchment.

No trend in U.S. public opinion has elicited more enduring concern amongscholars, political commentators, and politicians than declining levels of publicconfidence in the federal government. Spanning the past three decades, declining

* Data and codebooks from the General Social Surveys were provided by the Roper Center. Theauthors have sole responsibility for tabulations, analyses, and interpretations of these data. Anearlier version of this article was presented at the 2000 meetings of the American SociologicalAssociation. We tihank Paul Burstein, Jeremy Freese, Jeff Manza, Pamela Paxton, Brian Powell,Robert Robinson, and two Social Forces reviiewers for comments. Direct correspondence to ClemBrooks, Department of Sociology, 1020 E. Kirkwood Ave., Indiana University, Bloomington,IN47405-7103. E-mail: [email protected].

© The University of North Carolina Press Social Forces, June 2001, 79(4):1343-1375

1344 / Social Forces 79:4, June 2001

government confidence is distinguished not only by its magnitude but also by itstemporal duration. Whereas over 70% of Americans in 1960 indicated that theytrusted government "almost always" or "most of the time," this proportion dippedbelow 40% in 1974, recovering slightly in the mid-1980s only to reach new lowsin the 1990s (Erikson & Tedin 1995; Orren 1997). The cumulative decrease inpublic confidence in government has figured in two generations of scholarly debateconcerning the proper interpretation of these trends.

The central issue in first-generation debates concerned the possibility that lowlevels of government confidence signaled the declining legitimacy of U.S. politicaiinstitutions. Miller (1974a: 951; 1974b), for instance, construed low confidencelevels as indicative of growing and ideologically based public dissatisfaction withthe overall direction of national policy-making, warning that "a democratic politicalsystern cannot survive for long without the support of a majority of its citizens:'Citrin (1974), by contrast, hypothesized that declining confidence was limited tonegative feelings about political incumbents and their policies. Given that suchattitudes could readily be reversed (e.g., if popular leaders were elected to office),Citrin's interpretation cast doubt on the proposition that dedining governmentconfidence could threaten the legitimacy of political institutions. Extending thisline of reasoning, Lipset and Schneider (1983) raised even more fundamentalquestions about the significance of declining confidence, arguing that distrust ofnational institutions is a central feature of U.S. political culture and that citizens'underlying commitment to democratic institutions remained high during this time.

While a rebound in public confidence during the early 1980s momentarilyquelled debates, an even steeper decline since 1984 has renewed scholarly interestin these opinion trends (see Braithwaite & Levi 1998; Hetherington 1998;Hibbing & Theiss-Morse 1995; Miller & Borrelli 1991; Miller & Listhaug 1990;Nye 1997). While building from previous work, an emnerging focus withincontemporary debates is on questions about public satisfaction with the directionof federal policy-making (Barnes 1995). As developed in the work of Jennings(1998), the devolution thesis views declining public confidence as linked to a generaldissatisfaction with the role of the federal government in favor of state or localresponsibility for public policy. Although the evidence for the devolution thesis isat best controversial (Smith 1995), assumptions of a relationship betweengovernment confidence and devolution have become a popular device with whicha number of commentators have explained political change and policy conflictsin the 1990s (see Greenberg 1995; Morris 1998; Skocpol 1996).

We believe that the devolution thesis provides an important opportunity foradvancing theory and research on confidence in government. Coupled with theabsence of the type of widespread unrest or rebellion envisioned by analysts in theearly 1970s, Lipset and Schneider's (1983, 1987) evidence for strong public beliefsin democratic institutions has largely resolved earlier debates over the possiblerelationship between legitimacy and government confidence. However, the

Dedining Government Confidence in the U.S. / 1345devolution thesis raises a different but no less important scenario, namely, thatgovernment confidence is associated with individuals' preferences for (or against)government involvement in policy domains such as the provision of health care.In doing so, the devolution thesis raises a question that cannot be answered byLipset and Schneider's critique or by other existing research: What is the relationshipbetween individuals' level of confidence in government and their preferences withrespect to the level of involvement by the federal government in policy-makingactivities?

WVe identify two ways in which an analysis of the relationship between policypreferences and level of confidence in government can enhance our understandingof declining government confidence. First, preferences for governmentinvolvement in specific policy domains such as health care, education, or nationaldefense represent a theoretically meaningful variable against which to gauge thesignificance of declining confidence. If individuals' willingness to support federalinvolvement or specific programs is linked to their level of confidence ingovernment, then declining government confidence is clearly an importantphenomenon. Conversely, if lower levels of confidence have had little impact onwhat Americans prefer and expect from the federal government, then its significancewould be called into question,

Second, an analysis of policy preferences is informative in that the latterrepresent a causal process through which growing distrust' in government mayaffect the behavior of politicians or the activities of government agencies. Indeed,a growing body of research (Erikson, Wright & McIver 1989; Hill & Hinton-Andersson 1995: Stimson, Mackuen & Erikson 1995; see Burstein 1998 for review)has provided evidence that over time shifts in policy preferences contribute tosubsequent changes in the direction of government policy.2 However, confidencein government has not been induded as a variable in this research, thereby leavingopen questions about its possible role. If it has contributed to a decrease in thepublic's willingness to endorse government responsibility for policy challenges suchas health care or welfare, the decline of confidence in government has directimplications for understanding contemporary policy conflicts as vell as the balanceof federal- versus state-level or local authority. Such questions about the role ofpublic opinion are particularly relevant to emerging research on the causal sourcesof welfare state retrenchment in the 1990s (Cook & Barret 1992; Pierson 1994,1996; Shapiro & Young 1989; Skocpol 1996; Zylan & Soule 2000).

In this study, we develop a comprehensive analysis of the relationship betweenconfidence in government and policy preferences. Our analyses consider threecritical dimensions that have not been satisfactorily addressed in previous research:over time; across heterogeneous policy domains; and with reference to the two majorbranches of government that have experienced dedining confidence (Congress andthe presidency). We begin by summarizing the three main theoreticalinterpretations of confidence in government. We identify competing hypotheses


implied by these interpretations, considering their relevance to understanding theinterrelationship of governmental confidence and policy preferences during thepast three decades. After describing our research design, data, and measures, wepresent the results of the analyses. Finally, we discuss their relevance forunderstanding competing interpretations of declining confidence and its possiblerole in explaining contemporary patterns of welfare state retrenchment.

Competing Interpretations of Public Confidence in Government

SYMBOLIC CHANGE?

The first interpretation of government confidence we consider can be termed the

symbolic change thesis. In their seminal study The Confidence Gap (1983, 1987),Lipset and Schneider found evidence of strong public beliefs in the underlyinglegitimacy of U.S. political institutions. Countering claims of a legitimation crisis,Lipset and Schneider hypotlhesized that low levels of government confidence w% ere

limited to political leaders (as well as to leaders of other major institutions) and

involved a growing belief that politicians are motivated primarily by self-interest.

When coupled with the assumption that this belief is a product of changing styles

of media coverage (Lipset & Schneider 1983; see also Lipset 1996), Lipset andSchneider's results led them to view the decline in government confidence as an

increasingly prominent symbol of the post-1960s U.S., but one with few

implications for Anmericans' expectations or for the overall stability of political

institutions.Although Lipset and Schneider do not explicitly discuss policy preferences, their

symbolic change thesis suggests little interrelationship with government confidence.Indeed, without this implication, declining confidence would signal fundamentalchanges in Americans' expectations regarding the role of the federal government(and dissatisfaction with existing institutions). We thus derive the following twohypotheses from the symbolic change thesis: (1) individuals' preferences forgovernmient involvement within specific policy domains tend to vary independentlyof their level of confidence in government; and (2) the relationship between thesetwo variables involves no time trends (e.g., as would be exemplified by a growingassociation). Evidence of either a consistently large or a growfing association between

government confidence and policy preferences would thus call the symbolic change

thesis into question.

REGIME EFFECTS?

Whereas the symbolic change thesis implies that declining confidence has little

impact on what individuals expect from government, a different interpretation,developed by Citrin (1974), anticipates the possibility of a relationship. More

Declining Government Confidence in the U.S. / 1347specifically, Citrin assumed that declining confidence in the 1970s involveddissatisfaction with both elected political officials and their policies. Thisassumption implies the possibility of a relationship between government confidenceand policy preferences, but one that is conditional on the activities of specificpresidents or congressional leaders. Government confidence is thus assumed tobe a dimension of presidential or congressional popularity.

WAAe refer to this interpretation as the regime effects thesis to capture its claimthat the relationship between public confidence and policy preferences dependsupon the specific time period covered by a presidential administration or Congress.Given that specific presidential administrations or sessions of Congress may elicitparticularly low levels of public confidence, an oscillation between popular andunpopular regimes may result in time-specific patterns of association betweengovernment confidence and policy preferences. Popular political leaders mayfacilitate, while unpopular leaders may lower, public support for governmentinvolvement in specific policy domains. Changes in the magnitude (or sign) ofthe government confidence/policy preferences relationship that correspond tochanges in party control of the presidency or Congress are thus consistent with theregime effects thesis. It is possible, for instance, that a relationship betweenpresidential confidence and policy preferences grew during the later years ofDemocratic president Jimmy Carter's administration, while subsequently decliningduring the first term of Republican president Ronald Reagan. In summary, if weobserve a substantial relationship between government confidence and policypreferences at some (but not other) points in time, this would provide evidencefavoring the regime effects over the symbolic change thesis.

A SOURCE OF DEVOLUTION?

The devolution scenario is readily distinguished from the expectations of thesymbolic change and regime effects theses. First, as developed in the work ofJennings (1998), the devolution thesis implies that the relationship betweengovernment confidence and policy preferences is large. Second, although theliterature on devolution is equivocal on whether this relationship is stable overtime or instead involves a trend toward increased association, evidence for eitherscenario provides a sufficient basis for distinguishing the devolution thesis fromthe other two interpretations. The devolution thesis is unique in advancing claimsabout a consistently large association between confidence in government and policypreferences. Observations of a large or monotonically increasing association duringthe 1.990s would thus favor the devolution thesis over the other two theses.

To date, the evidence for the devolution thesis is inconclusive. Some analystshave cited declining government confidence as contributing to welfare stateretrenchment or the failure of reforms that sought to expand federal responsibilityfor social provision (Morris 1998; Skocpol 1996), but they offer no evidence forsuch cLaims. Inglehart (1997) hypothesizes a relationship between low government


confidence and dissatisfaction with the scope of government, but he does not offer

any supporting analyses. A recent study by Jennings (1998) reports that declining

government trust is associated with a general preference for state or local

responsibility for policy-making, but the data he analyzes are drawn from surveys

of a very specific time period (1968-80), raising questions about the generalizability

of his findings. Moreover, to fully meet the critique developed by Lipset and

Schneider (1983), proponents of the devolution thesis must also provide evidence

that a general willingness to favor state or local over federal government authority

is not itself purely symbolic - with the latter being unrelated to policy preferenceswithin specific domains. Ihese considerations require an analysis of policy

preferences across a suitable range of domains and spanning a longer time period.

CAUSAL INTERPRETATION

Evaluating the causal interrelationship of subjective phenomena such as confidence

in government and policy preferences is oftentimes difficult in the absence of

experimental data, and past research has alternated between treating government

confidence as a cause and treating it as an effect of other attitudes (Hetherington1998). Our working assumption, informed by the logic of the devolution thesis, is

that confidence in government is a cause of policy preferences. When interpreting

our regression results, we thus refer to the "effects" of government confidence onpolicy preferences.

However, it is important to emphasize that such issues of causal interpretation

are generally of consequence for statistical inference only if the association of two

variables is large or involves a time trend. As will become clearer in the presentation

of our results, the association of government confidence and policy preferences is

generally stmall and shows no evidence of trends. As a restult, the inconclusive causal

status of confidence in government in relation to policy preferences does not affectour evaluation of hypotheses.

Research Design, Data, and Measures

RESEARCH DESIGN

We analyze the relationship between confidence in government and policypreferences along three dimensions: over time; across policy domains; and withreference to the distinct political institutions of Congress and the presidency. Eachdimension has substantive relevance to theoretical debates over governmentconfidence, but none has been satisfactorily analyzed in past research. No previous

study has analyzed the interrelationship of congressional versus presidentialconfidence and policy preferences, and studies that directly measure government

confidence and policy preferences have considered a small number of policy

domains while relying on data that is limited to the 1970s (Jennings 1998; Miller1974a). We develop an explicitly multivariate analysis that controls for such

Declining Government Confidence in the U.S. f 1349potentially compounding factors as ideological identification, enabling informativeestimates of the total versus direct effects of government confidence. The inclusionof these controls also reduces the chance of detecting spurious relationshipsinvolving government confidence.

With regard to the dimension of time, the symbolic change thesis implies littlechange in what is expected to be a small relationship between governmentconfidence and policy preferences. By contrast, the regime effects thesis anticipatesthe possibility of time-specific patterns of association stemming from the effectsof different Congresses or presidential administrations. For its part, the devolutionthesis implies the existence of a large association between level of governmentconfidence and policy preferences, while also anticipating the possibility of a trendtoward growing association.

Our second dimension of comparison is across heterogeneous policy domains.This dimension is essential to testing hypotheses about the relationship betweenconfidence in government and preferences for government involvement withrespect to the large number of policy domains (e.g., public health, environmentalprotection, labor relations, national defense, and civil rights) in which moderngovernments are involved. Past studies of policy preferences have established thatpreferences for government involvement vary widely across domains (e.g.,Feldman & Zaller 1992; Page & Shapiro 1992), and our analyses take thisheterogeneity into account by considering the broadest possible range of policydomains.

Our third dimension of comparison relates to the institutional target of publicconfidence. We illustrate the importance of distinguishing among politicalinstitutions using the data summarized in Figure 1. These data are from the GeneralSocial Surveys (GSSs) (Davis & Smith 1997), and they document changing levelsof public support for Supreme Court justices, congressional leaders, and presidents.

Notwithstanding small differences between the patterns of declining confidencefor congressional leaders versus presidents, the larger contrast is with members ofthe Supreme Court. Supreme Court justices have enjoyed very high levels of publicconfidence, and the GSS data provide no evidence of a declining trend. Given thisresult and the focus of past debates, we restrict our analysis to confidence in leadersof the other two branches of the federal government.

DAIA

In this study, we analyze data from the General Social Surveys from 1974 through1996 (Davis & Smith 1997). These surveys provide the best data with which tosystematically test hypotheses about declining government confidence,3 satisfyingfour critical requirements.

A first requirement is coverage of the relatively long time period (the 1970sthrough the 1 990s) during which both waves of declining government confidence


FIGURE 1: Changes in Levels of Confidence in Supreme CourtJustices, Presidents, and Congressional Leaders

u

E

2.5-

4 2.0-

1.5

0

1.0

Source: Data are from the General Social Surveys, 1973-96.

74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96

3.0 7----------------------------------------------- I �-----

Declining Government Confidence in the U.S. / 1351occurred. The GSS data enable us to examine the relationship between decliningconfidence and policy preferences over a period as long as 22 years, lending fargreater generalizability than past studies whose data cover only the first wave ofdedine (see Jennings 1998; Miller 1974a). This lengthy time period is useful indistinguishing short-term fluctuations from trends, and while randommeasurement error can attenuate estimates of association between survey items,such errors nave no impact on trend estimates unless the former are also associatedwith time. Our analysis of the years 1974 through 1996 spans seven separatepresidential administrations and eleven separate sessions of Congress; during thistime party control of the presidency changed three times and control of the Houseof Representatives once, enabling a fruitful test of the regime effects thesis.4

The remaining three requirements relate to the availability of suitable itemswith which to measure government confidence, policy preferences, and relevantstatistical controls. We take advantage of the existence of items that employ identicalquestion wording and response categories across different surveys. Specific featuresof these measures are discussed below.

MEASURES OF PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN GOVERNMENT

We measure individuals' level of confidence in government using two GSS itemsthat ask respondents to assess their degree of confidence in congressional leadersand the president. These items have been used in past studies to identify decliningtrends in government confidence (see Lipset & Schneider 1983; Smith & Taylor1979). As summarized in Table 1, the items ask respondents whether they have "agreat deal of confidence" (1), "only some confidence" (2), or "hardly anyconfidence" (3) in the president and congressional leaders. In the analyses below,we treat these two items as continuous variables.5

The GSS confidence items have two features that make them especially usefulfor hypothesis testing. First, in contrast to the more commonly analyzed NationalElection Survey item, the GSS items distinguish among the institutional targets ofpublic confidence in government. This is appropriate in light of the possibility thatthe political salience of confidence in government - and thus the associationbetween confidence and policy preferences - may vary across branches of thefederal government.6 The GSS items are also useful in that they refer to individuals'level of confidence in the leaders of executive and legislative branches ofgovernment (rather than to the institutions). This enables us to incorporate Citrin's(1974) and Lipset and Schneider's (1983) claims that declining governmentconfidence relates primarily to national political leaders.

1352 f Social Forces 79:4, June 2001

TABLE 1: Description of Variables Used in the Analysis

Variables (Coding) Question Wording

Primary Itidependent Variables

them?

Confidence in president (continuous:1 = "a great deal"; 2 = "only some";3= "hardly any")

Confidence in congressional leaders(continuous: 1 = "a great deal";2 = "only some"; 3 = "hardly any")

Primary Control Variable

Ideological identification (continuous:I = extremely liberal; 7 = extremelyconservative)

Other Control Variables

Age (continuous: years)Education (continuous: years)Gender (dichotomous: male = 0;

female = I)

Race (dichotomous: other = 0;African American = 1)

Region (categorical: 0 =West; threedummyvariables for Northeast,South, and Midwest)

Dependent Variables 1-3: Government

Assistance Items

Assistance to the poor (continuous:1 = strongly agree that governmentshould improve living standards;5 = strongly agree that people shouldtake care of themselves)

I am going to name some institutions in thiscountry. As far as the people runniing theseinstitutions are concerned, would you sayyou have a great deal of confidence, only someconfidence, or hardly any confidence at all in

Executive branch of the federal government?

Congress?

We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals andconservatives. I'm going to show you a 7-pointscale on which the political views that peoplemight hold are arranged from extremely liberal-point 1-to extremely conservative-point 7.Where would you place yourself on this scale?

Some people think that the government inWashington should do everything possible toimprove the standard of living of all poorAmericans; they are at Point 1 on this card.Other people think it is not the government'sresponsibility, and that each person should takecare of himself; they are at Point 5. Where wouldyou place yourself on this scale, or haven't youmade up your mind on this?

Declining Government Confidence in the U.S. / 1353TABLE 1: Description of Variables Used in the Analysis (Continued)

Question Wording

Dependent Vfariables 1-3: GovernmentAscsistance Items (Continued)

Assistance to blacks (continuous:I = strongly agree that government isobligated to help blacks; 5 = stronglyagree that government shouldn't givespecial treatment)

Medical assistance (continuous:1 = strongly agree that it is theresponsibility of government tohelp; 5 = strongly agree that peopleshould take care of themselves)

Dependent Variables 4-18: GovernmentSpendingItems (all spending items arecontinuous: 1 = too little; 2 = about

right; 3 = too much)

Health careWelfareSocial securityEducation

BlacksCitiesEnvironment

CrimeDrugsMass transportationHighways and bridgesParksForeign aid

Some people think that (Blacks/Negroes/African-Americans) have been discriminated against forso long that the government has a specialobligation to help improve their living standards.Others believe that the govermnent should not begiving special treatment to (Blacks/Negroes/African-Americans). Where would you placeyourself on this scale, or have you made up yourmind on this?In genera], some people think that it is theresponsibility of the government in Washingtonto see to it that people have help in paying fordoctors and hospital bills. Others think that thesethings are not the responsibility of the federalgovernment and that people should take care ofthese things themselves. Where would you placeyourself on this scale, or haven't you made upyour mind on this?

[Filterfor all spending itemsl: We are faced withmany problems in this country, none of whichcan be sold easily or inexpensively. I'm going toname some of these problems, and for each oneI'd like you to tell me whether you think we'respending too much money on it, too little money,or about the right amount.

Improving and protecting that nation's health.Welfare.Social security.Improving the nation's education system.Improving the conditions of Blacks.Solving the problems of the big cities.Improving and protecting the environment.Halting the rising crime rate.Dealing with drug addiction.Mass transportation.Highways and bridges.Parks and recreation.Foreign aid.

(Continued on next page)

Variables (Coding)


TABLE 1: Description of Variables Used in the Analysis (Continued)

Variables (Coding) Question Wording

Dependent Variables 4-.18: GovernmentSpendingItems (Continued)

National defenseFederal taxes (continuous: I = too low;tax

2 = about right; 3 = too high)

Dependent Variables 19-27: GovernimentResponsibility Items (all responsibility

items are continuous: 1 = definitely

should be; 2 = probably should be;

3 = can't choose; 4 = probably should

not be; 5 = definitely should not be)

Provide jobs

Social securityHealth careUnemployment assistance

Provide housing

Educational opportunity

Reduce income inequality

Industrial assistance

Control inflation

The military, armaments and defense.

Do you consider the amount of federal income

which you have to pay ask too high, about right,or too low?

[Filter for all responisibility items]: On the whole,do you think it should or should not be the

government's responsibility to . . .

Provide a job for everyone who wants one?

Provide a decent standard of living for the old?

Provide health care for the sick?

Provide a decent standard of living for theunemployed?Provide decent housing for those who can'tafford it?Give financial assistance to college students fromlow-income families?

Reduce income differences between the rich andpoor?Provide industry with the help it needs to grow?

Keep prices under control?

MEASURES OF POLICY PREFERENCES

Our dependent variables measure policy preferences across a large number ofdomains, ranging from health and federal income taxes to preferred levels of publicspending on national defense and the environment. In all, we analyze a total of 27separate policy preference items from the GSS. Nine of these items7 have beenused as components of the measure of policy preferences (Stimson 1989) foundto predict changes in public policy (Stimson, Mackuen & Erikson 1995). Thisoverlap is useful in establishing the validity and reliability of the GSS policypreference items.

The first three dependent variables concern the public's level of support forgovernment assistance programs (see Table 1 for question wording). The threeLikert-type items in this category refer to assistance to the poor, to AfricanAmericans, and to individuals with health care costs. The response categories forthese items range from I ("strongly agree") to 5 ("strongly disagree"). These items

Declining Government Confidence in the U.S. I 1355are available for twelve years of the GSS, covering the long time period from 1975through 1996.8

The second block of dependent variables concems respondents' preferred levelof government spending. For these 15 items, respondents were asked whether thecurrent level of spending for a given policy domain is "too little" (l), "aboutright" (2), or "too much" (3).9 A positive association between these responses andconfidence in government indicates that low confidence is related to anunwillingness to endorse federal government activity or involvement. Thegovernment spending items have been fielded in most years of the General SocialSurvey since 1974, again enabling tests of hypotheses regarding time trends.'0

Our final block of dependent variables are nine GSS items that ask respondentstheir preferences regarding government's level of responsibility for specific policydomains. For these five-category Likert-type items, "1" indicates the strongest levelof support for federal governmental responsibility and "5" indicates the strongestlevel of opposition. The government responsibility items are available in fewerGeneral Social Surveys, but they span the most recent period during which controlof both the presidency and the House of Representatives changed." Theiroverlapping reference to three policy domains covered by other GSS items (socialsecurity, health care, and education) is also useful in gauging whether differencesin question wordings or the framing of government involvement yield differentestimates of association with respondents' level of confidence in government.

CONTROLS FOR SOCIODEMOGRAPHIc FACTORS AND IDEOLOGICAL IDENTIFICATION

We incorporate two types of control variables, one related to sociodemographicfactors and the other to ideological identification. The inclusion of thesociodemographic variables ensures that any association between governmentconfidence and policy preferences is not spurious (i.e., solely a product of socialgroup-based differences in government confidence and policy preferences).Potentially the most important of these factors is race. In keeping with researchdocumenting African Americans' comparatively high levels of support for manyfederal programs (Howell & Fagan 1988; Tate 1993), we analyze race as adichotomous variable coded " 1 " for African American and "O" otherwise. 12

The remaining sociodemographic controls measure other well-known sourcesof policy attitudes (see Brint & Kelley 1993; Erikson & Tedin 1995; Page & Shapiro1992). Age and education are both analyzed as continuous variables (measured inyears). Gender is a dichotomy coded "1" for women and "O" for men. We analyzeregion as three dummy variables for Northeast, South, and Midwest, with West asthe reference category.

The ideological control variable in the analysis measures individuals'identification using a seven-point scale whose categories range from "extremelyliberal" (1) to "extremely conservative" (7). In similar fashion to the


sociodemographic variables, ideological identification may also produce spuriousassociations between government confidence and policy preferences,13 possiblybecause ideological identification can be a cognitive heuristic that individualsutilize to evaluate politicians or public policies (Fuchs & Kiingemann 1990;Sniderman, Brody & Tetlock 199 1). As discussed in the results section, includingideological identification in the models also provides a useful baseline againstwhich to gauge the magnitude of the corresponding effects of presidential andcongressional confidence.

STATISTICAL MODEIS AND STANDARDIZED COEFFICIENTS

We use OLS models for our analyses. As a check on the OLS assumption of interval-

level measurement in the dependent variable, we also conducted the analyses usingan ordered logit specification. Because these analyses yielded congruent results,we present the simpler OLS estimates.

Our analyses are conducted in three stages. In the first stage we estimate modelswith covariates for the two government confidence items and the sociodemographiccontrol variables. In the second stage, we estimate models with covariates for theideological identification item and the sociodemographic control variables. Becausethe government confidence and ideological identification items are not estimatedin the same model, the first two stages of the analysis yield estimates of the totalrespective effects of government confidence and ideological identification.

The third stage of the analysis yields estimates of the direct effects of governmentconfidence and ideological identification by including both sets of covariates inthe same model. This design enables us to compare the total versus direct effectsof government confidence and ideological identification, thereby providinginformation about their interrelationships. For instance, if the total effects ofgovernment confidence shrink when ideological identification is estimated in thesame model, this indicates that the direct effects of government confidence aresmaller than their total effects (possibly because ideological identification mediatesthe effects of government confidence). However, if the total and direct effects are

similar, this shows that government confidence and ideological identification areindependent sources of policy preferences.

The dimension of time is central to our hypothesis testing, and we analyze eachpolicy preference item for every year that it was fielded in the GSS, yielding over750 separate statistical models. To facilitate the interpretation of results, we present

standardized coefficients using a series of graphical displays. The standardized

coefficients are useful in controlling for the varying marginal distributions of

independent and dependent variables (across policy domains and also over time).

Whereas unstandardized coefficients can frustrate comparisons across items with

different distributions and ranges, the fully standardized coefficients take such

variation directly into account using a common metric. This standardization thus

enables direct comparisons along our three cross-cutting dimensions of variation:

Declining Government Confidence in the U.S. / 1357across independent variables, between policy domains, and over time. Additionaldetails are discussed below.

Results

The results of our analyses are very consistent with respect to the dimensions oftime, policy domain, and institutional target of public confidence. Using the resultssummarized in Figure 2, we examine the first three dependent variables measuringgovernment assistance to the poor, to blacks, and to individcuals with medical costs.In the first column of Figure 2, we present estimates for the total effects ofpresidential confidence, congressional confidence, and ideological identification;estimates for their direct effects (derived fiom models including all independentvariables) are presented in the second column. Solid circles represent estimatedcoefficients.

By gauging its distance fronm the light, dashed line designating an estimate of 0,we can observe the magnitude of a specific coefficient at a particular point in time.Taking as an example the total effect of congressional confidence on governmentassistance to the poor, the .05 standardized coefficient for 1975 indicates that astandard deviation decrease in confidence is predicted to lower support forgovernment assistance by .05 standard deviations. Comparing this estimate withthe direct effects estimate in the second column reveals a nearly identical value of.04, indicating that the very small relationship between congressional confidenceand government assistance to the poor in 1975 was largely unrelated to thecorresponding effects of presidential confidence and ideological identification.

The results in Figure 2 show few differences across the dimensions of policydomain and institutional target. Of the three covariates, the effects of ideologicalidentification are by far the largest, with the average direct effects coefficient beingapproximately .1 5 for assistance to the poor (and .1 6 for the total effect estimates).By comparison, the corresponding effects of presidential and congressionalconfidence are much smaller (approximately -.05 and .04 in the direct effectsmodels), and this pattern is very similar across the three separate policy domainsanalyzed in Figure 2. The magnitude of these coefficients is largely unchanged inthe total versus direct effects models, indicating that the respective effects of thethree main independent variables are independent of one another and thus thatgovernment confidence and ideological identification represent separate sourcesof policy preferences.

Regarding the dimension of time, the effects of presidential and congressionalconfidence each underwent a change after 1991. Whereas lower confidence incongressional leaders was associated with lower support for government assistancethrough 1991, lower support in subsequent years has had a declining impact."4

The reverse pattern is observed for presidents, with lower presidential confidence

1358 1 Social Forces 79:4, June 2001

FIGURE 2: Standardized Effects of Confidence in President, Confidence inCongress, and Ideological Identification for Items 1-3

0.50 -

GOVT. ASSISTANCE TO THE POOR:

Total Effects

0 . .-

A 0.6

._-*t§_@A/~4 ' " *-# ,* @ u*

_ , __

' * . .. s *. * s *

74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96

GOV"T. ASSISTANCE TO BLACKS:

Total Effects

* * \ ;~ _ j ,; _ ~.5 0. _0-0 ___.__

- --- -- * -*-

74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96

0 .5 0 - - - -- -- - -- - - -- -- - - -- - -- -GOVT. MEDICAL ASSISTANCE:

Total Effects

0 .25 r - -- - - -- - -- - - -- -- - -- - ----- - -

* ' */ \ \ */ *

O. ------ - -- - ---- -- O'

-0.25 r . - r . _

0.50

0.25

0.00 '

-0.25

.50 -

0.25 -

0.00 -

-0.25 -

0.50

0.25

0.00 4

-0.25

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Direct Effects

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Direct Effects

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* * ;

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GOVT'. MEDICAL ASSISTANCE:

Direct Effects

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Source: D)ata are from the General Social Surveys, 1974-96.

0.25

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74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96

Declining Government Confidence in the U.S. / 1359generally associated with higher support for government assistance prior to 1991(but with lower support after 1991).

Notwithstanding the latter points, the more important finding is that the resultsin Figure 2 reveal no net increase in the effects of presidential and congressionalconfidence during the 21-year period covered by the analyses. We emphasize thatthese effects are small in magnitude while also being independent of the (larger)effects of ideological identification. The comparatively larger effects of ideologicalidentification are useful in establishing a baseline against which to gauge the relativemagnitude of goverrnent confidence. More specifically, the results in Figure 2demonstrate that the small coefficients for presidential and congressionalconfidence cannot be attributed solely to random measurement error in thedependent variables, given that the latter do not prevent the correspondingcoefficients for ideological identification from being considerably larger inmagnitude.1 5

Corroborating our results for the first three dependent variables, our analysesof the 24 remaining dependent variables do not reveal any consistently larger effectsof presidential and congressional confidence or any trends in their association withpolicy preferences. These results are readily summarized using the simplifiedgraphical displays in Figures 3 and 4. In these figures, we present the median, 10tlhpercentile, and 90th percentile values for each set of standardized coefficientsmeasuring the total effects (the charts in the first column) and direct effects (thecharts in the second column) of presidential and congressional confidence. Asbefore, coefficients greater than (or less than) a value of 0 indicate an associationwith policy preferences. By observing the circles designating the medians and thesmall rectangles designating the lower (10%) and upper (90%) percentiles, we cancompare the variability of effects of presidential and congressional confidence acrosspolicy domains.16

Like the average coefficients for the first three dependent variables, the mediancoefficients for the total and direct effects of presidential confidence on theremaining dependent variables are generally small in magnitude, with the largesttwo coefficients being .09 for health care and .08 for social security. The 80% rangefor these coefficients shows generally modest variation, with the majority varyingwithin a range of less than .08. As displayed in the bottom panels of Figure 3, thecorresponding effects for congressional confidence are smaller and their rangesshow even less variation.

Given the small magnitude of these effects, differences between policy domainsare not particularly noteworthy; the more important finding is instead the closeproximity of many coefficients to a value of 0 (e.g., the policy domains for crime,drugs, transportation, and highways). Extending the earlier results from Figure 2,comparisons of total versus direct effects suggest the independence of the effects ofpresidential and congressional confidence from the corresponding effects ofideological identification. Finally, our additional examination of year-specificcoefficients (using the more detailed type of chart employed in Figure 2) reveals

1360/ Social Forces 79:4, June 2001

no evidence for trends in the effects of presidential and congressional confidence

on policy preferences.Figure 4 summarizes the total and direct effects of presidential and

congressional confidence for our 12 final policy preference items. The results are

similar to those summarized in Figure 3: although modest in magnitude, the effects

of presidential confidence on policy preferences are generally larger than those of

congressional confidence, and total and direct effects coefficients are similar for

both presidential and congressional confidence. With two partial exceptions, the

over time results for these items provide no evidence of a consistently large or

increasing association between presidential and congressional confidence and

policy preferences.The two instances of nontrivial associations relate to the effects of presidential

confidence on national defense spending and on federal income taxes. With regard

to defense spending preferences, its interrelationship with presidential confidence

was small through 1980 but subsequently increased in size, reaching a peak of .26

in 1984 (.23 in the direct effects model). However, because this relationship declined

in magnitude by the late 1980s,l7 it does little to change our overall portrait of

wveak and trendless associations between government confidence and policy

preferences.Coefficients for the interrelationship of presidential confidence and preferences

relating to government taxes are modest in size, but they suggest a growth in

magnitude during the 1990s, increasing from .03 in 1991 to .15 in 1993 and

peaking at .25 in 1996. However, additional analysis of the 1998 GSS reveals a

return to smaller coefficients, providing evidence that the unusually large

association in 1996 does not represent an enduring trend."'

CHANGES CORRESPONDING TO SHIFTS IN PARTY CONTROL

Taken as a whole, the above results present a highly consistent portrait of the effects

of presidential and congressional confidence on policy preferences as small and

as having little relationship to the corresponding effects of ideological identification.

However, to fully evaluate the regime effects thesis, we analyze in greater detail

whether over time changes in coefficients' sign or magnitude correspond to changes

in party control of the House of Representatives or the presidency. With regard to

the presidency, we find that approximately 75% of shifts in party control were

accompanied by a change in coefficients' sign or magnitude. However, we also find

a larger number of changes occurring within the same presidential administration

(or within two administrations controlled by the same party's president). Indeed,

the latter represent 64% of all changes in coefficients' sign or magnitude (thus

representing a more commoni type of change than changes corresponding to

switches in party control).We obtain similar findings with respect to changes involving congressional

confidence, with more changes in coefficients (72%) occurring before the election

Declining Government Confidence in the U.S. 1 1361

FIGURE 3: Median and lOth/9Oth Percentiles for Standardized Effects ofPresidential and Congressional Confidence for Items 4-15

PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDENCE:Total Effects

) i T T I I Tj

3

CONGRESSIONAL CONFIDENCE:Total Effects

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I - i i 1 * 1T

i ', I I f fix: br ce s > =

Source: Data are from the General Social Surneys, 1974 -96.

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PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDENCE.Direct Effects

* i- i- .

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i 1 9 � I .1� A m I= u11� .S., I m.VS5 2


FIGURE 4: Median and lOth/9Oth Percentiles for Standardized Effects ofPresidential and Congressional Confidence for Items 16-27

0.50 T- ---- ---------- ---- --- --

PRESIDENTIAL CONFIDENCE:Total Effects

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Declining Government Confidence in the U.S. / 1363

of the 104th Congress (i.e., during the pre-1995 period of Democratic control).While some changes in congressional (or presidential) confidence may be relatedto political scandals (Paxton 1999) or economic change (Lawrence 1997), theirprimary relevance to the current study stems from our larger finding that mostchanges occur within periods of party control, thereby deviating from theexpectations of the regime effects thesis. We discuss below implications forcompeting interpretations of government confidence.

Discussion

Although competing interpretations of declining government confidence providedivergent answers to important questions about pressures for the devolution offederal policy-making authority, contemporary debates are inconclusive becauseof the underdeveloped state of empirical research. Indeed, the most prominentstatements (Greenberg 1995; Morris 1998; Skocpol 1996; see also Brinkley 1997)suggest provocative hypotheses without attempting to directly measure the impactof changing levels of government confidence. Our analysis addresses the limitationsof these commentaries and of past studies (e.g., Jennings 1998; Miller 1974a) bydistinguishing between theoretically relevant aspects of government confidence andpolicy domains, analyzing data over a longer and more recent time period thancovered in past research, and considering a wide range of policy domains. As aresult, we are able to test hypotheses implied by competing interpretations ofgovernment confidence.

Because it implies a strong relationship between government confidence andpolicy preferences, the devolution thesis is not supported by our analyses.Underlying the devolution thesis is the assumption that low levels of confidencein government are related to citizens' preferred level of involvement by the federalgovernment in policy-making activities. If the devolution thesis were true, thereshould be a large association by the 1990s between government confidence andpolicy preferences, but we find no such evidence across numerous policy domains.Not only is the relationship between government confidence and policy preferencessmall in magnitude, but only one of the twenty-seven policy domains we analyzeis even remotely close to approximating a trend toward increasing association.Given the large number of policy domains and relatively long time period coveredby our analyses, these results put the burden of proof on proponents of thedevolution thesis.

Our analyses provide qualified support for the regime effects thesis that shiftsin party control contribute to changes in the impact of presidential andcongressional confidence. However, because there are even more numerousinstances of such changes occurring without shifts in party control, the regimeeffects thesis is a limited guide to understanding these changes. Moreover, because


the effects of presidential and congressional confidence are typically small inmagnitude, changes between presidential administrations or sessions of Congresshave few consequences for the interrelationship of government confidence andpolicy preferences.

Taken as a whole, our results favor the symbolic change thesis. The evidence isespecialy noteworthy in that it takes into account the widest possible range of policydomains over a long time period in which t-he salience of government distrust mightitself have increased, thereby disposing individuals to weigh more heavily theirconfidence level when evaluating current or prospective federal policies. We alsoemphasize that our study analyzes measures of government confidence and policypreferences whose reliability and validity are well established. Indeed, we build frompast research by analyzing the same two items used in Lipset and Schneider's (1983,1987) seminal study of trends in government confidence, as well as nine of thecore items used by Stimson and his colleagues to measure policy preferences(Stimson 1989) and their relationship to changes in public policv (Stimson,Mackuen & Erikson 1995).

Our results extend and refine Lipset and Schneider's (1983) interpretation ofpublic confidence in government. Lipset and Schneider viewed declininggovernment confidence as a largely symbolic phenomenon, produced by changingpatterns of media coverage but not indicative of dissatisfaction with politicalinstitutions or with the direction of public policy-making. However, theynevertheless offered some qualifications based on their analysis proceeding nofurther than the early 1980s, concluding that any further decline could be indicativeof "signs of deep and serious discontent" (1983:412). In doing so, Lipset andSchneider (1987; see also Schneider 1992) allowed for a scenario in which symbolicdistrust could later evolve into substantial dissatisfaction with the federalgovernment and possibly even pressure for the devolution of policy-makingauthority.

We go beyond Lipset and Schneider's study by directly analyzing theinterrelationship of government confidence and policy preferences. Because ouranalyses also cover the post-1980 period, they provide evidence that governmentdistrust has not evolved into substantial policy dissatisfaction since that time. Inparticular, our results suggest that contemporary policy conflicts over such issuesas health care reform and the House Republicans' Contract with America did notprovide individuals with cues to develop closer connections between their level ofgovernment confidence and their preference for governnment activism.1 9 Moreover,despite long-standing, negative attitudes toward Congress (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse1995), congressional confidence tends to have an even smaller association withpolicy preferences than presidential confidence. Taken as a whole, these resultsprovide little grounds for expecting a larger association between confidence ingovernment and policy preferences in the immediate future. Given that the focusof both this study and of contemporary debates are on policy preferences, further

Declining Government Confidence in the U.S. J 1365

research may be able to shed light on the possibility that government confidence isrelated to other processes or outcomes.

DECLINING GOVERNMENT CONFIDENCE AND CONTEMPORARY WELFARE STATE

RETRENCHMENT

In assessing whether declining confidence might hav,e created public support fordevolution, we can think of no more convincing evidence than a strong associationbetween individuals' level of confidence in the federal govermment and their levelof support for govermment involvement across numerous policy domains. Indeed,in light of evidence for the interrelationship of public opinion and public policydiscussed in our introduction to this article (see Burstein 1998 for review), suchan association would indicate that declining confidence could contribute to thedevolution scenario by affecting the public's preferred levels of federal involvementin policy-making. However, given our findings of a consistently small relationshipbetween government confidence and policy preferences, we find no evidence thatdeclining confidence can be a major contributor to this scenario.

Over the past decade, conflicts over such reforms as Ronald Reagan's NewFederalism proposal and the transformation of federal welfare programs throughthe 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act havegiven rise to a burgeoning literature on welfare state retrenchment (Palmer &Sawhill 1982; Skocpol 1996; Zylan & Soule 2000; Weaver 1986; see also Grant1995). Within this literature, an important proposition developed by Pierson (1994,1996; see also Conlan 1988) is that public support for specific policies constrainsthe capacity of government officials to trim entitlements or limit federal spending,potentially explaining the absence of more extensive patterns of retrenchment inthe current era. Indeed, a large body of opinion research has found consistentlyhigh levels of support for many types of public social provision (including education,health, and social security), with liberal trends outnumbering conservative trends2 0

during the past two decades (Davis 1992; DiMaggio, Evans & Bryson 1996; Page &Shapiro 1992; Smith 1990).

In this context, our results have two noteworthy points of relevance to researchOni welfare state retrenchment. First, while some political commentators haveassumed that devolution of federal policy-making authority to the states or localgovernment would help restore public confidence (Nye 1997), our findings of aconsistently small association between government confidence and policypreferences cast doubt on this assumption. The causal status of these two factorsis, of course, inconclusive in our cross-sectional analyses, but the absence of a largerelationship by itself suggests that federal program cuts or more extensiveretrenchment would do little to enhance public confidence in presidents orcongressional leaders.21

Second, we emphasize that neither research on welfare state retrenchment northe literature on public opinion and policy change has analyzed the role of


confidence in government. However; our finding that support for federalinvolvement is consistent with high levels of public distrust of government suggests

that the explanation for contemporary patterns of retrenchment is to be found

elsewhere (see also Zylan & Soule 2000). Accordingly, while low levels of confidence

in presidents and congressional leaders show little sign of receding, there is little

evidence that they contribute to, or provide a mandate for, comprehensiveretrenchment at the federal level. Low levels of government confidence instead

appear to be compatible with public unwillingness to limit many governmentprograms.

Notes

1. The literature on government confidence equates confidence and trust - anassumption buttressed by findings that survey respondents' most common definitionof "confidence" involves reference to "trust" (Smith & Taylor 1979).

2. Note, however, that two recent studies within this literature have also reported a smallbut significant decline in this relationship (Jacobs & Shapiro 1997; Monroe 1998),suggesting that the divergence of federal policy-making from public opinion has increasedduring the past fifteen years.

3. Although a majority of research has relied on National Election Survey (NES) data(e.g., Citrin 1974; Hetheringtoni 1998, 1999; Jennings 1998; Miller 1974a), the GSS itemshave a number of desirable features (discussed below) that distinguish them from thesingle NES item used in previous studies. Our analysis of the NES data yielded consistentresults, and we present the results fromi the GSS analysis in light of the considerablybroader set of findings that the GSS data vield.

4. Our analysis of the GSS data begins with the 1974 survey, the first in which a numberof items central to our analyses were fielded. We note that the GSS was not fielded in1979, 1981, 1992, and 1995 and that since 1988 the GSS has employed a rotating, split-ballot design. Because of the periodic availability of several items, some of our modelsspan the years 1974 to 1996 while others span the years 1984 to 1996. As discussed in theresults section, the differences have little effect on our inferences by virtue of theconsistency of the results over time and across policy domains.

5. We investigated whether treating these items as categorical covariates would yielddifferent estimates of their association with policy preferences. Given clear evidence tothe contrary, we present the results using the less cumbersome, interval-levelmeasurement.

6. We assume that individuals' levels of confidence in presidents and in congressionalleaders represent separate phenomena. Bivariate analyses of the two GSS confidence itemsprovide evidence supporting this assumption, with the average correlation coefficientbeing .41 (with a high of .51 in 1978 and a low of .33 in 1975). Such values are also wellbelow the -. 75 threshold past which collinearity would be a problem in multivariateanalyses.

Declining Government Confidence in the U.S. / 13677. In Table 1, the nine items are 1, 3-5, 7-10, and 18.

8. The twelve years are 1975, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990,1991,1993,1994,and 1996.

9. These domains relate to health care, welfare, social security, education, AfricanAmericans, cities, environmental protection, fighting crime, drug addiction,transportation, infrastructure, parks, foreign aid, national defense, and federal incometax. As summarized in Table 1, the federal income tax item is also trichotomous but hasslightly different response category labels and question wording. We note that theinclusion of this item is instructive in light of Scholz and Lubell's (1998) evidence thatdistrust of government may dispose individuals to resist paying income tax.

10. For health care, welfare, education, African Americans, cities, environmentalprotection, drug addiction, foreign aid, and national defense, the available years are 1974,1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993,1994, and 1996. As discussed in the results section, the remaining six items are availablein a smaller number of the GSS surveys.

11. These items (and their survey years) are job provision (1989, 1989, 1991, and 1996),social security and health care (1990 and 1996), unemployment assistance (1989, 1989,and 1996), housing provision and educational opportunities (1990 and 1996), incomeinequality (1990, 1991, and 1996), and industrial assistance and inflation control (1990and 1996).

12. Given the magnitude of black/nonblack differences in policy attitudes, we conducteda search for interaction effects between race and government confidence. As illustratedin the Appendix (which presents models with these interaction effects for an illustrativedependent variable), these analyses provide little evidence for significant interactions.

13. We conducted additional analyses for interaction effects between ideologicalidentification and government confidence but found no significant interactions.

14. Given the Republican Party's congressional majorit,y after the 1994 midterm elections,a change of sign (but not magnitude) for the coefficient would indicate individuals'awareness of this change in party control. However, the results in Figure 2 suggest thatthe declining association of congressional confidence and policy preferences was underway before the 1994 election.

15. The small magnitude of the effects of presidential and congressional confidence canbe further appreciated through a comparison with the corresponding effects of the well-known black/nonblack cleavage in policy preferences (Erikson & Tedin 1995; Tate 1993).For our first three dependent variables, the average total effects coefficient for thedichotomous race variable is -.25, a figure well in excess of the large majority of thecorresponding coefficients for government confidence. Indeed, in only 2 cases (discussedbelow) out of more than 500 is the coefficient for presidential or congressional confidenceequal to or greater than an absolute value of .25 (the large majority have a value of lessthan .10). To call attention to these findings we use .25 intervals on all figures' y-axes.

16. Because our analyses of items 4-27 show no trends in coefficients, Figures 3-4 donot present the year-specific estimates, relying instead on summary box-plots. Eight


graphical displays with the detailed year-specific coefficients of the sort used in Figure 2are available from the authors.

17. In 1989, the total effects coefficient for presidential conifidence was . 3, declining furtherto-.01 in 1993.

18. The standardized coefficient for the total effects of presidential confidence ongovernment taxes in 1998 (.17) is c)mparable to the corresponding coefficient from 1994(.15) and considerably smaller than the 1996 coefficient (.25). The effects of congressionalconfidence on tax preferences in 1998 are small and nonsignificant (-.04 and -.03 fortotal and direct effects estimates).

19. These conclusions fit well with Pauxton's (1999) study of social capital, which findsthat the interrelationships of confidence in educational leaders, confidence in religiousleaders, and confidence in leaders of government institutions have been stable since theearly 1970s.

20. Conservative opinion trends include increased support since the ]i960s for punitivemeasures regarding crime (Erikson & Tedin 1995) and decreasing support in the 1990sfor public spending on welfare (Smith 1995).

21. The risks of interpreting low levels of government confidence as implying publicsupport for devolution can also be appreciated by considering a contemporary historicalexample. Buttressed by their congressional majority following the 1994 elections, SpeakerNewt Gingrich and a large segment of House Republicans promulgated their 10-pointContract with America, citing low confidence in government as providing a mandatefor transferring policy-making authority from the federal government to the states. Thepublic's subsequent response appears to have been- largely negative (National Journal1996), reflecting support for many existing government programs and later disposingthe majority of the public to blame House Republicans for the 1995 shutdown of thefederal government (Abramson, Aldrich & Rohde 1998).

Declining Government Confidence in the U.S. /1369

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Declining Government Confidence in the U.S. I 1373References

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TITLE: Declining government confidence and policy preferencesin the U.S.: devolution, regime effects, or symbolicchange?

SOURCE: Social Forces 79 no4 Je 2001WN: 0115300654003

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