Obama’s Foreign Policy on Afghanistan

By Stephen Thompson307074493

POL 445 – American Foreign PolicyDr. Alexander Moens

December 8, 2011

The War in Afghanistan has been an ongoing conflict since 2001. It lasted the 8-

year length of American President George W. Bush’s two terms in office and continues

on well into the third year of the current presidency of Barack Obama. After the

September 11, 2011 terrorist attacks, Afghanistan became the Bush administration’s

starting point of the Global War on Terror. It was the champion cause that could always

be pointed to as a real reason why the US was waging war in South Asia and the Middle

East.

But within just two short years the Bush administration would switch its focus and

become involved in a second war in Iraq. The Iraq War would consume most of the

administration’s focus, both in policy, resources, and time. The War in Afghanistan

became something of a sideshow; a secondary thought. It would take the next president to

bring this secondary thought back to the forefront.

During his election campaign, then Senator Barack Obama commented on the US

involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq. In his New York Times commentary Obama wrote

that only by ending the war in Iraq could the US be able to live up to its previous foreign

commitments and its overall strategic goals of defeating terrorism in Afghanistan and

neighbouring in Pakistan.1 His plan was to introduce a new strategy and to increase troop

levels by committing a minimum of two brigades. He stated the need for more troops,

more helicopters, better intelligence and more non-military assistance for nation building.

Since assuming office, the Obama administration has come into criticism over its

shifting policy. From the beginning of his term Obama had set out to increase

engagement in Afghanistan. After almost three years of being in office, Obama’s policy

has shifted because of the belief that the military defeat of the Taliban insurgency is both

1 Barack Obama, “My Plan for Iraq,” New York Times, July 14, 2008, A17.

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costly and ultimately unattainable. Within a 2-year period Obama has shifted away from

the initial policy of introducing more troops into Afghanistan and has since implemented

a withdrawal date. If this current policy is carried through it will lead to an overall

mission failure because of the inability to subdue the Taliban insurgency which could

ultimately allow the Taliban to gain some, if not complete control back over Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is a nation storied in the history of war ranging from Alexander the

Great, Genghis Khan and of more recent history, the Soviets. Today’s ongoing war has its

origins in December 1979. The initial war began when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan

in order to bring their preferred communist government faction into power. The invasion

by the atheist Soviets into a Muslim nation resulted in Muslims declaring a jihad. Beyond

the religious element the jihad was backed by numerous Western nations but most

importantly the US, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. A tangible resolution was reached in

1988 with the Geneva Accords, which set the timetable for Soviet withdrawal.

Even after the timetable was set the conflict did not cease; the US and Pakistan

continued to supply arms to the Afghanistan resistance. This would ultimately play a part

in creating a failed state.2 Following the retreat of the Soviets the US lost interest in the

region. The power vacuum left after the war led the remaining militias, drug traffickers

and any other groups with eye for power into a civil war. One such group, the Taliban,

was backed by Pakistan.3 By the late 1990’s the Taliban managed to gain control over

much of the nation.

The new Taliban regime did little to bring attention to itself outside the context of

the civil war. However this would change quickly. In 1996 the terrorist leader Osama bin

2 Rubin B. Barnett, “Saving Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs 86, No.1 (Jan/Feb): 57-78.3 Barnett, “Saving Afghanistan”, 57-78.

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Laden was expelled from his former safe haven of Sudan; the Taliban offered him a place

of operations in Afghanistan. The nation would not reappear on the radar of international

politics until after the 1998 US embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania. The American

reaction under President Clinton involved cruise missile strikes against training camps in

Afghanistan. It would take the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States

before further action would be taken against the Taliban government.

The Bush administration’s reaction was swift. Within a month of the attack it

launched an all out air campaign attack on Afghanistan in order to drive the Taliban out

of power. It was reminiscent of the air campaign against Kosovo. In addition to the air

campaign, US Special Forces carried out operations on the ground and worked in

conjunction with the rival faction to the Taliban, the Northern Alliance. By 2003

Afghanistan was a fragile but functioning state having been established with United

Nations (UN) assistance.4 Afghanistan now had 32,000 US and NATO troops in security

and counterinsurgency (COIN) work, and an additional 8,000 coalition troops carrying

out counterterrorism operations.5

The country suffered from a wide array of problems, ranging from: tribal and

ethnic conflict and mistrust, economic instability, unemployment and poverty. The

Taliban were able to fulfill a role that the newly established Afghanistan government led

by President Hamid Karzai could not because of its relative weakness as a central

government. The Taliban were able to offer financial and economic help by paying

impoverished farmers for their opium crops and offering money to fighters who joined

the insurgency.

4 Ibid., 57-78.5 Ibid., 57-78.

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The Bush administration’s policy towards Afghanistan was shortsighted. It set out

initially after September 11, 2001 with the goal of deposing the Taliban for allowing

Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda terrorist group a safe haven to operate out of. Allies such as

the Northern Alliance were chosen for their willingness to help the US depose the

Taliban and created factional and ethnic tensions. Overall the Bush administration’s

policy misjudged Afghanistan as an easy victory. The result was the US’s inability to

carry out the strategic goal of defeating terrorism in the region. The Bush administration

also misjudged its ability to do it at low-cost of troops and foreign aid.6

The Iraq War detracted from Afghanistan as being the focal point for the

administration. Iraq allowed for outside influences to become involved in Afghanistan. It

brought about the new strategies such as: suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices,

skilled bomb makers, and advanced communications. The neglect of Afghanistan allowed

the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to firmly establish itself in the Afghanistan-Pakistan

borderlands. The move to this area allowed has allowed both groups to receive benefits

from the ongoing collusion of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence.7 All of this would

give the next president a momentous task to accomplish.

The unsolved issues and unclear policy passed onto the new President Barak

Obama when he took office in January 2009. The initial policy proposed by Obama was

open-ended; it did not offer an exit policy, which would allow the Taliban the opportunity

to wait out any US policy.8 On March 27, 2009 Obama announced his new strategy for

Afghanistan. The President was clear on the question of why Afghanistan was important

when he said, “Al Qaeda and its allies -- the terrorists who planned and supported the 6 Ibid., 57-78.7 Ibid., 57-78.8 Milton Bearden, “Obama’s War: Redefining Victory in Afghanistan & Pakistan,” April 9, 2009, Foreign Affairs, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64925/milton-bearden/obamas-war?page=show.

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9/11 attacks -- are in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Multiple intelligence estimates have

warned that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from its

safe haven in Pakistan. And if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban -- or allows Al

Qaeda to go unchallenged -- that country will again be a base for terrorists who want to

kill as many of our people as they possibly can.”9 The new policy was comprehensive. It

covered humanitarian objectives such as basic human rights, with a focus on the need for

protection of women and the warning that should the Taliban ever be able to regain

control of Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda would not be far behind in returning. The policy

covered foreign aid to Pakistan, 1.5 billion dollars over 5 years; recognising the role the

country must play in an overall strategy.10 The new policy called for the introduction of

an additional 17,000 troops for combat roles and emphasising the need to shift to a

training role to assist the Afghanistan government in preparing for the future. Defeat of

the Taliban was essential to the President when he said, “There is an uncompromising

core of the Taliban. They must be met with force, and they must be defeated.”11 This new

strategy would be called “Af-Pak” and recognised the importance of both Afghanistan

and Pakistan in the overall US policy towards the ongoing war.

On December 1, 2009 Obama gave a speech at the United States Military

Academy at West Point. During the speech the President announced that he had finished

a complete review of the Afghanistan mission. The review came after many months of

deliberation and it was announced that an additional 30,000 troops would be sent to

Afghanistan. However after 18 months American troops would begin to be withdrawn

9 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Speech at The White House, Washington, D.C., March 27, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan-and-Pakistan. 10 Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan,”11 Ibid.

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from Afghanistan and returned home, putting the withdrawal date in July 2011. This new

policy had one overarching goal: the disruption, dismantlement and the defeat of Al-

Qaeda in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.12 The objective was to prevent Al-Qaeda from

using any location as a safe haven for which it could plan and implement its terrorist

plots. In addition to this, the purpose of the troop surge was also to repel the current

Taliban advances in Afghanistan and strengthen the ability the Afghan government so

that it could not be undermined or overthrown. Troops would also be used in a training

role in which a greater emphasis would be put on recruiting and training quality Afghan

army and police members. This would push the Afghan government into assuming

responsibility for its own protection – ultimately allowing for US troops to withdraw

from the war without Afghanistan reverting back to chaos in the face of the Taliban. This

new policy made it clear that for the Obama administration the Afghanistan war was not

going to be an endless war.

Obama’s overall policy goals are most apparent in this speech. He no longer

wishes for an ongoing and potentially endless war to last longer than is absolutely

necessary. The War in Afghanistan now continuing longer than all other wars the US has

been involved in. His first goal is to achieve a level of stability in Afghanistan. This

would be achieved by the introduction of the additional 30,000 troops. These troops

would fulfill two roles: first, a counterinsurgency role that would carry out a military

strategy to take, clear, and hold areas in Afghanistan in order to protect Afghan civilians

from the Taliban – shoring up support for the Afghan national government. Second, a

training role that would train the Afghan National Army and the Afghan police force to 12 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Speech at United States Military Academy at West Point, New York, December 1, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan.

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standard that would allow them to replace the role currently carried out by US and NATO

troops.

His second goal is expand the role in which outside partners play in Afghanistan –

specifically referring to working with the United Nations. This civilian strategy would be

used to build a system where corruption is fought and reduced in order to allow the

Afghan people to trust, and have a reason to trust their own government. This strategy

would see other areas improved such as infrastructure, education and support to

agriculture. Without a strong and confident government that can provide meaningful

protection and services to its citizens it creates a void. This void can be exploited by the

Taliban, which can weaken the government to create an ongoing challenge to its power.

The third goal of the policy is the focus on the prospect of success in Afghanistan

is directly linked to the ongoing partnership with Pakistan. The Taliban and Al-Qaeda

enjoy the benefit of being able to move back and forth between the mountainous border

between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Obama’s policy goal is to achieve a united front

against both these groups so that they cannot be pushed out of Afghanistan and allowed

to remain unchallenged in Pakistan. By working together the US and Pakistan

governments has a better chance of denying Al-Qaeda a safe haven.

His policy is constrained the by US’s financial conditions. The ongoing Iraq War

has added over a trillion dollars to the US deficit and the cost of the War in Afghanistan

has cost billions of dollars. Obama’s policy works to shift the burden for the War in

Afghanistan from the US towards the Afghanistan government. Obama limits the US in

this war, due to cost and overall interests as he said in his speech, “I refuse to set goals

that go beyond our responsibility, our means, or our interests.”13 The overarching policy

13 Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,”

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goal taken from these three points is to put the Afghan government in a position of

relative stability, to train up its security forces, and link success to Pakistan’s cooperation.

This policy comes with an exit strategy in order to show that US interests in Afghanistan

are not limitless and that the there is no unconditional support to the Afghan government

if it cannot take progressive steps to assuming responsibility for its own future.

According to Walter Mead, an academic who focuses on American foreign policy,

there are four main schools of thought on US president’s foreign policy. These four

schools are named after four presidents: Wilson, Hamilton, Jefferson, and Jackson. Each

represents a unique way of understanding and interpreting the policy, goals, and actions

of American foreign policy. President Obama falls into two categories. He strongly

represents a Wilsonian tradition, but as his presidency has progressed he has begun to

represent a Jeffersonian tradition.

Obama uses specific language that adheres to the Wilsonian humanitarian

message. This language has many key words such as human rights, diplomacy, the

United Nations, and so on, but it contains an overall message of wanting to better the

world through values that are expressed by the US. It is not merely the desire and

discussion of a better world but also one of acting to make a better world. We can find

evidence fittingly enough in President Obama’s speech when he received the Nobel

Peace Prize for “"for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and

cooperation between peoples".14

During his speech Obama used strong language that espoused Wilsonian

principles as understood by Mead. He discusses the role in which the US has played in

14 “The Nobel Peace Prize 2009,” Nobelprize.org, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/

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maintaining global peace through various means such as: the Marshall Plan, the

establishment of the United Nations, rules for waging of wars, human right treaties,

genocide preventing, and arms control.15 In regards to the role the US has played he said,

“We have borne this burden not because we seek to impose our will. We have done so

out of enlightened self-interest…” Wilsonian principles seek to expand an international

idealism of enlightenment. The principles of peace, cooperation, and respect are familiar

in international politics as they are foremost expressed by the United Nations; an

institution created with the help of Wilsonianism. While discussing the principles of a

just peace Obama does not limit his actions to lofty words. In regards to use of force

Obama said, “I believe that force can be justified on humanitiarian grounds, as it was in

the Balkans, or in other places that have been scarred by war. Inactions tears at our

conscience and can lead to more costly internvetion later. That is why all responsible

nations must embrace the role that militaries with a clear mandate can play to keep the

peace.”16

The Nobel Peace Prize speech may seem to be directed to a specific audience but

it is part of the views expressed by Obama elsewhere. In his speech at West Point his

humanitarian desires were expressed further when he said, “What we have fought for --

what we continue to fight for -- is a better future for our children and grandchildren. And

we believe that their lives will be better if other peoples’ children and grandchildren can

live in freedom and access opportunity.”17 Another Wilson principle seen in Obama is his

readiness to use multilateralism.

15 Barack Obama, “Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech,” Speech at Olso, Norway, October 12, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/34360743/ns/politics-white_house/t/full-text-obamas-nobel-peace-prize-speech/#.TuDon7JFuso16 Obama, “Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech,”17 Obama, “Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,”

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In his Af-Pak policy speech from March, 2009 he outlined his expectations for

what was expected from both NATO and the UN, “From our partners and NATO allies,

we will seek not simply troops, but rather clearly defined capabilities: supporting the

Afghan elections, training Afghan security forces, a greater civilian commitment to the

Afghan people. For the United Nations, we seek greater progress for its mandate to

coordinate international action and assistance, and to strengthen Afghan institutions.” In

addition to this he called out to other Asian powers, specifically Russia, China and India

to assist in security and development for the benefit of the region.18 These countries also

benefited from the removal of a threat that could easy have ended up within their borders,

as terrorism knows no passport. Obama however does not fit into one perfect foreign

policy category.

Obama also shows shades of the Jeffersonian principles. These principles are part

of the belief that the US should be an example to the world – but not through direct

military or other forms of foreign action. The best thing that the US can do according to

Jeffersonian principles is to be a city on the hill for the rest of the world, and they can be

persuaded by this example. In his Nobel Peace Prize speech there are elements of

Jeffersonian values, as seen when Obama commented on ideals when he stated, “We lose

ourselves when we compromise the very ideals we fight to defend. And we honour those

ideals by upholding them not just when it is easy, but when it is hard.”19

Jeffersonian principles are wary of foreign involvement as they are viewed as a

potential to corrupt America’s democracy and its values at home. When Obama was

discussing the exit strategy for Afghanistan he touched on this principle – that the longer

18 Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan,”19 Obama, “Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech,”

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that the US is involved in a foreign war the greater the drain is on America itself. Obama

hinted to these concerns when he said that, “We must draw on the strength of our values

– for the challenges that we face may have changed, but the things we believe in must

not. That’s why we must promote our values by living them at home…” and as

mentioned above when he said before, “I refuse to set goals that go beyond our

responsibility, our means, or our interests.”20 Lastly Obama shares a Jeffersonian

principle in the sort of Vietnamization role his policy has called for.21 During the Vietnam

War President Nixon was faced with an unpopular war. His strategic plan was to shift

responsibility away from US troops to those of South Vietnam. This would continue until

eventually all US troops would depart from the country. Obama started a similar process.

He has sought to increase the training of Afghan National Army and the Afghan police

while setting a timetable for which US troops would exit the country and hand over an

increasing role to the Afghan government.

The Obama administration’s policy towards Afghanistan has in some ways

proved positive. In the overall policy goal of establishing the Afghan National Army has

been a success. As of 2011 the army was set to meet its November recruiting goal of

171,000. A well-staffed army would be essential for the eventual shift of security

responsibility away from US and NATO troops. The army also currently enjoys a 70%

approval rating, a high number for a country with such a relatively new army.22

The US has also helped establish the West Point equivalent, the National Military

Academy of Afghanistan. This will allow Afghanistan to train university level recruits for

20 “Remarks by the President on the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan,”21 Walter Mead, “The Carter Syndrome,” Foreign Policy no. 177 (January 2010): 1, http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/bsi/detail?sid=6e576cb4-a901-4ee4-b61e-3cabdad67c7e%40sessionmgr114&vid=5&hid=112&bdata=JnNpdGU9YnNpLWxpdmU%3d#db=bth&AN=4844505922 David M. Abshire and Ryan Browne, “The Mission Endgame: A Sustainable Post-Bin Laden Strategy,” The Washington Quarterly, 34:4, 63.

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its military and an educated officer cadre. Strong leadership is required for any new army

and US-trained officers will be highly needed for when the Afghan government begins to

take on a larger role in maintain peace and security. The policy has also allowed US

Special Forces to take on a training role in order to recruit and train local police officers.

This sets a standard for well-trained bottom-up security forces.23

The policy has also been successful in other ways as well. It has set a guiding

principle and statement to the Karzai government that while the US is committed to

assisting Afghanistan in its efforts, it is not so committed that it will not consider

withdrawing at a later date.24 The policy puts forward an end-goal and it expects the

Afghan government to fulfill its duties and expectations. This timetable has spurred

action in the Afghan government to encourage dialogue with the Taliban. This dialogue is

targeted towards moderates and aims to bring some of the Taliban back into Afghan

society and weaken the group by reducing its numbers. The policy is also positive in that

it recognises that the Taliban and Al-Qaeda are two different organisations and have two

different missions. While Al-Qaeda has become the main focus and is considered the

biggest threat that must be destroyed, the Taliban has been reduced in importance of US

policy. While it is still seen as a threat, it is not one that cannot be reduced by a stabile

government and a competent and well-trained security force.

Obama’s policy has also called to other regions to become involved in

Afghanistan. By increasing involvement with the region, economic opportunities

increase. One of the biggest challenges of facing Afghanistan is financial. Afghanistan

needs regional cooperation and trade and not regional power politics. The current

23 Abshire and Browne, “The Missing Endgame: A Sustainable Post-Bin Laden Strategy,” 63.24 Wahabuddin Ra’ees, “Obama’s Afghanistan Strategy: A Policy of Balancing the Reality with the Practice,” Journal of Politics and Law, Vol. 3, No.2, September 2010, 85.

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ongoing financial uncertainly and government austerity measures in the world could

potentially see international funds being reduced.25 Afghanistan requires stability in order

for business to grow – both within its borders and within the region. While the troop

surge may likely help there is more that must be done. One suggestion for regional

stability is that Afghanistan should internationally declare itself neutral – removing it

from the Iran, Pakistan and Indian regional sphere of influence. Henry Kissinger points to

the example of neutral Belgium and how it remained neutral for over 100 years.26

In other ways the December 2009 policy as not worked well at all. There are

many ways in which the initial announcement has been perceived. In Bob Woodard’s

book Obama’s War there is a clear sense of conflict between the military’s desire for a

40,000-troop surge to what would become the eventual 30,000-troop surge. The criticism

has been less than kind towards the policy. In an article in U.S. Naval Institute

Proceedings magazine, retired Captain James F. Kelly Jr. called out on the president for

taking 90 days to come together with a policy that had an 18-month timetable for

withdrawal. In his article he states that, “This President has famously declared

Afghanistan a "war of necessity" and that failure there is not an option. Well then he

needs to understand that commitment to success is not compatible with timetables for

withdrawal. We cannot commit troops to battle and tell them that failure is not an option

if we have already established a schedule for retreat. This is no way to fight a war.”27 The

issue of the timetable for withdrawal is contemptuous. Even General Petraeus,

commander of the US forces in Afghanistan has opposed to the idea of a rapid

25 Absire and Brown, 63.26 Ibid., 70.27 James F. Kelly Jr., “Obama’s Afghanistan,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2010, Vol. 136 Issue 1, 8. http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.sfu.ca/ehost/detail?sid=b42a139d-5342-44f6-a1e9-261d76c6bea9%40sessionmgr112&vid=1&hid=112&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%3d%3d#db=aph&AN=47668724

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withdrawal when 18-month timetable came up.28 Wahabuddin Ra’ees shared similar

concerns in his article, “Obama’s Afghanistan Strategy: A Policy of Balancing the

Reality with the Practice,” when he stated that the deadline was a continued repeat of

historical mistakes – much like what occurred when the US lost interest in Afghanistan

after the Soviets withdrew.29 It creates a sense of fear that once the American goal of

defeating Al-Qaeda is accomplished it will leave Afghanistan while it is still a fragile

state.

Other criticism has been focused on the strategies involved. The current strategy

has been called “unsustainable and suffers from a deliberating credibility deficit.”30 What

was once considered the “good war” and backed by the UN has been falling out of

favour.31 The timetable has given the impression that the United States lacks a clear

interest in staying long-term. The US should have a direct interest in maintaining stability

in Afghanistan because there is a direct interest in preventing the return of terrorists.32

Much criticism has been laid against the policy for its reduced role for counterinsurgency.

While recognising the COIN operations cannot solve the all the issues that plague

Afghanistan it is a fundamental that they are carried out. They allow for the creation of

stability by protecting civilians and protecting much needed infrastructure. Without a

population that feels safe and without proper infrastructure such as roads, bridges, and

utilities there can be little hope for the improvement in the lives of Afghans. Amir Taheri,

a writer on Islamic law and peace, suggests in his article that the US should take

28 Dexter Filkins, “General Opposes A Rapid Pullout in Afghanistan,” New York Times, World Section, August 10, 2010, http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A04E4DB153AF935A2575BC0A9669D8B63&ref=stanleyamcchrystal&pagewanted=all29 Ra’ees, “Obama’s Afghanistan Strategy: A Policy of Balancing the Reality with the Practice,” 87.30 Absire and Brown, 60.31 Amir Taheri, “Afghanistan,” American Foreign Policy Interests, 2009, Issue 31, 364.32 Amir Taheri, “Afghanistan,” 370.

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advantage of over 150,000 former Mujahidin fighters who fought against the Soviets and

currently uninvolved to supplement their troop strength.33

The overall policy shift away from targeting the Taliban to the Al-Qaeda focused

strategy, troop surge, and withdraw timetable policy has created a dire situation. The

original intent of the War in Afghanistan was to oust the Taliban government from

power. This government had hosted Osama bin Laden and his terrorist group that had

carried out the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the US. The initial war quickly

toppled the Taliban but over the subsequent years the Taliban has carried out an

insurgency against the Afghan government. In Obama’s March 27, 2009 policy speech he

outlined the threat of the Taliban. “And if the Afghan government falls to the Taliban --

or allows Al Qaeda to go unchallenged -- that country will again be a base for terrorists

who want to kill as many of our people as they possibly can.”34 The new policy

announced later that year in December however shifts away from this statement. The

Taliban can be no less of a threat 9 months later than they could have been in March of

the same year.

Afghanistan has become an analogy of a Vietnam-like quagmire.35 The infighting

between the Obama administration and its military advisors over the counterinsurgency

policy has brought together a strategy with reduced troop numbers. Even before the final

result came out Vice President Joe Biden put in his own 5-point input on what the new

policy should be:

1. No full counterinsurgency;

33 Ibid., 373.34 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan.” 35 James Dobbins, “Your COIN Is No Good Here: How “Counterinsurgency” Became a Dirty Word,” Foreign Affairs, October 26, 2010, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66949/james-dobbins/your-coin-is-no-good-here?page=show

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2. No nation building;

3. Focus of Al-Qaeda;

4. The military can occupy only what they can transfer to the Afghans; and

5. The goal is to “degrade” the Taliban with the eventual reconciliation in mind.36

This would ultimately come together in the final policy decision.

The Taliban began and still are the number one threat to stability in Afghanistan.

Given the opportunity the Taliban will undermine the Karzai government and reclaim its

former position of power in Afghanistan. The shift away from combating the Taliban

fails to deal with a key US policy interest in the region – preventing Afghanistan from

being a terrorist safe haven again.

The task that faces Afghanistan is not direct terrorist activity but a direct ongoing

violent insurgency. COIN operations have been steadily re-learned by the US military

after having realised its value and helpfulness in Iraq after having fallen into disuse after

Vietnam.37 COIN operations require a large number of troops. While they are not always

engaged in fighting and defeating an enemy they are involved in direct interaction and

cooperation with civilians. Their main objective is to hold territory and defend the

civilian population from insurgent attack. Through the defence of the population and

positive interaction with them COIN operations can prove and influence the people that

that supporting or aiding the insurgency is not in their interests.

Detractors of this type of operation call for a shift to a counterterrorism role as

ground forces are reduced. While beneficial in some circumstances, such as the raid that

killed Osama bin Laden on May 2 2011; it is not the best overall strategy for Afghanistan.

36 Bob Woodward, “Obama’s War,” (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 309-310.37 James Dobbins, “Your COIN Is No Good Here: How “Counterinsurgency” Became a Dirty Word.”

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If the US shifts to a counterterrorism role it will create a enormous burden for the Afghan

National Army and NATO – which currently do not have the experience and the troop

strength to fulfill the same role US ground troops currently carry out. If such an action

did take place it could put the Taliban in a future position to retake Afghanistan. If the US

lost control of Afghanistan it would lose vital intelligence on terrorism and lose bases of

operations for which any counterterrorism strategy could be carried out from; such as the

bin Laden raid that used helicopters launched from airbases in Afghanistan to reach

inside Pakistan’s border.38 Counterterrorism does however play a role.

The December 2009 policy shift created too great an emphasis on

counterterrorism as an all-purpose weapon for a strategy that requires diverse elements.

The Special Forces raids were an incredible success, having increased in 2008 from 35%

to 80%.39 Meanwhile drone strikes have been producing success, estimates for between

2004 to 2011 range form a low of 1,717 to a high of 2,680 terrorists killed, mostly within

Pakistan.40 These numbers alone do not stop an insurgency. They are directly targeted

attacks against individuals or small groups. This strategy cannot, and should not replace

COIN operations in Afghanistan.

In August 2010 General Petraeus released the Counterinsurgency Guidance. This

guidance provided 24-points for all NATO and US troops in Afghanistan. Point number 5

read as: “Pursue the enemy relentlessly – Together with our Afghan partners, get our

teeth into the insurgents and don’t let go. When the extremists fight, make them pay.

Seek out and eliminate those who threaten the population. Don’t let them intimidate the

38 Ibid.39 Woodward, Obama’s War, 315.40 “Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative – Year of the Drone,” New America Foundation, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/drones#2011chart.

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innocent. Target the whole network, not just individuals.”41 This is what the Obama

policy should have focused on.

Originally the desire was to send in 85,000 troops in the surge, but this was seen

as too much of a strain and the military settled and put forward the claim that 40,000 plus

10% if needed would be integral for stabilizing Afghanistan and carrying out COIN

operations.42 The new policy shifted away from the most important objective of defeating

the Taliban. Al-Qaeda as a terrorist network will go wherever it can find a safe haven to

operate. Only by defeating the Taliban insurgency can Al-Qaeda be denied the

opportunity to return to Afghanistan and operate openly.

Afghanistan was been a country at war for the past 30 years. The September 11,

2001 terrorist attacks caused the US to become involved when it deposed the Taliban

government responsible for hosting Al-Qaeda, the terrorist network responsible for the

attacks. The Bush administration’s policy on Afghanistan was lacking due to overshadow

created by the Iraq War. During his campaign run Barack Obama sought a new strategy

with an understanding that a troop surge was required in Afghanistan.

After his election President Obama announced a new Afghanistan policy on

March 27 2009. This “Af-Pak” policy sought to introduce a troop surge and stated that

the threat of Taliban regaining control of Afghanistan and Al-Qaeda operating out of

Afghanistan were a US interest. Between March and December of the same year

Obama’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan shifted. The shift included a troop surge but

came with a timetable for withdrawal. It also switched focus away from the threat of the

Taliban to the threat of Al-Qaeda operating in Pakistan. 41 David Petraeus, “From the Commander – COMISAF’s Counterinsurgency Guidance,” International Security Assistance Force, August 2010 http://www.isaf.nato.int/from-the-commander/from-the-commander/comisaf-s-counterinsurgency-guidance.html.42 Woodward, 270.

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Obama’s presidency shows a foreign policy that is linked strong Wilsonian

principles. These principles can be heard in his Nobel Peace Prize speech. Obama’s

desire to make a better world through international humanitarian ideals however conflicts

with another foreign policy tradition. Jeffersonian principles see the outside world as a

threat to the values that the US must hold dear. Foreign involvement is a threat and the

way for the US to be an example it to be the city on the hill of strong American values

and a strong democracy. These two principles conflict, one that wants to engage

internationally, and the other that seeks to reduce foreign commitments and return home.

Overall the December 2009 policy creates more problems than it solves. The

policy has helped establish the Afghan National Army and allowed for training of local

police officers. The timetable for withdrawal is an encouragement to the Afghan

government that it should attempt to open dialogue with the Taliban. The policy also

encourages regional involvement such as the need for economic activity. But there are

more problems than benefits. The shift in policy made the fundamental mistake of not

using enough troops, imposing a timetable for an exit and shifting focus away from the

insurgency. If the Obama administration wants to take Afghanistan seriously it needs to

recognise that Afghanistan is a country where war has been ongoing for 30 years. A troop

surge of 30,000 accompanied with an 18-month exit plan signals to the insurgency all it

must do is wait for America to lose interest once again. If President Obama wants to be

known for his foreign policy he would be wise to re-consider the long-term implications

of his current policy and take focus on the US interests in Afghanistan, after all it has

been called “Obama’s War.”

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