AQIM: The Devolution of the North African al Qaeda Node

Summary

On July 27, French Prime Minister Francois Fillon said that France was at war with the North African al Qaeda node, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20100727_france_declares_war_aqim]. This followed a live televised broadcast the day before by French President Nicolas Sarkozy confirming that a 78-year-old French hostage captured by AQIM operatives this past April in Mali had been killed by his captors. Urging French citizens to avoid travel to the Sahel region, Sarkozy condemned the act and vowed a determined effort against the group. Fillon’s announcement comes three days after the end of a four-day French-backed security offensive by Mauritanian troops against AQIM militants suspected of holding the French hostage deep into the Malian portion of the Sahara desert. Despite the loss of the French hostage, this represented a largely heretofore unseen offensive escalation by European and African security forces in response to militant Islamists in the region.

The abduction and murder of the Western hostage and clashes over the past week indicate that AQIM and its sub-commanders do, indeed, remain a threat to security in North Africa and the Sahel-Sahara region. Indeed, the events follow a host of recent, similar episodes and messages from French and US officials warning citizens to exercise extreme caution and situational awareness when traveling around the Burkina Faso, Mauritanian and the Mali-Niger borders.

Yet, the events of the past week as well as the beginning of 2010 represent a steady devolution of the group’s operational capacity and overall strength. Using the U.S. National Counter-Terrorism Center’s Wordwide Incidence Tracking System [WITS] and a compilation of open source material, it is manifest that the frequency and lethality of the group’s attacks in Algeria have fallen to unprecedented lows since its founding in 2006. Indeed, because of increased security efforts against the group by Algerian and regional authorities, the group has been forced to strike softer, more vulnerable targets near its base/stronghold in the mountainous area east of Algiers in Bordj Bou Arreridj province and the so-called “triangle of death,” an area between Bouira, Boumerdes and Tizi Ouzou Kabyile <INSERT ALGERIA MAP>. Moreover, while AQIM has managed to widen its operational ambit far from its Algerian stronghold to countries of the Sahara-Sahel region, the distance of these attacks are more indicative of the growing autonomy and competitiveness of the group’s sub-commanders in its southern zone operations and overall lack of uniformity and control. They are also representative of the fact that the North African al Qaeda node is an Africa-wide organization and that its parent organizations [GIA and GSPC] – from which the group emerged -- have long had a presence in the lawless Sahel.

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The following will present an analysis of the current state of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, with a particular focus on the group’s structure, its ideological basis, scale and common methods of attacks as well as its operations across North Africa from its homebase of Algeria to the rest of the Maghreb and the Sahel-Sahara region.

Background

In terms of Islamist opposition and violence in Algeria, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb [Tanzim al-Qa’ida fi bilad al-Maghreb al-Islami] represents only its current I would say only the latest manifestation. Indeed, the group has roots as far back as the late 1980s and owes its foundation to the Salafist Group for Preaching/Call and Combat also known as the GSPC [Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat]. Primarily a nationalist-Islamist group, the GSPC emerged in 1998 after it split from the Armed Islamic Group or GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé) [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/algeria_founder_militant_gspc_arrested?fn=4514102860 ] because of the latter’s brutal attacks against Algerian civilians during the country’s civil war. Headed by a former Algerian paratrooper and GIA regional commander Hassan Hattab, the GSPC offered disaffected GIA militants a fresh start in its struggle against the Algerian government. So wait, they split because they were against targeting of civilians? That is a weird origin for a group that went psycho! Hattab’s leadership was, however, short lived. An ardent nationalist, Hattab began to dispute the GSPC’s slide toward to the transnational jihadist agenda espoused by al Qaeda after 2001. Feeling the pressure, he eventually “resigned” (though he was actually forced out) as the emir in 2001 and was replaced by a former GIA commander Nabil Sahraoui (aka/kunya Sheikh Abou Ibrahim Mustapha). What is Hattab doing now? Does he have his own TV show? A line of shampoo products? In 2003, Sahraoui issued a statement to the online jihadist forums in 2003 expressing his and his group’s intent to join al Qaeda [AQ] and “Osama bin Laden’s jihad against the heretic America.” He was killed the subsequent year by Algerian security forces and replaced by the current head of AQIM, Abdelmalek Droukdel [aka/kunya Abu Musab Abd al-Wadud], a seasoned Islamist militant and explosives expert.

The formation of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb was officially announced by al Qaeda’s number two in command, Ayman al-Zawahri [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/al_qaedas_pan_maghreb_gambit ], in an online video posted to jihadist websites via AQ’s As-Sahab media wing in September 11, 2006. “The “blessed union,” as Zawahri put it, vowed to, “be a bone in the throat of the American and French crusaders and their allies.” This was followed by a statement made three days later by the then head of the GSPC Droukdel, pledging allegiance to Osama bin Laden and AQ and, “in the faith, the doctrine, the method and the modes of action of [al Qaeda’s] members, as well as their leaders and religious guides.”While 2006 marked the formal merger between the two groups, AQ and members of its nodes had been corresponding and negotiating for at least a few years prior to this with the group’s GSPC parent organization.

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In a New York Times interview from July 2008, Abdelmalek Droukdel primarily cited religious motivations for the GSPC’s merger with AQ. However, there is speculation among Western and North African intelligence officials that the formation was less ideological and more opportunistic. Indeed, the GSPC was reeling from a long-running offensive spearheaded by the Algerian government that had almost annihilated the group and forced them to retreat to their traditional stronghold in the mountainous Kabylie region in eastern part of the country. To make matters worse, the government’s 1999 amnesty agreement with the militants convinced a number of GIA and GSPC members to lay down their arms [it is noteworthy that AQIM has since used the amnesty to its advantage, recruiting a number of former militants into its ranks]. Desperate for a means to survive, the group turned to AQ, surely facilitated by Belmokhtar and top members of the core group, to help its efforts in raising money, recruits and to increase its status among Islamist militants both domestically and internationally.

The GSPC’s decision to formally merge with AQ was certainly not without its difficulties. Indeed, a number of former high-ranking GSPC members turned their backs on AQIM, renouncing violence and pledging their support to the Algerian government against the newly refashioned ideology of the group. For instance, a former senior member of AQIM, Benmessaoud Abdelkader [aka/kunya Abu Daoud] who defected in July 2007 told journalists that the organization was riven by heated arguments over Droukdel’s and the GSPC’s decision to join AQ [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/algeria_threats_versus_realities_al_qaedas_north_african_node ]. The dispute was based on the fact that the merger effectively transformed the group’s ideological platform from primarily domestic/nationalist to internationalist/jihadist, extending the group’s target and operational ambit to include foreigners and unarmed civilians. The shift, however, was not entirely adopted, as rhetorical and tactical elements of the GIA and GSPC have endured to date, as demonstrated by the fact that the North African al Qaeda node continues to strike a number of targets favored by its predecessors. Indeed, as time showed, AQIM’s ideological platform and target set came to represent a synthesis between a focus on the “near enemy” -- whereby an insurgent/militant group directs its violence against symbols and representatives of oppressive Muslim regimes [police stations, ministries, etc]; and the “far enemy” – the notion of global jihadism’s promotion of military confrontation with the US and its allies to take revenge for and prevent the oppression of Muslims, which in the region means primarily the former imperial master France (since it is not really the U.S. that they can target in the Sahel, right?). Nevertheless, the focus on the far enemy led to a deep split in the organization – still strong within AQIM, leading to a decrease in the group’s overall size and logistical capabilities because, according to Abdelkader, dozens of foreign fighters deserted after becoming disillusioned with the group’s ideological shift.

Strategic and Tactical Shifts

2006

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Target selection and the means of carrying out militant attacks are fundamental to AQIM’s campaign of violence – or any militant group for that matter – as it represents an indication of the group’s ideology, operational capability and overall strategy. Accordingly, the newly formed Algerian al Qaeda node was quick to demonstrate its commitment to strike both the near and far enemy beginning in late Oct. 2006 [LINK:http://www.stratfor.com/algeria_gspc_fingerprints_oct_30_bombings?fn=6814102824 ]. In a 10-day span, for instance, AQIM carried out at least four coordinated IED/VBIED attacks against Algerian security and foreign oil establishments in and around Algiers. On Oct. 19, 2006, it conducted two IED attacks, one against a police station in El Harrach, an eastern suburb of Algiers, the second against a fuel storage site belonging to the French company Razel in Lakhdaria. On Oct. 29, 2006, the group conducted near-simultaneous VBIED attacks [LINK:http://www.stratfor.com/algeria_gspc_fingerprints_oct_30_bombings?fn=6814102824 ] against two Algerian police stations in Reghaia and Dergana.In total, from Sept. to Dec. 2006, AQIM carried out 19 attacks – 7 involving the use of an IED – that resulted in 39 deaths and 51 injuries to civilian and military personnel. Measuring lethality as the number of killed and injured per strike, the group managed to kill an average of just over 2 and injure roughly 4 individuals per attack. Also, the group managed to carry out an assault outside the borders of its Algerian stronghold when its operatives killed 9 civilians in an armed attack in Araouane, Tombouctou, Mali. Tactically, it soon became readily apparent that Droukdel was successfully blending the GSPC’s typical guerilla-style ambush tactics – representing a balanced use of firearms and explosives – used for years in northeastern Algeria with more sensationalist, AQ-p style bombings in urban areas [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/algeria_trademark_attacks_and_gspc_al_qaeda_blend?fn=7614102875. Indeed, a number of these attacks went well beyond the relatively more moderate tactics employed by its predecessor.

2007

In July 2007, AQIM released an online statement to the jihadist forums claiming that it had successfully restructured and reformed the militant Islamist resistance in Algeria that would lead to the targeting of foreigners and the employment of suicide bombers. Proof of the shift was demonstrated when the group dispatched two suicide VBIEDs against the prime minister’s office in Algiers and the police headquarters in the capital city in April [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/suicide_bombings_algerian_capital ], marking the first known suicide attacks in Algeria associated with AQIM [note: there was one [past incident in January 1995]. The VBIED attack against the coast guard barracks in Delly, Boumerdes east of Algiers in September was also particularly bloody, with 27 sailors and 3 civilians losing their lives and approximately 60 injured. The surge in attacks continued well into the year [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/algeria_al_qaeda_organization_countries_arab_maghreb_timeline ] with more sensationalist strikes against Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s convoy in the eastern town of Batna and two simultaneous

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suicide bombings against the Constitutional Court and the UN offices in Dec. [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/algeria_twin_blasts_rock_capital?fn=5014379656 ]. In its campaign to target the far enemy, the newly formed AQIM also began increasingly striking foreign energy instillations in Algeria [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/algeria_militants_focus_energy_targets] in line with AQ-p’s tactic of “economic jihad” [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100218_pakistan_bin_ladens_call_economic_jihad ]. However, despite the expanding target set, AQIM was unable to carry out any significant or truly disruptive attacks against the Algerian energy sector. This was likely because while the group had the intention to carry out significant strikes, it simply lacked the operational strength to target the bulk of possible targets in the Algerian energy sector that are located far into the southern desert and are well guarded.

In all, there were 33 documented AQIM-related attacks inside Algeria for 2007, 42 percent [14] of which were conducted using at least an IED and 3 using a VBIED [note: some studies put the VBIED figure as high as 8]. Combined, they indicate that the use of explosives in AQIM attacks in 2007 went up by more than 50 percent, while the use of firearms in such strikes dropped considerably. This likely contributed to the alarmingly high death and casualty rates of 88 and 208 respectively for total assaults both inside and outside Algeria for the year. In terms of the lethality of the attacks, this translates to roughly 2.5 fatalities and 6 casualties per attack. Outside the group’s headquarters in Algeria, the North African al Qaeda node also managed to carry out 2 armed assaults in Mauritania in December that led to 7 deaths and one casualty. This contributed to the decision by the governing body of the Dakar Rally to cancel the annual Dakar Rally in 2008 [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mauritania_threats_stall_dakar_rally]

The frequency and lethality of these attacks eventually forced the Algerian government’s hand. In mid-2007, security forces launched a massive operation against the group that resulted in significant losses of operatives and materiel for AQIM [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/algeria_threats_versus_realities_al_qaedas_north_african_node ]. According to the US State Department, the Algerian government killed or captured approximately 1,100 – nearly double the figures for 2006 – Islamist militants as a result of its crackdown

Operations in the Maghreb

AQIM also began plotting and carrying out attacks in countries contiguous to Algeria as well as more distant ones of the Maghreb <INSERT MAP OF MAGHREB> -- an Arabic word meaning “place of sunset” or “the west” that collectively refers to an area that encompasses the North African countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Mauritania and the disputed territory of the Western Sahara. Operating from its base in the mountainous area east of Algiers, AQIM worked to extend its range across the Maghreb by establishing and loosely operating cells that carried out

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attacks across North Africa. This has included cells [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/morocco_warnings_arrests_and_threat_soft_targets?fn=5711262333] and attempted attacks [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/morocco_casablancas_second_string_bombers ] in Morocco. AQIM cells were also active in Tunisia [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/tunisia_next_militant_hotspot?fn=4111262352 ], with kidnappings of Westerners [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/tunisia_brush_al_qaedas_north_african_node], and attempted strikes against the U.K. and US embassies and other tourist sites around Dec 2006 and Jan 2007 known as the “Soilman” plot in Tunisia . These attempts are not surprising, as militant Islamist cells/groups were already present in a number of these North African countries. Groups such as Morocco’s Islamic Combatant Group, Libya’s Islamic Fighting Group [LIFG] and a number of similar groups in Tunisia, such as the Tunisian Combatant Group, were all likely viewed as potential recruits in AQIM’s attempt to widen the scope of its operations. However, despite ample opportunity to recruit, organize and carry out attacks in North African countries, the attacks were, for the most part, terminated by authorities in the planning phase.

2008

2008 marked the most lethal 12 months for AQIM since its founding. Demonstrating that they were a force to be reckoned with, AQIM carried out 6 suicide bombings against police and military targets over an eight-month period, from January to August 2008, including a deadly train bombing in June [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/algeria_train_bombing_proves_deadly?fn=7514100085 ]. The month of August turned out to be particularly aggressive for the group. AQIM launched 12 attacks across the country, involving 4 suicide VBIED bombings leading to the death of 80 individuals and injuring many more. The VBIED attack against a police training academy in Issers was particularly bloody [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/algeria_aqim_and_perils_soft_targets ], leading to the death of 43. However, it is important to note that the majority of the targets struck were softer than the hardened targets the group managed to strike in Algiers in 2007, such as the Prime Minister’s office, the constitutional court and the UN.

Though the overall number of attacks was down by approximately 30 percent [10 to 23] from the previous year, the lethality [i.e. number of deaths and casualties per attack] was up almost 100 percent. This is best explained by AQIM’s shift in assault tactics, evidenced by the 20 percent increase [to 70%] in the use of IEDs, including the use of 7 suicide VBIEDs in strikes across Algeria, more than double the year before. Indeed, some sort of explosive was used in almost three-quarters of all attacks, further indicating AQIM’s gradual change in tactics away from simply armed assaults and ambushes to the use of IEDs.

All told, the marked increase in the use of IED and VBIED suicide bombings likely accounts for the increase of lethality in AQIM attacks, which averaged out to over 5

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deaths and 10 casualties per strike over the course of the year. Moreover, the group’s target set also witnessed a remarkable shift from the pre-2006 days of the GSPC. According to West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center [CTC] vol. 1 issue number 5 from April 2008, prior to the GSPC’s merger with al Qaeda, 88 percent [29 of the 33] of all successful attacks struck Algerian national targets, with only a single attack against an international target. However, after the merger the ratio of attacks against national to international targets reduced a substantial 88 percent [or by a ratio of seven to one]

The new surge in violence forced the Algerian government again to step up its assault on the group. The army launched a massive military operation against AQIM in September, deploying 15,000 troops to the eastern regions of Batna, Jijel and Skikda. Also, as part of its aggressive counterterror assault against the group, Algerian security forces began increasingly employing its air power, using helicopters with infrared equipment for reconnaissance and attacks.

The new emphasis on the use of suicide bombers using IEDs/VBIEDs to strike softer, civilian targets – quite evident in 2008 – should be briefly underscored as this was/is a relatively new phenomenon in Algeria and the larger Maghreb. This is likely attributable to two factors. First, Droukdel’s decision to take on AQ’s label, including its worldview and operational methods, likely influenced the veteran Algerian militant to employ methods of attack consistent with those carried out by AQ and its affiliates. Indeed, according to the US State Department report in 2007, after the merger it became apparent that militants in Algeria, “had shifted to assault tactics meant to emulate the success of suicide bombings in Iraq and Afghanistan.”

Second, according to American and European security and counterterrorism officials, Algeria fell victim to the “blowback” phenomenon, whereby seasoned militants returning from a jihadist theater – in this case Iraq – join up with the local Islamist militants, using their newly acquired battlefield skills to, in some cases, act as a significant force multiplier in their home countries [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/morocco_signs_increased_militant_activity_maghreb ]. According to a September 2005 study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Algerians were the single largest group of foreign fighters in Iraq, making up 20 percent of their total strength. Moreover, it is also quite possible that Islamist militants in Algeria were increasingly successful in urging fellow militants [and potential suicide operatives] to stay home and carry out operations on Algerian soil. Both likely account for the surge of VBIED suicide attacks in 2008.

The increasing use of suicide operatives and large-scale IED/VBIED attacks exacerbated the already heated the schism over targeting and tactics inside the group. Despite receiving praise for the more sensational attacks from a number of high-profile AQ members, such as the Libyan native Abu Yahya al-Libi [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/al_qaeda_next_generation ], Wadoud and AQIM largely failed to generate local support for their campaign of violence. Based on Algeria’s history of violent Islamist campaigns that witnessed the deaths of hundreds of

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thousands of innocent civilians, AQIM’s more indiscriminate campaign of violence turned popular sentiment against the group. Representative of this are the number of notable former hardened Islamists who have turned against the group. Influential former Islamist militants such as Hassan Hattab, Benmessaoud Abdelkader and Mustapha Kertali [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/algeria_attack_against_ex_islamist_militant ] have all joined the Algerian government in asking the militants to lay down their arms.

Operations in the Sahel-Sahara2008 also witnessed a noteworthy uptick of AQIM’s operations in the Sahel-Sahara region <INSERT MAP OF SAHEL> -- a region covering parts of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, Somalia, Ethiopia and Eritrea. Over a twelve-month period beginning in December, the North African al Qaeda node staged at least eight attacks in the northern portions of Niger, Mali and Mauritania. More recently, AQIM was responsible for a suicide attack in northern Mali in March 2010. While these certainly were not the first instances of activity by the al Qaeda node in the region, they represented an unprecedented uptick.

The presence of AQIM militants in these less-populated regions is not surprising, as the loosely patrolled borders and sparsely populated states of the Sahara provided and continue to provide AQIM and criminal gangs with a fertile ground to operate and grow relatively unchecked. The GSPC took advantage of this, with an active branch in the Sahara, which its current manifestation built on, developing new ties with smuggling rings in the desert. Building on the links of its predecessor, AQIM continues to cooperate with the Tuareg tribes in Niger and Mali [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mali_cease_fire_tuareg_how_long ] with the latter abducting foreigners and trading or selling them to AQIM who then holds them for ransom or uses them as bargaining chips in negotiations with Algerian and foreign governments to release AQIM operatives. There have also been rumors of AQIM trying to link up with militant groups in Nigeria like the Boko Haram also known as the Nigerian “Taliban,”[LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100615_nigeria_aqim_attempts_expand ], though this is unlikely. To fortify their operations in the Sahara-Sahel, AQIM has reportedly constructing bunkers in mountainous desert areas in Mali and Niger, as well as additional bases in the desert region between the borders of Algeria, Mali, Mauritania and Niger.

From 2008 and into 2009, AQIM put a particular focus on Mauritania as a staging ground to demonstrate its intent and capacity to carry out high-profile attacks against international targets. In Feb. 2008, for instance, unknown gunmen attacked the Israeli Embassy in the capital city of Nouakchott [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mauritania_embassy_attack_and_al_qaeda?fn=8111262323], causing no casualties to embassy personnel. The following fall, Droukdel/al-Wadoud issued what turned out to be an empty a call to arms Aug. 12 in response to the coup in Mauritania a week before [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/mauritania_unlikelihood_al_qaedas_threat]. In

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Jun. 2009, an American teacher was murdered in the capital city in what was likely a botched kidnapping attempt [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090624_mauritania_al_qaeda_video_and_follow_hit ]. The following August, a suicide bomber also struck the French embassy in Nouakchott that only managed to slightly damage the outside wall of the compound and injure two embassy security personnel [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090810_mauritania_tactical_look_nouakchott_bombing].

The comparatively higher incidence of AQIM-style attacks in Mauritania can be explained by a couple of factors. First, the country – similar to most countries in the Sahel – offers a particularly vast geography of approximately 400,000 square miles, combined with a small population of approximately 3 million people, which makes it difficult for any governing power to fully control [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090810_mauritania_suicide_attack_aqim?fn=3914379685. This provides AQIM and criminal gangs with ample operating space outside the purview of local governments. Also, according to local security officials, the choice to carry out these attacks in the Islamic Republic largely fell on the shoulders of the Afghan veteran and AQIM’s emir of the southern zone, Mokhtar Belmokhtar [aka/kunya Khaled Abou al-Abbas or Lâaouar the “one-eyed”]. The nineteen-year veteran of jihad dubbed “Uncatchable” by French intelligence is thought to be behind the attacks in Nouakchott. He and his 100 to 150-man “el Moulathamoune” [masked] brigade of Islamists were also reportedly responsible for past attacks outside the capital city, including attack on a Mauritanian military outpost in 2005 [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/mauritania_militants_accused_attack] and the murder of four French tourists near Aleg in December 2007. While evidence suggests that Belmokhtar has indeed been behind these attacks, it is unclear why he has chosen to put a particular emphasis on the country. Moreover, it is equally unclear if he carried out these attacks under the guidance/direction of AQIM’s emir, or whether he was acting more or less unilaterally. However, prior to the events in Mauritania, Droukdel acknowledged in his New York Times interview that AQIM and militant operations in the region could be best described as a growing network of militants only partially controlled by his far-flung deputies.

The run-down of the attacks is great… BUT, I would suggest you set up a “foreign-target” specific run down as well. Because right now the attacks against foreigners are lumped together with everything else. Why not pull out the attacks on foreigners and represent those in a separate graphic.

On top of the more sensational strikes in Mauritania, the uptick of violent AQIM attacks and kidnappings in the Sahel-Sahara region around 2008-2009 led to speculation that the group’s operational strength was surging. However, the real reason behind this was and continues to be what security officials are referring to as a vicious rivalry between two AQIM sub-commanders, Belmokhtar and Hamid Essouffi [aka/kunya Abdelhamid Abu Zayd]. This rivalry also extends to one between Belmokhtar and Droukdel, with the

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former going so far as to openly criticize the latter’s leadership of AQIM and the GSPC in Apr. 2009 in an interview with the newspaper Liberté in Algiers.

Belmokhtar and his “masked” brigade of Islamists are one of four similar yet competitive brigades operating in AQIM’s southern zone – the region in the Sahara-Sahel stretching from northeast Mauritania and the northern portions of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. His smuggling networks running drugs, weapons and illegal immigrants across the region as well as his kidnapping for ransom schemes have earned him quite the reputation, leading some to eventually call him “Mr Marlboro” for his lucrative cigarette-smuggling operations that he used to contribute large sums of money to AQIM. Though the native Algerian is a seasoned jihadist, he has been known almost equally for his more opportunistic, criminal endeavors. Sensing Belmokhtar’s growing influence as a potential threat to his rule, Droukdel promoted the less-experienced Abu Zayd – in charge of his own “Taregh Ibn Ziyad” brigade of approximately 100-150 militants – in AQIM’s ranks over Belmokhtar in the southern zone sometime around 2007-2008. Though the chain of command was reinforced, tensions brewed over the promotion and the hostage-for-cash process.

In Sept. 2008, 11 Mauritanian soldiers and a civilian guide were kidnapped after their military patrol was ambushed in the town of Zouerate in the Aklet Tourine northern province of Mauritania. A week later, their bodies were found mutilated and beheaded. On Sept. 22, AQIM released a statement to the jihadi forums claiming responsibility for the incident, in what the called the “Battle of Zouerate.” Abu Zayd is reported to have ordered their execution. He and his “Taregh Ibn Ziyad” brigade were also responsible for the high-profile abductions in Nigeria They’re then also operating in Nigeria? as well as the execution of a British hostage in Mali – a known operating environment for Belmokhtar’s kidnapping for ransom operation[s] operation – on May 31, 2009, depriving Belmokhtar of desperately-needed ransom money and bringing unwanted heat on him and his brigade. More recently, the southern commander has been deemed responsible for the execution of the French national this past week.

According to French and Algerian security officials the above actions were reflective of Abu Zayd’s desire to assert his global jihadist credentials against Belmokhtar’s already strong influence in the Sahara. Accordingly, security forces in the Sahel were forced to step up their assault on AQIM and its affiliated brigades. This led to a number of arrests of AQIM operatives and violent cycle of clashes and counter clashes pitting Abu Zayd’s and Belmokhtar’s brigades against the security forces of Mali, Mauritania and Niger. After taking a beating as a result of Abu Zayd’s more ambitious activities, Belmokhtar and his masked brigade were forced to retreat to the Algerian side of the Tanezrouft mountain range closer to AQIM’s home base. Belmokhtar’s newfound proximity to Droukdel decreased the former’s autonomy of action over the latter. However, the rivalry continued to grow between Belmokhtar and Abu Zayd with both brigade leaders pushing their respective network of militants to deliver more money and material to AQIM’s headquarters in Algeria.

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These attacks outside of AQIM’s Algerian stronghold naturally engendered fear among locals that the group’s influence could possibly increase in surrounding regions, especially those with large Muslim populations. However, while, for instance, Mauritania, Niger and Mali have majority Muslim populations, AQIM has yet to demonstrate an ability to cooperate with local Salafi movements. Indeed, the more radical Salafi-jihadist tenets simply have not gained traction in the region. Also, the deep influence and presence of Sufism in these countries likely stymies the group’s ideological appeal to the masses. Moreover, AQIM’s appeal and foundation, like AQ, is primarily theological. Indeed, the group justifies its attacks against the Algerian state, foreign interests and individuals in the region as well as the death of innocent civilians by religious duty. However, its deep history and cooperation with criminal smugglers without question damages its appeal to potential recruits and supporters. While AQIM’s criminal dimension is absolutely crucial to its operations, it invariably hurts its legitimacy with a number of more religious Muslim groups in the region. Are there any? You mean actual groups or potential recruits.

2009

Despite concerted propaganda and military efforts against AQIM by Algerian and regional authorities, 2009 was another banner year for the group in terms of the number of attacks. Over the twelve months, there were a total of 40 armed assaults attributed to the group – the highest tally thus far – both in Algeria and the surrounding Sahel countries of Mauritania and Niger resulting in 107 deaths and 73 casualties. Fifty-five percent [22] of these involved the use of IEDs in mostly roadside bombings as part of armed assaults. However, AQIM used far less explosive ordinance in these IEDS and strayed away from employing the more powerful VBIEDs previously seen. The most deadly of these was took place in June, when AQIM ambushed a security convoy escorting Chinese construction workers to a highway project in Bordj Bou Arreridj [110 miles southeast of Algiers]. In what was the worst attack in six months at the time [since the Aug 2008 VBIED suicide bombing Issers], the militants killed 18 gendarmes using a combination of IEDs and assault rifles.

While the quantity of assaults increased, their lethality significantly decreased to just over 2 deaths and casualties per strike, a significant drop from the year before. Also, the majority of strikes were carried out on softer, more vulnerable targets far outside the Algerian capital. Indeed, over the course of the year, over 95 percent of AQIM-affiliated assaults took place to the east of Algiers mostly in the Blida and Boumerdes provinces <INSERT MAP>, occurring at an average of 88 miles from the city’s center – representing the furthest average distance of attacks since the group’s founding. Indeed, only two attacks fell outside of these parameters: a single RPG attack in Algiers; and an armed assault 73 miles southwest of the capital city in in the city of Ibn Zayd in Ayn Defla. Also, the number of clashes with security forces in Mali, Mauritania and Niger increased, especially in the month of December. Evidenced by the geographic shift in AQIM’s attack, it is clear that the group was being forced to operative closer to its mountainous northern Kabylie stronghold

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because of the increasingly successful counterterrorism efforts by Algerian security forces. This, according to a number of security analysts, is referred to as a “displacement effect,” whereby a militant group will be forced to act closer to its safe haven, choosing to strike in locations where state security forces are weaker. As part of this, many of these attacks were also defensive in nature, striking security forces in or near their hideouts .

2010

The lethality and quantity of AQIM attacks in the first six months of 2010 have dropped considerably. For instance, the number of deaths has decreased by more than 100 percent [from 72 in 2009 to 31 in 2010], with the number of wounded civilians and military personnel following suit -- more than a 100 percent drop [48 in 2009 and 16 the following year]. The frequency of attacks has also dropped significantly from January to June, with only 10 compared to 22 in the same six-month period in 2009. AQIM is still using IEDs in approximately half of all attacks, the lion’s share of which continue to occur to the east toward the group’s stronghold. Moreover, it has only managed to strike one moderately hardened target in June when it carried out a suicide VBIED attack against a gendarme barracks in the eastern Boumerdes province in June [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100611_brief_follow_up_attack_near_algiers] inflicting minimal damages.

Conclusion

From AQIM’s official founding in 2006 to the present, our research indicates a few discernable patterns in regards to the group’s operational capacity inside Algeria. First, the majority of attacks have involved low casualty numbers, from 0-3. Those attacks that did achieve a higher degree of lethality, which we define as 2 or more casualties, were mostly restricted to Algiers and slightly to the east of the capital. Second, after the GSPC’s September 2006 merger with AQ, the number of violent attacks and threats against foreign/international targets within Algeria’s borders increased significantly. This was particular evident in the spring of 2008 and continues to date.

Also, the attack and casualty rates have been highest between mid-2008 and late 2009. Indeed, the last 6 months of 2009 there was a noteworthy spike in the number of attacks. However, tracing the geographical distribution of attacks last year, we noticed that AQIM had zeroed in on softer, more vulnerable targets closer to its base in the east, strongly suggesting that the group’s operational capacity was crippled by Algerian counterterrorism efforts and that they are likely attempting to defend their base. The uptick in attacks appears to represent an effort on the part of the North African al Qaeda node to demonstrate that they remained a veritable security threat as well as relevant actor on the international jihadist scene and not a verifiable indicator that the group’s strength was surging. Ultimately, it appears to

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be nothing more than a last gasp of air by the group that, by all indications, is not likely to be repeated.

Furthermore, the more recent increase of abductions of Westerners and clashes with security forces in the Sahel were not, as some suspected, indicative of AQIM’s ability to effectively strike targets at a much longer range; rather, it was more likely the result of a vicious rivalry between sub-commanders and an overall indication of the lack of uniformity within the group. It could also be the result of the increased initiative on the part of countries in the Sahara-Sahel region to go on the offensive against AQIM. For instance, a joint military base operated by Algeria, Mauritania, Mali and Niger was set up on April 21 this year in the southern Algerian town of Tamanrasset [LINK: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100421_brief_saharan_countries_cooperation_against_aqim ] to coordinate in anti-terrorism activities and to clamp down on one of the main smuggling routes employed by AQIM. Also, the aggressive military operations by French-backed Mauritanian troops in Mauritania and Mali over the past week are hopefully a harbinger of a more aggressive, counterterrorism approach by regional countries against the group. Paris' open declaration of war on the group after the death of the French national will certainly add impetus to the effort. However, as opposed to actual French troops on the ground in Algeria – something the country subsequently openly rejected and which would be impossible to envision knowing the history between the two -- this will most likely indicate enhanced military and intelligence efforts against the North African al Qaeda node. Joining France’s call, Niger’s military leader – whose remarks were conveyed by French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner – on July 28 said his government is ready to “take necessary action” against terrorism and AQIM in the Sahel.

Algeria itself continues its assault against the North African al Qaeda node. The Ministry of Defense recently announcing this past June that it is reinforcing it National Gendarmerie by adding a sizeable 9,000 members, and that it will begin using a new unified network of communication, known as Ronital in operations against AQIM. Ronital is a unified network operated by Algeria’s central command to ensure effective transmissions of electronic messages – including sound and images – that was set up in the Tizi Ouzou region of the Kabyle Mountains, a place where state concentrates its counterterrorism efforts against AQIM.

As the assault continues on AQIM and its affiliates continues, the future for the group appears bleak. In all likelihood, attacks – involving armed, IED assaults, ambushes of military-civilian convoys and strikes against more-hardened symbols of the Algerian state [e.g. police academies] -- inside Algeria will continue to be concentrated around its eastern stronghold in the Blida and Boumerdes provinces and will unlikely be seen in and around Algiers. The threat of abduction to Westerns and clashes with security forces in the Sahara-Sahel region will indeed, continue. However, STRATFOR anticipates their lethality and frequency to largely remain the same and/or decrease.

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