pla’s disaster relief and earthquake relief forces: capabilities, goals, and improvements
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Jack Guen-Murray The Chinese Military Professor Lonnie Henley Date: May 2nd, 2016 PLA’s Disaster Relief and Earthquake Relief Forces: Capabilities, Goals, and Improvements Executive Summery The purpose of this paper is to delineate the capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) disaster relief and earthquake relief forces, and then determine what PLA will need to accomplish their military operations other than war (MOOTW) by the early 2030s. First, this study will explain the new purpose of the PLA regarding MOOTW. Second, this study will explain PLA’s goals in developing its humanitarian forces. Third, this study will break down PLA’s humanitarian assistance forces. Fourth, a case study concerning bilateral and explicit military humanitarian assistance will be reviewed. From that case, we will determine what the PLA requires and assess their progress in meeting their goals by the early 2030s. Finally, this paper will provide a list of what humanitarian assistance related objectives PLA seeks to accomplish by the early 2030s. Methodology
Most of the research for this paper was conducted though the open source research method due to the recent nature of the subject. The Chinese government seldom releases information on the development of its disaster relief and military force structures, so much care was put into finding sources that could build a clear picture of the force development and its goals. Academic articles, government reports, news articles, websites, presentation transcriptions, video, and a PowerPoint presentation was used. I. New Historic Missions: Non-Traditional Missions and MOOTW In 2004, Hu Jintao announced the implementation of the ‘new historic missions’ of the
PLA, which is also known as the, ‘three provides, and one role.’1 These four military concepts
were to guide the PLA in its emphasis on ‘scientific development’ in the modern warfighting
era.2 The first three missions are designed to ensure the PLA’s commitment to the Chinese
1 Mulvenon, James. "Chairman Hu and the PLA’s “New Historic Missions”." Council on Foreign Relations. 2009. 2 Op. cit.
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Communist Party (CCP) and its interests. The fourth mission is the central focus of this paper
and it has been interpreted in many ways: ‘Help maintain world peace,’3 ‘playing an important
role in safeguarding world peace and promoting common development,’4 and ‘that it [PLA] will
contribute to global stability.’5
Out of the fourth mission, China’s new goal of developing its ability to conduct MOOTW
was born. Although China’s MOOTW doctrine has not been officially articulated, in the 2008
Defense White Papers, the Chinese government set a requirement for a MOOTW force to be
developed.6 The goal of MOOTW is to address non-traditional security threats in China’s far
seas, or in waters outside of the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Sea. Non-
traditional missions of the PLA are: counterpiracy, merchant ship escort, protection of sea lines
of communication (SLOC), peacekeeping, aircraft carriers, overseas bases, and humanitarian
assistance. This paper will discuss the PLA’s humanitarian assistance capabilities, force
structure, and goals. Based on PLA’s fourth ‘new historic mission’ and MOOTW, this paper
argues that the PLA seeks to conduct humanitarian assistance operations in the far seas by the
early 2030s.7
II. Broad Goals of PLA Humanitarian Assistance
Before this paper identifies the capabilities of PLA’s current humanitarian assistance
forces, it is necessary that we establish the goals PLA has set in place for these forces. As far as
3Cooper, Cortez. "The PLA Navy’s “New Historic Missions”." RAND. June 2009: 3. 4 Mulvenon, Op. cit. 5 Kamphausen, Roy D, "China’s Military Operations Other than War: The Military Legacy of Hu Jintao." SIPRI, NBR. April 2013: 7. 6 U.S. Navy. "The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century." ONI, 2015: 7 7 Note: For the purposes of utility, this paper will use the term humanitarian assistance as an umbrella term for the PLA’s developing disaster relief forces and the subsets of these forces
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this study can tell, PLA plans to develop five distinct specialized forces, and this study includes
hospital ships for measure:8
- Disaster Relief (flood, typhoon, epidemic, emergency supplies) - Earthquake Response/Relief - Chemical Rescue Force (nuclear, chemical, biological)9 - Transportation Facilities Relief - Peacekeeping (Counterpiracy, ship escort) - Floating Hospitals (Peace Ark)
To get a general sense of the PLA’s commitment and attention to each goal, I have
complied data on the number of publications concerning all six of PLA’s humanitarian assistance
forces. This data (145 publications total) was taken from the PLA’s MOOTW website. The
publications are dated from January 2nd, 2014 to April 8th, 2016.10 Although, the frequency of
reporting on each topic is dependent on the sudden occurrence of a natural disaster or mass
accident, this chart provides useful insights as to how the PLA would like its operations to be
perceived by domestic and foreign audiences.
8 Kamphausen, Op. cit. 9 Note: Chemical Rescue Force is not the name given by the PLA. I have not found an official name as of now, so I have used this name for purposes of utility. 10 "Military Operations Other Than War." Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China.
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The data shows that peacekeeping, disaster relief, and earthquake relief operations are the
most publicized MOOTW topics. These results are consistent with what an observer of the
PLA’s MOOTW might expect, because in the past two years the PLA has responded to many
matters involving the above three categories: counterpiracy operations in the Gulf of Aiden,
missing Malaysian MH730, earthquake in Nepal, and floods in Myanmar, etc. Although, the
development of China’s peacekeeping forces is integral to the development of MOOTW, there
has been a significant amount of academic and news coverage on China’s peacekeeping
operations, so the goal of this paper is to shed light onto the expectations and development of the
PLA’s disaster relief and earthquake relief forces.
This study will only cover two MOOTW forces: disaster relief and earthquake relief. At
present, there is no indication that a difference exists between PLA’s disaster relief and
earthquake relief forces. These two terms appear to be skill sets that the PLA expects its
humanitarian assistance forces to be capable of accomplishing. For that reason, I have folded
both terms into the acronym, DRER. This paper argues that by the early 2030s, the PLA expects
its DRER forces to be capable of executing effective humanitarian assistance operations
internationally.
III. PLA’s Disaster Relief Forces
The purpose of this section is to explicate the capabilities of the PLA’s current forces.
First, this study will provide a brief history of PLA’s disaster relief forces. Second, it will
provide information on the international government-military command structure. Third, it will
explicate PLA’s DRER order of battle. Fourth, it will provide government and non-government
DRER support organizations.
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History of PLA’s Disaster Relief Forces
The PLA and People’s Armed Police (PAP) have been the backbone of Chinese domestic
disaster relief since the beginning of the PRC. In his presentation, “The Role of Chinese Armed
Forces in Disaster Relief,” Sr. Col. Xu Wendi described their role: ‘It is a must that they make
DR [disaster relief] a basic task and save people in disasters.’11 He remarked that 2000 PLA or
PAP soldiers might be working in disaster relief at anytime. Although, PLA has decades of
experience working in disaster relief, they did not start to develop modern disaster relief systems,
procedures, plans, and command structures until the time of Sr. Col. Xu’s 2010 presentation,
which is referenced above. This fact attests to the developmental status of the PLA’s disaster
relief forces. Currently, PLA’s disaster relief forces are in the early stages of development,
however, through experience, they are learning quickly.
In 2003, the Chinese government established the ‘emergency management system,’
which is viewed to be the birth of modern disaster relief in China.12 In 2005, the CMC published
the “Doctrine for Military Participation in Disaster Relief Operations.”13 In 2006, the CMC
released the “General Work Plan for Military Response to Emergencies” to the PLA and PAP.14
These two documents established PLA and PAP roles during a domestic natural disaster. In
2008, the Wenchuan earthquake struck and caught the Chinese government off-guard. The CCP,
PLA, PAP, and CISAR were not prepared for a disaster of such a devastating magnitude, and as
a result thousands of Chinese citizens died and the Chinese government was embarrassed
11 Xu, Wendi. "The Role of Chinese Armed Forces in Disaster Relief." Institute of Strategic Studies, NDU, PLA. September 3, 2010: 3. 12 Qu, Guosheng. "International Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance: Recent Policy Development." National Earthquake Response Support Service, University of Nottingham. September 2011. 13 Xu, Op. cit. 14 Op. cit.
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internationally.15 In response to the Wenchuan earthquake there was a surge in PLA disaster
relief forces and training. Now there are 200-300 trained SAR teams in China, specializing in
mining rescue, disaster management, and firefighting among other things.16 With every disaster
that occurs, PLA has taken advantage of the unfortunate circumstances and treated them as a
learning opportunity. PLA’s domestic and international DRER forces are likely to develop into a
highly efficient and capable disaster relief force by the early 2030s, if not sooner.
Government-Military Command Structure
When conducting an international operation, the Emergency Management Office (EMO)
is the first to decide whether the Chinese government should send support to a country or region
in crisis.17 EMO first arranges a team with relevant staff and second, opens lines of
communication with the State Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Both government bodies
then open direct communications with the government(s) in crisis.
There are three conditions that must be met for the Chinese government to agree to
deploy SAR personnel.18 It is unclear whether these conditions apply for basic aid supplies such
as food, water, and medicine. First, the country must invite China to conduct SAR operations.
Second, the crisis must have an endorsement from the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. Third, China must be interested in helping the country.
The actual international government-military command structure is unknown,19 however
it is likely that the State Council and Ministry of Foreign Affairs play active roles in maintaining
15Patel, Nirav. "Chinese Disaster Relief Operations Identifying Critical Capability Gaps." NDU Press. May 2009. Accessed May 1, 2016:112. 16 Qu, Op. cit. 17 Op. cit. 18 Op. cit. 19 Note: the domestic government-military command structure can be found in Sr. Col. Xu Wendi’s presentation.
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communications with the country in crisis. It is likely that the deployed DRER forces will
maintain direct communication with PLA command, State Council, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and the organizations working on the ground.
Force Structure, Hardware, and Support
This study posits that PLA’s DRER forces are composed of two groups. The first group is
Chinese International Search and Rescue Team (CISAR) and the second group is the PLA
working in disaster relief situations. This study provides information on government and non-
government organizations that support PLA DRER operations.
Chinese International Search and Rescue Team
CISAR is PLA’s go-to special disaster relief force. This team is likely to be the first
Chinese team on the ground at any international disaster site. CISAR was founded on April 27th,
2001.20 Their force is composed of 480 highly-trained service men and women that work in
related fields in addition to working for CISAR: search and rescue, epidemic control, medical
treatment, seismology, and engineering.21 CISAR is part of the 38th Army division, based in
Beijing. Most of CISAR’s personnel are sourced from the army engineering corps and the
General Hospital of the Armed Police Force.22 They were ranked the 12th best search and rescue
team in the world. Their response time is is under 36-hours, flying from Beijing to most places in
the world. Since last counted in April 2015, CISAR rescued 63 survivors and provided medical
treatment for 40,000 people in over seven domestic and nine international deployments.2324
CISAR team members wear bright red uniforms.
20 "China International Search and Rescue Team." China.org.cn. May 2015. 21 Op. cit. 22 Yuankai, Tang. "Rising to the Challenge." Beijing Review. August 18, 2011. 23 Op. cit. 24 Op. cit.
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CISAR was present at all major international disaster relief operations since 2003. When
we look at their numbers we can see that CISAR provides more medical treatment than any other
service. Although, CISAR reported that they rescued 63 survivors since 2003, 49 of those
survivors were rescued during the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake in Sichuan Province, China.2526
Between 2003 and 2011, twelve of CISAR’s sixteen deployments dealt with earthquakes.27
CISAR’s rescue equipment and basic aid supplies, such as tents, medical supplies, food,
and water are stored at a warehouse in Beijing and leave with the team from the airport upon
call.28 Concerning equipment, CISAR has access to satellite communications in the field, sniffer
dogs, jaws of life, echolocation devices, snake cameras, and seismic shock sensors. Since 2008,
CISAR has been training at a special $32 million facility in Fenghuang Ridge, just outside of
Beijing.
DRER Capable Forces: PLA Army, PLAN, PLAAF
The second group of DRER are the regular PLA forces. This group includes personnel
and hardware of the PLA Army, PLAN, and PLAAF. The circumstances in which troops and
hardware are deployed in another country depend on the country’s proximity to the Chinese
mainland. For instance, if there was a natural disaster in Mongolia, along with CISAR, few PLA
ground forces would likely be deployed. However, as China advances its MOOTW agenda,
PLAN, and eventually PLAAF are likely to become the key disaster relief forces of the PLA.
Most military vehicles that have some ability to transport things or gathering information from
the air are duel-use in combat and humanitarian assistance operations, and therefore will not be
discriminated against for their functions in this study.
25 "China International Search and Rescue Team." China.org.cn. May 2015. 26 Note: countries do not usually publicize how many survivors their forces have rescued 27 Yuankai, Op. cit. 28 Yuankai, Op. cit.
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The most important hardware that a military can provide a humanitarian assistance
operation are airplanes and helicopters.29 Airplanes allow militaries to transport aid supplies,
personnel, and equipment long distances and over a short period of time. Some airplanes also
have the ability to drop supplies from the air to a community in need. Helicopters are the most
useful vehicle in most humanitarian assistance operations. Helicopters allow for the
transportation of machinery, equipment, supplies, personnel, and survivors to or from places that
are inaccessible to other vehicles and at a fast speed. Helicopters also provide SAR, site
surveillance, firefighting, and heavy-lift services. Recently, remote controlled drones and UAV
have been used to survey disaster sites.30
Surface vessels are slow to respond when compared to aircraft, however they offer the
most material and assistance benefits. Surface vessels are able to carry helicopters, small aircraft,
landing craft, ground transport vehicles, troops, survivors, and tons of aid supplies. Aircraft
carriers are extremely useful in disaster relief operations in that they have water desalinating
plants and nuclear power plants on board. Carriers are also useful because they have the ability
to project humanitarian assistance operations further than smaller ships that might sail alone or in
small groups. The greatest limitation to surface vessels is their need for supply, fuel, and
maintenance, which all require naval bases or port agreements.
Of the PLA’s 2,333,000 active personnel,31 Sr. Col. Xu reported that 50,000 troops have
been trained to work in disaster relief, and that each troop is always standing by.32 Of the 50,000
we should assume that some are trained in specialized disaster relief skills such as diving and
29 Cuny, Fredrick. "Use of the Military in Humanitarian Relief." PBS. 1989. 30 Leetaru, Kalev. "How Drones Are Changing Humanitarian Disaster Response." Forbes. November 2015. 31 "The Military Balance 2015." IISS. February 11, 2015: 237. 32 Xu, Op. cit.
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firefighting. The 50,000 soldiers are reserved for disasters on the mainland, however it is likely
that some would be deployed during the event of a massive natural disaster on one of China’s
many borders.
PLA Army has useful disaster relief hardware, however, because much of it is ground-
based, it is only useful in the event of a domestic disaster or in a country on China’s periphery. In
terms of aircraft, PLA has 4 Y-8 and 4 Y-7 transport airplanes.33 Helicopters: 150 ATK, 351
MRH, 338 TPT (61 Heavy, 209 Medium, 68 Light).34 PLA Army also has various UAV.
Presently, PLAN is best equipped to work in disaster relief operations in East, Southeast,
and South Asian waters. Outside of Asian waters, PLAN has no ability to accomplish MOOTW
disaster relief missions where PLAN surface vessels are not already present. Without overseas
bases or numerous port agreements for vessel replenishment and maintenance, PLAN surface
vessels and aviation are bound to waters within PLA’s dominion. For surface vessels, 15 of 17
PLAN destroyers have helicopters, 33 of 54 frigates have helicopters, and PLAN has over 233
patrol boats.35 PLAN has 3 Yuzhao-class amphibious ships, each equipped with 2 helicopters and
has a troop carrying capacity of 500-800 and 2 or 4 landing craft.36 PLAN has 85 landing ships
capable of carrying 2-10 tanks (or large vehicles) and 150-250 troops.37 For naval aviation,
PLAN has 3 tankers and 66 transport airplanes.38 Helicopters: 44 ASW, 10+ AEW, 6 SAR, 43
TPT (35 Heavy, 8 Medium).39 PLAN aviation has various UAV and ISR aircraft that are capable
of surveying disaster sites. If PLAN’s aircraft carrier, Liaoning, is deployed, it could accomplish
33 IISS. 239. 34 Op. cit. 35 Ibid. 240. 36 Op. cit. 37 Op. cit. 38 Ibid. 241. 39 Op. cit.
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MOOTW humanitarian assistance missions, provided overseas bases are built and port
agreements are made.
PLAAF shares similar limitations to PLAN. In Asian waters, PLAAF can conduct
humanitarian assistance operations, however their aircraft are bound by airport agreements and
limited flight range. PLAAF has 11 tankers, 325+ TPT (16+ Heavy, 41+ Medium, 239 Light),
and various UAV and ISR aircraft.40 Helicopters: 22 MRH, 28+ TPT (18+ Heavy, 10+
Medium).41
China Earthquake Administration
The China Earthquake Administration (CEA) plays a crucial role in the deployment and
communications of all PLA’s DRER forces. The CEA monitors all seismic activity around the
globe with sensors. If they detect a shock above the level of 6.0 on the Richter scale, then CEA
will automatically start to collect data on the area that was effected and setup an information
support group.42 It takes 30 minutes to arrange a fully functional support group. Reports are
frequently relayed to CEA HQ and after the human impact is known, CEA issues orders to
deliver aid to the effected region or not, however information support is never stopped. CEA is
not part of PLA; however, they remain in close communication with relevant PLA staff.
Disaster Relief NGOs
Although they are not a PLA force, Chinese disaster relief NGOs appear to play a role in
the development of the PLA’s disaster relief forces, however no direct contributions are certain.
During the 2015 Nepal earthquake relief operations, it was speculated that the Chinese
government participated in informal meetings with Chinese NGOs where they could share their
40 Ibid. 242. 41 Op. cit. 42 Qu, Op. cit.
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experiences.43 A UN relief expert, Jock Baker thinks Chinese NGOs will be able to help the
government organizations to improve their relationships with communities receiving assistance.
China’s prominent disaster relief NGO is the Blue Sky Rescue Team (BSRT).44 The team
is composed of at least 83 members and is currently led by Zhang Yong.45 BSRT works under
the Red Cross Society of China and assembles its response teams in Guangzhou.46 BSRT
members wear bright blue uniforms and pose for pictures with military posture. They are capable
of providing SAR, epidemic prevention disinfection, water purification, and have drones for
damage surveying. It is reported that they pay for their own airfare and carry their own supplies
to the disaster sites.47 BSRT provided assistance to thousands of people in the 2015 Nepal
earthquake, 2015 Myanmar flood, and in the 2013 Philippine typhoon. Other NGOs obtaining
international disaster relief experience are: One Foundation, Amity Foundation, and China
Foundation for Poverty Alleviation.48
IV. What Does Military Disaster Relief Look Like and Implications for PLA’s
DRER Force Development
When a natural disaster occurs in a country and another country would like to assist, there
is no established framework for bilateral aid, however there is a framework for international
response and coordination, which is usually organized by the UN.49 These two paths that
43 Bannister, Tom. "Learning from Nepal: An Interview with Humanitarian Relief Expert Jock Baker." China Development Brief. May 25, 2015. 44 "Chinese Rescue Team Arrives in Myanmar to Help Flood Victims." The State Council of the People's Republic of China. August 5, 2015. 45 "Blue Sky Rescue Team Completes Nepal Mission." China Daily. May 10, 2015. 46 Yangrong, Zhao. "China Rescue Team Starts Work." ChinaWatch Washington Post. April 28, 2015. 47 China Daily, Op. cit. 48 Anderson, Ashlyn. "Disaster Relief: China and India Come Together." CFR. October 30, 2015. 49 "Coordination." UN OCHA.
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governments can take to deliver humanitarian response, with military assets, will likely
determine or shape the ways in which PLA’s DRER forces will develop. This paper will only
cover the first support pathway, because it extremely ambitious and resource intensive in the
context of MOOTW missions.
The first component that will shape the development of the PLA’s DRER forces is a
fundamental international development principle: assistance is need based, not capability based.
The rule of thumb is to send as few resources to a disaster site as possible, and then when the
task is completed, leave as fast as possible. The second component is a rule: the faster a
country’s forces can get to the disaster site and start operating the better. From the start of a
disaster, humans trapped under rubble or in a dangerous situation typically have a 36-hour
window to be rescued. After the 36-hour window passes, people start to die, and as time passes
the number of casualties increases at a faster rate. PLA’s DRER forces will develop around the
above principle and rule.
Although many European and Asian countries have experience with military disaster
relief, one case will be used from the U.S. military because no other military can deliver a
response on such a scale. Based on the CCP’s MOOTW agenda, this study assumes that the PLA
expects to contribute to international disaster relief in kind.
The only way to understand the complexities of a humanitarian assistance operation
without participating in the operation itself, is through case studies. The case this paper presents
gives a practical image of what the PLA needs to acquire in order to accomplish its disaster relief
goals. In the words of Captain Cathal O’Conner of the U.S. Navy, “Foreign humanitarian
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assistance and disaster-relief operations are some of the most complicated operations conducted
by the military.”50
Case Study: U.S. Navy and Taiwan 2009
The first response path is bilateral and explicit: Country X asks Country Y for various
types of aid. Country Y decides, yes and the degree to which it will contribute resources, or no.
Then, Country X continues to ask other countries for aid until its needs are met. The case we will
review is considered a small humanitarian assistance operation.
In August 2009, Taiwan experienced massive waves that caused damage to buildings,
landslides, and floods.51 The Taiwanese government immediately requested heavy-lift support
from the U.S. government. The U.S Department of State and USAID, which jointly lead U.S.
international disaster response, requested for the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) to order
PACOM to deploy the necessary forces to Taiwan. DOD plays a supportive role in U.S. disaster
response, as opposed to a leadership role. The Seventh Fleet deployed Task Force 76:
Amphibious Squadron 11, relevant staff, 31 MEU from the USS Denver, four helicopters, and
hovercraft.
Forty-five Marines and sailors were put ashore to work tactical air-control and helicopter
rigging, logistics, and maintenance.52 A public affairs team was sent to Tainan Air Force Base to
plan and order helicopter missions. Two MH-53E helicopters were used to relocate heavy
earthmoving machinery on an as need basis, while two MH-60s were used to survey helicopter
landing zones and damage. Over the period of six days, the MH-53s did 55 sorties, carried 20
50 O'Conner, Cathal. "FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE AND DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS LESSONS LEARNED AND BEST PRACTICES." National War College Review 61, no. 1 (November 2012): 152. 51 Ibid. 154. 52 Ibid. 155.
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heavy construction vehicles and 255,880lbs of relief supplies.53 As soon as the job was done the
U.S. forces returned to their home in Japan.
Deciding what implements are necessary and the politics and logistics of a response is
often more complicated than actually providing services on the ground. At the head of the
operation is usually the U.S. ambassador, at least in the beginning. The U.S. Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and USAID assemble a Disaster Assistance Response Team
(DART), which is in charge of formulating and coordinating the official government response.
DART works with the NGOs, IGOs, and military (HAST). On the military side, the DOD will
appoint a geographic component commander (GCC) to lead the military’s operations. GCC will
appoint a joint task force (JTF) or an individual to oversee the Humanitarian Assistance Survey
Team (HAST). Once HAST arrives on site, then liaison officers are exchanged. The U.S. usually
invites officers of the host country onboard the U.S. ships to build trust. It is important that
HAST officers are chosen wisely because they act as informal diplomats. Regarding expenses,
DOS will reimburse DOD for most, usually all operational costs.
Case Analysis
The U.S. Navy and Taiwan 2009 case was chosen because it succinctly illustrates the
work that is put into a small humanitarian assistance operation strictly involving military assets.
Examples of larger operations are the U.S. Navy’s operations in the 2004 Indonesia earthquake
and Fukushima in 2012. This study operates under the assumption that the PLA seeks to
accomplish an operation of this small scale by the early 2030s. The lessons that we learn from
this case study will show us what the PLA needs to accomplish its goals.
53 Op. cit.
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The first observation concerns the situation in which the U.S. Navy was called upon. The
Taiwanese government reached out to the U.S. government for assistance. We can assume this is
because of the historical relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan and because the U.S. has
capable disaster relief assets. Additionally, Task Force 76 was deployed to Taiwan because they
were in close proximity to the island. First, this information shows that the Taiwanese
government trusted the U.S. government and military to operate within its territory. Second, the
U.S. had useful military assets in area already.
From this observation, we can take that the Chinese government must have candid
military-to-military relations with a country if they are to be asked for assistance. Although the
status of China’s allies will always be contested, Pakistan is argued to be China’s only real ally,
54 however the Pakistani government allowing Chinese forces into its territory is another issue.
The CCP and PLA must improve military-to-military ties with countries around the world if they
are to accomplish bilateral and explicit MOOTW by the early 2030s.
Secondly, massive amounts of global military infrastructure are required to accomplish a
mission such as this. The U.S. military’s ability to respond to the 2009 crisis in Taiwan was
enabled by its hundreds of military bases placed throughout Asia-Pacific.55 Additionally, a
military’s ability to provide basic aid is dependent upon the geographic location of its
international aid storage facilities. Storage of aid is extremely important in having an effective
humanitarian relief force. Currently, the US has five main aid storage bases: Florida, Italy, UAE,
and Malaysia.56 Japan International Cooperation Agency, or JICA, has its main storage
54 Rosin, Armin. "'China Has Only One Real Ally'" Business Insider. February 9, 2016. 55 Vine, David. "Where in the World Is the U.S. Military?" Politico. July 2015. 56 "LOGISTICS AND RELIEF COMMODITIES." USAID.
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warehouse in Singapore.57 To accomplish bilateral and explicit humanitarian missions, PLA will
need overseas bases, port agreements, and aid storage facilities for its surface vessels to provide
support to countries in crisis. PLA’s base in Djibouti58 and its port agreements with Sri Lanka
and Pakistan can be seen as progress in this respect.
It is unlikely that PLA will build trusted military-to-military relations and build more
bases in countries outside of East, Southeast, and South Asia by the early 2030s. This judgment
leads this study to conclude that PLA’s DRER forces will not have the ability to provide
bilateral and explicit humanitarian assistance to countries in the far seas, excluding where PLAN
vessels are not presently operating, by the early 2030s.
The second observation concerns the hardware and personnel that it took to accomplish
the 2009 Taiwan operation. The U.S. Navy deployed two heavy-lift helicopters, two smaller
helicopters, 46 personnel trained in air-traffic control and helicopter operations, and a public
affairs team. To accomplish small bilateral and explicit operations involving floods, landslides,
earthquakes, typhoons, and large waves the PLA will need surface vessels that are capable of
carrying heavy-lift helicopters and smaller helicopters, heavy-lift helicopters, smaller helicopters
for surveying, personnel trained to execute these operations ashore, and public affairs staff with
experience handling these types of disaster relief operations.
Although this study cannot say whether PLA forces have training in an operation of this
type, all branches of PLA have dozens of helicopters capable of carry heavy-machinery,
equipment, and supplies. Additionally, PLA has adequate number of surface vessels and fixed-
wing aviation (although airplanes could be upgraded). Currently, the PLA has the hardware that
57 "JICA Sending Emergency Supplies to Laos and Bhutan to Help Natural Disaster Victims." Japan International Cooperation Agency. October 6, 2009. 58 Tiezzi, Shannon. "US General: China Has 10 Year Contract for First Overseas Military Base." The Diplomat. November 26, 2015.
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it takes to accomplish bilateral and explicit missions. If PLA had overseas bases to replenish its
surface vessels than it could accomplish its MOOTW now.
The third observation concerns the cooperative government-military command structure
that enables the military to quickly provide humanitarian assistance to the country in need. The
U.S. government and U.S. Navy was able to quickly and effectively respond to Taiwan’s call for
aid. Overall, the operation went smoothly and everything was accomplished.
This study does not know the government-military command structure that China would
use to accomplish a bilateral and explicit mission. If the government and PLA do not have a
command structure, then they will need to develop a structure that is sensitive to political
nuances and responsible in execution.
V. Summery of PLA’s Expectations by the Early 2030s
This paper judges that by the early 2030s the PLA seeks to:
- Have trained and capable DRER, peacekeeping, chemical rescue, and transportation relief
forces
- Have the ability to accomplish bilateral and explicit DRER operations
- Obtain seaport and airport agreements with nations that permit PLA’s DRER forces to use their
facilities
- Obtain strategically located aid supply storage warehouses
- Have overseas bases built or under construction with humanitarian assistance facilities
- Have seaport and airport agreements that allows PLAN and PLAAF vessels to replenish
- Have aircraft carriers under construction that are capable of providing humanitarian assistance
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- If need be, develop a government-military command structure for the execution of a bilateral
and explicit mission
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Citations
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