on the ascertainment of validity in the buddhist epistemological tradition

24
HELMUT KRASSER ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY IN THE BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION The problem of whether the validity of a cognition is already ascertained due to the very cognition itself (svataÿ, raó las) or due to a further, later cognition (parataÿ, gŸan las) has been dealt with in several papers in the last decade. A lengthy account, mainly focusing on Sa skya paòðita’s (1182–1251) Tshad ma’i Rigs gter and Raó ’grel as well as on its sources and opponents referred to therein, was provided by Ernst STEINKELLNER in his contribution ‘Early Tibetan ideas on the ascertainment of validity (nges byed kyi tshad ma)’ of 1992. One year later, Masahiro INAMI presented a Japanese translation of the relevant passages in Devendrabuddhi’s Pramâòa-vârttika- pañjikâ and Œâkyabuddhi’s commentary thereon. In 1997, Masaaki HATTORI dealt with this problem in view of Œântarakšita’s and Kamalaœîla’s theories. Finally, in 1999 John DUNNE presented translations of selected passages from the commentaries of Devendrabuddhi and Œâkyabuddhi on PV 2.1–6 in which the question of whether the validity of a cognition is ascertained svataÿ or parataÿ is dealt with. In the present paper, for the sake of convenience, I would like to give a rough systematic overview of the theories held by the Indian scholars of the Buddhist epistemological tradition and to add some further material, regarding mainly the early Tibetan ideas, by considering rÓog Lotsâba’s (1059–1109) ‘Explanation of difficult points in the Pramâòa-viniœcaya’ (Tshad ma rnam óes kyi dKa’ gnas rnam bœad) that has recently been made available, as well as gTsaó nag pa brTson ‘grus seó ge’s (?—at least 1192) 1 commentary on Dharmakîrti’s Pramâòa-viniœcaya. As is well known, Dignâga does not deal with this problem at all 2 and Dharmakîrti simply states that the nature of cognition is known due to the cognition itself and that its validity is known by practice (vyavahâra). 3 However, already Devendrabuddhi distinguishes between certain cognitions the validity of which is ascertained svataÿ and others where the validity is known parataÿ, although he understands Dharmakîrti’s laconic statement as meaning that the validity must be ascertained due to a later cognition of the fulfilment of the purpose. 4 Perceptions, Devendrabuddhi explains, are possibly not reliable as there are variegated causes for error. In such cases the validity must be Journal of Indian Philosophy 31: 161–184, 2003. c 2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Upload: helmut-krasser

Post on 06-Aug-2016

221 views

Category:

Documents


1 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

HELMUT KRASSER

ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITYIN THE BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION

The problem of whether the validity of a cognition is alreadyascertained due to the very cognition itself (svataÿ, raó las) or due to afurther, later cognition (parataÿ, gŸan las) has been dealt with inseveral papers in the last decade. A lengthy account, mainly focusingon Sa skya paòðita’s (1182–1251) Tshad ma’i Rigs gter and Raó ’grelas well as on its sources and opponents referred to therein, wasprovided by Ernst STEINKELLNER in his contribution ‘Early Tibetanideas on the ascertainment of validity (nges byed kyi tshad ma)’ of1992. One year later, Masahiro INAMI presented a Japanese translationof the relevant passages in Devendrabuddhi’s Pramâòa-vârttika-pañjikâ and Œâkyabuddhi’s commentary thereon. In 1997, MasaakiHATTORI dealt with this problem in view of Œântarakšita’s andKamalaœîla’s theories. Finally, in 1999 John DUNNE presentedtranslations of selected passages from the commentaries ofDevendrabuddhi and Œâkyabuddhi on PV 2.1–6 in which the questionof whether the validity of a cognition is ascertained svataÿ or parataÿ isdealt with. In the present paper, for the sake of convenience, I wouldlike to give a rough systematic overview of the theories held by theIndian scholars of the Buddhist epistemological tradition and to addsome further material, regarding mainly the early Tibetan ideas, byconsidering rÓog Lotsâba’s (1059–1109) ‘Explanation of difficultpoints in the Pramâòa-viniœcaya’ (Tshad ma rnam óes kyi dKa’ gnasrnam bœad) that has recently been made available, as well as gTsaó nagpa brTson ‘grus seó ge’s (?—at least 1192)1 commentary onDharmakîrti’s Pramâòa-viniœcaya.

As is well known, Dignâga does not deal with this problem at all2 andDharmakîrti simply states that the nature of cognition is known due tothe cognition itself and that its validity is known by practice(vyavahâra).3 However, already Devendrabuddhi distinguishes betweencertain cognitions the validity of which is ascertained svataÿ and otherswhere the validity is known parataÿ, although he understandsDharmakîrti’s laconic statement as meaning that the validity must beascertained due to a later cognition of the fulfilment of the purpose.4

Perceptions, Devendrabuddhi explains, are possibly not reliable as thereare variegated causes for error. In such cases the validity must be

Journal of Indian Philosophy 31: 161–184, 2003.c©2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Page 2: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

162 HELMUT KRASSER

known from a subsequent valid cognition. In the case of inference,however, such causes for error do not occur and therefore theestablishment of validity does not depend on the occurrence of asubsequent cognition.5 Thus we can gain the following list:

A. svataÿ1. valid cognition, i.e. perception, related to the actual fulfilment of a

purpose (don byed pa’i yul can gyi tshad ma, *artha-kriyâ-višayaôpramâòam)

2. inference (rjes su dpag pa, *anumâna)

B. parataÿ1. perception with variegated causes for error (móon sum ñid la ’khrul

pa’i rgyu sna tshogs pa ñid)C. ascertaining cognition of B.1. is A.1.

A slightly more detailed list can be drawn from Œâkyabuddhi’streatment of the problem:

A. svataÿ1. trained perception (goms pa can, abhyâsa-vat)6

perception related to an object that is capable of fulfilling a purpose(don byed par nus pa’i yul can gyi móon sum, *artha-kriyâ-samartha-višayaô pratyakšam) when there are no causes for error(*bhrânti-nimitta)7

2. inference (rjes su dpag pa, *anumâna)8

[3. perception of the fulfilment of a purpose]9

B. parataÿ1. first occurrence (’jug pa daó po, âdyâ pravåttiÿ) of perception with

causes for error (’khrul pa’i rgyu mtshan, *bhrânti-nimitta)10 orwhere the causes cannot be ascertained11

C. ascertaining cognition: no explicit statement

The next author to be dealt with, Dharmottara, treated this subject inboth of his Prâmâòya-parîkšâs and in a digression at the beginning ofhis commentary on the Pramâòa-viniœcaya. The following list is basedon the latter.

A. svataÿ1. perception in which the [actual] fulfilment of a purpose appears

(*artha-kriyâ-nirbhâsaô pratyakšam)12

2. inference12

3. trained perception13

B. parataÿ14

1. perception in which the necessary connection with the object isuncertain (*arthâvinâbhâva-saôœaya)15

Page 3: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 163

a) perception with doubt as to whether the apparent (*pratibhâsamâna)object, e.g. fire, is real (*satya) or not: in this case the validity withregard to all aspects (*sarvâtmani) must be ascertained due to asubsequent cognition16

b) perception of the general aspect (*sâmânya) of something withbranches, in which the specific aspect (*viœeša), e.g. that it is aDhava or Palâœa tree, is uncertain: in this case the validity withregard to the general aspect is considered to be svataÿ, but withregard to the specific aspect parataÿ17

c) perception uncertain with regard to the appearance itself (? cf. belowp. 47)

C. ascertaining cognition: no explicit statement

The most exhaustive list is given by Kamalaœîla in TSaP 938.19–23.He distinguishes seven kinds of valid and invalid cognitions, which are,according to STEINKELLNER (1992: 259):18

‘(1.) the self-awareness-perception (sva-saôvedana-pratyakšam),(2.) yogic cognition (yogijñânam),(3.) cognition of the fulfilment of a purpose (artha-kriyâ-jñânam),(4.) inference (anumânam), and(5.) trained perception (abhyâsavat pratyakšam)are valid intrinsically (svataÿ), and …(6.) cognition produced by prescription (codanâ-janitaô jñânam), and(7.) perception that is not free from causes for error (pratyakšam

anapagata-bhrânti-nimittam)are extrinsically (anyataÿ) valid.’C. ascertaining cognition: no explicit statement

The last small list presented here is that of Manorathanandin to befound in his Pramâòa-vârttika-våtti (PVV 3.22–4.8):

A. svataÿ1. trained perception of [an object] that realises a purpose (asakåd-

vyavahârâbhyâsâd darœana-mâtreòôpalakšita-bhrama-vivikta-svarûpa-viœešaô sâdhanâdhyakšam)

2. inference3. perception in which the fulfilment of a purpose appears (artha-kriyâ-

nirbhâsaô pratyakšam)

B. parataÿ1. untrained perception in which the validity is doubtful (sandigdha-

prâmâòya)

C. ascertaining cognitions of B.1 are A.2 and A.3

An additional small list can be gathered from Mokšâkaragupta’sTarka-bhâšâ,19 who, like Kamalaœîla, also enumerates yogic cognition

Page 4: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

164 HELMUT KRASSER

and self-awareness as being among those cognitions the validity ofwhich is ascertained svataÿ. Karòakagomin only mentions that thevalidity in the case of perceptions with causes for error is ascertainedby inference, in other cases due to perception itself, and refers to thesecond chapter of his commentary where he intends to deal with thistopic.20 However, the text of his second chapter is not available. In thetexts of Prajñâkaragupta, Jñânaœrîmitra and Ratnakîrti I have not beenable to locate a discussion on the ascertainment of validity nor toextract a list. The commentaries on Prajñâkaragupta’s Pramâòa-vârttikâlaókâra still remain to be examined.

As can be seen from the material presented so far, in the course oftime the list has been expanded and differentiated in order to cover allpossible types of a valid or invalid cognition. I could not discover adiscussion among the Buddhist scholars referred to above; theopponent, if mentioned at all, remains the opposing school of theMîmâôsaka, especially Kumârila. An exception to this may beŒaókaranandana, who claimed that ascertainment of validity due tocognition itself is not possible at all, and that validity in all cases mustbe ascertained due to a further cognition. This information is obtainedfrom quotations and paraphrases in Tibetan sources only, asŒaókaranandana’s works in which he deals with this subject, namely histhree Prâmâòya-parîkšâs, have not yet been edited.21

The situation in the Tibetan tradition is quite different. Here we find alively discussion of the problem among Buddhist scholars, andKumârila has lost his position as the main opponent. This has beenshown clearly in STEINKELLNER’s paper cited above, in which he—with the help of the numerous commentaries—was able to identifymany of the opponents addressed by Sa skya Paòðita in his treatment ofthe topic in his Tshad ma Rigs gter with Raó ’grel, as well as most ofthe Indian sources he made use of. One of his Tibetan opponents is thetranslator rÓog Lotsâba Blo ldan œes rab, one of the most influentialexponents of what Leonard van der Kuijp calls the ‘later phase of thePre-classical Period’ of Tibetan tshad ma studies.22 The source of thetheories refuted by Sa paò, as reported by Œâkya mchog ldan and Gorams pa bSod nam seó ge, is rÓog Lotsâba’s commentary on thePramâòa-viniœcaya, the rNam par óes pa’i þîkâ.23 As none of rÓogLotsâba’s works was available at the time STEINKELLNER wrote hispaper, for his description of rÓog Lotsâba’s view on the ascertainmentof the validity he had to rely on the information provided by thecommentaries on Sa paò’s Rigs gter. Although rÓog Lotsâba’scommentary is still not available, in the interim his ‘Explanation of

Page 5: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 165

difficult points in the Pramâòa-viniœcaya’ has been published, whichallows for some further remarks.

Like Dharmottara, he treats this subject at the beginning of the firstchapter in connection with the ‘definition’ of valid cognition asformulated by Dharmakîrti in PVin 1.30.17–18: … na hy âbhyâmarthaô paricchidya pravartamâno ’rtha-kriyâyâô visaôvâdyate(‘ … because one who acts, after having ascertained the object bymeans of these two [kinds of cognition], is not betrayed with regard tothe fulfilment of [his] purpose’). The theme is introduced in the PVindKa’ gnas as the third and final point to be dealt with under the topic ofthe general definition (spyi’i mtshan ñid la gsum ste 28.4) of a validcognition, and is given the title ‘investigation of the cognitions thathave one ascertain the defining characteristic’ (mtshan ñid óes par byedpa’i œes pa dpyad pa gsum ni 28.5–6) which is reflected in Sa paò’sheading ‘the valid cognition which ascertains the defining characteristicin case of the instances of what is being defined’ (mtshan gŸi la mtshanñid óes pa’i tshad ma).24 The structure of this section in the PVin dKa’gnas is as follows:25

1. mtshan ñid óes par byed pa—cognitions that have one ascertain the definingcharacteristic (44.20–49.13)

1.1. raó <las óes pa>—ascertainment due to the cognition itself (44.21–45.16)1.1.1. <rjes su dpag pa>—inference (44.21–45.5)1.1.2. <don byed par snaó ba’i móon sum>—perception in which the fulfilment of

a purpose appears (45.5–45.10)1.1.3. <sgrub byed du snaó ba’i móon sum>—perception in which that which

realises a purpose appears (45.10–45.16)1.1.3.1. goms pa pa—trained perception (45.12–45.16)(1.1.3.2.) daó po pa—first perception (this is not mentioned again; cf. below, n. 29)1.2. gŸan las <óes pa>—ascertainment due to a subsequent cognition / perception

for the first time (45.17–49.13)1.2.1. gŸan las óes par bya ba’i khyad par—particular cognitions to be ascertained

due to a further cognition (45.20–48.16)1.2.1.1. don yod pa tsam la the tshom za ba—doubt whether the object exists at all

(46.2–11)1.2.1.2. spyi yod par óes kyaó khyad par la the tshom za ba—uncertainty with regard

to the specific aspect, although the general aspect has been ascertained to bepresent (46.12–47.15)

1.2.1.3. snaó ba ñid la the tshom za ba—doubt with regard to the appearance itself (47.16–48.16)

1.2.2. óes par byed pa’i khyad par—particular cognitions that have one ascertainthe defining characteristic (48.17–49.2)

1.2.3. óes pa’i don—the meaning of ‘ascertainment’ (49.3–13)

Page 6: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

166 HELMUT KRASSER

The structure of this section does not, however, reflect rÓogLotsâba’s own classification, as it merely indicates the points to bedealt with. His classification appears as follows:

A. raó las (svataÿ)1. inference (rjes su dpag pa, *anumâna)26

2. perception in which the fulfilment of a purpose appears (don byedpar snaó ba’i móon sum, *artha-kriyâ-nirbhâsaô pratyakšaô)27

3. trained perception (móon sum goms pa pa, *abhyasta-pratyakša)28

B. gŸan las (parataÿ)1. first perception (móon sum daó po pa)29

rÓog Lotsâba explains both cases of that which he calls firstperception in terms of Nos. B.1.a and B.1.b of Dharmottara’s list (cf.above, p. 162).a. perception in which the object’s existence itself is uncertain (yod

pa tsam la the tshom za ba)—example: Although something is ascertained as fire that appears in

one’s perception, one is unsure whether it is unreal like a magicalcreation (sgyu ma) or real.30

b. perception in which the object’s existence itself is ascertained, butin which the specific aspect of that existing thing is uncertain (yodpa’i khyad par la the tshom za ba)31

—example: Although something is ascertained as being a tree, one isunsure whether it is a œiôœapâ, or as in the case when something,although it is ascertained as being red, is not ascertained as beingfire or jewels.32

C. cognitions that have one ascertain the defining characteristic of theperceptions of Nos. B.1.a and B.1.b are of four kind: a) inference, b) aperception which grasps an additional object occurring at the same time[as the object of the uncertain cognition], c) a perception which in themeantime grasps that very uncertain object clearly, and d) a perception inwhich the fulfilment of a purpose appears.33

As can be easily seen, the cognition dealt with in § 1.2.1.3 of the sabcad in which one doubts whether something has appeared in one’smind which is then ascertained as being valid by a later cognition is notlisted under B.1. That this cognition is not accepted by rÓog Lotsâba asbeing valid, but is classified as invalid has been shown bySTEINKELLNER (1992: 267 f), who supports this with a quotation drawnfrom rÓog Lotsâba’s commentary on the Pramâòa-viniœcaya in Œâkyamchog ldan’s Rigs gter Pham byed. In this quotation,34 rÓog Lotsâbaascribes to Dharmottara the view that the cognition referred to in §1.2.1.3 is valid. The text, according to this quotation, reads as follows(Rigs gter Pham byed II 366.6–367.2):

Page 7: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 167

rnam par óes pa’i þî ka las /… daó po pa ni / gŸan óes kyi mtshan gŸiyin la / de la’aó slob dpon chos mchog ltar na gsum ste / don yod patsam la the tshom za ba daó / spyi yod par óes kyaó khyad par la thetshom za ba daó / snaó ba ñid la the tshom za ba gsum mo Ÿes zer ro //—‘The first [perceptions] are the instances of that which is being definedthat are ascertained [as being valid] due to a further cognition. In this casetoo, there are—according to the view of the Teacher Dharmottara—three[different kinds]: doubt regarding the object’s existence as such;uncertainty regarding the specific aspect although the general aspect isascertained as existing; and doubt regarding the appearance itself.’

As already mentioned, the first two kinds are accepted by rÓogLotsâba and the third is refuted. In contradistinction, Sa skya Paòðitaaccepts all three, although his classification is more differentiated.35 Alist drawn from his treatment of this topic in his Rigs gter and Raó ‘grelemerges as follows:36

A. raó las (svataÿ)1. perception in which the [actual] fulfilment of a purpose appears (don

byed par snaó ba’i móon sum, *artha-kriyâ-nirbhâsaô pratyakšam)2. trained perception (móon sum goms pa can, *abhyasta-pratyakša)3. self-awareness (raó rig, *sva-saôvedana)4. inference (rjes dpag, *anumâna)

B. gŸan las (parataÿ)1. first perception (móon sum daó po pa)

Sa paò does not enumerate different kinds of this cognition, but givestwo examples without spelling out that these are exemplifications of‘first perception’.37 The two examples correspond to those given byrÓog Lotsâba for the two kinds of ‘first perception’, i.e. B.1.a+b; forthe sake of convenience the same headings are used here:a. <perception in which the object’s existence itself is uncertain (yod

pa tsam la the tshom za ba)>38

—example: ‘… when the appearance of the object (snaó ba) isintrinsically ascertained, but the share of reality (bden pa’i cha) inthis appearance is extrinsically ascertained. E.g. when the form ofsomething shining red from afar (rgyaó rió po nas dmar ‘bar ba’irnam pa) is intrinsically ascertained, the doubt (the tshom za ba)whether this is as fire real or merely a wrong superimposition(sgro btags) like an illusion or a magical creation is settledextrinsically.’39

b. <perception in which the object’s existence itself is ascertained,but in which the specific aspect of that existing thing is uncertain(yod pa’i khyad par la the tshom za ba)>38

—example: ‘… when the general aspect (spyi) of something withbranches appearing afar is intrinsically ascertained, but thespecific aspect (bye brag), e.g. that it is a œiôœapâ-tree isascertained extrinsically.’40

Doubt with regard to the appearance itself

Page 8: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

168 HELMUT KRASSER

The third kind of perception to be ascertained parataÿ that isattributed by rÓog Lotsâba to Dharmottara, i.e. snaó ba raó ñid lathe tshom za ba, is—according to Œâkya mchog ldan41—divided bySa paò into two kinds, whereby the example is supplied to illustratethe first, i.e. yid ma gtad pa.

2. perception with distracted mind (yid ma gtad pa)42

—example: ‘If one doubts when somewhere fire appears “Did I have acognition of fire appearing or not?”, the sense-cognition whichcannot be ascertained by the [following] mental cognition (yid shes)is extrinsically ascertained, although it is non-conceptual (and) non-erroneous (and) therefore a valid cognition.’43

3. perception with grounds for error (’khrul rgyu can, *bhrânti-nimitta−): neither a definition nor an example is given, but accordingto the commentators it is like a cognition of sun-rays as beingwater44

C. ascertaining cognitions for the perceptions of Nos. B.1.a, B.1.b, B.2.a andB.2.b are the perceptions Nos. A.1, A.2 and inference.

Before treating the problem of whether this three partite division ofcognition attributed to Dharmottara was actually proposed byDharmottara himself, I would like to add a few words concerningŒâkya mchog ldan’s manner of quoting from rÓog Lotsâba’s Pramâòa-viniœcaya commentary by looking at his PVin dKa’ gnas. The ideaexpressed in the first part of the quotation45 has its corresponding partsin PVin dKa’ gnas 48.21–49.1, 44.21 and 45.11–12, and the secondpart referred to above (p. 167) is found more or less literally in PVindKa’ gnas (45.20–46.1) as an introduction to the section of theparticular cognitions to be ascertained by a further cognition (gŸan lasóes par bya ba’i khyad par):

daó po ni slob dpon chos mchog ltar na gsum ste / don yod pa tsam lathe tshom za ba daó / spyi yod par óes kyaó khyad par la the tshom zaba daó / snaó ba ñid la the tshom za ba’o Ÿe’o //

We thus have reason to assume that the idea attributed to rÓogLotsâba by Œâkya mchog ldan is presented in a reliable manner, and thesecond part even allows one to suppose that in this case we are dealingwith a literal quotation which may apply to the first part as well.46 Finalcertainty can be gained only when rÓog Lotsâba’s commentary isavailable.

Regarding these three kinds of ‘first perception’, STEINKELLNER(1992: 268) has expressed doubt as to ‘whether this third kind … wherethe appearance itself (snaó ba nyid) is doubtful has been proposed byDharmottara at all’, although ‘others like Phywa pa Chos kyi seng geand Shâkya mchog ldan also clearly attest to such a division for

Page 9: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 169

Dharmottara’.47 The reasons for this doubt are, among others, that theidea of a doubtful appearance itself can not be pinpointed inDharmottara’s works, and that even Œâkya mchog ldan questionswhether the third kind of ‘first perception’ was taught by Dharmottara.Moreover, with regard to the example given by Sa paò for theperception with distracted mind (yid ma gtad pa), namely ‘if one isuncertain, when in a particular cognition fire appears, asking ‘did I havea cognition of fire appearing or not?’’ there is a testimonial byDharmottara to the contrary, stating that doubt may have the form ofwhether the thing that appears in the cognition is real, but not whether itappears at all.48 Unfortunately, the wording of rÓog Lotsâba’s remarksin his PVin dKa’ gnas is not of much help to see how he extracts such athreefold division from Dharmottara’s works. In the section dealingwith doubt regarding the appearance itself (47.16–48.16), rÓog Lotsâbafirst presents Dharmottara’s opinion, then states that this is not correctat all,49 then refutes some possible undesired consequences andconcludes that there are only two kinds of cognition to be ascertained asbeing valid due to a subsequent cognition, namely cognitions withdoubt regarding the reality of the object and those with uncertaintyregarding the particular aspect when the general aspect has beenascertained. Dharmottara’s position is presented in the followingmanner (PVin dKa’ gnas 47.16–19):

snaó ba la the tshom za ba ni dper na sóon por snaó ba’i blo óa laskyes sam ma skyes Ÿes bya ba lta bu ste / de yaó the tshom gyis snaóba’i cha la Ÿen par byas pas snaó ba óes pa (pa Ms: par ed.) la myi ltospar tshad ma’i bya ba grub pa’i phyir tshad ma yin no Ÿes slob dponchos mchog gsuó óo //—‘Doubt with regard to the appearance is, for example: “Did I have acognition of something appearing as blue or not?” Further: Because theappearing part has been determined by the doubt, the function of thevalid cognition is realised independently of the ascertainment of theappearing [object]. Therefore it is a valid cognition. So it is said by theTeacher Dharmottara.’

From this it is clear that rÓog Lotsâba had the same passage in mindas Sa skya Paòðita when formulating his example for a cognition withdistracted mind, although they judge this cognition differently.However, I have not been able to locate the corresponding passage inany of Dharmottara’s works.50 But as the two kinds of ‘first perception’accepted by rÓog Lotsâba (cf. above p. 166) are summaries ofPVinÞ(a) 16.1–4 and 16.5–18.5 (cf. B.1.a+b in Dharmottara’s list,above p. 162), and because the commentators of the Raó ’grel connectSa paò’s ‘perception with grounds for error’ (’khrul rgyu can, *bhrânti-

Page 10: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

170 HELMUT KRASSER

nimitta−) with Dharmottara’s example51 for an invalid cognition, i.e.perception of sun-rays as being water,52 it is very likely that thisdigression in the PVinÞ is the source for rÓog Lotsâba’s attribution.And there really is a passage that can be interpreted in this way,although we understood it differently in our previous interpretation53

and although Œâkya mchog ldan did not recognise it.54 In PVinÞ(a)18.14–18, still dealing with doubt regarding the cognition’s necessaryconnection (*avinâbhâva-saôœaya) with the object, Dharmottara says:

snaó ba yaó raó ñid óes pa’i raó bŸin de kho na bŸin du óes pa’i phyirmed na mi ’byuó ba’i the tshom ni phyi nas ‘byuó bas móon sum gyibya ba mi ’gog go //—‘In case of the appearance too, a doubt regarding [the cognition’s]necessary connection [with its object], inasmuch as it arises later, doesnot impede the function of perception, because [that appearance] itselfis ascertained in accordance with the very nature of the ascertained[object] (?).’

This could mean that when in the case of a cognition of, for example,blue, one acts due to the uncertainty of whether one really had acognition of blue, and one then actually does obtain something blue, thecognition of blue turns out to be valid. The fact that the commentatorsof the Raó ’grel did not refer to this ambiguous passage, while Sa paòunderstood it in the same way as rÓog Lotsâba, may be explained bythe likelihood that the latter two used a Sanskrit manuscript whereas thecommentators relied on a Tibetan translation (?). Dharmottara’s ownstatement to the contrary in his shorter Prâmâòya-parîkšâ, namely thata doubt has the form of the question ‘is this thing which appears in theperception real or not?’ but not of the question ‘does it appear in theperception or not?’55 may apply only to certain cases of doubt, e.g. inthe case of cognitions in which the mind is not distracted. This needsfurther investigation.

In the next section I will consider possible Indian sources for rÓogLotsâba’s and Sa paò’s classification, i.e. the texts of Œâkyabuddhi,Dharmottara and Kamalaœîla, as well as differences between them.

Regarding the perception of the fulfilment of a purpose and inference,all authors mentioned so far share the same opinion. The same alsoholds true for the trained perception. Self consciousness (raó rig, *sva-saôvedana) is enumerated only by Kamalaœîla and Sa paò, yogicperception by Kamalaœîla alone. Whether Œâkyabuddhi, Dharmottara,rÓog Lotsâba and Sa paò did not mention them deliberately remains tobe investigated.56 Kamalaœîla’s ‘cognition produced by prescription’

Page 11: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 171

(codanâ-janitam jñânam) as a kind of cognition to be ascertainedparataÿ is to my knowledge not considered by the Tibetan scholars.57

The source for rÓog Lotsâba’s classification of perception into ‘first’(daó po pa) and ‘trained’ (goms pa pa) is evidently Œâkyabuddhi’sdistinction between ‘first’ and ‘trained’ occurrence of perception(s. above p. 162). In this context the phrase khrul pa’i rgyu mtshan(*bhrânti-nimitta) is first used by Œâkyabuddhi (cf. above, n. 6),although not in terms of a category, and Kamalaœîla lists a cognitionthat is not free from causes for error (pratyakšam anapagata-bhrânti-nimittam; cf. above, p. 163). Although they do not agree in all cases, itis clear from the examples they use that not only rÓog Lotsâba, but alsoSa paò depends highly on Dharmottara,58 and this is also attested by thecommentators of the Raó ’grel. Go rams pa bSod nam seó ge, forexample, after quoting Œâkyabuddhi’s PVÞ D75a7–75b2 andDharmottara’s PVinÞ(a) 13.5–7 and paraphrasing the beginning ofPVinÞ(a) 14.16 f59, says that the verses Rigs gter 8.55c–56d are inaccordance with these texts.60 Also Devendrabuddhi is quoted by Gorams pa and Óag dbaó chos grags.61

As we have seen above, Sa paò, although he follows the line of rÓogLotsâba in many cases, deviates, for example, in accepting a cognitionwith doubt regarding the appearance as valid. To this we may add afurther case. Among the four cognitions by means of which the validityof a previous uncertain cognition is ascertained, rÓog Lotsâbaenumerates a ‘perception which grasps a further object occurring at thesame time [as the object of the uncertain cognition]’ (lhan cig spyodpa’i don gŸan ’dzin pa’i móon sum) (cf. above p. 166). Although I donot yet know a passage in which rÓog Lotsâba himself explains whathe means by this, according to Sa paò it is a cognition of the smell offire subsequent to the uncertainty whether there is fire in a particularplace. Sa paò, having classified such a cognition as inference, mentionsthe opinion of some (kha cig) who take this to be a perception, andremarks that they are not very learned in distinguishing the realms ofobjects (skye mched, *âyatana).62 That Sa paò refers to rÓog Lotsâbawith kha cig is supported by Œâkya mchog ldan. In his discussionconcerning the origin of Sa paò’s extraction of the number three for thesubsequent ascertaining cognitions, he states that neither Dharmakîrti’stexts (gŸuó) nor the Indian commentaries (rgya ’grel) are clear on therestriction of the number, and that Sa paò arrives at the number threebecause he considers that which is explained by rÓog Lotsâba asperception, namely a cognition grasping a further object occurring at

Page 12: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

172 HELMUT KRASSER

the same time as (lhan cig spyod pa’i don gŸan ’dzin pa) the uncertainobject, to be inference.63

Finally I would like to add some provisional remarks on gTsaó nag pabrTson ’grus seó ge’s view on the ascertainment of the validity asavailable in his Pramâòa-viniœcaya commentary Tshad ma rnam paróes pa’i þi ka legs bœad bsdus pa, and try to identify some of hisopponents.64

He treats this subject under the heading ‘Considerations regarding theascertainment of the defining characteristic in case of the instances ofwhat is being defined’ (<mtshan> gŸi la mtshan ñid óes byed bsam pa),and begins with the question of whether the validity of the twocognitions is ascertained svataÿ or parataÿ.65 In the first case, he adds,œâstras on pramâòa would be futile,66 and in second case an infiniteregression would be obtained67.68 This is dealt with under the headings:1) identification (óos bzuó) of the meaning (don) of ‘ascertainment dueto [a cognition] itself or due to a further one’; 2) giving examples for theirrespective nature; and 3) showing that there are no faults. The first ofthese is introduced by daó po.69 Where the second and the thirdparagraphs begin is not indicated and there are no further subdivisions.Thus it is clear that he is not as fond of sa bcad as Sa paò and others are.

In treating the first subject he says that the formulation ‘Cognition(blo) is established as valid cognition that cognises the real firecorrectly just because of the fact that the object, fire, is established to bereal by perception in which the fulfilment of a purpose appears and byinference.’ is the poetry of the simple-minded (byis pa’i sñan óag,*bala-kâvya), because in the case of a cognition related to somethingreal there is neither the capability to perform the function of a validcognition nor doubt regarding that function.70 One of the possiblewriters of such ‘poetry of the simple-minded’ seems to be rÓogLotsâba, for he assumes that in the case of inference, the ascertainmentof the validity is due to awareness of something else (gŸan rig), but notof cognition itself (raó rig). In order to show this he explains that whenthe object of inference is ascertained as being real, doubt as to whetherthe cognition grasping that object is not valid is excluded, because thepresence of a real object and cognition that cognises it to be present,which is a valid cognition, share the same fate (grub bde gcig pa, *eka-yoga-kšema). This also holds good for the perception in which theactual fulfilment of a purpose appears: Uncertainty regarding theinvalidity of the cognition that cognises the object is excluded when theobject of knowledge (gŸal bya) and its effect are ascertained as beingpresent by this reliable cognition, which is the effect of the object of

Page 13: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 173

knowledge and awareness of something else (gŸan rig).71 It should bementioned, however, that also in the case of trained perception rÓogLotsâba assumes that its validity is known in the same way.72 Theargument against this view, namely that in the case of a cognitionrelated to something real there is neither the capability to perform thefunction of a valid cognition nor doubt, may be understood as follows:Perception cannot ascertain an object nor can be doubtful as it is free ofconception. The same opinion is expressed by Sa paò. When refutingtwo objections to his own position—the opponents in this case havebeen identified by the commentators as rÓog Lotsâba, Khyuó and Gaóspa œe’u73—Sa paò states that they mix the function of perception andconceptual cognition.74 While I cannot locate the second of these twopûrva-pakšas dealt with by Sa paò in this section of the PVin bsDus pa,the first is treated by gTsaó nag pa at the end of his digression on theascertainment of validity.75 The next two opponents gTsaó nag pa refersto, and who are also refuted by Sa paò, are probably Kumârila76 andŒaókaranandana77. Of the three cognitions the validity of which must beascertained parataÿ that are attributed by rÓog Lotsâba and others toDharmottara, in contradistinction to rÓog Lotsâba and Sa paò whoaccept two and three respectively, gTsaó nag pa accepts only one ofthem as being ascertained as valid due to a later valid cognition. gTsaónag pa also does not attribute the two cognitions that he refutes toDharmottara, but only to ‘others’ (gŸan dag). The first of these twocognitions is that in which one doubts the appearance itself, and thesecond is that of grasping a tree as such from afar in which one does notknow what kind of particular tree it is. These correspond to Nos. B.1.b.and B.2. of Sa paò’s list respectively (cf. above, p. 167).78 gTsaó nag patreats these cognitions at length and concludes that there is only onecognition the validity of which is to be ascertained due to a latercognition, namely the one with uncertainty as to whether the thing thatappears is actually real. This corresponds to No. B.1.a. of Sa paò’s list(cf. above, p. 167).79 In the number of the ascertaining cognitions,gTsaó nag pa again differs from rÓog Lotsâba and Sa paò, for heaccepts only the trained perception in which the fulfilment of a purposeappears, and denies the possibility that this cognition could be aninference based on a logical reason consisting in an effect.80

So far we have seen that gTsaó nag pa rarely follows the opinion ofrÓog Lotsâba, and that many topics dealt with by gTsaó nag pa can alsobe found in Sa paò’s treatment of the subject. Thus it seems very likelythat Sa paò, when composing his Tshad ma Rigs gter, not onlyconsidered the writings of rÓog Lotsâba, but also the PVin bsDus pa of

Page 14: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

174 HELMUT KRASSER

gTsaó nag pa. Due to the lack of any other indications, and due to theloss of many of the works of the Tibetan philosophers prior to gTsaónag pa, the possibility that gTsaó nag pa and Sa paò made use of acommon source cannot be excluded.

NOTES

1 This is the date calculated in SCHWABLAND (1995: 794 n. 3). For earlier calculations,cf. the references in STEINKELLNER (1992: 260 n. 25).2 The discussion as reflected in the available texts starts with Kumârila’s claim that inall cases the validity is ascertained due to the cognition itself (svataÿ); cf.SCHMITHAUSEN (1965: 189–201) and HATTORI (1997: 362 ff.).3 PV 2.4d–5a: sva-rûpasya svato gatiÿ // prâmâòyaô vyavahâreòa.4 PVP D5a6–7= Q6a1–2: ’o na ji ltar tshad ma ñid óes par bya Ÿe na / tha sñad kyis nitshad ma ñid (PV 2.5a) dus phyis ’byuó ba can gyi don byed pa’i yul can gyi œes passo //5 PVP D2a5–2b2 = Q2b5–7: móon sum ñid la ’khrul pa’i rgyu sna tshogs pa ñid kyis(kyis D : kyi Q) slu ba srid pa’i phyir de’i don gyi don byed pa’i yul can gyi tshad maphyi ma ’jug pas tshad ma ñid du rtogs par bya’i / rjes su dpag pa la ni ma yin no // deltar de’i raó bŸin can nam / ’bras bu’i rtags dóos po’i raó bŸin ñid daó / dóos po’i’bras bu ñid du óes pa ni rtags can gyi œes pa’i rgyu yin pas na / de lta bur gyur pa’idóos po med par rjes su dpag pa yod pa ma yin pa’i phyir / phyis kyi tshad ma’i ’jug pala ltos pa ma yin no // gŸan dag tu ni móon sum daó der snaó ba dag skye ba’i tshekhyad par óes pa med na de ni phyis kyi tshad ma ’jug pas mi slu bar rig par bya’o //This passage is translated in INAMI (1992: 66), INAMI (1993: 90 f) and DUNNE (1999:438 f).6 PVÞ D72a4–b1 = Q87a7–b2: <a móon sum ni rnam par rtog pa med pa ñid kyi phyiróes pa ma yin mod kyi ’on kyaó der snaó bar skyes pa tsam yin no // rjes su dpag pa nióes pa ñid yin no // gal te móon sum rtog pa med pas chu la sogs pa bden pa daóbrdzun pa rnam par ’byed par mi nus pa ñid kyi phyir ji ltar de las don yoós su bkagnas ’jug ce na / brjod pa móon sum gyi rten can gyi ’jug pa ni rnam pa gñis te daó poñid daó goms pa can no // a> de la goms pa daó ldan pa gaó yin pa de la œin tu goms pagsal ba can gyi móon sum skyes pa na ji lta ba bŸin du goms pa’i rnam par ’khrul pa’irgyu mtshan spaós pa can ñid gyis yoós su bcad nas skye ba daó / de lta bur gyur pa’iphyis ‘byuó ba’i óes pa skyed par byed pa’i phyir de la skyes bu ’jug par byed do // de’iphyir de la raó ñid kyis (kyis Q : kyi D) tshad ma óes par byed pa’i phyir phyis kyitshad ma ’jug pa la ltos pa med pa can yin pa’i phyir …; translated in INAMI (1993:95 f) and in part in DUNNE (1999: 437 n. 4).<a…a> Sanskrit fragments in the appendix to Manorathanandin’s PVV 522.27–30 havebeen identified in STEINKELLNER (1981: 290 frag. 8): ayaô tu bhedaÿ—pratyakšâvikalpakatvâd na niœcayaÿ, kiô tu tad-âbhâsôtpatteÿ. anumânaô (corr.:anumâne) niœcaya eva. yady evaô pratyakšeòâvikalpena mithyâ-phalâdinâô vivekasyakartum aœakyatvât kathaô tato ’rthaô paricchidya pravåttir iti cet, ucyate—dvidhâpratyakšâœrayâ pravåttir âdyâbhyâsavatî ca. Œâkyabuddhi is also referred to inJayantabhaþþa’s Nyâya-mañjarî (Mysore ed. 1969, Vol. I, 428.12 f.): dvi-vidhâ hipravåttiÿ—âdyâ câbhyâsikî ca. Both passages are referred to in INAMI (1993: 116 nn.35 and 36).

Page 15: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 175

7 PVÞ D75a6 = Q91a6–7: de’i phyir don byed par nus pa’i yul can gyi móon sum ni’khrul pa’i rgyu mtshan med pa’i phyir tshad ma ñid kyi bdag ñid du gyur pas raó rigpas yoós su bcad pa yin no //8 rjes su dpag pa ni óes pa ñid yin no // Cf. above n. 6 and also PVÞ D75b1–2 =Q 91b2: de bas na ’di ltar móon sum ni raó daó gŸan las (las Q : la D) tshad ma yin larjes su dpag pa ni raó ñid las yin no Ÿes bya bar gnas so //9 Although Œâkyabuddhi does not explicitly mention No. A.1 of Devendrabuddhi, thereis no reason to assume that he did not accept it.10 PVÞ D75a7–75b1 = Q 91a8–91b1: daó po’i me daó chur snaó ba’i œes pa yaó gomspa med pa na raó rgyud kyi tshad ma ñid kyis bzuó (corr.: gzuó DQ) du zin kyaó ’khrulpa’i rgyu mtshan yod pa’i phyir óes pa bskyed pa’i nus pa med pa de bas na / de laphyis kyi tshad ma ’jug pas tshad ma ñid du rnam par gŸag pa / de ltar na gŸan lastshad ma yin no // ; translated in INAMI (1993: 103) and DUNNE (1999: 440 n. 15).11 PVÞ D72b1–2 = Q87b3: móon sum thams cad ni gŸan las (las Q : la D) tshad ma óespar bŸag (bŸag Q : gŸag D) pa ma yin no // daó po ñid kyi (kyi Q : kyis D) ’jug pa gaóyin pa de la yaó rgyu mtshan óes par gzuó ba med pa na the tshom ñid kyi sgo nas ’jugpar byed do // ; cf. also n. 6. This passage is translated in INAMI (1993: 96) and DUNNE(1999: 437 n. 4).12 PVinÞ(a) 13.1–2: nus pa óes pa yaó rjes su dpag pa daó don byed par snaó ba’imóon sum ni raó kho na las ’gyur ro //13 PVinÞ(a) 13.5–18.14 In STEINKELLNER–KRASSER (1989: 95) the cognitions listed under B.1, B.1.a andB.1.b have been treated as three different cognitions, whereas I now consider B.1.a andB.1.b as being two different instances of perception that are uncertain with regard tothe necessary connection.15 PVinÞ(a) 14.16–15.18.16 PVinÞ(a) 16.1–4.17 PVinÞ(a) 16.5–18.5.18 I do not agree with STEINKELLNER’s introductory remark that Kamalaœîla‘distinguishes seven kinds of valid cognition’, for I consider cognition No. 6, i.e.codanâ-janitaô jñânam, as being introduced against the Mîmâôsâ theory thatprescription (codanâ) is the means for knowing the Dharma (cf. MSû 1.1.2: codanâ-lakšaòo ’rtho dharmaô) and that the validity of such cognitions is ascertained svataÿ.In particular, Kamalaœîla has MŒV (Codanâ) 184 (codanâ-janitâ buddhiÿ pramâòaôdoša-varjitaiÿ / kâraòair janyamânatvâl liógâptôkty-akša-buddhi-vat // ) and MŒV(Codanâ) 47ab (svataÿ sarva-pramâòânâô prâmâòyam) in mind, for he refers to thesestatements in TSaP 934.17–18 and 934.22 and rejects this idea in TSaP 939.22–23 (naca codanâ-janitâyâ buddheÿ prâmâòyaô siddham, yenâtrâpy anumâna-vat prâmâòya-vyavahâraÿ sâdhyata iti syât).19 Cf. KAJIYAMA (1998: 27).20 PVSVÞ 5.19–22: yatra tu kvacid višaye pâþavâbhâvâd bhrânti-nimittâpanayanâsamarthaô pratyakšam, tatrânumânâd niœcayaÿ prârthyate, nasarvatra. tasmât pratyakše svataÿ parataœ ca prâmâòya-niœcayaÿ, niœcâyayišyatecâyam artho dvitîya-pariccheda iti nêha pratanyate. That Karòakagomin at leastintended to comment not only upon the second chapter of the Pramâòa-vârttika, but onthe entire work can be seen from his statements that he will explain certain topics in thethird or fourth chapter; cf., e.g. … vakšyâmaÿ tåtîye paricchede 210.29; … vakšyâmaœcaturthe paricchede 381.21.21 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 259 with n. 16).22 Cf. VAN DER KUIJP (1989: 9–19). For an overview of the development of Buddhist logicin Tibet already written in the late 1960s or early 1970s, cf. SMITH (2001: 113–116).

Page 16: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

176 HELMUT KRASSER

23 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 264 n. 51).24 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 261) who in n. 28 also refers to the title of this section ingTsaó óag pa’s Pramâòa-viniœcaya commentary: <mtshan> gŸi la mtshan ñid óes byedbsams pa.25 My additions are indicated by < … >.26 PVin dKa’ gnas 44.21: de la rjes su dpag pa mtha’ dag ni / raó las óes pa’o //27 PVin dKa’ gnas 45.6: don byed par snaó pa’i móon sum yaó de bŸin te /28 PVin dKa’ gnas 45.10–12: sgrub byed du snaó pa’i móon sum ni gñis ste / goms papa daó daó po pa’o // sóa ma ni raó las tshad ma yin te /29 PVin dKa’ gnas 45.17: gñis pa ni gŸan las yin no // In this sentence gñis pa ni refersto daó po pa as one of the two instances of sgrub byed du snaó pa’i móon summentioned just previously; cf. n. 28. At the same time the sentence introduces the nextparagraph to be dealt with, i.e. ascertainment of the defining characteristic due to afurther cognition; cf. mtshan ñid óes par byed pa ni gñis te / raó daó gŸan las so //PVin dKa’ gnas 44.20 f.30 PVin dKa’ gnas 46.2–3: myer snaó ba óes kyaó / ci sgyu ma’i me ltar myi bdenpa’am / ’on te bden Ÿes the tshom za ba’o //31 PVin dKa’ gnas 48.14–16: de lta na gŸan las óes par bya ba’i tshad ma ni gñis ste /yod pa tsam la the tshom za ba daó / de óes kyaó yod pa’i khyad par la the tshom zaba’o //32 PVin dKa’ gnas 46.12–13: œió du óes kyaó œa par the tshom za ba’am / dmar por óeskyaó me daó nor bur ma óes pa lta bu’o //33 óes par byed pa yaó rnam pa bŸi ste / rtags la brten pa’i rjes su dpag pa daó / lhancig spyod pa’i don gŸan ’dzin pa’i móon sum daó / de ñid la bar du rnam par gsal bar’dzin pa’i móon sum daó / myi slu ba óes par byed pa don byed par snaó pa’i móonsum mo // PVin dKa’ gnas 48.17–21. For the corresponding passage in rÓog Lotsâba’scommentary on the Pramâòa-viniœcaya, s. below n. 63.34 The title of this section is (Rigs gter Pham byed II 366.5): ‘The way Lo chen, afterhaving mentioned the faults in the view of the Teacher Dharmottara, establishes hisown view’ (slob dpon chos mchog gi lugs la lo chen gyis skyon brjod nas raó lugs jiltar bŸag pa’i tshul / ).35 For Phywa pa Chos kyi seó ge’s view cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 268 n. 88).36 Sa skya Paòðita’s distinction has been shown in STEINKELLNER (1992: 262) andexplained further on the following pages. The list presented here is the one found there,expanded by including STEINKELLNER’s explanations.37 That they are meant to exemplify ‘first perception’ is also corroborated by Œâkyamchog ldan (Rigs gter Pham byed II 348.5–6): daó po la’aó gñis te / goms pa can daó /daó po pa’o // gñis pa la’aó gñis te / snaó ba raó las óes œió bden pa gŸan las óes daó /spyi raó las óes œió khyad par gŸan las óes pa’o //38 Rigs gter Raó ‘grel 100b6–101a2: dper brjod na snaó ba raó las óes bden pa’i chagŸan las óes pa rgyaó rió po nas dmar ’bar ba’i rnam pa raó las óes kyaó mer bdennam ’on te sgyu ma’am sprul pa la sogs pa sgro btags yin Ÿes the tshom za bar gŸan lasóes par byed pa’am rgyaó rió po na yal ‘dab daó ldan pa snaó ba na / spyi œió tsam labltos nas sgro ‘dogs chod nas raó las óes œió bye brag œa pa la rtog bral ma ’khrul payin pas móon sum tshad ma yin yaó œa pa’i ldog pa la sgro ’dogs ma chod pas gŸan lasóes so //39 Translated in STEINKELLNER (1992: 266).40 Translated in STEINKELLNER (1992: 267).41 Rigs gter Pham byed II 348.7–349.2: snaó ba ñid kyaó gŸan las óes dgos pa’i mtshangŸi ni / yid ma gtad daó khrul rgyu can gyi móon sum rnams so // daó po ni / mtshan gŸiyid gzugs mdzes la lhag par chags dus kyi sgra ’dzin ñan œes lta bu yin la / gñis pa ni

Page 17: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 177

smig rgyu la chur sgro ’dogs pa’i dus kyi smig rgyu’i kha dog mthoó ba’i mig œes daó /byis pa’i rgyud kyi móon sum skad cig ma lta bu’o //42 This kind of cognition is referred to by Óag dbaó chos grags in his Rigs gter dPal ster(368.3) in connection with PV 3.124a: yid ma gtad par ni / rnam ’grel las / thams cadlas ni sems bsdus nas // = saôhåtya sarvataœ cintâô PV 3.124a = PVin 1.13a; cf. alsoSTEINKELLNER (1992: 268 n. 82).43 Rigs gter Raó ’grel 101a3 f: yaó snaó ba raó ñid kyaó gŸan las óes pa dper na ’ga’Ÿig tu me snaó ba na / kho bo me snaó ba’i blo gcig byuó óam ma byuó Ÿes the tshom zaba na / dbaó œes rtog bral ma ’khrul pas tshad ma yin yaó yid œes kyis óes ma nus pagŸan las óes par byed pa’o //. Translated in STEINKELLNER (1992: 268).44 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 268).45 Rigs gter Pham byed II (366.6–367.1): rnam par óes pa’i þî ka las / yul gi don bdenpar (par corr.: pa) óes pa na yul can gyi blo tshad mar óes pa ni raó óes daó / yul gyidon bden par tshad ma raó ñid kyis óes ma nus par œes pa phyi ma gŸan gyis œes pa sóama’i gŸal bya bden par óes pa na œes pa sóa ma de ñid tshad mar œugs la óes pa degŸan óes kyi don do // mtshan gŸi ni rjes dpag daó goms pa can gñis ni raó óes so //46 For a further passage that Œâkya mchog ldan quotes from this commentary, and thecorresponding passage available in the PVin dKa’ gnas, cf. notes 33 and 63.47 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 266 with notes 77 and 78). bCom ldan Rigs pa’i ral gri alsoattests that some scholars attribute this division to Dharmottara (sDe bdun rGyan gyime tog 13.15–17): snaó ba raó ñid las the tshom za ba ni daó po snaó bar ’jug yulbstan kyaó phyis snaó ba la the tshom byuó ba ste ‘di’aó tshad mar slob dpon chosmchog bŸed de Ÿes kha cig zer ro //.48 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 266–269 with n. 84) for the text of Dharmottara (PPar II19.9–12): gal te bdag cag móon sum la the tshom skyes so Ÿe na bden te / móon sum lasnaó ba’i don ’di yaó dag pa yin nam ’on te ma yin sñam du the tshom za’o // ’di snaóóam mi snaó sñam du ni ma yin te /.49 The reason for his non-acceptance of this cognition as valid is, that otherwise alsomomentariness should be object of a valid perception; cf. PVin dKa’ gnas 47.20–48.1:’di ni œin tu myi rigs te / snaó bar ma óes pa yaó tshad ma’i yul yin na skad cig ma lasogs pa yaó ci ste móon sum gyi (gyi corr.: gyis) tshad ma’i yul ma yin /50 At this opportunity I would like to express my gratitude to all those involved in theAsian Classics Input Project for their efforts in producing electronic versions of thetexts of the Buddhist tradition and making them available to the scholarly world.51 PVinÞ(a) 15.10–18: des na snaó ba óes par byas pa ni bstan pa yin pa’i phyir ’jug pa’iyul la tshad ma’i bya ba yoós su rdzogs pa yin no // gaó yaó snaó ba daó ’gal ba’i rnampa óes pas gnod pa bskyed pa de ni tshad ma’i bya ba ma rdzogs pa’i phyir tshad ma mayin te / dper na smig rgyu ’dzin pa’i œes pa la chur óes pa ’jug pa bŸin no // med na mi’byuó bar the tshom za bas ni nam yaó móon sum gyi bya ba la gnod pa ma yin no //52 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 269).53 Cf. STEINKELLNER–KRASSER (1989: 89).54 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 268).55 PPar II 19.9–12: gal te bdag cag móon sum la the tshom skyes so Ÿe na bden te / móonsum la snaó ba’i don ’di yaó dag pa yin nam ’on te ma yin sñam du the tshom za’o // ’disnaó óam mi snaó sñam du ni ma yin te / ; cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 268 with n. 84).56 Go rams pa, e.g. presents the opinion of some who, based on PV 3.107cd, assumeyogic cognition to be ascertained as being valid svataÿ. He refutes this due to the factthat in the case of yogic perception neither svataÿ nor parataÿ ascertainment is possibleat all, and that only conceptual yogic perception can be ascertained as being valid dueto itself (Rigs gter rNam bœad 130b2–5): kha cig / rnal ’byor móon sum ni raó óestshad ma yin te /

Page 18: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

178 HELMUT KRASSER

blo gros chen pos mthoó ñid las / rnam pa thams cad óes par byed //(PV 3.107cd)

ces gsuós pa’i phyir // Ÿes zer ba mi ’thad de / ’di’i blo gros chen po ni móon sum gyimthoó ba’i don la ’khrul rgyu med pas óes pa raó stobs kyis ’dren nus pa la ’jog pa yingyi rnal ’byor móon sum kho na la ’jog pa skabs don min pa’i phyir daó / saós rgyas’phags pa’i rgyud la óes œes med pas de’i rgyud kyi rnal ’byor móon sum gyi óes œes’dren mi srid pa’i phyir ro // des na rnal ’byor móon sum la raó óes gŸan óes gaó yaómed pa srid ció ’phags pa rtog bcas kyi rnal ’byor móon sum ni raó óes kho na’o //57 However, it may have inspired bCom ldan Rigs pa’i ral gri in his differentiation ofseveral kinds of inference. In his sDe bdun rGyan gyi me tog he distinguishes inference(*anumâna) that occurs by force of reality (*vastu-bala-pravåtta), commonly accepted(*prasiddha) inference, and inference based on âgama. The former two are to beascertained as valid due to themselves (svataÿ), some of the latter svataÿ and someparataÿ (cf. sDe bdun rGyan gyi me tog 12.11–14: de la dóos po stobs Ÿugs daó gragspa’i rjes dpag gñis ni raó óes yin te yul daó ’gal ’brel grub pa’i gtan tshigs kyi rjes su’braó bas gñis po de raó gis óes pa’i phyir ro // luó gi rjes dpag ni kha cig raó gis óesla kha cig phyis byuó pa’i luó rigs la brten pa’i blo gŸan gyis óes so // ). This passage isalso referred to in SCHWABLAND (1995: 810 f n. 52).58 Dharmottara’s texts as sources for rÓog Lotsâba’s and Sa paò’s formulations areshown in STEINKELLNER (1992: 266 ff.).59 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 269).60 Cf. Rigs gter rNam bœad 132b6–133a6. PVÞ D75a7–75b1 is quoted by Óag dbaóchos grags in Rigs gter dPal ster 358.1–2 and in part in 368.1. The next sentence ofPVÞ D75b1 is referred to in Rigs gter dPal ster 368.2–3, and D75.1–2 in 356.2.61 PVP D2a5–2b2 in Rigs gter rNam bœad 132b4–6; PVP D2a5–6 in Rigs gter dPal ster353.1–2, D2a6–2b1 in 355.6–356.2, and D2b1–2 in 357.6.62 Cf. Rigs gter Raó ’grel 101a6–101b1: rjes dpag gi óes pa la yaó gñis las … ’am / lhancig rgyu ba’i don gŸan ’dzin pa Ÿes bya ba’i rjes dpag dmar ’bar ba la the tshom za bana / me’i dri la sogs pa skye mched kyi rdzas gŸan las mer óes pa lta bu’o // kha cig ’dimóon sum yin Ÿes zer ba ni / skye mched kyi rnam dbye la mi mkhas par zad do //63 Rigs gter pham byed II 350.1–4: ’on na ji skad du /

don byed pa daó goms pa can // rjes su dpag pas óes par byed //Rigs gter 8.56cd

ces bœad pa ’di’i khuós gaó las btsal bar bya Ÿe na / gŸuó daó rgya ’grel las graós óesgsal bar bœad med kyaó / róog lo’i rnam par óes pa’i þi ka las / óes par byed pa yaórnam pa bŸi ste / rtags la brten pa’i rjes su dpag pa daó / lhan cig spyod pa’i don gŸan’dzin pa’i móon sum daó / bar du skyes pa’i don gyi rnam pa gsal po ’dzin pa’i móonsum daó / don byed par snaó ba’i móon sum mo // œes pa bŸi po des ni raó gi gŸal byabden par óes pa na œes pa sóa ma tshad mar œugs la óes pa yin no // Ÿes gsuó óo // róoglo lhan cig rgyu ba’i (in 350.2 spyod pa is used for rgyu ba) don gŸan ’dzin pa móonsum du bœad kyaó / rigs pa’ gter las rjes dpag tu bŸed pas óes byed kyi tshad ma gsumbsdu ba yin no // For the corresponding passage in rÓog Lotsâba’s PVin dKa’ gnas,s. above n. 33.64 As already mentioned in STEINKELLNER (1992: 258 n. 8), he deals with this topic inPVin bsDus pa 26a2–27b5.65 The similarity to Sa Paò’s introduction of the section dealing with the ascertainmentof the validity has already been noticed by STEINKELLNER (1992: 261 n. 33): ‘Thequestion and its explanation are given in substantially the same way by gTsang nag pa(bsDus pa 26a2–3). It is possible, because of the referential way of presenting it

Page 19: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 179

(… zhes zer ro) that Sa paò is referring to gTsang nag pa here. But lacking otherindications we cannot say so for certain.’66 This idea has already been presented by Devendrabuddhi who says that if cognitions’validity were to be established already due to themselves, the writers of scientific bookswould not formulate contradictory definitions of valid cognitions, but only one, as thedifference between valid and invalid cognitions would already be established whenthey occur; cf. PVP D4b5–6 = Q4b7–8 gal te tshad ma raó ñid las grub pa yin par (parD : pa Q) ’gyur na bstan bcos byed pa dag gis phan tshun ’gal ba can gyi tshad ma’imtshan ñid byed par mi ’gyur ro // tshad ma skyes pa ñid na tshad ma daó / tshad mama yin pa’i óo bo’i rnam par dbye ba grub pa’i phyir mtshan ñid gcig pa can ñid byedpar ’gyur ro //67 This undesired consequence in the case that the validity of a cognition is ascertainedparataÿ is expressed by Kumârila in his Båhaþ-þîkâ (quoted in TSa 2853; TBV 6.27–28;SVR 251.13–14; PVÞ D74b7–75a1): yathÎva prathamaô jñânaô tat saôvâdamapekšate / saôvâdenâpi saôvâdaÿ punar mågyas tathÎva hi // Cf. MŒV (Codanâ) 75;FRAUWALLNER (1962: 85 f); INAMI (1993: 116 f n. 46); translated in DUNNE (1999: 439n. 14).68 PVin bsDus pa 26a3: yaó ci gñis po de dag tshad ma ñid du raó ñid dam gŸan Ÿig gisóes par byed / daó po ltar na tshad ma’i bstan bcos don med par ’gyur la / gñis pa ltarna thug pa myed par ’gyur ro Ÿe na /69 PVin bsDus pa 26a3–4: ’di yaó raó daó gŸan las óes pa’i don óos gzuó pa daó / soso’i óo bo dper brjod pa daó / de la skyon myed pa gsum gyis óes par bya ba las / daópo ni …70 PVin bsDus pa 26a5–6: don byed par snaó pa’i móon sum daó rjes su dpag pas yulme bden par grub pa ñid kyis blo me bden pa ’jal ba’i tshad mar grub pa Ÿes bya ba nibyis pa’i sñan sóags yin te / bden pa’i yul can gyi (gyi corr.: ni) blo tshad mar bya ba lanus pa daó dogs pa myed pa’i phyir ro //71 Cf. PVin dKa’ gnas 44.21–45.9: de la rjes su dpag pa mtha’ dag ni / raó las óespa’o // de yaó raó rig pa’i móon sum gis ni ma yin gyi / gŸan rig ñid kyis so // de yaórjes su dpag pa’i don bden par óes pa na (na corr.: ni) de la ’dzin pa’i blo de ñid latshad ma ma yin pa’i dogs pa spoó pa’i phyir te / œes bya bden pa yod pa daó / de yodpar rtogs pa’i œes pa tshad ma ñid yin pa ni grub bde gcig pa’i phyir ro // don byed parsnaó ba’i móon sum yaó de bŸin te / gŸal bya’i ’bras bu mi slu ba gŸan rig kyi blo desgŸal bya daó de’i ’bras bu yod par óes pas de rtogs pa’i blo yaó tshad ma ma yin pardogs pa spoó pa’i phyir ro //72 Cf. PVin dKa’ gnas 45.12–16. Of a different opinion is, e.g. Œâkyabuddhi whoassumes the validity to be known through self-awareness (raó rig); cf. above, n. 7.73 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 264).74 Cf. Rigs gter Raó ‘grel 101b2–4:

kha cig yul daó óo bo la // brtags nas gzan sel mi srid zer //Rigs gter 8.57ab

óes bya’i tshad ma daó óes byed kyi tshad ma gñis yul gcig na óes byed kyi tshad magñis pa bcad pa’i yul can du ’gyur la / yul mi gcig na yul gŸan dóos por grub pas / gŸanji ltar dóos por grub ces zer ba daó / yaó kha cig gŸan las óes pa thams cad kyis kyaóde’i tshe sgro ’dogs ma chod na tshad ma ñid ma yin pas gŸan óes su’aó mi thad la /sgro ’dogs chod na raó las su ‘gyur ro // des na gŸan las óes kyi tshad ma gtan mi sriddo Ÿes zer ro //

de dag gis ni móon sum daó // rtog pa’i byed pa ’dres par zad //Rigs gter 8.57cd

Page 20: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

180 HELMUT KRASSER

Sa paò already negates certainty (óes pa) in the case of perception in the second chapter(Rigs gter 2.9c–10b); cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 268 n. 88).75 PVin bsDus pa 27b3–4: gal te óes par bya ba óes par byed pa dag yul mtshuós nagaó yaó ruó pa tshad mar mi ’gyur la / tha dad na yaó sgrub bya srgub byed du mi ruóste / myig daó rna ba’i blo bŸin no Ÿe na /76 PVin bsDus pa 26a7–8: de lta yin yaó (yaó corr.: daó) tshad ma rnams ni raó ñid kyisgrub pa yin ste / blo rnams yul mi gcig pas gŸan gyis óes pa mi ruó pa’i phyir ro Ÿes zerba ni / ; cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 263 with n. 45).77 PVin bsDus pa 26a8–27a1: yaó kha cig gŸal bya’aó raó gis grub par ’gyur du ’oópas raó ñid kyis mi ’grub kyi / dpyod pa Ÿes bya ba ’du byed brtan par byed pa’i blogŸan gyis óes pa yin no Ÿes zer ro //Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 262 f. with notes 39 and 40):

‘The second of these theorems, that it is extrinsically ascertained (gzhanlas) is unanimously attributed to the Bram ze (chen po) by thecommentators,39 i.e. Œaókaranandana. Go rams pa presents in rNambshad 127a5 f. a quotation from Œaókaranandana that consists of a halfverse and explanation in prose: “«Although something (don) is provenby a valid cognition, the validity (tshad ma, *prâmâòya) [of this validcognition] is not (proven) by this same [valid cognition].» (Thatmeans:) Although the respective object of activity (’jug yul) isascertained by the two valid cognitions, an ascertainment of thedefinitory character (mtshan nyid), (i.e.) reliability (mi slu ba) is notprovided through itself. Therefore the general definition and (its)contrary concomitance (’gal ’brel) etc. are ascertained by a cognitioncalled «examination» (dpyod pa, *vicâra) which occurred subsequentlyto the valid cognition. As such the definitory character of a validcognition is ascertained only by another (valid cognition).”40 At thistime we can only assume that this verse comes from one of the threePrâmâòyaparîkšâ-texts written by Œaókaranandana, but the ascriptionof the theorem to this Indian scholar need not be doubted.39 Cf. rNam bshad 127a5 f. and gSal byed 57a3; Pham byed II 370.5

(Bram ze chen po Shal ka ril [?]; Rab gsal 167.2; Nyi ma 278.5; dPalster 354.5 f.

40 Go rams pa, rNam bshad 127a5 f.: Bram zes—/ tshad ma las dona grub pa yang // tshad ma de nyid las ma yin /zhes tshad ma gnyis kyis rang rang gi ’jug yul nges par byed kyangmtshan nyid mi bslu ba la nges par rang stobs kyis ’dren par mi byedpas tshad ma’i rjes su skyes pa’i blo dpyod pa zhes bya bas spyi’imtshan nyid dang / ’gal ’brel la sogs pa nges par byed pas na tshadma’i mtshan nyid ni gzhan kho na las nges par byed do—zhes bzheddo //

a don (cf. Nyi ma 278.6): ston

The half verse quoted is attributed to Œaókaranandana’s Sambandha-parîkšâ (’Brel pa brtag pa) by Glo bo mkhan chen (cf. Nyi ma 278.5 f.),but not to be found in neither the Sambandhaparîkšâ nor itscommentary, the Anusâra (cf. Frauwallner 1934: 263 ff. for the text ofthe verses in the translation of the Anusâra).

Page 21: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 181

The above explanation is also referred to in Ngag dbang chos grags’dPal ster 354.5 f.; cf. also Bo dong paò chen’s Rigs snang 483.4–6.’

78 PVin bsDus pa 27a3–4: gŸan dag ni róos po (= dóos po) snaó pa la mi snaó pa’i yidgñis kyis zin pa yaó phyogs cig gis don mthun pas mtshan ñid gŸan las óes pa’i tshadma yin la / rgyaó nas œió tsam ’dzin pa yaó bye brag œa pa lasogs pa’i khyad par gyidon la tshad ma ñid yin te spyi ni khyad par gyi mthar thug pa’i phyir ro // de la spyi laltos te ni tshad ma’i mtshan ñid raó gis óes la khyad par la ni gŸan las óes pa yin no Ÿeszer ro // de ni ye nas ma yin te / …79 PVin bsDus pa 27b2: des na mtshan ñid gŸan gyis óes pa’i tshad ma ni gcig ñid deróos po la der mi snaó pa’i sgro ’dogs chod kyaó de ma yin pa’i sgro ’dogs daó bcaspa’o //80 PVin bsDus pa 27b2–3: de óes par byed pa yaó de’i yul gyi rnam pa gsal bar myoópa’i goms pa tsam don byed par snaó pa’i móon sum ñid yin kyi / ’bras bu’i rtags lasœes pa’i rjes dpag ni ma yin te / yod pa bsgrub par bya ba la rtags kyi mtha’ ’gog pañid kyi phyir ro //

BIBLIOGRAPHY

D = Takasaki, J., Z. Yamaguchi, Y. Ejima (eds.): sDe dge TibetanTripiþaka bsTan ÿgyur—preserved at the Faculty of Letters,University of Tokyo. Tshad ma 1–20. Tokyo 1981–1984.

DUNNE 1999 = Dunne, John Dowling: Foundations of Dharmakîrti’sphilosophy: A study of the central issues in his ontology, logicand epistemology with particular attention to the Svopajñavåtti.Unpublished thesis presented to the Harvard University.Cambridge, Massachusetts 1999.

FRAUWALLNER 1962 = Frauwallner, Erich: ‘Kumârila’s Båhaþþîkâ’, Wiener Zeitschriftfür die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens 6 (1962) 78–90.

HATTORI 1997 = Hattori, Masaaki: ‘The Buddhist theory concerning the truth andfalsity of cognition’. In: P. Bilimoria and J.N. Mohanty (eds.):Relativism, suffering and beyond. Essays in memory of Bimal K.Matilal. Delhi 1997: 361–371.

INAMI 1992 = Inami, Masahiro: ‘Pramâòavârttika Pramâòasiddhi sh÷ nokenkyû (1) [A study of the Pramâòasiddhi Chapter ofPramâòavârttika (1)]’, Hiroshima daigaku bungakubu kiy÷ 51(1992) 59–76.

INAMI 1993 = Inami, Masahiro: ‘Bukky÷ ronrigakuha no shinriron—Devendrabuddhi to Œâkyabuddhi (The theory of the Buddhistlogical school concerning the validity—D. and Œ.)’. In: EgakuMayeda (ed.): Studies in original Buddhism and MahâyânaBuddhism in commemoration of late Professor Dr. FumimaroWatanabe. Vol. 2. Kyoto 1993: 85–118.

KAJIYAMA 1998 = Kajiyama, Yuichi: An introduction to Buddhist philosophy. Anannotated translation of the Tarkabhâšâ of Mokšâkaragupta.Reprint with corrections in the author’s hand. Wien 1998.

MŒV = Kumârila: Œloka-vârttika. Œlokavârttika of Œrî Kumârila Bhaþþawith the commentary Nyâyaratnâkara of Œrî PârthasârathiMiœra, ed. Dvârikâdâsa Œâstrî. Varanasi 1978.

Page 22: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

182 HELMUT KRASSER

NMa = Jayantabhaþþa: Nyâya-mañjarî. Edited with Þippaòi-nyâya-saurabha by the editor by K. S. Varadacharya, Vol. 1 & 2,Oriental Research Institute Series 116, Mysore 1969.

PPar II = Dharmottara: Laghu-prâmâòya-parîkšâ. Helmut Krasser (ed.):Dharmottaras kurze Untersuchung der Gültigkeit einerErkenntnis. Laghuprâmâòyaparîkšâ. Teil 1: Tibetischer Textund Sanskritmaterialien. Wien 1991.

PV 2, 3, 4 = Dharmakîrti: Pramâòa-vârttika, Chapters 2, 3, 4. YûshoMiyasaka (ed.): ‘Pramâòa-vârttika-kârikâ (Sanskrit andTibetan).’ [Chapter 2 = Pramâòa-siddhi, Chapter 3 = Pratyakša,Chapter 4 = Parârthânumâna]. Acta Indologica 2 (1971/72)[Narita].

PVin 1 = Dharmakîrti: Pramâòa-viniœcaya I (Pratyakša). Tilmann Vetter(ed.): Dharmakîrti’s Pramâòaviniœcayaÿ, 1. Kapitel:Pratyakšam. Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Übersetzung,Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Übersetzung. Veröffentlichungender Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Süd- und Ostasiens,Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Heft 3, Wien1966.

PVin bsDus pa = gTsaó nag pa brTson ’grus seó ge: Tshad ma rnam par óes pa’iþi ka legs bœad bsdus pa. Kyoto 1989.

PVin dKa’ gnas = rÓog Blo ldan œes rab: Tshad ma rnam óes kyi dga’ gnas rnambœad. Beijing 1994.

PVinÞ(a) = Dharmottara: Pramâòa-viniœcaya-þîkâ Q 7b6–13a7. ErnstSteinkellner und Helmut Krasser (eds.): Dharmottaras Exkurszur Definition gültiger Erkenntnis im Pramâòaviniœcaya.Tibetischer Text, Sanskritmaterialien und Übersetzung. Beiträgezur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens Nr. 2, ÖsterreichischeAkademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 1989.

PVP = Devendrabuddhi: Pramâòa-vârttika-pañjikâ. D Tshad ma Vol.2, No. 4217, Che 1b–326b = Q Vol. 130, No. 5717(b), Che 1–390a.

PVSVÞ = Karòakagomin: Pramâòa-vârttika-svavåtti-þîkâ. RâhulaSâókåtyâyana (ed.): Âcârya-Dharmakîrteÿ Pramâòa-vârttikam(svârthânumâna-paricchedaÿ) svopajña-våttyâ Karòakagomi-viracitayâ taþ-þîkayâ ca sahitam. Allahabad 1943. [Reprinted:Rinsen, Ky÷to 1982].

PVÞ = Œâkyabuddhi: Pramâòa-vârttika-þîkâ. D 4220, Tshad ma Vol. 4,Ñe 1–282a7 = Q 5718, Vol. 131, Ñe 1–348a8.

PVV = Manorathanandin: Pramâòa-vârttika-våtti. Râhula Sâókåtyâyana(ed.): Dharmakîrti’s Pramâòavârttika with a commentary byManorathanandin, Patna 1938–40.

Q = Suzuki, D.T. (ed.): The Tibetan Tripiþaka, Peking Edition.Tokyo-Kyoto 1955–1961.

Rigs gter dPal ster = Ngag dbaó chos grags: Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi dgoós dongsal bar byed pa’i legs bœad óag gi dpal ster. New Delhi 1963.

Rigs gter Pham byed II = gSer mdog Paò chen Œâkya mchog ldan: Tshad ma Rigs gter gyidgoós rgyan rigs pa’i ’khor los lugs óan pham byed ces bya ba’ibstan bcos smad cha. In: The Complete Works (gSuó ‘bum) ofgSer-mdog Paò-chen Œâkya-mchog ldan 10. Thimphu 1975.

Page 23: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 183

Rigs gter Raó ’grel = Sa skya Paòðita Kun dga’ rgyal mtshan: Tshad ma rigs pa’i gtergyi Raó ’grel. In: The Complete Works of Paòðita Kun dga’rgyal mtshan. The Complete Works of the Great Masters of theSa Skya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism 5, ed. bSod nams rgyamtsho. Tokyo 1968.

Rigs gter rNam bœad = Go rams pa bSod nams seó ge: Tshad ma rigs pa’i gter gyi dka’ba’i gnas rnam par bœad pa sde bdun rab gsal. In: TheComplete Works of Go ram bSod nams seó ge. The CompleteWorks of the Great Masters of the Sa Skya Sect of the TibetanBuddhism 12, ed. bSod nams rgya mtsho. Tokyo 1969.

SCHMITHAUSEN 1965 = Schmithausen, Lambert: Maòðanamiœra’s Vibhramavivekaÿ.Mit einer Studie zur Entwicklung der indischen Irrtumslehre.Wien 1965.

SCHWABLAND 1995 = Schwabland, Peter A.: ‘Direct and indirect cognition and thedefinition of pramâòa in early Tibetan epistemology’, AsiatischeStudien/Études Asiatiques 44/4 (1995) 793–816.

sDe bdun rGyan gyime tog

= bCom ldan Rigs pa’i ral gri, Tshad ma’i bstan bcos sde bdunrgyan gyi me tog. In: Tshad ma sde bdun rgyan gyi me tog, ed.rDo rje rgyal po. Beijing 1991: 1–138.

SMITH 2001 = Smith, E. Gene: Among Tibetan texts. History and literature ofthe Himalayan Plateau. Boston 2001.

STEINKELLNER 1981 = Steinkellner, Ernst: ‘Philological remarks on Œâkyamati’sPramâòavârttikaþîkâ’. In: Klaus Bruhn und Albrecht Wezler(eds.): Studien zum Jainismus und Buddhismus. Gedenkschriftfür Ludwig Alsdorf. Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 23, FranzSteiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1981: 283–295.

STEINKELLNER 1992 = Steinkellner, Ernst: ‘Early Tibetan ideas on the ascertainment ofvalidity (nges byed kyi tshad ma)’. In: Ihara Sh÷ren andYamagucchi Zuih÷ (eds.): Tibetan Studies. Proceedings of the5th Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan Studies,Narita 1989. Narita 1992: 257–273.

STEINKELLNER–KRASSER 1989

= Steinkellner, Ernst und Helmut Krasser: Dharmottaras Exkurszur Definition gültiger Erkenntnis im Pramâòaviniœcaya.Tibetischer Text, Sanskritmaterialien und Übersetzung. Wien1989.

SVR = Vâdideva-sûri: Syâd-vâda-ratnâkara. L. Motîlâl (ed.): Œrîmad-vâdidevasûri-viracitaÿ pramâòa-naya-tattvâlokâlaókâraÿ tad-vyâkhyâ ca syâd-vâda-ratnâkaraÿ. 5 Vols. Poona 1926–1930.

TBV = Abhayadevasûri: Tattva-bodha-vidhâyinî. Sukhlâl Saóghavi andBecardâs Doœi (eds.): Âcârya-œrî-siddhasena-divâkara-praòîtaôSaômati-tarka-prakaraòam … œrîmad-abhayadevasûri-nirmitayâ Tattva-bodha-vidhâyiny vyâkhyayâ vibhûšitam. 5Vols. Gujarât-purâ-tattva-mandir-granthâvalî 10, 16, 18, 19,21, Gujarât-purâ-tattva-mandir, Amdâvâd, 1924–1931[Reprinted: Kyoto 1984].

TSa = Œântarakšita: Tattva-saógraha. See: TSaP.TSaP = Kamalaœîla: Tattva-saógraha-pañjikâ. Tattvasaógraha of

Âcârya Shântarakšita with the Commentary ‘Pañjikâ’ of ShriKamalashîla, ed. Dvarikadas Shastri. 2. Vols. Varanasi 1981,1982.

Page 24: On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

184 HELMUT KRASSER

VAN DER KUIJP 1989 = van der Kuijp, Leonard W.J.: ‘An introduction to Gtsang-nag-pa’s Tshad-ma rnam-par nges-pa’i þi-ka legs-bshad bsdus pa.An ancient commentary on Dharmakîrti’s Pramâòaviniœcaya,Otani University Collection No. 13971’, Kyoto 1989: 1–39.