osher lifelong learning institute distinguished lecture...
TRANSCRIPT
Osher Lifelong Learning Institute
Distinguished Lecture for January 23, 2018
By Dr. James W. Ingram III
The Current Supreme Court Debate on Gerrymandering
“Toward the end of the Supreme Court’s argument in Gill v. Whitford, about the future of partisan gerrymandering, there was a revealing moment about the place of the newest Justice in the esteem of at least one of his peers. In less than a year, Neil Gorsuch has dominated oral arguments, lectured his colleagues, and given dubiously appropriate public speeches. Questioning Paul Smith, the lawyer challenging Wisconsin’s contorted district lines, Gorsuch made another pedantic gesture.”
The Gill v. Whitford Debate“The argument had gone on for nearly an hour when Gorsuch began a question as follows: ‘Maybe we can just for a second talk about the arcane matter of the Constitution.’ There was a rich subtext to this query. Originalists and textualists such as Gorsuch, and his predecessor on the Court, Antonin Scalia, often criticize their colleagues for inventing rights that are not found in the nation’s founding document. Gorsuch’s statement that the Court should spare ‘a second’ for the ‘arcane’ subject of the document was thus a slap at his ideological adversaries; of course, they, too, believe that they are interpreting the Constitution, but, in Gorsuch’s view, only he cares about the document itself.”
WWJD? = What Would James Madison Do? “Gorsuch went on to give his colleagues a civics lecture about the text of
the Constitution. ‘And where exactly do we get authority to revise state legislative lines? When the Constitution authorizes the federal government to step in on state legislative matters, it’s pretty clear—if you look at the Fifteenth Amendment, you look at the Nineteenth Amendment, the Twenty-sixth Amendment, and even the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 2.’ In other words, Gorsuch was saying, why should the Court involve itself in the subject of redistricting at all—didn’t the Constitution fail to give the Court the authority to do so?”
Ginsburg Strikes Back“Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who is bent with age, can sometimes look disengaged or even sleepy during arguments, and she had that droopy look today as well. But, in this moment, she heard Gorsuch very clearly, and she didn’t even raise her head before offering a brisk and convincing dismissal. In her still Brooklyn-flecked drawl, she grumbled, ‘Where did one person, one vote come from?’ There might have been an audible woo that echoed through the courtroom. (Ginsburg’s comment seemed to silence Gorsuch for the rest of the arguments.)”
Constitution Doesn’t State the One-Person One-Vote Rule
“In one cutting remark, Ginsburg summed up how Gorsuch’s patronizing lecture omitted some of the Court’s most important precedents, and Smith gratefully followed up on it: ‘That’s what Reynolds v. Sims and Baker v. Carr did, and a number of other cases that have followed along since.’ In these cases, from the early nineteen-sixties, the Court established that the Justices, via the First and Fourteenth Amendments, very much had the right to tell states how to run their elections.”
What is Gerrymandering? Gerrymandering can happen whenever maps of districts are
drawn for districts for a policy making body.
If districting or redistricting is unfair, as the map and districts are drawn to benefit whoever drew the map, we call it a gerrymander.
These districts can be for elections to a City Council, a school board, a county board of supervisors, a state legislature, the U.S. House of Representatives, or even California’s state Board of Equalization.
At the Congressional level, redistricting follows reapportionment. Even if a state neither gains nor loses House seats, it may be required to redistrict to comply with the need to ensure a one person-one vote representation standard is met.
The issue of gerrymandering is about fair representation.
The original specimen, which
although indigenous to these
states, is apparently global in
incidence.
Complaints of unfair
representative systems have
been made in virtually every
democracy humans have
established.
Gerrymandering can make it
difficult for certain voters to
receive fair representation,
depending on their race,
party or other geographically
distributed characteristics.
Gerrymandering, the Fiery Party Monster The editorial that accompanied the
monstrous drawing referenced “the present combustible and venomous state of affairs…
…many fiery ebullitions of party spirit, many democratic explosions of democratic wrath and fulminations of gubernatorial vengeance within the year past, which would naturally produce an uncommon degree of inflammation and acrimony in the body politic,”
and attributed some of the controversies around Gerry to “some rogue of his own party….his Excellency being somewhat like a tinder-horn, and his party very liable to take fire….”
Elbridge Gerry v. Democracy “The evils we experience flow from the
excess of democracy. The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots.
In Massts. it had been fully confirmed by experience that they are daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions by the false reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can refute….
He had he said been too republican heretofore: he was still however republican, but had been taught by experience the danger of the levilling spirit” (Constitutional Convention, May 31, 1787).
Infamous Gerry and his Monster
Ironically, Elbridge Gerry was so worried about
Americans’ rights that he refused to sign the
U.S. Constitution because it included no bill of
rights. He and George Mason and Edmund
Randolph aren’t in the above painting for that
reason. Gerry opposed the unfair redistricting of
Massachusetts, but signed the law under
pressure from his party.
Gerrymander Exaggeration
Fair Representation This issue actually pre-dates the United States Constitution.
The fact that America did not have rotten boroughs as England did is why our legislatures were more difficult for the royal governors and crown to control them than the British Parliament.
Before the 1832 Reform Act dealt with the issue of unfair representation, most Britons had taxation without representation.
Apportionment and freehold standards were so liberal in the colonies that “fifty to seventy-five percent of the adult white male population was eligible to vote—far more than could do so in England” (Bernard Bailyn, Origins of American Politics, 87-88).
Jefferson argued fair apportionment was “a right inestimable to the people and formidable to tyrants only” (Bailyn, 83).
James Wilson on Colonial Assemblies “Before [the Revolution], the executive and judicial powers of the
government were placed neither in the people, nor in those who professed to receive them under the authority of the people.
They were derived from a different and a foreign source: they were regulated by foreign maxims; they were directed to a foreign purpose. Need we be surprised, then, that they were objects of aversion and distrust?
...On the other hand, our assemblies were chosen by ourselves: they were guardians of our rights, the objects of our confidence, and the anchor of our political hopes.
Every power which could be placed in them, was thought to be safely placed: every extension of that power was considered to be an extension of our own security.”
Representation per the Original U.S. Constitution
“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.
The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.
The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative;
and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three” (§I.2.3).
Washington Speaks—Representation Mr. GORHAM said if it was not too late he could wish, for the purpose of lessening objections to
the Constitution, that the clause declaring "the number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every forty thousand" which had produced so much discussion, might be yet reconsidered, in order to strike out 40,000 & insert "thirty thousand." This would not he remarked establish that as an absolute rule, but only give Congress a greater latitude which could not be thought unreasonable.
Mr. KING & Mr. CARROL seconded & supported the idea of Mr. Gorham.
When the PRESIDENT rose, for the purpose of putting the question, he said that although his situation had hitherto restrained him from offering his sentiments on questions depending in the House, and it might be thought, ought now to impose silence on him, yet he could not forbear expressing his wish that the alteration proposed might take place. It was much to be desired that the objections to the plan recommended might be made as few as possible. The smallness of the proportion of Representatives had been considered by many members of the Convention an insufficient security for the rights & interests of the people. He acknowledged that it had always appeared to himself among the exceptionable parts of the plan, and late as the present moment was for admitting amendments, he thought this of so much consequence that it would give much satisfaction to see it adopted.
No opposition was made to the proposition of Mr. Gorham and it was agreed to unanimously.
On the question to agree to the Constitution enrolled in order to be signed. It was agreed to all the States answering ay.
Madison notes: [This was the only occasion on which the President entered at all into the discussions of the Convention]”.
First Citizen in the Big Chair
Benjamin Franklin at the close of the U.S.
Constitutional Convention: “I have the happiness
to know that it is a rising and not a setting Sun.”
Writing the Rules to Win the Game
Ironically, the Federalists feared fair representation when the Constitution was ratified.
They wanted the voters who favored the U.S. Constitution to choose the First Congress, not those who opposed it.
This is because the First Congress would structure the executive and judicial branches of government, and draft the all-important Bill of Rights.
The last thing Federalists wanted was for lots of Anti-Federalists to be elected to Congress.
The Federalists used state election systems strategically to ensure a Federalist majority in Congress.
Electoral Strategery
Reapportionment vs. Redistricting Apportionment is the designation of how many members
each state gets in the House of Representatives.
If a state gets only one House member, the whole state is the district and no districting or redistricting is needed.
But most states receive more than one HR member.
Under the original Constitution, states could choose whether to create districts or have at-large House members.
Some states chose to do districts, some to do at-large elections, depending on how this would affect the big party.
In an 1842 federal law, Congress tried to require every state entitled to more than one H.R. seat to create districts.
At-Large or District Elections A number of states believed the federal government had over-
stepped its bounds by requiring that states hold their elections a certain way, so 4 states continued doing as they pleased, holding at-large elections.
This practice continued from 1843-1971, ranging from one to five states flouting the law in any given election.
Over the years, the U.S. Congress altered the Apportionment Act on the districting issue, even allowing some at-large districts under the 1929 Permanent Apportionment Act that set the Congress at its present size of 435 members.
In 1967, the threat that states would use at-large elections to purposely dilute African American votes brought about a new law requiring that at-large districts no longer be used after 1971 in states with two or more Congressmembers.
Denial of Fair Representation One may use the malapportionment of representatives to
deny people fair representation.
Baker v. Carr, Reynolds v. Sims and associated cases make that practice unconstitutional.
One may also use at-large elections to deny various minority groups fair representation.
Thornburg v. Gingles, Miller v. Johnson and a series of Voting Rights Act cases make this kind of racial gerrymandering unconstitutional.
The U.S. Supreme Court has not clearly decided whether gerrymandering is allowed if it results in unfair representation for the majority or for more minorities on grounds other than race.
Types of Gerrymander Racial Gerrymandering has been used to dilute the
efficacy of minority votes.
African Americans have difficulty electing as many, or even any representatives, when it has been done.
The Supreme Court has overturned plans drawing district lines solely on the basis of race.
There are two other kinds of gerrymandering, on which the high court’s position are much less clear:
Partisan Gerrymandering, which maximizes the number of safe districts for a particular party.
Sweetheart Gerrymandering, which helps to insure that the incumbents are all re-elected.
Cracking, Packing, Even Stacking Cracking splits up districts to dilute the power of the group
that would usually win them.
Packing puts as many of one group as possible into a super-majority district. They will win that particular district, but at the cost of losing in other districts in which they are made the minority.
The ACLU has added the concept of Stacking, as in stacking the deck, which is when district lines are redrawn to create the appearance that a group can win when in reality the voting turnout disparities will ensure they lose instead.
On January 9, a
federal court found
North Carolina
guilty of an
unconstitutional
gerrymander and
instructed the state
legislature to come
up with a new and
fairer plan by
tomorrow, January
24.
Partisan Gerrymanders In Pennsylvania, the 2014 Congressional elections featured a 44%
Democratic vote, but 13/18 House members elected were Republican.
In Ohio, the 2014 Congressional elections featured a 40% Democratic vote, but 12/26 House members elected were Republican.
In North Carolina in 2016, 53% of the vote went Republican, but 77% of the seats in the state legislature did.
In Wisconsin, the subject of Gill v. Whitford in the U.S. Supreme Court, the post 2010 gerrymander produced this result:
“In the next election, in November 2012, Republicans won only 47 percent of the vote but 60 of 99 seats in the Assembly. In the midterm year of 2014, they won 57 percent of the Assembly vote and 63 seats, and in 2016, they won about 53 percent of the Assembly vote and 64 seats.”
Comparing the Efficiency GapsThe efficiency gap is the statistical measure of
partisan gerrymandering that is currently being
examined in Gill v. Whitford.
In Map #2, the blue party wastes 0 votes, while
the red party wastes all 20 of its votes due to
cracking, so the efficiency gap is 20/50, which
creates a 40% gap favoring the blue party.
In Map #3, the blue party wastes 18 votes due
to packing and 12 votes due to cracking. The
red party wastes only 2 votes where red voters
are placed in a packed blue district and 0 votes
in majority red districts where they have exactly
the number of votes needed to win. Thus, the
efficiency gap would be (18+12) -2 / 50, or (30-
2) / 50, which is 28/50, which means that there
is a 56% efficiency gap favoring the red party.
Representatives Choosing Voters
Safe Seats in the U.S. Congress
31
The reason that
incumbents win so
regularly is that
gerrymandering helps to
create uncompetitive
districts.
Given that politicians who
draw the districts want to
ensure safe seats they can
win in future, and that they
can get patronage from
Congress in exchange for
creating safe districts, this
is not a surprising result.
The Elected L.A. Charter Reform Commission
Archie-Hudson Boland Chemerinsky Dupont-Walker Finn
Glushon Hahn Kayser Lombard Macias
Pacheco Romero Weinberger Widom Zine
Districting Politics Elected L.A. Charter Reform Commissioners such as Woody
Fleming, an African-American council deputy from the 9th District who aspired to become its next Council member, referred to the efforts to increase Council size as a municipal version of the Missouri Compromise.
Just as that Compromise had tied the existence of “free” states to those allowing slavery, a larger City Council would have ensured retention of seats for African Americans at the cost of weakening the holders of these seats.
Fleming’s comparison was apt. The good news of the Missouri Compromise was that there would be free states, the bad news that there would also be slave states. This he thought analogous to African Americans holding offices, albeit much weaker ones.
Secrecy: Because It’s Easier to Screw People in the Dark The issue of Council size and districts was one of the most
controversial addressed by ECC. When the ECC was deliberating this question, a movie entitled Godzilla was in theaters, and posters all over the city were promoting the film by asking “Does Size Matter?”
The ECC wanted to use a sexy and topical subject for our meeting, so a staffer appropriated the catchphrase and used it to headline meeting notices. At the meeting, ECC members became very heated over the issue of an appropriate Council size and the boundary lines of specific districts, from which some members might campaign in future.
An Assistant City Attorney who was amused at the proceedings would answer the question posed by the flyer: “size always matters when you’re getting screwed.”
L.A. City Council Districts
Reapportionment v. Redistricting The two are often confused: reapportionment occurs
after every census, to ensure that the states split the House seats according to population.
Redistricting of the House is often needed because reapportionment changes the number of House seats a state gets.
Since the Baker v. Carr, Wesberry v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims cases, reapportionment and redistricting is also needed at the state level.
Supreme Court & Districting In earlier cases, the high court had held that matters such as
voting lines were non-justiciable, political questions.
Baker v. Carr addressed the malapportionment of votes for the Tennessee General Assembly, sending the case back to the federal district court to address.
Wesberry v. Sanders required that a state’s congressional districts also adhere to a one-person, one-vote standard.
Reynolds v. Sims applied the finding from Tennessee to Alabama, stating that in states with bicameral legislatures, both chambers had to be one-person, one-vote.
The Basis of Representation “Legislators represent people, not trees or acres” (Reynolds v. Sims)
If a tree falls in the forest, and it doesn’t hit a voter, then who cares?
Redistricting Criteria Districting must abide by “traditional race-neutral
districting principles, including but not limited to
compactness,
contiguity, and
respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests” Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) at 916.
Compactness
Obvious what it would be in
theory, but complicated due to
mountains, rivers and other
geographic features, not to
mention buildings and urban
features such as freeways,
railroads, etc.
Sometimes it is necessary to ignore
compactness to allow racial
minorities to create a district which
can allow minority representation.
But Shaw v. Reno makes district
drawing solely on race
unconstitutional
Modern Gerrymandering “North Carolina’s first redistricting
plan following the 1990 Census was rejected because it had created only one minority-majority district, while in the judgment of the US Attorney General, there could have been two.
This led to a new redistricting plan that involved a heavily gerrymandered district that used interstate highways to connect high density minority areas.
The plan was challenged by white voters who claimed that the plan was racially discriminatory, its only purpose being to elect a black representative.”
Reno-mandering: Shaw v. Reno
This was the map of districts that was overturned in Shaw v. Reno, 1993.
Contiguity Under Water
Contiguity Over Land
Establishing contiguity in
competitive municipal
annexation can resemble
the game of Go, as it did
in the early 20th Century
battle between L.A. and
Long Beach over control
of the ports of San Pedro
Bay.
Communities of Interest Reminiscent of Sesame Street’s comparative logic: “one
of these things is not like the others…”
Interesting Community or Community of Interest?
No “Federal Plan” Excuses “The superficial resemblance between one of the Alabama
apportionment plans and the legislative representation scheme of the Federal Congress affords no proper basis for sustaining that plan since the historical circumstances which gave rise to the congressional system of representation, arising out of compromise among sovereign States, are unique and without relevance to the allocation of seats in state legislatures” -Reynolds v. Sims
California’s Federal Plan The state’s original 1849 Constitution and 1879
Workingmen’s Party Constitution created a bicameral legislature and apportioned both houses on population.
After the 1920 Census, it was clear that urban areas were quickly burgeoning in population and would hold the lion’s share of both chambers soon.
In 1922, a federal plan was proposed via initiative, which failed, but it won in 1926.
Post-1926, the state’s assembly was apportioned on the basis of population, but the senate was elected by county based districts.
Since California had 40 state senators versus 58 counties, some counties had ½ or 1/3 of a senator.
Are Voters Rational? Voters were given the chance to revoke the federal plan via
initiatives in 1948, 1960 and 1962.
Each of these three efforts failed, and were not supported by some Angelenos, who received only one state senator out of 40 even though more than one-third of the voters lived in L.A. County.
Why did urban voters choose to allow rural voters more than their fair share of representation?
Urban Republicans realized that rural areas favored the GOP more than their cities so they wanted to weaken the urban areas in order to strengthen their political party.
It took Reynolds v. Sims to repeal the Golden State’s federal plan.
The Federal Plan Before 1926 the Cal. Constitution apportioned both houses of the
legislature on the basis of population.
In 1926 the voters approved an initiative known as Prop. 28 by a 55-45 margin; the measure left Assembly apportionment on a population basis, but no longer required the Senate to be.
Prop. 28 was intended to give the state a federal-type plan for California, similar to the apportionment of the United States Congress. The public implemented the new model fully with another initiative in 1928.
The Senate would be composed of 40 members, to be elected from senatorial districts; the districts would be based on population, but no county could contain more than one district, and no district could consist of more than 3 counties.
Continuing Disproportionality Since the federal plan took effect, voters addressed initiatives
designed to repeal it several times.
In 1948, the public maintained the federal plan by a vote of 2,250,937 to 1,069,899 (68-32).
In 1960, voters retained it by a 3,408,090 to 1,876,185 (64-36) margin.
And in 1962 another such proposition was defeated by a vote of 2,495,440 to 2,181,758 (53-47).
It is interesting that L.A. voters supported the federal plan when it greatly diminished the county’s power.
The federal plan was repealed by the U.S. Supreme Court in Jordan v. Silver, based on the precedents of Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims.
Exponential Disproportionality “The twenty-eighth district comprising Alpine, Mono, and Inyo
Counties contained fewer than 15,000 people. The thirty-eighth district, Los Angeles County, contained over 6,000,000 people. Based on the one man-one vote principle this was a ratio of over 400 to one.”
“In 1960, senators representing 10.62% of the state's population could, if they voted as a bloc, control the flow of legislation in the legislature. The California Senate was rated highest of all state senates as far as theoretical control by the fewest voters was concerned.”
“…the Bay Area and southern California had 80% of the population, paid 67% of the state's taxes, and had thirteen senators. On the other hand, the thirty least populous counties, with 6% of the state’s population, paid three-fourths of 1% of the state's taxes and had fourteen senators.”
Taxation without Adequate
Representation (11)
Under-representing L.A. Of the 18 million people who lived in California in
1965, about 7 million lived in Los Angeles County.
Although L.A. County represented more than 1/3 of the state’s population, it was only represented by 1/40 members of the state Senate. 1 County w/ 29k people had a Senator just like L.A. County.
After the federal plan was killed, LA County went from having 1 Senator to having 17.
Reapportionment Power One of the main powers of the legislature used to be
that of drawing the districts for Congress, the state Senate and Assembly and the 4 seats for the Board of Equalization.
In the 1980s, the Democrats used modern computer technology and their domination of the state legislature and governor’s office to gerrymander.
The election of Pete Wilson prevented the Democrats from doing the same thing after the 1990 Census. Wilson vetoed the Democratic gerrymander, and a panel of judges ended up drawing the lines.
Schwarzenegger’s Reforms After winning the 2003 recall, Arnold Schwarzenegger
suddenly had to deal with the reality of California’s polarized political process.
During his two terms as governor, he backed such reforms as the top two-tier primary and citizens’ redistricting commissions to address this state woe.
California Gerrymander After the 2000 census, the Democrats were well-placed
for redistricting because Gray Davis was Governor and the party held strong majorities in both houses of the legislature.
They enacted a redistricting plan that is best described as a sweetheart gerrymander.
This is the incumbent reelection insurance policy versus the guarantee of safe partisan seats.
But sometimes you can accomplish both goals simultaneously, which the Golden State did this time.
Bluer than Blue: the current state of the state’s parties
Senate:
27 Democrats
13 Republicans
Dem. majority since 1956
Assembly:
53 Democrats
25 Republicans (2 vacancies)
Dem. majority since 1996
Cal’s Congressional delegation to U.S. =
39 Dems., 14 Reps.)
California has as many registered
independents as Republicans today.
Self-Segregation One of the difficulties with Prop. 11 is that such legal criteria
for redistricting as contiguity, compactness and communities of interest—the three C’s if you will—do result in fairly concentrated districts.
Cracking and packing may not even be necessary if it turns out that voters of similar philosophical bents live near to each other.
Greenstein found out in the 1970s that the political regionalization of California seemed to be a legacy of the self-sorting of different groups into different residential areas.
Living with the Like-Minded
A “2008 book,The Big Sort,…posited that Americans have been self-selecting since the
1970s into like-minded communities that are less likely to hold competitive elections….
While others have mused about relocating liberals to red states to tip their elections, Mr.
Chabot’s company, Conservative Move, wants to help conservatives migrate to solidly
conservative places. He has turned the Big Sort into a real estate strategy.”
Vieth v. Julirer, 2004 “Justice Scalia, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice
O’Connor, and Justice Thomas, concluded that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable because no judicially discernible and manageable standards for adjudicating such claims exist. They would therefore overrule Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109, in which this Court held that political gerrymandering claims are justiciable, but could not agree upon a standard for assessing political gerrymandering claims.”
Vieth Concurrence “Justice Kennedy, while agreeing that appellants’ complaint must be dismissed,
concluded that all possibility of judicial relief should not be foreclosed in cases such as this because a limited and precise rationale may yet be found to correct an established constitutional violation. Courts confront two obstacles when presented with a claim of injury from partisan gerrymandering. First is the lack of comprehensive and neutral principles for drawing electoral boundaries. No substantive definition of fairness in districting commands general assent. Second is the absence of rules to limit and confine judicial intervention. That courts can grant relief in districting cases involving race does not answer the need for fairness principles, since those cases involve sorting permissible districting classifications from impermissible ones. Politics is a different matter. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735. A determination that a gerrymander violates the law must rest on something more than the conclusion that political classifications were applied. It must rest instead on a conclusion that the classifications, though generally permissible, were applied in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective. The object of districting is to establish “fair and effective representation for all citizens.” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533.”
Davis v. Bandemer, 1986 In this case, the Supreme Court majority held that:
“…each political group in a State should have the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any other political group….the issue is one of representation, and we decline to hold that such claims are never justiciable.”
There was no dissent in this case and a broad consent on this point; all justices either signed the majority opinion fully, or filed concurring opinions. Therefore, the court unanimously opposed partisan gerrymandering.
The Appendix
Today’s House would be 10,667 members at one representative per every 30,000 persons.
In actual fact, the average size population of a congressional district would be about 740,000 today.
This means that these districts contain about 25 times as large a population as Washington and the Constitutional Convention thought ideal.
The Big, Big House?
Distribution of House Members
The Schwarzenegger Ballot The 135 replacement candidates got on the ballot with 65
signatures and $3500.
Angelyne, Mary Carey, Gary Coleman, Leo Gallagher, Larry Flynt
and a middleweight sumo wrestler were among the 135 candidates.
