phil145 - midterm 1

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Eric Peterson March 1 st , 2011 Phil 145 ± Killing Things Midterm #1 1. Singer concludes in his paper All Animals Are Equal that factory farming is impermissible. His argument i s as foll ows: Certain non-human animals can suff er. Therefore, they have interests. And, if they have they interests, those in terests deserve equal consideration. So, the in terests of certai n non-human animals deserve equal consideration. This argument appears valid at f irst glance, b ut in order to see how i t applies to factory farming, we need to define what Singer means by equal co nsideration. The principle of equal considerat ion as Singer employs it can be explained by the foll owing stat ement: Two beings deserve equal consideration if and o nly if the interests of being 1 make a d ifference to what is permitted to do in the same extent and way that the interests of being 2 do. That is to say in more simple terms, that the interests of both beings should be weighed equally if and only if those interests make a difference to both beings in simil ar ways. This principle is easily misunderstood, and best unders tood through example. For instance, we d o not all ow polar bears the ri ght to vote. This would appear to violate this principle, since o ne would expect t hat polar bears might have considerable interest in putti ng their hand (paw) in g overnment. However, polar bears do not actually have the physical or m ental ability to vote. Therefore, it is meaningless to mention a polar bear¶s interests in voting in the same wa y as it is meaningless to t alk of a man¶s interest in h aving a right to an abortion. Therefore, since a pol ar bear does not have interest in voting, this example do es not violate the principle of equal considerat ion. 2. In Marquis¶ essay Abortion Is Immoral , there is a paragraph addressing whether or not his argument commits him to t he conclusion that killing non-human animals is also immoral. His argument in short is that the main f eature that makes killing immoral is that it robs the victi m of a future. Applied to human fetuses, kill ing fetuses is i mmoral because they have futures like ours (adult humans), and killing them robs them o f that future. Therefore, abortion i s impermi ssible. A possi ble worry with this argument however, is that it commits him to the conclusion that killing non-human animals is also impermissible since animals have futures (though not necessarily futures like ours). However, Marquis claims in this paragraph that such a conclusion would require a detailed examination of the futures of these non-human animals, and how they weigh up against the futures of humans like us. Marquis takes a neutral stance on this iss ue, he claims neither that non-human animals have futures o f such consequence that end ing them is impermissible, nor does he say tha t ending them is always permissible. Instead, he characterizes his paper as a sketch of an argument f or the permissibili ty of killing. In this way, he avoids the pot ential implication of his argument that makes such insti tutions as free-range farming impermissible. 3. Marquis¶ argument hinges on an account of µfutures like ours¶. Marquis begins by asking the question, what feature is it that makes killing a normal adult human impermissible? He comes to the conclusion that it is the robbi ng of that person of their future, one presumably f ull of activity, happiness, and good things . He calls this f eature a future like ours. As described b efore in question two, Marquis does not make a judgment

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Eric PetersonMarch 1

st, 2011

Phil 145 ± Killing Things Midterm #1

1. Singer concludes in his paper All Animals Are Equal that factory farming is

impermissible. His argument is as follows: Certain non-human animals can suffer.Therefore, they have interests. And, if they have they interests, those interests deserveequal consideration. So, the interests of certain non-human animals deserve equal

consideration. This argument appears valid at first glance, but in order to see how itapplies to factory farming, we need to define what Singer means by equal consideration.

The principle of equal consideration as Singer employs it can be explained by thefollowing statement: Two beings deserve equal consideration if and only if the interests

of being 1 make a difference to what is permitted to do in the same extent and way thatthe interests of being 2 do. That is to say in more simple terms, that the interests of both

beings should be weighed equally if and only if those interests make a difference to bothbeings in similar ways. This principle is easily misunderstood, and best understood

through example. For instance, we do not allow polar bears the right to vote. This wouldappear to violate this principle, since one would expect that polar bears might have

considerable interest in putting their hand (paw) in government. However, polar bears donot actually have the physical or mental ability to vote. Therefore, it is meaningless to

mention a polar bear¶s interests in voting in the same way as it is meaningless to talk of aman¶s interest in having a right to an abortion. Therefore, since a polar bear does not

have interest in voting, this example does not violate the principle of equal consideration.

2. In Marquis¶ essay Abortion Is Immoral , there is a paragraph addressing whether or not his argument commits him to the conclusion that killing non-human animals is also

immoral. His argument in short is that the main feature that makes killing immoral is thatit robs the victim of a future. Applied to human fetuses, killing fetuses is immoral

because they have futures like ours (adult humans), and killing them robs them of thatfuture. Therefore, abortion is impermissible. A possible worry with this argument

however, is that it commits him to the conclusion that killing non-human animals is alsoimpermissible since animals have futures (though not necessarily futures like ours).

However, Marquis claims in this paragraph that such a conclusion would require adetailed examination of the futures of these non-human animals, and how they weigh up

against the futures of humans like us. Marquis takes a neutral stance on this issue, heclaims neither that non-human animals have futures of such consequence that ending

them is impermissible, nor does he say that ending them is always permissible. Instead,he characterizes his paper as a sketch of an argument for the permissibility of killing. In

this way, he avoids the potential implication of his argument that makes such institutionsas free-range farming impermissible.

3. Marquis¶ argument hinges on an account of µfutures like ours¶. Marquis begins

by asking the question, what feature is it that makes killing a normal adult humanimpermissible? He comes to the conclusion that it is the robbing of that person of their 

future, one presumably full of activity, happiness, and good things. He calls this feature afuture like ours. As described before in question two, Marquis does not make a judgment

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on what types of futures make killing an individual impermissible. He only makes theclaim that ending a person with a future like ours is impermissible. Therefore, this

µfuture like ours account¶ does not make the claim that killing human persons who havebecome µvegetables¶ is morally wrong. This differs from a rival account of what makes

killing impermissible that Marquis calls the µdiscontinuation account¶. The

discontinuation account according to Marquis is the claim that what makes killing anadult human wrong is that it ends the continued experience by the victim. The differencebetween these rival accounts is that the discontinuation account makes no distinction

between the µgoodness¶ or richness of the future, whereas the future like ours accountdoes make such a distinction.

4. (P1) There appear to be factual inequalities between individuals from different

races and sexes.(P2) These inequalities could be the result of either genetic or environmental

factors.(P3) There is no evidence that these differences are caused by either genetic or 

environmental factors, therefore,(C1) We ought not to base our opposition to racism or sexism on any kind of 

factual equality

5. Hare makes an argument in his paper Why I am Onl y A Demi-Vegetarian for whyfree-range farming is permissible, even morally required of us. He does this by using a

utilitarian argument, which claims that the scenario that maximizes overall happiness(quantified as hedons), is the one we are morally required to do. Following this

potentially controversial and vulnerable claim, he makes the second claim that free-rangefarming, which gives animals happy lives, kills them, replaces them with new animals

who will lead more happy lives, then feeding the animals to humans, maximizeshappiness for both the humans and non-human animals involved. Therefore, he

concludes, free-range farming is the scenario we are morally required to choose. Noother type of animal farming is acceptable, if his argument succeeds. Scruton takes an

approach very different to Hare¶s argument. Scruton makes the controversial claim thatnon-human animals have interest only in avoiding suffering; they lack the ability to have

interest in life itself. Non-human animals according to Scruton are creatures who lack theability to place value in their own existence. Therefore, a painless death (one that avoids

suffering) does the animal no disservice. This argument, if it succeeds, has very differentimplications than Hare¶s. It would imply that any method of farming that places a

minimal burden of suffering on animals is acceptable. That means the farming does notnecessarily have to be free-range. It also makes no claims as to whether or not we are

morally required to do something, but only on what is acceptable to do.

6. When reading Marquis¶ paper Why Abortion is Immoral , it is easy to confuse hismeaning. His argument depends on very precise wording, since he is trying to draw a

line that is very controversial. Marquis makes the general argument that the main thingthat makes killing people wrong is that it deprives us (normal adult humans) of our 

futures. And since fetuses have futures like ours, it is also wrong to kill fetuses. Whenglancing over this argument, one can mistake it for making the claim that that it is wrong

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to kill fetuses because it ends their future. This is not what Marquis is arguing. Thiswould imply that destroying anything is wrong because it robs it of its future. This could

be applied just as easily to a block of wood as it could to a human infant. Obviously, thismakes no sense, since there is nothing seriously wrong with destroying a block of wood,

while there is something seriously wrong with destroying a human infant. The key words

that are missing are µfuture like ours¶. According to Marquis, only when something has afuture like ours, that is, a future resembling that of a normal adult human, one filled withactivity, happiness, and the good things, does it make it seriously morally wrong to end it.

Anything that has a future unlike ours is territory that is unexplored by Marquis, and hemakes no judgment on whether it is acceptable to end these futures.