paying or paying for it?
TRANSCRIPT
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Paying, or Paying for It?Sean McCoy, Alexander Egan, Jonathan Maesato, and Richard Winkeller*
December 19, 2013
AbstractWe investigate the forces driving takers actions in a modified power-to-
take game in which takers must explain their actions or pay to avoid doing so.Three groups of takers are tested against one group of receivers; we vary both thetiming of informing takers that they will need to explain themselves and thetakers ability to pay to avoid an explanation. We find that takers willingness topay (WTP) to avoid explanation stays roughly the same whether they are toldthey can pay to avoid explaining themselves before or during the experiment. Weobserve that Big 5 personality traits affect each treatment differently withrespect to WTP, take rate, happiness, and the qualities of the messages sent.Specifically, takers who are told mid-experiment that they have to explain
themselves report a higher level of neuroticism than those told prior. Allparticipants reported feeling less extraverted after the experiment; this waslargely brought about by changes in neuroticism and agreeableness during theexperiment. WTP did not change over different income ranges, but happinesshad a large, positive effect on WTP. For takers whose messages include the wordsorry, WTP falls and take rate and length rise, all by a large margin. Whenfairness appears, WTP, take rate, and happiness fall while length rises to asimilarly large extent. We assert that these findings extensively influence socialbehavior: Consideration of future explanations, or avoidance of such scenarios,appears to have a significant monetary value to takers in the present that can beexploited in politics or simply in everyday interactions with ones own family andneighbors.
*All are undergraduates at Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY. Email at: [email protected],[email protected], [email protected], and [email protected], respectively.
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1 IntroductionPeople often behave in ways that, at first, do not seem rational. In reality,
we make decisions contrary to the laws of economics, and we often attribute
these deviations to emotion. For example, knowing that your actions may
directly affect someone else may influence your behavior, and knowing that you
may have to explain your actions in the future may cause you to change your
behavior in the present. With these ideas in mind, people act differently in
different situations, causing their behavior to seem irrational at times. How can
we reconcile seemingly irrational behavior with seemingly rational thought
processes? Where exactly do these irrationalities lie, and are they irrationalities
at all?
Imagine that you have done something bad that will negatively impact
your spouse. This is not a good situation. You want to minimize the damage
done while keeping yourself reasonably happy. How should you respond? A
simple apology might not suffice. Often, people in this situation will turn to
buying something, paying in some form, to make up for their behavior. So, how
does dinner sound?
In this paper, we explore the behavior of takers in a power-to-take game.
Others (Grosskopf and Lpez-Vargas, 2013) have researched receivers in a similar
scenario. However, we do not study takers simply to complement their findings.
Takers, unlike receivers, are inherently selfish. People often think to act to serve
their own self-interest before considering how their actions will affect others.
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Would buying dinner make you feel better about telling your spouse bad news?
Probably. Did you think about how your spouse would feel at dinner? Probably
not yet, but you might argue that you will worry about that soon enough. Either
way, others feelings initially take a back seat so far as many people are
concerned; in a way, we are takers before we are anything else. Thus, we attempt
to determine whether takers are willing to pay to avoid explaining their actions,
and, if so, we consider the factors that influence their decision-making. In
addition, we study the messages they send and look for relationships between
their words and their actions. In particular, we are interested in take rate, WTP
to avoid explaining ones actions, explanations of actions, and changes in
happiness.
2 Literature Review We draw our inspiration primarily from two papers. The first (Bosman
and van Winden, 2002), investigates responses to emotion in a classical power-to-
take game. The study focuses on the ability of emotions to generate behavior.
Prior to the game, the subjects perform an effortful task to earn money. After
this, in the first stage of the game, the taker elects to take a percentage of the
responders income. In the second phase, the responder decides on some amount
of the their total income to destroy. Thus, while the take rate remains the same,
the actual amount the taker receives is decreased at the cost of the responder
having a portion of his or her own income destroyed as well.
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Using the results of the destruction rates as revealed preferences and self-
reported emotional states, they find that allowing the responder to self-select a
destruction rate, rather than having a choice between no money or all the money,
gives a more precise measure of emotional response than a dictator game. In
addition, the experiment requires that both players perform an effortful task to
earn income and avoid problems caused by the endowment effect.
The authors discuss the concept of emotional hazard, when a person
retaliates against an action done to him or her. In their experiment, the
emotional hazard is measured by the destruction rate, as it is an emotional
response to money being taken from the responder. Our experiment embraces the
concept of emotional hazard with the recognition that there can be more to the
cost of causing emotional hazard than having money destroyed. There are non-
monetary factors in emotional hazard, and we try to provoke these by having
takers explain their behavior in our experiment. We predict that takers will pay
to avoid explaining themselves to receivers, as they may view the non-monetary
emotional hazard of the other players judgment as a heavy cost that they wish
to avoid.
Even more important to our study was the work of Grosskopf and Lpez-
Vargas, who explore the often-overlooked topic of emotional expression and the
value of ex-post verbal communication in a power-to-take game. The authors use
a game in which one party (T) can take resources from the other party (P).
Players receive a $3 endowment for their participation. They then perform
effortful tasks that garner them additional income; these tasks are calibrated so
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that the average profit is around $10.35, totaling $13.35. Next, a T player decides
what percentages of a given P players income (what part of the $10.35) to take.
Then, player P is told about Ts decision and asked to report the maximum
amount he would be willing to pay to send a message to T. After stating this
value, an actual price is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution from $0
to $3. If Ps WTP exceeds the actual price, the message is sent for the
aforementioned cost; if not, it is not sent and there is no cost to P. The $3
endowment guarantees that all P players are able to respond to T players if they
so desire. The message sent falls into one of four categories: OFU (Only for You;
messages sent directly to T player for a cost), SLTM (Somebody Listen to Me;
messages sent to T player through neutral third party for a cost), FM (Free
Message; messages sent to T at no cost), and NM (No Message; no message sent).
Note that T players are informed of their partners type before they decide what
percentage of their partners income to take.
Their main findings were that expressions of this sort have material value,
that more drastic changes in mood result in a greater value placed on expression,
and that the anticipation of expression induces less selfish behavior. There was a
considerable difference between take rates in the NM and FM trials: On average,
the T player took 68% of the P players income when they knew no message
could be sent and only 48% when they knew a free message could be sent.
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3 Experiment This study has three main goals: First, we determine whether people will
pay to avoid explaining their actions. Second, we investigate the factors that
drive their behavior. Third, we analyze the messages they send in hopes of
understanding why they behave in the ways that they do and whether their
messages offer any valuable information about the senders.
3 1 Experimental DesignWe test our hypotheses, detailed below, in a modified power-to-take game
in which both takers and receivers complete an effortful task for which they are
then rewarded. Takers are then able to take any amount of the receivers
earnings. The receivers cannot respond; they must accept the division of earnings
as divided by the takers. Takers must then explain their actions unless,
depending on the trial, they have the option to pay to avoid doing so. We
conduct our experiment in four treatments, labeled trial 1-4 respectively. The
first involves takers who know beforehand that they will have to explain
themselves later but cannot pay to get out of doing so, whereas takers in the
second trial know beforehand that they can pay to avoid explaining themselves
later on. The third trial does not know that they will have to explain themselves
until they reach that part of the experiment, but they also learn at that point
that they can pay to avoid an explanation. The fourth trial is one of receivers
only; we want to concentrate on the takers in the experiment, and since the
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receivers in our design are only present for the sake of comparisonto see, for
example, how happiness, message qualities, and other factors change with respect
to the amount takenwe feel that playing receivers against aggregate data is
acceptable. By conducting matters in this way, we gather far more data than
were we to run a standard one-taker-versus-one-receiver experiment.
The power-to-take game part of the experiment is preceded and followed
by a survey. The first gathers basic demographic information, a starting level of
happiness, data on Big 5 personality traits, and contains simple filter questions
that double as the effortful task. Participants all answer the same survey and are
all paid for getting through this part of the experiment. The aforementioned
power-to-take game follows; each treatment receives a slightly different set of
instructions pertaining to their treatments specific limitations (can pay, cannot
pay, uninformed, receivers). The follow-up survey is similar for all participants.
Big 5 personality trait and happiness data is collected again, along with a handful
of questions specific to the participants trials. In general, this data was poorly
collectedoften in hypothetical questionsso it goes largely unused in our
analyses. The full surveys are available in the Appendix of this paper.
3 2 HypothesesWe have five hypotheses to explain how takers will respond. First, we
believe that takers are willing to pay to avoid explaining their actions. The guilt
that they incur from having to explain their selfish actions is burdensome enough
that they will want to avoid explaining it.
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Second, we believe that takers act less selfishly when they know ahead of
time that they must explain themselves later. These two hypotheses are tested by
regressing WTP, take rate, and other variables on message length and comparing
results by trial.
Third, we believe that takers WTP is higher when the take rate is higher.
We suspect that, as people take more, they will be willing to pay more to assuage
their guilt. We measure this by comparing WTP and take rate regressions
between trials.
Fourth, we believe that explanations will vary with take rate. More
specifically, as takers take more, we expect their messages to be longer and more
apologetic. We measure this through regressions of several variables on message
length and content, again sorting responses by trial.
Fifth, we believe that takers explanations of their actions will vary over
time. This relates to the hot and cold states of expression that occur during and
after the experiment. In short, we expect that explanations given in the exit
questionnaire will not match mid-game explanations. Since messages are
extremely difficult to quantify, we have not yet fully supported or rejected this
hypothesis, but we have regressed data of respondents whose messages contained
certain words against that of those who did not. Though this is not the most
complete analysis, we demonstrate the presence of strong effects of message
quality on actions in the game through regression.
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3 3 LogisticsWe ran our experiment online using MTurk and SurveyMonkey in an
effort to maintain anonymous conditions, speed up the process of paying
participant, and minimize time spent sorting and collecting data. Our survey was
available worldwide to all MTurk users with a HIT approval rate of over 80%.
Further restrictions could have been used, but we argue that, as our experiment
deals with social interactions, severely limiting the number of people able to
respond was not in our best interests. Participants were paid $0.10 for completing
the HIT and another $0.10 for completing the survey. Takers could earn an
additional $0.10 by taking receivers money; receivers could gain only the $0.10
from the effortful task section less whatever takers took from them. Trial 1 had
104 participants, trial 2 95, trial 3 96, and trial 4 83. Of the 83 receivers, roughly
an eleventh played in a scenario against each possible amount taken ($0.00,
$0.01, $0.10). Data was collected on October 28 and 29, 2013. Surveys ran
until roughly 100-120 participants had completed each trial. Data was then
sorted. Data of participants who completed the surveys in less than 120 seconds
was ignored; a majority of these finished in under 30 seconds, and compared to
the 180 seconds it took us, the experimenters, to answer the survey, we conclude
that these data were likely not thoughtfully reported. Participants were paid with
respect to their responses on October 30 and 31. In total, we gathered
approximately 500 responses of which 378 were analyzed. Nearly two thirds of
responses were from America, one third from India, and 4% from other nations in
Europe, North and South America, and the Middle East.
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4. Results
To test our first hypothesis, that takers are, in fact, willing to pay to
avoid explaining themselves, a t-test in Stata suffices: (Note that we explore this
in more detail later on.)
Table 1. T-test of WTP Versus 0.
For any reasonable p-value, we can safely say that takers are willing to pay to
avoid explaining themselves. One possible explanation for this is that there is a
cost involved in physically typing out message or in thinking of a message to type
out. However, participants in our study were MTurk users, individuals who
receive micropayments for doing similar tasks. So, we contend that inherent costs
are minimal and that the act of explaining their behavior was the costly part.
As for the second hypothesis, that takers change their behavior when they
know they must explain themselves beforehand, we call a regression table (note
that maleDummy is a binary sex variable, open1 etc. are measures of Big5
personality traits, take1 is take rate, and Informed etc. are the different trials):
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Table 2. OLS Regression of Sex, Personality, and Trial on WTP and Take Rate
Note that in the leftmost column, Informed is not significant in predicting
take1, the take rate from the first (incentivized) game. Thus, the statement
Takers take the same amount regardless of their knowledge (or lack thereof) of
the fact that they will be required to explain themselves cannot be statistically
disproven. However, stopping at this simple hypothesis test would be insufficient.
We are also curious if any factors are significant in predicting take rate under our
different treatments. For this, we provide a second regression table:
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Table 3. OLS Regression on Take Rate by Trial
Here we find a few interesting trends. First, an increase in age elicits a
decrease in take rate. This is logical given that older people are generally
wealthier than those who are younger; additionally, they are likely more aware of
the wellbeing of others and therefore act less selfishly. This effect is strongest in
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the first trial, suggesting that people who are aware of their future act more
decisively than those who are not. The nationbinary variable (1 if American
respondent, 0 if not) positively affects take rate in the two trials in which the
takers have the option to avoid explaining themselves for a cost. Americans in
trial 3 were particularly selfish, a trend that reappears several times in our
analysis. We attribute the effects of employment to the knowing where you
stand mentality; those who are employed are less willing to take less since they
have a source of income and therefore can afford to let others keep their earnings
and want to do so to avoid retribution. Happiness increases take rate since trial 1
takers know that they have to explain themselves later and thus see no reason
not to take more since they cannot avoid those future explanations. Additionally,
more agreeable takers were inclined to take less, perhaps suggesting that people
have a predisposition to behave in line with their self-reported personalities (also,
agreeable people might simply be less selfish than others). Finally, we note that
WTP affects trial 3 more than trial 2, indicating that those who were previously
uninformed about the explanation took more whereas those who knew about the
explanation acted more conservatively. This finding supports our third
hypothesis.
Next we look more carefully at WTP to avoid explanations:
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Table 4. OLS Regression on WTP by Trial.
Again we note that Americans were more selfish than international
respondents. Educations high significance implies those who were more educated
took less in scenarios where they understand their future options; perhaps these
people behave in a more sophisticated manner than the more nave trial 3 takers.
Employment behaves similarly: trial 2 takers understand the future and can
therefore assess their status in the present to make a split-second decision in the
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present about how to behave to benefit them most in the future. Incomebrackets
negative effect on WTP suggests that the rich are greedier, and happinesss effect
reflects that those who are informed are in a content enough state that they can
pay a bit extra to avoid unnecessary guilt in the future. Finally, we again note
that take rate and WTP are interrelated.
Next we look at changes in happiness (dhappy = happiness at end of
experiment happiness at its start):
Table 5. OLS Regression of Happiness by Trial
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We note that men in trial 3 (and also trial 2) were happier than women.
Partnered with the greedy American effect, this finding would indicate that
American men may get more pleasure out of greed than those in other nations
were it not for the overpower nationbinary finding that works in the opposite
direction; this suggests that Americans were less happy in all trials as a result of
their actions and makes the sex finding inconclusive. Those who were originally
more conscientious reported a large increase in happiness by the experiments
end, likely as a result of not feeling guilt or punishment for their actions. Most
importantly, we find that takers are greatly less happy at the end of the
experiment as a result of losing money. This is consistent with prospect theory
and general punishment aversion mechanisms.
We now explore more specifics of the messages sent:
Table 6. OLS Regression on Length by Trial
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We observe that older participants generally wrote shorter messages than
their younger counterparts, perhaps out of impatience. The particularly high
nationbinary numbers are telling: American receivers wrote 20 characters less
than internationals, while takers in trials 2 and 3 split the difference, writing 20
fewer characters when they knew their future and 20 more when they did not.
Happier receivers wrote more for aforementioned reasons, but happier takers
tended to write less, again most likely relating to their belief that they know
what will happen in the future, and a simple message will not change that fact.
Those reporting high levels of openness wrote more, as did extraverted trial 3
takers. This finding is striking as all the other trials, even receivers, reported
drops in message length with extraversion; it is probably best attributed to a
punishment avoidance mechanism triggered by the trials specific surprise
explanation conditions. People also wrote their messages after reporting initial
levels of extraversion, so it is possible that those who thought themselves to be
extraverts decided to prove it by writing longer messages. Amounttaken and
education also had weaker, but still generally positive, effects on message length
for obvious reasons.
Lastly, we look at datawith respect to messages involving the words
sorry and fair; we find that those who say sorry have decidedly lower WTPs,
higher take rates, similar levels of happiness, and longer messages than those who
Reported in Appendix as data is clunky since we could not find a neat way to output it.
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do not. Those who discuss fairness have much lower WTPs, lower take rates,
lower happiness, and longer messages, lending support to our fourth hypothesis.
5 DiscussionFrom this data, we have come to the following conclusions. First, we
confirm the findings in the Grosskopf paper for takers instead of receivers.
Therefore, evidence now exists supporting the notion that people on both sides of
the power-to-take game are willing to pay to send messages, and accordingly,
these messages inherently hold monetary value. The fact that our data, which
was gathered on MTurk, a community of people looking to make money, shows
this trend suggests that the magnitude of this trend in real life may be even
larger since people are not always interested in profit maximization when dealing
with people that they know personally, as opposed to people many miles away.
Second, we demonstrate that profit maximization is not the only factor
people consider when making decisions similar to those we pose in our game; this
is a relatively novel accomplishment as little on this topic exists in the realm of
power-to-take games. Punishment aversion seems a more likely mechanism across
all trials since takers take and pay in ways that lessen the retribution they might
expect from receivers. However, guilt likely plays a role as well since WTP
increased in trial 3 compared to trial 2, demonstrating that, once informed,
people are willing to pay more to remedy their selfish behavior. Backwards
Note that our fifth hypothesis is still unconfirmed. These data seem to support it, but furtheranalysis is required to make conclusions about it.
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induction factors in as well; trial 1 participants displayed a smaller change in
happiness than those in other trials likely because they knew beforehand that
they would have to explain themselves later; this explanation could not be
avoided, and thus they accepted it as an event that must occur whether they
want it to or not. On the other hand, participants in trials 2 and 3 had the
option of paying to avoid explaining themselves. This caused a smaller change in
happiness, large increases in neuroticism levels, and large decreases in
extraversion levels.
Third, people with different personalities behave differently and,
specifically, send messages differently. Extraverts and highly open people send
longer messages, and grateful receivers send longer messages as well. Takers who
learn that they have to explain themselves send longer messages than those who
knew they would have to explain themselves ahead of time. Those who mention
the words sorry and fair behave drastically differently in the game from
those who do not; perhaps they feel that key words carry more value than more
conservative players and may therefore be more (or less) selfish. There is much
more analysis to be done on messages of this sort, an endeavor we may undertake
in a forthcoming paper or perhaps one that will be taken up by other researchers.
On a social level, people do not behave as if in emotional hot and cold
states. They process data very quickly and make assumptions about the future
almost instantly; trial 2 participants did not differ that much from those in trial
3, especially given that trial 3 players were uninformed for the first half of the
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experiment. Behavior does not change as much with respect to when information
is learned but rather with respect to what sort of information is learned.
Additionally, guilting people into thinking about their actions cannot
enforce pro-social behavior; instead, threats that induce a punishment aversion
mechanism may be more successful. It is not yet clear what this says for politics
or keeping up with the Joneses on a larger scale, but our data suggests that is it
fear of having to explain why something is not a certain way that prompts us to
preemptively change our behavior to avoid these sort of explanations.
Looking forwards, we plan to re-run our experiment under slightly
different parameters to collect more compelling data. We will conduct a deeper
analysis of messages sent, and questions will be posed in a slightly different way
to MTurk participants, who will be selected more carefully. Ideally, an expansion
on this study would investigate the changes between messages sent at different
times (i.e., Does your story today differ from your story tomorrow?) to see if
people are time-inconsistent when it comes to explaining their actions. It is
entirely possible that explanations change on a sort of sliding, prospect-theory-
induced scale that produces a different, but always fitting, explanation given the
circumstances of the situation (i.e., Will you tell your spouse and your parents
the same story today? How about tomorrow? Will the stories converge from two
different starting points to a singular, end state story that is remembered and
retold in the future as the single story of past events?) There is much work to
be done, but for now, the question of Paying, or Paying for It? seems to be
best answered by Paying!
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6 ConclusionIn opposition to the standard belief that communication mainly has an
indirect cost and benefit to interactions, our experiment focuses on the direct cost
and benefit of communication itself. We find that the takers willingness to pay
to avoid an explanation in a power-to-take game stays similar regardless of
whether or not they are told that they can pay to avoid an explanation prior to
the experiment. We find that apologetic takers had a much lower willingness to
pay and sent longer messages, implying that both greed and guilt are important
mechanisms to consider. Finally, experiment subjects who had messages
regarding fairness and equality were more willing to explain their actions and,
unsurprisingly, had a lower take rate. These results suggest that the act of
explaining oneself, even to a complete stranger, has real costs. We care about
what others think of us, so guilt and punishment aversion factor into our
decision-making processes. However, because guilt is not particularly effective at
preventing people from being selfish, punishment mechanisms are a more effective
method of encouraging pro-social behavior.
References1. Bosman, Ronald, and Frans van Winden. 2002. Emotional Hazard in a
Power-To-Take Experiment. Economic Journal, 112 (476): 147-169.
2. Grosskopf, Brit and Kristian Lpez-Vargas. Forthcoming. The Demand forExpressing (Emotions).
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AppendixSorry data:
Table 7. WTP by Sorry and Take Rate by Sorry
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Table 8. Happiness by Sorry and Message Length by Sorry
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Fair data:
Table 9. WTP by Fair and Take Rate by Fair
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Table 10. Happiness by Fair and Message Length by Fair.
Surveys can be found at the links below. Note that you have to fill in answers forall questions to progress through the different pages of the survey. Responses donot matter; feel free to fill them in randomly:Trial 1: http://goo.gl/NhUKNBTrial 2: http://goo.gl/lqsxZXTrial 3: http://goo.gl/RIeux6Trial 4: http://goo.gl/i51KtpThe page displayed on MTurk can be found here: http://goo.gl/btBk5zMore information is available upon request. Please contact the authors.
This survey was given to the $0.05 sub-group of the receivers. All other Trial 4 surveys wereexactly the same except for the $0.05 (or another amount) has been taken from you line.