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VOL. 63, NO. 2 WINTER, 2013

UARTERLY

SIDESTEPPING PREEMPTION: GENERIC DRUG LITIGATION IN THE AFTERMATH OF MENSING Jeffrey R. Pilkington and James R. Henderson

MORTGAGE LENDING REFORM UNDER THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT John P. Scott, Jr.

TAKE THIS AND GOOGLE THAT: THE ETHICS OF LAWYERS, JUDGES AND JURORS MEETING IN CYBERSPACE Brian L. Calistri, Jennifer E. Johnsen and Phil R. Richards

TRYING A CASE IN CYBERSPACE Walter W. Dukes

ON COLOR BACKGROUND

ON WHITE BACKGROUND

Q

FEDERATION OF DEFENSE & CORPORATE COUNSEL

LIAISON-QUARTERLYJAMES A. GALLAGHER, JR.Marshall Dennehy Warner Coleman & GogginNew York, [email protected]

FDCC QUARTERLY EDITORIAL OFFICEMarquette University Law SchoolEckstein Hall, PO Box 1881Milwaukee WI, 53201-1881414-288-5375414-288-5914 [email protected]

EDITOR-IN-CHIEFPATRICIA C. BRADFORDAssociate Professor of Law

STUDENT EDITORKRYSTAL L. JOHN

PUBLICATIONSLATHA RAGHAVANGoldberg Segalla LLPAlbany, [email protected]

EDITOR-FLYERGREGORY A. WITKEPatterson Law FirmDes Moines, [email protected]

CLE COORDINATORFRANCIE BERG3714 22nd Avenue SouthMinneapolis, MN, [email protected] Fax

EDITOR-WEBSITEDAVID M. FUQUAFuqua Campbell, PALittle Rock, [email protected]

FDCC HISTORIANSTEPHEN P. PATEFulbright & Jaworski lLPHouston, [email protected]

DIRECTORSEDWARD J. CURRIE, JR.Currie Johnson Griffin Gaines & Myers PAJackson, MS [email protected]

ANDREW B. DOWNSBullivant Houser Bailey, PCSan Francisco, CA [email protected]

WALTER DUKESDukes Dukes Keating Faneca PA Gulfport, [email protected]

MICHAEL T. GLASCOTTGoldberg Segalla, LLPBuffalo, NY [email protected]

SUSAN B. HARWOODBoehm, Brown, Harwood, Kelly & Scheihing, P.A. Maitland, [email protected]

ELIZABETH F. LORELLGordon & Rees LLPFlorham Park, [email protected]

HOWARD M. MERTENPartridge, Snow & HahnProvidence, [email protected]

LESLIE C. PACKEREllis & Winters, LLPRaleigh, [email protected]

W. MICHAEL SCOTTBeirne, Maynard & Parsons, LLPHouston, [email protected]

SENIOR DIRECTORSBRUCE D. CELEBREZZESedgwick LLP San Francisco, [email protected]

STEVEN E. FARRAR Smith Moore Leatherwood LLP Greenville, SC [email protected]

H. MILLS GALLIVAN Gallivan, White & Boyd, PA Greenville, SC [email protected]

J. SCOTT KREAMERBaker, Sterchi, Cowden & Rice, LLC Kansas City, [email protected]

DEBORAH D. KUCHLER Kuchler Polk Schell Weiner & Richeson, LLC New Orleans, [email protected]

DONALD L. MYLES JR.Jones, Skelton & HochuliPhoenix, [email protected]

KENNETH J. NOTA Dryvit Systems Inc. West Warwick, RI [email protected]

DEBRA TEDESCHI VARNERMcNeer Highland McMunn Varner LC Clarksburg,[email protected]

PRESIDENTEDWARD M. KAPLANSulloway & Hollis PLLC Concord, NH603-224-2341 [email protected]

PRESIDENT-ELECT TIMOTHY A. PRATT Boston Scientifc Corporation Natick, MA 508-650-8616 [email protected]

SECRETARY-TREASURER VICTORIA H. ROBERTSMeadowbrook Insurance Group Scottsdale, [email protected]

BOARD CHAIR MICHAEL I. NEILNeil, Dymott, Frank, McFall & Trexler APLC San Diego, CA619-238-1712 [email protected]

EXECUTIVE DIRECTORMARTHA (MARTY) J. STREEPER11812 N 56th StreetTampa, FL [email protected] Fax

Winter, 2013 Volume 63, number 2

Contents

QUARTERLYFDCC

Cite as: 63 FED’N DEF. & CORP. COUNS. Q. ___ (2013).The Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel Quarterly is published quarterly by the Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel, Inc., 11812 North 56th Street, Tampa, FL 33617. Readers may download articles appearing in the FDCC Quarterly from the FDCC website for their personal use; however, reproduction of more than one copy of an article is not permitted without the express written permission of the FDCC and the author.

Copyright, 2013, by the Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel, Inc.

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SideStepping preemption: generic drug litigation in the aftermath of Mensing

Jeffrey R. Pilkington and James R. Henderson ...........................................................52

mortgage lending reform under the dodd-frank Wall Street reform and conSumer protection act

John P. Scott, Jr. ..........................................................................................................86

take thiS and google that: the ethicS of laWyerS, JudgeS and JurorS meeting in cyberSpace

Brian L. Calistri, Jennifer E. Johnsen and Phil R. Richards .....................................116

trying a caSe in cyberSpace

Walter W. Dukes ........................................................................................................153

FDCC Quarterly/Winter 2013

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Take This and Google That:The Ethics of Lawyers, Judges and Jurors

Meeting in Cyberspace†

Brian L. CalistriJennifer E. Johnsen

Phil R. Richards

i.introDuCtion

“Socialmedia”–whichMiriam-Websterdefinesas“formsofelectroniccommunica-tion(asWebsitesforsocialnetworkingandmicroblogging)throughwhichuserscreateonlinecommunitiestoshareinformation,ideas,personalmessages,andothercontent(asvideos)”1–hastransformedandwillcontinuetotransformthepracticeoflaw.Socialmediaoffersattorneyspreviouslyunimaginableoutletsandresourcesformarketing,clientdevelop-ment,collaboration,witnessandjurorresearch,andlitigationandtrialstrategies.Likeanypowerfultool,however,socialmediamustbeusedcarefullyandwithafullappreciationofitsconcomitantrisksanddangers.Socialmediaisanethicalandlegalminefieldforunwaryattorneys,clients,judgesandjurors. ThisArticlereviewssomeoftheissuescurrentlyconfrontingattorneysastheynavigatetheselargelyunchartedwaters.WefirstconsidertheguidancecurrentlyofferedbytheModelRulesofProfessionalConduct.WhiletheModelRulesdonot(andcouldnot)anticipateallofthequestionsandchallengesposedbytheuseofsocialmedia,wethinkthattheyremainthetouchstonegoverninganattorney’sconduct–intherealorvirtualworld.

† SubmittedbytheauthorsonbehalfoftheFDCCLife,Health,andDisabilitysection. 1 Merriam-Webster,Merriam-WebsterOnlineDictionary, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media(lastvisitedJune12,2013).

take this anD GooGle that

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Brian L. Calistri is a graduate of University of Notre Dame Law School and Bucknell University. He is Chair of the Gen-eral Liability Group at the firm of Weber Gallagher Simpson Stapleton Fires & Newby LLP, and devotes his practice to the litigation and trial of general and product liability cases and commercial matters. He has tried numerous cases in the state and federal courts of Pennsylvania and New Jersey, with several recent jury trial victories garnering front-page stories in The Legal Intelligencer. Mr. Calistri has obtained jury defense verdicts in cases involving allegations of defec-tive products, medical malpractice, electric shock accidents,

maritime injuries, and serious elevator accidents. He also serves as General Counsel for the Merit Elevator Contractors Association of America (MECAA). Mr. Calistri was recog-nized in 2002 as one of the “50 on the Fast Track: Top Attorneys in Region Under 40” in The Legal Intelligencer. In 2011, he was recognized by the publisher of the Pennsylvania edition of Super Lawyers magazine as being among the top five percent of practitioners in his practice specialty within the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Mr. Calistri is admitted to practice in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. He is a member of the Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel, the Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel, and the Penn-sylvania Bar Association.

Wenextexaminethemostpracticaluseofsocialmediabytrialattorneys–juryresearch.Ajuror’ssocialmediaprofilecanofferinvaluableinformationandinsightsintopotentialprejudicesandbias,andatrialattorneywouldberemissinnottakingadvantageofsuchresources–before,during,andaftervoirdire.Indeed,somedecisionssuggestanattorneyisrequiredtoconductjurorresearchthroughsocialmedia.Thatsaid,trialattorneysshouldremainalerttoethicalandprivacyconsiderations,aswellasanylocalrulesorrestrictionsonsuchactivities.Moreover,socialmediaresearchisanadditionto,andnotasubstitutefor,atrialattorney’seyes,ears,and“gut”whenassessingprospectiveandsittingjurors.Giventhevoluminousinformationavailable,trialattorneysmustalsobecarefulnottoal-lowthechafftoobscurethewheat.Noteverythingajurorwrites,tweetsorpostsonlineissignificanttothematterathand. Weconcludewithareviewoftheissuespresentedbyjurors’useandmisuseofsocialmedia.Jurorswhohaveaccesstosocialmediaandmobiledevicesareposting,“tweeting,”andotherwisecommunicatingtheirthoughtsregardingproceedings,parties,attorneys,andjudgesbefore,during,andaftertrial.Jurorshavealso“friended”litigantsandcounsel.Thesetypesofcommunicationsandconductareindisputablyinappropriate,butwhatremediesandpunishmentsshouldbeimposed?Wecontendthatacombinationofclearandrepeateddirectivesfromthecourt,prohibitingaccesstodevicesduringproceedings,andmeaningful


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sanctions,includingcriminalcontempt,offerthebestwaytoensureafairtrialintheageofsocial media.

i.soCial MeDia anD the MoDel rules oF ProFessional ConDuCt

MorethanabillionpeopleactivelyuseFacebook.2Fourhundredmilliontweetsarebroadcast over Twitter daily.3Combinethosenumberswiththe225millionpeoplewhohaveconnectedoverLinkedIn,4andsocialmediahasnowreachedpandemicstatus.Infact,

2 FaCebook ann. reP.5(2012),available at http://investor.fb.com/secfiling.cfm?filingID=1326801-13-3.“Wehad1.06billionmonthlyactiveusers(MAUs)asofDecember31,2012,anincreaseof25%ascom-paredto845millionMAUsasofDecember31,2011.”Id. 3 HayleyTsukayama,Twitter Turns 7: Users Send Over 400 Million Tweets Per Day,Wash. Post (Mar. 21,2013),http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-21/business/37889387_1_tweets-jack-dorsey-twitter. 4 SalvadorRodriguez,LinkedIn Reaches 225 Million Users as it Marks its 10th Birthday,l.a. tiMes (May6,2013),http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/06/business/la-fi-tn-linkedin-turns-10-20130506.

Jennifer E. Johnsen is a graduate of Suffolk University Law School and obtained her undergraduate degree in Politics from Mount Holyoke College. She is a shareholder at Gal-livan, White & Boyd in Greenville, South Carolina, where she serves as Chair of the firm’s Business & Commercial Litiga-tion Group. Her practice focuses on business and commercial litigation, insurance coverage and life, health and disability benefits litigation. Ms. Johnsen also serves as Chair of the firm’s Diversity Committee. She has been named in The Best Lawyers in America® in the practice areas of Commercial Litigation, Employee Benefits (ERISA) Law, and Insurance

Law. She has been a member of the Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel since 2008 and currently serves as Chair of the Life, Health and Disability Section. Ms. Johnsen has spoken and published on various insurance coverage topics, including Director’s and Officer’s coverage issues, The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and legal ethics. She has several published opinions dealing with insurance coverage and ERISA. Ms. Johnsen is a member of the Defense Research Institute and the South Carolina Defense Trial Attorneys Association. She served as a past president of the Greenville County Bar Association. Ms. Johnsen is extensively involved in the Greenville community serving on the Board of Directors of the Metropolitan Board of the YMCA, the Urban League of the Upstate, and Artisphere. In addition, she serves as Vice Chair of the Palmetto Society of the United Way of Greenville County. Ms. Johnsen was recognized in Greenville Business Magazine as one of Greenville’s Best & Brightest, 35 and Under.


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somereportshaveestimatedthatasmanyas65%ofonlineadultsuseatleastoneformofsocial media.5Withthesenumbers,itislikelythatmostpeopleyoucomeincontactwithonadailybasisarepluggedintosocialmedia. Lawyers,liketherestofsociety,arealsoshowinginterestinsocialnetworking.Ac-cordingtotheAmericanBarAssociation,asof2010,56%oflawyersnowmaintainatleast

5 MaryMadden&KathrynZickuhr,65% of Online Adults Use Social Networking Sites,PewInternetReport(Aug.26,2011),available at http://pewinternet.org/~/media//Files/Reports/2011/PIP-SNS-Update-2011.pdf

Phil R. Richards graduated from the University of Oklahoma College of Law in 1983. He began his practice as an Assistant District Attorney. In 1984, Mr. Richards joined a law firm to practice civil law and 1988 he became a partner in that firm. In 1997, Mr. Richards formed the law firm that is now Richards & Connor. His practice areas include insurance coverage litigation, insurance bad faith defense, defense of claims involving significant injuries or economic loss, and commercial litigation in state and federal courts. Primarily representing businesses and insurers, he has tried cases to juries in both state and federal courts throughout Oklahoma.

He has also litigated insurance coverage matters in Arkansas. Mr. Richards is admitted to practice before all trial and appellate courts of the State of Oklahoma, all federal district courts in Oklahoma, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court of the United States. Mr. Richards is a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers, and has served on the State Committee for Oklahoma (2006-present), as Vice-Chair for Oklahoma (2010-2011), and as State Chair (2011-2013). He is listed in The Best Lawyers in America, as an Oklahoma Super Lawyer (2006 to present), Top 50 Oklahoma Super Lawyers (2006 to present), Top 10 Oklahoma Super Lawyers (2011 to present), and as a Top Lawyer in Financial Services by Corporate Counsel magazine. Mr. Richards is also a member of the Oklahoma Association of Defense Counsel and has served on its Board of Directors (2000-2002), as its Vice-President (2003), and as its President (2004). He is also active in the Hudson-Hall-Wheaton Chapter of the American Inns of Court, where he is a Master Emeritus and previously served as the Inn’s Program Chair (2003-2007, 2011-12, 2012-13). He is also a member of the Federation of Defense and Corporate Counsel and has served on its Admissions Committee (2004-2011), its Extra-Contractual Liability Section (Vice Chair 2004-2005, Chair 2006-2008), its Nominations Committee (Chair 2011), and its Continuing Legal Education Committee (Vice Chair 2006-2008, Chair 2008-2011).


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somevirtualpresenceinsocialmedia.6Asmorelawyersusesocialmedia,theyareconnectedmorethaneverbeforenotonlytootherlawyers,butalsopotentialclients,witnesses,andjurors.Thoseconnections,ifnothandledappropriately,couldleadtoethicalviolationsfortheunwary. TheABAModelRulesofProfessionalConductwereoriginallyadoptedbytheABAHouseofDelegatesin19837–threedecadesbeforeFacebookwasborn.Assuch,theModelRuleswerenotequippedwithspecificprovisionsthatdealwiththelegalchallengesofthetechnologicalworld.WhiletheModelRulesunderwentarevisionin2002,socialmediaremainedbutaglimmerofwhatithasbecometoday.Inresponsetotheprevalenceofsocialmedia,theABACommissiononEthics20/20releasedadraftproposalin2011toclarifytheModelRules.8Atthe2012AnnualMeeting,theABAHouseofDelegatesapprovedaseriesofresolutionsamendingtheModelRulestoaccommodatechangesinlawpracticerelatedtotheuseoftechnology.9Nevertheless,newsituationsinvolvingsocialmediawillcontinuetoarise.However,allisnotlostwiththeModelRules.Justasreligioustextsarenotdiscardedbecausetheirauthorswereneverfacedwithtwenty-firstcenturychallenges,manyoftheolderModelRulesremainrelevantandapplicabletolegalpracticeinthesocialmedia era.

A. Ethical Implications of Using Social Media Lawyersuse socialmedia inamyriadofways, tonamea few:personalFacebookpagesdevotedtofamilyandfriends,legalblogsreportingondevelopmentsinthelaworprofessionalsuccesses,Internetsearchesonpartiesandwitnesses.Regardlessofwhethertheactivityappearstobe“personal”orisbusiness-related,lawyersmustkeeptheModelRulesinmindwhennavigatingacrosssocialmediaplatforms.

1. TheDutyofConfidentiality–ModelRule1.6 Tweets,Facebookstatusupdates,andblogpostsgiveattorneysfreereigntopublishinformationvisible toanyone loggedonto the Internet.Forsome lawyers, socialmediabecomesaplatformtospeakabouttheirprofession.Unfortunately,sometimesthosecasual

6 Release,ABALegalTechnologySurveyResultsReleased,abaNOW(Sept.28,2010),available at http://www.abanow.org/2010/09/aba-legal-technology-survey-results-released/ [hereinafter ABA Release].7 MoDel rules oF ProF’l ConDuCt preface(2011).8 ABACommissiononEthics20/20InitialDraftProposals–TechnologyandConfidentiality(May2,2011),available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibil-ity/20110502_technology.authcheckdam.pdf.9 DebraCassensWeiss&JamesPodgers,Clean Sweep: House of Delegates Approves Ethics 20/20’s Full Slate, a.b.a. J. (Sept.1,2012),available at http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/clean_sweep_house_of_delegates_approves_ethics_20_20s_full_slate/; see ABA,August2012AmendmentstoModelRulesofProfessionalConduct,available athttp://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20120808_house_action_compilation_redline_105a-f.authcheckdam.pdf.


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legalpostsincludecase-relatedinformation.ModelRule1.6(a)10prohibitslawyersfromrevealinginformation“relatingtotherepresentationofaclient”unlessthedisclosureisotherwisepermittedbytherule.Publishingcaseinformationonasocialmediasiteisnotamongthoselistedexceptions.However,newsubsection(c)ofRule1.6createsadutytouse“reasonableeffortstoprevent…inadvertentorunauthorizeddisclosureof…informationrelatedtotherepresentationofaclient.”Accordingly,alawyerwhochoosestousesocialmediatospeakaboutacaserunstheriskofviolatingRule1.6evenifthepostinadvertentlyincludesclientinformationthatthelawyerisnotauthorizedtoreveal.

2. LegalAdvertisingandSolicitation–ModelRules7.1,7.2,7.3 Itmayseemfairlyobviousthatpublishingspecificdetailsaboutacaserunsafouloftheethicalrules.Whetherpostingotherlegal-relatedinformationthroughsocialmediavio-latesanethicalrulemaynotbesoclear.Socialmediacan,andoftendoes,implicaterulesgoverningadvertisingandsolicitation.Unfortunately, therearealotofgrayareaswhendecipheringwhetherparticularcommunicationstriggertheModelRules.Forexample,isaLinkedIninvitationthatlinkstoalawyer’swebsiteanadvertisementsubjecttoregulation?11 WhatabouttweetsandFacebookpoststhemselves?Isatweetboastingofone’ssuccessfulresolutionofacaseanadvertisementofthelawyer’sservices? Despitetheblurredlinescreatedbysocialmedia,theCommissiononEthics20/20didnotrecommendedanychangestotherulesonadvertisingandsolicitationtoaddressthesequestions.AccordingtotheCommission,thereapparentlyisnoneed.AstheCommissionexplained:

Though theModelRuleswerewritten before these technologies hadbeeninvented,theirprohibitionoffalseandmisleadingcommunicationsapplyjustaswelltoonlineadvertisingandotherformsofelectroniccommunicationsthatareusedtoattractnewclientstoday.12

Inotherwords,theuseofsocialmediaissubjecttothesameModelRulesregardingadver-tisingandsolicitationasmoretraditionalcommunications. AccordingtoRule7.2(a),lawyersmayadvertisetheirservicesthroughwritten,recordedorelectroniccommunication,includingpublicmedia.Thus,asabaselinematter,advertis-ingthroughsocialmediaappearstobegenerallypermissible.Ifalladvertisementsmust

10 MoDel rules oF ProF’l ConDuCt r. 1.6(a).Unlessotherwisenoted,allrulescitedaretheModelRulesofProfessionalConduct.11 MichaelE.Lackey,Jr.&JosephP.Minta,Lawyers and Social Media: The Legal Ethics of Tweeting, Facebooking and Blogging, 28 touro l. rev. 149, 158 (2012).12 ABARelease,supra note 6.


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abidebythesamerules,however,doingsothroughsocialmediamayattimesbedifficult.Forexample,theModelRulesalsostateinRule7.2(c)thatthenameandofficeaddressofatleastonelawyerinthefirmshouldbeincludedwitheverycommunication.Iftweetsandstatusupdatesareinfactconsideredadvertisements,thentheytoomustabidebytheprovisionsof7.2(c).Thisisunwieldygiventhe140-characterlimitfortweets. Rule7.1alsoindicatesthatlawyersmustnotcommunicatefalseandmisleadinginforma-tion.Specifically,therulestatesthatacommunicationisfalseandmisleadingifitomitssomenecessaryfactneededtomakethestatement,asawhole,notmisleading.Again,paintingacompletepictureisdifficulttodowitha140-characterlimittweet.Eveniffullinformationisprovided,lawyersmayneverthelessrunintoethicalproblems.Forexample,alawyermaypostonhisFacebookpage,“Successfullyfoughttheinsurancecompanyandresolvedanotherclaimformyclient.”Thestatementmaybeaccuratetotheextentthatasettlementwasachieved.Thelawyer,however,mayhaveneglectedtomentionthatthesettlementwasforanamountequaltothatofferedtohisclientbytheinsurerpre-suit.Byomittingthisinformation,thereadermayconcludethatasettlementwasreachedwhichwouldhavebeenotherwiseunobtainablewithoutthelawyer’sservices.ThiskindofoversightisthefocusofRule7.1. Notwithstandingtheselimitations,attorneysmayinteractwithprospectiveclientsviasocialmedia.Rule7.3,whichgovernsthesolicitationofclients,prohibitsreal-timeelec-tronicsolicitationwithaprospectiveclient.TheEthicsCommitteeofthePhiladelphiaBarAssociation,however,hasopinedthatsocialmediacontactwithprospectiveclientsmaynotviolatetherulebecausea“recipientcanreadilyandsummarilydeclinetoparticipateinthecommunication.”13TheCommitteeprovidedthefollowinginsightregardingRule7.3:

ThepurposebehindthisRuleistoprohibitwhatisreferredtoas“directsolicitation”becauseoftheconcernaboutaninherentpotentialforabusewhereanon-lawyerisengagedbyatrainedadvocateinadirect,interpersonalencounterand,potentiallyfeelingoverwhelmedandnotabletofullyevaluatealltheavailablealternativesbeforeimmediatelyretainingtheoffendinglawyer,feelspressuredtoengagethelawyer.14

WhilesocialmediainteractionswithprospectiveclientsmaynotbeprohibitedunderRule7.3,theparametersoftheadvertisingrulesmustbefollowed.

13 Phila.BarAss’n.,Prof’lGuidanceComm.,Op.2010-6,at5 (June2010),available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion%202010-6.pdf. 14 Id. at 2.


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3. Attorney-ClientRelationships–ModelRules1.7,1.18 Asocialmediapresencecaninvitegreaterinteractionwiththepublic.Areadercancommentonalawyer’spageorpostamessageonalawyer’sFacebookpageandtriggeradialoguebetweenthereaderandthelawyer.Ifareadercommunicateswiththelawyeroversocialmediaregardingalegalissue,anattorney-clientrelationshipmaybecreatedalongwithahotbedofpotentialethicalissues. Asaninitialmatter,Rule1.7requiresscreeningpotentialclientstopreventanypotentialconflictsofinterest.Dialoguesviasocialmediararelyundergothisprocess.Furthermore,Rule1.18(b)requiresthat,evenifnoattorney-clientrelationshipisformed,anyinformationlearnedbytheattorneymustbekeptconfidential.Onceanattorneyengagesinadialogueoverasocialmediaforum,theinformationisnolongerconfidential. AninterestingexampleispresentedwiththeincreasinglypopularuseofSecondLife,anonlinevirtualworld.ThroughSecondLife,lawyerscancreate“avatars”andsetupvirtuallawofficestointeracttheotherresidentsoftheonlinecommunity.OneintellectualpropertyattorneywhoopenedaSecondLifeofficereportedlybilled$20,000inlegalfeesasaresultofclientsacquiredthroughtheprogram.15Obviously,thistypeofclientinteractiontouchesonanumberofadvertisingandsolicitationrulesaswell,includingwhethertheuseofanavatarisdeceptive,liketheuseofanactorinacommercialintheabsenceofadisclaimer.16 Asisrequiredinatraditionalattorney-clientrelationship,theremustbeasystemforcheck-ingpotentialconflictsinavirtualofficeaswell.Inthecaseofvirtualworlds,boththeavatarandrealworldnamesoftheSecondLiferesidentmayneedtobecheckedtoavoidconflictsofinterestwiththelawyer’sotherclients.

B. Ethical Implications of the Use of Social Media to Conduct Discovery Once litigation is underway, socialmediapresents unprecedentedopportunities forinformaldiscovery.Neverbeforehassomuchinformationaboutclients,opposingparties,andwitnessesbeenaccessibleonline.With somuch informationavailable, lawyers aremissingoutonagoldenopportunityiftheydonotatleastexploresocialmedia.Anethicalconundrumarises,however,withthemannerinwhichattorneysobtainsuchinformation.

1. TheDutyofCompetence–ModelRule1.1 Whilethenumberoflawyersusingsocialmediacontinuestorise,manystillrefusetoaccessthewealthofavailableinformation.PursuanttoRule1.1,lawyersarerequiredtoprovidecompetentrepresentationtotheirclients.Competentrepresentationrequiresthe“legalknowledge,skill,thoroughnessandpreparationreasonablynecessaryfortherepre-

15 JeffreyI.Silverberg,Hanging Out Your Virtual Shingle: A Look at How South Carolina’s Ethics Rules Concerning Attorney Communications, Advertising, and Solicitation Apply to Virtual Worlds, 62 s.C. l. rev.715,722(2011).16 See id. at 727.


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sentation.”Comment8toRule1.1instructslawyersthatinordertomaintaintherequisiteknowledgeandskill,theyshould“keepabreastofchangesinthelawanditspractice,in-cludingthebenefitsandrisksassociatedwithrelevanttechnology.”EventhoughlawyershaveprovidedcompetentrepresentationtotheirclientsforhundredsofyearspriortothefirsttweetorFacebookstatusupdate,theworldhaschanged.Withafewclicksofamouse,lawyerscannowfindoutbackgroundinformationofawitnessor,insomecases,thecur-rentactivitiesofapersonalinjuryplaintiff.ItisarguablethatRule1.1requireslawyerstoatleastrecognizethebenefitsandrisksofthisnewtechnologyinordertoprovidethemostcompetentrepresentationtotheirclients.

2. TheDutyofDiligence–ModelRule1.3 EventhoughanappreciationoftheinformationaccessiblethroughsocialmediamaybesufficienttosatisfyRule1.1,familiarityalonemaynotbeenoughtosatisfyotherstandardsfoundintheModelRules.Rule1.3requiresthatlawyersactwithreasonablediligenceinrepresentingtheirclients.Comment1ofRule1.3statesthatlawyersshouldtakewhateverlawfulandethicalmeasurestovindicateaclient’scauseandshouldactwith“zealandad-vocacyupontheclient’sbehalf.”Zealousadvocacymaymeanviewinganopposingparty’spublicFacebookprofileifdoingsocouldleadtoevidencerefutingtheparty’sclaims. Interestingly,however,Comment1ofRule1.3alsostatesthatalawyerisnotrequiredtopressforeveryadvantagethatmayberealizedforaclient.Assuch,ifthelawyerfindsthatsocialmediaresearchpresentsanethicalconundrumintheabsenceofmorespecificguidancefromtheModelRules,thenComment1mayserveasalifeline.

3. TheScopeofPermissibleDiscovery MuchoftheinformationonsocialmediaisavailabletothegeneralpublicandisfreelyaccessedthroughabasicInternetsearch.Thediscoveryofsuchinformationusuallydoesnotresultinethicalviolationsprimarilybecauseuserscanhavenoexpectationofprivacyregardinginformationmadeavailabletothepublic.17GuidancehasbeenprovidedbytheNewYorkStateBarAssociationCommitteeonProfessionalEthics:

Alawyerwhorepresentsaclientinapendinglitigation,andwhohasaccesstotheFacebookandMySpacenetworkusedbyanotherpartyinlitigation,mayaccessandreviewthepublicsocialnetworkingpagesofthatpartytosearchforpotentialimpeachmentmaterial.18

17 HopeA.Comisky&WilliamM.Taylor,Don’t Be a Twit: Avoiding the Ethical Pitfalls Facing Lawyers Utilizing Social Media in Three Important Arenas – Discovery, Communications with Judges and Jurors, and Marketing, 20 teMP. Pol. & Civ. rts. l. rev. 297,302(2011)(citingRomanov.SteelcaseInc.,907N.Y.S.2d650,657(N.Y.Sup.Ct.2010)).18 N.Y.StateBarAss’n,Comm.onProf.Ethics,Op.843(Sept.10,2010),available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=43208 (lastvisitedJune13,2013).


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Therefore,itappearsthatinformationpostedonthepublicpagesofsocialnetworkingsitesisfairgameandmaybediscoveredwithoutplacingthelawyerswhoaccessitinethicalperil.

a. Represented Parties – Model Rules 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 5.3, 8.4 Someinformationonsocialmediasitesisnotreadilyaccessibletothegeneralpublicbecauseuserscanemploycertain“privacy”settingswhichallowtheirpostedinformationtobeviewableonlybythepeopletheychoose.Consequently,alawyerwouldhavetotakesomeaffirmativesteps togainaccess to this informationsuchasbecomingaFacebook“friend”oraTwitter“follower.”DoingsolikelyrunsafouloftheModelRules. PursuanttoRule4.2,lawyersareprohibitedfromcommunicatingwithrepresentedpartieswithoutconsentoftheotherlawyerorbycourtorder.Accordingly,requestingpermissionfromarepresentedpartytoaccesshisorhernon-publicinformationisaviolationofRule4.2.Comment3alsoindicatesthatRule4.2appliesevenifthecommunicationisinitiatedbytherepresentedparty.Therefore,attorneysarealsoprohibitedfromacceptingafriendrequestfromarepresentedparty. Inaddition,lawyersmustavoid“pretexting”touncoverevidence.Pretextingiswherethelawyer,orthelawyer’sagent,concealshisorheridentitytoobtaininformation.19 Pretex-tingimplicatesRule4.1(prohibitingfalsestatementsofmaterialfact),Rule4.3(prohibitingmisleadingstatementstothirdparties),andRule8.4(prohibitinglawyersfromengagingindishonest,fraudulent,ordeceitfulconduct).Moreover,incasesinvolvingtheactionsofthelawyer’sagent,Rule8.4expresslyprohibitslawyersfromattemptingtoviolatetheRulesofProfessionalConductthroughtheactsofanotherorbyengagingindeceitormisrepresenta-tions.UnderRule5.3,lawyersareresponsiblefortheconductofanon-lawyeremployed,retainedby,orassociatedwiththelawyer.Ifitisunethicalforthelawyerhimselfto“friend”arepresentedparty,itisalsounethicalforthelawyertoencourageanotherpersontodosoon his behalf. Forexample,twoNewJerseylawyerswerechargedwithviolatingRules4.2,5.3,and8.4aftertheirparalegalallegedly“friended”apersonalinjuryplaintiff.Theallegedviolationwasdiscoveredafterthelawyersaskedveryspecificquestionsabouttheplaintiff’sconductduringhisdeposition.Thereafter,thelawyersamendedtheirdiscoveryresponseswiththeinformationtheyhadobtainedviaFacebook.Thelawyersarecontestingthecharges,claim-ingthatwhiletheydirectedtheparalegaltoconductbasicInternetresearch,theydidnot

19 AllisonClemency,“Friending,” “Following,” and “Digging” Up Evidentiary Dirt: The Ethical Im-plications of Investigating Information on Social Media Websites, 43ariz. st. l.J. 1021, 1036 (2011).


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authorizehertofriendtheplaintiff.AlthoughthematterwassetforahearinginFall2012,nofurtherinformationwaseverreleasedregardingthedispositionofthecomplaint.20

b. Unrepresented Persons – Model Rule 4.3 TheModelRulesmaynotrequirethesameconstraintsregardingpretextingtocommuni-catewithanunrepresentedindividual.Rule4.3statesthat“[i]ndealingwithapersonwhoisnotrepresentedbycounsel,alawyershallnotstateorimplythatthelawyerisdisinterested.”Severalstateethicscommittees,however,havedeterminedthatthisrulehaslittletodowithsocialmediaandisnotimplicatedwhenalawyerorathird-partyattemptsto“friend”anunrepresentedperson.21Nonetheless,toavoidviolatingotherethicalrulesinvolvingdeceitanddishonesty(suchasRules4.1,5.3and8.4),lawyersshouldavoidpretexting,evenwhenthepartyisunrepresented.

4. TheDutytoPreserveEvidence Justassocialmediaprovidesawealthofinformationregardingopposingparties, itlikewiseprovidesinformationregardingalawyer’sownclient.Manylawyerswillinvestigatetheirownclient’ssocialnetworkingsitesand,unfortunately,discoverpotentiallyharmfulinformation.Uponmakingthisdiscovery,thefirstreactionmaybetoinstructtheclienttomodifyordeletetheharmfulinformation.Doingso,however,mayresultinprofessionalmisconductbecauseRule3.4(a)prohibitsthealteringordestructionofevidence.Lawyershaveanethicaldutytopreserveelectronicallystoredinformation,includingsocial-network-ingprofiles.22Instructingaclienttodeletehisorherprofilemaybedeemedspoliationofevidencewhichcouldresultinsanctionsagainstthelawyer.Themoreprudentresponseistoinstructtheclienttoenhancehisorherprivacysettings,suchassettingtheprofilepageto“private,”topreventdirectaccesstotheinformation.

20 MaryPatGallagher,Hostile Use of “Friend”Request Puts Lawyers in Ethics Trouble,n.J. l.J. (Sept.3,2012),available at http://www.lexis.com/research/retrieve?cc=&pushme=1&tmpFBSel=all&totaldocs=&taggedDocs=&toggleValue=&numDocsChked=0&prefFBSel=0&delformat=XCITE&fpDocs=&fpNodeId=&fpCiteReq=&expNewLead=id%3D%22expandedNewLead%22&brand=ldc&_m=5a0c1444bb0a9f9e0d9025835bb45323&docnum=1&_fmtstr=FULL&_startdoc=1&wchp=dGLzVzt-zSkAW&_md5=d38690a94403288588821ec7a8224ff9&focBudTerms=&focBudSel=all.21 StevenC.Bennett,Ethics of “Pretexting” in a Cyber Word, 41 MCGeorGe l. rev. 271,273(2010);see, e.g., Ass’noftheBaroftheCityofN.Y.,Comm.onProf’landJudicialEthics,Op.2010-2,available at http://www2.nycbar.org/Ethics/eth2010.htm(lastvisitedJune13,2013);Phila.BarAss’n.,Prof’lGuidanceComm.,Op.2009-02,at4n.1(March2009),available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf(lastvisitedJune13,2013)(“[T]heCommitteedoesnotbelievethat[Rule4.3]isimplicatedbythisproposedcourseofconduct[third-party‘friending’anunrepresentedperson].”).22 MargaretM.DiBianca,Ethical Issues Arising from Lawyers’ Use of (and Refusal to Use) Social Media, 12 Del. l. rev. 179, 184 (2011).


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C. Ethical Implications of Using Social Media to Contact Judges and Attorneys Whetheritiswithahighschoolclassmateoranothermemberofthelocalbar,socialmediapresentsvaluablenetworkingopportunities.Socialmediacontactwithotherattorneysandjudges,however,stilldemandsthesamelevelofcivilityandcandorasin-personcontactorotherwrittencommunications.

1. Civility InthePreambletotheModelRules,lawyersareinstructedtomaintaina“professional,courteousandcivilattitudetowardallpersonsinvolvedinthelegalsystem.”Moreover,Rule3.5(d)prohibitsalawyerfromengaginginconduct“intendedtodisruptatribunalorengageinundignifiedordiscourteousconductthatisdegradingtoatribunal.”Unfortunately,whenshieldedbythescreenofacomputer,lawyersmaylosesightoftheseprovisions.Forexample,aFloridaattorneycalledajudgean“evil,unfairwitch”inablogpost.Thatat-torney,notsurprisingly,wasreprimandedbythecourt.23 Notonlyshouldlawyersbecarefulaboutwhattheypost,buttheyneedtobeawareofhowtheirpostmaybeusedbyothers.Forexample,afewdayspriortoaMondaymorn-ingmediation,oneSouthCarolinalawyerpostedhisplanstocelebratehisfiftiethbirthdayovertheweekend.Atmediation,opposingcounselpostedthelawyer’sFacebookpageaspartofhisopeningstatementandsuggestedthatthelawyerfailedtotakethecaseseriouslybecausehewascelebratinginsteadofpreparingformediation.Opposingcounselneglectedtomentionthatthelawyer’sseniorassociatewasactuallyhandlingthecase,andhadbeenformanymonths,underthelawyer’sclosesupervision.Needlesstosay,thecasedidnotsettle at mediation.24

2. Ex-ParteCommunication–ModelRule3.5 Rule3.5prohibits lawyersfromseekingto“influenceajudge, juror,orprospectivejurororotherofficial.”Intheeraofsocialnetworking,thelikelihoodthatanattorneyhasanonlinerelationshipwithajudgeishigh.TheABA’sruleregardingajudge’sparticipationinsocialnetworkingisasfollows:

A judgemayparticipate in electronic social networking, but aswith all socialrelationshipsandcontacts,ajudgemustcomplywithrelevantprovisionsofthe

23 Id. at197;JohnSchwartz,A Legal Battle: Online Attitude vs. Rules of the Bar,n.y. tiMes(Sept.12,2009),available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/13/us/13lawyers.html?_r=0.24 StuartMauney,Burned at Mediation by my own Facebook Post!, abnorMal use (Feb.8,2012),avail-able at http://abnormaluse.com/2012/02/burned-at-mediation-by-my-own-facebook-post.html (last viewed June13,2013).


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CodeofJudicialConductandavoidanyconductthatwouldunderminethejudge’sindependence,integrity,orimpartiality,orcreateanappearanceofimpropriety.25

Stateopinionsvary.SomejurisdictionshavegonesofarastobanjudgesfrombecomingFacebookfriendswith lawyerswhoappearbefore them.26Other jurisdictions,however,permitjudgestoengageinsocialnetworking,includingbeingFacebookfriendswithat-torneys.27SouthCarolinafavorsjudicialuseofsocialnetworkingasawaytopromotethepublic’sunderstandingofthejudiciary.28TheABA’sconclusionechoesthepublicoutreachvirtuesrecognizedbySouthCarolina.

JudicioususeofESMcanbenefitjudgesinboththeirpersonalandprofessionallives.Astheiruseofthistechnologyincreases,judgescantakeadvantageofitsutilityandpotentialasavaluabletoolforpublicoutreach.Whenusedwithpropercare,judges’useofESMdoesnotnecessarilycompromisetheirdutiesundertheModelCodeanymorethanuseoftraditionalandlesspublicformsofsocialcon-nectionsuchasU.S.Mail,telephone,emailortexting.29

Eveninjurisdictionswheresuchconnectionsareallowed,lawyersshouldavoidengaginginanyconductseekingtoinfluencethejudge.

D. Professional Misconduct: Lawyers Behaving Badly Aswecontinuedownthesocialmediapath,thecasesoflawyersmisusingsocialmediaareontherise.Inmanyinstances,lawyershaveengagedininadvertentmisuseofsocialme-dia.Inothersituations,theinvolvedlawyershaveactedintentionally.Alloftheseinstancesprovideteachablemoments.

25 ABAComm.onProf’lEthics&Grievances,FormalOp.462,at1(2013),available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/formal_opinion_462.auth-checkdam.pdf[hereinafterFormalOp.462].26 DiBianca,supra note22,at193;BrianHull,Why Can’t We Be “Friends”? A Call for a Less Stringent Policy for Judges Using Online Social Networking, 63hastinGs l.J.595,613,614-15 (2012) (citing Cal. JudgesAss’n,JudicialEthicsComm.,AdvisoryOp.66,at11(2010);Fla.Sup.Ct.JudicialEthicsAdvisoryComm.,Op.2010-06(2010);Fla.Sup.Ct.JudicialEthicsAdvisoryComm.,Op.2009-20(2009);Okla.JudicialEthicsAdvisoryPanel,Op.2011-3(2011)).27 Hull,supranote26,at614 (citingComm.oftheKy.Judiciary,FormalOp.JE-119(2010);Sup.Ct.ofOhioBd.ofComm’rsonGrievances&Discipline,Op.2010-7(2010);N.Y.AdvisoryComm.onJudicialEthics,Op.08-176(2009)).28 DiBianca,supranote22,at193;Hull,supra note26,at608(citingS.C.AdvisoryComm.onStandardsofJudicialConduct,Op.17-2009(2009)).29 FormalOp.462,supranote25,at4.


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30 MelissaE.Hoslman,Facebook Poem Gets Prosecutor in Hot Water,sunsentinel (Apr.22,2010),available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2010-04-22/news/fl-facebook-poem-ada-20100422_1_jurors-trial-facebook(lastvisitedJune14,2013).31 MollyMcDonough,Facebooking Judge Catches Lawyer in Lie, Sees Ethical Breaches,A.B.A.J.,Jul.31, 2009, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/facebooking_judge_catches_lawyers_in_lies_cross-ing_ethical_lines_abachicago/.32 908A.2d1281(Pa.2006).

1. The Gilligan’s IslandTrialfromHell InFlorida,AssistantStateProsecutorBrandonWhiterecounteda“trialfromhell”onhisFacebookpagetothethemesongfromGilligan’s Island.Thejury,however,hadnotyetreturneditsverdictwhentheparodywasposted.WhitepotentiallycouldhaverunafoulofRule3.6(a)whichprohibitslawyersfrommakingextrajudicialstatementsthatcould“ma-teriallyprejudice”alegalproceeding.However,fortunatelyforWhite,thejuryhadfinisheddeliberatingsotherewaslittleriskthattheparodywould“materiallyprejudice”theoutcomeofthecase.Whitewasnotsanctionedforhisconduct,buthisboss,ChiefAssistantStateAttorneyTomBakkedahl,isusingthepostasa“trainingmoment”forotherlawyersinthestate’sattorney’soffice.30

2. FacebookinTexas:UseatYourOwnRisk JudgeSusanCrisscheckstheFacebookpagesofthosewhoappearinherTexascourt.Inoneinstance,alawyerrequestedacontinuanceduetothedeathofherfather.JudgeCrisssubsequentlycheckedthelawyer’sFacebookpageonlytodiscoverthatshehadengagedinaweekofdrinkingandpartyingaftermakingtherequest.WhenthelawyerappearedbeforeJudgeCriss,shetoldacompletelydifferentstory.Unsurprisingly,hermotionforacontinuancewasdenied. AnotherlawyerwascaughtcomplainingonFacebookabouthav-ingJudgeCrisshearhermotion.WhenJudgeCrissdiscoveredtheaccount,sheengagedinsome “friendly” banter with the attorney over the social networking site.31 Whileneitherattorneywassubjecttosanctions,theseexamplesshowhowalawyer’sconductcannegativelyaffecttheoutcomeofthecase.

3. AppealingThroughSocialMediaisNotRecommended InOffice of Disciplinary Counsel v. Wrona,aPennsylvaniaattorneywasdisbarredformakingfalseaccusationsagainstajudgeandengaginginconductprejudicialtotheadminis-trationofjustice.32Thejudgefoundtheattorney’sclientincontemptforfailuretopaychildsupport.Followinganumberofunsuccessfulappealsandmotionsallegingthatstatementshadbeenomittedfromtheofficialtranscript,theattorneyengagedinamediacampaignagainstthejudgeandthejudicialsystem.Inalettertotheeditorpublishedinthelocalpaper,theattorneyaccusedthecourtof“systematicallydepriv[ing]litigantsofdueprocess”and


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33 Id.at1285.34 Id.35 Id. at 1286.36 Id. at1289.37 DisciplinaryActionAgainstSoronow,694N.W.2d556(Minn.2005).38 DebraCassensWeiss,Blogging Assistant PD Accused of Revealing Secrets of Little-Disguised Clients,A.B.A.J.(Sept.10,2009),http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/blogging_assistant_pd_accused_of_re-vealing_secrets_of_little-disguised_clie/.

“harbor[ing]criminalmisconductinordertopreventsuccessfulappeals.”33Thereafter,heposteda“pressrelease”onanInternetwebsiteaccusingthejudgeof“criminalalterationofrecordedcourtproceedings”andof“subornationofperjury.”34Inaddition,hewrotealettertotheAttorneyGeneral’sofficecomparingthejudge’sbehaviortopriestswhomolestedyoungboysandbishopswhocoveredupthecomplaints.35Thecourtdeterminedthattheattorneyactedrecklesslywithoutanyreasonablefactualbasisinmakinghisstatements.36 Indoingso,thecourtheldthathehadengagedinprofessionalmisconductinviolationofnumerousethicalrules,includingPennsylvaniaRulesofProfessionalConductRules3.3(a)(1),8.2(b),8.4(a),8.4(c),and8.4(d).

4. CautionWhenEmailingWitnesses(ThenBloggingAboutIt) InMinnesota,anattorneywassuspendedfromthepracticeoflawfollowingaseriesofInternet-basedethicalviolations.First,theattorneysentanemailtoawitnessinanotherlawyer’sdisciplinarymatterinstructingthewitnessnottocooperate.Thereafter,hemadeanumberofmisleadingstatementsabouttheeventonhisfirm’swebsite,bothbeforeandafterhissuspensionfromthepracticeoflaw.Asaresult,hewassuspendedfrompracticeforatleast30monthsandorderedtopay$900incosts.37

5. CautionaryTaleofBloggingAboutOne’sClients KristinePeshek,aformerIllinoispublicdefender,wasbroughtbeforethedisciplinarycommissionduetopostingsonherpersonalblog.38Peshekpennedablogcalled“TheBardd[sic]Before theBar– Irreverant [sic]Adventures inLife,Law,and IndigentDefense,”whichchronicledherworkinthepublicdefender’soffice.Inherblogposts,sheidentifiedherclientsandrevealedconfidentialinformationaboutthem. Oneparticularpostwasexceptionallyharmful.Peshekrecalledaconversationwithaclientfollowinghersentencing.TheclientaskedPeshekifshecouldgobacktotellthatjudgeshewasonMethadone,contrarytoherearliertestimony.Peshek’sresponsewas:


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39 Complaint,InreKristineAnnPeshek,No.6201779(Ill.Att’yRegistration&DisciplinaryComm’nAug.25,2009),https://www.iardc.org/09CH0089CM.html. 40 See In reDisciplinaryProceedingsAgainstPeshek,798N.W.2d879(Wis.2011).41 RyanFlinn,Social Media: A New Jury Selection Tool, businessWeek (April21,2011),http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/11_18/b4226028093461.htm (lastvisited June14,2013) (quotingDavidWenner,Snyder&Wenner,Phoenix,Ariz.).42 MichaelK.Kiernan&SamuelE.Cooley,Juror Misconduct in the Age of Social Networking,62 FeD’n DeF. & CorP. Couns. Q. 179, 190-92 (2012).43 SeePhila.BarAss’n.,Prof’lGuidanceComm.,Op.2009-02(March2009),available athttp://www.philadelphiabar.org/WebObjects/PBAReadOnly.woa/Contents/WebServerResources/CMSResources/Opinion_2009-2.pdf(lastvisitedJune13,2013).

Huh?Youwanttogobackandtellthejudgethatyouliedtohim.Youliedtothepre-sentenceinvestigator,youliedtome?Andyouexpectwhattohappenifyoudothis?I’lltellyouwhatwouldhappen;thesentencejustpronouncedwouldbeimmediatelyvacatedandyou’dgotoprison,that’swhatwouldhappen.39

Asidefromspeakingdirectlyaboutthecase,Peshekalsoappearstohavebeencomplicitwithherclient’sfraud.Peshekwassuspended60daysforviolatingRules1.2,1.6,3.2,and8.4.40

ii.sPokeo, FaCebook,tWitter anD Juror “DeseleCtion”

soCial MeDia at trial FroM voir Dire throuGh Deliberations

WithabillionFacebookusers,hundredsofmillionsofTwitterpostingsdaily,andaGooglequeryofanyadultlikelytoproduceatleastafewsearchengine“hits,”itwasonlyamatteroftimebeforesocialmediaandtheInternetmadetheirpresencefeltinthejuryselectionprocessinAmericancourtrooms.Indeed,thewealthofdataavailableonlinehasallowedlawyerstheopportunitytoscreenprospectivejurorsandalsotailorthepresentationoftheircasestojurors’biasesandpreferences.Asonetriallawyerstatedina2011inter-view:“Let’ssayyouhaveacaseinvolvinganemergencyroom—you’resuingahospitalfornegligence.Wouldn’titbenicetoknowthatthere’ssomepicturepostedonawebsiteof[aprospectivejuror]attendingsomehospitalcharityevent?”41

Thegrowthofsocialmediatechnologyhascausedcourtroomrulestoevolve.WhileithasbecomecommonplaceforjudgestoinstructjurorsagainstsocialmediauseandInternetresearchduring trial (somecourtsevenconfiscate jurors’cellphonesand tabletsbeforeeachdayoftestimony),thisbanthankfullyhasnotbeenextendedtotrialattorneys.42 Even ifitisrecognizedasinappropriate(andunethical)forattorneystocontactjurorsthroughsocialmedia(suchas“friending”themonlineeitherdirectlyorthroughsurrogates),43 it


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isnonethelessconsideredacceptableforattorneystoviewjurormaterialavailabletothegeneralpublicontheInternet.44Thus,itisbecomingroutineforattorneystoprobejuror’ssocialmediaprofilesduringjuryselectionandthroughouttrial—touncoveranybiasesorbehaviorthatwouldjustifystrikingajurorduringvoirdireordisqualifytheminthecourseoftrial.SomecommentatorshaveobservedthatInternetresearchisnotonlyatooltogivetheambitiousattorneytheedgeattrial;theyalsocontendthatbestpracticesandprofes-sional standards may requireatleastsomereviewofsocialmediaandjurorbackgroundsduringvoirdireandtrial.45Thatsaid,considerationmustbegiventothenature,extent,andsignificanceofsocialmediainformationthatcanbedevelopedandeffectivelyutilizedatallphasesoftrial.

A. Voir Dire or “Voir Google”? Juryquestionnaires,whichmostcourtsdistributetolawyersatthebeginningofjuryselection,oftencontainlittleinformationbeyondname,age,andmaritalstatus.Also,manyjudgesandvenuesrestrictthequestionsattorneyscanaskpotentialjurorsduringvoirdire.Forinstance,itistypicaltoprohibitattorneysfromaskingprospectivejurorsabouttheirpoliticalaffiliations.Thus,onlineaccess,boththroughsocialmediaandInternetdatabases,canprovideimportantendrunsaroundcourt-imposedrestrictionsonvoirdire.Juryconsul-tantshavebeenattemptingfordecadestocreatepsychologicalprofilestoassisttrialcounselinthevoirdireprocess–byretainingprivateinvestigatorstoreviewvotingrecordsandpublicmortgagedocuments,ordrivingtothejurors’neighborhoodstoassesstheiraffluenceorlifestyles.Thelureofsocialmediasitesisthattheyallowlawyerstogatherthesameinformation—inseconds.“There’sawholesortofgenerationoflawyerswhousedtopayinvestigatorstodrivebyhousestoseeiftherewerekids[intheyard]or[political]bumperstickersontheircars,”saidGeorgiaStateUniversitylawprofessor,CarenMorrison.“Nowtheycandoitinstantaneously.”46

Inaworldwherepeoplerevealthemselves,oftenunflatteringly,onFacebookandothersocialmediasites,Internetvettingbytrialcounselcanprovideaninvaluable“correction”forjurorswhoarenotforthcomingduringjuryselection.Indeed,useofsearchenginesdata-basesduringvoirdirehasonecommentatorre-namingtheprocess“voirGoogle.”47Insome

44 Carinov.Muenzen, No.L-0028-07,2010WL3448071,at*9-10(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.Aug.30,2010);Johnsonv.McCullough, 306S.W.3d551,554(Mo.2010)(enbanc).45 J.C.Lundberg,Googling Jurors to Conduct Voir Dire, 8 Wash. J. l. teCh. & arts 123,132-33(2012).46 TriciaBishop,Social Media of Increasing Concern for Courts: Lawyers Use Information to Check Pos-sible Jurors, balt. sun,Sept.18,2011,atA1,available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-09-18/news/bs-md-facebooking-lawyers-20110918_1_potential-jurors-jury-selection-bribery-trial (last visited June23,2013).47 BrianGrow,Internet v. Courts: Googling for the Perfect Juror, reuters,Feb.17,2011,available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/02/17/us-courts-voirdire-idUSTRE71G4VW20110217.


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instances,suchasinhighprofileandcapitalcases,jurypoolsheetsareprovidedinadvance,allowinglawyerstoconductextensiveonlinesearchesaboutprospectivejurorsandcompilethisinformationonspreadsheets.Morecommonplace,however,isthegrowingscenarioinwhichattorneysor(ifresourcesallow)atrialconsultantishandedajuryquestionnaireattheoutsetofvoirdire;theyfranticallytypeprospectivejurors’namesintotheirlaptopstogatherwhateverjurorinformationtheycanintheminutesthecourtallocatesduringjuryselection.Facebook,Spokeo,andTwitterarethuscrucialresourcesasattorneysattempttogatherinformationbeyondtheoftenunhelpfuldetailssetforthinthejuryquestionnaires.Spokeo.com,apeoplesearchsite,canprovideanimmediatelinktoabirds-eyeimageofajuror’shome;itreadilyyieldsotherfreeinformationinamatterofseconds,suchashomevaluesandthenamesofindividualswhoresideatthegivenaddress.Forasmallmonthlyfee,Spokeoprovidesextensiveadditionalinformation.Ofcourse,thistypeofvettingraisesprivacyconcernsandsomecourtsinevitablymaywishtoassertaroleinsupervisingthisinformation-gatheringprocess. Inonecase,aGooglesearchrevealedthatapotentialjurorliedduringvoirdirewhenheclaimedhehadneverbeeninacourtroombefore.Infact,theGooglematerialdemonstratedthatthejurorhadactuallyrecentlyservedasanexpertwitnessatajurytrial.48Similarly,ina2008WestVirginiacriminalcase,aconvictionwasreversedwhereajurorfailedtodisclosethatshewasaMyspacefriendwiththedefendant.Eventhoughshevotedtoconvict,thestateappealscourtbelievedherlackofcandorpotentiallyaffectedtheoutcomeofthecase.Thejuror,forherpart,explainedafterwardsthathercontactwiththedefendantwaslimitedand,otherthanseveralMyspacecontacts,shehadnointeractionswiththedefendant.“MaybeIshouldhavesaidhewasonmyMyspacepage,”thewomanexplained,“butthenIthoughttomyself,Ireallydon’tknowhim,soI’mreallynotlying.”49 TheInternetvettingofjurorsraisesquestionsofhowfarcan,orshould,anattorneygowhenitcomestoinvestigatingajuror’sbackgroundandpotentialbiases?Arethereanyethicallimitsandprivacyconsiderationsofwhichcounselshouldbeaware?WhatlimitshavejudgesplacedonInternetvetting?Furthermore,whatamountofvettingisactuallyproductiveforcounsel?IsthereapointwheretoomuchInternetinformationconfusestheprocessanddistractscounselfromold-fashioned“gut”feelingsaboutjurorsthatcanbequitedistinctfromgeneralimpressionsderivedfrombywhatisavailableaboutajuroronline?

48 Flinn,supra note 41.49 Id.


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B. Rule 3.5 Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal AmericanBarAssociationModelRuleofProfessionalConduct3.5states:

Alawyershallnot:

(a) seektoinfluenceajudge,juror,prospectivejurororotherofficialbymeansprohibitedbylaw;

(b)communicateexpartewithsuchapersonduringtheproceedingunlessautho-rizedtodosobylaworcourtorder;

(c) communicatewithajurororprospectivejurorafterdischargeofthejuryif:

(1)thecommunicationisprohibitedbylaworcourtorder;

(2)thejurorhasmadeknowntothelawyeradesirenottocommunicate;or

(3)thecommunicationinvolvesmisrepresentation,coercion,duressorharass-ment;or

(d)engageinconductintendedtodisruptatribunal.

Whileoftencitedinthecontextofjurorvetting,Rule3.5isactuallyfocusedon“com-munication”with the juror –which technically is notwhat is goingonduringGoogleandSpokeosearchesorwhilecounselperusesajuror’sopen-to-the-publicFacebookandMySpacematerials.Thus,whilecontactingajurorthroughsocialmedia,orenlistingsomeoneelsetodoitforyou,isunderstoodtobeunethical,fewspecificlimitshavebeenformallyimposedoncounsel,eitherbyethicsconsiderationsorcourtroomrulesenactedbyindividualjudges,whenitcomestoinvestigatingprospectiveandempanelledjurors. Indeed,inonewidely-reportedNewJerseycaseplaintiff’s“counselbeganusingalap-topcomputertoaccesstheInternet,intendingtoobtaininformationonprospectivejurors.Defensecounselobjected.”50Theopinionincludesthefollowingtranscriptoftheexchangebetweenthejudgeandtheplaintiff’scounsel:

THECOURT:AreyouGooglingthese[potentialjurors]?

[PLAINTIFF’SCOUNSEL]:YourHonor,there’snocodelawthatsaysI’mnotallowedtodothat.I-anycourtroom-

THECOURT:Isthatwhatyou’redoing?

[PLAINTIFF’SCOUNSEL]:I’mgettinginformationonjurors-we’vedoneitallthetime,everyonedoesit.It’snotunusual.It’snot.There’snorule,nocaseoranysuggestioninanycasethatsays-

50 Carinov.Muenzen,No.L-0028-07,2010WL3448071,at*4(N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div.Aug.30,2010).


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....

THECOURT:No,no,hereistherule.Theruleisit’smycourtroomandIcontrolit.

[PLAINTIFF’SCOUNSEL]:Iunderstand.

THECOURT:Ibelieveinafairandevenplayingfield.Ibelievethateveryoneshouldhaveanequalopportunity.Now,withthatsaidtherewasnoadvanceindi-cationthatyouwouldbeusingit.Theonlyreasonyou’redoingthatisbecausewehappentohavea[Wi-Fi]connectioninthiscourtroomatthispointwhichallowsyoutohavewirelessinternetaccess.

[PLAINTIFF’SCOUNSEL]:Correct,Judge.

THECOURT:Andthat isfineprovidedtherewasanotice.There isnonotice.Therefore,youhaveaninherentadvantageregardingthejuryselectionprocess,whichIdon’tparticularlyfeelisappropriate.So,therefore,myrulingisclosethelaptop for the jury selectionprocess.Youwant to-I can’t controlwhatgoesonoutsideofthiscourtroom,butIcancontrolwhatgoesoninsidethecourtroom.51

Afterthejuryreturnedaverdictforthedefendantdoctor,theplaintiffappealedunsuc-cessfully.Amongtheerrorsalleged,theplaintiffassertedthatthetrialjudgeerredby“pre-cludinghisattorneyfromaccessingtheinternetduringjuryselection.”52Theappellatecourtruledthatthetrialjudgehadimproperlyrestrictedplaintiff’scounsel’sonlinejurorvetting,butthetrialcourt’srulingdidnotprejudicetheplaintiff.53Theappellatecourtupbraidedthetrialjudgeforitsruling.

Despitethedeferencewenormallyshowajudge’sdiscretionincontrollingthecourtroom,weareconstrainedinthiscasetoconcludethatthejudgeactedun-reasonablyinpreventinguseoftheinternetby[plaintiff]’scounsel.Therewasnosuggestionthatcounsel’suseofthecomputerwasinanywaydisruptive.Thathehadtheforesighttobringhislaptopcomputertocourt,anddefensecounseldidnot,simplycannotserveasabasisforjudicialinterventioninthenameof“fairness”ormaintaining“alevelplayingfield.”The“playingfield”was,infact,already“level”becauseinternetaccesswasopentobothcounsel,evenifonlyoneofthemchosetoutilizeit.54

51 Id.52 Id.at*7.53 Id. at*10.54 Id.


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C. Juror Vetting Should Not End With Voir Dire Jurorvettingshouldnotendwiththevoirdireprocess.Althoughthetimecrunchofjuryselectionmaypreventcomprehensivejurorvettingatthattime,onceajuryisempanelledcounselmayfinditworthwhiletodouble-checkontheirjurors.Intwowell-publicizedcases,55 triallawyersweresurprisedbywhattheyfailedtounearthduringthevoirdireprocess. Inthefirstcase,ajuryconsultantforthedefendantmanufacturerdiscoveredthatanempanelledjurorhadpostedonFacebookthatherherowasErinBrockovich,thecrusadingparalegalfamousforherpro-plaintiffeffortsinenvironmentalcases.Thisresearchultimatelyhelpeddefenseattorneysinthecasehavethejurorremovedfromthepanelandreplacedbyan alternate.56 AnevenmorecompellingsituationaroseinKhoury v. ConAgra Foods, Inc.,acaseinwhichtheplaintiffallegedshehadcontractedararelungdiseasefromconsumingmicro-wavepopcorncontainingachemical(diacetyl)producedbyConAgra.57 According to the newsarticlewrittenaboutthiscase,duringthetrial,aConAgralawyerdiscoveredthatajuror’sFacebookpageprovidedlinkstonumerouswebsitescriticalofbigcorporationsandpromotedaboycottingofBPoil.58

Accordingtothetranscript,thejuror,24-year-oldUniversityofMissouri-KansasCitystudentJonathanPiedimonte,alsowasfoundtohaveapersonalblog--called“TheInsaneCitizen:RamblingsofaPoliticalMadman.”Theblogconsistsofpoetryandshortessays,andincludedstatementssuchas“F---McDonald’s.Ihateyourcommercials.I’mnot‘lovin’it.’”59

ConAgraarguedforthejuror’sremovalbecausehehadhiddenhisanti-businesssen-timentsduringjuryselectionandthejudgeagreed.Accordingtothereporterwhowroteaboutthiscase,thetranscriptquotesJudgeJackGratesaying“I’mgoingtoerronthesideofanybodythatstinksatallofprejudiceisnotgoingtositonthedamnjury.”60ThejuryruledinConAgra’sfavor,butonlybya9-3vote.ConAgra’scounselbelievestheoutcomemighthavebeendifferentifPiedimontehadbeenallowedtoremainonthejurybecausehemighthaveinfluencedtheotherjurors.Wheninterviewed,Piedimontsaid“thatwhileheunderstandswhyConAgra’slawyersviewedhisonlineactivitiesasevidenceofbias,he

55 Grow,supra note 47.56 Id.57 368S.W.3d189(Mo.App.W.D.2012).58 Grow,supra note 47.59 Id.60 Id.


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doesn’tbelievetheyshouldhavebeentakensoseriously.‘ThisistheInternet,’hesaid.‘It’sadifferentrealm.It’slikeaplayground.’”61

Onappeal,theMissouriappellatecourtaffirmedthetrialcourt’sjudgmentforConAgra.62 ThecourtquotedJudgeGrate’sreasonsforremovingthejuror:

WhatI’mshootingforhereisafairandimpartialjury.Andwhatwe’vegotnowis15peoplewhohavepassedthemusterbyanywaythatyouwanttomeasureit.Andnobodyhaslodgedadditionalobjectionsagainstthose15people….Ithinkit’saveryclosecallwhetherMr.Piedimonteshouldhavebeenremovedatall.I’mactuallyfollowingthroughonwhatismyheartfeltconvictionthatmyprimarydutyinvoirdireistomakesurethatanyopportunityforbiasorprejudicetofilterintothejurydeliberationsisextinguished….63

Theappellatecourtreasonedthattrialjudgescanobservejurorsanswerquestionsrelat-ing topossiblebias, insteadof relyingona“cold” transcript,and that iswhy thecourt“accord[s]somuchdiscretionto…colleaguesonthetrialbenchin‘closecalls’relatingtothe‘possibility’ofjurorbiasorotherissuesrelatingtotheabilityofajurortoeffectivelydischargehisduties.”64Thus,thetrialcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretioninconcluding,outofanabundanceofcaution,thatbecauseofpossiblecorporatebias,thejurorwasnotqualifiedtoserveonthejury.65 TheappellatecourtwascarefultopointouttheboundariesofitsholdingregardingusingtheInternettoscreenjurorsduringtrials.Italsostressedthatafindingthatajurorengagedinintentionalnondisclosureduringvoirdireisnotessentialwhenatrialcourtexercisesitsdiscretiontoremoveajurorforpossiblebiastowardsoneparty.Asstatedbythecourt,

ourrulingtodayisnotasuggestionthatjurorsare“fairgame”forcontinuousIn-ternet“screening”duringthecourseofatrial.Instead,when…thereisevidencefairlysuggestingintentionalnondisclosuretoavoirdirequestion,litigantshavearighttobringsuchallegednondisclosuretothetrialcourt’sattention….[I]tisalsonotarequirementforthetrialcourttoconcludethatajurorhas,infact,engagedinintentionalnondisclosureduringvoirdireforthetrialcourttoexerciseitsdiscretiontograntrelieftostrikeajurorfromthejurywhen…ajurorpossessesthepossibilityofbiastowardsoneofthepartiesinthejuryproceeding.66

61 Id.62 Khoury,368S.W.3d189,192(Mo.App.W.D.2012).63 Id. at 201.64 Id.65 Id.66 Id. at n. 11.


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D. Juror Vetting: A Tool or a Requirement? Vettingjurorsthroughouttrialmaybemorethanjustgoodpractice;infact,somecourtshaveindicatedthatinvestigatingjurorbackgroundshasessentiallybecomearequirement. InTricam Industries, Inc. v. Coba, thetrialcourtrefusedtogranttheplaintiffanewtrialbasedonajuror’snon-disclosureofpreviouslitigationhistory.Theappellatecourtaffirmedbecausethefailuretodisclosetheinformationwasattributabletotheplaintiff’slack of diligence.67InCoba,ajurordidnotdiscloseduringvoirdirehislitigationhistorywhich included a divorce, three foreclosures, and two collection actions.Although thejurormaynothaveunderstoodthequestionsaskedbythecourtregardingthejurors’priorlitigationexperience,theappellatecourtconsidereditverysignificantthat“duringthetrial,thetrialcourtsuggestedthattheattorneysrunthejurors’litigationhistorieselectronicallybeforethejurycommenceddeliberationsandwhileanalternatewasstillavailable”andthatplaintiff’scounseldeclinedtheoffertorunthejurors.68Accordingtothecourt,whiletheFloridaSupremeCourthadneverrequiredtrialcounseltorunjurors’litigationhistoriestodemonstrateduediligence,attorneysarepermittedtorunsearchesandtrialcourtscansuggestthem.Moreover,theFloridaSupremeCourtneverheldthatatrialcourtcouldnot“inappropriatecircumstances,consideratrialcounsel’srefusaltorunajuror’slitigationhistoryasoneofseveralfactorsunderaduediligenceinquiry.”69 AsimilardecisionwasreachedbytheSupremeCourtofMissouriinJohnson v. Mc-Cullough,where,duringvoirdireinamedicalmalpracticecase,ajurorincorrectlyansweredaquestionaboutwhetherhehadbeenalitigantinanypriorlawsuits.Afteradefenseverdict,theplaintiffconductedanonlinesearchanddiscoveredthatthejurorhadbeenadefendantinapersonalinjuryaction.Althoughthecourtheldthatcounselshouldconducttheirdatabasesearchesduringvoirdire,insteadofwaitinguntilaftertrial,70itupheldthedefenseverdictbecauseatthetimeofthetrial,therewasnoevidencethatitwaspracticableforcounseltohaveinvestigatedthelitigationhistoryofalltheselectedjurorspriortothejurybeingempanelled.71Indictum,theMissouriSupremeCourtadmonishedcounselthat

in light of advances in technology allowing greater access to information that can informatrialcourtaboutthepastlitigationhistoryofveniremembers,itisappro-priatetoplaceagreaterburdenonthepartiestobringsuchmatterstothecourt’sattentionatanearlierstage.LitigantsshouldnotbeallowedtowaituntilaverdicthasbeenrenderedtoperformaCase.netsearchforjurors’priorlitigationhistorywhen,inmanyinstances,thesearchalsocouldhavebeendoneinthefinalstagesof

67 100So.3d105,112(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012).68 Id. at 114.69 Id.70 Johnsonv.McCullough, 306S.W.3d551,554(Mo.2010)(enbanc).71 Id.at558.


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juryselectionorafterthejurywasselectedbutpriortothejurybeingempanelled.Litigantsshouldendeavortopreventretrialsbycompletinganearlyinvestigation.UntilaSupremeCourtrulecanbepromulgatedtoprovidespecificdirection,topreservetheissueofajuror’snondisclosure,apartymustusereasonableeffortstoexaminethelitigationhistoryonCase.netofthosejurorsselectedbutnotempanelledandpresenttothetrialcourtanyrelevantinformationpriortotrial.72

Morerecently, inKhoury v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., theplaintiff reliedonJohnson v. McCullough andarguedthatadefensemotiontostrikeajurorforpossiblecorporatebiaswasuntimelybecauseitwasmadeafterthejurywasempanelled.73Althoughthejurywasempanelledbeforethemotiontostrikewasmade,thecourtconsidereditsignificantthatthejurordidnotsitonthejuryorparticipateintheverdictbecausehewasreplacedbyoneofthealternatesbeforeopeningstatementsoccurred.74Moreover,thecourtdistinguishedJohnson asfollows:

Inshort,JohnsonreflectsaconcertedeffortbytheMissouriSupremeCourttoad-dress timely and reasonable investigation of the litigation historyofpotentialjurors.ItisnocoincidencethatwhentheSupremeCourtlaterpromulgatedarule—Rule69.025—therulewasexpresslyrelatedtojurornondisclosureonthetopicoflitiga-tion historyonly.NeitherJohnsonnoranysubsequentlypromulgatedSupremeCourtrulesonthetopicofjurornondisclosurerequirethatanyandallresearch—Internetbasedorotherwise—intoajuror’sallegedmaterialnondisclosuremustbeperformedandbroughttotheattentionofthetrialcourtbeforethejuryisempanelledorthecomplainingpartywaivestherighttoseekrelieffromthetrialcourt.WhilethedaymaycomethattechnologicaladvancesmaycompelourSupremeCourttore-thinkthescopeofrequired“reasonableinvestigation”intothebackgroundofjurorsthatmayimpactchallengestotheveracityofresponsesgiveninvoirdirebeforethejuryisempanelled—thatdayhasnotarrivedasofyet.75

Thus,althoughpossiblebiasandjurornondisclosureshouldbebroughttothecourt’sat-tentionassoonaspossible,iftheinformationitrelatestoissomethingotherthanajuror’slitigationhistory,atimelymotionmaybebroughtafterthejuryisempanelled.WhiletheKhourydecisioncreatesanincentiveforcounseltouseInternetresourcestoinvestigatejurorsevenaftertheyjuryhasbeenempanelled,thedecisionmayalsoprovidecounselwithasoundbasisforrequestingsufficienttimetoperformbackgroundchecks,ratherthanbeinghurriedbythecourttocompletethejuryselectionprocess.

72 Id. at558-59.73 Khoury,368S.W.3d189,202(Mo.App.W.D.2012).74 Id.at203.75 Id. at202-03.


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E. Practice Pointers QuestionsremainaboutwhetherattorneysmustdisclosetheirInternetresearchonjurorstoopposingcounsel.TheFederalRulesofCivilandCriminalProcedureprotectmaterialsproducedinpreparationfortrial,includingworkproductofjuryconsultants.

Theresultsof

jurorresearchconductedontheInternetorelsewhereshouldfallundertheprotectionsoftheserules. Whilesocialmediacanbeausefultoolinjuryselection,theineffectiveuseofsocialmediawillonlyaddevenmorestresstothealreadydifficultvoirdireprocess.Forthisrea-son,itisimportanttoknowwhatjurorinformationisactuallyhelpfulversuswhatismerelydistracting.Forinstance,itcanbetemptingtofocusoneverythingjurorsmaywrite,tweetorpostonlineandassigneachstatementexorbitantsignificancewhen,infact,somesuchpostingsarerandomlyorsloppilypostedand,intruth,areoflittleconsequence. Onekeytogatheringworthwhilesocialmediaistodeterminewhichinformationrevealsthedeeplyheldpersonalvaluesofthejuror.Onecommentatorhasstated:“WehavefoundthatthenumberofFacebook‘friends’apersonhasorthetypesofgamestheyplayarenottypicallyasrelevanttohowthepersonwillreactasajurorasthevariouscausesandeventsthey‘like’orthethingstheypostaboutthemselvesonline.”76

Counselshouldalsobewaryofover-usingtechnologyinthepresenceofprospectivejurors.Certainly,conspicuouslyGooglingthepanelrightinfrontofthemduringvoirdireislikelytooffendsomejurors.“Jurorsoftenfeelscrutinizedbythequestionslawyersaskduringvoirdire,andtheycanfeeltheyareunderevenharsherscrutinywhentheyperceivethattheyarebeing‘investigated’ontheinternetorpotentiallyattackedthroughthiseffort.”77 Thus,ifsocialmediasearchesrevealsignificantinformationaboutaprospectivejuror,counseliswell-advisedtotreadlightlybeforerevealingthattheyareawarewhatthejurorhasbeenuptointheir“virtual”life.Obviously,theblowbackcouldbesevereifjurorsperceivethatcounselhasanonline“dossier”thatcouldbeusedtoisolateorembarrassthem. Sometriedandtrueadviceappliesequallyintheageoftechnology.Barrierstocom-municationbetweentheattorneyandthejurymustbeminimized.Onesuchbarrierishav-ingtoomuchtechnology,suchasatabletorlaptop,atthepodiumwhilecounselspeakstojurors.Forthisreason,voirdireshouldbeconductedwithlittleinhandexceptalegalpadfornotesandperhapsaseatingcharttokeeptrackofjuror’snames. Rather than typingout juror nameson a laptop in plain viewof the juror, counselshouldconsidercarvingoutaperiodoftime,perhapsthroughpriorrequestofthecourt,forconductingonlinevettingoutofthepresenceofpotentialjurors.Byremindingthetrialjudgeoftheprecedentwherecounselwasreprimandedforfailingtoconductbackground

76 SamanthaD.Holmes&LoriG.Cohen,Seven Deadly Social Media Sins Lawyers Commit During Jury Selection, DefenseResearchInstitute“SharingSuccess--ASeminarforWomenLawyers”CourseMaterials45,45(October1,2012)(onfilewiththeauthor).77 Id.


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checks,78counselislikelytosecureatleastasmallamountoftimetoGooglejurorswithoutthediscomfortofhavingtodosointhejuror’spresence. Lawyerscanbecomesofocusedonjurors’onlineactivitiesthattheyfailtoseewhatjurorsaredoingrightinfrontoftheminthecourtroom.“Whileitcanbeinterestingtoknowwhopeople“friend”and“unfriend”onFacebook,itcanbeevenmoreinformativetoknowwhomthey“friend”and“unfriend”inthecourtroom.”79 Similarly,somelawyersthinkup-to-datetechnologyandafamiliaritywithFacebookwillbealltheyneedtopickagoodjury.Infact,socialmediasavvywillnot,byitself,overcomecommonerrorsofjuryselection,themostcommonofwhichisthemisperceptionthatajuryisactuallybeing“picked”atall.Theprocessisnotabout“picking”goodjurors;indeed,itistypicallyaforegoneconclusionthattheprospectivejurorsyoulikemostwillbethefirstonesstrickenbyyouradversary.Thus,therealpurposeofvoirdire,ratherthanselectingajury,isdeselecting thosejurorsyoucanidentifyasunfavorabletoyourcase.

F. Cutting to the Chase: What to Look for on Social Media Whenlookingatsocialmediaassociatedwithapotentialjuror,considerthefollowingshortlistofwhattolookforandconsiderandwhatitmaysignify:

1. Considerapotentialjuror’ssocialmedia“likes,”“tweets,”and“wallposts.”Theseshouldyieldimportantinsightintoajuror’scorevaluesandbeliefs.

2. Examineajuror’sidentificationwithperceivedvictimsortheirmembershipincharity,political,oractivistorganizations.

3. Takeparticularnoteofany“onlinerants”andangryposts.Thesemayrevealanunhappyjuror,possiblywithscorestosettle.

4. Lookforlifeexperiencesorsituationssimilartoanyofthelitigantsinyourcase.

5. Consideranyindicationsofleadershipqualitiessuchasonlinepopularityoraclosely-followed blog.

6. Photospostedsayagreatdealaboutthevaluesofthejuror.Theymaymakeasocialorpoliticalstatementorrevealattitudesandlifestylephilosophies.

78 See, supra, PartII.DdiscussingTricamIndustries,Inc.v.Coba,100So.3d105,112(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2012).79 Holmes&Cohen,supranote76,at47.


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iii.Juror aCCess to anD Misuse oF soCial MeDia DurinG trial

JusticeOliverWendellHolmesobserved:

Thetheoryofoursystemisthattheconclusionstobereachedinacasewillbeinducedonlybyevidenceandargumentinopencourt,andnotbyanyoutsideinflu-ence,whetherofprivatetalkorpublicprint. …Whenacase isfinishedcourtsaresubject to thesamecriticismasotherpeople;buttheproprietyandnecessityofpreventinginterferencewiththecourseofjusticebyprematurestatement,argument,orintimidationhardlycanbedenied.80

InNovember 2008, a trial court hearing a child abduction and sexual assault caseagainstthreedefendantsinLancashire,Englanddismissedajurorwhoposteddetailsofthetrialonasocialnetworkingsite.ThejurorhadcommentedonherFacebookpage,“Idon’tknowwhichwaytogo,soI’mholdingapoll.”Sheinvitedthosevisitingherpagetohelpherdecidewhetherthethreedefendantswereguiltyorinnocent.Thecourtdismissedthejurorandconcludedthetrialwiththeelevenjurorsremaining,whoultimatelyacquittedthedefendants.81

Totriallawyersandjudgeswholearnedtheircraftpriortotheadventofsocialmedia,graspingthefamiliarityandextentofuseofthatmediabythosewhogrewupwithitisdifficult.Arecentarticlenoted:

Tounderstandtheimpactofsocialmedia,wemustfirstconsiderahistoricalperspective.To reach50millionusers, themediumof radio required38years.Televisionrequired13years,whiletheInternetonlyfour.Incomparison,Facebookreached100millionusersinlessthanninemonths.Ifitwereacountry,Facebookwouldbethefourthlargestintheworld.82

Indeed,asofMarch2013,Facebookclaimedonebillionmonthlyactiveusers.83Approxi-mately79%ofdailyusersareoutsideoftheUnitedStatesandCanada.84Toputthisnumber

80 Pattersonv.Colorado,205U.S.454,462-63(1907)(citationsomitted).81 UrmeeKahn,Juror Dismissed From a Trial After Using Facebook to Help Make a Decision,the tele-GraPh (Nov. 24, 2008, 10:01A.M.), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/lawreports/3510926/juror-dismissed-from-a-trial-after-using-facebook-to-help-make-a-decision.html.82 MatthewJ.Smith,Social Media: What You’re Doing Wrong and How to Fix It,ClaiMs ManaGeMent (October2012),http://claims-management.theclm.org/home/article/Social-Media-Insurance-Claims-What-Youre-Doing-Wrong-and-How-to-Fix-It.83 FacebookNewsroom,CompanyInfo/KeyFacts,http://newsroom.fb.com/Key-Facts(lastvisitedJune21,2013).84 Id.


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85 UNNewsCentre,As World Passes Seven Billion Milestone, U.N. Urges Action to Meet Key Challenges (October31,2011),http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40257.86 MeGan Dunn, Jurors use oF soCial MeDia DurinG trials anD Deliberations: a rePort to the JuDiCial ConFerenCe CoMMittee on Court aDMinistration anD Case ManaGeMent1(Fed.JudicialCtr.,ed.,Nov.22,2011),http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dunnjuror.pdf/$file/dunnjuror.pdf.87 Id.88 Id.89 Id. at 2.90 Id.91 Id.92 Id.

inperspective,itrepresentsslightlylessthanone-seventhoftheworld’spopulationofover7billionindividuals.85Thus,apollofthetypeconductedbytheLancashirejuror,dependingupontheuser’sprivacysettings,candisseminatetrialinformationandresultinresponsesfromavastnumberofindividuals,bothwithinandoutsideoftheUnitedStates,soliciting“votes”fromthosebothfamiliarandunfamiliarwithAmericanlawandtheAmericanjurysystem.

A. Federal Judicial Center Study Althoughtheusebyjurorsofsocialmediaduringtrialisdocumented,thescopeofsuchuse is largelyunknown.InNovember2011, theFederalJudicialCenterreleasedareportbaseduponasurveyoffederaljudgesdesigned“toassessthefrequencywithwhichjurorsusesocialmediatocommunicateduringtrialsanddeliberations.”86ThesurveywasconductedinOctober2011throughanelectronicquestionnairesenttoallactiveandseniorfederaldistrictjudges.“Ofthe952judgeswhoreceivedthequestionnaire,508responded.”87 Theoverallresponseratewas53%withjudgesfromall94federaldistrictsrepresented.88 Thesurveyinquiredofthefederaljudges’knowledgeofjurors’useofsocialmediaduringtrialordeliberationandwasnotintendedtobeanempiricalmeasureofhowoftensuchbehavioractuallyoccurred.89 Of the 508 judgeswho responded to the survey, only 30 judges, or 6%, reportedknowledgeofinstancesinwhichjurorsusedsocialmediaduringtrialsordeliberations.90 Twenty-threejudgesreportedatleastoneinstancewhenjurorsusedsocialmediaduringtrials.Twelvereportedatleastoneoccasiononwhichjurorsusedsocialmediaduringdelib-erations.Twenty-twojudges,thevastmajority,reportedthatthisoccurredduringacriminaltrial,ratherthanaciviltrial.91ThemediausedincludedFacebook,instantmessaging,Twit-terandInternetchatrooms.92Thereportedinstancesincludedjurorsusingsocialmediatopostinformationaboutjurydeliberations,attemptsto“friend”participantsinthelawsuit,disclosing identifying information about other jurors, conducting case related research,sharinggeneralinformationaboutthetrial,and,inoneinstance,allowinganotherpersonto


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listenlivetothetestimonyasthetrialwasproceeding.93Twojudges“describedsituationsinwhichajurorcontactedapartywithcase-specificinformation”andanotherreportedanalternatejurorcontactinganattorneyduringdeliberationstoprovideinformationonthelikelyoutcomeofthetrial.94Onlytworespondingjudgesactuallyobservedjurorsusingelectronicdevicesinthecourtroom,whileotherslearnedoftheincidentsthroughreportsfromattorneysorcourtpersonnelor,mostoften,anotherjuror.95Whilethemajorityofthesereportedincidentsresultedinthejurorbeingremovedfromthepanelorcautionedbythecourt,fourjudgesdeclaredamistrialduetothisconduct.96

B. Reported Decisions Althoughthereporteddecisionsregardingjurorsusingsocialmediaaresparse,threerecentcasesareinstructive.InUnited States v. Fumo,theThirdCircuitCourtofAppealsconsideredtheappealbyPennsylvaniaStateSenatorVincentFumoofhisconvictionon137countsoffraud,taxevasionandobstructionofjustice.97OnebasisuponwhichFumoassertedtheconvictionshouldbereversedwasthatajurorpostedcommentsonFacebookandTwitterduringthetrialwhichwerenoted,andreported,byalocaltelevisionstation.98 Thejuror,whosawthenewsreportanddeletedtheFacebookcomments,hadmadeatotalofsevenFacebookandTwitterentriesduringjuryselectionandtrialwhichcommentedonthelengthofthetrialand,ultimately,noted,“StaytunedforthebigannouncementonMonday everyone!”99ThecommentonTwitterappearedafterthecompletionofthefirstweekofdeliberations,andisreportedtohavestated“Thisisit…nolookingbacknow!”100

Uponlearningofthejuror’scomments,Fumomovedtodisqualifythejuror.Thejudgeheld an in camerahearinginwhichthejurorstatedthathehadavoidedwatchingnewsreportsduringthetrial,buthadinadvertentlyseenthereportduringwhichhissocialmediacomments were revealed.101Asaresult,althoughconcludingthatthejurorhadviolatedthecourt’sinstructionnottocommunicateconcerningthecaseoutsideofthejuryroom,thetrialjudgenonethelessfoundthatthecommentswere“‘nothingmorethanharmlessramblingshavingnoprejudicialeffect.Theyweresovagueastobevirtuallymeaningless.’”102

93 Id.at3. 94 Id. at 4. 95 Id.at4-5. 96 Id.at5. 97 655F.3d288,294(3rdCir.2011). 98 Id. at298. 99 Id.100 Id.101 Id. 102 Id.at299.


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InconsideringFumo’sappealastothisissue,theThirdCircuitnotedthat

[n]otunlikeajurorwhospeakswithfriendsorfamilymembersaboutatrialbe-foretheverdictisreturned,ajurorwhocommentsaboutacaseontheinternetorsocialmediamayengenderresponsesthatincludeextraneousinformationaboutthecase,orattemptstoexercisepersuasionandinfluence.Ifanything,theriskofsuchprejudicialcommunicationmaybegreaterwhenajurorcommentsonablogorsocialmediawebsitethanwhenshehasadiscussionaboutthecaseinperson,giventhattheuniverseofindividualswhoareabletoseeandrespondtoacommentonFacebookorablogissignificantlylarger.103

However,thecourtconcludedthateveryfailureofajurortoabidebyatrialcourt’sad-monitionnottocommentaboutthetrialonsocialmediasiteswillnotresultinanewtrial,butratherthecourtmustdeterminewhethersubstantialprejudiceexists.104Inthisregard,theThirdCircuitfoundthatFumo’sargumentsthatthecommentsreflectedbiasorpartial-ityonthepartofthejurorwerenotplausible,andhencethetrialcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretion in denying his motion for a new trial.105TheThirdCircuitagreedwiththetrialcourt’sconclusionsthatthejuror’scommentsweremerely“harmlessramblings”withnoprejudicialeffect,and“sovagueastobevirtuallymeaningless.”106Eventhoughthedistrictcourtfoundthatotherjurorsmayhavelearnedofthesecomments,theThirdCircuitheldthatFumofailedtodemonstratesubstantialprejudiceandtherefore,hismotionforanewtrialwasproperlydenied.107ThecourtultimatelyaffirmedFumo’sconviction,althoughitconcludedforotherreasonsthathissentenceshouldbevacatedandthecaseremandedforresentencing.108

Inaseparateopinionconcurringwiththeaffirmanceoftheconviction,butdissentingastotheremandofthecaseforresentencing,oneoftheThirdCircuitjudgesexpressedconcernregardingthemisconductofthejurorinpostingthesecomments,andurged:

Technology,ofcourse,willcontinuetoevolveandcourtsmustcreativelyde-velopwaystodealwiththeseissues.Inadditiontotheendorsementthemajorityopiniongivestherecentlyproposedmodeljuryinstructions,Iwouldencouragedistrictcourtstogofurther.Wemustfirsteducatejurorsthattheirextra-curialuse

103 Id. at305.104 Id. 105 Id.106 Id.at306.107 Id. 108 Id.at324.


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ofsocialmediaand,moregenerally,theInternet,damagesthetrialprocessandthattheirpostingsonsocialmediasitescouldresultinamistrial,inflictingadditionalcostsandburdensonthepartiesspecifically,andthejudicialsystemgenerally.IsuggestthatdistrictcourtsspecificallycautionjurorsagainstaccessingtheInternettodoresearchonanyissues,conceptsorevidencepresentedinthetrial,ortopostorseekcommentsonthecaseunderreview. …Finally,theBaralsobearssomeresponsibility.Duringvoirdire,attorneysshould routinely question jurors on their Internet usage and social networkinghabits.Ajuror’sInternetactivitieshavethepotentialtoresultinprejudiceagainstadefendant,andcounselmustexpandthevoirdirequestioningtoincludeinquiriesinto online activity.109

Adifferentrationalewasused,andadifferentresultreached,bytheSupremeCourtofArkansasina2011decisionresultingfromtheappealofamurderconviction,inpartbecausea jurorhadpostedcommentsabout the trial tohisTwitteraccount.110 Erickson Dimas-Martinezwasfoundguiltyinthetrialcourtonchargesofcapitalmurderandag-gravated robbery, resulting in sentencesof death and life imprisonment, respectively.111 Appealingtheconviction,thedefendantallegedthatajurorwas“tweeting”duringthetrialand,evenaftertheconductwasdiscoveredandthejurorwasinstructedbythetrialjudgenottodoso,thejuror’stweetingcontinued.112Thepostingsincludeda“tweet”onthedaythatthesubmissionofevidencewasconcludedduringthesentencingphase,whichstated,“Choicestobemade.Heartstobebroken.Weeachdefinethegreatline.”113Dimas-Martinezarguedthattheconductofthejurorrepresented“aflagrantviolationofthecircuitcourt’sinstructionagainstTwitteringanddemonstratedthat[thejuror]couldnotfollowthecourt’sinstructions.”114

TheArkansasSupremeCourtagreed,butnotbecauseevidencehadbeenpresentedwhichdemonstratedsomeactualprejudicesufferedbytheaccused.Notingthatthejuror’scommentsonTwitteraboutthetrialwerequitepublic,thecourtcommented,“Evenifsuchdiscussionswereone-sided,itisinnowayappropriateforajurortostatemusings,thoughts,orotherinformationaboutacaseinsuchapublicfashion.”115Thecourtthenconcludedthat

109 Id.at332-33.110 Dimas-Martinezv.State,385S.W.3d238(Ark.2011).111 Id. at 240.112 Id. at 242.113 Id. at 246. 114 Id.115 Id. at 248.


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theprejudicewarrantingreversaldemonstratedbythejuror’sconductwasnotinthenatureofthecommentsmade,butinthedemonstratedrefusalofthejurortofollowthetrialcourt’sinstructions.

First,theproceduralpostureofthiscaseisnotthatappellantwasprejudicedbythefactthatthejurortweeted;rather,Appellantaverstheprejudiceresultsfromthefactthatthejuroradmittedtothemisconduct,whichprovesthathefailedtofollowthecourt’sinstructions,anditisthefailuretofollowthelawthatprejudicedAppellant.116

Inthisrespect,theArkansasSupremeCourtfoundthatthetrialcourt’sfailuretoacknowl-edgethejuror’sinabilitytofollowhisinstructionsconstitutedanabuseofdiscretionwhich,alongwithevidenceofajurorsleepingduringthetrial,warrantedareversalandremandof the case for a new trial.117

Indoingso,thecourtnotedthatsuchjurormisconductwasanissuewhichrequiredfurtherproactiveconsideration.

Finally,wetakethisopportunitytorecognizethewidearrayofpossiblejurormisconductthatmightresultwhenjurorshaveunrestrictedaccesstotheirmobilephonesduringatrial.Mostmobilephonesnowallowinstantaccesstoamyriadofinformation.NotonlycanjurorsaccessFacebook,Twitter,orothersocialmediasites,buttheycanalsoaccessnewssitesthatmighthaveinformationaboutacase.Thereisalsothepossibilitythatajurorcouldconductresearchaboutmanyaspectsofacase.Thus,werefertotheSupremeCourtCommitteeonCriminalPracticeandtheSupremeCourtCommitteeonCivilPracticeforconsiderationofthequestionofwhetherjurors’accesstomobilephonesshouldbelimitedduringatrial.118

Athirddecisionin2011,thisonefromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourtfortheEasternDistrictofPennsylvania,concernedatrialcourtfindingajurorincontemptofcourtforviolatingtheadmonitionagainstcommentingonthetrialthroughsocialmediawhileitwasongoing.Thecourtfinedthejuror$1000.119Thejuror,dismissedfromthejuryatherownrequestpriortotheconclusionofthetrialduetoissueswithheremployment,sentanemailtotwootherjurorsonthenightofherdismissalstating:

116 Id. 117 Id.118 Id.at249.119UnitedStatesv.JurorNumberOne,866F.Supp.2d442(E.D.Pa.2011).


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Dear[JurorNumberEight]and[JurorNumberNine]:Itwasgreatmeetingyouandworkingwithyouthesepastfewdays.IfIwassofortunateastohavefinishedthejuryassignment,Iwouldhavefound[Defendant]guiltyonall4countsbasedonthefactsasIheardthem.Therewasalotofspeculationandinnuendo,butthatisthecaseasIsawit.Howwonderfulitwouldhavebeentoseehowotherssawit.Pleasefillmeinasyoucan….IfeellikeIwasrobbed.Afterfourdays,Ishouldhavebeenabletocontributeinsomeway….Iwanttowishyouandtherestofthejurorsveryclearthinkingandthewilltodotherightthing.Respectfully,[JurorNumberOne].120

JurorNumberEightrespondedwiththefollowingmessage:“Thankyouforsharingyourthoughts.Iamofthesamemindandhavegreatdoubtthatthedefensecanproduceanythingnewtodaythatwillchangemythinking.Itdisturbsmegreatlytoknowthatpeoplelie....AnywayIwillshareyourmessagewiththegang.”121JurorNumberEightwasremovedfromthejuryattherequestofthedefendantandwithoutobjectionfromthegovernment,andreplacedbyanalternate.However,aftervoirdireofJurorNumberNine,duringwhichshestatedshehadnotseentheemailfromJurorNumberOne,shewasallowedbyagreementofthepartiestoremainonthejury.122

ThetrialjudgereferredthemattertotheUnitedStatesAttorneyforprosecutionofJurorNumberOneforcontemptofcourt.123Thedistrictcourtconcludedthattheprosecutionofthejurorforfailuretoobeytwoseparatecourtordersnottodiscussthecasewithanyoneuntilitwasconcluded,includingspecificallythroughtheInternetorelectronicmessaging,consti-tutedacriminalproceeding124forwhichthepunishmentwaseitherafineorimprisonmentnot to exceed six months.125Concludingthattheevidenceestablishedbeyondareasonabledoubtthatthejurorwasguiltyofcriminalcontemptofcourtandthatherconductwarrantedtheimpositionofafineof$1,000,thecourtnoted:

Jurorsarenotsupposedtodiscusswithanyonethecasestheyhearbeforedelibera-tionoroutsidethejurydeliberationroomsoastoavoidimproperinfluencesandtoensurethatajury’sverdictwillbejustandfair.

120 Id. at 444.121 Id. at445.122 Id.123 Id.124 Id. at 446.125 Id.at449.


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…HoldingjurorsincontemptduetoInternetmisconductvindicatesthecourt’sauthoritybypunishingpastactsofdisobedienceandconveys“apublicmessagethatthejudicialsystemcannottoleratesuchbehavior.”126

C. The Appearance of Impropriety Rule1.2oftheAmericanBarAssociation’sModel Code of Judicial Conductcodifiesthesignificanceofavoidingeventheappearanceofimproprietyinrequiringthatjudges“shallavoidimproprietyandtheappearanceofimpropriety.”127AstheauthoraGeorgetown Journal of Legal EthicsNoteobserved:

Inordertoprotectpublicconfidenceinthejudicialsystem,instancesofjurormisconductviasocialnetworkingsitesandtheuseofsanctionstoaddresssuchbehaviormustbeevaluatedundertheappearanceofimproprietystandard.Cur-rently,jurormisconductisviewedthroughthelensofprejudice.Ifthemisconductisnotprejudicialagainstthedefendant,ajudgewillgenerallynotpunishit.Thisstandardisdesignedtoprotectthedefendant’sSixthAmendmentrighttoafairtrial.However,theprejudicestandarddoesnotaccountforpotentialdamagetothejudi-cialsystem’spublicimage,somethingtheModel Code for Judicial Conduct Rule1.2isdesignedtoprotect.NewsstoriesinvolvingjurorsTweetingaboutevidenceorpostingFacebookmessagesdescribingdeliberationsreflectnegativelyonthejudiciaryasawhole,regardlessoftheprejudicialeffectofthatbehavior.128

Whenjurorstweetduringatrialdespitebeingadmonishednottocommunicateaboutthetrialtoanyoneoutsideofjurydeliberations,theydemonstrateaninabilityorrefusaltofollowthetrialjudge’sinstructions.Inthefaceofthistypeofconduct,courtscannotassumethatjurorswhodisobeythecourt’sadmonitionwillnonethelessfollowitsinstructionswithregard to the law governing the case.129Thus,evenintheabsenceofashowingofactualprejudiceaffectingtheoutcomeofthetrial,whenjurorsviolatethecourt’sinstructionnottocommunicatetheirobservationsorthoughtsoutsideofthejurydeliberationroom,theirdisobedienceshouldbedeemed,inordertoavoidtheappearanceofimproprietyintheju-dicialproceeding,toconstituteprejudicewarrantingamistrialoranewtrial.Sinceactual

126 Id. at451-52(quotingUnitedStatesv.Fumo,655F.3d288,332(3rdCir.2011)(Nygaard,J.,concurringinpart,dissentinginpart)).127 aba MoDel CoDe oF JuDiCial ConDuCt(2011),available at http://www.americanbar.org/groups/profes-sional_responsibility/publications/model_code_of_judicial_conduct.html. 128DavidP.Goldstein,The Appearance of Impropriety and Jurors on Social Networking Sites: Rebooting the Way Courts Deal with Juror Misconduct,24Geo. J. leGal ethiCs589,603-04(citationsomitted).129 See Dimas-Martinezv.State,385S.W.3d238(Ark.2011).


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prejudicecannotbeestablishedabsentanimpermissibleinvasionofthesanctityofthejurors’deliberations,onlyastrictstandardassumingsuchprejudicefromajuror’sviolationofthecourt’sprohibitionagainstcommunicatingabouttheproceedingsoutsideofthedeliberationroomcanensurefairnessofthejudicialprocessforthelitigants.

D. Suggested Actions TheFederalJudicialCenterstudyfoundthat60%offederaljudgesrespondingtoitssurveyhadusedamodeljuryinstructionpromulgatedinJanuary2010bytheCommitteeonCourtAdministrationandCaseManagement,whichcautionsjurorsagainsttheuseofsocialmediatocommunicateduringtrialabouttheproceeding.130TheversionpromulgatedinJune2012,forusebeforetrial,includesthefollowingadmonition:

Iknowthatmanyofyouusecellphones,Blackberries,theinternetandothertoolsoftechnology.Youalsomustnottalktoanyoneatanytimeaboutthiscaseorusethesetoolstocommunicateelectronicallywithanyoneaboutthecase.Thisincludesyourfamilyandfriends.Youmaynotcommunicatewithanyoneaboutthecaseonyourcellphone,throughe-mail,Blackberry,iPhone,textmessaging,oronTwitter,throughanyblogorwebsite,includingFacebook,Google+,MySpace,LinkedIn,orYouTube.Youmaynotuseanysimilartechnologyofsocialmedia,evenifIhavenotspecificallymentionedithere.Iexpectyouwillinformmeassoonasyoubecomeawareofanotherjuror’sviolationoftheseinstructions.131

Theproposedmodelinstructionforuseatthecloseoftheevidenceandbeforedeliberationsincludesasimilaradmonition,andstates:

Inotherwords,youcannottalktoanyoneonthephone,correspondwithanyone,orelectronicallycommunicatewithanyoneaboutthiscase.Youcanonlydiscussthecaseinthejuryroomwithyourfellowjurorsduringdeliberations.Iexpectyouwillinformmeassoonasyoubecomeawareofanotherjuror’sviolationoftheseinstructions. Youmaynotusetheseelectronicmeanstoinvestigateorcommunicateaboutthecasebecauseitisimportantthatyoudecidethiscasebasedsolelyontheevi-dencepresentedinthiscourtroom.Informationontheinternetoravailablethrough

130 MeGan Dunn, Jurors use oF soCial MeDia DurinG trials anD Deliberations: a rePort to the JuDiCial ConFerenCe CoMMittee on Court aDMinistration anD Case ManaGeMent6(Fed.JudicialCtr.,ed.,Nov.22,2011),http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dunnjuror.pdf/$file/dunnjuror.pdf.Sixpercentofthejudgesrespondingwerenotawarethatthemodeljuryinstructionsexisted.Id.131 JuDiCial ConFerenCe CoMM. on Court aDMin. & Case MGMt., ProPoseD MoDel Jury instruCtions: the use oF eleCtroniC teChnoloGy to ConDuCt researCh on or CoMMuniCate about a Case(2012),http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/News/2012/jury-instructions.pdf.


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socialmediamightbewrong,incomplete,orinaccurate.Youareonlypermittedtodiscussthecasewithyourfellowjurorsduringdeliberationsbecausetheyhaveseenandheardthesameevidenceyouhave.132

Ifacourtgavetheseinstructionsatbeginningofeachdayoftrialanddeliberations,respec-tively,withreminderswhenthecourtrecessesforbreaks,asittingjuror’sviolationoftheadmonitionshouldbesufficienttodemonstrateafailureorrefusalofthejurortoabidebythecourt’sinstructionsandwarrantapresumptionthatthejurorwillfailorrefusetoabidebythecourt’sinstructionsastothelawgoverningthedecisioninthecase.Thus,trialcourtshouldbeurged,beforethestartoftrial,togivetheseadmonitionstothejurors. Inordertoemphasizetojurorsthattheymustcomplywiththeinstructionthattheynotcommunicateregardingthecaseoutsideofthejurydeliberationroom,includingthroughtheuseofsocialmedia,thetrialcourtshouldrequirejurorstosurrendertheircellphones,BlackberriesandothercommunicationandInternetaccessibledevicesatthebeginningofeachtrialday,tobereturnedattheconclusionofthatday.Bysurrenderingtheircellphonesandotherdevices,jurorswouldrealizejusthowimportantitisforthemtocomplywiththeinstructionprohibitingoutsidecommunications.Uponreturningtheelectronicdevicestothejurorsattheendofthetrialday,and,perhaps,beforethelunchrecess,thecourtcouldagainremindthejurorsoftheadmonitionnottodiscussorinvestigatethecaseoranyissuesinitthroughanyelectronicmeans,orotherwise.Thisphysicalactofrequiringthejurorstosurrendertheirelectronicdeviceswhilecourtisinsession,coupledwiththerepeatedadmonitionofthejurorsuponreturningtheirdevicestothematthecloseofeachcourtses-sion,wouldlikelycreateastrongimpressioninthemindsofthejurorsofthesignificanceoftheircompliancewiththecourt’sadmonition. Finally,althoughsomehavecautionedthatpunishingjurorsfortheirmisuseofsocialmediaanddisregardforthecourt’sinstructionsmightdiscourageparticipationinjuryser-vice,133theimpositionofpunishmentanditspublicationinthemediashouldimpressinthemindsofthepublicthesignificanceofmaintainingtheintegrityofthejudicialprocess.Ifresistancetoserviceonjuriesresulted,thecourtcouldcontinuetouseitstraditionalauthor-itytorequirecompliancewiththatcivicobligation.Certainly,theintegrityofthejudicialprocess,andthepublic’sconfidenceinit,isasufficientreasontorequirecompliancewithrulesandadmonitionsagainst socialmediacommentsupon trialproceedingsby sittingjurors,despitewhateverobjectionmayresultfromenforcedcompliancewiththoserulesandprocesseswhichensurethatintegrity.

132 Id.133Goldstein,supra note128,at601.


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iv.ConClusion

Clients,thecourts,andtheprofessionarewell-servedbyattorneyswhorecognizeandutilizesocialmediaasatoolwhichcanenhanceandexpandthescopeofservicesdelivered,collaboration,thesharingofinformation,andmarketingefforts.Theethicalrulesgovern-ingattorneyconductarenonethelessapplicabletothevirtualworld,andonecanarguethattheuseofsocialmediademandsaheightenedawarenessofthosestandards.However,asdemonstratedinthisArticle,socialmedia’sutility,scope,easeofuse,andanonymity—realorperceived—hasalreadyresultedinanumberofinstancesofattorneymisconduct.Attor-neyscanandshould(re)familiarizethemselveswiththeModelRulesandapplicablelocalstandardswhenusingsocialmediaand,whennecessary,seekguidancebeforeundertakinganyquestionableornovelusesofthemedium. Socialmedia’s impactonjurytrialshasbeenparticularlyprofound.Atrialattorneyshouldtakeadvantageof thejuryresearchopportunitiesofferedthroughsocialmedia–before,during,andafterjuryselection.Attorneysmustnonethelessbecarefultocurbtheirenthusiasmas theyminesocialmedia for information regardingprospectiveandsittingjurors.Conductthatcouldbeviewedasdeceptiveorinvasiveofprivacymustbeavoided,andsocialmediashouldbeusedinconjunctionwith“oldschool”techniquesofjuryvetting. Atrialattorneymustalsobevigilantastojurors’potentialmisuseofsocialmedia.Jurorshavedisclosedtheirthoughtsandobservationsofproceedingsandevenjurydeliberationstothosehavingnoinvolvementinthetrial,orevenknowledgeofit.Infact,somejurorsactivelysolicitcommentsandresponsesregardingthesematters.Thedangersassociatedwith such communicationswarrant frequent,meaningful admonitions by the trial courtremindingjurorsnottocommentupon,orreviewcommentsupon,theproceedingsoutsideofthejurydeliberationroom.Theseadmonitionsshouldbereinforcedbythephysicalactofrequiringjurorstosurrendertheirelectroniccommunicationdevicesatthebeginningofeachtrialday,coupledwiththeimpositionandpublicdisclosureofsanctionsforcriminalcontemptwhere violations of those admonitions are discovered.These precautions arenecessary,insofarasispossible,toguardtheintegrityofthetrialprocess. Socialmedia’sroleinlitigation,trialsandotheraspectsofthepracticewillcontinuetoevolve,andislikelytogiverisetoadditionaldilemmas.Attorneyswhokeepabreastoffuturedevelopments,whorecognizethatsocialmediaisaresourceandameanstoanend,andwhoadheretothesameethical“rulesoftheroad”applicabletootherformsofcom-municationwillbewellpositionedtomeetthechallengesastheyarise.

The Federation of Insurance Counsel was organized in 1936 for the purpose of bringing together insurance attorneys and company representatives in order to assist in establishing a standard efficiency and competency in rendering legal service to insurance companies, and to disseminate information on insurance legal topics to its membership. In 1985, the name was changed to Fed-eration of Insurance and Corporate Counsel, thereby reflecting the changing character of the law practice of its members and the increased role of corporate counsel in the defense of claims. In 2001, the name was again changed to Federation of Defense & Corporate Coun-sel to further reflect changes in the character of the law practice of its members.

The FEDERATION OF DEFENSE & CORPORATE COUNSEL QUARTERLY, published quarterly through the office of publication by the Federation of Defense & Corporate Counsel, Inc., 11812 North 56th Street, Tampa, FL 33617.

Manuscripts and correspondence relating to the submission of articles for possible publication should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief, Patricia C. Bradford, Marquette University Law School, Eckstein Hall, P.O. Box 1881, Milwaukee, WI 53201-1881 or emailed to [email protected]. All other cor-respondence should be directed to the Executive Director.

The FDCC is pleased to provide electronic access to Quarterly articles from 1997 to present at its Internet website, www.thefederation.org.

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