peruvian social mobility: revolutionary and developmental potential

Peruvian Social Mobility: Revolutionary and Developmental PotentialAuthor(s): David ChaplinSource: Journal of Inter-American Studies, Vol. 10, No. 4 (Oct., 1968), pp. 547-570Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of MiamiStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/165316 .

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David Chaplin Department of Sociology University of Wisconsin Madison, Wisconsin

peruvian social mobility:

revolutionary and

developmental potential

While

Peru's economic development is highly influenced by its

resource endowment and the price structure of its exports, the

style of industrialization will be determined in large part by the

type and amount of social mobility its class structure permits. Although similar ethnically to Guatemala and Bolivia, Peru so far has managed to forestall a basic social revolution and has developed under one of the most private "free enterprise" regimes in Latin America.1 It should there? fore be interesting to examine the type of class structure and social mobility that underlies this stage of development.

In terms of a model of the process of industrialization, I shall em?

phasize the distinctive features of the transitional stage. It seems that a

folk-urban, traditional-modern dichotomy?or even a transitional type that is merely halfway between these extremes?is not adequate. There are features of the transitional class structure that are apparently peculiar to this stage, such as the multiple full time occupations of the middle class?rather than being merely a mixture of "the old and the new." It

may also turn out on reanalysis that some of these features are not limited to the currently underdeveloped countries, into which industrialization has been introduced from the outside, but will be found to have existed also in the "Western case" of spontaneous development.

A second element in the present discussion is the question of the unit of analysis. The usual units for studies of stratification are communities,

1 An analysis of Peru's failure to have a basic social revolution is presented in David Chaplin, "Peru's Postponed Revolution," World Politics, XX (April, 1968).

547



548 Journal of Inter-American Studies

cities, or whole societies. In the case of Peru, this model cannot be main?

tained. The jungle Indians and many highland Indian communities are so

marginal to the "civic culture" of Peru as to be essentially nonparticipants. On the other hand, a considerable proportion of the upper class and a

growing number in the middle class are so international in orientation that

their behavior and outlook can not be understood in purely Peruvian

terms. The "brain drain" is only one of the manifestations of this latter

pattern. In addition to the above perspectives, the question of downward

mobility, which has been neglected in many studies of social mobility,2 is particularly interesting in Peru. (It seems that the term "social mobility" has become synonymous with upward mobility.) Fox and Miller suggest that the amount of downward mobility in a society is the best measure of

the openness of a social system.3 Since industrialization "forces" inter-

generational upward mobility due to the decline in available manual posi? tions, one is thus running against the tide if he manages to drop into the

manual category in such a situation. In the case of the United States it

could be argued, contrary to its avowed universalism, that its economic

development has been such as to allow considerable upward mobility as

well as considerable upper-class continuity since so much room was being created at the top. Thus the "inequities" of the U.S. social and, especially, educational system are covered up by the rapid expansion of the whole

system. Fox and Miller note, for instance, that in comparing the United

States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Japan, "the ability of sons of

elite fathers to inherit their father's socio-economic status is greatest in

the United States, 24% greater than in Great Britain. . . . The U.S.A.

has high inheritance [of elite positions] and high accessibility." 4

It may be the case in Peru that, cultural particularism notwithstand?

ing, there is both low internal accessibility and relatively low inheritance, the latter arising from high elite fertility, inheritance laws calling for an

equal division of property?as well as a small but socially significant for?

eign immigration moving "in at the top."

Peruvian Social Structure

Before discussing mobility, an attempt will be made to describe the class structure of Peruvian society. Its most outstanding feature is its

large Indian population. Since for most purposes Indians constitute a

2 Thomas Fox and S. M. Miller, "Occupational Stratification and Mobility: Intra-Country Variations," in Studies in Comparative International Development, I, No. 1(1965), 1.

3 Ibid., p. 3. 4 Ibid., p. 8.



Peruvian Social Mobility 549

cultural rather than racial category, it is a matter of considerable dispute as to how many there are. An Indian is defined as someone who speaks little or no Spanish, wears Indian garb and sandals, or walks barefoot, and chews coca (cocaine) leaves. By this strict definition, they constitute

probably not over a third of the population.

Historically, the Indians were a subordinate "caste" majority, so the

process by which they have decreased in relative importance is one of

the most significant types of social mobility in Peru. At this point, the

caste-like relations between the two categories (Indian and non-Indian) should be mentioned. Even after independence the Indians continued to

be treated as a separate group with special burdens (tithing for support of the Church until 1854) and few privileges. In fact, most historians

agree that their condition worsened markedly after the somewhat restrain?

ing hand of the Crown was eliminated in 1821. On the other hand, since a majority of Peruvians today are racially mestizo (mixed Indian and

white), a strict caste endogamy has obviously not been maintained.

Paralleling this division between the Indian and non-Indian is the rural-urban difference in class structure. Although some observers feel class to be an urban phenomenon in developing societies, Peru's highland Indians are not an egalitarian, subsistence "hunting and gathering" folk culture. Most of them live inside or near large plantations. They have also acquired a strong Western sense of private property, indigenist ideol?

ogists notwithstanding. In cities of the importance of departmental capitals and above, the

upper stratum consists of a light-skinned class based on land, profession, governmental office, and commerce in rural departments, and finance, commerce, land, and government in Lima. There is a sharp break between Lima's population (1,500,000 in 1961), and the rest of Peru's towns

(Arequipa, the next largest, is only one-tenth as large). The major split in Peru's "oligarchy" is found between the inefficient

feudal latifundistas in the mountains (gamonales) and the modern export- oriented cotton and sugar plantation owners along the coast. The former

group is still dominant in local affairs only, while the national "power elite" is made up largely of the latter group. This oligarchy, Bourricaud

feels, is not a true elite or ruling class but a monopolistic collection of "clans" that is based on the neutralization of the middle classes and "shov?

ing aside the 'forgotten' " lower classes.5 Unfortunately, the use of bearer

stock (acciones al portador) and the secretive nature of Peruvian business life make a more detailed or reliable evaluation of upper-class economic

5 See Francois Bourricaud, "Structure and Function of the Peruvian Oligarchy," Studies in Comparative International Development, II, No. 2, (1966).




behavior very difficult. It is fairly clear, however, that Peru's national upper class does have the following characteristics: it is overwhelmingly based in Lima, quite open to infiltration by financially successful European or

North American entrepreneurs, and quite disunited by familial, commer?

cial, and political competition.

Turning to the 1961 census, there are some "objective" data avail?

able on class strata. If we type the eleven explicit occupational categories

provided by the census, by their median income (combining white- and blue-collar workers), the following socioeconomic status-type strata can be delimited:

TABLE 1

1961 Socioeconomic Status Structure6

Total Aya- Peru Lima Callao cucho Loreto Pasco

% % % % % Vo

I. Upper Class (administrative).... 1.5 3.5 3.2 .3 1.5 1.8 II. Upper Middle Class (profes?

sional, technical) . 3.5 6.3 4.4 2.1 3.5 3.0 III. Middle Class (office employees).. 4.5 11.0 13.9 .8 2.5 3.0 TV. Lower Middle Class (salesmen,

clerks, etc.) . 7.6 12.3 10.6 4.9 7.4 5.2 V. Upper Lower Class (miners,

artisans, chauffeurs, factory workers). 19.7 30.6 37.4 8.3 11.5 28.5

VI. Lower Lower Class (peasants, domestic servants) . 63.2 36.3 30.5 83.6 73.6 58.5

100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

For the country as a whole this distribution fits the pattern expected in underdeveloped countries with only 1.5 per cent in the upper class and 15.6 in the middle. The most urban and industrial departments, Lima (86

per cent urban) and Callao (96 per cent urban?Lima's nearby port city), have predictably the largest middle classes. Ayacucho is a prototypical In? dian sierra department with a very large lower class and a disproportion? ately large upper middle class made up predominantly of government offi? cials in the departmental and provincial capitals. The upper and middle classes listed in Loreto (Peru's largest department, consisting of sparsely populated jungle) live largely in one town: the capital at Iquitos. Pasco

6 Censo Nacional de Poblacidn (Lima: Direccion Nacional de Estadistica, 1966). I. tomo IV. Tables 8 and 18.




is the sierra department with the heaviest concentration of modern mining

operations. In terms of the occupational structure, Peru's distinctive features are:

1. An excessive tertiary sector composed of both government workers

and lawyers as well as surplus "primitive" services such as domestic ser?

vants, street vendors, etc.

2. A proliferation of multiple, full-time occupation-holding persons (not visible in Table 2), most striking in those modern middle-class posi? tions in which such behavior would be judged as diluting professional

specialization if not involving actual conflicts of interest.

3. A retarded development of industrial?especially manufactur?

ing?jobs. In this category we also find a "premature" exclusion of wom? en owing to their higher cost due to the selective enforcement of labor and welfare laws in this industrial sector.

TABLE 2

The Peruvian Labor Force7

1940-1961

The % Male Total

1940 1961 1940 1961

% % % %

1940 1961

1. Agriculture . 68.5 86.2 62.4 2. Extractive. 97.3 97.3 1.8 3. Manufacturing .. 43.5 71.8 15.4 4. Construction. 98.0 99.0 1.9 5. Commerce. 67.8 72.1 4.6 6. Transportation &

Communication.. 95.3 95.1 2.1 7. Services. 50.9 50.8 10.2

9.7\ 2.2J Primary Sector .... 64.4 51.8

49.7 2,

9.1

3.0 15.2

17.2 16.6

8. Other. 80.1 78.4 1.6 4.4

Tertiary . 16.8 27.2

1.6 4.4

% Male of All Economically Active. 64.6 78.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

One of the peculiarities of Peruvian social structure has been that the manual-nonmanual gap, already very wide traditionally, was increased

7 Censo Nacional de Poblacidn y Ocupacidn 1940 (Lima: Direccion Nacional de Estadistica, 1944), I, 69, 360, 606-7.

Censo Nacional de Poblacidn?Resultados Finales de Primera Prioridad, 1961 (Lima: Direcci6n Nacional de Estadistica, March, 1964), p. 230, Table 11.




in the labor laws passed between 1920 and 1960. In general, the benefits

of empleados (white-collar workers) were twice as good as those of

obreros (blue-collar workers). In the early 1960s the obreros* benefits

were pulled up to the level of the empleados except for the sharp distinc?

tion still maintained in medical facilities. The obrero labor and welfare

laws are, however, enforced only for a small segment of the labor force,

namely the organized workers in the Lima-Callao area and the few pro? vincial centers of industry.

In the white-collar sector there are two major categories in the 1961

census: governmental and private employees. The most striking feature

of this white-collar sector is the relative size of government employment. For the country as a whole, the ratio of white-collar workers who worked

for the government to those working for private employers was .65. This

varied, from a low of .48 in the department of Lima (in which the capital is over 80 per cent of the population) to a high of 3.9 in the jungle de?

partment of Amazonas. Thus, while both government power and person? nel are highly centralized in Lima, commerce and industry are even more

concentrated there. Within provincial towns, then, government workers

are relatively more numerous than in the capital. The difference between these two types of white-collar occupations is

also revealed in this comparison of their income distribution. The private employees span a much wider range of income levels by including more

highly paid as well as more poorly paid workers than those in govern? ment.

TABLE 3

Income Distribution of Peruvian Government and Private White-collar Workers?19618

Monthly Salary All White-collar (Soles) 26.8 S/=$l (U.S.) Workers Government Private

% % % 5,001+ 5.6 2.5 7.4 3,001-5,000 8.8 7.3 9.9 2,001--3,000 16.0 21.7 12.6 1,501-2,000 16.7 22.6 13.1 1,001-1,500 25.7 37.2 18.6

0-1,000 27.2 8.7 38.4

100.0 100.0 100.0 (323,177) (126,756) (196,421)

Median Salary 1450 S/. 1550 S/. 1350 S/.

8 Censo Nacional de Poblacion (Lima: Direcci6n Nacional de Estadistica, 1966). I. tomo IV. Table 115.




The main problem in interpreting this comparison is that the larger the

town the more likely government workers are to have also one or more

nongovernmental jobs. So, while this official report (undoubtedly under?

estimating the income of private employees) presumably avoids double

counting, it can not give an accurate picture of the total income of govern? ment employees.9

Another way of approaching the question of occupational differen?

tials is to examine the gap between the income of the urban empleados and

obreros and the per cent urban by departments. There is a strong negative correlation between the size of this gap and the per cent urban?that is, the more rural an area, the greater the distance between these groups within local towns. In Lima and Callao, therefore, we find a minimal differ?

ence in median monthly income of 450 S/. between urban empleados and

obreros, whereas in the isolated sierra department of Ayacucho this

difference (even at a lower absolute level of income for both) is greatest? at 1,150 S/. (Ayacucho also has the fourth highest ratio of government to private empleados in the country: 2.7.)

Turning to the Peruvian middle class, we find a dearth of empirical studies. Even the Pan American Union series on the middle classes in

Latin America omitted Peru. The most distinctive feature of this stratum

has already been described?namely multiple occupation-holding. The

"ideal" combination of occupations would be a university professorship for prestige, a government position for power and prestige, and various

private jobs related to the governmental post for income. It is partly

through the latter activities that a European type of bourgeois conscious?

ness is diluted. As Bourricaud observed, "the middle class has not evolved

an original value system ... vis-a-vis the oligarchs. . .. The characteristic

trait of [the] Peruvian middle class?whether ... old or new ... is

that it is a dependent group." This dependence arises from the fact that

"this country has no bureaucracy in the Weberian sense" nor has it pro? duced a nineteenth century type of entrepreneur. The few successful men

of this type were generally foreigners who "were bought out by the oligar?

chy, enjoying a rapid absorption into the traditional ruling class." 10

9 An additional problem in Peru was the institution of acciones al portador or bearer stock through which the ownership, and hence dividend recipients, of "anonymous societies" remained unknown. (It appears that this form of tax evasion is to be eliminated in 1968.)

i? Bourricaud, "Structure and Function of the Peruvian Oligarchy," p. 27. MacLean y Estenos suggests that the absence of independent guilds (the Indians

were used for artisan work or such goods were imported) is one factor accounting for the nonbourgeois character of Peru's middle class. Roberto MacLean y Estenos, Sociologia peruana (Lima: 1942) p. 118.

We could add the absence of a "free city" tradition. Lima has always been dominant over Peru but until recently subservient to a land-owning plutocracv.




This blurring of occupational identity could be interpreted as illus?

trating the point that in this transitional phase of industrial development, in the middle and upper classes, occupations are perhaps least relevant

to a man's overall status. I am assuming, perhaps incorrectly, that there

was a somewhat greater tendency for the very small (but certainly ex?

istent) colonial and nineteenth century middle class to have one major

occupation, as is still more the case in small towns. Today, the rapid ex?

pansion of the infrastructure beyond the supply of qualified personnel and

the depressing effect of inflation cause middle-class professionals to take

on as many sources of income as possible even if they are all full-time

occupations whose various commitments they could not properly meet.

Presumably, at a later stage, the U.S. middle-class pattern of a single

occupation, single source of income will occur. For the present, multiple

occupations are linked with a leisure-oriented basis for social status. It

is the middle-class man's style of consumption rather than production that

determines his prestige.11 Such an ephemeral basis for status naturally leads to a high degree of social instability and anxiety. One aspect of this

behavior is the abuse of the title doctor, or engineer, for almost anyone with a university level education.

Peru's middle classes are different from Western ones also in being made up largely of employees of the government or of large foreign firms.

The independent businessman is relatively rare and usually foreign in

origin (even if Peruvian in nationality, as in the case of the Chinese). A central factor in the situation of such a salaried class is inflation.

MacLean y Estenos places the first proletarianization of the lower middle

class during the inflation of World War 1.12 It would be extremely difficult

to pinpoint the moment when the better paid factory workers surpassed the income of the lower white-collar workers, but this "modern" phe? nomenon had occurred at least by 1958.13 This latter shift was not pri?

marily a matter of a relative decline in white-collar wages, but rather

was due to the substantial gains in welfare benefits as well as wages enjoyed

by the privileged sector of Lima's organized factory workers.

The urban lower class has been studied primarily in Lima. Its most

outstanding characteristic is its failure to radicalize. The urban proletariat has looked (successfully) more to paternalistic military dictators than

11 "In Puno, what matters is not what a person does . . . not his professional success but his facility, his style, his participation in clubs. It is important to *cut a good figure' at parties. The technical competition so admired in our industrial society is little appreciated." Francois Bourricaud, "Algunas caracteristicas originales de la cultura mestiza en el Peru contemporaneo," Revista del Museo Nacional, XXIII (1954), 165.

12 MacLean y Estenos, op. cit., p. 118. 13 David Chaplin, "Industrialization and the Distribution of Wealth in Peru,"

Studies in Comparative International Development, III, No. 3 (1967).




middle-class revolutionary leaders. In Peru's case the famous Aprista

party (one of the earliest significant non-Communist radical parties after

the Mexican revolution) must also share the credit or blame for this

situation since it has used its lower-class base largely to benefit its middle-

class leadership. It is closely linked to the textile federation, the earliest

major urban industrial union, but even so, most of the considerable bene?

fits enjoyed by these workers were enacted by the military dictators, Bena?

vides (1933-1939) and Odria (1948-1956), rather than by more demo?

cratic regimes. It seems that urbanization in Latin America, unlike the case of the

West, dilutes lower-class protest so effectively that a de-radicalization (or

stifling of radicalization) could be said to be occurring.14 An explanation for this "deviant" transitional phenomenon could be that:

1. As in other Latin American countries, the small group of highly organized urban factory workers are relatively well taken care of by the selective enforcement of very advanced labor and welfare benefits.

This can be done because factory owners are not yet a major sector of the national elite. They are also largely foreign in Peru. In addition, Peru's

factories are more capital intensive than were England's at a comparable level of economic development, hence they can afford to pay higher wages.

2. This industrial sector is still very small and, thanks to its capital intensity, is not likely ever to make up as large a percentage of the national labor force as was the case in Western development. The great lead of the tertiary sector is not likely to be reversed.

3. Seventy per cent of Peru's industrial establishments are located in the Lima-Callao area?hence are overshadowed by the size and com?

plexity of this metropolis.15 The few mining towns in Peru, however, do reveal the same pattern

of polarized intense labor management conflict that Kerr and Seigel noted for Western countries.16

To the middle and upper classes in Lima, the lower-class barriadas

(squatter villages) and callejones (densely packed one-story lots) are a homogeneous squalid mass. They are, however, highly differentiated,

14 Ratinoff, in his survey of middle-class ideology in Latin America, sees several stages to this de-radicalization. At first, the rising middle class is in favor of limits on individual freedoms?especially property rights since they are interested in undercutting the power of the plutocratic elite. Later, when their position is more firmly established, they favor a return to individual property rights. Luis Ratinoff, "La clase media en America Latina," Revista Paraguaya de Sociologia, Ano 2 (Sept-Dec, 1965), pp. 16-18.

15 Censo de Manufactura?1963 (Lima: Direeeion Nacional de Estadistica, 1965), p. v.

16 Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, "The Interindustry Propensity to Strike? An International Comparison," Chapter 14 in Arthur Kornhauser et al., Industrial Conflict (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1954).




as the hundreds of volunteer workers and social science researchers who

are now working there gradually discover. The callejones are located all over the older sections of the city, while the barriadas spread outward

on the western and northern side of Lima. The former are fairly stable

clusters of generally hopeless people who are barely maintaining them?

selves. Most of the men are unemployed and rely on their "wives" (few are legally married) and children for support. Structurally, they seem to

lack any organization?even the "a-moral" familism Banfield observed

in southern Italy.17 The only escape possible is via education, low fer?

tility or, in the case of women, marrying up and out.

The barriadas, on the other hand, were founded by self-selected

"emigrants" from callejones and similar slums who sought home owner?

ship by squatting on undeveloped land on the edge of the city. They in?

variably organize a variety of self-help associations in order to obtain land

titles, water, sewage, etc.

Nineteenth Century Social Mobility

In Kubler's invaluable study, he notes that "the first half-century of

Peruvian independence from Spain has . . . been an ethnohistorical

blank." 18 Using the only available empirical data on social and occupa?

tional categories (tax registers), he is able to give us a glimpse of the type of social change occurring during the nineteenth centry.

During the colonial period the bulk of the taxes was extracted from

the Indians as tribute. Although there was some talk of treating the In?

dians as full citizens during the wars for independence, the colonial tribute

system was continued until 1854. There were also three other categories of taxpayers: (1) landowners and tenants, (2) artisans, and (3) the

"castes" (translated by Kubler for this period as "non-Indian proletariat"), i.e., mestizos and Negroes. Most of the revenues were supplied by the

Indians.

The only distinctions Kubler pursued were those of Indian and

mestizo. He observes that from 1795 to 1940 there were many shifts

back and forth between these categories according to the degree of pros?

perity and governmental control, or decay and isolation. Whenever a

region experienced a decline, more of its inhabitants were defined as

Indians. (It should be clear that these changes referred only to the sub?

jective evaluation of the enumerators and not to biological or even ob?

jective behavioral aspects of Peru's population.) For present purposes it

17 Edward Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (Chicago: Free Press, 1958).

is George Kubler, "The Indian Caste of Peru, 1795-1940" (Washington, D.C: Smithsonian Institution, Institute of Social Anthropology, Publication No. 14,1952), v. 1.




is sufficient to observe that from 1795 to 1876 the so-called Indian pro? portion of Peru's population increased as a consequence of the govern? mental disintegration and economic decay of this period, culminating in

the disastrous War of the Pacific against Chile. In many regions, with

"isolation and economic decline, the non-Indian settlers of one generation lost caste and reverted to Indian status in a later generation."

19 Even

today there are several groups in Peru, notably the Morochucos in Aya? cucho, known as "white" Indians, the descendants of mestizos who sub?

sequently lost literacy and effectively dissolved into a unique variety of Indian culture.

On more hypothetical grounds, we can also support the thesis that the nineteenth centry was not a period of "feudalistic" stability but of

turbulent change even in rural areas. Factors increasing the level of elite

change in Peru during this period are:

1. The abolition of primogeniture and entail. Landed estates were divided up equally among all children?of both sexes, legitimate and il?

legitimate. One must also remember that fertility in Peru at this time un?

doubtedly varied directly rather than inversely with wealth. Most of the

poor died before adolescence and so could barely reproduce themselves. Thus there existed a demographic pressure for downward mobility for

some of the descendants of wealthy f amilies.

2. With a custom of dowries, together with the chance sex ratio

among children, the wrong mixture of children and marriages could ruin a family. In fact, one could say that only an extraordinarily adroit and

lucky family could preserve its status in rural Peru generation after gen? eration.20 We should add that by family we are referring to the West-

*? Ibid., p. 40. 20 The situation in Peru seems to be strikingly like that of the landed gentry in

nineteenth century China as described by Chung-li-Chang. He found that this class of elite landowners: 1. Could not earn enough from their land through a tenant- sharecropper system to radically enlarge their land-holdings. On the contrary, money had to be diverted into land from outside sources to effect such economic mobility. Therefore they found political posts indispensable to agricultural success. In this way, they could (a) evade taxes, (b) use the police to collect land rents, and (c) divert public funds to private advantage. (Peru's landed elite has long "accepted" public posts as deputies, senators, and departmental prefects, but not in the disin? terested spirit popularly attributed to England's landed aristocracy. Chang also found that: 2. Large estates could not be held together from one generation to the next due to the prohibition of entail and primogeniture?consequently China also experienced a high rate of social mobility at the gentry level. In both cases very few families succeeded in developing the Rothschild or DuPont "clan spirit" that has for so long balanced kinship ascription with the practical requirement for administrative efficiency for the sake of the family enterprise. Chung-li-Chang, The Income of the Chinese Gentry (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962), pp. 127-28.

Lenski has also noted a high level of agrarian elite turnover in studies on medieval Europe. See Gerhard E. Lenski, Power and Privilege (New York, McGraw- Hill, 1966), p. 239.




ern nuclear unit. Although some students of Peru, such as Bourricaud,

speak loosely of "clans," the Peruvian family is not such in any strict

sense of the term. In fact, it is somewhat more bilateral in orientation

than that of the United States (as indicated by the retention of the mother's

maiden name and the frequency of hyphenated paternal names?the sec?

ond half usually being a previous maternal ancestor of greater luster than

its contemporaneous paternal ancestor). Therefore one should not assume

that because certain (few) colonial elite names persist that "this family" has maintained an unbroken superior position. Probably the majority of

descendants of this line's founder have "disappeared" and the survivor

may really be the creature of a fortunate tie to a rising family. It should also be noted that Peru's nineteenth century plutocratic

families did not maintain any sense of "racial" or ethnic purity with respect to the few European or North American migrants who came to Peru

during this period. Like the sixteenth and seventeenth century British

landed aristocracy, they were only too happy to effect ties to this "elite

culture" entrepreneurial group.21 From a period of extreme provincial isolation when even the elite in Lima could cherish a sense of being the

center of a universe, the devaluation of Peru's culture has grown to a national disease. This "realization" first occurred to those on top, and

today it bedevils the upper middle class. As a result, Peru's elite is de?

nationalized by various foreign cultures of orientation, often not shared even within the same family. The committed nationalists are then only a segment of the lower middle class?and, of course, politicians?since the largely disenfranchised Indians are not yet part of Peru's "civic cul? ture."

Twentieth Century Social Mobility

The major change in social stratification in Peru's provincial towns has been the exodus of the original creole landed "aristocracy."22 There has always been a pattern of absenteeism, but before the turn of the twentieth century it usually took the form of having a town house in the provincial or departmental capital so that frequent and prolonged visits to the plantation could be made. Thereafter, a redefinition of an

acceptable level of physical comfort and style, together with the eroding effect of Indian unrest, caused these provincial elites to abandon their

21 Lawrence Stone, "Marriage among the English Nobility in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," Comparative Studies in Society and History, III (Jan? uary, 1961), 182-206.

22 Gabriel Escobar M., La estructura politica rural del departamento de Puno, published doctoral thesis in Anthropology (Cuzco: Universidad Nacional de San Antonio Abad del Cuzco. December. 1961L




landholdings to managers while they fled to Lima. Such a move usually meant a downgrading to the upper middle class at best since the Lima

social pyramid towers above that of all other cities. In a similar manner, movement out of Lima makes relative upward mobility possible although

acceptance by provincial society would be slower.23 Subsequently, even

an upper middle-class status in Lima may be difficult to maintain since

absentee-managed highland plantations are likely to yield declining reve?

nues?especially today in the face of Indian invasions and the threat of

land reform. As a result, unless such ex-provincial elite families can rise

to the challenge of developing a new urban economic base, they are likely to slip still further.24

Since there seems to be a link between downward mobile "aristo?

crats" and fascistic ideologies one could look for the same in Peru. Ap?

pearances to the contrary, it can be argued that Aprismo has had fascistic

elements in its ideology and has not in fact benefited its lower-class base

as much as its insecure middle-class leadership. The general flow of migration has been toward the coast, primarily

Lima, especially since 1940. While for the middle- and upper-class pro? vincials such a move can result in a relatively lower status, the type of

mobility experienced by the Indians and cholos is indeterminate since

they are moving between cultures. From one point of view, they can not

go down since they are already on the bottom; on the other hand, there are many urban situations that they would regard as worse than what they left behind.

Lower-class migrants to Lima arrive largely as discharged army recruits, domestic servants, construction workers, or street vendors.

Success in their lifetime would require literacy, the adoption of mestizo manners and speech, and the luck to obtain employment as taxi drivers

or factory workers or in one of the many semi-legal and illegal activities. The most striking effect of the heavy waves of rural migration to

Lima has been the ruralization of sections of the city. At the same time Peru's upper class, located overwhelmingly in Lima, has become more

cosmopolitan in its outlook. Thus there is less of a shared culture in Lima

today than fifty years ago, due not only to the increase in the absolute size of the population, but more crucially to these divergent influences.

Another current of migration, also of growing significance since

1940, has been the increasing number of middle-class Peruvians educated

23 Francois Bourricaud, "Castas y clases en Puno," Revista del Museo Nacional, XXXII (Lima, 1963), 208-321.

24 See Richard Patch, "La Parada," American Universities Field Staff Report, XIV, Nos. 1, 2, 3 (1967), for a case of a Puno middle-class family slipping to a lower class status in Lima.




abroad. Education in general is the most important means of upward mo?

bility (a good professional education can, of course, also cushion the fall

of the son of an ex-provincial "aristocrat"). As the national universities

are increasingly democratized the prestige value of their degrees declines, and hence a foreign education becomes even more desirable?aside from

its usually greater functional utility. Before World War II the majority of

Peruvians studying abroad were upper-class. The men tended to go to

English or German schools, while the few wealthy women educated

abroad (normally only through the secondary level) went to Spain or

France. With the closing off of Europe during World War II and the

growing importance of the United States in the Peruvian economy, the

predominant locale of the foreign-educated changed. The more univer-

salistic criteria employed in North American universities (and the sur?

plus demand) meant that no longer could scions of the best families count

on getting into elite foreign universities. Their places were increasingly

likely to be taken by more talented and ambitious middle-class Peruvians,

especially those of foreign parentage. The initial expectation of the North American foundations paying

for the education of this new group was that they would, "of course," return to their countries where the needs for their talents was so great. The

actual outcome is now described as the problem of the "brain drain" (in?

adequately compensated for by the importation of short-term foreign

"experts"). The problem for the foreign schools is that if they selected

Peruvian students only on the basis of ability they could be turning out

some graduates of such modest social background that the gap between

the position they were trained for and the one they could hope to obtain

would be unbearable. They would return to "their" foreign country or

become revolutionaries. Even where "excessive" social mobility is not

involved, a prolonged period of training in the "West" tends to have the

following disadvantages: 1. The student may unlearn the criollo (creole, or, in this context,

"operator") approach to career success and instead come to expect to

win a position on merit alone. He thus is psychologically unprepared to

play the game?as it still must be played in Peru.25

2. He may also simply lose touch with his clique or patron.

25 See Anthony Leeds, "Brazilian Careers and Social Structure: An Evolu? tionary Model and Case History," American Anthropologist, XVI, No. 6 (Part 1, December, 1964) for an excellent description of the operation of this same pre? bendary patronazgo (patronage) system in Brazil. Ratinoff generalizes Leeds' find? ings to all of Latin America (Ratinoff, op. cit.). Although, like many of my Latin American colleagues, Ratinoff manages to maintain an utterly abstract level of discourse throughout without once mentioning a single concrete case of his prop? ositions, I believe that he had Peru and the APRA party very much in mind.




A related matter for those not working primarily for the government is whether they seek employment with a national or foreign-owned firm.

Each has obstacles to advancement. The national firm is normally a

family enterprise in which the best positions go to relatives. The foreign firm for its part often reserves the top positions for its own countrymen.

However, in the latter case there are two countervailing factors. The aver?

age total size and relative proportion of higher level positions are larger in foreign firms. They are also, at least, true corporations and not family

enterprises. Moreover, they can be pressured by the government into

"nationalizing" their personnel up to the highest local level. Some of those

top positions, however, are also particularistic in a functional way. Each foreign firm needs a protective wall of local influentials whose only talent need be the right ties to the ruling oligarchy. These positions are therefore not open to talented "upstarts."

Among the foreign firms there are also interesting distinctions. The U.S. firms, in general, offer more opportunities to their Peruvian man?

agerial and technical staffs because most of their U.S. superiors are in Peru for a short term, anticipating promotion back to the United States. The European managers, on the other hand, generally have settled in Peru for life. They are thus less willing to teach their skills to their Peruvian subordinates. The British textile technicians are probably the worst of? fenders in this respect. Most of them are up-from-the-ranks section fore? men in England with a very limited craft union view of their employment security.

There is also, unfortunately, relatively little coordination between

supply and demand for particular skills. The country in general may need

engineers, but if 25 chemical engineers all return in one year only 10 may find relevant and acceptable positions.

Foreign Immigration

Strangers have played a crucial role in the economic development of Peru, because neither the Indian nor the criollo culture could produce the necessary individuals or behavior.

Unlike North America, Peru's excess of cheap manual labor and its

shortage of valuable unclaimed land alone made extensive lower-class

European immigration after independence out of the question. The few who did come, again in contrast to the North American patterns, were well educated and in many cases financially prepared to enter directly into business in Peru as entrepreneurs. Unlike the "stranger" entrepreneurs of medieval Europe, the Jews, or the overseas Chinese in much of Asia, Peru's "elite strangers" were able to marry into the best families and within two generations consolidate an upper-class position. Again in




contrast to the situation in Africa and Asia, the European commercial

elite is not as visible in Latin America as elsewhere.

The first to arrive in Peru were the British in 1840. In numbers and

by nationality, the Italians were most numerous and assimilated most

easily. According to the Ministry of External Affairs, in a release on

June 4,1960, there were the following foreigners resident in Peru:

7,587 Italians

7,144 North Americans (240 Canadians)

5,788 Spaniards 3,070 Germans

2,882 British

1,458 Swiss

1,429 French

This number, of course, does not include the generations of Italians who have immigrated since 1850, most of whom have become Peruvian citi?

zens, unlike most North Americans living in Peru who usually retain their

North American citizenship.26 The Peruvian government has tried repeatedly to encourage foreign

white immigration, but with little success. One small group of Basque

shepherds were so abused as leftists in 1881, because they would not live like Peruvian Indians, that Peru was almost involved again in a war with

Spain. A nineteenth century colony of Germans at Puzuzo has been ignored for so long, contrary to their expectations, that they have become a fas?

cinating example of cultural adjustment to extreme isolation. Foreign non- white immigration has been closed since the 1930s. Most vain of all,

however, is the persistent hope of attracting not only educated, self-

financed Europeans, but also people willing to settle in the jungle rather

than in Lima. One Peruvian writer feels that arguments for such immi?

grants aggravate the national inferiority complex, a "complex whose origin arose in the Colonial Era and justly should have died with Independence, but, on the contrary, its roots have become deeper and today it exists not

only in the Indian but it has also contaminated the middle class and even those who believe themselves to be cultivated. Their subconsciousness tells them they can never get ahead by themselves and that the only hope is to follow the path of the others (Europeans). ... Worse yet is another

complex, that of the climbers who desire so much to acquire social position that they exploit their own people in conspiracy with foreigners."

27

26 Between 1930 and 1952 only 1,757 foreigners were naturalized. Anuaria Estadistica del Peru (Lima: Direccion Nacional de Estadistica, 1951-1952), p. 385.

27 Arturo Nieves Ayala, El Peru y la inmigracion de post guerra (Lima, 1946), p. 45.




Lower Class Mobility

Lower class rural mobility occurs mainly through migration to cities

precipitated by available education and transportation routes. Culturally, it is described as the process of cholificacion?of Indians becoming cholos.28 Cholos are viewed as the next higher stratum to Indians (fol? lowed by mestizos and then Creoles). However, they are also in a different

situs since Indian communities have their own internal stratification system based on wealth, age, and political office. Their distinguishing traits are

bilingualism and an aggressive self-reliant relationship to the dominant

mestizo and Creole classes. They have sloughed off the deference and in?

feriority complex of the Indians without compromising their aggressions

through the adoption of middle-class aspirations. As a marginal category,

they lack stable reference groups and so live a disorganized existence.

They provide, however, the most dynamic element in the sierra, even if

this involves taking advantage of the Indian.

In the 1920s a series of Indian revolts against further encroachment

on their lands by plantation owners in the southern sierra brought about an "indigenous community" reform law. It was designed to protect the

surviving ayllus (traditional Indian communities created by the colonial

reducciones) from further expropriation. In principle, this seemed to

promise a U.S. type of reservation system that could slow down the ac? culturation of the Indian, thus keeping him out of national life. In fact, the results were quite different. (The traditional subsistence plantation with its "attached" Indians is actually the most effective isolating institution.) Since taking advantage of this law required the employment of a lawyer and a direct relationship with the Ministry of Labor and Indian Affairs in

Lima, the registered communities were actually projected into greater participation in national life. A related factor is that while some Peruvian intellectuals and folklorists idealize the Indian (primarily in his role in the defunct Incaic civilization), the contemporary Indian is generally despised for his "dirty, uncultivated" habits.

In addition, a considerable number of the communities that registered under this law were not in fact made up of real Indians at all.29 They were, rather, c/j<?/<?-mestizo villages or towns taking advantage of the law to

expropriate land from the Church, private landlords, and the govern? ment. They then proceeded to distribute this land in individual, private units in contradiction to the law. In this manner, as well as through illegal

28 Gabriel Escobar M., "El mestizaje en la region andina: el caso del Peru," Revista de Indias (Madrid, January-June, 1964), pp. 197-220.

29 Felix Cosio, "Realidad y ficcion de las comunidades indigenas," Peru In? digena, II (June, 1952), 214.




invasions, a de facto land reform has been occurring in the sierra for

some time.

The flow of migrants from Indian areas, as revealed in the 1940

census, began from the central and nearby northern mountainous depart?

ments, especially where mining operations and the central railroad had

penetrated. By 1961, the more densely populated but more isolated south?

ern altiplano region was sending out a comparable flow of migrants.

Mobility within Indian communities occurs largely through the lavish

patronizing of fiestas and election to local political office. But even this

internal mobility requires participation in the national economy to raise

the necessary money.30

Distribution of Income and Wealth

For the middle third of the twentieth century some data is available

on changes in the distribution of wealth and income.31 All of the available

sources suggest that while a small proportion of the organized urban in?

dustrial labor force is gaining both relatively and absolutely, the overall

distribution of wealth and income has become increasingly unequal. The

reasons for this are:

1. Movement into the market economy of the relatively larger, elite-

owned resources previously possessed but not evaluated in commercial

market terms. The extension of commercialism also means that real estate

is exchanged for money rather than primarily as familial inheritance or

bridal dowries, hence the possibility for a more rational concentration of

holdings. 2. Since only the upper class can save significantly, and since in-

vestable saving is most practical in the form of liquid wealth, commerciali?

zation increases the economic opportunities of those already on top. 3. There is an increasing gap between the urban and rural world re?

sulting from the concentration of industrialization in the largest cities?

in Peru's case almost exclusively in Lima?since increases in per capita

productivity come more rapidly in the urban industrial sector.

4. Excessive population growth decreases the level of living of the

mass of landless peons, thus widening the gap even if the wealth of the

elite remains stable.

5. The shift from sharecropping and other types of subsistence farm?

ing to large scale commercial cash crops that use paid labor. This is

accompanied by a consolidation of holdings and, as in most non-Western

countries, by the substantial transfer of ownership of foreigners.

3(> Gabriel Escobar M., La estructura politica rural del departamento de Puno, pp. 27-28.

3i See Chaplin, "Industrialization and the Distribution of Wealth in Peru."




6. The usual inflation that undercuts the position of the majority

group of employees in favor of the owners of land and other flexible price assets.

Agrarian Reform

In this connection the question of the aims and the probable conse?

quences of land reform should be raised. They are: (1) social justice

through a redistribution of wealth, and (2) increased food production for

Peru's booming population. A not-so-explicit goal is the creation of a con?

servative petit bourgeois peasantry to offset the danger of a revolutionary landless proletariat. (I am speaking of the type of "bourgeois-reformist" land reform as it is generally defined in Latin America?not of Soviet type of collectives or state farms.) Of course there are still some obtuse diehards

who view this program as itself revolutionary because it will require the

expropriation of the notoriously inefficient (but also economically unprom?

ising) mountain latifundia. Actually it is sophisticated conservatism in

the same sense as is birth control for the masses. Communists do, or should, from their own perspective, see it as a bourgeois trick to repeat the unin?

tended effect of the early Soviet (which created the ultra-conservative

Kulaks) or the Napoleonic land reforms.32 Nevertheless, they must pay it lip service since it has become an article of faith with most Latin Ameri?

can progressives. As to its practical consequences for changing the social structure,

we can perhaps turn to Bolivia. There the old class of landlords was in?

deed destroyed in the 1952 revolution and a new rural political base

developed with which the government could offset the persistently rebel?

lious mine union and its militia. (A comparable goal was achieved in

Venezuela.) The same type of minimal immediate improvement in eco?

nomic conditions could be accomplished in Peru in spite of the extremely conservative and laggard nature of its law and program. (In Peru no

redistribution of wealth is contemplated since the landlords would be well

compensated by government bonds with extraordinary financial support.) On the other hand, it seems unlikely that the ultimate development of land redistribution in Peru will be much structured by this law since most of the division of land so far has been primarily a legalization of land in? vasions outside the law. Moreover, it seems very unlikely that, were the

32Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1943), pp. 135-37. Marx also observed that the benefits to the peasantry of such a division of land had to be transitory?enough to buy support and time for one regime; but, subsequently, equally great poverty would result. Latin American land reformers should not expect this conservatizing effect to last indefinitely. An increase in fertility from the earlier marriages that such ready land makes possible alone can undermine the benefits of such a reform.




Indians to default on their mortgage payments, the government would

forcibly eject them en masse.

In the long run, even an immediately successful land reform program can not avoid the inevitable reconcentration of land that seems to occur

in any industrialized society?Communist, or capitalist; only a system of uneconomic subsidies (such as those of the U.S., which Peru could

not afford) could maintain an agricultural sector of independent farm

families. This reconcentration will be hastened by the desperate need for

more food, for the production of which there is not enough time or per? sonnel to painfully retrain the mass of Peruvian Indians. Moreover, it

seems likely that one of the consequences of land reform will be an in?

crease in peasant fertility, thus wiping out, in a generation, the gain in

food production and increase in land holdings to the lots of minimal scale

efficiency that land reform provides initially. In traditional communities

an Indian does not establish his own family until he can acquire land. A

land shortage thus results in postponed marriages or emigration. The

sudden provision of more land for all would lower the age at marriage and probably increase the per cent of the married, thereby increasing the

size of completed families in such a "noncontracepting" population. Land reform, then, can be viewed as a short-term stopgap and as a

politically unavoidable effort to buy time (against a Communist revolu?

tion?regression to chaos), which can only work if parallel efforts are made in the urban industrial sector in which most of the subsequent gener? ations will be living.

Education

The primary avenue to social mobility in Peru is formal education.

In this respect Peru is not following the pattern of Western industrializa?

tion, but is rather "prematurely" up to date. Unlike the United States in

the nineteenth century (and this source has been much exaggerated) there

are very few Peruvians who have risen primarily through business activi?

ties. As mentioned above, entrepreneurs in Peru have been overwhelm?

ingly of foreign extraction.

Education thus has to bear an especially heavy burden of responsi?

bility for the ambition that it creates?or aggravates?and then frustrates, either because of its own poor quality or nonfunctional nature, or because

of the many obstacles over which it has little control that society places in the path of those attempting to rise by merit.

This radicalizing effect of higher education may, in part, account for

the decision of the Peruvian government to reopen or establish universities in provincial towns instead of merely adding more in Lima. The expecta? tion may have been that such unsophisticated locales would restrain radi-




calization, or that it could be more easily contained there. The accessibility of the national government to intimidation by student unrest would also be

reduced. Only the latter goal could be said to have been partially ac?

complished. From the start in the late 1950s, the program of establishing additional provincial universities has been plagued with staffing problems. Most educated Peruvians want to move to, or stay in, Lima. Only those

lacking either influential connections or talent, or those imbued with con?

siderable idealism (often revolutionary), would have to, or care to, teach

outside of Lima. The relative elevation in status is insufficient compensa? tion for the distance from the glamour, comfort, and centralized political

power in the capital. As a consequence, students at provincial universities

tend to be exposed to more radical faculty influence than in Lima.

This radicalization of the university-educated person tends, however, to be a transitory phenomenon for the individual, even if it increases for

the country as a whole due to the larger proportion in school. The radicali?

zation of the university student is a feature of the middle years of his

studies and tends to disappear, except perhaps in private conversation, as

he comes to terms with the pressures of a career. In other words, the uni? versities are not radicalizing the entire population of adult university gradu? ates, but rather exposing students to a period of maximum ideological stimulation with freedom from outside countervailing pressures. There is, as Theisenhusen notes, "an unseemly willingness of the liberal-minded uni?

versity-trained in Latin America to be co-opted by the establishment." 33

Primary and secondary education in Peru remain highly class- stratified and hence reinforce the current class structure, except at the bottom. (Rural primary schools are the basic means by which Indians can

aspire to becoming cholos.) At both levels the government-run schools

(with a few exceptions in Lima) are for the lower class. Middle- and

upper-class children attend private schools. All primary and secondary students wear official uniforms, which differ by school and hence bear

explicit class stigma. One crucial difference within the private school sector is the national as opposed to the foreign-oriented schools. Many of the latter affect foreign names in order to appear more attractive when, in

fact, some can not offer any more than the national schools.34

The Military and the Church

There are two other major institutions that also offer increasing opportunities for lower-class mobility: the armed forces and the Church.

33 William C. Thiesenhusen, "How Big is the Brain Drain?" (Madison: Land Tenure Center Paper No. 29, University of Wisconsin, January, 1967), pp. 20-22.

34 This deprecation of whatever is national extends even to one class of prosti? tutes in Callao, Lima's port, who assert that they will accept only foreign sailors as customers.




The former has its internal stratification system, with the navy being the

most elite, followed closely by the air force and then the army. The

Guardia Civil apparently suffers a much lower status, drawing its officer

corps from the cholo class, while the army officers are largely mestizo and

the navy and air force largely white and upper middle-class. One could

interpret these differences both as a matter of the differential pressure for practical performance (the navy is largely decorative while the

Guardia Civil?as a sort of "state police" in the U.S. sense?is constantly active), or attempt to explain them in terms of different foreign cultures

of orientation. The air force and navy are largely U.S.-trained, while the

army, until 1939, was French-trained. In any case, the army and Guardia

Civil do offer the possibility for career mobility to thousands of lower-class

males?much more so than the civilian government services.

Such "social democracy" has no necessary tie to a preference for

parliamentary democracy. In fact, the military ethos of discipline and

disdain for "politicians" leads, at best, to a technocratic professionalism at the higher levels, while at the lower ranks it serves to so alienate the

Indian recruit from his people that he will willingly kill them if necessary. The army's system of training and assignments effectively turns Indians into cholos who tend to despise "their people."

The Catholic clergy also offers an increasing opportunity for lower-

class mobility due to the decline in the attractiveness of this profession for the middle and upper class. Today, although the highest positions in

the Peruvian hierarchy are still held largely by upper-class priests (with Peruvian congressional and presidential approval), this group has few

successors among the coming generation. The clergy, in general, has

shrunk in numbers due to the decline in recruits, and it has also "dark? ened" as it declined?that is, a larger proportion of the declining numbers of entrants are lower-class in origin. It is a moot question, pending a sys? tematic study, as to whether the lower social origins of the coming genera? tion of priests will further accelerate the decline in the clergy's prestige. The personal behavior of many provincial priests is as much to blame as their class visibility: the keeping of mistresses, the siring of illegitimate children, drunkenness, and abuse of Church lands and funds for personal benefit are allegedly common. There is also a growing proportion of

foreign priests in Peru, some as temporary missionaries, others as mem? bers of the national hierarchy. This could conceivably have a renovating effect on the Church. The proportion of foreign priests in Peru (9.4 per cent) is, however, one of the lowest in Latin America.35

35 Isidoro Alonso et al, La iglesia en el Peru y Bolivia, Estudios Socio-Religiosos Latino-Americanos (Madrid: Federaci6n Internacional de los Institutos Catdlicos de Investigaciones Sociales y Socio-ReHgiosas [FERES], 1962).




Conclusion and Further Speculation

In concluding this discussion of patterns of social mobility in Peru, it should be reiterated that more solid evidence is needed for most of the

foregoing assertions. While all are based on field observations, few are buttressed by systematic empirical investigations. There is, however, some concrete evidence that the distribution of wealth and of income is

becoming even more unequal than it was some fifty years ago. The crucial

exception to this is a small elite segment of urban manufacturing workers whose income has risen relatively as well as absolutely since 1940.

In terms of economic development, the small but strategic flow of

foreign migrants to Peru could be said to have the following alternative

consequences: (1) a replacement for Peruvians lost through the brain

drain; (2) an obstacle to upward mobility within Peru; (3) dynamic entrepreneurship in the form of creating their own?as well as other?

positions for Peruvians, rather than blocking internal mobility. (Peruvian writers tend to view foreigners at least as an obstacle if not as outright exploiters of national resources and manpower.) The major obstacle to the entrepreneurship role is the high degree of acceptance of "elite

strangers" by Peru's established elite. Such absorption tends to dilute the

dynamic function of at least the next generation. Overall, it seems probable that, in spite of Peru's low level of eco?

nomic development and supposedly rigid social structure, there may be a rather high level of social mobility down as well as up. The significant size of the educational system, the military, and the Church provide various channels of upward mobility, while inheritance practices, inflation, high upper-class fertility, and other factors foster a high rate of downward

mobility. It is hoped that this discussion also contributes toward a model, or

at least models, of the transitional stage as not merely derivable from a traditional and modern era. At the present level of abstraction, we would have to include such factors as: (1) whether a country had ever been a

colony, and if so, whether freed before or after its first industrial revolu? tion; (2) its economic structure; (3) whether a revolutionary, traditional? ist, or "reform-mongering" regime was in power.

Some of the general features of the current transitional stage seem to be: (1) the "advantage" of a late start?which, depending on one's evaluation, might include a relatively wide franchise and very ample (but selectively enforced) labor and welfare legislation; (2) urbanization and population growth ahead of local industrialization; and (3) multiple occupation holding.

In terms of revolutionary potential, Peru's most subjectively deprived category consists of its nationally educated university students. They are




the major exception to the peculiarly de-radicalizing effect urbanization

has had on Peru's class conflict. This phenomenon illustrates the central

point that Peru is far more urbanized than industrialized, since its level

of urbanization is based on foreign trade rather than domestic industrial

development or an adequate internal hinterland.

At present the most promising mass base for the student middle-

class revolutionary leadership is the landless peasantry. The acceptance

by this leadership of the petit bourgeois type of land reform program

popular in Latin America as a necessary intervening stage threatens to

deprive them of the continued support of the small number of peasants

they have been able to attract.

At this over-urbanized stage, the potential protest of the industrial

proletariat has been "bought off" or deflected. However, the relatively

high wages and fringe benefits required for this situation have already raised the prices of Peru's manufactured goods so far above the level of

comparable imports that a productivity showdown has only been post?

poned. Some future government will have to reorganize Peru's industrial

system with a resultant labor reaction that could be exploited by either a

rightist or a leftist party.



peruvian social mobility: revolutionary and developmental potential

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