On the Ascertainment of Validity in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition

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HELMUT KRASSERON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITYIN THE BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITIONThe problem of whether the validity of a cognition is alreadyascertained due to the very cognition itself (svata, ra las) or due to afurther, later cognition (parata, gan las) has been dealt with inseveral papers in the last decade. A lengthy account, mainly focusingon Sa skya paitas (11821251) Tshad mai Rigs gter and Ra grelas well as on its sources and opponents referred to therein, wasprovided by Ernst STEINKELLNER in his contribution Early Tibetanideas on the ascertainment of validity (nges byed kyi tshad ma) of1992. One year later, Masahiro INAMI presented a Japanese translationof the relevant passages in Devendrabuddhis Prama-vrttika-pajik and kyabuddhis commentary thereon. In 1997, MasaakiHATTORI dealt with this problem in view of ntarakitas andKamalalas theories. Finally, in 1999 John DUNNE presentedtranslations of selected passages from the commentaries ofDevendrabuddhi and kyabuddhi on PV 2.16 in which the questionof whether the validity of a cognition is ascertained svata or parata isdealt with. In the present paper, for the sake of convenience, I wouldlike to give a rough systematic overview of the theories held by theIndian scholars of the Buddhist epistemological tradition and to addsome further material, regarding mainly the early Tibetan ideas, byconsidering rog Lotsbas (10591109) Explanation of difficultpoints in the Prama-vinicaya (Tshad ma rnam es kyi dKa gnasrnam bad) that has recently been made available, as well as gTsa nagpa brTson grus se ges (?at least 1192)1 commentary onDharmakrtis Prama-vinicaya.As is well known, Dignga does not deal with this problem at all2 andDharmakrti simply states that the nature of cognition is known due tothe cognition itself and that its validity is known by practice(vyavahra).3 However, already Devendrabuddhi distinguishes betweencertain cognitions the validity of which is ascertained svata and otherswhere the validity is known parata, although he understandsDharmakrtis laconic statement as meaning that the validity must beascertained due to a later cognition of the fulfilment of the purpose.4Perceptions, Devendrabuddhi explains, are possibly not reliable as thereare variegated causes for error. In such cases the validity must beJournal of Indian Philosophy 31: 161184, 2003.c2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.162 HELMUT KRASSERknown from a subsequent valid cognition. In the case of inference,however, such causes for error do not occur and therefore theestablishment of validity does not depend on the occurrence of asubsequent cognition.5 Thus we can gain the following list:A. svata1. valid cognition, i.e. perception, related to the actual fulfilment of apurpose (don byed pai yul can gyi tshad ma, *artha-kriy-viayapramam)2. inference (rjes su dpag pa, *anumna)B. parata1. perception with variegated causes for error (mon sum id la khrulpai rgyu sna tshogs pa id)C. ascertaining cognition of B.1. is A.1.A slightly more detailed list can be drawn from kyabuddhistreatment of the problem:A. svata1. trained perception (goms pa can, abhysa-vat)6perception related to an object that is capable of fulfilling a purpose(don byed par nus pai yul can gyi mon sum, *artha-kriy-samartha-viaya pratyakam) when there are no causes for error(*bhrnti-nimitta)72. inference (rjes su dpag pa, *anumna)8[3. perception of the fulfilment of a purpose]9B. parata1. first occurrence (jug pa da po, dy pravtti) of perception withcauses for error (khrul pai rgyu mtshan, *bhrnti-nimitta)10 orwhere the causes cannot be ascertained11C. ascertaining cognition: no explicit statementThe next author to be dealt with, Dharmottara, treated this subject inboth of his Prmya-parks and in a digression at the beginning ofhis commentary on the Prama-vinicaya. The following list is basedon the latter.A. svata1. perception in which the [actual] fulfilment of a purpose appears(*artha-kriy-nirbhsa pratyakam)122. inference123. trained perception13B. parata141. perception in which the necessary connection with the object isuncertain (*arthvinbhva-saaya)15ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 163a) perception with doubt as to whether the apparent (*pratibhsamna)object, e.g. fire, is real (*satya) or not: in this case the validity withregard to all aspects (*sarvtmani) must be ascertained due to asubsequent cognition16b) perception of the general aspect (*smnya) of something withbranches, in which the specific aspect (*viea), e.g. that it is aDhava or Pala tree, is uncertain: in this case the validity withregard to the general aspect is considered to be svata, but withregard to the specific aspect parata17c) perception uncertain with regard to the appearance itself (? cf. belowp. 47)C. ascertaining cognition: no explicit statementThe most exhaustive list is given by Kamalala in TSaP 938.1923.He distinguishes seven kinds of valid and invalid cognitions, which are,according to STEINKELLNER (1992: 259):18(1.) the self-awareness-perception (sva-savedana-pratyakam),(2.) yogic cognition (yogijnam),(3.) cognition of the fulfilment of a purpose (artha-kriy-jnam),(4.) inference (anumnam), and(5.) trained perception (abhysavat pratyakam)are valid intrinsically (svata), and (6.) cognition produced by prescription (codan-janita jnam), and(7.) perception that is not free from causes for error (pratyakamanapagata-bhrnti-nimittam)are extrinsically (anyata) valid.C. ascertaining cognition: no explicit statementThe last small list presented here is that of Manorathanandin to befound in his Prama-vrttika-vtti (PVV 3.224.8):A. svata1. trained perception of [an object] that realises a purpose (asakd-vyavahrbhysd darana-mtrepalakita-bhrama-vivikta-svarpa-viea sdhandhyakam)2. inference3. perception in which the fulfilment of a purpose appears (artha-kriy-nirbhsa pratyakam)B. parata1. untrained perception in which the validity is doubtful (sandigdha-prmya)C. ascertaining cognitions of B.1 are A.2 and A.3An additional small list can be gathered from MokkaraguptasTarka-bh,19 who, like Kamalala, also enumerates yogic cognition164 HELMUT KRASSERand self-awareness as being among those cognitions the validity ofwhich is ascertained svata. Karakagomin only mentions that thevalidity in the case of perceptions with causes for error is ascertainedby inference, in other cases due to perception itself, and refers to thesecond chapter of his commentary where he intends to deal with thistopic.20 However, the text of his second chapter is not available. In thetexts of Prajkaragupta, Jnarmitra and Ratnakrti I have not beenable to locate a discussion on the ascertainment of validity nor toextract a list. The commentaries on Prajkaraguptas Prama-vrttiklakra still remain to be examined.As can be seen from the material presented so far, in the course oftime the list has been expanded and differentiated in order to cover allpossible types of a valid or invalid cognition. I could not discover adiscussion among the Buddhist scholars referred to above; theopponent, if mentioned at all, remains the opposing school of theMmsaka, especially Kumrila. An exception to this may beakaranandana, who claimed that ascertainment of validity due tocognition itself is not possible at all, and that validity in all cases mustbe ascertained due to a further cognition. This information is obtainedfrom quotations and paraphrases in Tibetan sources only, asakaranandanas works in which he deals with this subject, namely histhree Prmya-parks, have not yet been edited.21The situation in the Tibetan tradition is quite different. Here we find alively discussion of the problem among Buddhist scholars, andKumrila has lost his position as the main opponent. This has beenshown clearly in STEINKELLNERs paper cited above, in which hewith the help of the numerous commentarieswas able to identifymany of the opponents addressed by Sa skya Paita in his treatment ofthe topic in his Tshad ma Rigs gter with Ra grel, as well as most ofthe Indian sources he made use of. One of his Tibetan opponents is thetranslator rog Lotsba Blo ldan es rab, one of the most influentialexponents of what Leonard van der Kuijp calls the later phase of thePre-classical Period of Tibetan tshad ma studies.22 The source of thetheories refuted by Sa pa, as reported by kya mchog ldan and Gorams pa bSod nam se ge, is rog Lotsbas commentary on thePrama-vinicaya, the rNam par es pai k.23 As none of rogLotsbas works was available at the time STEINKELLNER wrote hispaper, for his description of rog Lotsbas view on the ascertainmentof the validity he had to rely on the information provided by thecommentaries on Sa pas Rigs gter. Although rog Lotsbascommentary is still not available, in the interim his Explanation ofON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 165difficult points in the Prama-vinicaya has been published, whichallows for some further remarks.Like Dharmottara, he treats this subject at the beginning of the firstchapter in connection with the definition of valid cognition asformulated by Dharmakrti in PVin 1.30.1718: na hy bhymartha paricchidya pravartamno rtha-kriyy visavdyate( because one who acts, after having ascertained the object bymeans of these two [kinds of cognition], is not betrayed with regard tothe fulfilment of [his] purpose). The theme is introduced in the PVindKa gnas as the third and final point to be dealt with under the topic ofthe general definition (spyii mtshan id la gsum ste 28.4) of a validcognition, and is given the title investigation of the cognitions thathave one ascertain the defining characteristic (mtshan id es par byedpai es pa dpyad pa gsum ni 28.56) which is reflected in Sa pasheading the valid cognition which ascertains the defining characteristicin case of the instances of what is being defined (mtshan gi la mtshanid es pai tshad ma).24 The structure of this section in the PVin dKagnas is as follows:251. mtshan id es par byed pacognitions that have one ascertain the definingcharacteristic (44.2049.13)1.1. ra ascertainment due to the cognition itself (44.2145.16)1.1.1. inference (44.2145.5)1.1.2. perception in which the fulfilment ofa purpose appears (45.545.10)1.1.3. perception in which that whichrealises a purpose appears (45.1045.16) goms pa patrained perception (45.1245.16)( da po pafirst perception (this is not mentioned again; cf. below, n. 29)1.2. gan las ascertainment due to a subsequent cognition / perceptionfor the first time (45.1749.13)1.2.1. gan las es par bya bai khyad parparticular cognitions to be ascertaineddue to a further cognition (45.2048.16) don yod pa tsam la the tshom za badoubt whether the object exists at all(46.211) spyi yod par es kya khyad par la the tshom za bauncertainty with regardto the specific aspect, although the general aspect has been ascertained to bepresent (46.1247.15) sna ba id la the tshom za badoubt with regard to the appearance itself (47.1648.16)1.2.2. es par byed pai khyad parparticular cognitions that have one ascertainthe defining characteristic (48.1749.2)1.2.3. es pai donthe meaning of ascertainment (49.313)166 HELMUT KRASSERThe structure of this section does not, however, reflect rogLotsbas own classification, as it merely indicates the points to bedealt with. His classification appears as follows:A. ra las (svata)1. inference (rjes su dpag pa, *anumna)262. perception in which the fulfilment of a purpose appears (don byedpar sna bai mon sum, *artha-kriy-nirbhsa pratyaka)273. trained perception (mon sum goms pa pa, *abhyasta-pratyaka)28B. gan las (parata)1. first perception (mon sum da po pa)29rog Lotsba explains both cases of that which he calls firstperception in terms of Nos. B.1.a and B.1.b of Dharmottaras list (cf.above, p. 162).a. perception in which the objects existence itself is uncertain (yodpa tsam la the tshom za ba)example: Although something is ascertained as fire that appears inones perception, one is unsure whether it is unreal like a magicalcreation (sgyu ma) or real.30b. perception in which the objects existence itself is ascertained, butin which the specific aspect of that existing thing is uncertain (yodpai khyad par la the tshom za ba)31example: Although something is ascertained as being a tree, one isunsure whether it is a iap, or as in the case when something,although it is ascertained as being red, is not ascertained as beingfire or jewels.32C. cognitions that have one ascertain the defining characteristic of theperceptions of Nos. B.1.a and B.1.b are of four kind: a) inference, b) aperception which grasps an additional object occurring at the same time[as the object of the uncertain cognition], c) a perception which in themeantime grasps that very uncertain object clearly, and d) a perception inwhich the fulfilment of a purpose appears.33As can be easily seen, the cognition dealt with in of the sabcad in which one doubts whether something has appeared in onesmind which is then ascertained as being valid by a later cognition is notlisted under B.1. That this cognition is not accepted by rog Lotsba asbeing valid, but is classified as invalid has been shown bySTEINKELLNER (1992: 267 f), who supports this with a quotation drawnfrom rog Lotsbas commentary on the Prama-vinicaya in kyamchog ldans Rigs gter Pham byed. In this quotation,34 rog Lotsbaascribes to Dharmottara the view that the cognition referred to in is valid. The text, according to this quotation, reads as follows(Rigs gter Pham byed II 366.6367.2):ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 167rnam par es pai ka las / da po pa ni / gan es kyi mtshan giyin la / de laa slob dpon chos mchog ltar na gsum ste / don yod patsam la the tshom za ba da / spyi yod par es kya khyad par la thetshom za ba da / sna ba id la the tshom za ba gsum mo es zer ro //The first [perceptions] are the instances of that which is being definedthat are ascertained [as being valid] due to a further cognition. In this casetoo, there areaccording to the view of the Teacher Dharmottarathree[different kinds]: doubt regarding the objects existence as such;uncertainty regarding the specific aspect although the general aspect isascertained as existing; and doubt regarding the appearance itself.As already mentioned, the first two kinds are accepted by rogLotsba and the third is refuted. In contradistinction, Sa skya Paitaaccepts all three, although his classification is more differentiated.35 Alist drawn from his treatment of this topic in his Rigs gter and Ra grelemerges as follows:36A. ra las (svata)1. perception in which the [actual] fulfilment of a purpose appears (donbyed par sna bai mon sum, *artha-kriy-nirbhsa pratyakam)2. trained perception (mon sum goms pa can, *abhyasta-pratyaka)3. self-awareness (ra rig, *sva-savedana)4. inference (rjes dpag, *anumna)B. gan las (parata)1. first perception (mon sum da po pa)Sa pa does not enumerate different kinds of this cognition, but givestwo examples without spelling out that these are exemplifications offirst perception.37 The two examples correspond to those given byrog Lotsba for the two kinds of first perception, i.e. B.1.a+b; forthe sake of convenience the same headings are used here:a. 38example: when the appearance of the object (sna ba) isintrinsically ascertained, but the share of reality (bden pai cha) inthis appearance is extrinsically ascertained. E.g. when the form ofsomething shining red from afar (rgya ri po nas dmar bar bairnam pa) is intrinsically ascertained, the doubt (the tshom za ba)whether this is as fire real or merely a wrong superimposition(sgro btags) like an illusion or a magical creation is settledextrinsically.39b. 38example: when the general aspect (spyi) of something withbranches appearing afar is intrinsically ascertained, but thespecific aspect (bye brag), e.g. that it is a iap-tree isascertained extrinsically.40Doubt with regard to the appearance itself168 HELMUT KRASSERThe third kind of perception to be ascertained parata that isattributed by rog Lotsba to Dharmottara, i.e. sna ba ra id lathe tshom za ba, isaccording to kya mchog ldan41divided bySa pa into two kinds, whereby the example is supplied to illustratethe first, i.e. yid ma gtad pa.2. perception with distracted mind (yid ma gtad pa)42example: If one doubts when somewhere fire appears Did I have acognition of fire appearing or not?, the sense-cognition whichcannot be ascertained by the [following] mental cognition (yid shes)is extrinsically ascertained, although it is non-conceptual (and) non-erroneous (and) therefore a valid cognition.433. perception with grounds for error (khrul rgyu can, *bhrnti-nimitta): neither a definition nor an example is given, but accordingto the commentators it is like a cognition of sun-rays as beingwater44C. ascertaining cognitions for the perceptions of Nos. B.1.a, B.1.b, B.2.a andB.2.b are the perceptions Nos. A.1, A.2 and inference.Before treating the problem of whether this three partite division ofcognition attributed to Dharmottara was actually proposed byDharmottara himself, I would like to add a few words concerningkya mchog ldans manner of quoting from rog Lotsbas Prama-vinicaya commentary by looking at his PVin dKa gnas. The ideaexpressed in the first part of the quotation45 has its corresponding partsin PVin dKa gnas 48.2149.1, 44.21 and 45.1112, and the secondpart referred to above (p. 167) is found more or less literally in PVindKa gnas (45.2046.1) as an introduction to the section of theparticular cognitions to be ascertained by a further cognition (gan lases par bya bai khyad par):da po ni slob dpon chos mchog ltar na gsum ste / don yod pa tsam lathe tshom za ba da / spyi yod par es kya khyad par la the tshom zaba da / sna ba id la the tshom za bao eo //We thus have reason to assume that the idea attributed to rogLotsba by kya mchog ldan is presented in a reliable manner, and thesecond part even allows one to suppose that in this case we are dealingwith a literal quotation which may apply to the first part as well.46 Finalcertainty can be gained only when rog Lotsbas commentary isavailable.Regarding these three kinds of first perception, STEINKELLNER(1992: 268) has expressed doubt as to whether this third kind wherethe appearance itself (sna ba nyid) is doubtful has been proposed byDharmottara at all, although others like Phywa pa Chos kyi seng geand Shkya mchog ldan also clearly attest to such a division forON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 169Dharmottara.47 The reasons for this doubt are, among others, that theidea of a doubtful appearance itself can not be pinpointed inDharmottaras works, and that even kya mchog ldan questionswhether the third kind of first perception was taught by Dharmottara.Moreover, with regard to the example given by Sa pa for theperception with distracted mind (yid ma gtad pa), namely if one isuncertain, when in a particular cognition fire appears, asking did I havea cognition of fire appearing or not? there is a testimonial byDharmottara to the contrary, stating that doubt may have the form ofwhether the thing that appears in the cognition is real, but not whether itappears at all.48 Unfortunately, the wording of rog Lotsbas remarksin his PVin dKa gnas is not of much help to see how he extracts such athreefold division from Dharmottaras works. In the section dealingwith doubt regarding the appearance itself (47.1648.16), rog Lotsbafirst presents Dharmottaras opinion, then states that this is not correctat all,49 then refutes some possible undesired consequences andconcludes that there are only two kinds of cognition to be ascertained asbeing valid due to a subsequent cognition, namely cognitions withdoubt regarding the reality of the object and those with uncertaintyregarding the particular aspect when the general aspect has beenascertained. Dharmottaras position is presented in the followingmanner (PVin dKa gnas 47.1619):sna ba la the tshom za ba ni dper na son por sna bai blo a laskyes sam ma skyes es bya ba lta bu ste / de ya the tshom gyis snabai cha la en par byas pas sna ba es pa (pa Ms: par ed.) la myi ltospar tshad mai bya ba grub pai phyir tshad ma yin no es slob dponchos mchog gsu o //Doubt with regard to the appearance is, for example: Did I have acognition of something appearing as blue or not? Further: Because theappearing part has been determined by the doubt, the function of thevalid cognition is realised independently of the ascertainment of theappearing [object]. Therefore it is a valid cognition. So it is said by theTeacher Dharmottara.From this it is clear that rog Lotsba had the same passage in mindas Sa skya Paita when formulating his example for a cognition withdistracted mind, although they judge this cognition differently.However, I have not been able to locate the corresponding passage inany of Dharmottaras works.50 But as the two kinds of first perceptionaccepted by rog Lotsba (cf. above p. 166) are summaries ofPVin(a) 16.14 and 16.518.5 (cf. B.1.a+b in Dharmottaras list,above p. 162), and because the commentators of the Ra grel connectSa pas perception with grounds for error (khrul rgyu can, *bhrnti-170 HELMUT KRASSERnimitta) with Dharmottaras example51 for an invalid cognition, i.e.perception of sun-rays as being water,52 it is very likely that thisdigression in the PVin is the source for rog Lotsbas attribution.And there really is a passage that can be interpreted in this way,although we understood it differently in our previous interpretation53and although kya mchog ldan did not recognise it.54 In PVin(a)18.1418, still dealing with doubt regarding the cognitions necessaryconnection (*avinbhva-saaya) with the object, Dharmottara says:sna ba ya ra id es pai ra bin de kho na bin du es pai phyirmed na mi byu bai the tshom ni phyi nas byu bas mon sum gyibya ba mi gog go //In case of the appearance too, a doubt regarding [the cognitions]necessary connection [with its object], inasmuch as it arises later, doesnot impede the function of perception, because [that appearance] itselfis ascertained in accordance with the very nature of the ascertained[object] (?).This could mean that when in the case of a cognition of, for example,blue, one acts due to the uncertainty of whether one really had acognition of blue, and one then actually does obtain something blue, thecognition of blue turns out to be valid. The fact that the commentatorsof the Ra grel did not refer to this ambiguous passage, while Sa paunderstood it in the same way as rog Lotsba, may be explained bythe likelihood that the latter two used a Sanskrit manuscript whereas thecommentators relied on a Tibetan translation (?). Dharmottaras ownstatement to the contrary in his shorter Prmya-park, namely thata doubt has the form of the question is this thing which appears in theperception real or not? but not of the question does it appear in theperception or not?55 may apply only to certain cases of doubt, e.g. inthe case of cognitions in which the mind is not distracted. This needsfurther investigation.In the next section I will consider possible Indian sources for rogLotsbas and Sa pas classification, i.e. the texts of kyabuddhi,Dharmottara and Kamalala, as well as differences between them.Regarding the perception of the fulfilment of a purpose and inference,all authors mentioned so far share the same opinion. The same alsoholds true for the trained perception. Self consciousness (ra rig, *sva-savedana) is enumerated only by Kamalala and Sa pa, yogicperception by Kamalala alone. Whether kyabuddhi, Dharmottara,rog Lotsba and Sa pa did not mention them deliberately remains tobe investigated.56 Kamalalas cognition produced by prescriptionON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 171(codan-janitam jnam) as a kind of cognition to be ascertainedparata is to my knowledge not considered by the Tibetan scholars.57The source for rog Lotsbas classification of perception into first(da po pa) and trained (goms pa pa) is evidently kyabuddhisdistinction between first and trained occurrence of perception(s. above p. 162). In this context the phrase khrul pai rgyu mtshan(*bhrnti-nimitta) is first used by kyabuddhi (cf. above, n. 6),although not in terms of a category, and Kamalala lists a cognitionthat is not free from causes for error (pratyakam anapagata-bhrnti-nimittam; cf. above, p. 163). Although they do not agree in all cases, itis clear from the examples they use that not only rog Lotsba, but alsoSa pa depends highly on Dharmottara,58 and this is also attested by thecommentators of the Ra grel. Go rams pa bSod nam se ge, forexample, after quoting kyabuddhis PV D75a775b2 andDharmottaras PVin(a) 13.57 and paraphrasing the beginning ofPVin(a) 14.16 f59, says that the verses Rigs gter 8.55c56d are inaccordance with these texts.60 Also Devendrabuddhi is quoted by Gorams pa and ag dba chos grags.61As we have seen above, Sa pa, although he follows the line of rogLotsba in many cases, deviates, for example, in accepting a cognitionwith doubt regarding the appearance as valid. To this we may add afurther case. Among the four cognitions by means of which the validityof a previous uncertain cognition is ascertained, rog Lotsbaenumerates a perception which grasps a further object occurring at thesame time [as the object of the uncertain cognition] (lhan cig spyodpai don gan dzin pai mon sum) (cf. above p. 166). Although I donot yet know a passage in which rog Lotsba himself explains whathe means by this, according to Sa pa it is a cognition of the smell offire subsequent to the uncertainty whether there is fire in a particularplace. Sa pa, having classified such a cognition as inference, mentionsthe opinion of some (kha cig) who take this to be a perception, andremarks that they are not very learned in distinguishing the realms ofobjects (skye mched, *yatana).62 That Sa pa refers to rog Lotsbawith kha cig is supported by kya mchog ldan. In his discussionconcerning the origin of Sa pas extraction of the number three for thesubsequent ascertaining cognitions, he states that neither Dharmakrtistexts (gu) nor the Indian commentaries (rgya grel) are clear on therestriction of the number, and that Sa pa arrives at the number threebecause he considers that which is explained by rog Lotsba asperception, namely a cognition grasping a further object occurring at172 HELMUT KRASSERthe same time as (lhan cig spyod pai don gan dzin pa) the uncertainobject, to be inference.63Finally I would like to add some provisional remarks on gTsa nag pabrTson grus se ges view on the ascertainment of the validity asavailable in his Prama-vinicaya commentary Tshad ma rnam pares pai i ka legs bad bsdus pa, and try to identify some of hisopponents.64He treats this subject under the heading Considerations regarding theascertainment of the defining characteristic in case of the instances ofwhat is being defined ( gi la mtshan id es byed bsam pa),and begins with the question of whether the validity of the twocognitions is ascertained svata or parata.65 In the first case, he adds,stras on prama would be futile,66 and in second case an infiniteregression would be obtained67.68 This is dealt with under the headings:1) identification (os bzu) of the meaning (don) of ascertainment dueto [a cognition] itself or due to a further one; 2) giving examples for theirrespective nature; and 3) showing that there are no faults. The first ofthese is introduced by da po.69 Where the second and the thirdparagraphs begin is not indicated and there are no further subdivisions.Thus it is clear that he is not as fond of sa bcad as Sa pa and others are.In treating the first subject he says that the formulation Cognition(blo) is established as valid cognition that cognises the real firecorrectly just because of the fact that the object, fire, is established to bereal by perception in which the fulfilment of a purpose appears and byinference. is the poetry of the simple-minded (byis pai san ag,*bala-kvya), because in the case of a cognition related to somethingreal there is neither the capability to perform the function of a validcognition nor doubt regarding that function.70 One of the possiblewriters of such poetry of the simple-minded seems to be rogLotsba, for he assumes that in the case of inference, the ascertainmentof the validity is due to awareness of something else (gan rig), but notof cognition itself (ra rig). In order to show this he explains that whenthe object of inference is ascertained as being real, doubt as to whetherthe cognition grasping that object is not valid is excluded, because thepresence of a real object and cognition that cognises it to be present,which is a valid cognition, share the same fate (grub bde gcig pa, *eka-yoga-kema). This also holds good for the perception in which theactual fulfilment of a purpose appears: Uncertainty regarding theinvalidity of the cognition that cognises the object is excluded when theobject of knowledge (gal bya) and its effect are ascertained as beingpresent by this reliable cognition, which is the effect of the object ofON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 173knowledge and awareness of something else (gan rig).71 It should bementioned, however, that also in the case of trained perception rogLotsba assumes that its validity is known in the same way.72 Theargument against this view, namely that in the case of a cognitionrelated to something real there is neither the capability to perform thefunction of a valid cognition nor doubt, may be understood as follows:Perception cannot ascertain an object nor can be doubtful as it is free ofconception. The same opinion is expressed by Sa pa. When refutingtwo objections to his own positionthe opponents in this case havebeen identified by the commentators as rog Lotsba, Khyu and Gaspa eu73Sa pa states that they mix the function of perception andconceptual cognition.74 While I cannot locate the second of these twoprva-pakas dealt with by Sa pa in this section of the PVin bsDus pa,the first is treated by gTsa nag pa at the end of his digression on theascertainment of validity.75 The next two opponents gTsa nag pa refersto, and who are also refuted by Sa pa, are probably Kumrila76 andakaranandana77. Of the three cognitions the validity of which must beascertained parata that are attributed by rog Lotsba and others toDharmottara, in contradistinction to rog Lotsba and Sa pa whoaccept two and three respectively, gTsa nag pa accepts only one ofthem as being ascertained as valid due to a later valid cognition. gTsanag pa also does not attribute the two cognitions that he refutes toDharmottara, but only to others (gan dag). The first of these twocognitions is that in which one doubts the appearance itself, and thesecond is that of grasping a tree as such from afar in which one does notknow what kind of particular tree it is. These correspond to Nos. B.1.b.and B.2. of Sa pas list respectively (cf. above, p. 167).78 gTsa nag patreats these cognitions at length and concludes that there is only onecognition the validity of which is to be ascertained due to a latercognition, namely the one with uncertainty as to whether the thing thatappears is actually real. This corresponds to No. B.1.a. of Sa pas list(cf. above, p. 167).79 In the number of the ascertaining cognitions,gTsa nag pa again differs from rog Lotsba and Sa pa, for heaccepts only the trained perception in which the fulfilment of a purposeappears, and denies the possibility that this cognition could be aninference based on a logical reason consisting in an effect.80So far we have seen that gTsa nag pa rarely follows the opinion ofrog Lotsba, and that many topics dealt with by gTsa nag pa can alsobe found in Sa pas treatment of the subject. Thus it seems very likelythat Sa pa, when composing his Tshad ma Rigs gter, not onlyconsidered the writings of rog Lotsba, but also the PVin bsDus pa of174 HELMUT KRASSERgTsa nag pa. Due to the lack of any other indications, and due to theloss of many of the works of the Tibetan philosophers prior to gTsanag pa, the possibility that gTsa nag pa and Sa pa made use of acommon source cannot be excluded.NOTES1 This is the date calculated in SCHWABLAND (1995: 794 n. 3). For earlier calculations,cf. the references in STEINKELLNER (1992: 260 n. 25).2 The discussion as reflected in the available texts starts with Kumrilas claim that inall cases the validity is ascertained due to the cognition itself (svata); cf.SCHMITHAUSEN (1965: 189201) and HATTORI (1997: 362 ff.).3 PV 2.4d5a: sva-rpasya svato gati // prmya vyavahrea.4 PVP D5a67= Q6a12: o na ji ltar tshad ma id es par bya e na / tha sad kyis nitshad ma id (PV 2.5a) dus phyis byu ba can gyi don byed pai yul can gyi es passo //5 PVP D2a52b2 = Q2b57: mon sum id la khrul pai rgyu sna tshogs pa id kyis(kyis D : kyi Q) slu ba srid pai phyir dei don gyi don byed pai yul can gyi tshad maphyi ma jug pas tshad ma id du rtogs par byai / rjes su dpag pa la ni ma yin no // deltar dei ra bin can nam / bras bui rtags dos poi ra bin id da / dos poibras bu id du es pa ni rtags can gyi es pai rgyu yin pas na / de lta bur gyur paidos po med par rjes su dpag pa yod pa ma yin pai phyir / phyis kyi tshad mai jug pala ltos pa ma yin no // gan dag tu ni mon sum da der sna ba dag skye bai tshekhyad par es pa med na de ni phyis kyi tshad ma jug pas mi slu bar rig par byao //This passage is translated in INAMI (1992: 66), INAMI (1993: 90 f) and DUNNE (1999:438 f).6 PV D72a4b1 = Q87a7b2: de la goms pa da ldan pa ga yin pa de la in tu goms pagsal ba can gyi mon sum skyes pa na ji lta ba bin du goms pai rnam par khrul pairgyu mtshan spas pa can id gyis yos su bcad nas skye ba da / de lta bur gyur paiphyis byu bai es pa skyed par byed pai phyir de la skyes bu jug par byed do // deiphyir de la ra id kyis (kyis Q : kyi D) tshad ma es par byed pai phyir phyis kyitshad ma jug pa la ltos pa med pa can yin pai phyir ; translated in INAMI (1993:95 f) and in part in DUNNE (1999: 437 n. 4). Sanskrit fragments in the appendix to Manorathanandins PVV 522.2730 havebeen identified in STEINKELLNER (1981: 290 frag. 8): aya tu bhedapratyakvikalpakatvd na nicaya, ki tu tad-bhstpatte. anumna (corr.:anumne) nicaya eva. yady eva pratyakevikalpena mithy-phaldin vivekasyakartum aakyatvt katha tato rtha paricchidya pravttir iti cet, ucyatedvidhpratyakray pravttir dybhysavat ca. kyabuddhi is also referred to inJayantabhaas Nyya-majar (Mysore ed. 1969, Vol. I, 428.12 f.): dvi-vidh hipravttidy cbhysik ca. Both passages are referred to in INAMI (1993: 116 nn.35 and 36).ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 1757 PV D75a6 = Q91a67: dei phyir don byed par nus pai yul can gyi mon sum nikhrul pai rgyu mtshan med pai phyir tshad ma id kyi bdag id du gyur pas ra rigpas yos su bcad pa yin no //8 rjes su dpag pa ni es pa id yin no // Cf. above n. 6 and also PV D75b12 =Q 91b2: de bas na di ltar mon sum ni ra da gan las (las Q : la D) tshad ma yin larjes su dpag pa ni ra id las yin no es bya bar gnas so //9 Although kyabuddhi does not explicitly mention No. A.1 of Devendrabuddhi, thereis no reason to assume that he did not accept it.10 PV D75a775b1 = Q 91a891b1: da poi me da chur sna bai es pa ya gomspa med pa na ra rgyud kyi tshad ma id kyis bzu (corr.: gzu DQ) du zin kya khrulpai rgyu mtshan yod pai phyir es pa bskyed pai nus pa med pa de bas na / de laphyis kyi tshad ma jug pas tshad ma id du rnam par gag pa / de ltar na gan lastshad ma yin no // ; translated in INAMI (1993: 103) and DUNNE (1999: 440 n. 15).11 PV D72b12 = Q87b3: mon sum thams cad ni gan las (las Q : la D) tshad ma espar bag (bag Q : gag D) pa ma yin no // da po id kyi (kyi Q : kyis D) jug pa gayin pa de la ya rgyu mtshan es par gzu ba med pa na the tshom id kyi sgo nas jugpar byed do // ; cf. also n. 6. This passage is translated in INAMI (1993: 96) and DUNNE(1999: 437 n. 4).12 PVin(a) 13.12: nus pa es pa ya rjes su dpag pa da don byed par sna baimon sum ni ra kho na las gyur ro //13 PVin(a) 13.518.14 In STEINKELLNERKRASSER (1989: 95) the cognitions listed under B.1, B.1.a andB.1.b have been treated as three different cognitions, whereas I now consider B.1.a andB.1.b as being two different instances of perception that are uncertain with regard tothe necessary connection.15 PVin(a) 14.1615.18.16 PVin(a) 16.14.17 PVin(a) 16.518.5.18 I do not agree with STEINKELLNERs introductory remark that Kamalaladistinguishes seven kinds of valid cognition, for I consider cognition No. 6, i.e.codan-janita jnam, as being introduced against the Mms theory thatprescription (codan) is the means for knowing the Dharma (cf. MS 1.1.2: codan-lakao rtho dharma) and that the validity of such cognitions is ascertained svata.In particular, Kamalala has MV (Codan) 184 (codan-janit buddhi pramadoa-varjitai / kraair janyamnatvl ligptkty-aka-buddhi-vat // ) and MV(Codan) 47ab (svata sarva-pramn prmyam) in mind, for he refers to thesestatements in TSaP 934.1718 and 934.22 and rejects this idea in TSaP 939.2223 (naca codan-janity buddhe prmya siddham, yentrpy anumna-vat prmya-vyavahra sdhyata iti syt).19 Cf. KAJIYAMA (1998: 27).20 PVSV 5.1922: yatra tu kvacid viaye pavbhvd bhrnti-nimittpanayansamartha pratyakam, tatrnumnd nicaya prrthyate, nasarvatra. tasmt pratyake svata parata ca prmya-nicaya, nicyayiyatecyam artho dvitya-pariccheda iti nha pratanyate. That Karakagomin at leastintended to comment not only upon the second chapter of the Prama-vrttika, but onthe entire work can be seen from his statements that he will explain certain topics in thethird or fourth chapter; cf., e.g. vakyma ttye paricchede 210.29; vakymacaturthe paricchede 381.21.21 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 259 with n. 16).22 Cf. VAN DER KUIJP (1989: 919). For an overview of the development of Buddhist logicin Tibet already written in the late 1960s or early 1970s, cf. SMITH (2001: 113116).176 HELMUT KRASSER23 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 264 n. 51).24 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 261) who in n. 28 also refers to the title of this section ingTsa ag pas Prama-vinicaya commentary: gi la mtshan id es byedbsams pa.25 My additions are indicated by < >.26 PVin dKa gnas 44.21: de la rjes su dpag pa mtha dag ni / ra las es pao //27 PVin dKa gnas 45.6: don byed par sna pai mon sum ya de bin te /28 PVin dKa gnas 45.1012: sgrub byed du sna pai mon sum ni gis ste / goms papa da da po pao // sa ma ni ra las tshad ma yin te /29 PVin dKa gnas 45.17: gis pa ni gan las yin no // In this sentence gis pa ni refersto da po pa as one of the two instances of sgrub byed du sna pai mon summentioned just previously; cf. n. 28. At the same time the sentence introduces the nextparagraph to be dealt with, i.e. ascertainment of the defining characteristic due to afurther cognition; cf. mtshan id es par byed pa ni gis te / ra da gan las so //PVin dKa gnas 44.20 f.30 PVin dKa gnas 46.23: myer sna ba es kya / ci sgyu mai me ltar myi bdenpaam / on te bden es the tshom za bao //31 PVin dKa gnas 48.1416: de lta na gan las es par bya bai tshad ma ni gis ste /yod pa tsam la the tshom za ba da / de es kya yod pai khyad par la the tshom zabao //32 PVin dKa gnas 46.1213: i du es kya a par the tshom za baam / dmar por eskya me da nor bur ma es pa lta buo //33 es par byed pa ya rnam pa bi ste / rtags la brten pai rjes su dpag pa da / lhancig spyod pai don gan dzin pai mon sum da / de id la bar du rnam par gsal bardzin pai mon sum da / myi slu ba es par byed pa don byed par sna pai monsum mo // PVin dKa gnas 48.1721. For the corresponding passage in rog Lotsbascommentary on the Prama-vinicaya, s. below n. 63.34 The title of this section is (Rigs gter Pham byed II 366.5): The way Lo chen, afterhaving mentioned the faults in the view of the Teacher Dharmottara, establishes hisown view (slob dpon chos mchog gi lugs la lo chen gyis skyon brjod nas ra lugs jiltar bag pai tshul / ).35 For Phywa pa Chos kyi se ges view cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 268 n. 88).36 Sa skya Paitas distinction has been shown in STEINKELLNER (1992: 262) andexplained further on the following pages. The list presented here is the one found there,expanded by including STEINKELLNERs explanations.37 That they are meant to exemplify first perception is also corroborated by kyamchog ldan (Rigs gter Pham byed II 348.56): da po laa gis te / goms pa can da /da po pao // gis pa laa gis te / sna ba ra las es i bden pa gan las es da /spyi ra las es i khyad par gan las es pao //38 Rigs gter Ra grel 100b6101a2: dper brjod na sna ba ra las es bden pai chagan las es pa rgya ri po nas dmar bar bai rnam pa ra las es kya mer bdennam on te sgyu maam sprul pa la sogs pa sgro btags yin es the tshom za bar gan lases par byed paam rgya ri po na yal dab da ldan pa sna ba na / spyi i tsam labltos nas sgro dogs chod nas ra las es i bye brag a pa la rtog bral ma khrul payin pas mon sum tshad ma yin ya a pai ldog pa la sgro dogs ma chod pas gan lases so //39 Translated in STEINKELLNER (1992: 266).40 Translated in STEINKELLNER (1992: 267).41 Rigs gter Pham byed II 348.7349.2: sna ba id kya gan las es dgos pai mtshangi ni / yid ma gtad da khrul rgyu can gyi mon sum rnams so // da po ni / mtshan giyid gzugs mdzes la lhag par chags dus kyi sgra dzin an es lta bu yin la / gis pa niON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 177smig rgyu la chur sgro dogs pai dus kyi smig rgyui kha dog mtho bai mig es da /byis pai rgyud kyi mon sum skad cig ma lta buo //42 This kind of cognition is referred to by ag dba chos grags in his Rigs gter dPal ster(368.3) in connection with PV 3.124a: yid ma gtad par ni / rnam grel las / thams cadlas ni sems bsdus nas // = sahtya sarvata cint PV 3.124a = PVin 1.13a; cf. alsoSTEINKELLNER (1992: 268 n. 82).43 Rigs gter Ra grel 101a3 f: ya sna ba ra id kya gan las es pa dper na gaig tu me sna ba na / kho bo me sna bai blo gcig byu am ma byu es the tshom zaba na / dba es rtog bral ma khrul pas tshad ma yin ya yid es kyis es ma nus pagan las es par byed pao //. Translated in STEINKELLNER (1992: 268).44 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 268).45 Rigs gter Pham byed II (366.6367.1): rnam par es pai ka las / yul gi don bdenpar (par corr.: pa) es pa na yul can gyi blo tshad mar es pa ni ra es da / yul gyidon bden par tshad ma ra id kyis es ma nus par es pa phyi ma gan gyis es pa samai gal bya bden par es pa na es pa sa ma de id tshad mar ugs la es pa degan es kyi don do // mtshan gi ni rjes dpag da goms pa can gis ni ra es so //46 For a further passage that kya mchog ldan quotes from this commentary, and thecorresponding passage available in the PVin dKa gnas, cf. notes 33 and 63.47 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 266 with notes 77 and 78). bCom ldan Rigs pai ral gri alsoattests that some scholars attribute this division to Dharmottara (sDe bdun rGyan gyime tog 13.1517): sna ba ra id las the tshom za ba ni da po sna bar jug yulbstan kya phyis sna ba la the tshom byu ba ste dia tshad mar slob dpon chosmchog bed de es kha cig zer ro //.48 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 266269 with n. 84) for the text of Dharmottara (PPar II19.912): gal te bdag cag mon sum la the tshom skyes so e na bden te / mon sum lasna bai don di ya dag pa yin nam on te ma yin sam du the tshom zao // di snaam mi sna sam du ni ma yin te /.49 The reason for his non-acceptance of this cognition as valid is, that otherwise alsomomentariness should be object of a valid perception; cf. PVin dKa gnas 47.2048.1:di ni in tu myi rigs te / sna bar ma es pa ya tshad mai yul yin na skad cig ma lasogs pa ya ci ste mon sum gyi (gyi corr.: gyis) tshad mai yul ma yin /50 At this opportunity I would like to express my gratitude to all those involved in theAsian Classics Input Project for their efforts in producing electronic versions of thetexts of the Buddhist tradition and making them available to the scholarly world.51 PVin(a) 15.1018: des na sna ba es par byas pa ni bstan pa yin pai phyir jug paiyul la tshad mai bya ba yos su rdzogs pa yin no // ga ya sna ba da gal bai rnampa es pas gnod pa bskyed pa de ni tshad mai bya ba ma rdzogs pai phyir tshad ma mayin te / dper na smig rgyu dzin pai es pa la chur es pa jug pa bin no // med na mibyu bar the tshom za bas ni nam ya mon sum gyi bya ba la gnod pa ma yin no //52 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 269).53 Cf. STEINKELLNERKRASSER (1989: 89).54 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 268).55 PPar II 19.912: gal te bdag cag mon sum la the tshom skyes so e na bden te / monsum la sna bai don di ya dag pa yin nam on te ma yin sam du the tshom zao // disna am mi sna sam du ni ma yin te / ; cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 268 with n. 84).56 Go rams pa, e.g. presents the opinion of some who, based on PV 3.107cd, assumeyogic cognition to be ascertained as being valid svata. He refutes this due to the factthat in the case of yogic perception neither svata nor parata ascertainment is possibleat all, and that only conceptual yogic perception can be ascertained as being valid dueto itself (Rigs gter rNam bad 130b25): kha cig / rnal byor mon sum ni ra estshad ma yin te /178 HELMUT KRASSERblo gros chen pos mtho id las / rnam pa thams cad es par byed //(PV 3.107cd)ces gsus pai phyir // es zer ba mi thad de / dii blo gros chen po ni mon sum gyimtho bai don la khrul rgyu med pas es pa ra stobs kyis dren nus pa la jog pa yingyi rnal byor mon sum kho na la jog pa skabs don min pai phyir da / sas rgyasphags pai rgyud la es es med pas dei rgyud kyi rnal byor mon sum gyi es esdren mi srid pai phyir ro // des na rnal byor mon sum la ra es gan es ga yamed pa srid ci phags pa rtog bcas kyi rnal byor mon sum ni ra es kho nao //57 However, it may have inspired bCom ldan Rigs pai ral gri in his differentiation ofseveral kinds of inference. In his sDe bdun rGyan gyi me tog he distinguishes inference(*anumna) that occurs by force of reality (*vastu-bala-pravtta), commonly accepted(*prasiddha) inference, and inference based on gama. The former two are to beascertained as valid due to themselves (svata), some of the latter svata and someparata (cf. sDe bdun rGyan gyi me tog 12.1114: de la dos po stobs ugs da gragspai rjes dpag gis ni ra es yin te yul da gal brel grub pai gtan tshigs kyi rjes subra bas gis po de ra gis es pai phyir ro // lu gi rjes dpag ni kha cig ra gis esla kha cig phyis byu pai lu rigs la brten pai blo gan gyis es so // ). This passage isalso referred to in SCHWABLAND (1995: 810 f n. 52).58 Dharmottaras texts as sources for rog Lotsbas and Sa pas formulations areshown in STEINKELLNER (1992: 266 ff.).59 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 269).60 Cf. Rigs gter rNam bad 132b6133a6. PV D75a775b1 is quoted by ag dbachos grags in Rigs gter dPal ster 358.12 and in part in 368.1. The next sentence ofPV D75b1 is referred to in Rigs gter dPal ster 368.23, and D75.12 in 356.2.61 PVP D2a52b2 in Rigs gter rNam bad 132b46; PVP D2a56 in Rigs gter dPal ster353.12, D2a62b1 in 355.6356.2, and D2b12 in 357.6.62 Cf. Rigs gter Ra grel 101a6101b1: rjes dpag gi es pa la ya gis las am / lhancig rgyu bai don gan dzin pa es bya bai rjes dpag dmar bar ba la the tshom za bana / mei dri la sogs pa skye mched kyi rdzas gan las mer es pa lta buo // kha cig dimon sum yin es zer ba ni / skye mched kyi rnam dbye la mi mkhas par zad do //63 Rigs gter pham byed II 350.14: on na ji skad du /don byed pa da goms pa can // rjes su dpag pas es par byed //Rigs gter 8.56cdces bad pa dii khus ga las btsal bar bya e na / gu da rgya grel las gras esgsal bar bad med kya / rog loi rnam par es pai i ka las / es par byed pa yarnam pa bi ste / rtags la brten pai rjes su dpag pa da / lhan cig spyod pai don gandzin pai mon sum da / bar du skyes pai don gyi rnam pa gsal po dzin pai monsum da / don byed par sna bai mon sum mo // es pa bi po des ni ra gi gal byabden par es pa na es pa sa ma tshad mar ugs la es pa yin no // es gsu o // roglo lhan cig rgyu bai (in 350.2 spyod pa is used for rgyu ba) don gan dzin pa monsum du bad kya / rigs pa gter las rjes dpag tu bed pas es byed kyi tshad ma gsumbsdu ba yin no // For the corresponding passage in rog Lotsbas PVin dKa gnas,s. above n. 33.64 As already mentioned in STEINKELLNER (1992: 258 n. 8), he deals with this topic inPVin bsDus pa 26a227b5.65 The similarity to Sa Pas introduction of the section dealing with the ascertainmentof the validity has already been noticed by STEINKELLNER (1992: 261 n. 33): Thequestion and its explanation are given in substantially the same way by gTsang nag pa(bsDus pa 26a23). It is possible, because of the referential way of presenting itON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 179( zhes zer ro) that Sa pa is referring to gTsang nag pa here. But lacking otherindications we cannot say so for certain.66 This idea has already been presented by Devendrabuddhi who says that if cognitionsvalidity were to be established already due to themselves, the writers of scientific bookswould not formulate contradictory definitions of valid cognitions, but only one, as thedifference between valid and invalid cognitions would already be established whenthey occur; cf. PVP D4b56 = Q4b78 gal te tshad ma ra id las grub pa yin par (parD : pa Q) gyur na bstan bcos byed pa dag gis phan tshun gal ba can gyi tshad maimtshan id byed par mi gyur ro // tshad ma skyes pa id na tshad ma da / tshad mama yin pai o boi rnam par dbye ba grub pai phyir mtshan id gcig pa can id byedpar gyur ro //67 This undesired consequence in the case that the validity of a cognition is ascertainedparata is expressed by Kumrila in his Bha-k (quoted in TSa 2853; TBV 6.2728;SVR 251.1314; PV D74b775a1): yathva prathama jna tat savdamapekate / savdenpi savda punar mgyas tathva hi // Cf. MV (Codan) 75;FRAUWALLNER (1962: 85 f); INAMI (1993: 116 f n. 46); translated in DUNNE (1999: 439n. 14).68 PVin bsDus pa 26a3: ya ci gis po de dag tshad ma id du ra id dam gan ig gises par byed / da po ltar na tshad mai bstan bcos don med par gyur la / gis pa ltarna thug pa myed par gyur ro e na /69 PVin bsDus pa 26a34: di ya ra da gan las es pai don os gzu pa da / sosoi o bo dper brjod pa da / de la skyon myed pa gsum gyis es par bya ba las / dapo ni 70 PVin bsDus pa 26a56: don byed par sna pai mon sum da rjes su dpag pas yulme bden par grub pa id kyis blo me bden pa jal bai tshad mar grub pa es bya ba nibyis pai san sags yin te / bden pai yul can gyi (gyi corr.: ni) blo tshad mar bya ba lanus pa da dogs pa myed pai phyir ro //71 Cf. PVin dKa gnas 44.2145.9: de la rjes su dpag pa mtha dag ni / ra las espao // de ya ra rig pai mon sum gis ni ma yin gyi / gan rig id kyis so // de yarjes su dpag pai don bden par es pa na (na corr.: ni) de la dzin pai blo de id latshad ma ma yin pai dogs pa spo pai phyir te / es bya bden pa yod pa da / de yodpar rtogs pai es pa tshad ma id yin pa ni grub bde gcig pai phyir ro // don byed parsna bai mon sum ya de bin te / gal byai bras bu mi slu ba gan rig kyi blo desgal bya da dei bras bu yod par es pas de rtogs pai blo ya tshad ma ma yin pardogs pa spo pai phyir ro //72 Cf. PVin dKa gnas 45.1216. Of a different opinion is, e.g. kyabuddhi whoassumes the validity to be known through self-awareness (ra rig); cf. above, n. 7.73 Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 264).74 Cf. Rigs gter Ra grel 101b24:kha cig yul da o bo la // brtags nas gzan sel mi srid zer //Rigs gter 8.57abes byai tshad ma da es byed kyi tshad ma gis yul gcig na es byed kyi tshad magis pa bcad pai yul can du gyur la / yul mi gcig na yul gan dos por grub pas / ganji ltar dos por grub ces zer ba da / ya kha cig gan las es pa thams cad kyis kyadei tshe sgro dogs ma chod na tshad ma id ma yin pas gan es sua mi thad la /sgro dogs chod na ra las su gyur ro // des na gan las es kyi tshad ma gtan mi sriddo es zer ro //de dag gis ni mon sum da // rtog pai byed pa dres par zad //Rigs gter 8.57cd180 HELMUT KRASSERSa pa already negates certainty (es pa) in the case of perception in the second chapter(Rigs gter 2.9c10b); cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 268 n. 88).75 PVin bsDus pa 27b34: gal te es par bya ba es par byed pa dag yul mtshus naga ya ru pa tshad mar mi gyur la / tha dad na ya sgrub bya srgub byed du mi ruste / myig da rna bai blo bin no e na /76 PVin bsDus pa 26a78: de lta yin ya (ya corr.: da) tshad ma rnams ni ra id kyisgrub pa yin ste / blo rnams yul mi gcig pas gan gyis es pa mi ru pai phyir ro es zerba ni / ; cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 263 with n. 45).77 PVin bsDus pa 26a827a1: ya kha cig gal byaa ra gis grub par gyur du opas ra id kyis mi grub kyi / dpyod pa es bya ba du byed brtan par byed pai blogan gyis es pa yin no es zer ro //Cf. STEINKELLNER (1992: 262 f. with notes 39 and 40):The second of these theorems, that it is extrinsically ascertained (gzhanlas) is unanimously attributed to the Bram ze (chen po) by thecommentators,39 i.e. akaranandana. Go rams pa presents in rNambshad 127a5 f. a quotation from akaranandana that consists of a halfverse and explanation in prose: Although something (don) is provenby a valid cognition, the validity (tshad ma, *prmya) [of this validcognition] is not (proven) by this same [valid cognition]. (Thatmeans:) Although the respective object of activity (jug yul) isascertained by the two valid cognitions, an ascertainment of thedefinitory character (mtshan nyid), (i.e.) reliability (mi slu ba) is notprovided through itself. Therefore the general definition and (its)contrary concomitance (gal brel) etc. are ascertained by a cognitioncalled examination (dpyod pa, *vicra) which occurred subsequentlyto the valid cognition. As such the definitory character of a validcognition is ascertained only by another (valid cognition).40 At thistime we can only assume that this verse comes from one of the threePrmyapark-texts written by akaranandana, but the ascriptionof the theorem to this Indian scholar need not be doubted.39 Cf. rNam bshad 127a5 f. and gSal byed 57a3; Pham byed II 370.5(Bram ze chen po Shal ka ril [?]; Rab gsal 167.2; Nyi ma 278.5; dPalster 354.5 f.40 Go rams pa, rNam bshad 127a5 f.: Bram zes/ tshad ma las dona grub pa yang // tshad ma de nyid las ma yin /zhes tshad ma gnyis kyis rang rang gi jug yul nges par byed kyangmtshan nyid mi bslu ba la nges par rang stobs kyis dren par mi byedpas tshad mai rjes su skyes pai blo dpyod pa zhes bya bas spyiimtshan nyid dang / gal brel la sogs pa nges par byed pas na tshadmai mtshan nyid ni gzhan kho na las nges par byed dozhes bzheddo //a don (cf. Nyi ma 278.6): stonThe half verse quoted is attributed to akaranandanas Sambandha-park (Brel pa brtag pa) by Glo bo mkhan chen (cf. Nyi ma 278.5 f.),but not to be found in neither the Sambandhapark nor itscommentary, the Anusra (cf. Frauwallner 1934: 263 ff. for the text ofthe verses in the translation of the Anusra).ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 181The above explanation is also referred to in Ngag dbang chos gragsdPal ster 354.5 f.; cf. also Bo dong pa chens Rigs snang 483.46.78 PVin bsDus pa 27a34: gan dag ni ros po (= dos po) sna pa la mi sna pai yidgis kyis zin pa ya phyogs cig gis don mthun pas mtshan id gan las es pai tshadma yin la / rgya nas i tsam dzin pa ya bye brag a pa lasogs pai khyad par gyidon la tshad ma id yin te spyi ni khyad par gyi mthar thug pai phyir ro // de la spyi laltos te ni tshad mai mtshan id ra gis es la khyad par la ni gan las es pa yin no eszer ro // de ni ye nas ma yin te / 79 PVin bsDus pa 27b2: des na mtshan id gan gyis es pai tshad ma ni gcig id deros po la der mi sna pai sgro dogs chod kya de ma yin pai sgro dogs da bcaspao //80 PVin bsDus pa 27b23: de es par byed pa ya dei yul gyi rnam pa gsal bar myopai goms pa tsam don byed par sna pai mon sum id yin kyi / bras bui rtags lases pai rjes dpag ni ma yin te / yod pa bsgrub par bya ba la rtags kyi mtha gog paid kyi phyir ro //BIBLIOGRAPHYD = Takasaki, J., Z. 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Delhi 1997: 361371.INAMI 1992 = Inami, Masahiro: Pramavrttika Pramasiddhi sh nokenky (1) [A study of the Pramasiddhi Chapter ofPramavrttika (1)], Hiroshima daigaku bungakubu kiy 51(1992) 5976.INAMI 1993 = Inami, Masahiro: Bukky ronrigakuha no shinrironDevendrabuddhi to kyabuddhi (The theory of the Buddhistlogical school concerning the validityD. and .). In: EgakuMayeda (ed.): Studies in original Buddhism and MahynaBuddhism in commemoration of late Professor Dr. FumimaroWatanabe. Vol. 2. Kyoto 1993: 85118.KAJIYAMA 1998 = Kajiyama, Yuichi: An introduction to Buddhist philosophy. Anannotated translation of the Tarkabh of Mokkaragupta.Reprint with corrections in the authors hand. Wien 1998.MV = Kumrila: loka-vrttika. lokavrttika of r Kumrila Bhaawith the commentary Nyyaratnkara of r PrthasrathiMira, ed. Dvrikdsa str. Varanasi 1978.182 HELMUT KRASSERNMa = Jayantabhaa: Nyya-majar. Edited with ippai-nyya-saurabha by the editor by K. S. Varadacharya, Vol. 1 & 2,Oriental Research Institute Series 116, Mysore 1969.PPar II = Dharmottara: Laghu-prmya-park. Helmut Krasser (ed.):Dharmottaras kurze Untersuchung der Gltigkeit einerErkenntnis. Laghuprmyapark. Teil 1: Tibetischer Textund Sanskritmaterialien. Wien 1991.PV 2, 3, 4 = Dharmakrti: Prama-vrttika, Chapters 2, 3, 4. YshoMiyasaka (ed.): Prama-vrttika-krik (Sanskrit andTibetan). [Chapter 2 = Prama-siddhi, Chapter 3 = Pratyaka,Chapter 4 = Parrthnumna]. Acta Indologica 2 (1971/72)[Narita].PVin 1 = Dharmakrti: Prama-vinicaya I (Pratyaka). Tilmann Vetter(ed.): Dharmakrtis Pramavinicaya, 1. Kapitel:Pratyakam. Einleitung, Text der tibetischen bersetzung,Sanskritfragmente, deutsche bersetzung. Verffentlichungender Kommission fr Sprachen und Kulturen Sd- und Ostasiens,sterreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Heft 3, Wien1966.PVin bsDus pa = gTsa nag pa brTson grus se ge: Tshad ma rnam par es paii ka legs bad bsdus pa. Kyoto 1989.PVin dKa gnas = rog Blo ldan es rab: Tshad ma rnam es kyi dga gnas rnambad. Beijing 1994.PVin(a) = Dharmottara: Prama-vinicaya-k Q 7b613a7. ErnstSteinkellner und Helmut Krasser (eds.): Dharmottaras Exkurszur Definition gltiger Erkenntnis im Pramavinicaya.Tibetischer Text, Sanskritmaterialien und bersetzung. Beitrgezur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens Nr. 2, sterreichischeAkademie der Wissenschaften, Wien 1989.PVP = Devendrabuddhi: Prama-vrttika-pajik. D Tshad ma Vol.2, No. 4217, Che 1b326b = Q Vol. 130, No. 5717(b), Che 1390a.PVSV = Karakagomin: Prama-vrttika-svavtti-k. RhulaSktyyana (ed.): crya-Dharmakrte Prama-vrttikam(svrthnumna-pariccheda) svopaja-vtty Karakagomi-viracitay ta-kay ca sahitam. Allahabad 1943. [Reprinted:Rinsen, Kyto 1982].PV = kyabuddhi: Prama-vrttika-k. D 4220, Tshad ma Vol. 4,e 1282a7 = Q 5718, Vol. 131, e 1348a8.PVV = Manorathanandin: Prama-vrttika-vtti. Rhula Sktyyana(ed.): Dharmakrtis Pramavrttika with a commentary byManorathanandin, Patna 193840.Q = Suzuki, D.T. (ed.): The Tibetan Tripiaka, Peking Edition.Tokyo-Kyoto 19551961.Rigs gter dPal ster = Ngag dba chos grags: Tshad ma rigs pai gter gyi dgos dongsal bar byed pai legs bad ag gi dpal ster. New Delhi 1963.Rigs gter Pham byed II = gSer mdog Pa chen kya mchog ldan: Tshad ma Rigs gter gyidgos rgyan rigs pai khor los lugs an pham byed ces bya baibstan bcos smad cha. In: The Complete Works (gSu bum) ofgSer-mdog Pa-chen kya-mchog ldan 10. Thimphu 1975.ON THE ASCERTAINMENT OF VALIDITY 183Rigs gter Ra grel = Sa skya Paita Kun dga rgyal mtshan: Tshad ma rigs pai gtergyi Ra grel. In: The Complete Works of Paita Kun dgargyal mtshan. The Complete Works of the Great Masters of theSa Skya Sect of the Tibetan Buddhism 5, ed. bSod nams rgyamtsho. Tokyo 1968.Rigs gter rNam bad = Go rams pa bSod nams se ge: Tshad ma rigs pai gter gyi dkabai gnas rnam par bad pa sde bdun rab gsal. 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Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 23, FranzSteiner Verlag, Wiesbaden 1981: 283295.STEINKELLNER 1992 = Steinkellner, Ernst: Early Tibetan ideas on the ascertainment ofvalidity (nges byed kyi tshad ma). In: Ihara Shren andYamagucchi Zuih (eds.): Tibetan Studies. Proceedings of the5th Seminar of the International Association of Tibetan Studies,Narita 1989. Narita 1992: 257273.STEINKELLNERKRASSER 1989= Steinkellner, Ernst und Helmut Krasser: Dharmottaras Exkurszur Definition gltiger Erkenntnis im Pramavinicaya.Tibetischer Text, Sanskritmaterialien und bersetzung. Wien1989.SVR = Vdideva-sri: Syd-vda-ratnkara. L. Motll (ed.): rmad-vdidevasri-viracita prama-naya-tattvloklakra tad-vykhy ca syd-vda-ratnkara. 5 Vols. Poona 19261930.TBV = Abhayadevasri: Tattva-bodha-vidhyin. Sukhll Saghavi andBecards Doi (eds.): crya-r-siddhasena-divkara-prataSamati-tarka-prakaraam rmad-abhayadevasri-nirmitay Tattva-bodha-vidhyiny vykhyay vibhitam. 5Vols. Gujart-pur-tattva-mandir-granthval 10, 16, 18, 19,21, Gujart-pur-tattva-mandir, Amdvd, 19241931[Reprinted: Kyoto 1984].TSa = ntarakita: Tattva-sagraha. See: TSaP.TSaP = Kamalala: Tattva-sagraha-pajik. Tattvasagraha ofcrya Shntarakita with the Commentary Pajik of ShriKamalashla, ed. Dvarikadas Shastri. 2. Vols. Varanasi 1981,1982.184 HELMUT KRASSERVAN DER KUIJP 1989 = van der Kuijp, Leonard W.J.: An introduction to Gtsang-nag-pas Tshad-ma rnam-par nges-pai i-ka legs-bshad bsdus pa.An ancient commentary on Dharmakrtis Pramavinicaya,Otani University Collection No. 13971, Kyoto 1989: 139.


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