plamondon 1975 dialectica

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Th e C ontemporary Reconciliation of Mechanism and Organicism

By Ann PLAMONDON

Summary

In the contemporary literature, mechanism and organicism are represented as the-

ses which make incompatible claims. Much of the debate has come about because the

key concepts in the principal theses which divide mechanism and organicism have not

been adequately analyzed. I argue that making sense of the key concepts in the respec-

tive theses of the mechanist and the organicist shows that these theses are not at all

logically incompatible. The reconciliation, however, involves the mechanist in presup-

posing metaphysical doctrines not ordinarily associated with

his

position.

RCsumC

Dans la litt6rature contemporaine, le mCcanisme et l’organicisme sont prksentts

comme des thtses dtfendant des postulats incompatibles. Une grande part du dCsac-

cord provient du fair q ue les principales theses q ui opposent l’organicisme au mkcanisme

on t CtC insuffisamm ent analyskes. L‘auteur m on tre qu e ces thbses ne

sont

pas logique-

m ent incompatibles. Cette rCconciliation n’est cepen dant possible q u e parce qu e le

mC-

canisme moderne ne correspond plus h 1’idCe traditionnelle qu’on s’en faisait.

Zusammenfassung

In der zeitgenossischen Literatur werden mechanische und organische Thesen als

solche dargestellt, die unvereinbare Anspriiche aufstellen. Ein wichtiger Anteil an die-

sem Widerstreit

riihrt

davon her, dass die Hauptthesen, die die organistischen Auffas-

sungen den vitalistischen entgegenstellen, ungeniigend analysiert worden sind. Der Ver-

fasser zeigt, dass diese Thesen logisch nicht unvertraglich sind. Diese Aussohnung ist

allerdings nur deshalb moglich, weil die moderne mechanistische Betrachtungsweise

nicht me hr m it der traditionellen iibereinstimmt.

In the contemporary literature, mechanism and organicism are repre-

sented as theses which make incompatible claims. This has come about for

two reasons. First, the major thesis of vitalism is not distinguished from the

theses

of

organicism. Second, the key concepts in the theses which divide

mechanism and organicism have not been adequately analyzed. In what fol-

lows,

I

argue that organicism is not vitalism and that making sense of the

key concepts in the respective theses of the mechanist and the organicist

shows that these theses are not at all logically incompatible. The reconcilia-

tion, however, involves the mechanist in presupposing metaphysical doc-

trines not o rdinarily associated with his position.

Dialectica

Vol.

29,

No

4 1975)


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214 Ann Plamondon

1. What organicism is not.

Organicism

is

not vitalism. I think this can be clearly seen by considering

two definitions

of

vitalism.

1)

Vitalism is a traditional and persistent belief that the laws of physics

that hold in the inaminate world would not suffice to explain the phe-

nomena of l i e ”

2)

vitalism

=

“Elements

+

Organization + Vital Principle

-

Living

Being

” z.

It is important to notice that in definition 2), he v ital principle is “ ex-

trinsic

”

to the elements and their organization. It is this extrinsicness

of

the

vital principle that characterizes vitalism. The extrinsicness makes vitalism

set up a fundamental ontological dualism between living and non-living.

This dualism

is

the ground for definition

1)

. e., it is the ground for

the claim of the irreducibility of biology to physics and chemistry

in

the

sense that biological concepts are not

in

principle)

“

definable

”

in physico-

chemical terms and biological relations are not in principle)

“

derivable

”

from physico-chemical relations.

Organicism, however, is non-dualistic. The theses of organicism derive

from the metaphysical doctrine of internal relations3. The application of

this doctrine to organisms entails a distinction in degree, but not

in

kind,

between living and non-living4. Hence the theses of organicism do not in-

volve extrinsic vital principles

or

even extrinsic principles of organization

s.

Further, organicism does not entail the irreducibility of biology to physics

and chemistry.

I hope to make these claims clear by setting out the principal issues that

divide mechanists and organicists and by exploring what each means. In

1

I .

Bronowski, “New Concepts in the Evolution

of

Complexity,” Synthese

21

1970),

p.

228.

Bronowski correctly classifies Elsasser as

a

“vitalist”, although Elsasser

calls his view “organicism”. See

W.

lsasser, “Synopsis

of

Organismic Theory,” Journal

of Theoretical Biology

7 1964),

pp.

5 3 - 6 7 .

I tak e “organicism”, “emergentism”, an d

“holism” to involve approximately the same set of theses. Also

I

understand “reduc-

tionism” and “mechanism” to be the same. “Vitalism” is

a

distinct third alternative.

2 W.

.

Carlo , “Reductionism a nd Em ergence, M echanism an d Vitalism Revisited,”

Proceedings

of

the American Catholic Philosophical Association

40 1966),

p.

97.

Carlo

tends to suggest the identification

of

vitalism and organicism, p.

96.

3

See D.

C.

Phillips, “Organicism in

the

Late Nineteenth and Early Twentie th

Centuries,” Journal of the History of Ideas

31 1970),

pp.

4 1 3 4 3 2 .

4

See

I.

Leclerc, The Nature of Physical Existence George Allen an d Unwin Ltd.,

London,

1972),

p.

313;

A. N.

Whitehead,

Science

and the Modern World

The Mac-

millan Company, New York,

1925),

pp.

115-116; and

Whitehead, Process

and

Reality

Vhe Macmillan Company, New York,

1929)) Part 11

Ch.

3.

H. Hein claims the contrary.

See

“Molecular Biology

vs.

Organicism: The En-

during Dispute Between Mechanism and Vitalism,” Synthese

20 1969),

p.

241

and

p.

243.


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The Contemporary Reconciliation of Mechanism and Organicism

21

5

treating the explication of the organicists’ theses

I

shall limit my remarks

to what the o rganicist must logically accept in accepting the various claims.

2.

The principal issues that divide mechanists and organicists.

be summ arized in four claims.

M-1 Organisms are no t more than the sum of their physico-chemical parts.

M-2

The understanding of an organism can be achieved in principle) by a

full understanding of the physico-chemical parts of the organism.

M-3

The physico-chemical parts determine the nature of the organism.

M-4

Organisms can be adequately studied by analytical methods.

0-1

Organisms are more than the sums of their physico-chemical parts.

0-2 The understanding of an organism cannot be achieved by a full under-

standing of its physico-chemical par ts in isolation from the organism.

0-3

The organism determines the nature of its physico-chemical parts.

0-4 The complexity and hierarchical organization of organisms precludes

an adequate understanding by analytical methods.

1) M-1-M-4 and 0-1-0-4 are related in such a way that all four claims must

be accepted if any one is.

2)

M-1-M-4 and 0-1-0-4 seem to be contrary sets

of

claims.

I wish to examine these claims in succession. 1) above indicates the dif-

ficulty of a truly independent examination of the claims.

The principal issues that divide mechanists and organicists can, I think,

3. M-1

VS.

0-1

Organicists base the claim of the irreducibility of organisms to sums of

physico-chemical parts on the evidence that such parts, say, i, j, and

k,

may

behave differently in isolation than they behave when they organize a com-

plex C6. The organicist has sometimes been interpreted as meaning that i

exhibits “new characters” in

C

haracters not found to be predicable

of

i

in isolation. “New characters

”

is a somewhat ambiguous notion.

If

it

is taken to mean characters for which there is no ground

in

the isolated part

i7, the organicist is put in th e position of being logically absurd, resorting

to miracles

”

8 But there is another way of construing new charac ters ”,

viz., that these characters are potentially predicable of

i in

isolation which

become actually predicable of

i

when i, j , and k organize complex

C.

This

6 See,

for

example,

E.

Laszlo, The Systems

V i ew o f

the World George Braziller,

New York, 1972), p. 31, and

Laszlo,

“Systems and Structures oward Bio-Social

Anthropology,”

Theory

and Decision 2 1971), p. 179.

7 Phillips, p. 417.

8 M. Simon, The Matter of Life Yale University Press, New Haven, 1971), p. 156.


4/9

216 Ann Plamondon

meaning of

“

new characters ” is not logically absurd, and it is in complete

accord with the empirical evidence on which the organicist claim is based.

Contemporary mechanists do not mean organisms are mere aggregates

when they claim the reducibility of organisms to “ sums

”

of physico-chem-

ical parts. Nagel’s discussion of the meaning of um

”

is most illuminating g.

Consider i,

j ,

and k organizing complex C. C is a sum

of

i,

j,

and k, if the

theories which explain isolated i, isolated j, and isolated k T-i, T-j, T -k)

explain the behavior of i,

j,

and k in complex C. More precisely, C is the

sum of i, j, and k, if one can deduce from T-i, T-j, and T-k the laws ex-

plaining the properties of i,

j,

and k n

C.

On the other hand, C is not a sum

of i, j , and k if one cannot deduce these laws from T-i, T-j, and T-k. In

such cases, a wider theory

T

is needed to explain the behavior of

i,

j

and

k in C. Nagel concludes that whether or not any complex is a sum of its

parts is relative to a theory. In brief, a complex is a sum when theories

about its parts explain the relationsh ip of the parts in the complex but not

a sum when a wider theory is required to explain the relationsh ip of the

parts in the complex.

Nagel’s discussion clearly shows mechanists do not mean organisms are

aggregates by M-1; they m ean organisms are parts in interrelation. Further,

it would seem that the empirical evidence is against construing organisms

as “ sums

”

as Nagel defines this term.

To

explain organisms, wider theories

T s) are required; indeed, on the whole, such theories are still lacking

lo

This is not to say, however, that biological relations are not reducible to

physico-chemical ones. I t is quite possible that organisms fail to be sums

”,

yet T is a theory which contains only physico-chemical laws.

But a more important point is the nature of T , The existence of any

T * affirms the potentiality of any physico-chem ical part to behave dif-

ferently solated

”

than it behaves in

a

complex it organizes. This is pre-

cisely the meaning of 0-1

if

0-1

is

to make any sense at all). Hence, the

theses

M-1

and 0-1 are only apparently contraries.

4

M-2

VS.

0-2

Claims M-2 and 0-2 are generally taken to be theses about predictability.

That is, 0-2 implies that it is not possible to predict the properties of phy-

sico-chemical part i in biological complex C i,

j,

k)

by having knowledge

of the properties of i, j , and k n isolation. Defenders of M-2 bring evidence

9 E.

Nagel, The Structure

of

Science Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., New

York,

10 See Bronowski, pp. 228 246.

1961),

p.

390.


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2

17

against 0-2 ll. The evidence is, on the whole, against “chemical emer-

gence ”. It is suggested that defenders of 0-2 and emergence” generally)

must mean that com pounds, say, water, have properties not in principle pre-

dictable from the properties of their atomic components hydrogen and

oxygen). However, this is not the case. The properties of compounds can

in principle be predicted from the spectroscopic properties of their con -

stituent atoms.

Let us consider how such a prediction is possible. It is possible because

we have a theory which explains how parts behave in a complex, i. e., a

theory about the relations of the pa rts within the complex. Generalization

of the possibility of prediction of the kind tha t is claimed by M-2 prediction

of the behavior of physico-chemical part i in biological complex C i,

j ,

k)

from know ledge of iso lated

i, j ,

and k) depends upon the existence of a

theory which explains the po tential of the physico-chemical parts for rela-

tionship in C. This condition for predictability suggests that “ full knowl-

edge ” of isolated parts includes knowledge of the potential predicates appli-

cable to the part for any biological complex that the physico-chemical part

can organize. If this be the meaning of “fu ll know ledge” in thesis M-2,

then the organicist must accept M-2 because M-2 becomes trivially true.

The behavior of

i in

C i,

j , k)

is surely

analyzable

from the knowledge as

to how i behaves in any complex it can organize.

5 .

M-3 VS. 0-3

There is an interpretation of 0-3 which renders it logically absurd12.

The organicist must accept the obvious fact that organisms are organized

of physico-chemical parts; hence, there is a sense in which the organism is

determined by its physico-chemical parts. The only logical meaning of “de -

termine ” in 0-3 is a reference to the fact that there is modification of phy-

sico-chemical part according to the biological complex it organizes

13.

But

this amounts to nothing more than the affirmation of the empirical claim

that we have seen in sections

3.

and 4 above that physico-chemical parts

have the potential to behave differently in different complexes they orga-

nize. Indeed, this kind of behav ior is exemplified by physico-chemical parts

organizing physico-chemical complexes the behavior of an “ solated ” elec-

tron is not the same as its behavior in the hydrogen atom).

11

C.

W. Berenda, “On Emergence and Prediction,” Journal o f Philosophy 50

1953), p. 271; Simon, p. 155; and

J.

J

C.

Smart, Philosophy and Scientific Realism

Random House, N ew York, 19 67 , pp. 51-52.

1 2 See Phillips, p. 418; Hein, p. 247.

13 See W hitehead,

Science and the Modern World

pp. 115-116 and pp. 215-216;

David Bohm, “Further Remarks on Order,”

Towards a Theoretical Biology

2:

Sket-

ches

ed. C . H. Waddington Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1969), pp. 51-58.


6/9

218

Ann Plamondon

This kind of “dete rm ina tion” of physico-chemical part by biological

complex is in no way contrary to M-3, if we have correctly stated the mea-

ning of “ ull understanding

”

in M-2.

In

discussions

of

the mechanist mea-

ning of the properties of physim-chemical parts, one finds the following

phrases:

i) relational properties ” l4

ii) potential of being fashioned into

”

l5

iii) basic architectonic tendency inherent in the fundamental particles of

iv) nherent power of spontaneous self-assembly

”

17.

matter itself ” l6

If properties i)- iv) be included in a listing of the properties of physico-

chemical parts, then clearly there is no real difference in meaning between

claims M-2 and 0-2; M-3 and 0-3.

“

Full understanding ” of physico-chem-

ical parts which includes such properties as i)- iv) above precludes any

possibility of making sense of

“

n isolation ” in 0-2, and

“

determination ”

of a biological complex by these properties of physico-chemical parts in-

cludes “ determination” of the physico-chemical parts by the biological

complex.

6 .

M-4 VS.

0-4

Three preliminary remarks will help to clarify the issues involved in

1) 0-4 cannot mean that organismic biologists do not proceed by the

use of analytical methods . e. by “ concentrating on a limited set of

properties things possess and

ignoring

at least for a time) others, and by

investigating the traits selected for study under controlled conditions

”

la

2) 0-4 cannot mean that there has been no success in biology by using

analytical methods

19.

3)

M-4

cannot mean that there are no conditions under which it will

not be necessary to study an organism by methods other than analysis of

its physico-chemical parts. In particular, studying the whole organism as

well as studying its physico-chemical parts will be necessary when a theory

is lacking as to what characteristics are predicable of a physico-chemical

part when it organizes the organism

20.

M-4 and 0-4.

14 Simon, p.

155.

1s

Ibid. p. 156.

16

Hein, p. 242.

17 Ibid. p. 248.

18 Nagel, p. 445.

19 J

Monod,

Chance and Necessity

Alfred

A.

Knopf, Inc.,

New York,

1971),

20 Nagel, p. 440.

pp.

79-80.


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2 19

0-4

denies the adequacy of analytical methods because of the comple-

xity and hierarchical nature of organisms. Let us consider each.

The complexity of organisms, on the whole, refers to the inhomogeneity

of biological complexes as opposed to the homogeneity of the physico-chem-

ical parts which organize them 21. That is, the physico-chemical parts of orga-

nisms can be classified into sets in such a way that sampling will, in general,

provide the ground for good ” generalizations. On the other hand, while

it is possible to find homogeneous classes in biology, such classes are “ho-

mogeneous in one respect or a few respects,

. .

not homogeneous in all rel-

evant biological respects

”

22 Such limited homogeneity precludes the general

use of methods of physics and chemistry. However complexity only entails

that the use of these methods could reveal at best rather restricted general-

izations.

The hierarchical organization of organisms involves recognizing i) levels

of organization or stratification of stability ” and ii)

“

vertical relation-

ships ” 24. It is the

“

vertical relationships ” which make difficulty for analyt-

ical methods in biology. These relationships require a cooperation ”

of

the levels of physico-chemical parts. This is

to

say there are vertical laws

”

of organization which are in essence laws of modification hey are laws

describing the determination

”

as we have used the term in section

5 .

of the physico-chemical part by the complex which it organizes25. These

laws are to be contrasted with “horizontal laws” of the physico-chemical

parts,

i.

e., laws which describe the behavior of isolated parts ” without

describing their modification in the various complexes which they can or-

ganize. Hence 0 4 rejects the adequacy of analytical methods in so far as

analysis omits vertical laws. There is a further problem with analysis be-

cause vertical relationships suggest the possibility of different analyses at

different levels

of

organization in the same complex. This, it would seem,

is the foundation for the claim that more traditional biological methods are

valuable in guiding the proper application of the analytical methods of phy-

sics and chemistry 26

It seems clear, however, that with the existence of a theory containing

laws of modification, analysis would not be inadequate from the organicists’

21 R.

Ackermann, “Mechanism, Methodology, and Biological Theory,”

Synthese

22 Ackermann,

p.

222.

23

Bronowski,

p.

272.

24 Bohm,

pp.

51-58; Laszlo, “Systems an d Str uct ure s

- ” pp.

178- 179; an d

25 Bohm,

p. 57;

Whitehead, Science and the Modern World pp. 215-216.

26 Ackermann,

p.

224; B. Commoner, “In Defense of Biology,” Science 133 1961)’

20 1969),

pp.

219-222; Elsasser,

p.

59.

Whitehead, Science and the Modern World pp. 215-216.

p.

1747.


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220

Ann Plamondon

point of view. Hence 0-4 is pointing to the lack, on the whole, of such theo-

ries for organisms; whereas M-4 is referring to the possibility of finding them.

0-1-0-4 do not entail that such theories will not be found; nor do 0-1-0-4

entail that if such theories are found, they will not be expressed in physico-

chemical terms and relations. Hence there seems to be no disagreement in

principle between M-4 and 0-4.

7.

What mechanism

is

not.

Contemporary mechanism

is

very far removed from traditional mech-

anism. A recent discussion of mechanism suggests that the thesis is con-

cerned primarily with the question

of

relations and not with material nature

of physico-chemical parts at all.

We are thus saying that what is definitory of a machine struc-

ture a re relations and, hence, that the s tructure of the machine has

no connection with materiality, that is, with the properties

of

the

components that define them as physical entities

27

. . the basic assertion for biological mechanism: living systems

are machines of one

or

several well-defined classes. That is to say:

the definitory element in the living organization is a certain struc-

ture the set of interrelations leading to a given form of transitions)

independent of the materiality that embodies it; not the nature of

the components, but their interrelations 28.

Contemporary mechanism disassociates the material nature

of

physico-

chemical parts from their interrelatedness. It is in one sense clear why this

must be done. The notion of materiality is logically incom patible with the

nature

of

physico-chemical parts as they are represented in the explication

of M-1-M-4.

This

is because materiality entails a theory of external rela-

tions.

In a theory

of

substance as matter, in itself fully actual, all rela-

tions between substances must be completely external to the sub-

stances. Since the substances are fully actual, relations

of

distance

from each other, for example, can make no difference whatever to

the substances in question. The same is true of temporal relations.

Any individual substance remains exactly what it is, in no way af-

fected

by

other substances, and it would indeed remain unaffected

even if all other substances were annihilated. All relations which are

27

F.

G Varela and

H.

R. Maturana, “Mechanism and Biological Explanation,”

28 Zbid. p. 380.

Philosophy of Science, 39 1972),p. 378.


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221

quantitatively specifiable are of

this

kind;

in

this theory they must

necessarily be entirely external to the material substances 29

Yet the explication of theses M-1-M-4 has involved

a

rejection of ex-

ternal relations.

In addition, the question must be raised as to the appropriateness of

characterizing the nature of physico-chemical existents as material. Are

we simply to disassociate the nature of physico-chemical existents from

their interrelatedness? Might not physico-chemical existents be conceived

in such a way that the nature and interrelatedness of the physico-chemical

existent be in an important sense identified? What is the nature of a phy-

sico-chemical existent whose properties include the potential of being

fashioned into

”

and nherent power of spontaneous self-assembly ”? Im-

portant advances in answering these questions have been made 30.

8. The reconciliation of mechanism and organicism.

The reconciliation of mechanism and organicism,

I

suggest, is brought

about by the contemporary mechanist’s acceptance of the doctrine of internal

relations. Making sense of M-1-M-4 has involved an implicit acceptance

of this doctrine. The explication of the key concepts of M-1-M-4 has led

to the theses that physico-chemical parts have the potential

to

act differently

in different complexes, that physico-chemical parts are modified according

to the complexes they organize, and that the complete description of phy-

sico-chemical parts must involve reference to this potential for modification.

These notions do not suggest that the interrelatedness of physico-chemical

parts is to be disassociated from their nature; rather they suggest that their

nature is their relationships.

Once it is seen that contemporary mechanism accepts the doctrine of

internal relations, the reconciliation of mechanism and organicism is clear.

0-1-0-4 are nothing more than the application of the doctrine of internal

relations to organisms.

29 Leclerc, p. 265.

30 See, especially,

Bohm

and Leclerc.

Ann Plamondon

Department

of

Philosophy

Box 9 Loyola University

New Orleans

La.

7 118

U . S .

A .

Dialectica

Vol.

29, No 4 1975)

plamondon 1975 dialectica

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