philosophy of science after mirowski’s history of the philosophy of science

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Philosophy of science after MirowskiÕs history of the philosophy of science K. Brad Wray Department of Philosophy, State University of New York, Oswego, 128 Piez Hall, Oswego, NY 13126, USA 1. Introduction In the middle of the twentieth century American philosophers of science en- joyed a long period of consensus which enabled them to direct their attention to detailed problems. During this period, the Ôreceived viewÕ was the dominant view. However, after the publication of Thomas KuhnÕs Structure of scientific rev- olutions the consensus began to unravel. As philosophers of science came to real- ize that physics was not a suitable paradigm for all sciences, many philosophers of science directed their attention to philosophical problems in the special sci- ences. Further, many philosophers of science abandoned the project of developing a general philosophy of science. In an effort to come to terms with the insights of Kuhn and the aftermath of Structure, a number of contemporary philosophers working in general philosophy of science have sought to develop accounts of the social dimensions of science. In ÔThe scientific dimensions of social knowledge and their distant echoes in 20th-century American philosophy of scienceÕ, Philip Mirowski raises concerns about recent developments in philosophy of science. In particular, he argues that philosophers of science neglect and misunderstand the history of their field. As a result, philosophers misunderstand the role they have played and continue to play in our understanding of science. Mirowski argues that, rather than providing an accurate account of the social dimensions of science, American philosophers of science have been rationalizing the status quo. 0039-3681/$ - see front matter Ó 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2005.08.016 E-mail address: [email protected] (K.B. Wray). Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 36 (2005) 779–789 Studies in History and Philosophy of Science www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa

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Studies in History

Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 36 (2005) 779–789

and Philosophyof Science

www.elsevier.com/locate/shpsa

Philosophy of science after Mirowski�s historyof the philosophy of science

K. Brad Wray

Department of Philosophy, State University of New York, Oswego, 128 Piez Hall, Oswego, NY 13126, USA

1. Introduction

In the middle of the twentieth century American philosophers of science en-joyed a long period of consensus which enabled them to direct their attentionto detailed problems. During this period, the �received view� was the dominantview. However, after the publication of Thomas Kuhn�s Structure of scientific rev-

olutions the consensus began to unravel. As philosophers of science came to real-ize that physics was not a suitable paradigm for all sciences, many philosophersof science directed their attention to philosophical problems in the special sci-ences. Further, many philosophers of science abandoned the project of developinga general philosophy of science. In an effort to come to terms with the insights ofKuhn and the aftermath of Structure, a number of contemporary philosophersworking in general philosophy of science have sought to develop accounts ofthe social dimensions of science.

In �The scientific dimensions of social knowledge and their distant echoes in20th-century American philosophy of science�, Philip Mirowski raises concernsabout recent developments in philosophy of science. In particular, he argues thatphilosophers of science neglect and misunderstand the history of their field. As aresult, philosophers misunderstand the role they have played and continue to playin our understanding of science. Mirowski argues that, rather than providing anaccurate account of the social dimensions of science, American philosophers ofscience have been rationalizing the status quo.

0039-3681/$ - see front matter � 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2005.08.016

E-mail address: [email protected] (K.B. Wray).

780 K.B. Wray / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 36 (2005) 779–789

In this paper, I have four objectives. I begin by recounting Mirowski�s project,giving special attention to his externalist account of philosophical studies of thesocial dimensions of science. I then examine three reasons why philosophers areapt to resist Mirowski�s history. Then I offer an explanation for why philosophersof science are prone to forget their history. Finally, I explain and defend what Ibelieve is a new direction for philosophical studies of the social dimensions ofscience. I argue that Mirowski is correct to claim that many Americanphilosophers of science have neglected the history of philosophical studies ofthe social dimensions of science. But this is not true of all philosophicalstudies of the social dimensions of science. I suggest that some contemporarystudies are mindful of history, and thus avoid the sorts of problems Mirowskiidentifies.

2. Mirowski�s project: externalist history

In �Distant echoes� Mirowski presents a history of the explorations of the socialdimensions of science by American philosophers of science. One of Mirowski�s chiefaims is to correct a common misconception, that studying the social dimensions ofscience is a relatively recent topic in philosophy of science. Mirowski chastises someof the leaders in the field, including Philip Kitcher (1993), Helen Longino (1990,2002), and Alvin Goldman (1999), for propagating this misconception. Rather thanbeing pioneers in a new sub-field of philosophy of science, Mirowski argues thatthese philosophers are following a long tradition, one that he believes is both morallyand intellectually dubious.

Contrary to what these philosophers suggest, Mirowski argues that Americanphilosophers of science have always recognized that scientific research is (i) asocial activity, and (ii) affected by the society in which it is done. Thus, Americanphilosophers of science have always had a view on the social dimensions ofscience. In an effort to prove this, and set the historical record straight, Mirowskitraces the development of philosophy of science in America. He distinguishesbetween three epochs, and his narrative is constructed around three representativefigures: John Dewey, Hans Reichenbach, and Philip Kitcher. Each philosopherrepresents a different epoch in the history of American philosophy ofscience. And each philosopher has a different view about the social dimensionsof science.

Mirowski argues that, despite the fact that American philosophers of sciencehave developed different accounts of the social dimensions of science, each ac-count is �molded by the actual regimes of science organization within which theyare embedded� (p. 283). Thus, for example, when government agencies were theprincipal source of funding for basic research, philosophers were under theimpression that (i) scientists operated independently of their paymasters and (ii)science was value-free. Mirowski suggests that this ideology supported the regime.In particular, it fostered an image of science that disguised both (i) the role the

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government played in directing research, and (ii) the ways that scientists servedthe interests of those in power.1

According to Mirowski, when the place of science in society changed, there wasa corresponding change in philosophy of science. As industry has come to play agreater role in funding scientific research, a new philosophy of science has developedwhich reflects the new regime. A popular metaphor used by contemporary philoso-phers of science is �the marketplace of ideas� (p. 290). Thus, according to Mirowski,philosophy of science in America has developed in response to changes in scienceand society.

Mirowski�s history of the philosophy of science is an externalist account. Factorsthat are generally regarded as external to the dynamics of philosophy of science, inparticular, non-rational factors, are alleged to be operative in the development of thefield. Thus, rather than developing an accurate theoretical account of the socialdimensions of scientific knowledge that offers insight into the nature of scienceand scientific change, Mirowski maintains that American philosophers of sciencehave been influenced by developments in society at large. Worse still, they havedeveloped accounts of the social dimensions of science that merely serve to rational-ize the status quo.

Mirowski is not accusing philosophers of science of intentionally constructingfalse accounts of the social dimensions of science. That is, he is not suggesting thatour philosophies of science are designed to shield the machinations of those control-ling science, though there are suggestions that Reichenbach was more aware of hisrole as propagandist than either Dewey or Kitcher (pp. 315–316). Rather, Mirowskiconstrues American philosophers of science as dupes, taken in by their own rhetoricand enthusiasm for science. As a result, they have failed to see the social world ofscience as it really is.

3. Three points of resistance

It is difficult to reconcile Mirowski�s account of philosophy of science with ourown professional self-understanding. I suspect that his account will be greeted withhostility by many philosophers. In this section, I want to review three reasons whyMirowski�s externalist history of philosophical studies of the social dimensions of sci-ence is apt to cause concern amongst philosophers.

1 Value-free science means different things at different times. Though in the twentieth century it mayhave come to be associated with scientists operating independent of their paymasters, the concern forvalue-free science in the seventeenth century had different associations. Specifically, it was associated witha science that transcended national, religious, and class differences. As Thomas Sprat explains in hishistory of the Royal Society, the Society �admitted Men of different Religions, Countries, and Professionsof Life. This they were oblig�d to do, or else they would come far short of their largeness of their ownDeclaration. For they openly professed, not to lay the Foundation of an English, Scotch, Irish, Popish, orProtestant Philosophy; but of a Philosophy of Mankind� (Sprat, 1959, p. 63; first published 1667).

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First, Mirowski tells us that rather than hitting upon a new and exciting topic,American philosophers of science have been talking about the social dimensionsof science all along. Hence, it is a mistake to regard Kitcher, Longino, and Goldmanas pioneers. Rather, according to Mirowski, they are amnesiacs who have forgottenthe accomplishments and mistakes of their predecessors. In light of Mirowski�s newhistory, one has to wonder how it could come to pass that philosophers of sciencecould be so myopic and forgetful of our past. Are we really such negligent scholars?

Second, Mirowski�s history undercuts the integrity both of our contemporary the-ories of the social dimensions of science and our earlier theories of the social dimen-sions of science. Instead of being viable theories that account for the facts, Mirowskileads us to believe that they are merely new versions of an old project that rational-izes the status quo. Philosophers generally take themselves to be high enough abovethe battle to see the world as it really is. It is we who get as close to the god�s eye viewas is humanly possible (even though we know it is a godless universe). Instead, onMirowski�s account, philosophers look like bland civil servants, hired to put a goodface on a bad product, one that hides the worst of what is happening from would-bedissenters. This criticism is doubly painful for philosophers of science. First, we phi-losophers are reluctant to see ourselves as merely rationalizing the status quo. Sec-ond, many contemporary philosophers of science who are interested in examiningthe social dimensions of science see themselves as politically progressive (see Brown,2001, and Kitcher, 2001).2 Clearly, Mirowski�s externalist history is incompatiblewith our self-image.

Third, philosophers of science are inclined to regard externalist history as out ofplace in the history of ideas. The great rift that now divides philosophers of science,on the one hand, and sociologists and historians of science, on the other, developedin the early and mid-1970s, when many externalist historical studies of science werepublished (see Shapin, 1975; Farley & Geison, 1980; & Forman, 1980). Paul For-man�s (1980) study of the development of quantum mechanics is typical of thesestudies in many respects. As Forman explains, there is

2 Inaim isconcep

overwhelming evidence that in the years after the end of the First World Warbut before the development of an acausal quantum mechanics, under the influ-ence of �currents of thought�, large numbers of German physicists, for reasonsonly incidentally related to developments in their own discipline, distancedthemselves from, or explicitly repudiated, causality in physics. (Forman,1980, p. 268)

Forman thus attributes the development of quantum mechanics to factors externalto physics. That is, rather than being a response to new ideas or persistent anomaliesin physics, Forman suggests that the development of quantum mechanics is a conse-quence of the influence of various cultural factors on scientists. Other externalist his-torical studies of science attribute other important scientific developments to the

contrast, David Hull (1988) does not have a political goal in his social studies of science. Rather, hismerely descriptive, to account for how the social dimensions of science can help and hindertual developments.

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influence of various cultural factors. Farley & Geison (1980), for example, suggestthat Louis Pasteur�s views on spontaneous generation changed in response tochanges in the socio-political climate in France.

Mirowski�s history of American philosophy of science is a history in this tradition.Non-epistemic factors are alleged to be the engines of change in the philosophy ofscience. This view is alarming to philosophers of science who generally believe thatexternalist histories do not give adequate attention to the role of either (i) evidence or(ii) scientists� epistemic concerns. Thus, though it is often admitted that scientistshave non-scientific motives and interests (see Solomon, 2001, Hull, 1988, and Kit-cher, 1993), philosophers of science generally assume that such motives and interestsare not the principal determinants of scientific change. Similarly, philosophers areequally reluctant to see developments in their own field as a consequence of changesin society. If evidence and arguments play a role anywhere, surely they play a role inphilosophy.

In summary, Mirowski�s externalist history is apt to be regarded as objectionablefor the following three reasons. He suggests that (i) philosophers of science are igno-rant of their past. He suggests that (ii) the various theories of the social dimensionsof science that American philosophers of science have developed are likely false.And, he suggests that (iii) ideas and arguments are not the factors driving develop-ments in the philosophy of science.

4. The charge of collective amnesia

In the remainder of this paper, I want to address Mirowski�s concerns. Ultimately,I aim to show that there are viable ways for philosophers to study the social dimen-sions of science. Thus, I aim to show that we have reason to doubt Mirowski�s claimthat ideas and arguments are not the factors driving developments in the philosophyof science. But, I also argue that there is some truth to his claim that philosophers ofscience have often neglected the history of their own field. However, determining therespects in which the particular ahistorical philosophical theories of the social dimen-sions of science Mirowski discusses are flawed is beyond the scope of this paper.

In this section, I want to explain why contemporary American philosophers of sci-ence have forgotten the history of philosophical studies of the social dimensions ofscience. I argue that particular developments in the profession of philosophy areresponsible for this tendency for philosophers of science to neglect their past. Whenphilosophers looked to the sciences as a model for professional development, theydirected their attention to problem solving and away from history.

As Richard Rorty notes, in the early 1900s American philosophers fashionedthemselves and their discipline along the lines of a science (Rorty, 1982, pp. 169–170). That is, rather than pursuing philosophy as humanists, masters of canonicaltexts, they decided to pursue philosophy as scientists, directed at solving problems.As Rorty explains, the American Philosophical Association�s annual meetings wereto be the forum in which philosophers met to discuss �well-structured controversieson sharply defined problems� (ibid., p. 170). �At the end of each convention it would

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be agreed who had won�, so philosophers could move on to the next set of pressingproblems (ibid.). Though not everyone agreed that this was the direction in which theAmerican philosophical community should go, as Rorty notes, it is the direction inwhich philosophy in America developed.

This course of development was not uniquely American. Similar debates aboutthe purpose and direction of philosophy were unfolding in both Britain and Ger-many (ibid., p. 169). The desire to emulate scientists was not just a perverse idoliza-tion of science or �the scientific method�. Nor was it merely a clever scheme to carveout a social niche for a threatened species of intellectual, the professional philoso-pher (on the importance of having a social role see Ben-David, 1984). At least in Eur-ope, many of those who came to endorse the new scientific philosophy weremotivated by moral considerations. As Thomas Uebel notes (2005), many Europeanscientific philosophers were concerned with advancing socialist goals. Further, thealternative to the scientific approach to philosophy was thought to be romantic, anti-rational, and consequently dangerous (see Butts, 2000, p. 194). Scientific philosophy,on the other hand, was thought to encourage the development of an intellectual pos-ture that could save people from fascism. For the most part, American philosophershave been committed to scientific philosophy. And American philosophers of scienceare some of the most committed scientific philosophers.

I believe that it is this scientific posturing that has led American philosophers ofscience to forget their past. As Kuhn (1996) notes, scientists are famous for forget-ting their past. This is a feature often noted by those who study science. Robert Mer-ton, for example, notes that whenever a claim becomes widely accepted in a scientificfield, scientists often forget to cite who made the discovery. Merton calls this phe-nomenon �collective amnesia� (Merton, 2004, pp. 269–278). When scientists have for-gotten who made the discovery, the claim acquires a status that puts it beyondquestion and in no need of justification. Stephen Cole describes this process asone in which a scientific finding moves from the frontier of a field to the core (Cole,1992, pp. 15–16). Once integrated into the core of a field a claim can be taken forgranted. It becomes an assumption in subsequent research, a claim that can be usedto justify other claims while in no need of justification itself. Latour & Woolgar(1986) have studied the subtle process by which the qualifications that modify theclaims scientists make while working in the laboratory are erased. An event once wit-nessed in very specific conditions by a few individuals gradually sheds its history andbecomes a fact, a claim that others can rely on and subsequently take for granted intheir own research. What is ultimately reported in a published scientific paper issomething very different from the event witnessed in the laboratory. The negotiationsand social interactions that play a role in this process are what led Latour and Wool-gar to conclude that scientific facts are socially constructed.3

3 As Robert Merton observes, in the early 1960s Peter Medawar had already noted the discrepanciesbetween finished scientific papers and the path of discovery in his provocative paper �Is the scientific papera fraud?� Merton, too, discusses the role that the structure of the standard scientific article plays inobliterating scientific serendipities (Merton, 2004, pp. 269–278).

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This is not the only respect in which scientists forget their past. As Kuhn notes,typically, scientists do not read the history of their discipline (1996, pp. 136–138). In-stead, scientists typically learn from textbooks that have been written explicitly forscience students. As Kuhn explains, the aim of a science textbook is �to communicatethe vocabulary and syntax of a contemporary scientific language� (ibid., p. 136). Inthis respect, much of the history of a discipline is irrelevant. Because a contemporaryphysicist will gain little insight into the vocabulary and syntax of contemporary the-ories from reading Aristotle�s Physics, such a text is irrelevant to their training.

Further, insofar as the history of a field is discussed in science texts, it is a partialhistory. As Kuhn explains, �science textbooks . . . refer only to that part of the workof past scientists that can easily be viewed as contributions to the statement and solu-tion of the text�s paradigm problems� (ibid., p. 138). That is, science texts present avery selective history, one that highlights the continuities between past scientific the-ories and practices and contemporary theories and practices. Events and alleged dis-coveries that do not seem to contribute to our understanding of contemporarytheories are omitted. For example, young scientists are not apt to be exposed to,or even made aware of, Newton�s reflections and research on theology and alchemy.Thus, insofar as scientists teach the history of their discipline, it is Whig history, ahistory that selectively links a series of past events with current theories.

Nonetheless, Kuhn insists that the histories of science written by and for scientistsserve an important function. As he explains, these histories suppress dissensus sothat the hard but rewarding work of normal science can get under way. But, becausetextbook history is constructed to emphasize continuities between the past and thepresent, whenever there is a change in theory in a field, textbooks need to be rewrit-ten (ibid., p. 137). This is the Orwellian dimension of science.

Like the scientists whose behavior they emulate, American philosophers of sciencehave been forgetful of the past. This collective amnesia has taken two forms. First,philosophers of science have tended to have little regard for the history of science.Second, philosophers of science have forgotten their predecessors� investigations intoand theories of the social dimensions of science.

As Robert Butts (2000, p. 199) notes, in the middle of the twentieth century therewas a period of three decades of consensus in philosophy of science. As a result, phi-losophers of science were able to work within a �normal science� tradition, secure thatthey agreed more or less on foundational issues in the field.4 As Butts explains, whatwas ultimately created �was a philosophy of science free of ontology, of psychology,and of history� (p. 203). The break with the past was self-conscious. History was gen-erally regarded to be as irrelevant to a philosophical study of science as psychologyand ontology were. It has only been since the publication of Kuhn�s Structure thatAmerican philosophers of science have acknowledged a role for history of sciencein philosophical studies of science. Still, philosophers have yet to agree on exactlywhat is the proper role of history in a philosophical study of science.

4 People often exaggerate the extent of the consensus amongst scientific philosophers. As both Butts(2000) and Richardson (2004) note, there is no set of tenets that all scientific philosophers accepted.

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Philosophical studies of the social dimensions of science are also Whiggish. Amer-ican philosophers of science working in this area tend to tell a history that servestheir purposes. As a result, many past analyses of the social dimensions of scienceare disregarded. As Mirowski suggests, a passing reference might be made to Wil-liam James, but only if a philosopher seeks to emphasize the continuities betweentheir own view and pragmatism. Hence, it is little wonder that some of the leadersin philosophy of science studying the social dimensions of science, such as Kitcherand Goldman, have neglected our past and failed to recognize the continuity be-tween their projects and the social epistemologies of Dewey and Reichenbach. Thus,Mirowski is at least partially correct—some American philosophers of science havetended to be forgetful of the past. However, a thorough evaluation of whether or notKitcher and Goldman are merely rationalizing the status quo exceeds the scope ofthis paper.

5. How to study the social dimensions of science

What Mirowski draws to our attention is the fact that a viable philosophical studyof the social dimensions of science should not merely rationalize the status quo. Sucha project needs to provide us with the means to criticize contemporary practices andinstitutions. I argue that some contemporary American philosophers of science areengaged in such a project.

One of Mirowski�s key concerns is that philosophical studies of the social dimen-sions of science tend to be ahistorical. That is, such studies both (i) fail to acknowl-edge that science and scientific practices have changed significantly throughouthistory, and (ii) erase or neglect their own history. Any viable philosophical studyof the social dimensions of science will have to address this concern. That is, any via-ble study will have to be historically sensitive.

Contrary to what is implied by Mirowski�s history, not all philosophers of sciencestudying the social dimensions of science are negligent of history. For example, Er-nan McMullin has been particularly astute in noticing how historical contingenciesaffect science and scientific practices. McMullin argues that many factors that wenow regard as metaphysical or religious, and thus irrelevant to science, once playedan important and legitimate role in scientific debates (McMullin, 1984, pp. 129–132).He thus demonstrates that the distinction between non-epistemic factors and episte-mic factors has been subject to change and that if we fail to understand this we willfail to understand the history of science and the dynamics of scientific change.

McMullin�s research provides insight into developing a viable project for philos-ophers interested in studying the social dimensions of science. Philosophers canexamine changes in the practice of science, with particular attention to the epistemicsignificance of such changes. For example, consider the changing trends in collabo-rative research in science. There has been a constant increase in the proportion of co-authored articles in the natural sciences and social sciences between 1900 and 1960,but no increase in the proportion of co-authored articles in the humanities (seeWray, 2002). Moreover, the increase has been greater in the natural sciences than

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in the social sciences (ibid.). In one of the most important earlier studies of collab-orative research, Beaver and Rosen suggest that the change was merely a socialchange in scientific practice (see Beaver & Rosen, 1978, 1979a,b).

I, on the other hand, argue that such an explanation is inadequate (Wray, 2002). Iargue that the trend toward increasing collaborative research has been the result of aprocess of social selection, a process operative in the social world analogous to theprocess of natural selection in the biological world. Given that scientists who collab-orate generally have access to more resources than those who do not collaborate,and scientists with more resources tend to be more productive, those who collaboratehave tended to be more successful researchers. Consequently, in the course of thetwentieth century, scientists who engaged in collaborative research tend to out-pro-duce those who did not employ this strategy. In time, scientists who collaborate havebecome a greater proportion of research scientists.

Importantly, the change in the proportion of collaborative research cannot beidentified with any one of the three regimes that Mirowski identifies. That is, thechange is not unique to either the epoch Mirowski identifies with Dewey or the epochhe identifies with Reichenbach. Rather, the trend cuts across all three regimes. Fur-ther, the increasing frequency of collaborative research is not an unequivocal good.There are both good and bad effects resulting from this trend. Though collaborativeresearch enhances scientists� productivity, it may also reduce scientists� sense ofresponsibility, and thus erode the reliability of the results produced.

My recent study of the epistemic significance of collaborative research in scienceprovides an example of how philosophers of science interested in the social dimen-sions of science can be historically sensitive. By examining changes in science and sci-entific practice, science and scientific practices are recognized as a product of cultureand as affected by historical contingencies. Thus, science is not regarded as anunchanging practice that transcends culture. Further, in principle, we could discoverthat science sometimes takes a turn for the worse. That is, we may discover that aparticular change in scientific practice reduces the effectiveness of scientists in realiz-ing their epistemic goals.

To traditional philosophers of science, it may seem that I am proposing that phi-losophers of science become sociologists of science. I have two replies to this con-cern. First, indeed I am recommending that philosophers of science engage inempirical studies of science, the sorts of studies associated with the Mertonian schoolof sociology of science. Like David Hull (2001), I believe that because many of theclaims that philosophers make about science are empirical claims, the only way wecan advance our understanding of science is to test those claims. Second, I believethat those who harbor the concern that I am replacing philosophy of science withsociology of science misunderstand the nature of the project I am proposing. It isnot merely a descriptive project, concerned with documenting changes in scientificpractice. In my recent study of collaboration in science, I found that the social prac-tice of researching collaboratively has epistemic import. That is, particular theoret-ical developments in science depend upon collaborative research (Wray, 2002). Forexample, as Paul Thagard notes, the discovery of the bacterial theory of ulcers re-quired extensive knowledge of both gastroenterology and pathology (Thagard,

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1999, p. 85). Further, I discovered that scientists who engage in collaborative re-search tend to be more productive. They tend to (i) publish more than those whodo not collaborate, and (ii) publish papers that are cited more frequently than singleauthored papers (Wray, 2002). Thus, given the connections between the socialdimensions of science and the prospects of scientists realizing their epistemic goals,this new project I am proposing is relevant to philosophers of science.

Hence, despite Mirowski�s concerns about many contemporary philosophicalstudies of the social dimensions of science, it seems that philosophers can studythe social dimensions of science in a manner that does not merely rationalize the sta-tus quo. A critical normative philosophy of science is indeed possible.

6. Conclusion

In summary, I believe that Mirowski is correct to claim that some contemporaryphilosophers of science studying the social dimensions of science show little aware-ness of the history of philosophical studies of the social dimensions of science. I haveargued that this neglect of our past should be understood as a consequence of devel-opments in the field of philosophy of science. When American philosophers em-barked upon the project of scientific philosophy they adopted many of thepractices of those they sought to emulate. In particular, they tended to be historicallyinsensitive. First, they neglected the history of science in their studies of science. Sec-ond, they forgot their own history, the fact that philosophical studies of the socialdimensions of science are not new.

However, I have argued that philosophers of science can study the social dimen-sions of science in a manner that does not merely result in a justification of the statusquo. In this respect, Mirowski�s concerns are not insurmountable. I have suggestedthat philosophers should focus on examining the epistemic significance of changes inscientific practice. I suggested that my own research on collaborative research is anexample of what can be done.

Acknowledgements

I thank Lori Nash, Jean Chambers and Thomas Uebel for helpful comments onan earlier draft of this paper.

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