pdaf and dap cases 2014, 2015

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    G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013



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    G.R. No. 20893



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    G.R. No. 209251

    (EDRITO !. NE(O!UCENO, ormer !$orBo$4, !$r%&:e ormer (rov%4$; Bo$r&!ember (rov%4e o< !$r%&:e,Petitioner,vs.(RESIDENT BENIGNO SI!EON C. A'UINO III= $%& SECRETAR+ LORENCIO BUTC) ABAD,


    D E C I S I O N


    "Experience is the oracle of truth."

    -!aes #adison

    $efore the Court are consolidated petitions%ta&en under Rule '( of the Rules of Court, all of )hichassail the constitutionalit* of the Por& $arrel S*ste. Due to the coplexit* of the su+ect atter, the

    Court shall heretofore discuss the s*stes conceptual underpinnins +efore detailin the particularsof the constitutional challene.

    /he 0acts

    I. Por& $arrel1 2eneral Concept.

    "Por& $arrel" is political parlance of 3erican -Enlish oriin.45istoricall*, its usae a* +etraced to the deradin ritual of rollin out a +arrel stuffed )ith por& to a ultitude of +lac&

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    slaves )ho )ould cast their faished +odies into the porcine feast to assuae their huner)ith orsels coin fro the enerosit* of their )ell-fed aster.6/his practice )as latercopared to the actions of 3erican leislators in tr*in to direct federal +udets in favor oftheir districts.(7hile the advent of refrieration has ade the actual por& +arrel o+solete, itpersists in reference to political +ills that "+rin hoe the +acon" to a leislators district andconstituents.'In a ore technical sense, "Por& $arrel" refers to an appropriation of

    overnent spendin eant for locali8ed proects and secured solel* or priaril* to +rinone* to a representative9s district.:Soe scholars on the su+ect further use it to refer toleislative control of local appropriations.;

    In the Philippines, "Por& $arrel" has +een coonl* referred to as lup-su, discretionar*funds of #e+ers of the

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    7hile the previous" Conressional Por& $arrel" )as apparentl* discontinued in =:%after #artial 233? calledthe" Support for

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    In ==6,4@==(,4and ==',4%the 233s contained the sae provisions on proectidentification and fund release as found in the ==4 CD0 3rticle. In addition, ho)ever,the Departent of $udet and #anaeent >D$#? )as directed to su+it reports tothe Senate Coittee on 0inance and the 5ouse Coittee on 3ppropriations onthe releases ade fro the funds.44

    Bnder the ==:46CD0 3rticle, #e+ers of Conress and the ice-President, inconsultation )ith the ipleentin aenc* concerned, )ere directed to su+it to theD$# the list of (@ of proects to +e funded fro their respective CD0 allocations)hich shall +e dul* endorsed +* >a? the Senate President and the Chairan of theCoittee on 0inance, in the case of the Senate, and >+? the Spea&er of the 5ouseof Representatives and the Chairan of the Coittee on 3ppropriations, in thecase of the 5ouse of RepresentativesF )hile the list for the reainin (@ )as to +esu+itted )ithin six >'? onths thereafter. /he sae article also stated that theproect list, )hich )ould +e pu+lished +* the D$#,4("shall +e the +asis for the releaseof funds" and that "no funds appropriated herein shall +e dis+ursed for proects notincluded in the list herein reuired."

    /he follo)in *ear, or in ==;,


    the foreoin provisions reardin the reuired listsand endorseents )ere reproduced, except that the pu+lication of the proect list)as no loner reuired as the list itself sufficed for the release of CD0 0unds.

    /he CD0 )as not, ho)ever, the lone for of "Conressional Por& $arrel" at thattie. Other fors of "Conressional Por& $arrel" )ere reportedl* fashioned andinserted into the 233 >called "Conressional Insertions" or "CIs"? in order toperpetuate the ad inistrations political aenda. 4:It has +een articulated that sinceCIs "fored part and parcel of the +udets of executive departents, the* )ere noteasil* identifia+le and )ere thus harder to onitor." Nonetheless, the la)a&erstheselves as )ell as the finance and +udet officials of the ipleentin aencies,as )ell as the D$#, purportedl* &ne) a+out the insertions.4;Exaples of these CIsare the Departent of Education >DepEd? School $uildin 0und, the Conressional

    Initiative 3llocations, the Pu+lic 7or&s 0und, the El NiGo 0und, and the Povert*3lleviation 0und.4=/he allocations for the School $uildin 0und, particularl*, Hshall+e ade upon prior consultation )ith the representative of the leislative districtconcerned.6@Siilarl*, the leislators had the po)er to direct ho), )here and )henthese appropriations )ere to +e spent. 6

    E. !oseph Eercito Estrada >Estrada? 3dinistration >==;-%@@?.

    In ===,6%the CD0 )as reoved in the 233 and replaced +* three >4? separatefors of CIs, nael*, the "0ood Securit* Prora 0und,"64the "

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    personnel +enefits.6:/he succeedin PD30 provisions reained the sae in vie) ofthe re-enactent6;of the %@@@ 233 for the *ear %@@.

    0. 2loria #acapaal-3rro*o >3rro*o? 3dinistration >%@@-%@@?.

    /he %@@%6=PD30 3rticle )as +rief and straihtfor)ard as it erel* contained a sinle

    special provision orderin the release of the funds directl* to the ipleentinaenc* or local overnent unit concerned, )ithout further ualifications. /hefollo)in *ear, %@@4,(@the sae sinle provision )as present, )ith sipl* anexpansion of purpose and express authorit* to realin. Nevertheless, the provisionsin the %@@4 +udets of the Departent of Pu+lic 7or&s and 5ih)a*s(>DP75? andthe DepEd(%reuired prior consultation )ith #e+ers of Conress on the aspects ofipleentation deleation and proect list su+ission, respectivel*. In %@@6, the%@@4 233 )as re-enacted.(4

    In %@@(,(6the PD30 3rticle provided that the PD30 shall +e used "to fund priorit*proras and proects under the ten point aenda of the national overnent andshall +e released directl* to the ipleentin aencies." It also introduced the

    prora enu concept,((

    )hich is essentiall* a list of eneral proras andipleentin aencies fro )hich a particular PD30 proect a* +e su+seuentl*chosen +* the identif*in authorit*. /he %@@( 233 )as re-enacted('in %@@' andhence, operated on the sae +ases. In siilar reard, the prora enu concept)as consistentl* interated into the %@@:,(:%@@;,(;%@@=,(=and %@@'@233s.

    /extuall*, the PD30 3rticles fro %@@% to %@@ )ere silent )ith respect to the specificaounts allocated for the individual leislators, as )ell as their participation in theproposal and identification of PD30 proects to +e funded. In contrast to the PD30

    3rticles, ho)ever, the provisions under the DepEd School $uildin Prora and theDP75 +udet, siilar to its predecessors, explicitl* reuired prior consultation )iththe concerned #e+er of Conress'anent certain aspects of proect ipleentation.

    Sinificantl*, it )as durin this era that provisions )hich allo)ed foral participationof non-overnental orani8ations >N2O? in the ipleentation of overnentproects )ere introduced. In the Suppleental $udet for %@@', )ith respect to theappropriation for school +uildins, N2Os )ere, +* la), encouraed to participate. 0orsuch purpose, the la) stated that "the aount of at least P%(@ #illion of the P(@@#illion allotted for the construction and copletion of school +uildins shall +e adeavaila+le to N2Os includin the 0ederation of 0ilipino-Chinese Cha+ers ofCoerce and Industr*, Inc. for its "Operation $arrio School" prora, )ithcapa+ilit* and proven trac& records in the construction of pu+lic school +uildins x xx."'%/he sae allocation )as ade availa+le to N2Os in the %@@: and %@@= 233sunder the DepEd $udet.'43lso, it )as in %@@: that the 2overnent ProcureentPolic* $oard'6>2PP$? issued Resolution No. %-%@@: dated !une %=, %@@: >2PP$

    Resolution %-%@@:?, aendin the ipleentin rules and reulations'(

    of R3=;6,''the 2overnent Procureent Refor 3ct, to include, as a for of neotiatedprocureent,':the procedure )here+* the Procurin Entit*';>the ipleentinaenc*? a* enter into a eorandu of areeent )ith an N2O, provided that"an appropriation la) or ordinance earar&s an aount to +e specificall* contractedout to N2Os."'=

    2. Present 3dinistration >%@@-Present?.

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    Differin fro previous PD30 3rticles +ut siilar to the CD0 3rticles, the %@:@PD303rticle included an express stateent on lup-su aounts allocated for individualleislators and the ice-President1 Representatives )ere iven P:@ #illion each,+ro&en do)n into P6@ #illion for "hard proects" and P4@ #illion for "soft proects"F)hile P%@@ #illion )as iven to each Senator as )ell as the ice-President, )itha P@@ #illion allocation each for "hard" and "soft proects." +?allotent released has not *et +een o+liated for the oriinal scope of )or&, and >c?the reuest for realinent is )ith the concurrence of the leislator concerned.:

    In the %@%:%and %@4:4PD30 3rticles, it is stated that the "identification of proectsandJor desination of +eneficiaries shall confor to the priorit* list, standard ordesin prepared +* each ipleentin aenc* >priorit* list reuireent? x x x."5o)ever, as practiced, it )ould still +e the individual leislator )ho )ould chooseand identif* the proect fro the said priorit* list.:6

    Provisions on leislator allocations:(as )ell as fund realinent:')ere included inthe %@% and %@4 PD30 3rticlesF +ut the allocation for the ice-President, )hich)as peed at P%@@ #illion in the %@ 233, had +een deleted. In addition, the %@4PD30 3rticle no) allo)ed #arcos?

    on #arch %%, =:'. In enactin the said la), #arcos reconi8ed the need to set up a specialfund to help intensif*, strenthen, and consolidate overnent efforts relatin to theexploration, exploitation, and developent of indienous ener* resources vital to econoicro)th.;%Due to the ener*-related activities of the overnent in the #alapa*a naturalas field in Pala)an, or the "#alapa*a Deep 7ater 2as-to-Po)er Proect",;4the specialfund created under PD =@ has +een currentl* la+eled as #alapa*a 0unds.

    On the other hand the Presidential Social 0und )as created under Section %, /itle I;6of PD;'=,;(or the Charter of the Philippine 3useent and 2ain Corporation >P32COR?. PD

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    ;'= )as siilarl* issued +* #arcos on !ul* , =;4. #ore than t)o >%? *ears after, heaended PD ;'= and accordinl* issued PD ==4 on Octo+er 4, =;(,;'aendinSection %;:of the forer la). 3s it stands, the Presidential Social 0und has +een descri+edas a special fundin facilit* anaed and adinistered +* the Presidential #anaeentStaff throuh )hich the President provides direct assistance to priorit* proras and proectsnot funded under the reular +udet. It is sourced fro the share of the overnent in the

    areate ross earnins of P32COR.;;

    I. Controversies in the Philippines.

    Over the decades, "por&" funds in the Philippines have increased treendousl*,;=o)in in nosall part to previous Presidents )ho reportedl* used the "Por& $arrel" in order to ainconressional support.=@It )as in ==' )hen the first controvers* surroundin the "Por&$arrel" erupted. 0orer #ari&ina Cit* Representative Roeo Canda8o >Canda8o?, then ananon*ous source, "+le) the lid on the hue sus of overnent one* that reularl* )entinto the poc&ets of leislators in the for of &ic&+ac&s."=5e said that "the &ic&+ac&s )ereSOP >standard operatin procedure? aon leislators and raned fro a lo) = percent toa hih (% percent of the cost of each proect, )hich could +e an*thin fro dredin, rip

    rappin, sphaltin, concretin, and construction of school +uildins."


    "Other sources of&ic&+ac&s that Canda8o identified )ere pu+lic funds intended for edicines and text+oo&s. 3fe) da*s later, the tale of the one* trail +ecae the +anner stor* of the Philippine Dail*Inuirer issue of 3uust 4, ==', accopanied +* an illustration of a roasted pi."=4"/hepu+lication of the stories, includin those a+out conressional initiative allocations of certainla)a&ers, includin P4.' $illion for a Conressan, spar&ed pu+lic outrae."=6

    /hereafter, or in %@@6, several concerned citi8ens souht the nullification of the PD30 asenacted in the %@@6 233 for +ein unconstitutional. Bnfortunatel*, for lac& of "an* pertinentevidentiar* support that illeal isuse of PD30 in the for of &ic&+ac&s has +ecoe acoon exercise of unscrupulous #e+ers of Conress," the petition )as disissed. =(

    Recentl*, or in !ul* of the present *ear, the National $ureau of Investiation >N$I? +ean its

    pro+e into alleations that "the overnent has +een defrauded of soe P@ $illion over thepast @ *ears +* a s*ndicate usin funds fro the por& +arrel of la)a&ers and variousovernent aencies for scores of host proects."='/he investiation )as spa)ned +*s)orn affidavits of six >'? )histle-+lo)ers )ho declared that !(? la)a&ers for Plunder, and three >4? other la)a&ers for#alversation, Direct $ri+er*, and iolation of the 3nti-2raft and Corrupt Practices 3ct. 3lsorecoended to +e chared in the coplaints are soe of the la)a&ers chiefs -of-staff or

    representatives, the heads and other officials of three >4? ipleentin aencies, and theseveral presidents of the N2Os set up +* Napoles.=;

    On 3uust ', %@4, the Coission on 3udit >Co3? released the results of a three-*earaudit investiation==coverin the use of leislators9 PD30 fro %@@: to %@@=, or durin thelast three >4? *ears of the 3rro*o adinistration. /he purpose of the audit )as to deterinethe propriet* of releases of funds under PD30 and the arious Infrastructures includin I

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    controlled corporations >2OCCs?.@/he total releases covered +* the audit aountedto P;.4:6 $illion in PD30 and P4%.''6 $illion in ICo3 Chairperson?, the Co3 is, as of this )ritin, in theprocess of preparin "one consolidated report" on the #alapa*a 0unds.@(

    . /he Procedural 3ntecedents.

    Spurred in lare part +* the findins contained in the Co3 Report and the Napolescontrovers*, several petitions )ere loded +efore the Court siilarl* see&in that the "Por&

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    $arrel S*ste" +e declared unconstitutional. /o recount, the relevant procedural antecedentsin these cases are as follo)s1

    On 3uust %;, %@4, petitioner Sason S. 3lcantara >3lcantara?, President of the Social !usticeSociet*, filed a Petition for Prohi+ition of even date under Rule '( of the Rules of Court >3lcantaraPetition?, see&in that the "Por& $arrel S*ste" +e declared unconstitutional, and a )rit of prohi+ition

    +e issued peranentl* restrainin respondents 0ran&lin #. Drilon and 0eliciano S. $elonte, !r., intheir respective capacities as the incu+ent Senate President and Spea&er of the 5ouse ofRepresentatives, fro further ta&in an* steps to enact leislation appropriatin funds for the "Por&$arrel S*ste," in )hatever for and +* )hatever nae it a* +e called, and fro approvin furtherreleases pursuant thereto.@'/he 3lcantara Petition )as doc&eted as 2.R. No. %@;6=4.

    On Septe+er 4, %@4, petitioners 2reco 3ntonious $eda $. $elica, !ose $elica, et al.?, and !ose #. illeas, !r. >illeas? filed anBrent Petition 0or Certiorari and Prohi+ition 7ith Pra*er 0or /he Iediate Issuance of /eporar*Restrainin Order >/RO? andJor 7rit of Preliinar* Inunction dated 3uust %:, %@4 under Rule '(of the Rules of Court >$elica Petition?, see&in that the annual "Por& $arrel S*ste," presentl*e+odied in the provisions of the 233 of %@4 )hich provided for the %@4 PD30, and the

    Executives lup-su, discretionar* funds, such as the #alapa*a 0unds and the PresidentialSocial 0und,@:+e declared unconstitutional and null and void for +ein acts constitutin rave a+useof discretion. 3lso, the* pra* that the Court issue a /RO aainst respondents Pauito N. Ochoa, !r.,0lorencio $. 3+ad >Secretar* 3+ad? and Rosalia . De D$#?,and National /reasurer, or their aents, for the to iediatel* cease an* expenditure under theaforesaid funds. 0urther, the* pra* that the Court order the foreoin respondents to release to theCo3 and to the pu+lic1 >a? "the coplete scheduleJlist of leislators )ho have availed of their PD30and I

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    proects of the overnent under the sae provisionF and >d? settin the consolidated cases forOral 3ruents on Octo+er ;, %@4.

    On Septe+er %4, %@4, the Office of the Solicitor 2eneral >OS2? filed a Consolidated Coent>Coent? of even date +efore the Court, see&in the liftin, or in the alternative, the partial liftin)ith respect to educational and edical assistance purposes, of the Courts Septe+er @, %@4

    /RO, and that the consolidated petitions +e disissed for lac& of erit. 4

    On Septe+er %6, %@4, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directin petitioners to repl* tothe Coent.

    Petitioners, )ith the exception of Nepouceno, filed their respective replies to the Coent1 >a? onSepte+er 4@, %@4, illeas filed a separate Repl* dated Septe+er %:, %@4 >illeas Repl*?F >+?on Octo+er , %@4, $elica, et al. filed a Repl* dated Septe+er 4@, %@4 >$elica Repl*?F and >c?on Octo+er %, %@4, 3lcantara filed a Repl* dated Octo+er , %@4.

    On Octo+er , %@4, the Court issued an 3dvisor* providin for the uidelines to +e o+served +* theparties for the Oral 3ruents scheduled on Octo+er ;, %@4. In vie) of the technicalit* of the

    issues aterial to the present cases, incu+ent Solicitor 2eneral 0rancis 5. !ardele8a >Solicitor2eneral? )as directed to +rin )ith hi durin the Oral 3ruents representativeJs fro the D$#and Conress )ho )ould +e a+le to copetentl* and copletel* ans)er uestions related to,aon others, the +udetin process and its ipleentation. 0urther, the Co3 Chairperson )asappointed as aicus curiae and there+* reuested to appear +efore the Court durin the Oral


    On Octo+er ; and @, %@4, the Oral 3ruents )ere conducted. /hereafter, the Court directed theparties to su+it their respective eoranda )ithin a period of seven >:? da*s, or until Octo+er :,%@4, )hich the parties su+seuentl* did.

    /he Issues $efore the Court

    $ased on the pleadins, and as refined durin the Oral 3ruents, the follo)in are the ain issuesfor the Courts resolution1

    I. Procedural Issues.

    7hether or not >a? the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and usticia+lecontrovers*F >+? the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are atters of polic* not su+ect to

    udicial revie)F >c? petitioners have leal standin to sueF and >d? the Courts Decision dated 3uust=, ==6 in 2.R. Nos. 4@(, 4:6, 4:'', and 4;;;, entitled "Philippine Constitution

    3ssociation v. Enriue8"6>Philconsa? and Decision dated 3pril %6, %@% in 2.R. No. '6=;:, entitled"

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    III. Su+stantive Issues on the "Presidential Por& $arrel."

    7hether or not the phrases >a? "and for such other purposes as a* +e hereafter directed +* thePresident" under Section ; of PD =@, 'relatin to the #alapa*a 0unds, and >+? "to finance thepriorit* infrastructure developent proects and to finance the restoration of daaed or destro*edfacilities due to calaities, as a* +e directed and authori8ed +* the Office of the President of the

    Philippines" under Section % of PD ;'=, as aended +* PD ==4, relatin to the PresidentialSocial 0und, are unconstitutional insofar as the* constitute undue deleations of leislative po)er.

    /hese ain issues shall +e resolved in the order that the* have +een stated. In addition, the Courtshall also tac&le certain ancillar* issues as propted +* the present cases.

    /he Courts Rulin

    /he petitions are partl* ranted.

    I. Procedural Issues.

    /he prevailin rule in constitutional litiation is that no uestion involvin the constitutionalit* orvalidit* of a la) or overnental act a* +e heard and decided +* the Court unless there iscopliance )ith the leal reuisites for udicial inuir*,:nael*1 >a? there ust +e an actual case orcontrovers* callin for the exercise of udicial po)erF >+? the person challenin the act ust havethe standin to uestion the validit* of the su+ect act or issuanceF >c? the uestion of constitutionalit*ust +e raised at the earliest opportunit* F and >d? the issue of constitutionalit* ust +e the ver* lisota of the case.;Of these reuisites, case la) states that the first t)o are the ostiportant=and, therefore, shall +e discussed forth)ith.

    3. Existence of an 3ctual Case or Controvers*.

    $* constitutional fiat, udicial po)er operates onl* )hen there is an actual case or controvers*.%@/his

    is e+odied in Section , 3rticle III of the =;: Constitution )hich pertinentl* states that "udicialpo)er includes the dut* of the courts of ustice to settle actual controversies involvin rihts )hichare leall* deanda+le and enforcea+le x x x." !urisprudence provides that an actual case orcontrovers* is one )hich "involves a conflict of leal rihts, an assertion of opposite leal clais,suscepti+le of udicial resolution as distinuished fro a h*pothetical or a+stract difference ordispute.%In other )ords, "there ust +e a contrariet* of leal rihts that can +e interpreted andenforced on the +asis of existin la) and urisprudence."%%Related to the reuireent of an actualcase or controvers* is the reuireent of "ripeness," eanin that the uestions raised forconstitutional scrutin* are alread* ripe for adudication. "3 uestion is ripe for adudication )hen theact +ein challened has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenin it. It is aprereuisite that soethin had then +een accoplished or perfored +* either +ranch +efore acourt a* coe into the picture, and the petitioner ust allee the existence of an iediate orthreatened inur* to itself as a result of the challened action."%4"7ithal, courts )ill decline to pass

    upon constitutional issues throuh advisor* opinions, +ereft as the* are of authorit* to resolveh*pothetical or oot uestions."%6

    $ased on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and usticia+le controvers* inthese cases.

    /he reuireent of contrariet* of leal rihts is clearl* satisfied +* the antaonistic positions of theparties on the constitutionalit* of the "Por& $arrel S*ste." 3lso, the uestions in these consolidated

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    cases are ripe for adudication since the challened funds and the provisions allo)in for theirutili8ation A such as the %@4 233 for the PD30, PD =@ for the #alapa*a 0unds and PD ;'=, asaended +* PD ==4, for the Presidential Social 0und A are currentl* existin and operationalFhence, there exists an iediate or threatened inur* to petitioners as a result of the unconstitutionaluse of these pu+lic funds.

    3s for the PD30, the Court ust dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had +een renderedoot and acadeic +* the refors underta&en +* respondents. 3 case +ecoes oot )hen there isno ore actual controvers* +et)een the parties or no useful purpose can +e served in passin uponthe erits.%(Differin fro this description, the Court o+serves that respondents proposed line-ite+udetin schee )ould not terinate the controvers* nor diinish the useful purpose for itsresolution since said refor is eared to)ards the %@6 +udet, and not the %@4 PD30 3rticle)hich, +ein a distinct su+ect atter, reains leall* effective and existin. Neither )ill thePresidents declaration that he had alread* "a+olished the PD30" render the issues on PD30 ootprecisel* +ecause the Executive +ranch of overnent has no constitutional authorit* to nullif* orannul its leal existence. $* constitutional desin, the annulent or nullification of a la) a* +edone either +* Conress, throuh the passae of a repealin la), or +* the Court, throuh adeclaration of unconstitutionalit*. Instructive on this point is the follo)in exchane +et)een

    3ssociate !ustice 3ntonio /. Carpio >!ustice Carpio? and the Solicitor 2eneral durin the Oral3ruents1%'

    !ustice Carpio1 /he President has ta&en an oath to faithfull* execute the la),%:correct Solicitor2eneral !ardele8a1 es, our 5onor.

    !ustice Carpio1 3nd so the President cannot refuse to ipleent the 2eneral 3ppropriations 3ct,correct

    Solicitor 2eneral !ardele8a1 7ell, that is our ans)er, our 5onor. In the case, for exaple of thePD30, the President has a dut* to execute the la)s +ut in the face of the outrae over PD30, thePresident )as sa*in, "I a not sure that I )ill continue the release of the soft proects," and thatstarted, our 5onor. No), )hether or not that Q >interrupted?

    !ustice Carpio1 eah. I )ill rant the President if there are anoalies in the proect, he has the po)erto stop the releases in the eantie, to investiate, and that is Section 4; of Chapter ( of $oo& ' ofthe Revised 3dinistrative Code%;x x x. So at ost the President can suspend, no) if the President+elieves that the PD30 is unconstitutional, can he ust refuse to ipleent it

    Solicitor 2eneral !ardele8a1 No, our 5onor, as )e )ere tr*in to sa* in the specific case of thePD30 +ecause of the Co3 Report, +ecause of the reported irreularities and this Court can ta&e

    udicial notice, even outside, outside of the CO3 Report, *ou have the report of the )histle-+lo)ers,the President )as ust exercisin precisel* the dut* Q.

    x x x x

    !ustice Carpio1 es, and that is correct. ouve seen the Co3 Report, there are anoalies, *ou stopand investiate, and prosecute, he has done that. $ut, does that ean that PD30 has +eenrepealed

    Solicitor 2eneral !ardele8a1 No, our 5onor x x x.

    x x x x

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    !ustice Carpio1 So that PD30 can +e leall* a+olished onl* in t)o >%? cases. Conress passes a la)to repeal it, or this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct

    Solictor 2eneral !ardele8a1 es, our 5onor.

    !ustice Carpio1 /he President has no po)er to leall* a+olish PD30. >Ephases supplied?

    Even on the assuption of ootness, urisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the oot andacadeic principle is not a aical forula that can autoaticall* dissuade the Court in resolvin acase." /he Court )ill decide cases, other)ise oot, if1 first, there is a rave violation of theConstitutionF second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paraount pu+lic interest isinvolvedF third, )hen the constitutional issue raised reuires forulation of controllin principles touide the +ench, the +ar, and the pu+licF and fourth, the case is capa+le of repetition *et evadinrevie).%=

    /he applica+ilit* of the first exception is clear fro the fundaental posture of petitioners A the*essentiall* allee rave violations of the Constitution )ith respect to, inter alia, the principles ofseparation of po)ers, non-delea+ilit* of leislative po)er, chec&s and +alances, accounta+ilit* and

    local autono*.

    /he applica+ilit* of the second exception is also apparent fro the nature of the interests involved

    A the constitutionalit* of the ver* s*ste )ithin )hich sinificant aounts of pu+lic funds have +eenand continue to +e utili8ed and expended undou+tedl* presents a situation of exceptional characteras )ell as a atter of paraount pu+lic interest. /he present petitions, in fact, have +een loded at atie )hen the s*stes fla)s have never +efore +een anified. /o the Courts ind, thecoalescence of the Co3 Report, the accounts of nuerous )histle-+lo)ers, and the overnentso)n reconition that refors are needed "to address the reported a+uses of thePD30"4@deonstrates a pria facie pattern of a+use )hich onl* underscores the iportance of theatter. It is also +* this findin that the Court finds petitioners clais as not erel* theori8ed,

    speculative or h*pothetical. Of note is the )eiht accorded +* the Court to the findins ade +* theCo3 )hich is the constitutionall*-andated audit ar of the overnent. In Delos Santos v. Co3,4arecent case )herein the Court upheld the Co3s disallo)ance of irreularl* dis+ursed PD30 funds, it)as ephasi8ed that1

    /he CO3 is endo)ed )ith enouh latitude to deterine, prevent, and disallo) irreular,unnecessar*, excessive, extravaant or unconsciona+le expenditures of overnent funds. It istas&ed to +e viilant and conscientious in safeuardin the proper use of the overnent9s, andultiatel* the people9s, propert*. /he exercise of its eneral audit po)er is aon the constitutionalechaniss that ives life to the chec& and +alance s*ste inherent in our for of overnent.

    It is the eneral polic* of the Court to sustain the decisions of adinistrative authorities, especiall*one )hich is constitutionall*-created, such as the Co3, not onl* on the +asis of the doctrine of

    separation of po)ers +ut also for their presued expertise in the la)s the* are entrusted to enforce.0indins of adinistrative aencies are accorded not onl* respect +ut also finalit* )hen the decisionand order are not tainted )ith unfairness or ar+itrariness that )ould aount to rave a+use ofdiscretion. It is onl* )hen the Co3 has acted )ithout or in excess of urisdiction, or )ith rave a+useof discretion aountin to lac& or excess of urisdiction, that this Court entertains a petitionuestionin its rulins. x x x. >Ephases supplied?

    /hus, if onl* for the purpose of validatin the existence of an actual and usticia+le controvers* inthese cases, the Court dees the findins under the Co3 Report to +e sufficient.

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    /he Court also finds the third exception to +e applica+le larel* due to the practical need for adefinitive rulin on the s*stes constitutionalit*. 3s disclosed durin the Oral 3ruents, the Co3Chairperson estiates that thousands of notices of disallo)ances )ill +e issued +* her office inconnection )ith the findins ade in the Co3 Report. In this relation, 3ssociate !ustice #arvic #arioictor 0. !ustice

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    of discretion aountin to lac& or excess of urisdiction on the part of an* +ranch or instruentalit*of the 2overnent." In Estrada v. Desierto,6%the expanded concept of udicial po)er under the =;:Constitution and its effect on the political uestion doctrine )as explained as follo)s164

    /o a reat deree, the =;: Constitution has narro)ed the reach of the political uestion doctrine)hen it expanded the po)er of udicial revie) of this court not onl* to settle actual controversies

    involvin rihts )hich are leall* deanda+le and enforcea+le +ut also to deterine )hether or notthere has +een a rave a+use of discretion aountin to lac& or excess of urisdiction on the part ofan* +ranch or instruentalit* of overnent. 5eretofore, the udiciar* has focused on the "thou shaltnot9s" of the Constitution directed aainst the exercise of its urisdiction. 7ith the ne) provision,ho)ever, courts are iven a reater preroative to deterine )hat it can do to prevent rave a+useof discretion aountin to lac& or excess of urisdiction on the part of an* +ranch or instruentalit*of overnent. Clearl*, the ne) provision did not ust rant the Court po)er of doin nothin. x x x>Ephases supplied?

    It ust also +e +orne in ind that H )hen the udiciar* ediates to allocate constitutional+oundaries, it does not assert an* superiorit* over the other departentsF does not in realit* nullif*or invalidate an act of the leislature or the executive, +ut onl* asserts the solen and sacred

    o+liation assined to it +* the Constitution."


    /o a reat extent, the Court is lauda+l* coni8ant ofthe refors underta&en +* its co-eual +ranches of overnent. $ut it is +* constitutional force thatthe Court ust faithfull* perfor its dut*. Bltiatel*, it is the Courts avo)ed intention that aresolution of these cases )ould not arrest or in an* anner ipede the endeavors of the t)o other+ranches +ut, in fact, help ensure that the pillars of chane are erected on fir constitutionalrounds. 3fter all, it is in the +est interest of the people that each reat +ranch of overnent, )ithinits o)n sphere, contri+utes its share to)ards achievin a holistic and enuine solution to thepro+les of societ*. 0or all these reasons, the Court cannot heed respondents plea for udicialrestraint.


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    illeal expenditure of pu+lic funds is the ortal )ound inflicted upon the fundaental la) +* theenforceent of an invalid statute.(@3ll told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instantcases.

    D. Res !udicata and Stare Decisis.

    Res udicata >)hich eans a "atter aduded"? and stare decisis non uieta et overe >or sipl*,stare decisis )hich eans "follo) past precedents and do not distur+ )hat has +een settled"? areeneral procedural la) principles )hich +oth deal )ith the effects of previous +ut factuall* siilardispositions to su+seuent cases. 0or the cases at +ar, the Court exaines the applica+ilit* of theseprinciples in relation to its prior rulins in Philconsa and a? the inter-

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    relation +et)een the CD0 and PD30 3rticles )ith each other, forative as the* are of the entire"Por& $arrel S*ste" as )ell as >+? the intra-relation of post-enactent easures contained )ithin aparticular CD0 or PD30 3rticle, includin not onl* those related to the area of proect identification+ut also to the areas of fund release and realinent. /he coplexit* of the issues and the +roaderleal anal*ses herein )arranted a* +e, therefore, considered as a po)erful countervailin reasonaainst a )holesale application of the stare decisis principle.

    In addition, the Court o+serves that the Philconsa rulin )as actuall* riddled )ith inherentconstitutional inconsistencies )hich siilarl* countervail aainst a full resort to stare decisis. 3s a*+e deduced fro the ain conclusions of the case, Philconsas fundaental preise in allo)in#e+ers of Conress to propose and identif* of proects )ould +e that the said identificationauthorit* is +ut an aspect of the po)er of appropriation )hich has +een constitutionall* loded inConress. 0ro this preise, the contradictions a* +e easil* seen. If the authorit* to identif*proects is an aspect of appropriation and the po)er of appropriation is a for of leislative po)erthere+* loded in Conress, then it follo)s that1 >a? it is Conress )hich should exercise suchauthorit*, and not its individual #e+ersF >+? such authorit* ust +e exercised )ithin the prescri+edprocedure of la) passae and, hence, should not +e exercised after the 233 has alread* +eenpassedF and >c? such authorit*, as e+odied in the 233, has the force of la) and, hence, cannot +eerel* recoendator*. !ustice itus Concurrin Opinion in the sae case sus up thePhilconsa uandar* in this )ise1 "Neither )ould it +e o+ectiona+le for Conress, +* la), toappropriate funds for such specific proects as it a* +e indedF to ive that authorit*, ho)ever, tothe individual e+ers of Conress in )hatever uise, I a afraid, )ould +e constitutionall*iperissi+le." 3s the Court no) larel* +enefits fro hindsiht and current findins on the atter,aon others, the Co3 Report, the Court ust partiall* a+andon its previous rulin in Philconsainsofar as it validated the post-enactent identification authorit* of #e+ers of Conress on theuise that the sae )as erel* recoendator*. /his postulate raises serious constitutionalinconsistencies )hich cannot +e sipl* excused on the round that such echanis is "iainativeas it is innovative." #oreover, it ust +e pointed out that the recent case of 3+a&ada 2uro Part* 3+a&ada? has effectivel* overturned Philconsas allo)ance of post-enactentleislator participation in vie) of the separation of po)ers principle. /hese constitutionalinconsistencies and the 3+a&ada rule )ill +e discussed in reater detail in the ensuin section of this


    3s for

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    intended to +enefit a definite constituenc* in a particular part of the countr* and to help the politicalcareers of the dis+ursin official +* *ieldin rich patronae +enefits.(:/he* further state that the Por&$arrel S*ste is coprised of t)o >%? &inds of discretionar* pu+lic funds1 first, the Conressional >oror Executive?Por& $arrel, specificall*, the #alapa*a 0unds under PD =@ and the Presidential Social 0undunder PD ;'=, as aended +* PD ==4.(=

    Considerin petitioners su+ission and in reference to its local concept and leal histor*, the Courtdefines the Por& $arrel S*ste as the collective +od* of rules and practices that overn the anner+* )hich lup-su, discretionar* funds, priaril* intended for local proects, are utili8ed throuh therespective participations of the %? &inds of lup-su discretionar* funds1

    0irst, there is the Conressional Por& $arrel )hich is herein defined as a &ind of lup-su,discretionar* fund )herein leislators, either individuall* or collectivel* orani8ed into coittees,are a+le to effectivel* control certain aspects of the funds utili8ation throuh various post-enactenteasures andJor practices. In particular, petitioners consider the PD30, as it appears under the %@4233, as Conressional Por& $arrel since it is, inter alia, a post-enactent easure that allo)s

    individual leislators to )ield a collective po)erF



    Second, there is the Presidential Por& $arrel )hich is herein defined as a &ind of lup-su,discretionar* fund )hich allo)s the President to deterine the anner of its utili8ation. 0or reasonsearlier stated,'the Court shall deliit the use of such ter to refer onl* to the #alapa*a 0undsand the Presidential Social 0und.

    7ith these definitions in ind, the Court shall no) proceed to discuss the su+stantive issues ofthese cases.

    $. Su+stantive Issues on the Conressional Por& $arrel.

    . Separation of Po)ers.

    a. Stateent of Principle.

    /he principle of separation of po)ers refers to the constitutional dearcation of the threefundaental po)ers of overnent. In the cele+rated )ords of !ustice

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    independence )ould result in the ina+ilit* of one +ranch of overnent to chec& the ar+itrar* or self-interest assertions of another or others.:@

    $roadl* spea&in, there is a violation of the separation of po)ers principle )hen one +ranch ofovernent undul* encroaches on the doain of another. BS Supree Court decisions instruct thatthe principle of separation of po)ers a* +e violated in t)o >%? )a*s1 firstl*, "one +ranch a*

    interfere iperissi+l* )ith the others perforance of its constitutionall* assined function"F:and"alternativel*, the doctrine a* +e violated )hen one +ranch assues a function that ore properl*is entrusted to another.":%In other )ords, there is a violation of the principle )hen there isiperissi+le >a? interference )ith andJor >+? assuption of another departents functions.

    /he enforceent of the national +udet, as priaril* contained in the 233, is indisputa+l* a function+oth constitutionall* assined and properl* entrusted to the Executive +ranch of overnent. In2uinona, !r. v. 5on. Caraue:4>2uinona, !r.?, the Court explained that the phase of +udetexecution "covers the various operational aspects of +udetin" and accordinl* includes "theevaluation of )or& and financial plans for individual activities," the "reulation and release of funds"as )ell as all "other related activities" that coprise the +udet execution c*cle.:6/his is rooted inthe principle that the allocation of po)er in the three principal +ranches of overnent is a rant of

    all po)ers inherent in the.


    /hus, unless the Constitution provides other)ise, the Executivedepartent should exclusivel* exercise all roles and preroatives )hich o into the ipleentationof the national +udet as provided under the 233 as )ell as an* other appropriation la).

    In vie) of the foreoin, the

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    >%? investiation and onitorin of the ipleentation of la)s pursuant to the po)er ofConress to conduct inuiries in aid of leislation.

    3n* action or step +e*ond that )ill underine the separation of po)ers uaranteed +* theConstitution. >Ephases supplied?

    +. 3pplication.

    In these cases, petitioners su+it that the Conressional Por& $arrel A aon others, the %@4PD30 3rticle A ")rec&s the assinent of responsi+ilities +et)een the political +ranches" as it isdesined to allo) individual leislators to interfere ")a* past the tie it should have ceased" or,particularl*, "after the 233 is passed.":=/he* state that the findins and recoendations in theCo3 Report provide "an illustration of ho) a+solute and definitive the po)er of leislators )ield overproect ipleentation in coplete violation of the constitutional principle of separation ofpo)ers.";@0urther, the* point out that the Court in the Philconsa case onl* allo)ed the CD0 to existon the condition that individual leislators liited their role to recoendin proects and not if the*actuall* dictate their ipleentation.;

    0or their part, respondents counter that the separations of po)ers principle has not +een violatedsince the President aintains "ultiate authorit* to control the execution of the 233 and that he"retains the final discretion to reect" the leislators proposals. ;%/he* aintain that the Court, inPhilconsa, "upheld the constitutionalit* of the po)er of e+ers of Conress to propose and identif*proects so lon as such proposal and identification are recoendator*.";43s such, the* clai that"ever*thin in the Special Provisions of the %@4 PD30 3rticle follo)s the Philconsa frae)or&, andhence, reains constitutional.";6

    /he Court rules in favor of petitioners.

    3s a* +e o+served fro its leal histor*, the definin feature of all fors of Conressional Por&$arrel )ould +e the authorit* of leislators to participate in the post-enactent phases of proect


    3t its core, leislators A a* it +e throuh proect lists,;(prior consultations;'or prora enus;:Ahave +een consistentl* accorded post-enactent authorit* to identif* the proects the* desire to +efunded throuh various Conressional Por& $arrel allocations. Bnder the %@4 PD30 3rticle, thestatutor* authorit* of leislators to identif* proects post-233 a* +e construed fro the iport ofSpecial Provisions to 4 as )ell as the second pararaph of Special Provision 6. /o elucidate,Special Provision e+odies the prora enu feature )hich, as evinced fro past PD30 3rticles,allo)s individual leislators to identif* PD30 proects for as lon as the identified proect falls under aeneral prora listed in the said enu. Relatedl*, Special Provision % provides that theipleentin aencies shall, )ithin =@ da*s fro the 233 is passed, su+it to Conress a oredetailed priorit* list, standard or desin prepared and su+itted +* ipleentin aencies fro)hich the leislator a* a&e his choice. /he sae provision further authori8es leislators to

    identif* PD30 proects outside his district for as lon as the representative of the district concernedconcurs in )ritin. #ean)hile, Special Provision 4 clarifies that PD30 proects refer to "proects to +eidentified +* leislators";;and thereunder provides the allocation liit for the total aount of proectsidentified +* each leislator. 0inall*, pararaph % of Special Provision 6 reuires that an*odification and revision of the proect identification "shall +e su+itted to the 5ouse Coittee on

    3ppropriations and the Senate Coittee on 0inance for favora+le endorseent to the D$# or theipleentin aenc*, as the case a* +e." 0ro the foreoin special provisions, it cannot +eseriousl* dou+ted that leislators have +een accorded post-enactent authorit* to identif* PD30proects.

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    3side fro the area of proect identification, leislators have also +een accorded post-enactentauthorit* in the areas of fund release and realinent. Bnder the %@4 PD30 3rticle, the statutor*authorit* of leislators to participate in the area of fund release throuh conressional coittees iscontained in Special Provision ( )hich explicitl* states that "all reuest for release of funds shall +esupported +* the docuents prescri+ed under Special Provision No. and favora+l* endorsed +*5ouse Coittee on 3ppropriations and the Senate Coittee on 0inance, as the case a* +e"F

    )hile their statutor* authorit* to participate in the area of fund realinent is contained in1 first ,pararaph %, Special Provision 6;=)hich explicitl* state s, aon others, that "an* realinent offunds shall +e su+itted to the 5ouse Coittee on 3ppropriations and the Senate Coittee on0inance for favora+le endorseent to the D$# or the ipleentin aenc*, as the case a* +e Fand, second , pararaph , also of Special Provision 6 )hich authori8es the "Secretaries of

    3riculture, Education, Ener*, Interior and

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    x x x x

    !ustice $erna+e1 In short, the act of identification is andator*

    Solictor 2eneral !ardele8a1 es, our 5onor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is noidentification.

    x x x x

    !ustice $erna+e1 No), )ould *ou &no) of specific instances )hen a proect )as ipleented)ithout the identification +* the individual leislator

    Solicitor 2eneral !ardele8a1 I do not &no), our 5onorF I do not thin& so +ut I have no specificexaples. I )ould dou+t ver* uch, our 5onor, +ecause to ipleent, there is a need for a S3ROand the NC3. 3nd the S3RO and the NC3 are triered +* an identification fro the leislator.

    x x x x

    Solictor 2eneral !ardele8a1 7hat )e ean +* andator*, our 5onor, is )e )ere repl*in to auestion, "5o) can a leislator a&e sure that he is a+le to et PD30 0unds" It is andator* in thesense that he ust identif*, in that sense, our 5onor. Other)ise, if he does not identif*, he cannotavail of the PD30 0unds and his district )ould not +e a+le to have PD30 0unds, onl* in that sense,our 5onor. >Ephases supplied?

    /hus, for all the foreoin reasons, the Court here+* declares the %@4 PD30 3rticle as )ell as allother provisions of la) )hich siilarl* allo) leislators to )ield an* for of post-enactent authorit*in the ipleentation or enforceent of the +udet, unrelated to conressional oversiht, asviolative of the separation of po)ers principle and thus unconstitutional. Corollar* thereto, inforalpractices, throuh )hich leislators have effectivel* intruded into the proper phases of +udetexecution, ust +e deeed as acts of rave a+use of discretion aountin to lac& or excess of

    urisdiction and, hence, accorded the sae unconstitutional treatent. /hat such inforal practicesdo exist and have, in fact, +een constantl* o+served throuhout the *ears has not +een su+stantiall*disputed here. 3s pointed out +* Chief !ustice #aria Chief !ustice Sereno?durin the Oral 3ruents of these cases1=4

    Chief !ustice Sereno1

    No), fro the responses of the representative of +oth, the D$# and t)o >%? 5ouses of Conress, if)e enforces the initial thouht that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research ade +* *staff, that neither the Executive nor Conress frontall* faced the uestion of constitutionalcopati+ilit* of ho) the* )ere enineerin the +udet process. In fact, the )ords *ou have +eenusin, as the three la)*ers of the D$#, and +oth 5ouses of Conress has also +een usin issurpriseF surprised that all of these thins are no) surfacin. In fact, I thouht that )hat the %@4PD30 provisions did )as to codif* in one section all the past practice that had +een done since==. In a certain sense, )e should +e than&ful that the* are all no) in the PD30 Special Provisions.x x x >Ephasis and underscorin supplied?

    Bltiatel*, leislators cannot exercise po)ers )hich the* do not have, )hether throuh foraleasures )ritten into the la) or inforal practices institutionali8ed in overnent aencies, else theExecutive departent +e deprived of )hat the Constitution has vested as its o)n.

    %. Non-delea+ilit* of

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    a. Stateent of Principle.

    3s an adunct to the separation of po)ers principle,=6leislative po)er shall +e exclusivel* exercised+* the +od* to )hich the Constitution has conferred the sae. In particular, Section , 3rticle I ofthe =;: Constitution states that such po)er shall +e vested in the Conress of the Philippines)hich shall consist of a Senate and a 5ouse of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the

    people +* the provision on initiative and referendu.=($ased on this provision, it is clear that onl*Conress, actin as a +icaeral +od*, and the people, throuh the process of initiative andreferendu, a* constitutionall* )ield leislative po)er and no other. /his preise e+odies theprinciple of non-delea+ilit* of leislative po)er, and the onl* reconi8ed exceptions thereto )ould+e1 >a? deleated leislative po)er to local overnents )hich, +* ieorial practice, are allo)edto leislate on purel* local attersF='and >+? constitutionall*-rafted exceptions such as the authorit*of the President to, +* la), exercise po)ers necessar* and proper to carr* out a declared nationalpolic* in ties of )ar or other national eerenc*,=:or fix )ithin specified liits, and su+ect to suchliitations and restrictions as Conress a* ipose, tariff rates, iport and export uotas, tonnaeand )harfae dues, and other duties or iposts )ithin the frae)or& of the national developentprora of the 2overnent.=;

    Nota+l*, the principle of non-delea+ilit* should not +e confused as a restriction to deleate rule-a&in authorit* to ipleentin aencies for the liited purpose of either fillin up the details ofthe la) for its enforceent >suppleentar* rule-a&in? or ascertainin facts to +rin the la) intoactual operation >continent rule-a&in?.==/he conceptual treatent and liitations of deleatedrule-a&in )ere explained in the case of People v. #aceren%@@as follo)s1

    /he rant of the rule-a&in po)er to adinistrative aencies is a relaxation of the principle ofseparation of po)ers and is an exception to the nondeleation of leislative po)ers. 3dinistrativereulations or "su+ordinate leislation" calculated to proote the pu+lic interest are necessar*+ecause of "the ro)in coplexit* of odern life, the ultiplication of the su+ects of overnentalreulations, and the increased difficult* of adinisterin the la)."

    x x x x

    Nevertheless, it ust +e ephasi8ed that the rule-a&in po)er ust +e confined to details forreulatin the ode or proceedin to carr* into effect the la) as it has +een enacted. /he po)ercannot +e extended to aendin or expandin the statutor* reuireents or to e+race atters notcovered +* the statute. Rules that su+vert the statute cannot +e sanctioned. >Ephases supplied?

    +. 3pplication.

    In the cases at +ar, the Court o+serves that the %@4 PD30 3rticle, insofar as it confers post-enactent identification authorit* to individual leislators, violates the principle of non-delea+ilit*since said leislators are effectivel* allo)ed to individuall* exercise the po)er of appropriation,)hich A as settled in Philconsa A is loded in Conress.%@/hat the po)er to appropriate ust +e

    exercised onl* throuh leislation is clear fro Section %=>?, 3rticle I of the =;: Constitution)hich states that1 "No one* shall +e paid out of the /reasur* except in pursuance of anappropriation ade +* la)." /o understand )hat constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in$en8on v. Secretar* of !ustice and Insular 3uditor%@%>$en8on?, held that the po)er of appropriationinvolves >a? the settin apart +* la) of a certain su fro the pu+lic revenue for >+? a specifiedpurpose. Essentiall*, under the %@4 PD30 3rticle, individual leislators are iven a personal lup-su fund fro )hich the* are a+le to dictate >a? ho) uch fro such fund )ould o to >+? a specificproect or +eneficiar* that the* theselves also deterine. 3s these t)o >%? acts coprise theexercise of the po)er of appropriation as descri+ed in $en8on, and iven that the %@4 PD30

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    3rticle authori8es individual leislators to perfor the sae, undou+tedl*, said leislators have +eenconferred the po)er to leislate )hich the Constitution does not, ho)ever, allo). /hus, &eepin )iththe principle of non-delea+ilit* of leislative po)er, the Court here+* declares the %@4 PD30

    3rticle, as )ell as all other fors of Conressional Por& $arrel )hich contain the siilar leislativeidentification feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.

    4. Chec&s and $alances.

    a. Stateent of PrincipleF Ite-eto Po)er.

    /he fact that the three reat po)ers of overnent are intended to +e &ept separate and distinctdoes not ean that the* are a+solutel* unrestrained and independent of each other. /heConstitution has also provided for an ela+orate s*ste of chec&s and +alances to securecoordination in the )or&ins of the various departents of the overnent.%@4

    3 prie exaple of a constitutional chec& and +alance )ould +e the Presidents po)er to veto anite )ritten into an appropriation, revenue or tariff +ill su+itted to hi +* Conress for approvalthrouh a process &no)n as "+ill presentent." /he Presidents ite-veto po)er is found in Section

    %:>%?, 3rticle I of the =;: Constitution )hich reads as follo)s1

    Sec. %:. x x x.

    x x x x

    >%? /he President shall have the po)er to veto an* particular ite or ites in an appropriation,revenue, or tariff +ill, +ut the veto shall not affect the ite or ites to )hich he does not o+ect.

    /he presentent of appropriation, revenue or tariff +ills to the President, )herein he a* exercisehis po)er of ite-veto, fors part of the "sinle, finel* )rouht and exhaustivel* considered,procedures" for la)-passae as specified under the Constitution. %@63s stated in 3+a&ada, the final

    step in the la)-a&in process is the "su+ission of the +ill to the President for approval. Onceapproved, it ta&es effect as la) after the reuired pu+lication." %@(

    Ela+oratin on the Presidents ite-veto po)er and its relevance as a chec& on the leislature, theCourt, in $en8on, explained that1%@'

    /he forer Oranic 3ct and the present Constitution of the Philippines a&e the Chief Executive aninteral part of the la)-a&in po)er. 5is disapproval of a +ill, coonl* &no)n as a veto, isessentiall* a leislative act. /he uestions presented to the ind of the Chief Executive are precisel*the sae as those the leislature ust deterine in passin a +ill, except that his )ill +e a +roaderpoint of vie).

    /he Constitution is a liitation upon the po)er of the leislative departent of the overnent, +utin this respect it is a rant of po)er to the executive departent. /he

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    /he ustification for the Presidents ite-veto po)er rests on a variet* of polic* oals such as toprevent lo-rollin leislation,%@:ipose fiscal restrictions on the leislature, as )ell as to fortif* theexecutive +ranchs role in the +udetar* process. %@;In Iiration and Naturali8ation Service v.Chadha, the BS Supree Court characteri8ed the Presidents ite-po)er as "a salutar* chec& uponthe leislative +od*, calculated to uard the counit* aainst the effects of factions, precipitanc*,or of an* ipulse unfriendl* to the pu+lic ood, )hich a* happen to influence a aorit* of that

    +od*"F phrased differentl*, it is eant to "increase the chances in favor of the counit* aainst thepassin of +ad la)s, throuh haste, inadvertence, or desin."%@=

    0or the President to exercise his ite-veto po)er, it necessaril* follo)s that there exists a proper"ite" )hich a* +e the o+ect of the veto. 3n ite, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertainsto "the particulars, the details, the distinct and severa+le parts of the appropriation or of the +ill." Inthe case of $en8on v. Secretar* of !ustice of the Philippine Islands,%@the BS Supree Courtcharacteri8ed an ite of appropriation as follo)s1

    3n ite of an appropriation +ill o+viousl* eans an ite )hich, in itself, is a specific appropriation ofone*, not soe eneral provision of la) )hich happens to +e put into an appropriation +ill.>Ephases supplied?

    On this preise, it a* +e concluded that an appropriation +ill, to ensure that the President a* +ea+le to exercise his po)er of ite veto, ust contain "specific appropriations of one*" and not onl*"eneral provisions" )hich provide for paraeters of appropriation.

    0urther, it is sinificant to point out that an ite of appropriation ust +e an ite characteri8ed +*sinular correspondence A eanin an allocation of a specified sinular aount for a specifiedsinular purpose, other)ise &no)n as a "line-ite."%/his treatent not onl* allo)s the ite to +econsistent )ith its definition as a "specific appropriation of one*" +ut also ensures that thePresident a* discerni+l* veto the sae. $ased on the foreoin forulation, the existin Calait*0und, Continent 0und and the Intellience 0und, +ein appropriations )hich state a specifiedaount for a specific purpose, )ould then +e considered as "line- ite" appropriations )hich arerihtfull* su+ect to ite veto. aintenance and other operatin expenses?, in )hich case the relatedpurposes shall +e deeed sufficientl* specific for the exercise of the Presidents ite veto po)er.0inall*, special purpose funds and discretionar* funds )ould euall* suare )ith the constitutionalechanis of ite-veto for as lon as the* follo) the rule on sinular correspondence as hereindiscussed. 3nent special purpose funds, it ust +e added that Section %(>6?, 3rticle I of the =;:Constitution reuires that the "special appropriations +ill shall specif* the purpose for )hich it isintended, and shall +e supported +* funds actuall* availa+le as certified +* the National /reasurer, ort o +e raised +* a correspondin revenue proposal therein." #ean)hile, )ith respect to discretionar*

    funds, Section % (>'?, 3rticle I of the =;: Constitution reuires that said funds "shall +e dis+ursedonl* for pu+lic purposes to +e supported +* appropriate vouchers and su+ect to such uidelines asa* +e prescri+ed +* la)."

    In contrast, )hat +ec&ons constitutional infirit* are appropriations )hich erel* provide for asinular lup-su aount to +e tapped as a source of fundin for ultiple purposes. Since suchappropriation t*pe necessitates the further deterination of +oth the actual aount to +e expendedand the actual purpose of the appropriation )hich ust still +e chosen fro the ultiple purposesstated in the la), it cannot +e said that the appropriation la) alread* indicates a "specific

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    appropriation of one* and hence, )ithout a proper line-ite )hich the President a* veto. 3s apractical result, the President )ould then +e faced )ith the predicaent of either vetoin the entireappropriation if he finds soe of its purposes )asteful or undesira+le, or approvin the entireappropriation so as not to hinder soe of its leitiate purposes. 0inall*, it a* not +e aiss to statethat such arraneent also raises non-delea+ilit* issues considerin that the ipleentinauthorit* )ould still have to deterine, aain, +oth the actual aount to +e expended and the actual

    purpose of the appropriation. Since the foreoin deterinations constitute the interal aspects ofthe po)er to appropriate, the ipleentin authorit* )ould, in effect, +e exercisin leislativepreroatives in violation of the principle of non-delea+ilit*.

    +. 3pplication.

    In these cases, petitioners clai that "in the current x x x s*ste )here the PD30 is a lup-suappropriation, the leislators identification of the proects after the passae of the 233 denies thePresident the chance to veto that ite later on." %%3ccordinl*, the* su+it that the "ite veto po)erof the President andates that appropriations +ills adopt line-ite +udetin" and that "Conresscannot choose a ode of +udetin )hich effectivel* renders the constitutionall*-iven po)er of thePresident useless."%4

    On the other hand, respondents aintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process )hichis intended to eet the deands of a oderni8in econo* and, as such, lup-su appropriationsare essential to financiall* address situations )hich are +arel* foreseen )hen a 233 is enacted./he* arue that the decision of the Conress to create soe lup-su appropriations isconstitutionall* allo)ed and textuall*-rounded.%6

    /he Court arees )ith petitioners.

    Bnder the %@4 PD30 3rticle, the aount of P%6.:= $illion onl* appears as a collective allocationliit since the said aount )ould +e further divided aon individual leislators )ho )ould thenreceive personal lup-su allocations and could, after the 233 is passed, effectivel* appropriatePD30 funds +ased on their o)n discretion. 3s these interediate appropriations are ade +*leislators onl* after the 233 is passed and hence, outside of the la), it necessaril* eans that theactual ites of PD30 appropriation )ould not have +een )ritten into the 2eneral 3ppropriations $illand thus effectuated )ithout veto consideration. /his &ind of lup-suJpost-enactent leislativeidentification +udetin s*ste fosters the creation of a +udet )ithin a +udet" )hich su+verts theprescri+ed procedure of presentent and conseuentl* ipairs the Presidents po)er of ite veto.

    3s petitioners aptl* point out, the a+ove-descri+ed s*ste forces the President to decide +et)een>a? acceptin the entire P%6.:= $illion PD30 allocation )ithout &no)in the specific proects of theleislators, )hich a* or a* not +e consistent )ith his national aenda and >+? reectin the )holePD30 to the detrient of all other leislators )ith leitiate proects.%(

    #oreover, even )ithout its post-enactent leislative identification feature, the %@4 PD30 3rticle)ould reain constitutionall* fla)ed since it )ould then operate as a prohi+ited for of lup-su

    appropriation a+ove-characteri8ed. In particular, the lup-su aount of P%6.:= $illion )ould +etreated as a ere fundin source allotted for ultiple purposes of spendin, i.e., scholarships,edical issions, assistance to indients, preservation of historical aterials, construction of roads,flood control, etc. /his setup connotes that the appropriation la) leaves the actual aounts andpurposes of the appropriation for further deterination and, therefore, does not readil* indicate adiscerni+le ite )hich a* +e su+ect to the Presidents po)er of ite veto.

    In fact, on the accounta+ilit* side, the sae lup-su +udetin schee has, as the Co3Chairperson rela*s, "liited state auditors fro o+tainin relevant data and inforation that )ould

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    aid in ore strinentl* auditin the utili8ation of said 0unds."%'3ccordinl*, she recoends theadoption of a "line +* line +udet or aount per proposed prora, activit* or proect, and peripleentin aenc*."%:

    5ence, in vie) of the reasons a+ove-stated, the Court finds the %@4 PD30 3rticle, as )ell as allConressional Por& $arrel a? scrutin* +ased priaril* on Conress po)er ofappropriation and the +udet hearins conducted in connection )ith it, its po)er to as& heads ofdepartents to appear +efore and +e heard +* either of its 5ouses on an* atter pertainin to theirdepartents and its po)er of confirationF%%4or >+? investiation and onitorin of theipleentation of la)s pursuant to the po)er of Conress to conduct inuiries in aid of leislation.%%6

    /he Court arees )ith petitioners that certain features e+edded in soe fors of ConressionalPor& $arrel, aon others the %@4 PD30 3rticle, has an effect on conressional oversiht. /he factthat individual leislators are iven post-enactent roles in the ipleentation of the +udet a&esit difficult for the to +ecoe disinterested "o+servers" )hen scrutini8in, investiatin or onitorinthe ipleentation of the appropriation la). /o a certain extent, the conduct of oversiht )ould +e

    tainted as said leislators, )ho are vested )ith post-enactent authorit*, )ould, in effect, +echec&in on activities in )hich the* theselves participate. 3lso, it ust +e pointed out that this ver*sae concept of post-enactent authori8ation runs afoul of Section 6, 3rticle I of the =;:Constitution )hich provides that1

    Sec. 6. No Senator or #e+er of the 5ouse of Representatives a* personall* appear as counsel+efore an* court of ustice or +efore the Electoral /ri+unals, or uasi-udicial and other adinistrative+odies. Neither shall he, directl* or indirectl*, +e interested financiall* in an* contract )ith, or in an*franchise or special privilee ranted +* the 2overnent, or an* su+division, aenc*, or

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    instruentalit* thereof, includin an* overnent-o)ned or controlled corporation, or its su+sidiar*,durin his ter of office. 5e shall not intervene in an* atter +efore an* office of the 2overnent forhis pecuniar* +enefit or )here he a* +e called upon to act on account of his office. >Ephasissupplied?

    Clearl*, allo)in leislators to intervene in the various phases of proect ipleentation A a atter

    +efore another office of overnent A renders the suscepti+le to ta&in undue advantae of theiro)n office.

    /he Court, ho)ever, cannot copletel* aree that the sae post-enactent authorit* andJor theindividual leislators control of his PD30 per se )ould allo) hi to perpetuate hiself in office.Indeed, )hile the Conressional Por& $arrel and a leislators use thereof a* +e lin&ed to this areaof interest, the use of his PD30 for re-election purposes is a atter )hich ust +e anal*8ed +asedon particular facts and on a case-to-case +asis.

    0inall*, )hile the Court accounts for the possi+ilit* that the close operational proxiit* +et)eenleislators and the Executive departent, throuh the forers post-enactent participation, a*affect the process of ipeachent, this atter larel* +orders on the doain of politics and does not

    strictl* concern the Por& $arrel S*stes intrinsic constitutionalit*. 3s such, it is an iproper su+ectof udicial assessent.

    In su, insofar as its post-enactent features dilute conressional oversiht and violate Section 6,3rticle I of the =;: Constitution, thus ipairin pu+lic accounta+ilit*, the %@4 PD30 3rticle andother fors of Conressional Por& $arrel of siilar nature are deeed as unconstitutional.

    6. Political D*nasties.

    One of the petitioners su+its that the Por& $arrel S*ste ena+les politicians )ho are e+ers ofpolitical d*nasties to accuulate funds to perpetuate theselves in po)er, in contravention ofSection %', 3rticle II of the =;: Constitution%%()hich states that1

    Sec. %'. /he State shall uarantee eual access to opportunities for pu+lic service, and prohi+itpolitical d*nasties as a* +e defined +* la). >Ephasis and underscorin supplied?

    3t the outset, suffice it to state that the foreoin provision is considered as not self-executin due tothe ualif*in phrase "as a* +e defined +* la)." In this respect, said provision does not, +* and ofitself, provide a udiciall* enforcea+le constitutional riht +ut erel* specifies uideline for leislativeor executive action.%%'/herefore, since there appears to +e no standin la) )hich cr*stalli8es thepolic* on political d*nasties for enforceent, the Court ust defer fro rulin on this issue.

    In an* event, the Court finds the a+ove-stated aruent on this score to +e larel* speculative sinceit has not +een properl* deonstrated ho) the Por& $arrel S*ste )ould +e a+le to propaatepolitical d*nasties.


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    Sec. %(. /he State shall ensure the autono* of local overnents.


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    officers, to su+stitute their udents in utili8in pu+lic funds for local developent.%4@/he Courtarees )ith petitioners.

    Philconsa descri+ed the ==6 CD0 as an attept "to a&e eual the uneual" and that "it is also areconition that individual e+ers of Conress, far ore than the President and theirconressional colleaues, are li&el* to +e &no)ledea+le a+out the needs of their respective

    constituents and the priorit* to +e iven each proect."%4Dra)in strenth fro this pronounceent,previous leislators ustified its existence +* statin that "the relativel* sall proects ipleentedunder the Conressional Por& $arrel copleent and lin& the national developent oals to thecountr*side and rassroots as )ell as to depressed areas )hich are overloo&ed +* central aencies)hich are preoccupied )ith ea-proects.%4%Siilarl*, in his 3uust %4, %@4 speech on the"a+olition" of PD30 and +udetar* refors, President 3uino entioned that the Conressional Por&$arrel )as oriinall* esta+lished for a )orth* oal, )hich is to ena+le the representatives to identif*proects for counities that the

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    C. Su+stantive Issues on the Presidential Por& $arrel.

    . alidit* of 3ppropriation.

    Petitioners preliinaril* assail Section ; of PD =@ and Section % of PD;'= >no), aended +* PD==4?, )hich respectivel* provide for the #alapa*a 0unds and the Presidential Social 0und, as

    invalid appropriations la)s since the* do not have the "priar* and specific" purpose of authori8inthe release of pu+lic funds fro the National /reasur*. Petitioners su+it that Section ; of PD =@ isnot an appropriation la) since the "priar* and specific purpose of PD =@ is the creation of anEner* Developent $oard and Section ; thereof onl* created a Special 0und incidentalthereto.%4:In siilar reard, petitioners arue that Section % of PD ;'= is neither a validappropriations la) since the allocation of the Presidential