philosophy and linguistic relativity

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Editorial Philosophy and Linguistic Relativity DOES LANGUAGE SHAPE our thoughts? And do the differences among languages in structure and vocabulary make their speakers think differently? Affirmative answers to these questions can have far-reaching consequences for philosophy. Different languages – different philosophies? In linguistics, the idea that dissimilarities between languages lead to profound differences in thought patterns is called linguistic relativity, or the Whorf or Sapir–Whorf hypothesis after its major proponents Edward Sapir (1884–1939) and Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897–1941). (The infelicitous but established term “linguistic relativity”, chosen by Whorf, is based on a misguided parallel with relativity theory. Feuer, 1953, p. 96; Heynick, 1983.) After a period of disrepute, linguistic relativity has experienced somewhat of a revival in recent years (Sidnell and Enfield, 2012; Collin, 2013; Enfield, 2013). It has also had some impact in philosophy. In a 1996 paper, William Harvey tried to show that the differences between French, English, and German philosophy depend on the grammatical differences between the three languages. The four-case inflection of German nouns (nomina- tive, genitive, dative, and accusative) is “part of the explanation for German philosophy’s orientation towards system construction”. The preponderance in German of words consisting of a root with a prefix or a suffix (as in “verboten” and “Botschaft”) inclines German philosophers to “a unitary idealism that posits a fundamental cosmic ordering principle”. In addition, the placement of verbs at the end of sentences imparts to German philosophy a “unitary mode”. In contrast, the “relative variability and looseness of English syntax” makes English thought “more open to ambiguity and lack of system”, and the frequent use of passive verb forms in that language makes its philosophers more empiricist and materialistic. In particular, “Hume’s concept . . . that knowledge is based in experience would seem to be related to the various English passive forms that emphasize the object and connote property rather than activity”. In the French language, the distinction between two grammatical genders instils a “penchant for dualism” in the minds of French philosophers, and it made Sartre introduce “new dualisms of freedom and responsibility, society and the individual”. Furthermore, the French use of articles before abstract nouns (“la bonheur”) contributes to the “analytic, specifying tendency” of French philosophy (Harvey, 1996). Needless to say, all these claims are baseless. The article referred to is nothing more than an (inadvertently) entertaining collection of argumentative fallacies. It is THEORIA, 2014, 80, 201–204 doi:10.1111/theo.12055 © 2014 Stiftelsen Theoria

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Editorial

Philosophy and Linguistic Relativity

DOES LANGUAGE SHAPE our thoughts? And do the differences among languagesin structure and vocabulary make their speakers think differently? Affirmativeanswers to these questions can have far-reaching consequences for philosophy.

Different languages – different philosophies?In linguistics, the idea that dissimilarities between languages lead to profounddifferences in thought patterns is called linguistic relativity, or the Whorf orSapir–Whorf hypothesis after its major proponents Edward Sapir (1884–1939)and Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897–1941). (The infelicitous but established term“linguistic relativity”, chosen by Whorf, is based on a misguided parallel withrelativity theory. Feuer, 1953, p. 96; Heynick, 1983.) After a period of disrepute,linguistic relativity has experienced somewhat of a revival in recent years (Sidnelland Enfield, 2012; Collin, 2013; Enfield, 2013). It has also had some impact inphilosophy.

In a 1996 paper, William Harvey tried to show that the differences betweenFrench, English, and German philosophy depend on the grammatical differencesbetween the three languages. The four-case inflection of German nouns (nomina-tive, genitive, dative, and accusative) is “part of the explanation for Germanphilosophy’s orientation towards system construction”. The preponderance inGerman of words consisting of a root with a prefix or a suffix (as in “verboten” and“Botschaft”) inclines German philosophers to “a unitary idealism that posits afundamental cosmic ordering principle”. In addition, the placement of verbs at theend of sentences imparts to German philosophy a “unitary mode”. In contrast, the“relative variability and looseness of English syntax” makes English thought “moreopen to ambiguity and lack of system”, and the frequent use of passive verb formsin that language makes its philosophers more empiricist and materialistic. Inparticular, “Hume’s concept . . . that knowledge is based in experience would seemto be related to the various English passive forms that emphasize the object andconnote property rather than activity”. In the French language, the distinctionbetween two grammatical genders instils a “penchant for dualism” in the minds ofFrench philosophers, and it made Sartre introduce “new dualisms of freedom andresponsibility, society and the individual”. Furthermore, the French use of articlesbefore abstract nouns (“la bonheur”) contributes to the “analytic, specifyingtendency” of French philosophy (Harvey, 1996).

Needless to say, all these claims are baseless. The article referred to is nothingmore than an (inadvertently) entertaining collection of argumentative fallacies. It is

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THEORIA, 2014, 80, 201–204doi:10.1111/theo.12055

© 2014 Stiftelsen Theoria

not difficult to find other features of the three languages that would supportdifferent and even opposite conclusions. In short, there is no valid evidence that ourphilosophical standpoints are determined by the languages that we speak.

Can we understand each other?But there is another, more serious question on language relativity in philosophy:is philosophy translatable? Or are we doomed to live in different philo-sophical “worlds”, prevented by language barriers from understanding each other’sphilosophies?

There are at least three good reasons why this gloomy picture of philosophy iswide of the mark. First, even when a word in language A has no counterpart inlanguage B, we can often express its meaning with other linguistic means. Forinstance, English has no word corresponding to the German “Wissenschaft”, butfor most purposes it can be translated as “science and the humanities”. Some moredistant languages lack words that we consider to be fundamental and irreplaceable.For instance, some languages (such as the Samoyed language Nenets) have nowords corresponding to the English “and” and “or”. However, they can expressconjunction and disjunction by prosodic means or with phrases meaning “all” or“one of ”. Languages that lack the negation particle (“not”) have other means fordenial, such as an abessive noun case (expressing absence of that which the noundenotes) or connegative (denying) verb forms (Ackerman and Salminen, 2006;Kubo, 2007; Haspelmath, 2007). Similar periphrastic strategies can often be usedsuccessfully for philosophical terminology.

Secondly, and even more importantly, languages are remarkably flexible andthey can readily be extended to cover new concepts and ideas. Obviously, phi-losophy like all other linguistic activities is bound by the limits of what can beexpressed in our natural languages. But these limits are not fixed; to the contrary,they are constantly being pushed back as we develop new concepts and distinc-tions together with new linguistic means to express them. When there is a needto talk about something that was not talked of before, appropriate linguisticdevices will be developed for the purpose. The on-going development of termi-nologies for computing and information technology in all the world’s major lan-guages is an example of this. In the same way, a language that lacks scientific orphilosophical terms will be enriched with them when the need arises (Feuer,1953). If the same concept is talked about in two languages, they will usuallydevelop expressions that are similar in meaning. For instance, the English“democracy” and the corresponding Japanese word are reportedly very close inmeaning (Collin, 2013).

In English and the other currently spoken European languages the philoso-phical terminology is a relatively new acquisition. It was modelled after theLatin terminology, which was in its turn modelled after the corresponding Greek

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vocabulary – largely by Cicero, whose influence on our philosophical language canhardly be overestimated (Murphy, 1998).

Thirdly, the difficulties in understanding philosophical terminology apply notonly to translation between languages but also to the experience of learning suchterminology within one’s own language. Roman Jakobson distinguished betweenthree types of translation:

“These three kinds of translation are to be differently labeled:

1) Intralingual translation or rewording is an interpretation of verbal signs by means of othersigns of the same language.

2) lnterlingual translation or translation proper is an interpretation of verbal signs by means ofsome other language.

3) Intersemiotic translation or transmutation is an interpretation of verbal signs by means ofsigns of nonverbal sign systems.

The intralingual translation of a word uses either another, more or less synonymous, word or resortsto a circumlocution. Yet synonymy, as a rule, is not complete equivalence.” (Jakobson, 1959,p. 233)

For instance, the word “knowledge” does not have the same meaning in philosophi-cal and general English. Moreover, its exact philosophical meaning is not easilypinpointed since its definition is contested. Learning the philosophical meaning (orusage) of “knowledge” is a difficult and uncertain process for the native speaker, infact more so than learning the meaning of most words in a foreign language. Thematch between “knowledge” and the German “Erkenntnis” is not perfect, but forsomeone who masters philosophical terminology in one of the two languages it isusually not very difficult to get a grasp of the difference between the two terms. InJakobson’s terminology, the intralinguistic translation appears to be more difficultthan the interlinguistic one. This seems to often be the case for philosophicalterminology.

Philosophical insularismThe conclusion from all this is that philosophy can be communicated acrosslanguage “barriers”. This is obviously bad news for those who wish to use phi-losophy for nationalistic purposes. As noted by Lewis Feuer: “The ‘will to beuntranslatable’ grows during an era of cultural regression and ethnocentrism”(Feuer, 1953, p. 95). The most influential Nazi philosopher claimed that Germanhas a superior role in philosophy over all the other modern languages (Rand,1990). As late as 1966 he said that French philosophers would have to use theGerman language since philosophical thinking is impossible in their own lan-guage (Bambach, 2003, p. 202). Other claims of untranslatability have been iso-lationist rather than supremacist, but they too have served as excuses for fencingoff one’s philosophy from the international community. But philosophical

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insularism cannot be blamed on language. It depends on narrow-mindednessand unwillingness to communicate, and these are obstacles that can beovercome.

Sven Ove Hansson

References

ACKERMAN, F. and SALMINEN T. (2006) “Nenets.” In K. Brown, ed., Encyclopedia of Lan-guage & Linguistics (2nd edition), Vol. 8. Oxford: Elsevier.

BAMBACH, C. R. (2003) Heidegger’s Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism, and the Greeks.Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

COLLIN, R. O. (2013) “Moving Political Meaning Across Linguistic Frontiers.” PoliticalStudies 61: 282–300.

ENFIELD, N. J. (2013) “Language, Culture, and Mind: Trends and Standards in the LatestPendulum Swing.” Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 19: 155–169.

FEUER, L. S. (1953) “Sociological Aspects of the Relation between Language and Philosophy.”Philosophy of Science 20: 85–100.

HARVEY, W. (1996) “Linguistic Relativity in French, English, and German Philosophy.”Philosophy Today 40: 273–288.

HASPELMATH, M. (2007) “Coordination.” In T. Shopen (ed.), Language Typology and SyntacticDescription (2nd edn), Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

HEYNICK, F. (1983) “From Einstein to Whorf: Space, Time, Matter, and Reference Frames inPhysical and Linguistic Relativity.” Semiotica 45: 35–64.

JAKOBSON, R. (1959) “On Linguistic Aspects of Translation.” In R. A. Brower (ed.), OnTranslation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,

KUBO, Y. (2007) “A Note on Typology of Coordination.” http://www.adm.fukuoka-u.ac.jp/fu844/home2/Ronso/Jinbun/L38-4/L3804_1229.pdf.

MURPHY, T. (1998) “Cicero’s First Readers: Epistolary Evidence for the Dissemination of HisWorks.” Classical Quarterly 48: 492–505.

RAND, N. (1990) “The Political Truth of Heidegger’s ‘Logos’: Hiding in Translation.” PMLA105: 436–447.

SIDNELL, J. and ENFIELD, N. J. (2012) “Language Diversity and Social Action.” CurrentAnthropology 53: 302–333.

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