echaniCf Imns.dison: Univer­. note 2.( the Tower of• 1935). p. 14.

Parent, Child, Alterity, DialogueDavid Kennedy

ing. Irans. Johnv York: Harperllingen: Verlag

'he Phi/o.rophi­ert Leslie Elli>bertson (Lon-

I Science andsearch in Phe­~it/iche Na(ur­'id.. pp. 1-2. p.

"De ire for the new in us is the desire forthe other:'

Emmanuel Levina

The dult-Child Situationand the Plural Self

The adult-child ituation is paradigmatic ofalterity, both p ychologically and ethically.For the child, it i literally the first relation withthe other. For the parent. it i also a fir t rela­tion hip: the first time one ha been on theother side. acro s from one's childhood. Fac­ing my child. I am till the child I was. but nowI am in my parents' place. I wa once a childwith my own parent just like this. I am till thatchild, yet here is another child before me. owI, who e identity was intersubjectively con ti­tuted in my fir t relationship, am the fir t rela­tionship-the agent of constitution-for an­other. It i obvious that thi relationship in itintricate geometry of projection andintrojections will shape the child before me.But is there a way in which I will be shaped byit a an adult? Is it a way of coming into a dif­ferent relation hip with the child that I was andtill am a constituted by another? It seems

clear to us what the possibilities for the psy­chological development of the child are. Whatare the po ibilities for the adult? How doadults grow p ychologically through their rela­tions with their own children.

The child-adult relation po es complicatedproblem for our understanding of personalidentity. We assume the profound influence onthe identity of the child by the parent. but lack away to approach how the child hape adultsubjectivity. Thi relative ignorance may be aresult both of adult egocentrism and of an in­equality-the child has no choice but to beshaped, wherea the adult can reject beingshaped. But rejecting being haped i beingshaped negatively-in turning away from thetransformative potentia) of thi relation, heturns away from coming to term with her ownchildhood through parenthood, and therefore

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

from a crucial dimen ion of adult develop­ment

Many testify to the experience of a profounden e of interior relocation connected with

having children. Levina (1969) con ideredthat the child-adult relation hip disprove thecommon en e notion of the unity of per onalidentity. He aid.

In a ituation uch a paternity the return of the I10 the elf. which is et forth in the monist con­cepl of the identical subject. is found to be com­pletely modified. The son is not only my work.like a poem or an object. nor is he my propert .

eilher the categories of power nor tho e ofknowledge de cribe my relation with the child.... [ do not have my child: I am my child. Pater­nity i a relation with a tranger Who while be­ing Other is me. a relation of Ihe elf wiLh a selfwhich is yet not me. In thi "I am" being is nolonger Eleatic unity. In exi ting itself there is amultiplicity and a tran cendence. In this tran­scendence the I i not swept away. since the sonis nOt me: and yet Iam my on. The fecundity ofthe I is its very transcendence. (p. 277)

The realization of the "fecundity of the I"-theexistential experience of the multiplicity ofelfhood-is the first outcome of becoming a

parent. Early in life one becomes an other tooneself, for the reflective elf originates in asplit. or doubling of con ciousness. But in be­coming a parent thi otherne s-which­is-also-myself is uddenly found out there inthe world. in another human. Compared toother adults. the child i a radical other-a tinyper on who cannot quite peak one's language.and who depend on me to urvive. One doesnot "have" this other, nor i thi other oneself.but one is thi other. Thi i a powerful imageof alterity which ha the effect of whatLevinas (1987, p. 17) call the "rupture of theegoi t-I, ' and its "reconditioning in the face ofthe Other, the re-oriemation despite-it elf ofthe for-itself to the for-the-other. ' The ruptureand reconditioning provide the context for the

SPRl G 2001

33

psychological development of the adultthrough her relation hip with the child-a de­velopment ba ed on the experience of alteritand dialogue.

For the adult it i a moment-often thefirst-of the problematization of elfhood,through realizing in the mo t concrete, com­pelling way po ible that ubjecti ity and theexperience of alterity are in eparable.Child-rearing breaks open identity, ith thepromi e it reorganization acro the bound­aries of the ubject. The relation with the chi Idis the grand and primary instance of the ontol­ogy of person -in-relation, which combineself-unity, othemes and projection~r themean through which we find and define our­selve in the other. In having children, I amconfronted with the fact that the elf i not ju ta multiple structure, but a structure which tran­scends the boundarie between myel f and oth­ers.

In the modern We t, the goal of p ychologi­cal development i typically de cribed withwords like individuation. autonomy. differen­tiation. and self-actualization. Our teleolog ofelf-development assumes a discrete elf, a el f

cl arly within its own boundarie -other for-• ations are often con idered pathological.

For thi culture of radical individuali m. therole of the other in the pur uit of thi goal habeen unclear. It i onl in the last third of ourcentury that adulthood has generally been con­sidered to be an thing but an end to develop­ment-a terminus of childhood. If develop­ment continued in adulthood. it wa thought ofas the result of elf-impo ed technologie ofgrowth-what Foucault (19 6) refer to a"the care of the self." Although the notion oflifelong development wa implicit in the ri e ofpsychoanalytic thought, it i the arne no­tion-"therapy" "education," and "care of theelf' are all analogous term. The implication

here is that one develop naturall in child­hood but in adulthood one doe 0 onlthrough technologies of the elf. So Freud re­fer to p ychoanalysi as "a prolongation ofeducation for the purpo e of overcoming there idue of childhood' (1957 Vol. lip. 48).

It was Jung, with hi global notion of the on­et of a psychological proce in midlife truc­

tured around the integration of con ciou anduncon cious psychic content who eem fir t

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

34

to ha e introduced the notion of a developmen­tal journey in adulthood which i more than aclean-up operation on childhood. or a programfor .. elf-realization." Drawing on a prolifera­tion of metaphor from religion and hermeticphilo ophy, Jung' thought implie that devel­opment i mo ed and energized b an everhifting relation between the con ciou and the

uncon ciou . and the continual reconstructionof the tructure of the p yche with a re ulting"decentering' of the ego.

But the tud of life-cour e development,like that of child-development, ha been mosttrongly influenced in our century by biol­

ogy-for example Werner's (1957) "organi ­mic" theory, and Erikson's (1964) epigeneticmodel which takes its chief metaphor fromembryonic development. Be ide it inherentdetermini m. it weakne s when it cro e overinto p ychology i that in the realm of biology,maturity i the apex of the life-cycle. and fur­ther de elopment is development towarddeath; thi make it hard to imagine adulthooda anything but a journey toward di integra­tion. And it is limited in it ability to addrethe i ue of alterity, for the "organism" ha anen ironment, whereas the panicularl humanha an other. In fact the other is the original en­vironment of the infant, and the non-humanother i only lowly differentiated from a per-onal matrix (Macmurray 1979, Luckmann

1970).The biological model does offer powerful

formulations of the structural dynamic of or­ganic development-Werner' characteriza­tion, for example of the function of regressionin development (1957, p. 20) offers suggestiveparallel and connections with both Freudianand Jungian de criptions of psychic proces .But ultimately any merely biological accountbreak down at the moment at which the hu­man world eparate from the organic. Thimoment i connected not just with the dou­bling of con ciousne -the mirror elf-a-o iated particularly with the human, but with

it multiplication acro personal boundaries.In order to look more clo ely into the

adult-child relation and it implication foradult development, we need a model whichrecognize the multiplicity of elfhood acrosubject-object boundaries, the projective rela­

tion with the other which that implie , and an

expanded andcrucial aspect I

relational coneontologically :misused distollike the health)no one ideal enment, and psyc"natural" courWinnicott calliment. In factcho-ethical devture, somethingof biological a .is that adu Itthrough dialogLdevelopmentalcause parents wtheir children tethe fruits of thalgrow even furthown children, acomes normalizing, the human'

Child and Ad'Who is this I

thrust into such c

for many adultschildren are justdifference thatThis projective palterity in gene"view of the aduI 10) calls the ctabsolute other, rothers, the child'greater than any cor gender differeJlogical and ephechanging and pa~

adult. Children ;brain size and orand hormonal orgderstood that thecome, and corrlong-term projectit-which makeYoung children alby radical physic:cal dependence csensorial and motl

a deveJopmen­i more than a

d, or a programon a prolifera­1 and hermeticlies that devel­ed by an ever1 ciou and therecon truction{ith a re ulting

development,ha been mo tllUry by biol­)57) 'organi ­54) epigeneticletaphor from~ it inherentit cro e over1m of biology,: c1e. and fur­ment towardine adulthoodrd di integra­it to addreslni m" has anularly humanIe origin~J en­e non-human:d from a per­~, Luckmann

er powerfulnamic of or­haracteriza­

of regressionuggestive

th Freudianhic process.ical account

,hich the hu­rganic. This

,i th the dou-r self-as­

lan, but withundaries.

:1 into thelications for

del whichhood across~ective rela­lie and an

expanded and nuanced notion of dialogue as acrucial aspect of that relation. Each of these arerelational conditions which. although they areontologically given, can be ignored, denied,misused, distorted, or otherwi e wounded. Un­like the healthy "organism" of biology, there isno one ideal environment for optimal develop­ment, and psychological development i not a"natural" course of events, even given whatWinnicott called a "good enough' environ­ment. In fact to orne extent human psy­cho-ethical development is an aberration of na­ture, omething seized from the relative inertiaof biological adaptation. My ba ic as umptionis that adult p ychological developmentthrough dialogue with children i crucial to thedevelopmental advance of human culture, be­cause parents who grow through dialogue withtheir children tend to produce adult who reapthe fruits of that growth. and are positioned togrow even funher through dialogue with theirown children, and 0 on. When dialogue be­comes normalized as an a pect of child-rear­ing the human world changes.

Child and Adult: Developmental Themes

Who is this other with whom the adult isthrust into such crucial dialogue? It is difficultfor many adults to resist either assuming thatchildren are just like them, or attributing suchdifference that it amounts to subspeciation.This projective polarization is a problematic ofalterity in general. Speaking from the point ofview of the adult, Merleau-Ponty (1964, p.110) calls the child a "polymorph"-"not anabsolute other, nor the same."1 Unlike adultothers, the child's difference from the adult isgreater than any combination ofcultural, racialor gender differences, for it is organic and bio­logical and ephemeral-that is, it is rapidlychanging and passing into sameness with theadult. Children are different from adults inbrain size and organization, phy ical tature,and hormonal organization, but it is always un­derstood that that difference i being over­come, and commonly assumed that thelong-term project of childhood is to overcomeit-which makes it more easily overlooked.Young children are distinguished from adultsby radical physical and (usually) psychologi­cal dependence on others, by differences insensorial and motor organization and intensity,

by less (usually) impulse control. by compara­bly greater developmental pia ticit , and bylength of experience in the world. The e trans­late into differences-whether of degree orkind is moot-in the qualitative experience oflived pace and time and a different. ort ofego- tructure, a well a differing ontologicaland epi temological assumption ,theorie andconvictions. All of these differences make thechild particularly vulnerable to marginaliza­tion and domination by the culture of adult­hood. ot only are adults much more physi­cally powerful, but their typical relation hip totheir own experience of childhood i to havemo tly forgotten it. The child come to theadult a the inhabitant of a world once indweltfully but now di tant, once intimately knownfrom the inside but now forgotten. become ex­terior-a form of exi tence which i familiaryet trange. Thi can be dangerou for dia­logue, for the adult maya ume that he under-tands the child because he has been one, yet

the actual experience is to a greater or les erdegree lost to con cious memory.

Seen from the perspective of childhood.adulthood is both a fulfillment of potentialitiespresent in childhood, and a los . The los is anecessary one to attain adulthood, and gener­ally ocially and per onally considered thegains are considered to be worthwhile. Cogni­tively, the adult profit from the ability to"decenter" and take multiple per pectives, andto operate transformationally on the relationsbetween those perspective. re ulting in an in­crease of practical and abstract problem- olv­ing kills. Yet the adult acrifices a kind ofknowledge of the world which come from aform of con ciousnes embedded in relativelyimmediate perceptual modes, ba ed more onmimesis and mental oreidetic images than ab-tract. chematic interpretations. As children

become adult , thi world-embeddedne at­tenuates. Perception itself is increasingly typi­fied: categorization are built up through bothinductive experience and socially mediatedknowledge (Schutz 1967a).2 Both my own in­ductive generalizations from experience andocially derived knowledge become involun­

tary expectations and interpretive frameworksthrough which further experience i prejudgedand thereby to a great extent predetermined.This chematizalion of experience, and the

PARENT A D CHILD DIALOGUE

35

canalization of impulses and tendencies whichaccompanies it stand between the subject andthe world and lead to the loss of what Schactel(1959) called the child's "world openness," anexperiential edge which even if the child isn taware she has, the adult can observe, and theadult can be aware she has lost. It also lead totbe forgoing or foreclosure of new experience,and hence increasing repetition andstereotypification. The trade-off of adulthoodis that less world-embeddedness leads to lessworld-openness.

If adults knew just what they had lost. itwould not be lost. Freud considered what hecalled "childhood amnesia' to be a result of re­pression-blocked traumatic memories thatobscure the context of the trauma along withthem. Schactel thought that childhood amnesiaresults from a transformation of noetic struc­tures into an abstract categorical memory sy ­tern which doesn't correspond to the waymemory is stored in childhood-hence, for ex­ample, the legendary childhood memories trig­gered by smell. The frequent overwhelming in­tensity of early childhood experience-ofanger. fear delight frustration, fascinated at­tention and so on-testifies to what Schutz andLuckmann (1973. Schutz I967b) called a "ten­sion of consciousness" which has not yet nor­malized in the "wide awake" cognitive style ofthe adult. In Freudian terminology the youngchild's cognitive style represents a differentbalance of primary and secondary processesthan the adult's. That form of intentionality inwhich wish, fantasy. dream, and various formsof liminal knowledge mix with everydayschematized knowledge-Winnicott (1970)called this 'transitional space"- uggests adifferent subject-object. elf-world relation. Itis best illustrated in young children's fanta yplay, but that i only where it is expre sed indramatized narrative form. In adults it i thecognitive space of theater (in our age, evenmore so the space of film, which i a technicalanalogue of its processes), dream and deepsensuou and emotional experience.

Given this situation of both gain andlos -and who is to say that as many adultsaren't as relieved to be done with childhood asare sorry to have lost it?-the child come tocarry special symbolic re onance for manyadults. She stands for oneself-a -a-child, and

PHll..OSOPHY TODAY

36

the half-remembered experience of the lostcontinent of childhood. She invokes in theadult an interiority which feels lost to view andyet is of enormous significance-an experi­ence of self submerged, rendered inaccessiblebecause the categorical, typifying memorystructures on which all but "deep memory" isarrayed are not present in early childhood. Forthe adult who experiences elfhood a frag­mented and dislocated, childhood represents areturn to a lived immediacy which is half­imagined, because it i as much the projectionof a po sible future as a recollection of the past.Being with children can promise the unlockingof the ecret of a form of lived experiencewhich has become removed, abstracted, andcompartmentalized. The child comes to standfor a concrete, immediate form of knowledgewhich the adult aspires to regain on anotherpsycho-spiritual level as a direct, intuitive ap­prehension of the whole. The child is a symbolfor the unification ofself-which by definitionimplies unification with the world-which isthe adult's developmental project. As such. shealso represents the adult' identity projectedinto the future. a self-permutation which car­ries possibilities of self-world unity and bal­ance.

Adult and child in relation are faced and di­rected toward different but mutually determi­native developmental goals. The trajectoriesand dynamics of the two directions differ butare related, and are mutually entraining. Whenthey are face to face in the parent-child rela­tion, for one to develop without the other doingso suggests dysfunction. The child's path isclearer than the adult's, for the latter's is a formof recollection--anamnesis-of indirect ex­ploration of an obscure past and its projectiononto a future which feels like it might be a re­turn to a different but related place. The adult'sdirection is toward coming to terms with herown childhood. with the level of experi­ence-i.e. the dimension of subjectiv­ity-which is "child" in her life as an adult andwith the complexitie of the ituation of theprojection of that child-self onto the real childbefore her-who, as Levinas reminds us, isand yet is not her. The adult' developmentaldirection is toward re-integration of self on an­other level a level which has incorporated thestage----<:hildhood-it has passed beyond into

a new stage. SIthis on the eve

They are whar

once again be<and our culrureshould lead us InOI only the re~

.. bul they are ;fulfillment in tl

The child'sward "reason"ture"-toward (of being 'growadult that she alknows she willitoward differ.other-embeddecself-the emerEself from a globtivity is ubmer.tions. She is tra'non-plural self.parent she projeonto the adult,super-ego ideal­hand, the adult, ethis unified selffof parenting,-brcLevinas descrilxand not juSt pluraboundaries of sutriggers in her is.ity away from tltrans-personal su

Dialogue and

If this involblocked-i.e.. iftered by the adultity and a form ofdomination becorsocial reproducticterns is always poof relation becausize, experience, (doubly acute as aso easily overloolmutual projectiOlwhen he looks at Iother, and the com

nee of the lostinvokes in thelost to view andIce-an experi­red inaccessibleifying memoryeep memory" isrchildhood. Forlfhood as frag­lad represents awhich is half­

h the projection;tion of the past.;e the unlockingved experienceabstracted, andcome to standn of knowledge;ain on anotherct, intuitive ap­hild is a symbolch by definitionarid-which is:ct. A such she:ntity projectedtion which car-L!nity and bal-

re faced imd di­ItuaJly determi­['he trajectorieslions differ butItraining. Whenrent-child rela­the other doingchild's path isalter's is a formof indirect ex­d its projectiont might be a re­ice. The adult'sterms with hervel of experi­of subjectiv­as an adult, andituation of the

the real childreminds us, isdevelopmentaln of selfon an­corporated the:d beyond into

a new stage. Schiller (1966 p. 85) articulatedthis on the eve of the French Revolution:

They are what we we~: they are what we shouldonce again become. We were nalUre just as they.and our cullUre. by means of reason and freedom.hould lead u back to nalUre. They are. therefore.

not only the representation of our lost childhood.... but they are also representations of our highestfulfill ment in the ideal

The child's direction is from "nature' to­ward "reason' and "freedom" through "cul­ture"-lOward a clear and well-defined futureof being "grown up"-toward imagining theadult that she aJready in a sen e, is. since sheknow he will be it eventually. She i directedtoward differentiation rom world-andother-embeddedne , toward articulation ofself-the emergence of a con ciou , unifiedself from a global matrix in which her subjec­tivity i ubmerged or imprecated in its rela­tion . She is traveling LOward the ideal of thenon-plural self. In her relation hip with herparent, she projects thi anticipated elf-unityonto the adult, who provides a model-auper-ego ideal-for the child. On the other

hand, the adult, even as she comes to representthi unified self for the child, is, in the situationof parenting brought LO the realization whichLevinas describes-that he is a plural selfand not just plural within herself but across theboundaries of subjectivity. So what the childtriggers in her is a reorganization of subjectiv­ity away from the isolation of self and intotrans-personal subjectivity

Dialogue and Creative Reorganization

If this involuntary mutual project isblocked-i.e., if child-rearing is not encoun­tered by the adult as a developmental possibil­ity and a form of self-work, the condition fordomination become acute. Domination and its. ocial reproduction through child rearing pat­terns is always possible in this particular formof relation because of radical differences insize, experience and mutual dependence. It isdoubly acute as a possibility because it can beso easily overlooked, due LO the situation ofmutual projection. The adull sees himselfwhen he looks at his child, but he also sees another, and the combination of the two can lead

him all to easily to ee someone he "has,'omeone who is not only "me" but is "mine" as

well. Levinas takes the analysi of this ten­dency to another level when he peaks of therelation to the other in which there is not a'ru ptu re of the egoi t-f' a a fundamental formof ubjective knowledge. This is the tendencyof the ego to absorb or 'thematize' the other inits own image, 0 that indeed there i no other.Buber (1970) characterizes this a the "I-It" re­lation, as oppo ed to the "I-Thou," or ituationofdialogue. Levinas (1987 p.68) uggests thatthis is how the ego makes ense of the world,and identifies it with "reason:' • knowledge,"or "intelligibility"-thus showing how deep ahuman tendency it is:

The light that permits encountering somethingother than the self. makes it encountered as ifthis thing came from the ego. The light. thebrightness, is intelligibility itself: making ev­erything come from me, it reduces every experi­ence to an element of reminiscence. Reason isalone. And in this sense knowledge never trulyencounters anything truly other in the world.

The fact that, in the I-It modality, "reasonnever truly encounters anything truly other inthe world" would seem to imply that the rup­ture of the egoist-I is not an inevitable aspect ofpsycho-ethical development but a task and adiscipline, and hence a developmental phe­nomenon which is supported by cultural-his­torical traditions and practices.

The rupture of the egoist-I can be identifiedwith lung's metaphor of the decentering of theego with the appearance of the unifying "Self'in the individuation process. For lung, the egoas "reason 'or "intelligibility itself' representsa provisional unity of the subject-in-process.There comes a certain moment in adult devel­opment when it becomes possible for the egoto be "ousted from its central and dominatingposition," and to give up its "illusion of rna ­tery"-to recognize its inability to act as thecontrol center of subjectivity-which allowsfor what he refers to as a vitalizing of the per­sonality through an "afflux of unconsciouscontents." It is through thi process ofdecentering and regression that a • new total­ity" emerges, which lung (1969) calls the"Self." The ego does not disappear for "theSelf has a functional meaning only when it can

PARENT AND CHll..D DIALOGUE

37

act compensatorily to ego-consciousness" (p.231).3 Rather the ego recognizes that it is notthe self-recognizes its relative position in aplural and evolving subjectivity, and enterinto dialogue with the other element of theconstellated structure, which now include theother. lung con iders this movement of reorga­nization to begin in midlife and doe nm con­nect it with parenting. I would suggest that itcan begin at any time in the life cycle, and thatparenting is a major opportunity for the initia­tion of this process and perhaps it mo t fre­quent trigger for many adults.

The ego-centered self is non-dialogical-itdoes not encounter anything truly other in theworld. In the mode of alreriry dialogue is aform of knowledge; one know the otherthrough dialogue. Dialogue assumes thedecentered ego, and also produces il. When weenter into dialogue we do what psychoanalysicalls "withdrawing the projection," for it isthrough projection of chematized catego­ries-of typification -that we make of theother the same. When we enter dialogue, weenter into what Levina (1987, p. 116) call"the logical character of uniciry, beyond thedistinction between the univer al and the indi­viduaL" We recognize "the unique one... theabsolutely oTher."When the "egoist-I' j • rup­tured: we grasp the other, as Buber (1966, p.97) says "non-relatively, ... without in ertingthe experienced thing into relations to otherthings. ' If we recognize the other only throughthe schematized and typified knowledge of theunrupLUred ego, we know the world onlythrough projection of the categories ofedimented experience. So dialogue is, a

Levinas (1987, p. lIS) ays, a "rupwre of thenatural order of being:' and yet it i the heart ofthe ethical relation. In dialogue, we recognizethe other a non-thematizable; it i a "relation-hip to the other a other, and nm a reduction of

the other to the arne."Projective knowledge ab orbs the identity

of the other, and bend and adjust the other toits schemata; the other is a creen onto which Iproject my internal imagery. To 'withdraw"this imagery is experienced as a rupture be­cause in the natural order of being human rela­tionships are characterized by an inter-play ofprojections. My lome" is a way of meeting yourprojection of who I am and visa versa. If self-

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

38

hood i plural across personal boundaries, thenit is to a large extent projective. There is nouch thing a eeing the other (or oneself) in

her es ence, apart from projection. To a greatextent our own felt subjectivity consists of at­tempts to sati fy and to internalize the other'sprojection. We hape the screen to receive theimage, and we hape the image to fit the creen.

What then does it mean to withdraw the pro­jection, and to apprehend the other asunthematizable, a the unique one? ForLevina thi i ugge ted in hi reflections onli me. I and the olher do not share temporalpre ence except in thematized lime-typifiedtime, time organized schematically which as-ume and project a past and a future. The

lime of radical alterity i a time in which theother i "alway on the verge of presence butnever comes to pre ence" (1987, p. 18). It is notso much that the other is before or outside oftime a that "the time of the other and my timedo not occur at the arne lime; the time of theother disrupTS my temporality. So time is nei­ther the other's nor mine" (p. 12). The unique­ne of the ingle one never emerges from thematrix of projection but is always on theverge, hiding on it margins or within a breakin its patterned continuitie -a transgressiveurd. The egoi t-I, then is never really rup­

tured, becau e it i omological-but it is con­tinually threatened with rupture by another or­der of being. an order which we might call. pre ence." Whether or not this "presence' isimply the limit condition in the play of

Derrida's "differance" is a moot poinl. In anycase the other is the one who both evokes it andremains just beyond it.

Technically speaking, it would appear thatto withdraw the projection i above all to be­come conscious of it-as in meditation one iconsciou of the content of the mind, but doesnot identify with them. The major relationaloutcome is an ethical one-what Levinas(1987, p. 25) cal1s "renouncing conslrainl...re­nouncing ... force and whatever is ail-power­ful.' Relations based on projection are rela­tion of force, and commonly relation ofdomination however subtle and complex. Inopening oneself to the other who 'eludesthematization " who "overflow absolutelyev­ery idea I can have of him," one experiences"the wonder proper to ethical significance"-a

felt responsibilenced as an exThis is partiadult-child reI:easily to force,power differercause a crucialmental journe}perience of a Ibetween pers·sue-whether Iconstellated ell

Regression a

One overareprojective rela!through dialoglregression. If thdegree my regnis in a differenherself, and therelation. That dresents-is-rrpp.138-39)pripsychological e

an organism. Istruclures andress funher. biplished througearlier. less SIalder to progres!psychologicaloperations: omlution) of existbehavior paltervation of pri nwhich undiffernomena emerg l

My child is ation in the serviinvolved in a Iimovement fromative globality ,state of increasiland hierarchic iother hand, lriggalterity, am dt(partly) accompof the emergentof stability as a g

)undaries, then'e. There is no(or oneself) inion. To a greatconsists of at-

lize the other's1 to receive theo fit the creen.:hdraw the pro­the other aslue one? Forreflections on

.hare temporaltime-typified:ally which as-a future. The

e in which theIf pre ence but,p. 18).lt is note or outside of~r and my timethe time of theSo time i nei­~). The unique­erge from thellway on thewithin a breakI tran gressivever really rup­-but it is con­by another or­we might call• "presence" is, the play ofIt point. In anyh evokes it and

lid appear thatDove all to be­dilation one ismind, but doesajor relationalwhat Levinas:onstraint...re­r is aJl-power­:tion are rela­, relations of::I complex. Inwho "eludes

absolutelyev­Ie experiencesnificance"-a

felt responsibility to the other which is experi­enced as an existential categorical imperative.This is particularly significant for theadult-child relation which lends itself all tooeasily to force, not only becau e of the obviouspower differential between the two, but be­cause a crucial aspect of the child' develop­menlal journey is the internalization from ex­perience of a perspective on power relationsbetween persons. Force is always an i ­sue-whether between person or between theconstellated elements of the plural elf.

Regression and Creative Reorganization

One overarching theme of the adult-childprojective relationship and it tran formationthrough dialogue is connected with the idea ofregres ion. If the child is my elf, he i to ornedegree my regressed self. She is me and yet heis in a differeOl relation between the part ofherself, and therefore in a differeOl elf-worldrelation. That different elf-world relation rep­resems-is-my regressed self. Werner (1957,pp. 138-39) prioritizes the role of regre ion inpsychological de elopment:

an organism. having anained highly Slabilizedstructures and operations mayor may not prog­ress further. but if it does. this will be accom­plished through partial return to a geneticallyearlier. less stable level. One has to regress in or­der to progress.... in creative reorganization.psychological regression involves two kinds ofoperations: one is the de-differentiation (disso­lution) of existing. schematized or automatizedbehavior patterns: the other consists in the acti­vation of primitive levels of behavior fromwhich undifferentiated (little-formulated) phe­nomena emerge.

My child is actively involved in differentia­tion in the service of the emergent self. She isinvolved in a life-cycle moment of dramaticmovement from as Werner says, "a state of rel­ative globality and lack of differentiation to astate of increasing differentiation articulation,and hierarchic integration" (p. 126). I, on theother hand, triggered by thi new experience ofalterity am de-differentiating an already(partly) accomplished structure in the serviceof the emergent sel f. She use my relative tateofstability as a guide and aprojective goal, and

I use her relative lack of stability as a meta­phorical model for the deconstruction of atructure of subjectivity become' schematized

or automatized," and as an incenlive to the cre­ative reorganization of that structure. AnnaFreud referred to this as "regression in the ser­vice of progression" (Blum, 1994. p. 67).

There is a connection between my elf-reor­ganization when faced with my child, and mycapacity to assist in the emergent self-organi­zation of my child. The psychohistorian LloyddeMause (1974, p. 3), in his theory of the hi ­torical evolution of child-rearing modes, iden­tified thi connection a the most importantfactor of advance. "The origin of thi evolu­tion, . he claims, "lie in the ability of ucce -ive generations of parents to regress to the

p ychic age of their children and work throughthe anxieties of that age in a better manner theecond time they encounter them than they did

during their own childhood." The resu It is whathe calls the "empathic reaction," or:

the adult's ability to regress to the level of achild's need and correctly identify it without anadmixture of the adult's own projections. Theadult must then be able to maintain enough dis­tance from the need to be able to satisfy it. It isan ability identical (0 the u e of the psychoana­lyst' unconscious called "free-floating allen­tion." or ... "listening with the third ear." (p. 7)

Taken together, lung's. Werner's, AnnaFreud' and deMau e' formulations implythat the child' relatively low impulse-controltriggers regression in the parent, which helpshim understand and tolerate the child's feel­ings and behavior; which in turn helpshim-through revisiting these feelings in another who is himself-to come into a new rela­tion with his (the adult's) own impulse-lifewhich is often tied up in what lung calls the"shadow," or that regressive aspect of myselfwhich my ego will not permit me to recognizeas my own. According to lung, the encounterwith the shadow is the first step of the individu­ation process-by which he means thedecentering of the ego and the emergence ofthe Self.

It is the adult's child-within which the childbefore him both evokes and constrains him toreconstruct, which in tum moves him to with­hold his projections from the child-before-him

PARENT AND CHll..D DIALOGUE

39

and experience hi alway -coming-to- pre ­ence as the unique one. The net effect for theadult i a reorganization of the ubjective econ­omy toward the Self-toward an emergent in­tegration of compartmentalized and polarizeda pect of the plural elf, and the energizing ofthi new balance by in tinctual energie hichcan now be allowed into the reorganized truc­ture.In 0 doing the adult find him elf able tooffer the psychological pace to the child-be­fore-him that will reduce the po ibilitie ofthe reproduction in the child of a elfhood withsplit-off element. The child generate a p y­chological pace for the adult in which the lat­ter re-experience the developmental plastic­ity, the pre-unity which characterize the life ofchildhood, in which the dynamic balance be­tween what Werner call "fixity and mobility"is tuned for creative self-reorganization. A theadult learns to guide hi child toward a healthyimpulse life and an integrated shadow throughwithholding the projection, he re-teache him­self.4

Finally, deMause's analy i uggest thatthis process is accompli hed through dia­logue-through the meditative "free-Ooatingattention" which doe not identify with one'projections, in thi ca e the punitive, repre ivesuperego projections introjected from theadult's own parents. At thi dialogical momentof dodging and di entangling the projections,the adult renounces force in the form of beingable to control the child' "will." This i po i­ble because the parent recognize the uniqueone, the other who, as Levina 1987) put it.comes before the ego and it other-ab orbingform of knowledge, a a radical. in oluntaryethical command [Q attention. re ponsibility,and deep care:

Responsibility for the Other-the face ignify­jng to me "thou shalt not kill:' and con equently

also "you are responsible for the life of (hi ab-

olutel other other"-is re pon ibilit for the

unique one. The "unique one" mean the lovedone, love being the condition of the very po j.

bility of uniqueness. (p. 108)

Distance, Dialogue, and Dialectic

Although consciousness i by nature pro­jective-<:>r in the language of phenomenology., intentional"-the child begin with a mini-

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

40

mum of hi torically developed projection tododge or di entangle. The child live in a worldof what Buber (1970, pp. 76. 78) call "purenatural a ociation: where' the longing for re­lation i primary." Thi exi tential ituation ithe ground of and precondition for dialogue,but the emergence of dialogue proper followdifferentiation from thi matrix-world. whenthe child come to percei e her elf a another-when he begin [Q a "I." Thi i themoment of inner divi ion, when the elf i putat a distance from it elf and become plural.~

Oi lance is a necessary condition for dialogue,So Buber (1965, p. 60) peak of a twofoldmovement of development of ubjectivity. thefirst being "the primal euing at a di tance,"and the second "entering into relation," Dis­tance. he says, "provides the human situation:relation provides man's becoming in that situa­tion." When distance emerges, the I-It be­come po sible; the I now begin to meet andassimilate the other according to categorizedchemata developed from past experience and

projected onto new. The I-It is not alienated ex­perience except a it hardens against the po si­bility and the emergence of the I-You. It ithrough dialogue that the original condition isendle sly-but never completely-recovereddialectically.

Dialogue i not a sured. while typificationi .Thi i the ulnerabilityofthehumancondi­tion to objectification. alienation, and rational­ization, Typification i natural, while dialogue,which i a heuri tic for the opening of the elfto the I-You relation. must be de elopedthrough culture, childrearing and education.Projective chemata proliferate effortle Iy,while the withholding or u pen ion of the pro­jection-although it i an involuntary re pon eto what Levina (1987. p. 113) refer to a "theimperative that command the ego b way ofthe Other' face," a '·commandment•. a "cate­gorical imperative"-<:an be ignored.

The importance of adult-child dialogue liein the fact that dialogue i a cultural and a hi ­tOricaJ product. which mean that it i repro­duced-<:>r not-through child-rearing and ed­ucation, Children are both more dialogicalthan adult and Ie 0; more 0 becau e theyare till immer ed in the primary relation withthe other, which i a pre-dialogical condition.Their approach to the other i only lowly dif-

ferentiating frorelation" (Bub(tively concretmodes of perctheir paradworld-embednes -inherentles dialogicalmakes it po !

jor-the-other wimandment" (Uyet fully articiteacher and Ietion with her chitself' (p. 91 )­ground of relati<for the child theis natural or prscious dimensio

Withholdingative movementmandment-it i!is always cominprojections. Thefrom even furthein our arm and;coming a new g,replaceable indi'locutor into the:other in the full ~thematizing gazeyond the ego's t

through ab orbilmy recognition 0

that she is a persperson-which !

optimal develo{:

Blum. H. P. (1994) ,,­

gres ion:' in The P:

pp.6(}...76.

Buber, M. (1965)

Knowledge of Mar.

( ew York: Harper

Buber. M. (1966) Thl

( ew York: Schock

Buber, M. (1970) I ar

York: Scribner's).

WORKS CITED

I projections tolives in a world78) call 'pure: longing for re­Itial situation in for dialogue,proper follow

lx-world, whenher elf a an"I." Thi i then the elf is put;:comes plural.~

)n for dialogue.: of a twofold;ubjectivity, theat a di lance,'relation." Dis­

uman ituation:ng in that itua­:s. the I-It be­ins to meet andto categorized

experience andlot alienated ex­~ain t the po si­:he I-You. It isnal condition isely-recovered

lile typificatione human condi­)0, and rational­while dialogue,:ning of the elfbe developed

and education..te effortlessly,Ision of the pro­lOtary responserefers to as "theego by way ofment," a "cate­nored.Id dialogue liestural and a hi ­hat it is repro­rearing and ed­lore dialogical

because theyy relation withical condition.nly slowly dif-

ferentiating from this matrix of "the a priori ofrelation" (Suber, 1970, p. 78), and their rela­tively concrete-intuitive, figural, mimeticmodes of perception and cognition are-intheir paradoxical combination ofworld-embedded ness and world-open­ness-inherently other-grounded. They areless dialogical becau e the di tance whichmake it possible for alterity-for "thejar-the-other which dawns in the ego a a com­mandment" (Levinas, 1987, p. 106)6-i notyet fully arriculated. So the adult i bothteacher and learner: learner because her rela­tion with her child-her "ego become other toitself' (p. 91 )-returns her to the participatoryground of relation: teacher becau e he modelfor the child the relation acros di tance, whichis natural or proto-dialogue rai ed to a con-ciou dimension.

Withholding the projection i not ju t a neg­ative movement, or the constraint of a com­mandment-it i a welcoming of the other whois alway coming to me from ju t beyond myprojection. The child appear to come to usfrom even further. When we first take our childin our arm and look into her face, we are wel­coming a new gaze a new voice, a new and ir­replaceable individuality, a full-fledged inter­locutor into the world. My child is already another in the full sense of the term-beyond thethematizing gaze of the 'egoist-I," and thus be­yond the ego's capacity to make her presentthrough absorbing her into its own time. It ismy recognition of her otherness, which impliesthat he is a person-that she was never not aperson-which supports and releases her foroptimal development through our relation,

Blum, H. P. (1994) "The Conceptual Development of Re­

gression," in The PsychoanalyTic STudy oflhe Child. 49,

pp.60-76.

Buber. M. (1965) "Dislance and Relation," in The

Knowledge 0/ Man: A Philosophy of Ihe Interhuman

( ew York: Harper and Row).

Buber, M. (1966) The Wayo/Response, . . Glazer. ed.

( ew York: Schocken Book ).

Buber. M. (1970) I and Thou .. Iran. W. Kaufmann ( e\

York: Scribner's).

which is also the vehicle for my self-transfor­mation.

My tran formation i toward a form of ub­jectivity which is plural acros the boundariesof the elf. ow the other is no more other tome than I am to myself: the field of my ubjec­tivity is now in a process of reeon tructionacro the boundaries of my per on. and in­clude the other. It eems a paradox that theunification of self which this initiates pre entsit elf-to analy i anyway-a a pluralization.It wa the totalizing gaze of the ego that, inlung' terms when "ou ted from it centraland dominating po ition' in the self-structure.relinquished its role as the "control center" ofubjectivity, Through thi decentering of one

part of the structure. the whole a a structure ofdialogical relation emerges. The whole in­cludes elements of otherne s both within andacross boundaries. My ego, which no longerpresumes to unite the other element throughdomination, now experience emergent unitythrough dialogue-dialogue with elements ofthe personal and collective unconscious anddialogue with the other with whom I am in re­lation-and potentially every other. Individua­tion is a process which i moved along throughpluralization and dialogue. In recognizing theother as non-thematizable, as the unique onewho comes from beyond the typifying gaze ofthe ego, of reason, of "intelligibility, ' I recog­nize her like my child, as myself. In recogniz­ing the other as myself, I recognize that I my­self am an emergent whole whose parts IcannOI control, but only encounter. "Desire forthe new in us is the desire for the other."

DeMause. L. (1974) "The Evolulion of Childhood," in

DeMause. L.. ed. The HislOry ofChildhood. ( ew York:

P ychohistory Pre 5). pp. 3-75.

Erik on. E. H. (1964) "Human Strenglh and Ihe Cycle of

Generalions," in Insight and Responsibility: LeCTures on

The Ethical Implicarions of Psychoanalytic InsighT

( ew York: OrlOn).

Foucaull. M. The Care nf The Self ( ew York: Random

Hou e. 1986).

PARE TAD CHILD DIALOGUE

41

END OTES

Montclair State University, Upper Montclair, NJ 07043

Freud. S. (1957) Five Lectures on PsychoafUJlysis. in J.

Strachey. ed.. The Standard Edition of the Comp/ere

Psychological Works ofSigmund Freud. vol. 11 (Lon­

don: Hogarth Press).

Jung. C. G. (1969) Structure and Dynamics ofthe Psyche,

ed. and trans. by G. Adler and R. F. Hall (Princeton:

Bollingen).

Levinas. E. (1969) Totality and Infinity. trans. A. Lingis

(Pittsburgh: Dusquesne University Press).

Levinas. E. (1987) 1ime and the Other. trans. R. A. Cohen

(Pittsburgh: Dusquesne University Press, 1987).

Luckmann, T. (1970) "On the Boundaries of the Social

World:' in M. atan on. ed. Phenomenology andSocial

Reality: Essays in Memory ofAlfredSchutz (The Hague:

Maninus Nijhoff). pp. 13-100.

Macmurry, J. (1961) Persons in Relation (Atlantic

Heights. J: Humanities Press).

Merleau-Ponty. M. (1964) "Methode en psychologie de

I'enfanl." Bulletin de Psychologie n. 236 tome XVIII

3-6. ovembre.

Schactel. E. (1959) Metamorphosis ( ew York: Basic

Books).

1. "II faut concevoir renfam ni comme un 'autre' absolu,

ni comme 'Ie meme' que no us, mais com me

polymorphe:'

2. I.e., knowledge acquired from "my friends, my par­

ents. my teachers and the teachers of my teachers" (p.

13).

3. And he adds. "If the ego is dissolved in identification

with the Self. it gives rise to a son of nebulous superman

with a puffed up ego and a deflated self."

4. According to George Vaillant (1977. pp. 383-86) the

growth of the adult i IOward more mature defense

Schiller. F. von (1966) Nai"ve and Sentimental Poetry and

On the Sublime ( ew York: Frederick Unger).

Schutz. A. (1967a) The Phenomenology of the Social

World (Evanston: ortbwestem University Press).

Schutz, A. (1967b) "On Multiple Realities," in Collected

Papers. Vol. 1: The Problem of Social Reality (The

Hague: Maninus ijhoff). pp. 230-42.

Schutz. A. and Luckmann. T. (1973) The Structures ofthe

life- World(Evanston: ortbwestem University Press).

Stem. D. . (1985) The Interpersonal World ofthe Infant

( ew York: Basic Books).

Vaillant. G. (1977) Adaptation to Life (Boston: Little

Brown).

Werner, H. (1957) "The Concept of Development from a

Comparative and Organismic Point of View." in D. B.

Harris. ed., The Concept of Development: An Issue in

the Study ofHuman Behavior. pp. 137-47 (Minneapo­

lis: University of Minnesota Press).

Winnicott. D. W. (1970). Playing and Reality (London:

Tavistock).

mechanisms, i.e. those "unconscious strategies for deal­

ing with anxiety." The adult could also be seen as re­

working each of Erikson's "psychosocial crises" as the

child works through them for the first time. See Erikson

1964.

5. This plurality i structurally implicit from the begin­

ning. See tern, 1985.

6. And he adds. "a commandment understood by the ego

in its very obedience ... as jfthe ego obeyed beforehav­

ing understood. and as if the intrigue of alterity were

knOlled prior 10 knowledge."

HEGELAI

In Same' latetical Reason, hein comprehendindom in a concret,where reciprocit:dom and self-unlis a dialecticallythe isolated indivigrated individualforms of social l

solidarity.' In whthe accounts Hegthe lived experienwhen involved iJmeaning of the b<text, especially thunderstood as theargues that his vieity is more concrand that only tiorganicism, but Ispond to these cri!has much to offertique addresse arreciprocity and scconsider directly,ments of the Critiwards a constructthought instead 01cifically Sartre'~

Hegel's account t<of group involvemthe group how thlthe bonds of solietion, and how onevidual and a grouf

In light of whathink it is worth trsic philo ophicalSartre (of the Cric.generally, both thlpush the terms of e.ing from the parti;

PHILOSOPHY TODAY

42

PHll.-OSOPHY