ordnance safety

Click here to load reader

Download Ordnance Safety

Post on 30-Dec-2015




1 download

Embed Size (px)


Ordnance Safety. DO NOT TOUCH! DO NOT MOVE! Note/record location Call 911 or local law enforcement. Technical Project Planning (TPP) Meeting 7. Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS), Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS) - PowerPoint PPT Presentation


  • Ordnance SafetyDO NOT TOUCH! DO NOT MOVE!

    Note/record location Call 911 or local law enforcement

  • Technical ProjectPlanning (TPP) Meeting 7

    Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS), Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS) Kirtland AFB Precision Bombing Ranges (N-1, N-2, N-3, N-4 and New Demolition Area) (A.K.A. West Mesa)

    FUDS ID K06NM044501

  • AgendaPre-meeting Coffee (optional) 8:30-9:00Introductions and Agenda ReviewReview results of the follow-up MRS boundary meetingExplain MRS N-2/NDA split from rest of MRSsSummary of the RI ReportSummary of the FS ReportSummary of Regulator Comment ResolutionPresent MEC HA ResultsBreak -10:00-10:15Introduction to the RD/RAUSACE GoalPresentation of Conceptual Site ModelDiscussion of Stakeholder valuesDevelopment of DQOs

  • Agenda (continued)Lunch - 11:45-1:00Presentation of Recommended RA AlternativeBreak 2:30 2:45 Presentation of EM61 and MetalMapper TechnologiesPresentation of Alternative Geophysical Survey and RA Design ApproachesUXO EstimatorVSPProbabilistic ApproachDiscussion and Selection Design Approach for the RD/RAPresentation of Hazard Assessment ApproachFinal DiscussionsMeeting End 5:00

  • West Mesa Project Map

  • MRS N-2/NDA Addressed FirstThe RI and FS reports address MRSs N-2 and NDA only. The primary reason this RI/FS report is focused on N-2 and NDA is because there is a more urgent need to reduce potential hazards at these sites than at the other MRSs. The City of Albuquerque intends to develop this land within the next five years. Separating these high priority sites from the other six MRSs will allow USACE to expedite progress to select a remedial alternative for these two MRSs, and thus mitigate the majority of hazards that would be potentially encountered during future planned land development activities. A result of the RI and Technical Project Planning (TPP) discussions is that MRSs N-2 and NDA were combined into one MRS. These areas are henceforth designated as MRS N-2/NDA.

  • MRS N-2/NDA BoundaryPrimary Purpose - Develop a systematic defensible approach for defining the West Mesa MRS boundaries. DOD and EPA have no formal approach to defining MRS boundaries.Julie Jacobs (NMED) spoke with a representative of UXOPro.com, who suggested using a specified distance beyond the furthest MD item to help define the MRS boundary. AR 750-10, Range Regulations for Firing Ammunition in Time of Peace, May 1939 January 1944; AAF Manual 85-0-1, Army Air Forces Gunnery and Bombardment Ranges, June 1945; Army Air Corps Studies and Reports on Bombing Analysis and Bombing Accuracy, 1942. In reference to 100-lb AN-M30 General Purpose bombs this research states:From studies completed in WWII, 99 percent of the bombs should be found within 3,000 feet for bombers flying at 25,000 feet or below and at speeds up to 250 mph. The same study implied a 2,000-foot radius should include 95 percent of the bombs under the same conditions.

  • Approach for Determining West Mesa MRS Boundaries

    First, establish the 3000-ft radius boundary from each target feature center. Use dig results from the EE/CA, TCRA and WAA to determine where anomalies identified as MD fall outside or within 250 ft of the 3000-ft boundary.Draw boundary to include the MD item plus a buffer of 250-ft beyond the item.If there is an MD item further away, but within 250 ft of the MD, move the boundary 250 ft beyond that item. If an MD item is discovered outside of the 250-ft buffer this MD item shall be considered an isolated incidence and not be included in the MRS boundary. In an instance where a MEC is discovered within the 250-ft buffer or outside of the MRS boundary the boundary will be moved to include the location of the MEC item plus the 250-ft buffer.All agreed that if during subsequent phases of investigation or remedial action, if MEC and MD items are found adjacent to a boundary, the boundary will be refined.

  • MRS N-2/NDA Boundary (continued)Figures display: proposed MRS boundaries 3,000 ft from target centers, anomaly density contours, colorized anomaly concentrations from heli-mag surveys, anomalies identified by the EE/CA, likelihood 2 anomalies identified by the WAA, dig results from the WAA and EE/CA that were MD items greater than three lbs, and TCRA dig results for MD greater than three lbs.

  • MRS N-2/NDA Boundary (continued)

  • MRS N-2/New Demolition Area

  • The result of applying these criteria is that Former MRSs N-2 and NDA are combined into one MRS designated as MRS N-2/NDA. This approach:Serves to encompass all high-density anomaly areas delineated through statistical spatial analysis and indicative of specific impact areasProvides supporting documentation for boundary selection in the form of DoD studies specific to the munitions used at the siteProvides built-in contingences that allow refinement of the MRS boundary if MD meeting a specified criteria are discovered, outside of the initial MRS boundary in the future; andIt makes the conservative assumption that the two target areas should be treated similarly, and assumes the higher risk of HE bombs cannot be ruled out, given a 100-lb HE bomb was found elsewhere outside the NDA target in 1996.

  • Summary of the Remedial Investigation

  • Goals of the RIDetermine nature and extent of MC contamination at each MRS,Verify the type of MEC items within each MRS,Determine the density and distribution of MEC items within each MRS, Redefine the boundaries of each identified MRS, Redefine the boundary of the West Mesa MRA, if necessaryDetermine the presence or absence and distribution of 100-lb HE bombs within MRSs N-2 and New Demolition Area,Assess MEC Hazard with MEC HA, andDevelop a FS to identify and evaluate munitions response alternatives for each MRS.

  • Data Gaps and RI Actions

    Data Gap Identified by the TPP TeamRI ActionResult

    Is HE UXO present in the vicinity of the New Demolition Area? Intrusive investigation of 100 high probability anomalies No UXO found: still unknownIs UXO is present in the vicinity of other MRSs (N-2)?Qualitative Reconnaissance (QR) during incremental sampling (IS) and document MEC, MC or MPPEHNo MEC, MC or MPPEH observedAre HE MCs present in surface soils at all MRSs?Systematic random and biased IS for HE MC in areas most likely to have surface soil contaminationNo HE MC detected in 0 to 4 -inch soil samplesWhat impact do physical processes have on transport of MEC, specifically wind and water erosion and frost heave?Gather physiographic data and present results of this researchNet increase in aeolian sediment deposition, no water transport of MEC, near zero potential for frost heave to being MEC to surfaceWhat is future land use within the MRA?Obtain future land use plans from the City of Albuquerque.Airport and commercial development is planned for the area in and around MRS N-2/NDA. Uncertainty with regard to the existing MRS boundaries.Use data from previous geophysical investigations, the intrusive investigation at NDA, IS, and QR to define MRS boundaries.The MRS boundaries and the MRA boundary are delineated based on presence of metallic anomalies associated with MD identified in the EE/CA, WAA, and this RI.

  • MRSs N-2/NDA MC Sampling8 random SUs and 4 biased SUs performed at N-2 target areaNo HE MC detected8 random SUs and 5 biased SUs performed at NDA target areaNo HE MC detected

  • Intrusive MEC InvestigationExcavation Results

    InvestigationTotal Anomalies IdentifiedTotal Anomalies DugPercent UXOPercent Practice Bomb MDPercent HE FragmentationPercent Non Munitions ScrapPercent No ContactPercent OtherRI/FS - New Demolition and N-2236100077%19%2%0%2%EE/CA - New Demolition and N-21,149755043%31%18%0%8%Wide Area Assessment (WAA)Tens of Thousands777073%0%0%19%8%

  • Intrusive MEC Investigation

  • Intrusive MEC InvestigationReacquisition of 100 Anomaly LocationsEM 61 Anomaly Location Verification

  • Intrusive MEC InvestigationHE - Bomb FragmentationM38 Sand-filled Practice Bomb

  • Summary of Feasibility Study

  • Remedial AlternativeEVALUATION CRITERIAThreshold CriteriaBalancing CriteriaModifying Criteria Overall Protectiveness of Human Health and the EnvironmentCompliance with ARARsShort-Term EffectivenessLong-Term Effectiveness and PermanenceReduction of Toxicity, Mobility, and Volume Through TreatmentImplementabilityCost (Present-Worth)State AcceptanceCommunity AcceptanceAlternative 1 No Further ActionNot protective; does not mitigate potentially remaining MEC hazards to surface receptors or intrusive workersCould be implemented to compliance with ARARsNot effective in the short term; no MEC hazard reductionNot effective in the long term; no MEC hazard reduction.NoneLikely not administratively feasibleMinimalUnlikelyUnlikelyAlternative 2 - Land Use Controls Protective of construction and maintenance workers; but poses some degree of hazard due to potential MEC to future receptorsCould be implemented to compliance with ARARsEffective in the short term; implementation of LUCs to mitigate MEC hazard to construction and maintenance workers Required training and construction support would mitigate hazards to construction and maintenance workers until evaluation determines LUCs no longer necessary.No reduction in volume because no further MEC removals would be conductedAdministratively feasible; moderate technical effort required to implement$1,803,000 May be acceptable because of short- and long-term mitigation actionsMay be acceptable; takes short- and long- term mitigation actionsAlternative 3 - MEC removal (100% anomaly excavation for high-density anomaly area only) to 4-feet with LUCsProtective of construction and maintenance workers; Protective of human health and the environm

View more