philosophy of the artsby morris weitz

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Philosophical Review Philosophy of the Arts by Morris Weitz Review by: Melvin Rader The Philosophical Review, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Jul., 1951), pp. 407-409 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2181883 . Accessed: 25/06/2014 01:10 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Duke University Press and Philosophical Review are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Philosophical Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 62.122.77.83 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 01:10:20 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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Page 1: Philosophy of the Artsby Morris Weitz

Philosophical Review

Philosophy of the Arts by Morris WeitzReview by: Melvin RaderThe Philosophical Review, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Jul., 1951), pp. 407-409Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2181883 .

Accessed: 25/06/2014 01:10

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Duke University Press and Philosophical Review are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extendaccess to The Philosophical Review.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 62.122.77.83 on Wed, 25 Jun 2014 01:10:20 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 2: Philosophy of the Artsby Morris Weitz

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

PHILOSOPHY OF THE ARTS. By MORRIS WEITZ. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, I950. PP. xv, 239. $4.00.

A good indication of the scope of Professor Weitz's book is to be found in his prefatory statement: "The nature of art is our main prob- lem. Around it we shall deal with such related questions as those of the meaning of form and content, representation versus nonrepresen- tation, the meaning of music and abstract art, the special importance of the medium in art, the conception of art as a language and the nature of appreciation. These problems are considered in relation to the arts themselves: painting, poetry, music, the motion pictures, etc."

The book is excellent. Despite its brevity, it is more meaty and com- prehensive than most aesthetic treatises of considerably greater length. It is clear, concise, broad-minded, and especially rich in pertinent illus- trations drawn from the arts and contemporary aesthetic theories. Its speculative vigor matches its analytic precision.

Professor Weitz begins with a meticulous examination of the aes- thetic formalism of Clive Bell and Roger Fry. He shows that they have rejected current doctrines which conceive of form as relations versus elements, and that they understand form as certain elements in certain relations. To this extent they are superior to their critics, namely, the voluntarists, emotionalists, Thomists, and Marxists who still, to some extent, accept a mechanical form-content distinction in terms of rela- tions versus elements. Weitz believes, however, that Bell and Fry have too narrowly circumscribed art. In their attempt to rule out certain representational, dramatic, and nonplastic spiritual values, they have failed to realize that these can contribute as much to art as line and color.

Weitz advances an "organic theory" of art as an alternative to the theories of Bell and Fry and their critics. This theory involves two main doctrines. First, it regards artistic form and content as synony- mous, the content consisting of relationcl elements that are formal, and the form consisting of the organic unification of these relational constituents. Second, he rejects the distinction between representa- tional and nonrepresentational elements, and maintains that every constituent is representational. He concludes that a work of art can be defined as an organic complex of expressive elements- all of these elements having both a presentational and a representational character.

The presentational aspect is the immediately given sensuous char- acter. The representational aspect includes not only "subject," such as the shape of a tree, but reference to emotions. Every constituent in art, he maintains, represents some emotion or emotional quality. A fugue of Bach, or the so-called nonrepresentational art of a Kandinsky or a Mondrian, really functions as representational art because it signifies human emotions.

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Page 3: Philosophy of the Artsby Morris Weitz

THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW

In this part of his argument, Weitz sounds as if he is endorsing the theory that art is the language of emotions; but he also maintains that art contains ideas and, especially in its implicit meanings, makes truth claims. He believes that such ideational elements are legitimate if they are fused into the organic unity of the work. Yet he also says that truth claims are not the central factor in art, and that our belief or disbelief in them should not control our appreciation.

Maintaining that expansion and not contraction should be our aes- thetic ideal, he objects to any theory that would seriously limit the range of art. For example, he would not repudiate program music or narrative painting upon the ground that it is unsuitable to the medium and infringes upon the domain of literature. The real test is whether the work has organic unity. If so, any expressive ingredient can be admitted.

Also in discussing the appreciation of art, he objects to any theory that would restrict the range of artistic awareness. On this ground, for example, he rejects Tolstoy's doctrine which implies that the way to appreciate a work of art is to indulge fully in the emotions communi- cated by the artist. Such indulgence, he contends, leads to an exclusive response to part of the work. If we are to appreciate the whole of any complex work, we must be detached and impartially aware of the many strands that enter into the totality. Such an adherence to the contem- plative attitude, Weitz contends, can give us an even richer experience than we can gain by unreserved emotional indulgence.

Although I substantially agree with the conclusions set forth in the book, I have a few misgivings. I am not sure that Weitz has given us, as he purports to do, a real definition of art. He defines a work of art as an organic complex of expressive elements. But a fish, no less than a painting, is an "organic complex"; and the "expressive elements" which might serve to distinguish the painting remain a bit ambiguous. Weitz finds inadequate the theories of Veron, Tolstoy, and Ducasse that art expresses emotions and he admits that volitions and ideas are also expressed. Moreover, he says that not only science but art makes "truth claims." What then is the precise differentia of art? He hints at a possible answer when he declares: "Art is the embodiment of the expressive - of values, as many philosophers declare." (My italics.) But this remains a hint.

I also have misgivings about his semantic theory. Every, constituent in a work of art, he contends, is representational of either some recog- nizable natural object or of some psychological entity, such as an emotion. Now of course even an "abstract" painting evokes emotions, but I see no reason to say that it always represents them or anything else. I can enjoy the colors and shapes of a daisy without regarding them as signs; and similarly, it would seem, I can enjoy the colors

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Page 4: Philosophy of the Artsby Morris Weitz

REVIEWS OF BOOKS

and shapes of the painting without reference beyond. If Weitz means to imply that even when I am not consciously interpreting the shapes and colors as signs, I must subconsciously do so, he is dealing with specu- lation and not with verifiable fact.

I believe that the artist, in creating such a painting, is not simply producing certain signs of pre-existing entities; he is creating in a more radical sense - he is making something new, something to be found only in the work of art, something presentational and not necessarily referential. Even signs, when they do occur in a work of art, are main- ly instrumental to a fresh imaginative experience. That is why an artist never quite knows what an art work is to be until he has completed it.

But even when, in my judgment, Professor Weitz is mistaken, he reveals a lively and informed sensibility.

MELVIN RADER

University of Washington

PHILOSOPHICAL PHYSICS. By VINCENT EDWARD SMITH.

New York, Harper and Brothers, I950. PP. xvi, 472. $4.00.

Philosophical Physics is primarily an introduction to a neo-Aristo- telian interpretation of nature. It is intended, the author says, mainly for the lay reader. The book is in two parts, the second part covering the same ground as Part I at a more advanced level and discussing some related subjects not included in the elementary part.

Part I comprises about the first third of the book and is a fairly complete introduction to the author's analysis of nature. Mr. Smith intends that it should be usable as a short course in itself. In it, he presents the Aristotelian fourfold interpretation of causation; states how other modern analyses of experience fail to account for causation, change, or order in the world; and ends with an Aristotelian account of the true status of infinity in nature. In this elementary part, as throughout the book, the author restricts his analysis of experience as much as possible to aspects of experience which are immediately found in "mobile being," or which are immediately required for a basic understanding of mobile being. Thus, while avoiding pure mathematics and the refinements of metaphysics wherever he can, Mr. Smith deals with problems of matter, form, final causation, chance, change or mo- tion, infinity, measurement, and the apparatus of modern physical science. He calls his treatment of experience "philosophical physics," contrasting it with ordinary "empiriological physics." The contrast is based mainly on differences in method and in sources of evidence be- tween the two kinds of physics. A main interest of the author in Part I, and indeed throughout the book, is to convince the reader of the truth and certainty of the principles of philosophical physics. This task involves convincing the reader of the inadequacy, to experience, of

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