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Parties Change: So What?Toward a Research Agenda on Consequences of Party Change

by Robert HarmelTexas A&M University

Prepared for presentation at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 27-31 August

Copyright American Political Science Association

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Introduction

More than a decade ago, in the wake of perceptions that political parties were no longer adequately performing important roles for their democratic systems, coupled with concerns that they might be ill-suited both in their organizational structures and their standard operating procedures/strategies to avoid complete obsolescence, a significant amount of attention in parties research turned to their abilities to reform themselves: to change, innovate and/or adapt. While some new research focused on historical tendencies for parties en masse to alter their purposes, roles, and organizations to fit changing times, and the evidence that they might be doing so again, others focused on questions related to the relative influences of environment and internal factors in shaping and re-shaping parties organizations and issue profiles. Underlying these strains of party change research, there is an assumption that the change is purposeful, motivated by expectations of results, whether electoral, governmental, policy-oriented, or related to internal workings of the party itself.1 And yet, though party change could presumably alter both the effectiveness of parties and their internal politics, and though research on party change has documented and attempted to explain a multitude of party changes across many established democracies, relatively little research has been directed at measuring or explaining variant consequences of such change.

1For a synthesis of the party change literature and further on the various strains within it, see Harmel, 2002.

2As Janda noted in his 1990 paper positing a Performance Theory of Change in Political Parties,

There is certainly a need for a change theory ... in which change is the independent variable and performance is the dependent variable. (1990: 12)

But just as such a mission was deemed by Janda to be outside the scope of [his] effort in that paper, the issue of the consequences of change has been outside the scope of most subsequent research on party change.2 It is the central purpose of this paper to help, albeit in a very small way, to encourage and support the placement of consequences of party change high on the agenda for future research.

Though it is still, to a large extent, an open question whether party change does, in fact, make any significant difference, it is a working assumption of this paper that some though not all party changes do produce significant consequences, some of which are intended and some of which are not. It is a challenge for future research to determine the circumstances under which certain consequences are and are not produced; it is the challenge for this paper to develop some propositions which may help to guide such research.

In embarking down this path, we face greater difficulties in maintaining coherence than most such efforts, because it is normal to start with a dependent variable and develop its theoretical explanation. In our case, we begin with the causal variable of interest party change and attempt to identify and at least partially explain a range of possible consequences, both intended and unintended. To lessen the difficulties that this implies, we have chosen to limit our search for mediating factors (the most important component for our work) to just party-level variables; as will be noted and further explained below, we virtually ignore variation in the parties environments.

Because of the nature of this theory building (or perhaps better: agenda setting) exercise, we begin with discussion of some important concepts and terms, next state our basic assumptions, and then identify dependent variables. When all of that has been done, we will be ready to develop what we consider to be among the most important mediatingfactors in various party change->consequence relationships. In the process of doing so, we

2There are, of course, exceptions. One that is particularly noteworthy is the recent special issue of Party Politics Journal (2001) devoted in large part to research on consequences of changes in candidate selection procedures. Though the articles are in that chapter are exemplary, candidate selection procedures are just one of the many areas in which parties have recently undergone change.

3will posit a number of potentially testable propositions.

Concepts/Terminology

Party Change

The usage of the term party change is the same as in Harmel and Janda (1994: 275):Party change (in the broadest sense) is any variation, alteration or modification in

howparties are organized, what human and material resources they can draw upon, what they stand for and what they do. But this usage is so broad that it raises unrealistic expectations about the scope of a theory of party change. Our theory only [pertains to] those aspects of party change that are within a partys direct control that it decides to change... Examples are changes in party rules, structures, policies, strategies and tactics.

Our focus in this paper, however, is more limited. We are concerned only with change in parties organization and ideology/issue profiles.

Though some of the party change literature combines both types of change into one, i.e. party change writ large (e.g., Harmel et al, 1995), it is also the case that separate literatures have developed to explain organizational (e.g. Panebianco, 1988) and issue change (e.g. Downs, 1957), and for good reason. Issue change primarily relates to collective benefits and is often motivated by desire to garner more public support, while much organizational change is invisible to the public, with effects that are more immediately and directly relevant to those who share in its internal power and other resources. We too will at times distinguish between consequences of issue and of organizational change, but when the distinction does not seem theoretically important, we will merge the two and refer simply to party change.

We will also, at times, distinguish among different amounts (or degrees) of change. It should not be expected that all degrees of change will have the same impact, and we will not make such an assumption here. Neither will we assume that larger amounts of change will in all circumstances produce larger effects; there are times when a single, small, well-conceived change could have more impact (at least, of the intended variety) than a mass of changes which are less thoroughly considered and/or controlled. Indeed, as will become evident later, there are situations where the more dramatic the amount of change, the more likely that it will backfire and prove counter-productive. We will, then, find it useful to distinguish between change which amounts to tweaking and that which amounts to a drastic makeover.

4Because the concept of party change is so central to the purpose of this paper, we should say something here about empirical indicators. Though we are loathe to suggest that measurement of party change, and particularly measurement which distinguishes among types of party change, is easy, we can at least report on a few attempts to do so, with some success. The Party Change Project at Northwestern and Texas A&M Universities has produced annualized, judgmental data covering 1950-1990 for a large number of indicators of both organization (covering organizational complexity, centralization of power, and parliamentary/extraparliamentary distribution of power) and issue position (covering a range of left-right and other issues). These data currently exist, though, for just the nineteen most significant parties of Denmark, Germany, the U.K. and the U.S. While these data are specifically designed for use in quantitative analysis, their quality depends on availability and accuracy of secondary literature on the parties. (See project information and data at http://www-polisci.tamu.edu/Cross-National/DataSources/Party%20Change.htm) Another project, directed by Richard Katz and Peter Mair, has produced data on a range of organizational attributes of parties; while these data are based on official records on and about parties, they are not readily accessible for quantitative use (i.e., that would still require development and application of judgmental coding schemes). (See Katz and Mair, 1992.) These projects do provide prototypes for collection of data on the party change variables of interest to us here, complete with potential for effectively distinguishing among both types and degrees of change.

Important Terminological Distinctions

In order to be clear in our usage of some closely related terms, we will try to be consistent in making the following distinctions.

Though dictionaries often treat objective and goal as synonymous, we will use the word objectives when referring to hoped-for, intended effects which are narrower and more concrete (and usually more immediate) than goals, which thus are broader and more abstract. It would not be uncommon for a strategy designed to accomplish a particular goal to include several, more specific objectives. Democratization might be the goal, for example, with greater representation, more member participation, and further decentralization being component objectives. We will try to be consistent in distinguishing in this way between objectives and goals.

Similarly, effects and consequences are terms which are often treated as synonymous with such others as results or outcomes. In attempting to distinguish so as to capture the difference between intended and non-intended outcomes, we will use the word consequences to cover both, but effects to refer only to intended consequences. Though we may slip in this usage from time to time, it is our hoped-for intention (or

5objective) to be as consistent as possible in distinguishing between intended effects and unintended (or all) consequences of change.

Assumptions

Though empirical theories are composed of potentially testable propositions, those propositions and the theory as a whole rest upon certain untested assertions called assumptions. Ultimately, of course, the theory is only as strong as the assumptions on which it is built. The following is a list of what we consider to be the most important assumptions upon which our propositions rest.

The first four assumptions deal with the nature of change and its possible consequences:

A1: Every party change which is the result of a decision to change (at least, any that is worth studying) is purposeful. That is, when a change is made, those who make it intend to do so and have a purpose in mind. This is true not only for individual, incremental changes, but also for those changes which collectively amount to a lifestyle change or a different party type. (See Harmel, 2002: 129)

A2: Not every change is functional, in the sense of producing the intended effect. (See Janda, 1990: 11 or Harmel and Janda, 1994: 275)

A3: Some changes produce unintended effects, which may or may not be beneficial to the organization.

A4: Production of consequences, both intentional and non-intentional, is to some extent situational. It should be possible to identify the relevant situational variables and to specify their roles in mediating change->consequence relationships.

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Next are assumptions regarding party goals and objectives:

A5: Parties vary in the amount of emphasis placed on particular goals (e.g. electoral success, a role in government, policy advocacy or achievement, internal democracy), and the goal priorities matter in making decisions to change. As a corollary to A5, now linking goal priorities to internal disagreements over change, we assume

A5': When changes are motivated by goals other than the primary goal, internal fissures are likely to develop during the decision-making process, with those favoring the change pitted against others upholding the priority of the primary goal. As a corollary to A5', we further assume

6A5': Fissures over adoption of a party change do not disappear with the adoption; those opposing the change are likely to continue to oppose its implementation and its effects.

A6: When specific objectives associated with a partys decisions to change are inconsistent with its most highly prioritized goal(s), the goal(s) trump the objectives in affecting behavior of party operatives.

A7: When the stated justification for a change is not the true motivation, the true trumps the stated in affecting behavior of party operatives. In such situations, true goals trump stated goals, and true objectives trump stated objectives.

The following assumptions involve different amounts or types of change:

A8: Not all degrees of change have the same impact. We do not make the blanket assumption that large amounts of change always produce more dramatic consequences of all types. However, we do believe that larger amounts of change do result in heightened potential for the party to be seen as unstable. Hence, we also assume this corollary:

A8': Lots of change, or frequent changes over a limited time span, create potential for concern over party stability and trustworthiness (a la Downs, 1957: 109).

A9: Issue change primarily relates to collective benefits, and hence is often motivated by desire to increase public support.

A10: Organizational change relates more directly to selective benefits than to collective benefits, with effects more directly and immediately relevant to those sharing in internal power and resources than to the public (i.e. electorate).

Finally, the following assumptions relate to implementation of change:

A11: A decision to change does not imply that the change will necessarily be fully and vigorously implemented.

A11': Without full and vigorous implementation, a change while effected to some degree is less likely to accomplish intended objectives.

A12: The values of tradition and internal coherence tend to conflict with the value of

7change.

A12': Strong attachment to the values of tradition or coherence contributes to resistance to change

It is these assumptions and especially #s 2 through 4 that give importance to the exercise of this paper. It is clearly not enough to just draw arrows extending from party change to intended effects (i.e., party change -> effects); what will be much more helpful is theoretical work to distinguish when accomplishment of intended effects is likely and when it is not, as well as when certain unintended consequences are likely to occur.

Additional, narrower assumptions are embedded in the general discussions of variables and of propositions which follow below.

In addition to these empirical assumptions, we must for purposes of this paper make another working assumption on grounds which are purely practical. Organizational theory (including much of party theory) clearly assumes that the organizations environment matters in virtually all aspects of organizational life. Though we fully subscribe to the view that parties environments are important not only in shaping the parties themselves (see Harmel and Janda, 1982), but also in shaping many of their decisions to change, we will here assume the unassumable: that environments make no difference regarding the consequences of party change. While we certainly do not believe that to be true, it is our purpose here to demonstrate (albeit only theoretically) that there is also a role for characteristics of the party and of the change itself to influence the change->consequence relationship. And we fully admit to ignoring the possible effects of environmental differences in order to make theorizing concerning party- and change-leveldifferences more manageable. Hence, though we will never say so explicitly, the reader should assume this important caveat regarding each of our propositions: all else especially as pertains to the environment being equal. It will remain for future work to specify which aspects of parties environments may be most important in affecting particular change->consequence relationships.3

3For those who take up this challenge, we offer just two possible environmental influences to consider. First, a particular party may not be alone in recognizing need to change; its best efforts could be neutralized by other parties making similar or different changes to accomplish the same objective. And second, the environment may change in more than one important way at one and the same time; a party change designed to adapt to one environmental change, while failing to recognize others, may result in creation of yet another problem to be solved later.

8In focusing our attention on just party- and some change-level factors, we not only ignore the environment, but also some features of the changes themselves. For instance, a change may fail to reach its intended mark because of a design flaw in the change itself; it simply couldnt work, through all fault of its own. While such may certainly happen in the real world, we must for our purposes assume a theoretical world in which changes have real potential for producing their intended effects. (At the level of changes themselves, we will focus only on aspects pertaining to amount, frequency, and type of change.)

Finally, we should also note here that we understand the tension that exists between theorizing about actions of parties while recognizing that it is individuals who actually make decisions. When a party decides to change, that is actually the result of decisions made either by an individual party leader or, more often, by individuals whose votes count in the collective processes of committees, boards, or congresses. Even recognizing the different dynamics that may be in play in these different situations, however, it remains that the ultimate decision to change is made on behalf of the party, and associated with that decision is a collective understanding of what it is intended to accomplish for the party. It is in that vein that we theorize here about the partys decisions and its objectives in making the change.

We turn next to identification of some of the key dependent variables for a theory on consequences of party change, and will suggest whether and if so, how each might be operationalized.

The Dependent Variables: Potential Consequences

Consequences of change may come in many forms and sizes; it is certainly not our purpose here to account for all of them. Instead, we are content to highlight several categories which seem particularly important for parties, their actors and their constituencies. For the most part, these are potential consequences which have already been identified elsewhere in the literature.

We will first consider intended effects. As will be argued forthwith, we assume that for most party actors, the most important effects are related to parties main goals, i.e. the goals which are commonly referenced when arguments are made for the changes in the first place. We will then turn to two broad categories of unintended consequences: internal political disruptions and more change.

Intended Effects I: Objectives Related to Primary Goals

Among the intended or hoped for consequences of change are objectives that are

9directly related to the primary goals associated with political parties. Though it is certainly conceivable that some party changes are not goal-related, it is nevertheless the case that most changes of sufficient import and magnitude to have been decided, recorded, and then recognized by others than the decision-makers themselves, will at least have been justified on grounds of performance related to some important goal. Hence, it is a further working assumption of this paper that success for the change will be measured at least by most members and by the public4 in those terms.

Strom (1990) and others have distinguished among vote-seeking, office-seeking, and policy-seeking roles and goals of political parties. Deschouwer (1992) distinguished among the goals of votes, power (akin to office), and participation (similar to representation). Taking from both places, Janda and I (Harmel and Janda, 1994) have developed theory involving four separate goals of parties: votes (implying also: seats), office (or government), policy/ideology, and intraparty democracy, arguing that while parties may share these goals to some extent, any one of the four could serve as a particular partys primary goal.

For purposes of this paper, it is enough to recognize that any goal-motivated party change carries with it certain expected or at least, intended consequences. Hence, for each goal-related objective, there should be a gauge by which to measure degree of intended effects.

4This qualification accounts for the possibility that the decision-makers, in spite of their goal-related rhectoric, never really wanted the change to move the party toward the stated goal in the first place.

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For goals of votes (or seats) and government office, the gauges are relatively clear and easy to employ. A party changing its organization or its issue profile to garner more electoral success hopes to see improvement in its fortunes regarding votes and seats. The party which alters its organization or modifies its profile so as to better position itself for office hopes for participation in government. Any complication in assessing whether results of party change have met expectations would, for the outside observer, come not from difficulty in measuring the results, per se, but rather in gauging the decision-makers true intentions (i.e. whether to improve, to maintain, or to minimize losses in electoral/governmental stature) and hence whether success has been achieved from their perspectives.5

Assessing results with regard to policy/ideology advocacy or party democracy would be more difficult. Democracy presumably encompassing participation, representation, decentralization, or some combination of those is a spongy concept, very difficult to grab onto, much less quantify. For each of the component parts or objectives, though, measurement is more direct and hence somewhat easier. If the intention behind a change were to produce explicitly quantitative results as in increasing the number or percentage of members involved in a particular activity, or providing for representation of designated groups on decision-making boards then measurement could even be quite straight-forward. As has been suggested in recent work on consequences of change in candidate selection procedures (e.g. Katz, 2001; Hopkin, 2001), however, indicators of improvement on such specific, narrow dimensions may constitute poor measures of democratization more broadly and meaningfully. (More on this below.)

Policy/ideology advocacy is spongier still, particularly if the target is truly policy. In 1990, Strom (568) described the policy-seeking party as the least adequately developed model of competitive party behavior, and little has changed in that regard. If by policy-seeking one truly means the desire to convert the partys promises into government policy, then not only is it extremely difficult to measure success in reaching the objective, but the goal is itself so closely embedded in office-seeking that the latter might be an effective and

5Christensen (1997: 391), for instance, notes that the Agrarian parties of Norway and Sweden had to broaden their appeal or face inevitable decline. In such a situation, just avoiding decline would presumably be considered success. For an attempt to deal with the problem of taking parties own expectations into account when gauging electoral performance, see Janda et al, 1995: 181-185.

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much more easily measurable substitute. If the goal is to accomplish or maintain ideological purity in the partys profile, then the party change may simply determine the outcome. That is, if a change of position on some issue was intended to accomplish greater ideological coherence, then presumably adoption of the change would automatically accomplish that objective (unless the change was ill-conceived in the first place). In truth, though, arguments advocating ideological or issue purity are more often forwarded to fend off rather than to accomplish change.

In addition to the party goals identified above, organizational theory would add the goal of survival. According to such thinking, the ultimate goal of organizations and that would reasonably include political parties is to survive (relatedly, see Hall, 1991: 183). Though measurement of performance on this goal is rather straightforward failure to survive is measured as organizational death it is not so easy to separate the goal itself from the performance goals discussed above. That is, the survival of a political party presumably rests directly upon its performance on one or more of those four goals. Hence, for our purposes, it is sufficient to treat just the goals of votes, office, internal democracy, and policy.

Unintended Consequences I: Disruption of Internal Politics

Though the range of possible unintended consequences is limitless, a large portion of those that are likely to be most important -- in addition, of course, to reduction of performance on one or more of the partys goals -- fall into two areas: (a) further change (i.e., where one change is a cause of, or factor in, another), and (b) disruption of internal politics. We begin with the latter, which has been the subjective of a good deal of speculation in the literature already. As with the discussions of intended effects above, it is our purpose here only to identify important categories of potential consequences; theoretical development awaits the next section.

The expectation that change may cause political disruptions, perhaps at times amounting to turmoil, is based on the notion that any change has the potential to affect the distribution of access to and control over organizational resources and other valued things. For organizational change, the resources and valued things which may be affected include not only jobs and other selective goods, but also the distribution of organizational power itself and all that could imply for decisions as far reaching as redefinition of the partys ultimate goals (on the latter, see Panebianco, 1988: 244). As Kaufman (1971: 11) notes, in explaining why change tends to be resisted in organizations generally:

Without claiming there is a fixed fund of organizational benefits such that any increase in benefits for some participants inevitably reduces the benefits for others, we may safely assume that it is a rare change (or one of negligible proportions)

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which does not affect someone adversely in some respect, at least as he sees his interests. Most people who perceive adverse effects on them and who link them, rightly or wrongly, with a proposed change can usually be counted on to resist as mightily as they can.

Writing about parties specifically, Panebianco (1988: 241) first quotes Crozier and Friedberg (1977: 334) as saying any change is dangerous, in that it inevitably throws the [actors] conditions of the game, his sources of power and his freedom of action into question, modifying or eliminating the zones of uncertainty he controls, and then concludes:

Whether organizational change be deliberate or arbitrary, it always has the effect of altering the distribution of resources among different internal groups.

Those who fear loss of benefits or power resist a change; it could hardly be expected that those who actually lose that battle will, in every case, just passively accept the change and its harmful consequences.

When it is the partys issue profile that is changed rather than it organization, the affected valued things include the partys very identity as well as its public image. This would be particularly loathsome for those who committed themselves to the party because of what it stood for, only to find that the party now stands for something else.

Either way whether in response to organizational or to issue profile change potential is created for negative reaction from some quarters within the party. It may take the form of contained intra-party tension, blossom into full-fledged intra-party warfare, and/or result in highly publicized resignations or even a factional split from the party. As a matter of measurement, contained tension may be difficult for the outside observer to detect and particularly to quantify, but uncontained intra-party warfare would certainly be easier to identify, and resignations and splits would speak forcibly for themselves.

Unintended Consequences II: More Party Change

At times, what appears to be a disconnected string of changes -- taking place over a period of years is actually the fruit of a grand plan to incrementally reorganize the party or reorient its ideology. At other times, a single, shocking, external event may set in motion a chain of changes within the party, all of which may be attributed to the original event. Yet another scenario developed thoroughly in the literature on party responses to environmental trends involves accumulation of related changes over time, each caused independently in response to a gradually changing environment, and culminating in a new party form. In none of those cases would it be appropriate to say that a party change itself caused subsequent change.

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But there are times when a party change can be the cause of further party change. As Panebianco (1988: 241) notes with regard to the fundamental changes6 which interest him:

... each choice, being effected in a complex context, produces a plethora of effects unforeseen by its authors. Since an organization is, moreover, a system of interdependent parts, change in one part leads to changes in the entire organization,

6See Panebianco, 1988: 243. Such changes alter the organizations authority structure.

There are at least two scenarios within which such chain reactions might logically occur, albeit not as dramatically, perhaps, even when the magnitude of the original change falls short of fundamental. The first is when decision-makers in the party have found it necessary to implement a change which causes or contributes significantly to internal inconsistency, requiring change on other dimensions in order to create or restore basic coherence to the partys organization or its message. The other is when a change has negatively affected the position (and/or feelings) of a particular faction, tendency, wing, or important party actor, who may subsequently be paid back (or bought off) with another change deemed to positively affect their/his position. Both scenarios involve party change serving as a factor in further party change.

When subsequent change is intended to bring or restore coherence to the partys organization or message, the result is likely to be a string of two or more changes which add up to a consistent package of change. Because all such changes would presumably point in a common direction, we will subsequently call this the cumulative reaction model of party change. In his treatment of fundamental changes of conformation, Panebianco (1988: 243) seemed to be pointing to cumulative reaction when he posited:

If the conformation of the dominant coalition changes in one register, it is likely to change in one or more of the other registers as well.

And though not referring specifically to change at the time, Downs (1957: 109) did point to the importance of maintaining ideological consistency for at least some parties:

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Any party which is both responsible and reliable will probably have an ideology which is relatively coherent and immobile. In other words, its ideology will not be internally contradictory but will be at least loosely integrated around some social Weltanschauung.

One might infer from that statement that such a party would, if it found it necessary to significantly alter its position on one important issue, feel it necessary to consider changing its positions on other issues as well, i.e. to restore the internal coherence.

When a successor change results not from desire to enhance coherence, but rather from a felt need to offset perceived harm done by previous change to some important component of the party, there is no necessity that the changes add up to any particular pattern (except, perhaps, to a zero-sum). A change to reduce the influence of the parliamentary wing on one party board may be offset by strengthening its position on another. A change to moderate the partys position leftward on one issue may be offset by moving rightward on another. The defining motivation for such change is not (obviously) that it should result in greater internal consistency, but rather that it keep the peace through counterbalancing.7 Thus, we will henceforth call this the compensatory reaction

7The behavior of the U.S. Democrats regarding change in delegate selection

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model of party change.

procedures would seem to provide an example of this type of reactive change. After recalling how the 1968/1972 reforms did what they were intended to do with regard to democratizing the party, Katz and Kolodny (1994: 37) recall that It also threatened to leave the partys public office-holders out altogether. To avert this possibility, and to increase the weight given to professional politicians (who presumably would value electoral attractiveness over ideological purity), the Democrats have, since 1980, reserved an increasing number of delegate positions for pledged (and since 1984 also for unpledged) super-delegates.

Such behavior may be necessary not only to counterbalance conflicting interests of different organizational wings of the party (a la Michels parliamentary/extraparliamentary dichotomy, Downs members vs. voters, Katz and Mairs three faces of party organization), as in the above example, but also among a partys various factions or tendencies, or even between what Panebianco (1988: 245) labels as its careerists as opposed to its believers . In any of these instances, there is potential for need to compensate a harmed group with yet another change that is to its liking. When that compensation is delivered, it is quite reasonable to see the original change as an important factor in the second.

It is also very reasonable to wonder how one would detect which of the scenarios discussed here actually applies in a particular case. Though there is no simple answer, partial solutions would seemingly include (a) elimination of as many of the alternatives as possible through careful matching of the requirements of the scenarios with the details of the case and/or (b) searching in party archives. Archival research in parties has been done

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successfully, albeit not for this particular purpose, by Appleton and Ward (1997) for American states and Muller (1997) for Austria.

A Foray into Theory Development: Positing Consequences of Party Change

In the previous section, we have identified a number of potential consequences, both intended and unintended, of party change. Though we have not yet spoken in overtly theoretical terms, one can easily imagine arrows emanating from party change, per se, and directed toward each of the potential consequences. As theory, this certainly would result in a number of testable propositions. Indeed many important, still inadequately researched questions may be inferred directly from such basic propositions. Does change that was motivated by electoral performance concerns actually produce improved electoral results, for instance?8

But it would not be very satisfying to leave things there. No one would really expect that every party change produces its intended effect(s), much less that all change results in internal disruptions or additional change. A useful theory of the consequences of party change must posit conditions which help us to understand why it is that particular consequences result in one case of change and not in another.

8Some empirical research has focused recently on the extent to which change justified on grounds of democratizing the party has actually achieved that goal. See the special issue of Party Politics Journal. 7 (3), 2001.

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We will consistently call such conditions mediating factors, since they effectively mediate the change->consequence relationship. Under ideal conditions, changes would presumably result in the intended effects and only the intended effects. But in the real world, there are mediating factors which affect the opening and closing of the spigots through which consequences, both intended and unintended, actually flow. The search for mediating factors, then, involves uncovering the inhibitors9 to intended effects and the contributors to unintended consequences.

Though we will refer to these as mediating factors throughout the remainder of this paper, we should note that they actually serve in the role of independent variables for several of our propositions, i.e. those which distinguish, not between change and non-change, but rather between different categories or circumstances of change. In those cases, change itself merely determines inclusion in the relevant population (i.e., only cases involving change are of interest).

We turn next to theoretical arguments and the development of potentially testable propositions. We begin with treatment of three party-level mediating factors (institutionalization, coherence, and the partys goals and its objectives for change), all of which are posited -- under certain circumstances -- to play dual roles: as inhibitors of intended effects and contributors to detrimental, unintended consequences. Then we will turn to amount, frequency, and type of change as additional factors in unintended consequences of change.

9Inhibiting accomplishment of an objective does not have to involve actively trying to thwart the effect; it may mean just not enthusiastically trying to accomplish the objective; i.e. not trying vigorously or putting full effort into turning the change into its intended effect. Then the potential for producing the objective may just suffer and eventually die from neglect.

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Institutionalization

Institutionalization is hypothesized here to be both an inhibitor with regard to intended effects and a contributor to the unintended effect of internal political disruptions.

It is widely theorized that the more institutionalized an organization, the more likely it will resist change (e.g. see Panebianco, 1988: 166, 261, 265; Janda: 1990: 10). For us who are only interested in cases where change is known to have occurred this translates into the supposition that the more institutionalized the organization, the less likely its component parts and constituencies will be accepting of change, and thus the lower the likelihood that subsequent behavior can be reshaped so as to allow/produce the changes intended result. If institutionalization is defined such that the more routinized the procedures and the more ingrained the distributions of power and resources, the more institutionalized the organization, then less institutionalized organizations are, by definition, more malleable. And by extension, behavior within them should also be more flexible, thus increasing the likelihood that formal changes will be followed by behavioral ones as well. It is not our contention that all party change->effect relationships are equally susceptible to this intermediate effect of institutionalization, however. Because institutionalization is an aspect of organization, effectiveness of organizational change is likely to be affected; it does not follow that implementation of ideology/issue position change should be affected as well. We posit:

P1: The greater the institutionalization of the partys organization, the less likely that intended effects of organizational change will be achieved. (See assumptions A11, A11', A12', A10.)

The inhibiting effects of institutionalization are likely to be even greater where the leaders themselves are institutions. On the other hand, change of leadership may at least increase the probability of full and vigorous implementation. If it is new leadership which has made the decision to change and/or is now charged with its implementation, the likelihood is greater that the change will reach its objective. First, there is more likelihood of the stated objective being the true objective. (More later on stated vs. true objectives!) Second, there may be less tendency to reject that which turns out not to fit well with the old. Hence, a change of party leader and/or dominant faction (with both presumably being better than either alone), there is greater likelihood of a change producing the intended effect. New leadership wont trump institutionalization, but it may at least mitigate institutionalizations inhibiting effect.

P2: Inhibiting effects of institutionalization on implementation of organizational change are less strong under new leadership (i.e. party leader and/or dominant faction)

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than under longer-tenured leadership. (See assumptions A11, A11', A10, A7.)

Moving beyond intended effects, the greater rigidity that comes with institutionalization increases the likelihood of internal political disruptions. Though defining institutionalization differently than we do (1988: 59), Panebiancos proposition applies for us as well:

A highly institutionalized party is one in which change takes place slowly and laboriously, one which is more likely to break up because of excessive rigidity (as was the case with the SPD in 1917) than to experience deep-rooted and unexpected changes. (1988: 58)

In the highly instititutionalized party, where routines are valued and distributions are ingrained, organizational change is likely to be strongly resisted, and once adopted, its implementation even more strongly resisted, by many old hands within the party. Change and its implementation are likely to come with less disruption in younger, less institutionalized parties.

P3: The greater the institutionalization of the partys organization, the more likely that organizational change will result in internal political disruptions. (See assumptions A5', A12'.)

Though not part of our concept of institutionalization, there is another aspect of party organization which is relevant and should also be considered here. While we have posited above (P1) that institutionalization has a dampening effect on intended effects of organizational change, Panebianco suggests that a partys degree of systemness (which is actually included in his own conceptualization of institutionalization, but is explicitly excluded from ours) actually encourages further change once the process has begun. For Panebianco (1988: 56-57), systemness refers to the internal structural coherence of the organization, such that when an organizational system leaves a good deal of autonomy to its sub-groups, its degree of systemness is low.

With regard to organizational change, Panebianco (1988: 214), as already noted above, argues that because of the interrelated nature of an organizations parts, change in one part leads to changes in the entire organization. However, he further argues that the velocity and intensity of the reactive changes will depend on systemness: if its structural coherence is high, interdependence is high, and so thus are he speed and intensity of the changes propagation. Paraphrasing Panebianco, we posit:

P4: The higher the degree of organizational systemness, the greater the speed and intensity of a cumulative reaction process of change.

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Ideological/Issue Coherence

When it comes to production of intended effects, emphasis on ideological coherence is for issue change what institutionalization is for organizational change: a likely inhibitor. It is also likely to contribute to a particular pattern of sequential change.

The literature on political parties has long distinguished between programmatic (or ideological) and pragmatic parties. Whereas programmatic parties place a premium on commitment to an internally consistent set of ideals and policy positions, pragmatic parties place highest value on winning (whether votes, seats, or office). Given this fundamental difference in regard to importance of a coherent program, it is reasonable to expect that change in the program will be treated differently as well. Change in programmatic parties takes place in a context where consistency both within a program and over time is deeply valued for its own sake; in pragmatic parties, consistency is valued only insofar as it contributes to votes or office. Hence, we posit:

P5: The greater the commitment to ideological coherence, the less likely that issue/ideological changes will have the intended effects on party behavior. (See assumptions A12', A11, A11'.)

P6: The greater the commitment to ideological coherence, the greater the likelihood that issue/ideological change will result in internal political disruptions. (See assumptions A12', A5'.)

For programmatic parties, by definition, it is important that behavior conform to an internally consistent program of positions. Such parties should be markedly more conservative than pragmatic parties with regard to tinkering with their issue positions. But when circumstances are strong enough to dictate that change must occur, it should be expected that the same rule of the game which made change difficult in the first place could now require similar change across the program. The programmatic party which, like the SPD in the 1950s, decides it is time to shed elements of its extremist ideology in favor of more moderacy, may find it is difficult to change one feature of the program without doing a more complete ideological makeover.

As noted in Parness (1991: 66), the Dortmund Program of 1952 provided the first sign that the SPD was beginning to grapple with the serious short-sightedness of its postwar social and economic programs.

At Dortmund the party ... took a momentous step away from its insistence on nationalization and comprehensive planned economy.

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It was seven years later when, according to Chalmers (1964: 224), the more far-reaching Godesberg program was important in creating a common frame of reference for all the important areas of policy making, especially the most sensitive and sensational ones. So the across- the- board transformation attributed to Godesberg may reasonably be seen as the culmination of at least seven years of what we have called a cumulative reaction model of party change. And so it should be for programmatic parties: when one or a few changes result in a program that is no longer consistent, the value traditionally attached to coherence should dictate even further change to restore coherence once again.10

For pragmatic parties, there is no fundamental concern over internal ideological consistency which would place a limit on the range of changes to be considered when change is deemed necessary. Position changes may appear random to the outside observer, and are explainable chiefly by what is in the electoral interests of the party at the moment. There is no guiding principle of doctrinal coherence which would impede moving to the left on this, to the right on that, sequentially or even at the same point in time. When offsetting changes will serve the needs of keeping the party electorally strong, the door is open to making them.

10We should note that Chalmers who is not alone in this view -- makes clear that he does not see the Godesberg program as an ideology, in the sense that socialism is an ideology. Instead, he sees it as signaling a more pragmatic approach to policy. Still, his application of descriptors such as common frame of reference and logically coherent (1964: 224) does suggest that he sees the program as more than a haphazard collection of policy statements or themes.

From this discussion, it follows that so-called programmatic or ideological parties

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are more likely to engage in cumulative change with regard to issue change, i.e. more likely than compensatory change, and more likely than pragmatic parties to do so. Hence, we offer the following proposition:

P7: When issue/ideological change causes reactive change in programmatic parties, it is more likely to be of the cumulative than the compensatory type; there is no such propensity for pragmatic parties.

Goals and Objectives

A partys goal priorities, along with its more specific objectives regarding particular changes, may also affect the likelihood of producing intended -- or for that matter, certain unintended -- effects.

When the partys objectives for a particular change are completely in sync with its most highly prioritized goals, it is reasonable to anticipate greater likelihood of achieving the intended effects than when the specific objectives are at odds with the partys primary goal(s), as can be inferred from Assumption #6 above.

When a change is motivated by an objective not associated with the primary goal, and when that objective and the primary goal are seen to conflict, it is reasonable to posit that the change will not be vigorously or fully implemented, and the intentions will not be accomplished. Even when there is no such objective/goal conflict, it is reasonable to expect that a partys limited resources will be directed first and foremost toward objectives designed to accomplish the primary goal. For instance, a party that alters its organization with the stated intention of increasing members role in decision-making is more likely to achieve that effect if its primary goal is internal democratization than if its highest priority is winning votes and seats, since goal-objective consistency is much clearer in the first situation than in the second. Hence, we offer the following propositions:

P8.1: Changes motivated by the goal of internal democratization are less likely to accomplish their intended objectives in parties with primary goals other than internal democratization.

P8.2 Changes motivated by the goal of policy are less likely to accomplish their intended objectives in parties with primary goals other than policy.

P8.3 Changes motivated by the goal of votes are less likely to accomplish their intended objectives in parties with primary goals other than votes.

P8.4 Changes motivated by the goal of office are less likely to accomplish their intended objectives in parties with primary goals other than office.(See assumption A6.)

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Similarly, there may be inconsistency between a partys stated reasons for a particular change and its authors true intentions, with similar results.

If both the stated and the true reason for increasing member involvement on a party board is to democratize decision-making, that intended effect is more likely to be realized, for instance, than when the true motivation is to tinker with symbols while steadfastly retaining power in the hands of the leader(s). Put more generally, stated intentions are more likely to be accomplished when they are the true objectives of those making the decision to change.

Indeed, a recurring theme in recent work on changes in candidate selection (inspired partly by the cartel party thesis; see Mair, 1997; Katz and Mair, 1995) is that, while they are almost always linked in party rhetoric and in the public mind to the goal of internal party democratization, the real intentions of the decision-makers may lie somewhere else, with important consequences for the ultimate effects of reform. In Hopkins analysis of adoption of membership votes in candidate selection in British parties, he noted that declining membership figures and poor electoral performances provided the ideal conditions for democratizing the candidate selection process, and that

Democratizing reforms of candidate selection were also a function of internal power games, shifting power downwards towards individual party members and upwards towards the party leaderships, with party intermediary elites emerging as the key losers,

along with Labours trade unions, whose influence was diminished through loss of the bloc vote.Hopkins conclusion, from the standpoint of accomplishing the stated objective of enhancing members role in party decision-making?

Inclusive selectorates do reduce party leaders control over candidate selection processes, but they also provide them with opportunities to increase their power by marginalizing alternative centres of internal power, such as parties intermediate structures. (358)

Though this discussion thus far has focused on just one aspect of democratization reform, candidate selection, it nonetheless seems reasonable to extrapolate to other changes related to the democratization goal. The authors of the cartel party thesis have argued that a range of changes ostensibly meant to strengthen the role of members as individuals have actually been motivated by a desire to defang the middle-level elites who, in coordinated and organized fashion, could actually mount a more effective challenge to top party

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leadership (see, for example, Katz and Mair, 1995; Katz, 2001).

With the supposition that decision-makers may choose to mislead regarding motives for any type of change, we offer the following:

P9.1: Changes justified by the goal of internal democratization are more likely to reach the democratization objectives when those were the true objectives of the decision-makers.

P9.2: Changes justified by the goal of policy are more likely to reach the policy objectives when those were the true objectives of the decision-makers.

P9.3: Changes justified by the goal of votes are more likely to reach the objectives related to votes when those were the true objectives of the decision-makers.

P9.4: Changes justified by the goal of office are more likely to reach the office objectives when those were the true objectives of the decision-makers.(See assumption A7.)

Regardless of whether goal-related changes have their intended effect, change related to certain goals at least in certain situations may (also) result in detrimental, unintended consequences.

Changes intended to democratize the party may, for instance, be detrimental to electoral performance. Assuming the partys organization contributes to its electoral performance, then to the extent that democratization reforms result in diminished roles for seasoned party operatives (including for this purpose, public office holders), the immediate electoral impact may well be negative. Such would seem to be the lesson from the democratization reforms of Americas Democratic Party prior to the 1972 election. As recalled by Janda (1990: 11):

The new delegate selection guidelines did increase representation of blacks, women, and youth (for a time) in the partys nomination conventions, but the Democrats ran a terrible campaign in 1972 and the partys candidate, George McGovern, lost by a landslide. In fact, the Democrats won only one of [the next] five presidential elections [after] the guidelines went into effect.

Though not all democratization-motivated changes are as dramatic or immediate in their effects on party organization as the reforms of the Democrats in the early 1970s, it still seems reasonable to posit:

P10.1: Changes motivated by the goal of internal democratization are more likely to result in diminished electoral performance than are changes motivated by electoral or governmental goals.

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Because changes motivated exclusively by concern for the policy goal (e.g. as for (re-)establishing ideological coherence) could hamper flexibility of movement during a campaign, we also posit:

P10.2: Changes motivated by the policy goal of ideology/issue advocacy are more likely to result in diminished electoral performance than are changes motivated by electoral or governmental goals.

Electoral or governmental goals may also, in certain circumstances, contribute to negative, unintended consequences.

Though most parties would certainly prefer to govern at least by sharing in control of government that is not true for all. Especially at their origins, some parties relish the role of the anti-establishment outsider, valuing clear reception of their message more than acceptance into the halls of power. Those who initially support such a party tend also to be outsiders (or at least, protestors), drawn to the party specifically because of its anti-establishment character. Indeed, as Deschouwer (1994: 106) puts it, new parties begin to lose as soon as they are perceived as being part of the traditional game, which certainly happens when they accept an offer to join the government. Even short of taking power, the prior act of changing so as to be a more acceptable candidate may also backfire, for like reasons. Hence, we posit:

P11: For anti-establishment parties, more so than for other parties, changes designed to succeed on the office goal are likely to result in reduced electoral performance

We certainly do not mean to suggest that a grooming for government strategy will have negative electoral consequences in all cases, nor that the negative reaction will necessarily be long-lasting. The German Greens entered government successfully, as have some radical rightwing parties.

Changes designed to make such parties governmentally acceptable, or even more electorally successful, are certainly likely to result in internal disruptions, possibly leading to splits and/or noteworthy resignations. This is because anti-establishment parties generally have within them factions (or at least tendencies) which are committed to the cause and to being different more than to electoral or office success. In some cases, individuals including party leaders are even committed to the anti-establishmentposture, per se. Such groups and individuals will likely find it very difficult or impossible to accept concessions designed to accomplish broader appeal. Hence we further posit:

P12: For anti-establishment parties, more so than for other parties, changes designed to improve electoral or office performance are likely to result in severe internal

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disruptions.(See assumption A5'.)

Parties whose primary goal is votes and/or government may still find occasion to adopt changes designed for internal democratization. For some such parties, changes toward democratization may simply be part of a broader strategy to improve the partys popularity and hence its electoral performance. But for others, internal democracy may indeed be another important goal for the party, in which case reforms to open the party or spread its power may be genuine, at least for some within the party. In those cases, what is true of organizational changes generally will be especially true of changes explicitly designed to redistribute power or resources more broadly, as is inherent in democratization:

P13: For parties whose primary goal is votes, office, or policy, more so than for parties whose primary goal is internal democracy, changes motivated by the goal of increasing internal democracy are likely to result in significant internal disruptions. (See assumptions A5' and A5'.)

Amount and Frequency of Change

The amount or frequency of change may also contribute to production of unintended consequences.

In his very well known thesis with regard specifically to ideology/issue change, Downs (1957: 109-110) argued that such change is hard to come by (the party will not radically shift its policies and doctrines overnight), and then only slowly and incrementally, because if a party frequently adopts new policies inconsistent with its old ones, voters will suspect that it cannot be trusted to carry out any long-range policies at all. So, parties are rewarded by voters for being responsible -- or at least punished for being irresponsible --and hence parties do not normally choose to risk the ire of the voters by changing too much, too quickly. By inference then, the party which does change its ideology/issue profile dramatically, within a short period of time, should suffer electorally. We offer

P14: Frequent change of ideology/issue positions is likely to result in reduced electoral performance. (See assumption A8'.)

It is also tempting to posit, by short extension, that a large amount of ideology/issueposition change, in a very short period of time, is likely to reduce electoral performance. However, we must also recognize, as Downs does, that there are circumstances which might warrant quick, dramatic change. In his words:

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Ideological immobility is characteristic of every responsible party, because it cannot repudiate its past actions unless some radical change in conditions justifies this. (italics added)

Since for Downs, all parties are primarily electoral animals, such radical change in conditions would be signaled by a severe electoral shock (1957: 300). Indeed, in the aftermath of what was already a severe electoral downturn, one might not anticipate radical change presumably designed to turn around the electoral fortunes to affect electoral performance unfavorably. Hence we offer the proposition:

P15: A large amount of ideology/issue position change, in a very short period of time, is likely to reduce electoral performance, except when the change was preceded by a severe electoral shock. (See assumption A8.)

Just as a large amount of ideology/issue change may impact voters, a substantial amount of organizational change -- even more so than more limited change -- may be expected to disrupt the internal workings of the party. While even small, isolated changes will likely affect some party members and/or workers, larger changes or more of them would be more prone to fundamentally affect distributions and relationships. Hence, we posit

P16: The larger the amount of organizational change, the more likely that severe internal disruption will result. (See assumptions A8' and A5'.)

Type of Change

Finally, type of change, or of sequence of change, may affect the likelihood of certain unintended consequences.

Panebianco (1988) suggests parties are conservative with regard to organization because of concerns over internal disruptions. Downs (1957) argues parties are conservative with regard to ideology/policy because of concern for looking irresponsible to voters. Therein lies a telling difference. Organizational change is designed to improve efficiency and/or redistribute power or resources. Hence, organizational change relates more directly to selective benefits than to collective benefits, with effects more directly and immediately relevant to those sharing in internal power and resources than to the public (i.e. electorate) [Assumption 10 above]. To the extent that Downs thesis is correct, ideological/issue change is designed primarily to improve electoral/governmental performance. Issue change relates more to collective benefits, and hence is indeed very

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relevant to potential voters [see Assumption 9 above].

Consequently, while large amounts of organizational change are more likely to produce internal disruptions than to impact negatively on voters, large amounts of ideology/issue change may well diminish electoral performance. Even taking into account that ideology/issue changes are not all alike, with some going more to the core identity of the party than others (see Harmel, Janda, and Tan, 1995),11 we still posit that on average,

11Some changes in party platforms such as shifting of emphasis from one issue to another while not actually changing position -- may have little internal impact, while still having an intended effect on the electorate. But others involving actual changes in the parties issue positions are more likely to be felt internally as well. Some members may have committed time, energy, and money to the party because of its stands on the issues; they may well be disheartened by change. Hence, especially in those cases where the change(s) go to the core identity of the party, such ideology/issue change may well result in internal disruptions. Empirical research on this proposition should take this distinction into account.

P17: Organizational changes, more so than ideology/issue changes, are likely to result in serious internal disruptions. (See assumptions 9 and 10.)

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Finally, our last proposition deals with our two models of sequenced, reactive change and their relative likelihoods of resulting in disruptions of internal party politics. Our proposition is derived primarily from the distinction between the purposes at least as argued above for engaging in one or the other type of reactive change. Cumulative reactive change is the born of the desire to forge greater coherence in the partys ideology/issue profile and/or its organization, whereas compensatory reactive change is designed specifically to keep peace in parties where prior change has resulted in self-assessed losers. Given not only the purpose of compensatory change, but also the observation that greater coherence is often won at the expense of one interest or another, with accumulated losses as the reactive changes continue, it follows logically that

P18: For situations where change causes further change, the cumulative type is more likely than compensatory change to result in severe disruptions to internal politics.

Conclusion

It has been our purpose here to encourage more empirical research on the consequences of party change. Our method has been the generation of a number of potentially testable propositions, tying certain party- and change-level mediating factors to the likelihood that party change will result in various intended and unintended consequences. Ultimately, the value of the exercise should and will be judged -- even more so than by whether the propositions withstand empirical testing -- by the extent to which the propositions prove testable at all. And that will depend, to a very large extent, on whether indicators can be found or developed for each of the important concepts. If not, then this exercise in agenda setting could also prove to have been an exercise in futility. We have already spoken to the measurement issues related to party change and to the dependent variables, but until now have said nothing about the measurability of the all-important mediating factors. It is incumbent upon us to do so now.

Existing data sets are at least indicative of the availability of measures of some critical variables, though individual researchers may wish to extend their procedures to additional parties. While Harmel and Jandas Party Change Project (PCP) has not collected data on party institutionalization, Jandas earlier International Comparative Political Parties (ICPP) project did do so for multiple indicators for the 153 parties covering the 1950-1962 period. Short of replicating the laborious procedures for more recent years, one may be satisfied to use age as a surrogate for instititutionalization.12 If so, then party ages for older parties (i.e. those significant parties born prior to 1963) may

12Janda (1980; 1990: 10), for instance, uses age as one indicator of institutionalization, along with electoral stability, legislative stability, and leadership competition.

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be calculated using data from Jandas ICCP project (Janda, 1980), and country- and party-specific literature will contain party birth information for significant parties of more recent vintage. Leader change and goal priority data are available from the Party Change Project for the nineteen parties included in that study. Sufficient data do exist to suggest that some of our propositions should indeed be susceptible to broadly-based, systematic comparisons within the short term.

For other variables, extant data sets offer little guidance as to appropriate indicators or their availability. Detection of the intended effects, and particularly when distinction is necessary between decision-makers ostensive and true objectives, or of the parties relative commitment to ideological coherence/consistency (beyond just knowing the priority level attached to the policy goal, which can be gleaned from the PCP), may indeed require nothing short of careful detective work. Presumably, searching party archives and/or conducting interviews with party decision-makers could be valuable parts of the process.

For those propositions which would require data on the latter variables or on assessment of consequences other than electoral or governmental, quantitative, large-n analysis is clearly not within short-term reach. However, as has been effectively demonstrated by recent studies of consequences, ostensible and otherwise, of changes in candidate selection procedures (see special issue of Party Politics, 2001), there is much that can be learned from in-depth case or small-n analyses. Such studies will not only provide initial tests for some of the more difficult propositions, but will also inspire further theoretical work on the effects of party change.

It has been our hope that a paper such as this might not only encourage critique and testing of our propositions, but even more so, that it might help to inspire further theoretical development regarding consequences of change. In limiting this paper to the party and change levels, we have intentionally left the environment out. The next theoretical work should be devoted to bringing the environment back in, both as a source of mediating factors13 and as a locus of consequences. With the regard to the latter, consideration should certainly be given to possible consequences of party change for increased competition at the system level (a la Farrell, 1994: 238; Chalmers, 1964: 230), for the development and spread of innovations across the systems parties (a la Appleton and Ward, 1997), and for accomplishing some parties objective of coopting electoral support which might otherwise go to new competitors (a la Koole, 1994: 300; see also Schlesinger, 1991: 27).

13For an argument on the importance of environment as a mediator in organizational effectiveness, see Deschouwer, 1986.

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The arguments presented in this paper are based on the -- as yet largely unsubstantiated -- assumption that the answer to the question in the title is party change does matter sometimes, but not always, and then not always in the same ways. Our propositions point to an important role for party attributes and characteristics of the changes themselves in affecting when party changes have particular consequences. Validating that assumption, testing such propositions, and building a stronger and more complete explanatory framework constitute an important and worthwhile challenge for the next generation of party change research.

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