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MONOGRAPH

Boko Haram, the Government and Peace Negotiation By

Professor James B. Kantiok, Ph.D., MDY

*Professor Kantiok is Professor of Peace and Security Studies, a former Fulbright Senior Scholar and Currently Director, Center for Peace, Conflict and Security Studies

Ahmadu Bello University

Zaria.

Centre for Democracy and Development Monograph: CDDM/01/2014 July 2014

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PART 1: THE PHILOSOPHY OF PEACE NEGOTIATION

INTRODUCTION

The recent increase in Boko Haram activities as manifested in bombing of schools, police and military facilities, twin bombing in Nyanya, a suburb of the federal capital, Abuja, kidnapping of nearly 300 girls from a boarding school, senseless murder of lives totaling almost 1000 in less than one month, and the continuing intransigence of the Boko Haram puts a black spot on the nationhood of Nigeria. The negative image Nigeria is attracting internationally, the scathing remarks by Senator John McCain of the US Senate in early May 2014 that the Nigerian government is almost nonexistent, accusing President Barack Obama of no action to help Nigeria, go a long way to say that the government must act now to stop the country from disintegration. Boko Haram can no longer be treated with kids’ gloves. The lackadaisical approach and complacency by the Nigerian government and especially governors of the most affected areas of operation of the group can no longer be accepted as normal and the Nigerian people need now, more than ever before, to hold their government accountable. The colossal loss of human lives, destruction of property suffered by especially people in the northern part of the country, and the crumbling effect that the Boko Haram insurgency has on Nigeria’s economy is peaking and all hands must be on deck to arrest the situation. The government has ruled out any form of negotiations with Boko Haram; this is in line with the rhetoric often recited in most world capitals, but we know as will later be demonstrated that there is a difference between rhetoric and reality.

This monograph is an attempt to explore the way out of this menace in the best possible way. There have been opinions and counter opinions on why government should or should not negotiate with Boko Haram. My goal in this monograph is to relay the facts so that Nigerians and others in the international community can come to terms with a real problem, and, thus pursue the best way to resolving the problem. My goal is to create awareness on the way forward with the menace of the Boko Haram insurgency among Nigerians, the Government and the international community. It is also to help us understand the gravity of this problem and propose reasons why the Nigerian governments must avoid the purely hardliner/military approach, which had earlier been dominant, but rather seek an alternative engagement.

The first part examined the philosophy of peace negotiation and how it relates to the handling of the Boko Haram insurgency. The second part examined arguments for and against Government dialoguing or negotiating with terrorist organizations, especially Boko Haram. The third part proposed ways on how to engage terrorist organizations and part four discussed the way forward for Nigeria in the handling of the Boko Haram insurgency. The concluding part makes recommendations to the Government on how to address not only the problem of Boko Haram, but also the entire economy, which would provide the panacea to overcome terrorism in the country at large.

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DEVELOPING A PHILOSOPHY FOR EXPEDIENT/A GENERIC PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

The Preamble to the UNESCO Constitution states that, "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defenses of peace must be constructed" (UNESCO). Peace is the most expensive commodity in the global market today. It has been described as the Summum Bonum or supreme ideal for human progress and enjoyment of life on this part of the divide. To understand the exact meaning and real nature of peace, as well as the means to realizing it, we must first of all rectify the prevailing tendency, which thinks of peace in terms of what peace practitioners call negative peace, which is the absence of conflict or war. This line of thinking only encourages a pacifist understanding of the term, but denounces conflict or war owing to the shallow understanding of what actually causes those wars. Global overviews now confirm the presence of ethnic, religious, sectarian, economic as well as cultural strife that lead to civil and international wars. Therefore, our definition of peace should include the elimination of wars and strives.

While it is true that peace will be achieved by removing all kinds of violence, such as war, environmental destruction, violation of human rights, cruelty against women and children, exploitation and oppression of the weak, poor and illiterate and the powerless, it will amount to grandstanding to believe that peace is merely a state of non-violence or absence of wars. We must understand peace in all its dimensions. First, we must understand it theoretically at the personal or mental level, that is, the inner state of calm or tranquility. Second, we must also understand it as social in terms of the state of social justice and development. Third, peace should be understood at the national level in terms of nation-state stability, progress and freedom from civil disorder. Fourth, at the international level, peace or peaceful relation is needed among all nations for global security and prosperity. Global peace, that is, peaceful co-existence is therefore necessary for the continued existence of the human race. Therefore, peace is a global phenomenon and no nation can survive without others. Relationships must be global, because it is the foundation of the survival of humankind. MENTAL PEACE/INTRINSIC VIOLENCE

The achievement of mental peace is revealed in a state of unshakable quiet and composure, which is achieved through the inculcation of such virtues as friendliness, compassion, mercy, moderation, modesty, forgiveness, non-violence, love, and etcetera. These virtues therefore imply that peace carries with it a surpassing of personality and includes the abandonment of egotism. (Whitehead, 1967, p.237) This means that even at the personal level, peace anticipates peaceful interpersonal relations. Such personal peace appears to be lacking today, especially in those countries, where the grip of industrial consumerist culture has taken over interpersonal relationships. It is becoming more and more difficult to have mental peace in our restless fast life, continuously affected by rapid changes in socio-political and economic situations. In regards to social peace, we see that no society can remain peaceful due to current injustices, terrorism, unemployment, communal and ethnic riots, party-politics and other internal disputes. This is beside the

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fact that no nation can achieve its own unadulterated peaceful state in this world of international network, complicated by a culture of greed, ideological and other differences, along with ecological crisis. Baring all these, and after contemplating on such disturbing scenario, no intelligent person can deny the inseparability of different dimensions of peace, which makes today’s quest for the ultimate ideal of global peace.

Humankind all over the world is suffering from multidimensional crises such as terrorism, population explosion, denial of human rights, economic inequality, ethnic and racial discrimination, vanity of cultural superiority, ideological extremism, religious intolerance, nationalism, social injustice, poverty, starvation, exploitation of nature, oppression of the weak by the powerful and rich, ecological imbalance, natural calamities, consumerism, and etcetera. Pathak tries to help us understand this phenomena when he aptly comments on the paradoxical world situation, elucidating that "there is poverty amidst plenty, over production Vs. undernourishment, affluence and wistful life in contrast to bare survival, overdevelopment Vs. underdevelopment, economic growth vs. ecological crisis, consumerism for a few as against denial of basic need for many, explosion of knowledge Vs. illiteracy, globalization vs. intense nationalism.” (nd, P.7)

There is no doubt that present day phenomena of human intrinsic violence is essentially global, because as noted by British writer, Arthor Koestler “from the dawn of consciousness until 6th August 1945 man had to live with prospects of his death as an individual, (but) since the day when the first atomic bomb outshone the sun over Hiroshima mankind as a whole has had to live with prospects of its extinction as a species" (1978, p.3, as cited in Mariner and Pehler, 2009). This point is also anchored by Gorbachev when he writes in Perestroika, “having entered the nuclear age, when the energy of atom is used for military purposes, mankind has lost its immortality.” (1996, pp.225-266) The survival of humankind and other related issues of peace is compelling enough to help us lay down the fundamental principles of an emerging comprehensive global ethics that expects us to realize our freedom to choose between life and death, our active participation in decision-taking and policy-making and our commitment to human values and world peace. THE ROLE OF EDUCATION IN PEACEBUILDING

It is quite shocking and rather unfortunate that no serious and sustained consideration is given to human search for peace in academic circles and indeed, some of our faculties of social sciences dissipate so much energy on teaching abstract theories, while our faculties of sciences may even devote more energy to the study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs); our world having become a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. Historians and anthropologists all over the world have been more occupied with the stories of war, while peace endeavors have been very scanty and insignificant from the study of human culture. According to Chhaya Rai in Arabic culture, "Salaam" expresses a wish for peace in interpersonal relationship; Greek tradition believes in "Irene" the goddess of peace, which leads to material wellbeing. "Ax” or Roman word for peace is still used for treaties between two or more nations. In India "Shanty” has been a multifaceted concept, and it has a considerable impact on Indian life-style from the very beginning of her recorded history. (nd, para.10). It is to be noted also that Hebrew use the word “Shalom” for peace while modern day Christianity, which is based on the Hebrew culture uses the word peace as a form of greeting of goodwill. Rai

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further notes that cosmo-political ethics, therefore, demands that the history of human culture must be understood from the point of view of peace-making and peace- keeping efforts.

A tragic feature of education today is the emphasis on highly specific knowledge and skills during vocational and professional education with less emphasis on professional ethic. This leaves professionals ill trained and ill-prepared for taking decisions conducive to peace. Conversely, those trained to explore issues from the moral standpoint often lack the scientific or specific knowledge to question technological or other types of decisions, especially policy decisions. This especially poses problems for the scientific community that is consumed with the science of discovery rather than the ethics of discovery. Reminding scientists and technocrats of their obligation to choose peaceful means, Albert Camus wrote on 6th August 1945, the day Hiroshima was bombed that: "Technological civilization has just reached its final degree of savagery, we will have to choose, in a relatively near future, between collective suicide and the intelligent use of scientific conquests" (1988, p.77).

Unfortunately, most scientists and technocrats continue to ignore this clarion call. Camus warned further that due to their divorce from global responsibilities and their exclusive concentration on research and discoveries, the invention of biological, chemical, nuclear and sophisticated Laser Weapons are now evidence of the reluctance of scientists and technocrats to perform their duty towards humanity. In spite of many UN special sessions on global disarmament, there appears to be no end in sight to the global arms race. It is clear that science and technology are being frequently used as instruments of exploitation, domination and distraction rather than as a means to the service of humankind. The proliferation of small arms that are now easy tools in the hands of terrorist speaks to the lack of care about the ethics of weapons production by the scientific community.

Weapons production by developed nations has become a clash of the titan in which each nation tries to outdo the other. In fact it has become sort of bragging rights without serious thought about the impact of these weapons. The fear has always been that of these arms not getting to the wrong hands. But where economic fortunes trump peaceful coexistence and destruction of human lives, it can only be said that developed nations produce these weapons, not necessarily for territorial protection but as an economic commodity to be sold in the world market. This is how and why wars are encouraged in order to test the potency of these new weapons. Thus, developing nations that are threatened by internal strife and unrest are left with the only option to buy them. The world is now saturated with these weapons thereby making it more and more unsafe. That these weapons now fall in the wrong hands and that the world has become an unsafe place simply speaks to the need to address the ethics of weapons production. In the aftermath of 9/11 and following the undoubting part of fighting Al Qaeda and the Taliban, the US rushed to produce a bomb it called the Mother of All Bombs (MOAB). This was meant to be a scare tactic, but it never was used.

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PEACE NEGOTIATION IS A DUTY FOR ALL

Issues relating to peaceful co-existence are not solely the property of politicians, moralists, religionists, national leaders and social scientists, but of everyone. Every citizen must be aware of his/her responsibility by adopting an essentially new and intrinsic way of thinking for peace. The duty of philosophers and ethical thinkers is to make men and women free from their deep-rooted superstitions, dogmas and also from illogical, irrational and outdated way of thinking. We need to evaluate and reevaluate the relevance of traditional politico-national goals such as patriotism, nationalism, as well as the spiritual ideals of personal salvation and self-realization. This has become necessary because of the recent global situations that require a review and reassessment of traditional ideas and values from the global perspective to the decision-maker, the voters, the executives, parents, national leaders, national bodies and international organizations. The greatest responsibility of thinkers and philosophers alike is to see that humanity is upheld as supreme. Hence, it is necessary to awake the human conscience at personal, national and even at international level. This is needed because "the seeds of peace do not lie in lofty ideas, but in human understanding and empathy of ordinary people" (Rai, nd).

That the futility of philosophies and ideologies, which declare "conflict" or "strife" as a necessary condition for progress, has been proved is no longer debatable. What is needed therefore is to replace such philosophies, which accept peace as a factor contributory to progress. The interpretation of progress in terms of conflict and competition, advanced by Malts, Darwin, Marx and industrial civilization, must be replaced by interpretations that promote cooperation or peaceful relation, because peace within and without is not only a preferable condition for progress, but an essential one. The road to a peaceful future can only be traversed through cooperation based on the recognition of equality among nations and peoples respect for the sovereignty of humanity.

First, we must understand that peace cannot be brought about by fine phrases, jingles and nice lectures; it involves hard work and sacrifice. This is what has often been overlooked due to the following obstacles. The first barrier to peace is negligence. Many, especially African leaders find no time to think over disturbing global problems. This is particularly true in Nigeria, where leaders, for the most times, think and promote what is now called the Nigerian Factor. The Nigerian Factor posits that things need to be done the Nigerian way irrespective of what is done elsewhere and/or without global implications for such actions. Coming back to Nigeria from the US some three years ago, I have had to deal with this negative thinking even from highly “educated” people, especially in the academia that whatever works elsewhere won’t work in Nigeria. People have confronted me with this slang, “your American ideas can’t work here, this is Nigeria where we do things our own way and they work for us.” It is this kind of backward thinking that has impacted our global understanding of events, thus sometimes presenting Nigeria as a pariah nation, with indolent leaders and people that are still groping in darkness. One is not surprised at the high degree of display of ignorance even among the so-called elite. It has also impacted policy formulation and implementation. The Arab Spring that is supposed to teach Nigeria some lessons in poor governance and the need to respect the rights of citizens seems not to be having any meaningful impact on the Nigerian society generally, and the leadership in particular. This explains the reason/s why, one hardly hears of lectures, colloquia, and symposia addressing the implications

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for poor governance in Nigeria coming from our ivory towers. Many armchair academicians, especially in the Social Sciences busy themselves with unworkable theories of scientific socialism that no longer bear relevance to the present day realities of a globalized society. As much as the historical understanding of such theories help to shape some of our current policies, the wholesale application of such theories in today’s society is no longer workable.

Second, a feeling of helplessness; that we cannot change the decisions taken by our national leaders, who often align with international authorities to the detriment of their countries, needs to be addressed. Third and a major obstacle is humankind’s intrinsic fascination with war and violence which drives a wedge between our understanding of the need for peaceful coexistence and a society devoid of violence based on parochial and sedentary needs. This obstacle is not only due to superpowers’ quest to test and sell their new weapons, but also due to the fact that developing and emerging nations are as well just too eager to try to dress themselves with different kinds of weapons in spite of the awareness of their destructive effects. Lastly, the paralyzing social embarrassment of daring to question authority, especially within the African context, has great impact on resisting the decisions that are sometimes deemed to be damaging to major peace moves. It is generally not in the African or Nigerian culture to question authority and this has translated into the inability to question the decisions of leaders whether right or wrong.

For peace to reign in Nigeria, we must educate each other and ourselves in ideals of human conduct. It is unquestionable and ultimately true that humankind itself is the insurmountable barrier in the accomplishment of peace, since alternatives of war and peace, of progress and regress, of construction and destruction are matters of human choice and not historical processes. We are our own worst controversial enemies. If we want peace in Nigeria and in the world generally, we must imbibe creative qualities or virtues such as love, friendliness, self-control, sacrifice, modesty, non-violence, forgiveness, tolerance, compassion, gentleness and self-contentment. This should not be a matter of the head only, but a matter of the heart. Having knowledge of virtues alone is not sufficient; to be virtuous is more important. Virtues must be reflected in our thought, speech and conduct. Seemingly destructive qualities or vices such as anger, greed, arrogance, pride, excessive self-esteem, treachery and willful committal of injury to others should be denounced. To cultivate noble qualities as well as the elimination of demoniac qualities require extensive moral training. This is something that is currently lacking in the Nigerian society. In spite of the proliferation of churches and mosques, the emergence of reverend gentlemen and sheikhs, the moral fabric of the society remains tattered. Corruption is at its highest levels in our national life and it cuts across all facets of the society that includes the church, the mosque, traditional institutions and shrines.

Accordingly, the duty of moralists, philosophers, religious thinkers, social reformers and philanthropists is to devote their life for training in the moral philosophy, religious and traditional institutions that teach morality. Growing up in the countryside, I was taught that the Abvoi (Dodo), the traditional symbol of moral authority in Southern Kaduna is always watching you. The Abvoi was represented by a bunch of leaves from a sacred plant tied at one edge of the farm along the road that guarded all crops until they were ripe for harvest. You could not plug an ear of corn without Abvoi noticing and reporting you with a loud echo. And once caught, the traditional fine was too enormous

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for the poor family. This kept us, as children and adults from stealing any farm produce no matter how tempting. All human activity in southern Kaduna was under 24-hour surveillance by Abvoi and this ensured no immoral behavior was tolerated. Today, the area has been “Christianized” and the moral fabric of society decayed. This is not to say that Christianity and Islam, breed immorality, but simply that both religious leaders and adherents are not doing enough to teach and practice the basic tenets of the newfound faiths.

Our immediate need today is to proclaim again and again the significance of morality and the need for a culture of nonviolence since the world is experiencing ethnic violence, apartheid, political violence, religious and sectarian strife as well as socio-economic and sociopolitical conflicts. Nonviolence is an important virtue that must be cultivated and is the most fundamental principle of establishing peace. As love is unambiguously proclaimed as essential to human lifestyle, violence would be curtailed in our society. According to Mahatma Gandhi, the greatest proponent of non-violence in 20th century, it is not merely a personal virtue, it ought to be cultivated at and extended to social, national and international levels. Many still believe in the Gandhian doctrine which is still relevant and can redeem today’s world. Although global society is constantly changing, yet the philosophy of a nonviolent approach to resolving conflicts is still useful, since it springs from inner realization of the equality of all living beings. Psychology teaches us that where divisions occur, human beings become isolated and victims of unhappiness and misery. This is true of nations, which are constituent parts of and the same global system.

Peace advocates ought to congregate to adopt the policy of Dialogue or Bilateral Negotiations. We are living in a very crucial age, where confrontational determination to counter force should be replaced by policies of nonviolent dialogue. Ideological extremism, religious authoritarianism, extreme patriotism, imperialistic tendency can only lead to intolerance and fanaticism; and these rob people of their ability to engage in dialogue. While peace practitioners argue in favor of a preparedness to discuss, examine and change (where possible and if necessary) our own beliefs and those of others based on factual experience and reason, they do not by any means advocate dropping fundamental principles in a belief systems that sustain especially religious practices. Through direct communication, even the ideologically inspired enmity, animosity or mistrust can be dissolved and the aim of global peace may be achieved. While I do not claim that the foregoing description is comprehensive and exhaustive, but we can look at them critically and ensure therefrom, and from other pertinent insights, to build the grounds for peaceful coexistence and negotiation as sin qua non for a new peaceful and progress driven Nigeria. Although some may describe terrorists, albeit, Boko Haram members as coldblooded murders, not negotiating with them may equally increase the loss of human lives and property that cannot be as yet quantified.

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PART 2: SHOULD GOVERNMENT NEGOTIATE WITH BOKO HARAM?

INTRODUCTION

Many of us are now used to the rhetoric by governments all over the world that they will never negotiate with terrorists. Whether such outbursts can be sustained in the present realities that we face with global terrorism is yet to be seen. Former US President George W. Bush declared in 2003, “You’ve got to be strong, not weak. The only way to deal with these people is to bring them to justice. You can’t talk to them. You can’t negotiate with them.” Similarly, UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, at the height of IRA violence, vowed never to negotiate with terrorists. In the same vein, the governments of Colombia, Turkey and other Spanish leaders also pledged not to negotiate with terrorist organizations. Such outburst and bickering by governments are backed by some prominent scholars of terrorism. Paul Wilkinson (2001, p.80), a leading scholar in the field for decades, wrote that it would be ‘totally unacceptable’ for talks to be opened with the assailants who killed 58 tourists in Luxor, Egypt in 1997. Other scholars like (Wilkinson, 2001; Ward-law, 1989; Alexander, 2002; Narveson, 1991; Weinberg & Davis, 1989; and Neumann, 2007) believe that negotiations on the underlying political demands of terrorists are unlikely to resolve the conflict and may simply incite more terrorism. In this case, (Zartman, 1990, p.165) holds the view that “the standard doctrine holds that one should not negotiate with terrorists” and the subject overall remains a taboo.

Why this aversion to talking with terrorists and terrorist organizations by governments all over the world? The answer lies in the fundamental belief by governments that negotiating with terrorists will legitimize terrorists and terrorism in general. Legitimizing terrorist groups and their actions would weaken the democratic quality of states and likely only serve to incite more violence. Terrorist groups often lack organizational structures that would ensure a path to negotiations. This is very apparent with the Boko Haram, which is said to be an offshoot of Al Qaeda and Al-Shabab. The advent of Al-Qaeda and its non-traditional structure seemingly based on a loose network of cells and like-minded groups as well as the complexity of the modus operandi gives more reasons for governments to become averse to the whole notion of negotiations or even dialogue. It has also added another major hurdle to applying conflict resolution methods to terrorism. Therefore, two important questions must be addressed while attempting to engage terrorists, namely: Who does one talk to? Who speaks for the ‘terrorists’? These questions relate to legitimacy and complexity in talking with terrorists.

The aim of this second part of the monograph is to examine and offer alternative perspectives to the questions of legitimacy and complexity in engaging with terrorists and terrorism. The author draws from research in peace and conflict studies, and attempts to analyze how, contrary to conventional wisdom and what is generally argued, that these two nagging questions may well provide the path conducive to peaceful resolution of conflicts involving terrorist violence. There are two examples from history that are used to illustrate the argument. On the question of legitimacy, the author examines talks with the Irish Republican Army and its leader, Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland. The complexity question is examined through the lenses of the relationship between Al-Qaeda and its locally linked groups and in, particular the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) of the Southern Philippines region of Mindanao and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

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TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS HAVE NO TERRITORY

Some argue that terrorism cannot be deterred because they do not have territories on which to attack neither do they have populations or infrastructure that could be killed or destroyed. They are invisible and therefore, this makes it more difficult to track them down. Because Al-Qaeda is invisible, and even though its training camps and headquarters in Afghanistan have apparently been hit by the American war machine, but the network remains unaffected. Al Qaeda is an ideology and followers join it, believe in it and fight for it, but they do not settle within it, unlike a state. Al Qaeda therefore, can be anyone and everywhere. This gives the organization an advantage over a conventional military power. Al Qaeda is never ultimately threatened because its invisibility makes the threat of retaliation and preemption less likely.

Similarly, organizations like Hezbollah, Al Shabab, and Boko Haram have no territories or population to attack. In fact, members of such organizations can easily blend with the general population, thus making it even more difficult to be targeted. Although one may argue, as Israel does, that Hezbollah has a territory, such as the West Bank or South Lebanon from where it launches its attacks and where it can be hit. The US in its global war on terror maintains that nations that harbor terrorist or terrorist organizations are legitimate targets of the global war on terror. It could therefore be argued that attacking the West Bank, Lebanon or even Somalia may not necessarily affect such groups. Attacking Hezbollah camps and deploying rocket launchers in Lebanon would only and unavoidably hit the Lebanese people. Thus, holding innocent men, women and children collectively liable for violent acts for which they are not responsible will surely foster the belief that Hezbollah is fighting a necessary and justified war. It only bolter the resolve of the people in those territories to support the actions of the terrorist organizations as this was clearly demonstrated in Lebanon’s support for the Hezbollah war against Israel in 2006. This means, generally speaking, that attacking countries, which are under suspicion of supporting or harboring terrorists will only strengthen the ideology these organizations stand for. In other words, these attacks give terrorists a pretext for their attacks and make it easier for people to believe in their ideology and justifications. This is why it is justified to parley or negotiate with terrorist organizations rather than adopt the hawkish approach to fighting terrorism. Many in Nigeria are in support of negotiations with Boko Haram not necessarily because they support their activities, but are simply tired of the murders and insecurity.

Secondly, the threat of death and destruction serves no useful purpose for those willing to sacrifice their lives in a suicide bombing. A rhetorical question that is important at this point is “Has the world become more secure because of the US-led Global War on Terrorism?” It is very doubtful because it seems it has only intensified terrorism worldwide. The problem with us is that history does not seem to teach us anything at all. If it did, the Cold War could have taught us that deterrence leads to more insecurity. Deterrence is based on a negative approach that if we threaten terrorist with punishment if they continue their activities, then they will stop. According to (Frey, 2004, p.34), “coercive action is answered by coercive action and such interaction tends to degenerate into a negative zero sum game between the parties involved, making each of them worse off.” There is no winner between countries engaging in the coercive response and the terrorists since both lose.

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The conclusion here is clear enough, that deterrence or use of force is neither the right way nor an adequate answer to the threat of terrorism. It only toughens the terrorist and makes them more isolated and more likely to wreak more havoc. To reduce the threat of terrorism, we must reduce people’s willingness to engage in terrorism. Governments must address the issues terrorists are raising. For example, in the case of Nigeria, corruption, injustice, religious persecution, unemployment and poverty must be addressed. Once this is done, it makes recruitment more difficult for Boko Haram. The state’s line of defense is to identify areas where it knows and fears that new terrorists will be recruited. The less support the likes of Shekau receive, the less likely that there will be more attacks. Once we can scuttle their ability to recruit, then we will be able to focus on those who are already in and with them, we will be able to defeat them. This means that the Nigerian government, while pursuing the Boko Haram insurgents, must also address some of the issues they are raising that are within the reach of government. There is enough money in this country to go round if the astronomical levels of corruption in the country are checked. The widening gap between elected and appointed members of the government, the isolation of the elected representatives of the people, their arrogance and flamboyant lifestyles cannot be tolerated. There is absolutely no justifiable reason why a senator takes home about N35000000.00 ($218,750.00) a year, while the ordinary Nigerian lives on less than $1 or N160 a day. Such gross injustices must be addressed. Addressing these problems would increase the chances of successful negotiations with terrorist organizations, albeit Boko Haram. If we are willing to negotiate with terrorists we open up a window of opportunity for them to attain some of their objectives in a peaceful way.

We can reward them if they are cooperative by accepting them as a negotiating partner. Doing this should not necessarily mean that the state is acknowledging or accepting all their objectives or actions. It simply means the state is merely offering them and olive branch, much the same way it is doing with other rogue and pariah states. Offering terrorists and their supporters a real and credible chance of achieving some of their objectives without violence will challenge the terrorists’ claim that they have no other choice than to use deadly force. Of course, we must understand that there will always be those supporting violence for the sake of violence. However, offering the olive branch will make it more difficult for an organization to find support and to recruit new followers for its violent actions if there is a credible peaceful alternative. Bock (2007) believes that by offering negotiations to terrorists, even when it seems taboo, we start to fight terrorism at its source, in a setting where violence is perceived, for whatever reason, as the only option.

DOES NEGOTIATION GIVE LEGITIMACY TO TERRORISTS AND TERRORISM?

The first question we must address is: Should a government negotiate with a terrorist group? Those who argue against negotiating with terrorists believe in this simple fact: that democracy must never give in to violence, and terrorists must never be rewarded for using it. Negotiating with terrorist groups therefore gives legitimacy to terrorists and their methods and undermines actors who have pursued political change through peaceful means. Talking with terrorists can destabilize the negotiating governments' political systems, undercut international efforts to outlaw terrorism, and set

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a dangerous precedent. So for hardliners and the hawks within a democratic system, we must never talk with them, recognize them or legitimize their activities, as doing so will be a sign of weakness on the part of the government in power.

This tough talk stance by government often contradicts the dirty deals that take place behind the scenes. In practice, democratic governments often negotiate with terrorists. For example, during the intractable conflict between Great Britain and the Irish Republican Army, there were dirty deals and behind the scene negotiations going on, even though the IRA was branded a terrorist group. The British government maintained a secret back channel to the Irish Republican Army even after the IRA had launched a mortar attack on 10 Downing Street that nearly eliminated the entire British cabinet in 1991. Similarly, in 1988, the Spanish government sat down with the separatist group Basque Homeland and Freedom (known by its Basque acronym ETA) only six months after the group had killed 21 shoppers in a supermarket bombing. The often celebrated Israeli tough stand on terrorist has been contradicted by the fact that the government strayed from the supposed banned negotiation with terrorists and in in 1993, secretly negotiated the Oslo Accords even though the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) continued its terrorist campaign and refused to recognize Israel’s right to exist. Very recently, the US government, which maintains the toughest stance on terrorism, went against itself and the government of Afghanistan to open communications channels leading to negotiations with the Taliban. In her desperate move to end the Afghan War, which has been known as the dungeon for all known imperialist governments, the US hurriedly recognized the Taliban’s office in Dubai and a conference that was convened in spite of protests from the Afghan government. ARGUMENTS AGAINST ENGAGING TERRORISTS IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

One of the main arguments put forward by scholars against engaging with terrorists is that such a course of action would legitimize the terrorists, their goals and, most of all, their means. In fact, Wilkinson rejected the idea of even the possibility of talks with the Luxor assailants because he believed it would mean accepting “such criminals as legitimate interlocutors” (Wilkinson, 2001, p.80). Others like Laqueur (1987, p.308) posit that compromising with terrorists will give full recognition to terrorist groups and would likely lead to increased attacks.

The major argument against negotiating with terrorists is simply that democracies must never reward violence by legitimizing terrorist actions. Negotiations give legitimacy to terrorists and their methods and thus undermine actors who pursue political change through peaceful means. According to Neumann (2007, p.128), talking to terrorists has the potential for destabilizing the negotiating government’s political systems, undercutting international efforts to outlaw terrorism, and setting dangerous precedents.

Scholars like (Wardlaw, 1989 and Clutterbuck, 1993) have tried to draw a distinction between ad hoc negotiations to release hostages or end a hijacking from political negotiations that involve concessions. Negotiations that involve the former, such as hostage release or aborting a hijacking incidence could be problematic, but necessarily unavoidable in order to save lives. On the other

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hand, conflated concessions by governments while negotiating with terrorists might be seen as counterproductive and dangerous.

While terrorism scholars and experts continue to raise such red alert, they have not been able to tell us how negotiations lead to legitimation, neither have they nor policymakers elaborated on how dangerous or counterproductive such negotiations would impact the general population. Narveson, 1991); Gilbert, 1994; Crenshaw, 1983, based their objections to negotiations on ethical and moral issues surrounding terrorism. According to Paul Gilbert (1994, p.169), by targeting civilians, terrorist groups forfeit their legitimacy because they have breached the conventions of debate required for negotiations. Similarly, Jan Narveson (1991, p.161) posited that terrorists put themselves in “Hobbes’ state of nature with respect to us.” Therefore, engaging with terrorists would translate their violence into a legitimate means to be heard and thus lead other groups to engage in similar activities. Crenshaw (1983, p.25) argued, “The power of terrorism is through political legitimacy, winning acceptance in the eyes of a significant population and discrediting the government’s legitimacy.” To negotiate with them, therefore, means giving them the power and legitimacy they have always craved for. Arguing to the contrary, Gilbert believes that the state criminalizes terrorism or in some cases turns terrorists into “external adversaries” warranting a military as well as police response.” It is such policies that make it hard for the state to negotiate with terrorist groups. And because terrorists are often branded as bandits, the state therefore finds it difficult to do deals with them, since doing so is inappropriate under the rule of law. Such prejudiced stance already makes it difficult for negotiations to take place because it is supposedly inappropriate to negotiate with terrorists (Gilbert, 1994, p.167).

It should be noted here that the very act of naming a group or action as terrorist already presupposes it is illegitimate and precludes any form of negotiations. By delegitimizing the group, it gives the state the power to go after them and/or their sources of finance. Such designation is not a desirable side effect that accompanies the legal and financial penalties, but rather one of the stated goals of governments in naming terrorist groups. For example, the US Department of State (2005) said its classification of a group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) “stigmatizes and isolates designated terrorist organizations internationally.” The constant use of the term FTO by the US government has prompted the UN Working Group on Terrorism to express concern that “labeling opponents and adversaries as terrorists offers a time-tested technique to de-legitimize and demonize them” (United Nations, 2002, p.6). We should understand that by delegitimizing a group and giving it the terrorist label, it simply curtails attempts to resolve the conflict through nonviolent means (Nadarajah & Sriskandarajah, 2005; Hicks, 1991; Russell, 2005). It is such labeling that has hampered attempts at reaching a permanent solution between the government and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Boko Haram in Nigeria and Al Shabbab in Somalia.. In the same vein, the US designation of terrorist groups under the Reagan and the first and second Bush administrations placed severe limitations on the range of U.S. response to such attacks, thus encouraging the use of military force while imposing strong disincentives on negotiation (Kenneth Hicks, 1991).

Lastly, when the state classifies a group or opposition movement as terrorist as we are now witnessing the events in Egypt where the interim government is calling the Freedom and Justice Party (Muslim Brotherhood) terrorists, it can also polarize such movements, forcing moderate voices to choose between accepting the ‘terrorist’ label and thus engage in illegal

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actions or abandon their activism altogether (Russell, 2005). In fact, terrorists and terrorism have simply become the buzz word to silence opposition to bad governments. Legitimacy is thus seen as a key obstacle in engaging with terrorism through talks. Labeling a group ‘terrorist’ has the sole aim to delegitimize it and allow for public statements aimed at discrediting them. For example, former New York mayor Rudolph Giuliani said, “Those who practice terrorism lose any right to have their cause understood” (Philipson, 2005).

NEGOTIATING WITH TERRORIST GRANTS THEM LEGITIMACY

If legitimation that accompanies negotiations brings an insurgent group to change its behavior would it be congruent with the norm barring political violence? In answer to this question, we may look at three scenarios. First, negotiations may eliminate the very reasons why the insurgents may have engaged in violence in the first place. Lack of a legal outlet to voice their grievances could have been responsible for their violent action. In this case, if the Nigerian government had carefully studied the reasons for the Boko Haram insurgency carrying arms, the problem might have been resolved or at least, checked. Bulunkutu Ward, a very poor and neglected area in the Maiduguri metropolis, is known to have been the site for the worst Maitatsine riots of the early 1980s. Boko Haram started as a vigilante group, protecting one of the prominent politicians in Borno State. It does not necessarily reject Western Education, but the philosophical understanding that Islamic education is superior and that western education is responsible for perpetuating corruption and poverty in the world. It is purported that a prominent politician had promised to change their fortunes if they supported his political bid, but reneged on the promise once he was elected. Members of the sect who had worked hard to ensure political victory felt betrayed and deceived; hence their rejection of western values deemed to be corrupt. In this regard, Boko Haram came about as the result of poor governance, deceit and arrant display of ill-gotten wealth by politicians in the area.

Tom Woodhouse, Oliver Ramsbotham & Andrew Cottey (2003, p.44) argued that a common factor in most cases of terrorism is a sense of injustice, frustration and humiliation, and the idea that there are no nonviolent channels for redress. If meaningful negotiations must take place, then the government must overcome this sense of exclusion, humiliation and impotence through democratic engagement. It must sure that members of the isolated groups are brought mainstream. Some may argue that Boko Haram’s objective is to Islamize the country. In response to this, I make bold to say that this is just a mere dream, something that is often used by those on the fringes to bargain for recognition. The Boko Haram members are aware that Nigeria, whose population is evenly divided between Christians and Muslims, can neither be Christianized nor Islamized. It is simply a wild goose chase used by their sponsors to gain political relevance. According to Michael Ignatieff (2004, p.88), to engage the terrorist organization, the state must acknowledge that the terrorist group represents a valid claim even though its means are unacceptable. This involves the state’s willingness to engage with insurgent goals, and therefore its recognition of these goals as legitimate. Doing this could thus contribute to the resolution of the conflict. While Inaitieff makes a valid point, but this cannot be applied in the case of Boko Haram whose main goal is to Islamize the country as doing so would only lead to more sectarian violence. Government can however attempt to address their second demand, which is, the eradication of

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poverty and reduction of corruption in the country. This is within the government’s power to address.

Zartman & Alfredson (2006), argue that when the state accepts insurgent groups as legitimate interlocutors, it potentially strengthens the factions within the group that are pushing for a political solution. Government’s offer to negotiate could contribute to creating and strengthening moderate factions within the movement. Negotiations may strengthen factions within the insurgent group that are in favor of nonviolent engagement to breakaway and commence negotiations. When this happens, it weakens the overall strength of the group, thus forcing the organization to want to negotiate. This appears to be evident in some members of Boko Haram’s willingness to negotiate with the government. Once the government can engage them as well as ensure safe passage, we could be on our way to finding some resolution to the problem. The opposite could be the case, especially in a situation where the government refusal to accept a group as legitimate could lead to further radicalization (Ricigliano, 2005; Zartman & Alfredson, 2006; and Russell, 2005).

Third, negotiations may draw insurgent groups down a path of change or transformation towards nonviolence. The state’s legitimation of groups involved in terrorist violence could facilitate the bringing of such violence to an end. According to Leary (2004), legitimacy through engagement can lead not only to the strengthening of the accommodating factions, but also the slow transformation of the entire group into one adhering to the norms of nonviolent political debate. Once we lay down the conditions for negotiation, which include compromise, persuasion, positive-sum outcomes and democracy, there could be some form of resolution of the conflict. Legitimacy of all parties, need to appeal widely, and acceptance of popular judgment impose limitations on terrorists that can mark the beginning of the socialization process toward inclusion. In the case of Boko Haram, they must recognize the constitution and the flag of Nigeria as supreme and not subject to negotiation. The unity of Nigeria as a nation cannot be compromised as this was settled at independence. Member of the Boko Haram sect must lay down their arms, embrace dialogue and recognize the Constitution of Nigeria for any negotiations to take place. Nigeria is a democracy, a multicultural and multireligious society and no single ethnic group or religion must claim superiority over others, thus imposing its sectarian and religious ideology on them. The current Constitution of Nigeria is nonnegotiable.

Taking this argument a step further, the state can, in a constitutive act, give the possibility to an armed group of becoming a legitimate group by offering it precisely what it lacks vis-à-vis the state, legitimacy. This was what the Yar’Adu’a government did in the Delta Region by granting amnesty to the insurgents and bringing them mainstream by offering to train them as well as offer employment. This has reduced youth restiveness in the area and is ensuring meaningful development in the area. A state’s recognition of a violent group’s legitimacy claim would not weaken the democratic qualities of the said state, but rather strengthen them by drawing groups away from violent opposition and toward compliance with the state’s norms. This is clearly evidenced in the reduction of the kidnapping rate in the Niger Delta region. Engaging with a group based on the legitimacy of its grievances and goals may create a lot of problems for governments, but the end game supersedes some of these hiccups. It forces the state into making the difficult call of judging which goals and grievances are legitimate and which are not. Beyond this, it leaves two important questions unanswered, namely: what should be done when there is consensus that a

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group’s goals are illegitimate? What are the consequences of such an action? By accepting violent actors as legitimate, governments risk marginalizing the forces that have struggled for the same goals without engaging in violence. Because of the above, legitimacy remains a key problem surrounding engagement, to which not many solutions are insight.

The alternative approach to conflict resolution that is based on legitimacy could be viewed through the lenses of Northern Ireland, which offers a rare example of an overall successful peace process involving a group using terrorist violence in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Sinn Fein leader, Gerry Adams (2001, p.320) states in his autobiography that nationalists took part in armed struggle due to the feeling that the alternative means for achieving progress was closed off. By recognizing the grievances of the republicans through opening a channel of nonviolent engagement as was done in the late 1980s with direct and indirect contacts with mainstream parties, the British, Irish and US governments created the condition by the republican camp for the peace process to move forward.

LEGALIZATION MIGHT BE THE PATH TO RESOLVING ARMED CONFLICTS

We must understand that armed groups’ main argument for engaging in violence is that they have no choice. In spite of this, we must also accept the fact that the recognition or acceptance of the republican grievances as legitimate may have been one of the factors that brought the republican side to move toward contemplating a negotiated solution to the conflict. We can also argue that legitimacy could strengthen the descent within the group as in the case of Northern Ireland. In fact, the recognition by governments of Gerry Adams as the legitimate leader of the republican movement, especially when he was granted a visa to visit the US in 1994, helped to strengthen the hand of the Sinn Fein leader vis-à-vis the hardliners (Coogan, 2000; Mitchell, 1999). According to Dominic Adams, brother of the Sinn Fein leader, who spent seven years in jail for IRA activity, “when you see Bill Clinton meeting Gerry Adams on the Falls Road, when you see Nelson Mandela taking Martin McGuiness and Gerry Adams around Pretoria, when you see Tony Blair and people like that greeting Gerry, Martin and the leadership, it legitimizes the struggle, propagandizes it too and it allowed Sinn Fein to take on that role of the spokespeople for the republican struggle.”

Legitimation is said to have played an important role in allowing the leaders in Northern Ireland to repeatedly take into account the trade-offs between militancy and respectability (Weinberg & Pedahzur, 2003, p.25). It is noteworthy that the IRA/Sinn Fein underwent a strategic shift because the British government offered it legitimacy as an interlocutor and as a potentially influential political party operating in an open democratic context (Leonard Weinberg & Ami Pedahzur, 2003 p.117). The British government understood the risks involved in legitimizing the IRA/Sinn Fein and the wrath of hardliners that it incurred in so acting, but, as stated in former Prime Minister John Major’s autobiography, it was worth a try. Major States, “We were well aware of the unlikelihood of success, but we felt we had a responsibility . . . to see if the leadership of the Provisionals, if offered fair and equal treatment, had the will and ability to move away from terrorism” (Major, 1999, p.433). This move by John Major was based on the belief in the possibility that

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granting the republicans ‘fair and equal treatment,’ accepting them as a legitimate group would give them the occasion to become a legitimate group and renounce violence. And it worked!

Although we may not attribute the peace process in Northern Ireland solely to the start of talks with and the legitimation of Sinn Fein, it cannot be said that it didn’t play an important role. One may say here that such steps may have contributed to the end of IRA terrorist violence in at least three ways. First, by opening an alternative way to change for the republicans; second, by strengthening the factions favoring talks; and third, by offering the republicans the possibility to transform themselves into a legitimate entity. Engaging the IRA/Sinn Fein, the UK, Irish and US governments, as well as mainstream parties, accepted the republicans as legitimate interlocutors and paved the way for them to be accepted as a legitimate political force by the broader national and international publics. Although one cannot say categorically that such legitimization was wholeheartedly accepted by either majority Protestant or non-republican Catholic communities in Northern Ireland or abroad, it however helped in cessation of violence. In fact, many have blamed the slow process of the transition on the republicans’ behavior, and, in particular to their decommissioning and conforming to the norm of nonviolence.

NEGOTIATING WITH GROUPS WITH A RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY

Our second example of engagement is seen in the peace process entered into between the Philippines government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Although, some have linked Muslim insurgency in the southern Philippines with Al Qaeda, it long predates the emergence of Al-Qaeda, with fighting marring the region ever since the Christian Spanish conquest in the 16th century. According to scholars of terrorism, the MILF founder and leader Salamat Hashim, however, had strong international Islamist ties, including with Osama bin Laden himself (ICG, 2004, p.4; Abuza, 2003). Through training as well as financing, the MILF is widely believed to have maintained links with Al-Qaeda and its close Southeast Asian-based ally Jemaah Islamiyah after receiving training for its operatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan (ICG, 2004, 2005; Rogers, 2004; Abuza, 2006, 2003; Swanstrom & Bjornehed, 2004). During the post-World War II era, clashes flared in the early 1970s in reaction to the central government’s sponsored migration of Christians to Muslim regions (Rogers, 2004). The MILF reportedly returned favor by allowing foreign militants to use its numerous camps for training purposes to counter the government’s efforts at integration. Although MILF continues to maintain links with Al Qaeda, this has not subjugated its local goals to the transnational jihadist agenda of Al-Qaeda.

The conflict in the Southern Philippines does not fit into the external conspiracy theory of clash of civilizations as proposed by Huntington, but simply an internal problem. This is reminiscent of the Boko Haram insurgency, which though maintain links with Al Qaeda in Yemen and Al Shabbab of Somalia, tries to maintain its local identity and operational goals of Islamizing the whole of Nigeria. The point is validated by the fact that the MILF continues to maintain off and on peace talks with the government over the creation of an autonomous region. This clearly demonstrates that its local agenda remains more important than any Al-Qaeda-imported transnational one. Although there may be a remote connection between Boko Haram and other transnational terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and Al Shabbab, Boko Haram remains committed to pursuing an Islamist agenda aimed at the complete

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Islamization of Nigeria despite the fact that mainstream Muslims argue that it is impossible to achieve such an agenda. Thus, despite the links between the MILF and Al-Qaeda’s hardcore leadership, peace talks with the government remained possible precisely due to the fact that local grievances remain the prime focus of the group. It might interest the reader to note that despite accusing the MILF of using indiscriminate attacks against civilians and of having links with Al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah, the President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo led administration, chose not to classify it as a terrorist organization. This has culminated into the signing of the peace treaty in March 2014.

Therefore, if we can’t talk to Boko Haram because such talks legitimizes them and terrorism and because like Al-Qaeda we don’t know who to talk to, there may be the need for the dirty deals and behind- the- scene negotiations reminiscent of the British-IRA/Sinn Fein and the US-Taliban peace negotiations to be initiated. While it is true that negotiating with ‘terrorists’ can indeed lead to their legitimation, but through this very legitimation it may offer them an alternative path and the chance to transform into nonviolent actors. The transformation of the Republican Movement in Northern Ireland and MILF in Southern Philippines could be seen as an example of such a process. In the case of Al-Qaeda and Boko Haram and their complex structure can certainly be seen as a hurdle to understanding and engaging with the network. However, such complexity could be the expansion of opportunities, to study their structure to determine multiple points of entry for negotiations. The case of the MILF and its loose transnational links with Al-Qaeda’s hard core provides us with an advantage allowing for negotiations at the local level to continue despite bin Laden’s opposition to talks. This may be true for Boko Haram and other local groups with ties to Al-Qaeda, allowing for the possibility for separate peace negotiations beyond the reach of the network’s global reach.

In spite of all the successes recorded and the problems in the UK and Philippines, it must be stated that neither legitimacy nor complexity appears to rule out negotiations entirely. It may not necessary be said that negotiations are always possible or will necessarily be fruitful, but it is worth the try and should not be ruled out as a priori in conflicts marked by terrorist violence. Negotiations offer the possibility of an alternative route to the policy of violent counter-terrorism currently advocated and enforced worldwide and in which tens of thousands have been killed post-9/11.

The position of the writer is that naming groups as terrorists simply drives a wedge between them and the government since the main goal of designating groups as terrorists is often precisely an attempt to delegitimize and isolate. Once this is done, it, potentially radicalizes it, and crucially closes off nonviolent paths to negotiations. Hicks (1991) believes that reducing a group or movement to its terrorist acts, which often does not even represent the main activity of the group, limits the group’s possibilities of being anything but a terrorist group. It also limits how the state can engage with such groups, putting decision-makers in a policy straightjacket. While it is true that some groups do carry out terrorist acts, but by defining them only by their actions of extreme violence, states stand the risk of limiting their responses to ones of extreme violence.

This second part of the monograph argued that by engaging with “terrorist” groups through negotiations states can potentially reverse this naming, isolating, radicalizing game and in its place, create an all-inclusive and legitimization regime that brings all parties on board. It is the position of the writer that rather than disempowering the norm of nonviolence, negotiations can lead to its strengthening. Negotiations between states and terrorist groups are not only possible;

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they also have the potential for reducing or even resolving the conflict. They are also potentially less destructive than most other responses to terrorism envisioned by academics and policy-makers today. Finally, such negotiations may offer a path of empowerment for the norm of nonviolent political contestations.

We may object that it is impossible to negotiate with, say, al Qaeda, Hezbollah or Boko Haram, because they make unrealizable claims. True, but that is what negotiations are all about. In negotiations demands are never completely realized. Which objectives will be realized and to what extent we can do this is a matter of negotiation. And even Boko Haram has demands that could be partially realized. For example, their demand for a just society that is free of high crime rates, corruption, poverty and poor infrastructure cannot be impeached. They may not get their demand for an Islamic republic, but they can justify their attacks on, among other things, moral laxity and corruption.

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PART 3: PSYCHOLOGY AS A COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism of the 21st century has acquired new meanings and dimensions. The coordinated 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, symbolic pillars of American economic and military might; the March 4, 2004 bombing of the Madrid Train Station; the London transit bombing of July 5, 2005; the daily suicide bombings in Iraq and Afghanistan; the suicide bombings in Pakistan; bombing of the Bali Sheraton Hotel in Indonesia, the political ascendancy of fundamentalist terrorism-using groups, such as Hamas and Hezbollah; the emergence of the global Salafi Jihad movement inspired by al- Qaeda; the increase in Boko Haram and Al Shabab attacks in Nigeria and Somalia respectively, and the specter of the acquisition and use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists have made the task of opposing terrorism as difficult as it is pressing. Though modern terrorism has captured the world’s attention intermittently since the late 19th century (Rapoport, 2004), its contemporary forms and dimensions now pose acute dangers, particularly to orderly societies. This is so because of the assumption that societies are orderly and that mass terrorism has been limited in scope but has now assumed wider use and in large propositions.

Studies in terrorism have focused more on the social sciences, particularly, political science, international studies and sociology. An important science of the study of human behavior has been left on the fringes. The use of psychology to understand the behavior of terrorist is as important as any of the other aforementioned social science disciplines. In this section, I explore the importance of psychology in understanding terrorists and as a counterterrorism strategy. (Ganor, 2005) believes that “international terrorism [is] the most serious strategic threat to global peace and safety” (p.293). Terrorism as a form of intelligible human behavior has fundamental psychological aspects (Crenshaw, 1990/1998; Posit, 1990). Terrorism rests on its own subjective rationality and is anchored in terrorists’ ideologically based beliefs about its utility and ethical justifiability (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006). It is driven by goals, which members of the group presumed to serve group and individual interests. It is enabled by mechanisms of moral disengagement (Bandura, 1998) and is heavily dependent on processes of communication, persuasion, leadership, and group dynamics (Post, 1986).

WHY PEOPLE ENGAGE OR GET INVOLVED IN TERRORISM

To understand terrorism, certain varied psychological factors that would help us devise effective strategies for undermining terrorist’s activities and reducing its appeal for sympathizers and potential recruits need to be taken into account. As is the case with any systematic initiative, policies aimed at opposing terrorism require a guiding conception that affords a plan of action and forecasts its likely consequences. This section discusses metaphors as a counterterrorism approach and assesses their likely psychological impacts and policy implications. Specifically, the section seeks to identify the complex tradeoffs, intricate ramifications, and unintended

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outcomes that adopting a given counterterrorism metaphor may promote. The Webster dictionary (1986, p.746) defines metaphor as “a figure of speech in which a word or a phrase literally denoting one kind of object or idea is used in place of another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them.” The use of metaphor is commonplace in the construction of new knowledge. It involves assimilation of a relatively unfamiliar and poorly understood phenomenon and in this case, terrorism, to a well-known concept embedded in a different domain (Gentner & Jeziorski, 1995, p.448). Metaphors are ways of understanding complex situations (Gelfand & McCusker, 2002). They structure thought in application to particular events. They constitute ways of simplifying complex realities, and they induce a sense of familiarity and comprehension. Metaphors enable problem setting and the generation of proposed solutions (Shon, 1993). Lakoff (1990) has argued that understanding a thing in terms of a particular metaphorical concept necessarily conceals other aspects of that thing that may be inconsistent with the metaphor. Metaphors can thus hide aspects of experience from our perception.

Kruglanski, Crenshaw, Post, and Victoroff (2008) believe that metaphors of counterterrorism construct a conceptual framework within which historical analogies can be evoked. It is their view that without the “war” metaphor of counterterrorism, the historical analogies to specific wars would not be part of the debate. As is the case with flawed theories generally, flawed metaphors may be abandoned when confronted with inconsistent facts. Adopting a particular metaphor can lead to “top-down processing,” in which actors’ perceptions are biased by the metaphor rather than faith. Kruglanski, Crenshaw, Post, and Victoroff (2008) present four that relate to counterterrorism strategies. These are war, law enforcement, containment of social epidemic, and a process of prejudice reduction.

THE WAR METAPHOR

The war metaphor believes that wars are fought by states; the enemy is thus an identifiable entity whose interests fundamentally oppose your own. In the War metaphor the conflict is a zero-sum game and the outcome will be victory for one side and loss for the other; there must be a winner of this zero-sum game, which is war. The war metaphor believes that in a conflict, there will be no compromise. It is totalistic and extreme. This war metaphor was adopted, arguably in light of the collateral damage and national hurt produced by the 9/11 attack in the United States. It has insinuated itself into the public discourse about counterterrorism, and it has guided policy, but it has also met challenges because of lack of fit and the availability of counter analogies with different lessons of history.

In an address to the joint congress session in September 2001, President George Walker Bush declared that America’s War on Terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. According to him, it will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated. He believed that terrorists want to overthrow existing governments in many Muslim countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan. They want to drive Israel out of the Middle East. They hate what the free world stands for, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech, freedom to vote and assemble and disagree with each other. They want to drive Christians and Jews out of vast regions of Asia and Africa. These terrorists kill not merely to end lives, but

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to disrupt and end a way of life. Their leaders being self-appointed believe that with every atrocity, they hope that America and its allies grow fearful, retreating from the world and forsaking their friends. They stand against those who stand for and fight for freedom because they stand in their way. Bush declared, “We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions . . . by abandoning every value except the will to power, they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism.” (September 21, 2001). They use all kinds of lies to hold captive those who believe in their discarded ideology marked by repression, fear and lack of decorum. Bush then called on every nation, every region, to decide whether to support America or not in the war against terror. He declared, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.” From this day forward, noted Bush, “any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, and drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism.” (September 21, 2001)

The war metaphor refers to a global “us against them” mentality, as in the "war on terror" concept launched by President George W. Bush in the wake of 9/11. The metaphor implies that military action should be used against a clear enemy, and that only one side may win the conflict. Susan Sontag argues that war making is one of the few activities that people are not supposed to view “realistically”; that is, with an eye to expense and practical outcome. In an all-out war, expenditure is all out, imprudent – war being defined as an emergency in which no sacrifice is excessive’ (1989, p.99). So the normal budgetary concerns and the idea of a cost-benefit analysis go out the window to a certain extent as the whole nation’s industry has to be mobilized and sacrifices have to be made to ensure the ultimate victory. War is not considered a normal state of affairs; it is an unusual period of time where unusual measures have to be implemented to stop the enemy from winning. Securing the boarders of a country and preventing the enemy from entering makes sense in a war. The state of emergency in a war calls for such new legislation where checks and balances are reduced and civil liberties are restricted; both sacrificed in the war effort (Shimko 1995). Criticism of the war becomes unpatriotic, cowardly and treacherous. The problem becomes apolitical, something which cannot be debated in the public realm. ‘What feedback are we allowed in wartime? Acceptable questions include, “Are we winning?” “What weapons should be used to defeat the enemy?” “What war strategies should be applied?” We cannot ask if the war is necessary, or if the enemy is ourselves. We cannot back away saying that we were wrong” (Hartmann-Mahmud, 2002, p.429).

Most obviously, a military style constitution of terrorism calls for a military response. As early as 1987 Jeffrey Simon of the RAND Corporation, a think tank not really known for its expertise on metaphor analysis, realized the importance of the war metaphor in the fight against terrorism, when he stated, “Equating terrorism with war effectively ends any debate over whether military responses are justified: If a nation is at war it must respond militarily to attack” (1987, p.9). So the war metaphor influences the public’s perception of the enemy and makes a military response appear logical (Bates 2004). Sarbin points out, “An important feature of the war metaphor is that problems engendered by terrorist acts can be solved through the deployment of military forces”

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(2003, pp.150-151). So more than anything else, the public associates war with violence, insecurity and the application of military force to achieve victory and solve the threat of terrorism. If the problem is considered to have military dimensions, then a military solution seems appropriate. Shimko (1995) observed that metaphors such as “terror army” or “war on terror” are all part of the language of war and thereby frame the issue of terrorism and the conflict with any terror group as a war which can be won by military means. These words may not cause a certain policy, but they increase the likelihood of a military response, as it seems appropriate to the constructed image of terrorism. Obviously, a military response entails violence and therefore, casualties both at home and abroad are naturally accepted. Although sad and regrettable, civilians always perish in a war where collateral damage is part of the fighting. After all, it is war! (Crenshaw et al., 2008)

Many governments justify excessive expenditures on security as intent to secure the homeland. Many governors, particularly in the northern part Nigeria have justified their nonperformance and lack of development of their states to the fact that they are fighting terrorism in their various states. Huge sums of monies are designated security votes and have been embezzled by these governors while failing to secure their various states. More often than not, they justify the expenditure on equipping the police and the manning the various checkpoints in their states. The same thing can be said of the federal government in its huge expenditure on defense, yet not fully equipping the security forces with the needed equipment. That the insurgency sometimes outguns the security agents tells on the dilapidated equipment that they use in trying to contain the terrorism.

The war metaphor simplifies the issue, which it frames. The problem is made manageable as it is reduced to a question of defeating the enemy and winning the war. Searching for the root causes of the problem is discouraged as critical voices are silenced. This is the case in the fight against Boko Haram. Rather than searching for the roots of Boko Haram, rather that honestly addressing the politicization of religion and rather than addressing the real problems behind the Boko Haram insurgency, politicians are busy trading blames and politicking with human lives. They believe that using the war metaphor will bring the insurgency on their knees begging or running for cover. As we have seen, the military option currently in use is not working and more and more innocent lives are being wasted. We must learn from the American tough stance and war rhetoric that terrorism may never be defeated as it is growing more and more in the degree of sophistication. The Law Enforcement Metaphor

The Law enforcement metaphor sees terrorism as a crime and therefore the law needs to be enforced when dealing with terrorists. While many in the literature on terrorism point to the almost dichotomous relationship between the war and the criminal justice model of engaging terrorism (Crelinsten and Schmid 1992), the discourse on terrorism in the media contains both metaphors of war and crime at the same time. Using the law enforcement metaphor sees terrorists are not only soldiers, but also murderers. As in the case of Al Qaeda and Boko Haram, their armies are not only seen as troops but also as gang or mob of ‘criminals, who commit murderous crimes. The aftermath of an attack is not only likened to a ‘warzone’ but also to a ‘crime scene’. The terrorist casualties of war are also considered victims of crime. By constituting an act of terrorism as, for example, murder, the

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metaphorical expressions map the source domain crime onto the target domain terrorism (Crenshaw et al, 2008).

Besides viewing terrorism as a war, the media also portrays terrorism as crime. However, in contrast to the war, the crime metaphor predicates terrorism as something rather ordinary. While the event of a war is something unusual, something that has a beginning and an end, crime is very common and can be considered almost a constant phenomenon in every society. In comparison to war anybody can be a victim of crime, not just the soldiers and those close to the front. Importantly, criminals are part of society and crime is generally understood as something, which happens inside a community, while war is something, which involves engagement with the outside. Kappeler and Kappeler posit that, “Regardless of what country we live in, we are taught from childhood that people who are criminals live among us” (2004, p.176).

Predicating terrorism as crime automatically involves judging its legitimacy not inherent in the constitution of terrorism as war. While it is accepted generally that war can be a legitimate endeavor, crime cannot be so judged. In everyday life, we have come to accept the right of existence of a military adversary, while the criminal is considered a menace to the society, who lacks any kind of legitimacy. Kappeler and Kappeler once more point out, “the eradication and punishment of criminal behavior is seen as a desirable and just goal” (2004, p.176). The military adversary is similar to us but only that he/she is on the other side of the front, almost like a unit, which generally follows certain rules of engagement. The criminal on the other hand is deviant; he/she does forbidden things and does not adhere to rules. In fact, criminals by definition break rules and therefore have to be punished in some sort of way. This designation of terrorists as criminals therefore, makes it hard for the state to negotiate with them.

The law enforcement metaphor, therefore, focuses on apprehending individual perpetrators and on punishing individual terrorist acts, rather than on demonizing an entire group. It is more likely than the war metaphor to balance both security needs and human rights concerns. In this case, the hunt for Osama bin Laden was the top priority of the US government leading to his killing in Pakistan by the Obama Administration in 2012. Similarly, drone strikes have targeted Al Qaeda leaders more than the whole group since it is more difficult for the group to assemble together. This tactic should be employed by the Nigerian government in the hunt for Abubakar Shekau, the Boko Haram leader, and should be made the top priority of the Federal Government.

Unlike war’s special status and circumscribed duration, law enforcement is an ongoing concern that must compete for resources with other societal needs. A major advantage of law enforcement over warfare is that it is focused nature and targets the actual terrorists, with less likelihood of injuring innocent parties. Yet despite its advantages, the law enforcement metaphor exhibits a partial mismatch with the realities of terrorism. Its complete and uncritical adoption may temporarily hamper terrorists’ ability to launch attacks without substantially altering their motivation to do so.

THE EPIDEMIOLOGICAL OR PUBLIC HEALTH METAPHOR

The epidemiology metaphor suggests that terrorism is an ideological disease that needs to be fought by winning over hearts and minds. In this case, the government must get rid of this disease before it spreads to the general population. The public health or epidemiological model

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was usefully applied to the epidemic of terror that followed the 9/11 attacks. It utilizes a partition between (a) an external agent, (b) a susceptible host, (c) an environment that brings them together, and (d) the vector that enables transmission of the disease. In the specific application to jihadist terrorism, the agent refers to the militant Islamist ideology, the susceptible host refers to radicalizable Muslim populations, the environment refers to conditions that promote the readiness to embrace such ideology, and the vectors are conduits whereby the ideology is propagated. The epidemiological metaphor has its own advantages over the war and law enforcement metaphors, but has its limitations. Whereas the other metaphors neglect the long-range process of ideological conversion and radicalization that creates terrorists, the epidemiological metaphor neglects the ‘‘here and now’’ of counterterrorism and the value of resolute strikes and intelligence-gathering activities needed to counter terrorists’ concrete schemes and capabilities.

THE PREJUDICE-REDUCTION METAPHOR

Lastly, the prejudice-reduction metaphor acknowledges that the conditions that spawn terrorism involve a dynamic interplay between two parties. It's the only one of the metaphors that takes an explicitly bilateral view, and suggests that social psychological interventions such as creating positive contact between members of the conflicted groups could help to resolve their differences. Framing counterterrorism as the process of prejudice reduction addresses the interaction between two communities whose conflict may breed terrorism. This framing shifts the focus from a unilateral to a bilateral concern and acknowledges the contribution to intergroup tensions that the party targeted by terrorists may make. A major tool of prejudice reduction is the creation of positive contact between members of the conflicted groups. Efforts at prejudice reduction via positive contact need to take place in the context of a larger set of policies, such as those concerning immigration laws, educational programs, and foreign policy initiatives designed to augment the good-will-generating efforts of optimal-contact programs. For all its benefits, the prejudice-reduction framework is also not without its drawbacks. Specifically, the positive-contact notion highlights the benefits of mere human interaction; it disregards differences in ideological beliefs between the interacting parties, thereby neglecting an element. It is important to note that none of these metaphors standing on its own offer us an all-inclusive solution to the problem of terrorism. A combination of these metaphors is more likely to produce better results. Having examined these metaphors, it is imperative to proceed to discuss the need for an understanding of terrorist motives that ginger their activities. ONE MAN’S TERRORIST IS ANOTHER MAN’S FREEDOM FIGHTER

Most terrorist organizations are not engaged in violence simply for the love of it or for personal gain; instead, they stand for a particular political position, and often for a particular group of people. It is important to recognize that there are always two sides to every conflict. The ANC struggle against the Apartheid regime in South Africa serves as a good example. For many years, the Apartheid regime and many of its supporters in the West regarded the black liberation movements as illegal terrorist organizations. However, for the majority of the black population of the country, the ANC was legitimately fighting

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for their freedom. History has vindicated the ANC and after many years of fighting the illegal Apartheid regime, Nelson Mandela, who served twenty-seven years in prison finally emerged as the first Black President in the post-Apartheid South Africa. Equally important is the need to recognize the PLO struggles as freedom fighting rather than terrorism.

Be that as it may, many hardliners argue that the South African example is an isolated one. In many cases, the political situation in which terrorism takes place is far more complex, and it is far less clear who is in the right and who is in the wrong. In such cases, we must bear in mind that killing human beings under any guise is immoral. By accepting violence as a political tool, these groups as defined by the law enforcement metaphor, become no more than murderers, and should be treated as such. While this argument satisfies our moral philosophy and law enforcement metaphor, how do we define and differentiate the question of justice and denial of human rights to those fighting for liberation, howbeit independence from oppressed regimes? GOVERNMENT’S PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY IS TO SAVE LIVES

A major argument for negotiating with terrorist groups/organizations is that the primary responsibility of any government to its citizens is to save lives. In this regard, many governments will take any step to ensure the safety of lives of its citizens. Historically, military solutions have had minimal successes and less effective in dealing with terrorism. It is almost impossible to defeat a human organization that is composed of individual people with guns and bombs without unbearable restrictions on the freedom of the innocent. A clear case in point is the use of Drones by the US government in Pakistan and the collateral damage it is causing on the civilian population. Invariably, the killing of Osama bin Laden has only weakened the organizational structure of Al Qaeda, but strengthened individual resolve to fight on. Similarly, the civilian causality in the fight against Boko Haram is immeasurable. The more the military targets the movement the more innocent civilians are being massacred by the group. Since the new wave of military onslaught started early in 2014 in the Northeast of Nigeria, not less than 1000 lives have been lost. It does even appear that the military is overstretched as the activities of groups have mushroomed to almost every part of the North, including Abuja, the Federal Capital. The Abuja bomb blast at the bus station, killing more than 200 people on April 14, 2014 and the kidnapping of 300 girls from a school in Chibok on April 15, 2014 demonstrate this point. The more the group is being targeted by the Nigerian forces, the more damage it is causing to the civilian population. From April 10-14 not less than 500 people have been killed. Killing over 500 people within the span of a week by the Boko Haram insurgency does not assure Nigerian of their safety. Even in conventional wars, it is difficult to lose as many lives in one week. How much more lives need to be wasted before the government could realize that the military option or the war metaphor is not working?

In the case of prolonged internal campaigns of terrorism, the promise of negotiations can be used as a bargaining tool to end violence, and will almost always lead to a ceasefire. Under continuous bombardment by the Nigerian military in the Northeast during the month of March, the Boko Haram insurgency called for a ceasefire to start negotiations, but the Nigerian government may have missed this rare opportunity and

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instead opted for the military option, the result of what we are witnessing today in the intensity of the attacks nationwide. This has been seen in almost every case where terrorist groups have been brought to the negotiating table. The fight against Boko Haram is not only taking a toll on civilians but also the security forces. Politicians, especially in the Northeastern part of the country have done nothing to support the Federal Government’s efforts to secure their states except trading blames and making irresponsible statements. That a retired naval general, former Deputy Chief of Defense (State) and now Governor and Chief Executive of a state could make such irresponsible and inflammable statements accusing the Federal Government of sponsoring the Boko Haram insurgency to score cheap political points is beyond the pale. It even calls to question his ability to govern and/or if he is not even sponsoring the insurgency in his home state to destabilize the country.

Hardliners and war hawks believe that giving in to terrorists may save lives in the short term, but is harmful in the longer term. By making concessions, according to hardliners and war hawks, the government is saying that groups who use guns and bombs can have more influence in society than those who use peaceful methods. Negotiating with terrorists sets a dangerous precedent that encourages others to see violence as the only means to attaining their objectives. Thus, according to this approach, rather than negotiating with terrorist groups, governments must demand that those groups abandon violence and cease acts of terrorism before negotiations can even be considered. MANY TERRORIST CONFLICTS ARE THE RESULT OF POLITICAL DISAGREEMENTS THAT RUN BACK MANY YEARS

Some of the conflicts we face today are rooted in our history. Nigeria faces the deep cultural divide, cultural encroachment, religious differences and disagreements dating back to pre-colonial times. There are deep cultural and religious differences that have not been properly addressed from the amalgamation to date. The prevalence of injustice and uneven development, especially among ethnic minorities in the country gives birth to acrimony and the quest for revenge. The need to negotiate with terrorist stems from the fact that many of these terrorist conflicts are the result of political disagreements that run back many years. Poor governance, lack of fulfillment of political campaign promises by elected officials, sky rocking poverty levels, decay in infrastructure, all lead to conflicts fuelled by a historic culture of hatred and distrust. In such situations, it is imperative that someone takes the first step in trying to resolve the situation. In this case, the government should take the first step to address the grievances of these pariah groups before they grow into terrorist groups. If some of the problems Boko Haram is fighting against had been addressed earlier, we probably will not be dealing with the problem that has now metathesized into a religious cancer that is consuming all today. In the interest of peace and of fairness, it is the government, which must take this first step. It is inevitable that government is the more powerful side in the conflict and is therefore in a position to make concessions. Only by taking a lead is it possible to end the killings. Although government may not be able to meet all the demands, especially the demand for an Islamic republic by Boko Haram, but it can address some of the fundamental ones like injustice, poverty, decayed infrastructure, corruption, religious liberty, unemployment and good education for all.

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Those who argue to the contrary should understand that the terrorists really have nothing to lose by government refusal to negotiate peace. Their goal is to embarrass the government and show it as incompetent and epileptic in securing the citizens. They choose to strike at will and cause the most damage that makes the government look incompetent. For example, the bombing of the UN Headquarters in Abuja in 2012 and the two bomb blasts in Nyanya a suburb of Abuja within just two weeks (late April and early May, 2014, the kidnapping of nearly 300 girls from a school in Chibok, all go to show that the terrorist are more resolved to win the war. Those that argue against negotiation also believe that the threat of violence gives terrorist undue power at the negotiating table. Therefore, they can insist on total concessions to all their demands even when such demands are undemocratic and threaten to recommence terrorist activities if they are denied. In Northern Ireland, Spain and Israel, negotiations have hit this same stumbling block, and ceasefires have been broken. Terrorists cannot be trusted and since this is the case, there is no point in any form of negotiations. While I believe that this line of argument is valid, but the only problem is that everybody becomes a loser, and the innocent become the biggest losers since it is they that suffer most the effect of the terrorist activities. Those who argue this way have probably not lost relatives or property in any terrorist attack. Israel, while it is bombing Palestinian targets is also losing the support of even some of its moderate neighbors, the EU and even the US that is its greatest supporter and defender. President Obama has not hidden his displeasure with the current hardline stance of the Benjamin Netanyahu, the current Israeli Prime Minster. REFUSING TO TALK TO TERRORISTS CAN CLOUD THE ISSUES SURROUNDING THEIR ACTIVITIES

When we refuse to talk to terrorists, issues surrounding their activities get clouded and can make them seem as if they are fighting against an oppressive regime. By opening up negotiations, a government denies them this opportunity to present themselves as martyrs, and opens their often un-democratic demands up to public scrutiny. Once government can win the public on its side, it diminishes the terrorists’ opportunity to pursue their philosophy.

Those who argue to the contrary once more believe that negotiating with terrorists gives them a legitimacy, which they do not deserve. Those who use peaceful means to achieve their goals should be respected and listened to; those who murder and terrorize innocent civilians in order to be heard must be treated not as political leaders but as criminals. They may also take a cue from the late President Ronald Reagan. It was President Ronald Reagan who once said "there will be no negotiations with terrorists of any kind." Even at that, once the US was embroiled in the Irangates scandals he was forced to negotiate with Iran a country that was at pariah with the US and the some of its western allies, a country declared a state sponsor of terrorism. After American citizens were taken hostage under the Carter Administration, which eventually led to the loss of election by Jimmy Carter, to Reagan himself, intense negotiation went on with Iran that eventually led to the release of the hostages. President Reagan himself must have learned that tough talk does not always bring the peace. There are time we have to look the other way in other to ensure peace and the security of lives and property. Peace is not about

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zero-sum game; it is about the lives that are saved and the development that takes place in a country.

It is on record that when it comes to negotiating with terrorists, there is always a clear disconnect between what governments profess and what they actually do. In the government’s rigid stance of "no negotiations" any systematic exploration of how best to conduct such negotiations has been prevented. These nagging questions remain in the mind of most democratic governments in their attempt to negotiate with terrorist organizations. How can a democratic government talk to terrorists without jeopardizing the integrity of its political system? What kinds of terrorists are susceptible to negotiations? When should negotiations be opened?

In response to the above question, it is important to define clear objectives for the negotiations. Once there are defined objectives, it shouldn't be difficult for governments to initiate some form of negotiation with terrorist organizations. The key objective for any government contemplating negotiations with terrorists should not simply be to end violence but to do so in a way that minimizes the risk of setting dangerous precedents and destabilizing its political system. Given this dual goal, a number of conditions must be met in order for talks to have even a chance of success. If negotiations are to take place at all, it must not be assumed that they are simply a valid theory than they are really supposed to be.

From the soft-pedaling in rhetoric by the US government and its avowed ally, Great Britain, negotiations with terrorist groups have become an integral part of a holistic counter terrorism strategy. It is a strategy used to encourage pariah organizations to enter the political mainstream rather than turning to terrorism, and to induce rebels holding hostages or demanding ransom to release their victims. They are no longer assumed to be simply theoretical but a reality. Although many states may want to avoid negotiations, it must be however stated that, negotiations often become inevitable and have been accepted as a formal strategy even by nations such as the United States and the United Kingdom, who have traditionally been averse to what is generally seen as surrender to the demands of violent rebels. This is clearly evident in the US clandestine move to negotiate with the Taliban, an organization it has labeled terrorist in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.

There are many governments across the world spanning all continents from Europe, to the Indian subcontinent to Central America who have an unwritten policy of negotiations for tactical purposes as well. Given the proliferation of terror groups, the degree of sophistication with which these groups now operate, and other forms of violence such as piracy, negotiations have become an essential tool in the counter terror armory of every nation. Therefore, Nigeria cannot be left out of this regime. In a country so polarized along religious and ethnic lines, negotiations must be seen to provide the window for countering the Boko Haram insurgency.

A new study found that counterterrorism policies that respond to a group's more legitimate demands are more successful than punitive measures. Researchers from the University of Denver and the University of Maryland, which studied the Israeli-Palestinian conflict between 1987 and 2004 found that Israeli humanitarian policies that raised the standard of living in Palestine resulted in fewer terrorist attacks from groups, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hamas, in the ensuing months than offensive measures such as bulldozing suspected terrorists' homes and establishing curfews (US News and Report, July 31,

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2012).

TO ENGAGE TERRORISTS, WE MUST UNDERSTAND THEM

Psychologists such as DeAngelis (2009), studying why people engage in terrorism posits that determining what drives people to terrorism is no easy task. This is because terrorists aren't likely to volunteer as experimental subjects. So, to examine their activities from afar could lead to erroneous conclusions. As the definition of a terrorist is often colored, some see terrorists as freedom fighters, as the millions of Arabs who support Palestinian suicide bombers will attest to the fact that they are fighting for self-determination. This situation makes the psychologist job to determine why people get involved in terrorism more difficult. In view of these complexities, the psychology of terrorism is marked more by theory and opinion rather than by good science as many researchers would admit. It, however, gladdens one’s heart to learn that a number of psychologists are starting to put together reliable data. Psychologists are now finding that it is generally more useful to view terrorism in terms of political and group dynamics and processes than individual actions. Most psychologists now believe that universal psychological principles such as our subconscious fear of death and our desire for meaning as well as personal significance may help to explain some aspects of terrorist actions and our reactions to them. In this regard, we will now examine the main drag towards terrorism.

WHAT IS THE LURE TO TERRORISM?

For years, psychologists examined terrorists' individual characteristics, mining for clues that could explain their willingness to engage in violence. While researchers now agree that most terrorists are not "pathological" in any traditional sense, several important insights have been gleaned through interviews with some 60 former terrorists conducted by psychologist John Horgan of Pennsylvania State University's International Center for the Study of Terrorism. In his research, Horgan identified the following characteristics among those who are easily open to terrorist recruitment and radicalization. They:

a) Feel angry, alienated or disenfranchised b) Believe that their current political involvement does not give them the power to

effect real change. c) Identify with perceived victims of the social injustice they are fighting. d) Feel the need to take action rather than just talking about the problem. e) Believe that engaging in violence against the state is not immoral. f) Have friends or family sympathetic to their cause. g) Believe that joining a movement offers social and psychological rewards such as

adventure, camaraderie and a heightened sense of identity (2008, p.60). Aside from the above individual characteristics of terrorists, Horgan also found that it is more fruitful to investigate how people change as a result of terrorist involvement rather than to simply ask why they entered in the first place. This is because asking why only yields ideological responses, while asking how reveals important information about the processes of entry, involvement and leaving organizations. Piecing together reasons why peopled are lured to terrorism will require examining the myriad ways people join organizations, whether via recruitment or personal decision; how leaders influence

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people's decision to adopt certain roles, for example by glorifying the role of suicide bomber; and factors that motivate people to leave.

Horgan found from an ex-terrorist that he was lured into a movement as a teen when recruiters romanticized the cause. But he soon discovered his comrades held sectarian values, not the idealistic ones he had, and was horrified when he killed his first victim at point-blank range. So, for the most times, the reality of what is promised to would be recruits is not what they finally see. However, it needs to be pointed out that once recruited; it is very difficult to leave the group for fear of being hunted down. Recruits of the Boko Haram group find it more difficult to leave because if they leave, they do not only become victims; members of their families are also targeted.

Psychologist Clark McCauley (2010) believes that terrorism is "the warfare of the weak," the means by which groups that lack material or political power attack what they see as oppressive forces. He also believes that terrorist actions and government reactions to them represents a dynamic interplay, with the moves of one group influencing those of the other. For example, if terrorists commit an attack and a state uses extreme force to send a punishing message back, the terrorists may use that action to drum up greater anti-state sentiment among citizens, lending justification to their next actions. The Boko Haram sect has continued to react to the extra- judicial killing of their leader and many of their supporters by the government. Using the military option has made the sect more and more violent because the more the government targets them, the more violent they have become. The first four months in 2014 have been the bloodiest since the inception of the insurgency a pointer to the fact that the military option, while it has scored some successes has actually hardened the group in its resolve to cause more damage.

Another important factor that drives people into violence and terrorism specifically is injustice. Hacker (1976) concluded, “Remediable injustice is the basic motivation for terrorism.” A desire for revenge or vengeance is a common response to redress or remediate a wrong or injustice inflicted on another. These grievances may be economic, ethnic, racial, legal, political, religious, and/or social; they may be targeted to individuals, groups, institutions or categories of people who are thought to be responsible for injustices (Crenshaw, 1992). For example, one of the reasons why terrorists continue to target USA is because they believe it is a symbol of modernization, which produces disharmony in society in terms of unbalanced economic growth, communication structure, and lack of political opportunity. It is also believed that the US policies in the Middle East are anti-Islam and continue to interfere with the Islamic way of life and cultural heritage. The mere presence of American troops, particular in the Arabian Peninsula infuriates Al-Qaeda and other Islamic groups in the belief that it is polluting their “Holy Land.” This is the reason why Al-Qaeda believes that there is a struggle and war against infidels and the preservation of Islamic traditions. Similarly, Boko Haram, which stands against the influence of Western culture on Islamic practices, is fighting a jihad to purify Islam and rid it of all semblances of Western culture.

Beyond, the Boko Haram philosophy, the reintroduction of extreme or what I call a revised Shari`a in the early 2000s in Nigeria was a reaction to a Western judicial culture and other Western practices that have failed the nation and advanced corruption, thus placing Nigeria as one of the most corrupt nations in the world. While one can identify with these sentiments, there is no evidence to suggest that even purely Islamic states in the Middle East, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Indonesia are free of corruption. It can also be argued that the introduction of

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Shari`a in fourteen Northern States in Nigeria, that was meant to address this problem has not done so. The data on the ground suggests otherwise as even the Shari`a apostles, notably the governors of these states were listed among the most corrupt government officials in Nigeria. Boko Haram cannot therefore sustain their philosophy that Western education and culture encourages corruption. The Arab Spring movement that portrayed most of the Middle Eastern and Northern African leaders as being corrupt has proved this simplistic approach wrong. An Islamic Republic of Nigeria cannot and will therefore not rid the country of corruption since prominent and ordinary Muslims are as corrupt as their counterparts from other religions. Boko Haram’s culture war is therefore a ruse and out of sync with reality. How does one explain the kidnapping of over 300 girls from a boarding school and the threat to sell them as slaves, a crime against humanity under international law as a religious duty? Isn’t Islam against rape, slavery and the killing of innocent children? If one of the strongest motivations behind terrorism is vengeance, particularly the desire to revive cultural practices that are currently at risk, how does one relate this with the kidnapping of innocent girls, the killing of innocent children in boarding schools as well as killing innocent people at random?

IDENTITY AND TERRORISM

A very important factor to consider when discussing individual involvement in terrorism is the fact that such a decision may not necessarily be a discrete choice based on freewill, but a desire to belong. It is a gradual process that might even involve some sort of coercion rather than freewill or even a lure or enticement. Horgan and Taylor (2001) stated that what is now known of actual terrorists suggests that there is rarely a conscious decision made to become a terrorist. Most involvement in terrorism results from gradual exposure and socialization towards extreme behavior. They identified three factors that could lead an individual in a given environment to become a terrorist namely, justice, identity and belonging, which have been found often to co-occur in terrorists and to strongly influence decisions to enter terrorist organizations as well as engage in terrorist activity.

Self-identity is very important because it defines the wholeness of a person. Like gang recruitment and affiliation, the identity question drives individuals to join a group. One’s psychological identity is a developed and stable sense of self and resolved security in one’s basic values, attitudes, and beliefs. There are individuals who are unable or unwilling to identify with anybody or anything intensively or for long period of time. This unsatisfied identity needs might be manifested in many ways; the individual may adopt someone’s identity without personal and critical examination. According to Crenshaw (1986) the absolutist, “black and white” nature of most extremist ideologies is often attractive to those who feel overwhelmed by the complexity and stress of navigating a complicated world. When this happens, the individual may be drawn to extremist and terrorist organizations in a search for his/her identity. Under such desperate quest for personal meaning, individual may easily adopt a role whether noble or ignoble. In answer to the question “who am I?” they may identify themselves as “terrorist” or “freedom fighter.” Taylor and Louis (2004) describe a classic set of circumstances for recruitment into a terrorist organization when they state:

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These young people find themselves at a time in their life when they are looking to the future with the hope of engaging in meaningful behavior that will be satisfying and get them ahead. Their objective circumstances including opportunities for advancement are virtually nonexistent; they find some direction for their religious collective identity but the desperately disadvantaged state of their community leaves them feeling marginalized and lost without a clearly defined collective identity (p.178).

Some individuals on the way to finding an answer to “who am I?” may define their identity through group membership. When this happens, the individual’s personal identity is merged with a group identity, with no sense of, or need for individuality or uniqueness. Johnson and Feldman (1992) suggest that membership in a terrorist group provides a sense of identity or belonging for those personalities whose underlying sense of identity is flawed. This is the drag in most gangs and drug rings in American and Mexican cities, who, for the most times are regarded as social outcasts or deviants, but who find solace in joining a gang that gives them a sense of identity. Individuals designated as social outcasts or hoodlums as has become the order in Nigeria see belonging to a pariah or terrorist group as the most important component of their psychosocial identity (Post, 1987).

This sense of belonging pulls an individual to a radical extremist group, not only because the group gives him/her a sense of meaning but also the sense of belonging and connectedness. Luckabaugh et al, (1997) argue that among potential terrorists, the real cause or psychological motivation for joining is the great need for belonging. This point is supported by Hacker (1976) when he states, “You belong; therefore, you exist.” Individuals that are drawn to terrorism or gangsterism have experienced a lifetime of rejection that includes family rejection, social rejection, and peer rejection. By joining a terrorist organization they gain a new sense of belonging. The new group (terrorist group) thus becomes the new family for those people (Post, 1984). In her observation of many extremist groups, Crenshaw (1988) drew the conclusion that for the individuals who become active terrorists, the initial attraction is often to the group or community of believers, rather than to an abstract ideology or to violence. For these individuals, the image of such strong cohesiveness and solidarity among extremist groups makes them more attractive than some pro-social collectives as a way to find belonging (Johnson & Feldman, 1982). Therefore, it will be safe to conclude that injustice, identity and belonging exert strong psychological influence and motivation for an individual joining and staying with a terrorist group. THE FEAR OF CULTURAL ANNIHILATION DRIVES TERRORISM

It is no longer a secret that talking terrorists out of committing violence using peaceful dialogue is no longer an idealist's pipe dream, but a reality that is actually the aim of a growing number of programs worldwide aimed at "de-radicalization" of pariah groups. Arie Kruglanski (2006) found that across dozens of studies, the team has induced thoughts of death by subliminally presenting people with death-related stimuli or by inserting a delay-and-distraction task between a reminder of death and people's assessment of its effects. This subliminal prompting induces people to psychologically defend themselves against death in ways that bear

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little surface relationship to the problem of death, Pyszczynski's team has found. These include clinging to their cultural identities, working hard to live up to their culture's values and going to great lengths to defend those values. Conversely, the investigators have shown that getting people to consciously contemplate their mortality increases their intention to engage in life-enhancing behaviors, such as exercise. The importance of psychology in understanding terrorism and developing counterterrorism strategies is important. To counter Boko Haram, we need not only understand these theories but also implement them.

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PART 4: THE WAY FORWARD

How do we negotiate with groups that use terror to achieve their objectives? Should a mediator exclude the policy makers from any form of participation in the peace process on the grounds that to do so might seem to the general public that government is rewarding violence, thus giving the terrorist organization the legitimacy they would not otherwise possess? Should the mediator acknowledge groups that use terror as influential and equal partners and actors in the ongoing conflict, but seek to confine them to the sidelines of the peace process, hoping thereby to diminish their incentives for further violence while not alienating the other, non-terrorist actors in the peace process? Or should the mediator reach out to such groups, in spite of the fact that they have been branded a terrorist group, and seek to engage them in negotiations, being calculative that by so doing they can be persuaded to turn away from violence and toward peaceful political processes, thereby making them “ex-terrorists” and “legitimate” political actors?

These are pertinent questions that must be addressed in our quest to find peaceful solutions to the current insurgency in Nigeria. As controversial as this debate might be due to the fact that it is becoming more of an exchange between politics and morality, negotiations are needful if we must stem the unnecessary loss of human lives and the collateral damage that terrorism brings on infrastructure and the economy of nations. In view of the debate that goes on between politics and morality, accusations and counteraccusations that generate more heat than light about the best way for a mediator to deal with groups that use terror, we must find common grounds for resolving the problem. Arguably, governments, not just in Washington, but also in capitals throughout the world, seek to shield themselves from such heat by categorical assertions that they have made not to talk to terrorists.

Despite the high handedness of many governments and the rhetoric of these governments there have been high-level negotiations between governments and terrorists. From Western Europe to the Middle East, Southeast Asia to South America, mediators, negotiators, and other government officials have sought to push forward a peace process by engaging in some fashion with a movement or organization that they regard as a terrorist outfit. Even in the recent past, the U.S. government and its allies have talked with the leaders of terrorist organizations in detail and at length about their political goals and the make-up of their organizations. These talks have sometimes expanded into negotiations intended to find a political accommodation. There are four known examples of negotiations between the US and known terrorist organizations.

1. Bilateral negotiation

In December 1988, the United States sought to advance the Middle East peace process by initiating a dialogue with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), then a proscribed organization. In spite of the PLO’s clear history of terrorism, which ranged from hijacking of international airline flights to the murder of Israeli athletes during the 1974 Munich Olympic Games, there were quiet meetings between the U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia and a special

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emissary of PLO leader, Yasser Arafat in Tunis on US-PLO relations. These Tunis discussions later culminated into the signing of the Madrid Peace Accord in October 1991.

2. Multiparty negotiation/mediation

In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan mandated his Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker, to engage in a quiet dialogue with officials of the African National Congress (ANC) as part of a wider effort to bring peace to Namibia. Like the PLO, the ANC had a history of targeting civilians for its own political purposes. The Crocker talks were secret, but substantive. At the same time, U.S. emissaries had a series of exchanges with the leaders of the proscribed Southwest Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), then at war with South African troops deployed in Southwest Africa. These quiet exchanges, when coupled with a regional peace initiative begun by Crocker, led to the adoption of a regional diplomatic framework that brought an end to the conflict in Southwest Africa and led to the independence of Namibia.

3. Mediation

In the 1990s, the Provisional IRA was included in talks on the status of Northern Ireland. The Irish Republican Army had a long history of terrorism, which included the murder of British citizens in a series of ongoing bombing incidents in Great Britain and in Northern Ireland. Even so, the talks with the IRA went forward, in the hopes that they might lead to a resolution of the troubles in Northern Ireland. While the dialogue with the IRA was fraught with difficulties, but after a delicate diplomatic exchange the movement was successfully brought into the Northern Ireland peace process. Senator George Mitchell, tasked by President Bill Clinton with conducting these talks, had a series of substantive exchanges with IRA leaders as a part of meeting his mandate. The Good Friday Agreement that brought an end to the conflict in Northern Ireland resulted, in part, from Senator Mitchell’s discussions.

4. Quasi-official negotiation

In July 2004, a group of senior U.S. Marine Corps officers met with leaders of the primary Iraqi National Resistance movements in Amman, Jordan. The Iraqi resistance had a history of targeting civilians, and the talks proved controversial, particularly inside the U.S. government, which had not mandated them. The series of exchanges, which became known to the public by the end of 2005, were substantive and were continued into 2006 and 2007. Eventually, they led to the creation of a Sunni political network allied with the United States and opposed to al-Qaeda.

In each of these cases, talking to groups designated as “terrorist” had a significant impact on fostering stability and peace. A successful outcome is by no means guaranteed, however.

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Talks with proscribed armed groups (PAGs) often fail, can easily backfire, and are almost always politically costly. For instance, the exchange between U.S. Marines and the anti-U.S. insurgency helped stabilize Western Iraq but it had not been mandated by the U.S. government and subsequently met with strong disapproval from Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice. Neither can we say that such stabilization went far enough as seen in the current events in Iraq, that have polarized and destabilize the country.

NEGOTIATING WITH BOKO HARAM AND OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS IN NIGERIA

To initiate negotiations with Boko Haram and other terrorist groups in the country, we must first of all assess the potential for talks. Peace research suggests that we do not simply engage in talks that will lead to nowhere until we have made an assessment to determine if engaging in some form of dialogue will lead to an overall peace process, impede or fatally compromise an otherwise promising strategy or process. In making the assessment, the fate of the peace process not the group should be paramount. Two scenarios are possible in negotiated peace processes; first, will it make the group’s larger constituency or supporters amenable to a negotiated settlement to the problem? Second, would it also enhance the group’s power and prestige and thus bolster its ability and incentive to obstruct any settlement that dilutes its control over its constituency? On the flip side of it, would not negotiating also drive the terrorist group to the fringes, thus leading to more violence on a wider scale that could endure for generations to come? The increase in intensity and randomization of the Boko Haram attacks gives credit to this hypothesis. It does appear that the Boko Haram insurgence is not letting off and is increasing in dimension and sophistication. If this is the case, does the refusal of the government to broker a peace deal with Boko Haram reduce or intensify the conflict?

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIALS BENEFITS FOR ENGAGING BOKO HARAM?

Beyond the fundamental question posed above, the following benefits might be derived from talking with and negotiating a peace deal with the Boko Haram insurgency.

1. They may become part of the solution to the problem. Engaging Boko Haram could turn them from being the problem to being part of the solution to the problem. The problem we have had in Nigeria is that both Muslims and Christians have isolated Boko Haram, when the solution could actually be found in leaders of both Christians and Muslims trying to reach out to them in one way or the other. Government efforts have been sloppy, dishonest and uncoordinated! One government after the other has simply paid lip service to the dangers of the

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religious fundamentalism. In fact some of our leaders especially during the military juntas starting from 1976 have even fanned and supported it for political legitimacy. During the President Shehu Shagari Administration and at the behest of the Maitatsine Riots that bedeviled his administration, a Religious Advisory Council was set up to help address the problems of religion and its misinterpretation thereof. That Council has remained dormant except for some sporadic and uncoordinated moves whenever the religious problem heightens. In fact the council is deemed nonexistent today. My take is that the lack of honesty from both Muslim and Christian leaders is what killed the council. It must be stated emphatically that both Christians and Muslim leaders have not been honest in their discussion of the religious problems of the country, which is responsible for the religious conflagration in the country.

2. Engaging Boko Haram could weaken their support for violence and boost moderates within the group. Our inability to engage religious extremists will consume all of us someday because neither Muslims no Christians will be spared the destructive effects of Boko Haram as we are already witnessing. The attempt on the life of Emir of Kano bears testimony to this. Engaging Boko Haram could also help avoid it stretching the bearing limits and creating a sense of disenchantment in the general public leading to a complete breakdown of law and order. The general feeling of most Nigerians, especially in the northern part of the country is a sense of insecurity, revenge and a rise in the use any means available to them to protect themselves. When this happens, it shows a vote of no confidence on the government and its ability to protect the citizens. Government must not, therefore, allow the situation to degenerate to such a level that citizens find no reason to look up to it for protection. Not engaging Boko Haram could limit the government’s influence on the conflict and may thus lead to further radicalization of the group, even empowering the belligerent elements within the group if they discover that there is no nonviolent means available to them.

3. Negotiating or dialoguing with Boko Haram could redirect their attention to the negotiation talks where their energy is now expended on the peace talks rather than the violence. This could serve as a slow down to the violence while negotiations are going on. The President Jonathan Administration set up a committee to explore ways of engaging Boko Haram, but like any other government committee, nothing seems to have come out of the committee. In fact shortly after the submission of the Committee Report, Boko Haram seems to have been become stronger, killing at will at random.

4. Engaging Boko Haram could lead to good intelligence gathering. The longer the talks linger on, the greater the chance to acquire good intelligence about the group. Talking with a terrorist group is one way to gather more intelligence about the group’s goals, priorities and sensitivities. Useful intelligence could also be gleaned from the group dynamics including interplays, rivalries, as well as shifting balance of power within the leadership of the group. Good intelligence could also help woo the moderates in the group to renounce violence and negotiate a political settlement to the conflict. However, it is fair to observe that some members of security forces as well as government officials are polarized along religious lines, despite the fact that they claim neutrality. This hampers that

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flow of good intelligence that could stop or at least paralyze insurgency attacks. 5. Engaging terrorist groups also enhances the credibility of the negotiator to

mediate both to external players and the group itself. That the mediator or negotiator is willing to even talk to and do everything to bring about peace makes him/her credible before the group and the general public. However, finding such a credible negotiator in a country that is deeply divided, fractured and polarized along ethnic and religious lines will be an uphill task for the government. This does not mean government cannot find a mediator; neither should it prevent it from looking for one. Once it is determined that government is genuinely interested in stopping the Boko Haram insurgency and is honestly pursuing this option, it shouldn't be difficult to get a mediator. The person’s religious or ethnic background shouldn’t be an issue, but most preferably, such a person should be a Muslim that is respected by the group, the Muslim and Christian communities.

WHAT ARE THE POTENTIAL DANGERS OF ENGAGING BOKO HARAM?

Although I have outlined the benefits of talking with Boko Haram above, I am not unaware of the potential dangers of doing so. Such dangers include the following:

1. Rewarding Terrorism. I have said it over and over that the commonly cited objection to peace negotiation with terrorist groups is that it legitimizes them. All terrorist groups crave for legitimization as their activities and tactics make them to be seen by the world and many would-be constituents as unusual. Negotiations could lead other would-be terrorist to believe that continued or even increased violence may lead to eventual recognition. This could convince other observers that terrorism works and this could be damaging to the government. The arrogant and irresponsible statements issued by Alhaji Asari-Dokubo of MEND cannot be said to help in bringing peaceful resolution to the Boko Haram insurgency.

2. Weakening the terrorism stigma. Although terrorists and terrorist organizations make bold their activities, they are however scared of being listed as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the US State Department, the EU list of terrorist individuals and organizations and India’s Ministry of Home Affairs’ schedule of Banned Organizations. The British government has already listed Boko Haram as a terrorist organization; equally, the US recently designated Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Therefore negotiations could pose some problems for the Nigerian government in international circles because fighting terrorism is based on international cooperation. But if one goes by the quest for the US government to negotiate with the Taliban, it shouldn't be difficult for the international community to understand the problems and the pains the Nigerian government and the people are going through.

3. Negotiations could compromise and undermine mediator’s standing. It is a worthwhile price for negotiators and mediators if success is guaranteed. Peace deals are very difficult to reach and terrorism needs only a small splinter group to bow out of the negotiations, which will continue the circle of violence. When this happens and negotiations fail, advocates of peace negotiations look naïve, unwise or even worse in the eye of the government and public. The backlash from local

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stakeholders and international actors could seriously affect the mediator’s effectiveness. Even successes when they come, are often piecemeal and this affects the credibility of the government as well as produce political high stakes for the talks.

4. Negotiations could undercut the moderates within the group especially when the talks lead to nowhere. The moderates that championed the talks could risk the danger of being isolated, sanctioned or even killed by hardline colleagues within the organization when such talks fail. When talks fail, it opens the door to hardliners to resume their nefarious activities, thus increasing the chance for violence. This is evidenced by the increase in the Boko Haram activities across the nation.

5. Splinter groups could arise. When talks are deadlocked and progress stalled, the internal cohesion of the group is affected. This usually happens when concessions become imminent and hardliners feel sidelined. When this happens, a splinter group could spring up thus truncating the whole peace process and increasing more terrorist activities. This recently happened in Maiduguri when Boko Haram called for a ceasefire that was rebuffed by the government.

6. Buying time or giving terrorist breathing space. Some terrorist enter into negotiations not out of a sincere mind; they enter into a ceasefire with no intention for permanently renouncing violence but to buy time from an aggressive government counterterrorism campaign. When this happens, the group simply buys time and peace talks give them an advantage to take a breather and regroup.

IS THE BOKO HARAM WILLING AND CAPABLE OF NEGOTIATING A PEACE DEAL?

A thorough analysis of the terrorist group goals, history, leadership and constituents is needed to determine its willingness and capability to engage in dialogue. If it is determined that such talks are possible and that they could achieve the stated objectives, then such assessment could lay the foundation for a strategy of talking. The following will however need to be considered before the start of negotiations with Boko Haram.

1. An evaluation of their goals and ideology is needed. Although an analysis of the group’s aims and objectives is crucial and critical to any peace negotiation, it is important to determine the groups’ willingness and capability to engage in dialogue. Does Boko Haram have the capacity to negotiate and can we negotiate their main goal, which is to institute a government based on Islamic injunctions, a complete and unconditional Islamization of Nigeria and a new constitution based on Shari`a law? If Boko Haram has aligned itself to the goals of Al Qaeda, how easy would it be to negotiate with the group? We must however understand that many terrorist movements or organizations do adhere to a set of political principles designed to attract followers. This appears to be the case with Boko Haram. However, a mediator or negotiator engaging with Boko Haram should also consider non-ideological goals of the group, which is, to rid Nigeria of corruption and poor governance.

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The chart below would help us determine if it is worthwhile negotiating with Boko Haram or not.

Figure 1. Indicators Regarding Opportunities for and Constraints on Armed Groups’ Engagement

Positive Indicators Negative indicators Political power • Are or have been in political power • Respect rules of law, provide services • Have political institutions, agenda, candidates

Political power • Disregard for rule of law and elections • Political assassinations • Intolerant of differences, change

Territory • Hold territory over time • Set up systems within the territory • Allow freedom of movement

Territory • Engage in ethnic cleansing, destruction • Have no territory or control over it

Social and economic support • Enjoy support of public constituency • See settlement of conflict as delivering economic benefits to their region or consistency

Social and economic support • Isolate themselves from wider society • Derive substantial profit from the war economy

Use of military force • Possess without necessarily using force • Observe humanitarian law, proper treatment of civilians • Troops disciplined

Use of military force • Indiscriminate, high civilian casualties • No or little effective command and control • Troops undisciplined • Troops, force used to sustain illegal activities

Source: Sue Williams and Robert Ricigliano, “Understanding Armed Groups,” Accord 16, Choosing to Engage Armed Groups (London: Conciliation Resources, 2005), p.27.

2. Mediators and negotiators must assess the terrorist’s constituency. We must determine if Boko Haram has a constituency, what specific constituency it represents and where such a constituency is located. Furthermore we must determine how much influence the constituency, if any has on the group. If a terrorist movement or organization has no constituency, compromise is less likely and therefore making negotiations less likely. This also makes its leadership more likely self-selected and its claim to legitimacy less certain. This will also not provide an answer to the question: Who do they represent? This has been the question in the minds of many Nigerians, who does Boko Haram really represent? Where and how the movement is funded will also provide the answer to the constituency that the movement represents. A movement that is funded through

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fraudulent and criminal activities like drug running and counterfeiting might not have a broad base, represent a small constituency and therefore unwilling to negotiate any peace deal. The more diverse the funding base of the group, the more diverse its constituency. In this case, if Boko Haram’s funding comes from some politicians in Nigeria, there is a strong likelihood that it might be amenable to peace negotiations. Identifying funders can also lead to strangulation as a strategy for negotiations.

3. The group’s leadership and discipline provides us with important leads for negotiations. A failure to understand the group’s leadership can lead to fundamental misunderstanding of the movement’s mindset. To avoid such misunderstandings and miscalculations, it is very necessary to research the group. There appears to be very little research on Boko Haram and not much is known about the group. This is where we have failed in trying to understand Boko Haram while adopting haphazard measures as well as sporadic strategy to curb the menace of the group. We must determine whether the group’s leadership is elected or appointed and by whom. We must also determine if the group leadership decision-making process is democratic, consensual or driven by a single leader. Questions such as what is the educational level of the leadership, its religious status and whether or not it arose as a result of a fight among factions must be answered before we engage them. We must also determine if the leadership has an overall control over the group and is capable of controlling the radical elements within the movement. Some leaders are willing and able to shift their organization from war to peace, while others are locked psychologically and/or politically, into an antagonistic, distrustful, zero-sum mindset.

4. Determine the attitude toward political participation. The bigger question is whether terrorist groups really talk democracy or are already participating in a democracy? Does the organization or movement have a political wing? If a political wing exists, then negotiations might be more likely. Terrorists crave for power and more likely to renounce violence if they believe they can win through the ballot box. The question therefore is whether or not Boko haram is willing to even participate in the democratic process talk less of winning an election. The goals of Boko Haram, though amorphous and unwieldy, could still be brought to the negotiation table for scrutiny and discussion. Many of the followers of this sect have very little education either in Islam or western education, which makes it incumbent on the part of government to try to reach them.

WHEN IS THE RIGHT TIME TO NEGOTIATE?

When is the right time to negotiate with a terrorist movement? When the movement is winning or convinces itself it can win, chances are that it will not be willing to negotiate. This means that the extent of the conflict will determine the ripeness of time for negotiation. Negotiators and mediators must determine when it is time to negotiate. This can be done through examining some indicators. Such indicators could include failed military offensive, rising numbers and levels of casualties indicating that a stalemate in the conflict has probably been reached. There appears to be a stalemate judging by the military upsurge, especially in the Northeastern Region of Nigeria leading to heavy civilian and military causalities. Government

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relaxed its military offensive once the committee to explore ways of reaching out to the group was set up. And because government did not follow through with its promise of reaching out to them, the group probably felt deceived and hence the surge in their activities. It allowed the group to regroup, strengthened its base, and acquired more sophisticated weapons; the result of which is being witnessed in the increased attacks and heavy civilian causalities.

Subjective indicators such as statements and comments made by leaders indicating that victory through an arms struggle alone is less likely could be indicators that the time is ripe for negotiations. We are however yet to witness such statements, although some of their leaders called for a ceasefire in March 2014 to allow for negotiations. When a terrorist movement employs less inflammatory statements or rhetoric and when less violent attacks become visible, it is time to begin peace negotiations. Once the conflict has taken a big toll on human casualties, and a clear winner seems unlikely on both sides, then the time is ripe for negotiations. Talking may help to reduce the violence and promote a political settlement, while not talking will only lead to more casualties and loss of lives. Terrorists are more likely to engage in peace talks without preconditions if they believe that a victory through arms struggle is unreachable. They are also more likely to engage in peace talks when they believe they are likely to lose influence to a rival group that is interested in pursuing diplomacy. Unfortunately government appears confused and is not studying and reading the signs that the group would like to start some sort of talks so as to reduce the bloodletting both on its members and innocent Nigerians.

The presence of rival groups increases the chances of moderation. Increased incidents of violence could also signal a willingness to negotiate as terrorist movement make last-minute moves to strengthen their position before sitting down at the bargaining table. The threats by MEND and its war rhetoric with the rival Boko Haram is not necessarily a bad thing, but as usual in Nigeria, such threats are quickly interpreted in a north-south dichotomy or Christian-Muslim dichotomy when in fact the prominent kingpin of MEND is also a Muslim. Such exchanges between MEND and Boko Haram could actually provide the inroads to peace negotiations with Boko Haram. Again, government is not using some of these opportunities to find the solution to the Boko Haram insurgency. While not encouraging the rise of revival groups, suffice it to say that rivalry between pariah groups is a positive sign for peace negotiations.

While government continues to call on the international community to help, there must be seriousness on its part to actually confront this insurgency without politicizing it. No government will ever win the war on terror by politicizing it. Republicans and Democrats in America may philosophically disagree on many issues, but once it comes to the security of the American state and its citizens, politics is set aside. This is what Nigerian politicians have yet to learn, that Nigeria is bigger than political party affiliations. When highly placed political figures make irresponsible, unpatriotic and provocative statements like those made by Governor Murtala Nyako of Adamwa State and Rabiu Kwanwaso of Kano State, it leaves one in no doubt that they could be sponsors of the insurgency for cheap political gains.

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THE NEED FOR THIRD PARTIES IN PEACE NEGOTIATION

A terrorist group might signal a readiness to negotiate, calling for a third party, but the mediator must determine if the third party is supportive and the external environment suggests that talks will advance rather than stall or obstruct the wider peace moves. The following steps must be taken to ensure the usefulness and need for third parties. We must assess international leverage over terrorists and their adversaries. Mediator’s effort to secure a peace pact with a terrorist movement is more likely to succeed if he/she has the support of a wide range of international actors, especially those that have influence over the movement. The mediator should therefore evaluate such international actors. This should not be restricted to only neighboring states or major powers but also regional and global International Governmental Organizations (IGOs), International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), Diaspora and other groups. We should determine what they could offer at present and the future. Can these International actors put enough on the table to make terrorist groups willing to change their behavior? In many cases, international actors could offer what the terrorist group craves for, which is legitimacy. In cases where the movement is seeking independence, involving international actors gives hope to the group that they could eventually be granted independence or at least greater autonomy. International actors could also exert considerable pressure on the government to make concessions for the sake of peace. In this case, government must identify Boko haram’s external links and friends that are amenable to negotiations to serve as some of the external negotiators. President Ahmad Karzai of Afghanistan has tried to address the Boko Haram and Muslims in Nigeria in many occasions. He could be of help, sharing his experiences in Afghanistan. In fact, he could as well be engaged as an external negotiator using his experience with the Taliban and Al Qaeda, especially now that his presidency is over.

WE NEED TO EVALUATE THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT

1. For successful negotiations to take place, mediators and negotiators must evaluate the dynamics of domestic constituency. The weight of opinion within the government and the overall public opinion may be against engaging the terrorist group. Government action in total disregard to these dissenting opinions could result in a backlash that could turn the negotiator or mediator into a liability for the peace process. If domestic constituencies are averse to the peace negotiation, government must back down as continuing with the negotiations could prove a politically difficult task. In this case, government versus public discussions on Boko Haram must be honest and unbiased.

2. When contemplating whether to open talks with terrorists, a mediator or negotiator must determine which of the domestic constituencies, notably, the public, government officials, political parties other than the ruling party, the armed forces and other security agencies, or even other terrorist groups that might support or oppose moves to talk to a particular terrorist groups. This is the dilemma the Jonathan-led administration is facing in its attempt to negotiate with

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Boko Haram. Would the support for negotiations be vital for success or will the opposition be opposed to the talks or to the wider peace process? We must examine the leverage domestic actors have to make talks more productive. We must also evaluate their motives and resources that could undermine the peace talks. Unfortunately, Boko Haram has been politicized to the point that rival political parties now see the insurgency as a political bargaining chip. This is not necessarily a bad thing as we witnessed the defeat of President Jimmy Carter by Ronald Reagan due to his inability to bring the American hostages home from Iran. However, it must be stated that irresponsible and unguarded statements by some governors in the Northeast region and other opposing political party members of northern extraction cannot help in the fight against Boko Haram. Unconfirmed reports also indicate that the Boko Haram has infiltrated the security agencies and if this is true, then there is no way the government can ever defeat this insurgency. The president himself has confessed to the general public that Boko Haram has infiltrated his government and this is very worrisome.

3. In the final analysis, charges will arise that talks reward terrorism and until time demonstrates a reduction in violence, a mediator and the government have an uphill task and can only defend their actions or policies in terms of hoping for the best even when skeptical about the success of such talks. The government must also be prepared for repeated leaks to the media on failures or struggles by government officials, who opposed the talks in the first place. This could be the frustration the president is going through when he stated that Boko Haram has infiltrated his government. Giving the fact that peace negotiations take time to yield dividend, if at all they ever achieve anything, change and make up in governments, shift in public opinion, all have the potential to derail such negotiations After a thorough assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of talking to Boko

Haram, the willingness of the group to participate in constructive negotiations, and the degree of support for talks within the international and domestic environment and whether we have mediators or negotiators that are willing to advance the peace process, this author believes that the government should pursue the peace rather than the arms option to resolving this conflict. I believe that the ongoing onslaught against Boko Haram, while it is achieving some level of success will simply be a temporary setback for the group. Al Qaeda’s influence has been reduced in Afghanistan, but it is growing stronger in Pakistan and worldwide; it is recruiting in Africa, Asia and Europe. The military option while viable, does not necessarily offer a lasting solution to terrorism.

My conclusions are that we can now develop strategies that maximize prospects for the success of the peace talks. If the chances of success seem modest or remote, the author recommends that government must avoid engagement. In this case, the government should use the report of the exploratory committee set up to look into the possibilities of negotiating with Boko Haram to begin the process. It is my opinion that on no account should government attempt an amnesty program for Boko Haram members as this would encourage many more such groups to arise. No parallels exist between MEND and Boko Haram and no one should be making such comparisons. While MEND is fighting against exploitation and environmental degradation, Boko Haram is fighting an ideological war, have no territory, have lost nothing and deserve no

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compensation!

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Part 5: Recommendations on how to address the Boko Haram Insurgency

Introduction

Religious and ethnic tensions have been the bane of the country now called Nigeria. Even before the amalgamation, there had been religious and ethnic tensions in the different territories that later came to be known as Nigeria. The 1804-1807 Uthman Danfodio jihad remains part of Nigeria’s religious conflagration. The British colonial government and the late Sir Ahmadu Bello, Sardauna Sokoto made attempts to address the religious question, but were not honest and used a haphazard approach to an important problem. Just twelve days after Nigeria’s independence, Sir Ahmadu Bello made this statement about the South and Northern Minorities on October 12, 1960. He said, “…The new nation called Nigeria should be an estate of our great grandfather, Othman Danfodio. We must ruthlessly prevent a change of power. We must use the minorities in the North as willing tools and the South as conquered territories and never allow them to rule over us or have control over their future.” (Sir Ahmadu Bello, Parrot Newspaper, October 12, 1960.) Although the context of this statement has been subject of debate, the fact that it came from the protagonist of Northernization clearly demonstrates a nation whose foundation was laid on a “we-they” syndrome, the rulers and the ruled, a nation where some were to be first class citizens and others become willing tools and conquered territories as second hand citizens that must never be allowed to rule. This statement resonates in the mind of the curious observer of the events now plaguing our nation under the presidency of a southern minority. Could this mean that that the activities of the Boko haram are political skirmishes meant to perpetuate Northern rule over other Nigerians? Northern Minorities have always made this statement a cardinal point in their relationship with Hausa and Fulani Muslims. This is more so that Sir Ahmadu Bello vehemently opposed the creation of the Middle Belt region at the time the Midwest region was created. Simply put, this has remained a sticky point in the sour relations between the Northern Minorities and the core north as well as other parts of Nigeria and the North. These are issues that must be addressed if Nigeria is to become a nation where every citizen feels a sense of belonging.

The designation of certain parts of Nigeria as Muslim or Christian is divisive. That Western nations continue to partition Nigeria into Muslim North and Christian South creates an impression that those who practice the two religions belong exclusively to certain parts of the country. There are many Muslims in the Southwest and pockets in the Southeast. Equally important to note is that the Middle Belt of Nigerian is predominantly Christian. There are also large Christian populations in Kano, Jigawa, Katsina, Kebbi, and Adamawa in the Northeast and Northwest. Kaduna state is evenly divided or has more Christians than Muslims, but yet the West continues to partition Nigeria into Muslim North and Christian South. This must stop as well as it continues to aggravate the conflicts in the country.

Clarifying the question of violence in Islam

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Some people have already formed their opinion of Islam as a violent religion. But just before we pass such a value judgment, it must be stated that religion by its very nature tends to encourage violence due to the drive to make converts. That each religion makes conversion as a cardinal point makes it vulnerable to violence due certain passages in the religious texts that tend to encourage violence. So, religious violence is not the exclusive preserve of Islam. There are some elements of violence in every religion, be it Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, Judaism, Hinduism and all other known human religions. There appears to be a double standard in the interpretation of Islam as a violent religion. This is so because of the surge in violence by extremist Muslims who interpret the Quran to fit their narrow understanding of Islam.

Farooq (2010) states this succinctly when he said “there are two parallel camps within Muslims. One camp on the fringe has no qualms in taking a public position that Islam enjoins fighting and subduing the non-Muslims, and this is a sublime religious duty. They urge the Muslims to take up a combative struggle - armed if necessary - to resist the evil of the "infidels" (kafir) and to facilitate Islam's victory over others. They cite the example of the Prophet as to how under his leadership the world of the unbelievers was subdued.

Repudiating this group of extremist Muslims, there is the broader Muslim community that finds an echo of their own position in what President Bush said in 2001 that Islam is a religion of peace and they would like the world to know that Islam means peace and Islam is peaceful. This group is very much troubled by the hate-mongering and violent posturing of the fringe extremists among Muslims. Thus, they would like to underscore and highlight the essential dimension of Islam, which in their view is peace.

So, is Islam essentially intolerant and violent or is it essentially tolerant or peaceful? The fact of the matter is that in presenting Islam as essentially peaceful or violent, there is a false and an unacceptable reductionism, and trying to cast Islam in such reductionist framework inevitably leads to either misunderstanding or misrepresentation.

To put this in context, we need to understand five premises of Islam. At the center of the debate on whether Islam is violent or peaceful are three aspects: the Qur'an, the life of the Prophet (Hadiths), and the historical experience of Muslims. (1) Muslims hold the Qur'an as the ultimate source of divine guidance. Even the Prophet could not have contradicted the Qur'an, let alone anyone else. (2) The Qur'anic verses should not be taken in isolation from other verses or from the Prophetic experience. (3) The Qur'anic verses, commands or otherwise, have different levels of priority; some are general in scope and are to be treated or upheld as norms, while other verses might be contextual, delimited or transitional. (4) Life is an integrated whole, and Islam is a guidance for the whole of life in a comprehensive or holistic manner, where a sense or goal of balance is of supreme importance. (5) Life needs to be treated as life, which from the Islamic viewpoint should be understood as based on Fitrah, the innate human nature.

Farooq further notes that all killing, fighting, war and even administration of law and order involve some type of violence. The "Wild, Wild West" did not earn the United States a reputation for violence; neither did the two World Wars, the most violent and worst killings in human history, earn the West in general and Europe in particular a reputation for violence either. The virtual decimation of the Indian people in the United States, the internment of Japanese and

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inhuman treatment of Slaves did not make the country barbaric or uncivilized. The European colonization that ravaged, exploited and dehumanized various parts of Asia and Africa, including the Muslim world, did not make Europe any less civilized. The Spanish Inquisition and the Crusades did not make Christianity violent and barbaric. Even the organized torching of Muslims in India by a Hindu mob does not make Hinduism a burning example of violence and barbarism. Yet, these days there are people who would like to identify Islam and the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) as violent or a symbol of violence. These are the issues we must sincerely address when we talk about Islam, culture and Christianity

Truth-telling as a tool for reconciliation

The biggest problem confronting Nigeria in regards to the question of religion is truth telling and honesty with one other. The truth is that both Muslims and Christians are economical with the truth when it comes to addressing the question of conflict and violence. There are troubling passages in both the Qur’an and the Bible. Muslims use the Qur’an to justify violence against non-Muslims, particularly Christians whom they call infidels. It should be stated here that any Muslim who refers to a Christian an infidel (Kafir) surely does not know anything about the religion of Islam. The Quran refers to Christians as the people of the Book and the closest to the Muslims. On the other hand, Christians use passages in the Bible to justify retaliation against Muslims in the face of violence. To put the facts right, Islam, Christianity and Buddhism understand peacemaking differently. One needs to recognize that Islam does not teach that if anyone's one cheek is slapped as Christians do, he or she should turn the other cheek. As stated earlier in one of the premises above, Islam is based on Fitrah, that is, the innate human nature. The principle of Fitrah posits that as a society, if we all turn our other cheek in the face of violence or open the door to the intruding burglars, or point to our heart to give a killer's gun a more accurate target, it would be simply be against human nature and also against any viable, functional, or healthy society. Anyone familiar with the Shaolin temples knows that even the Buddhists contributed toward the development of the martial arts, as life's need for self-protection so dictated. So, even Buddhism as a religion often paraded as the most peaceful is not as peaceful as we think. The continuous persecution and violence against Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar is a clear example of violence by Buddhists. In fact, on January 14, 2014 about forty-eight Rohingya Muslims were murdered by Buddhist mobs in Myanmar.

Some troubling verses in the Qur’an that are often cited by extremists to justify killing include the following:

Let not the unbelievers think that they can get the better (of the godly): they will never frustrate (them). Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom you may not know, but whom Allah doth know." [Quran 8:59-60]

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Another troubling verse that is often cited by non-Muslims to justify that Islam is a religion of violence is:

"Then, when the sacred months have passed, slay the idolaters wherever you find them, and take them (captive), and besiege them, and prepare for them each ambush." [Quran 9:5]

Muslim apologists believe that Islamic guidance is to help people find a balance between life's conflicting priorities. It is not static or predefined, but a dynamic search for an equilibrium. Whether in self-defense, to resist the evil of injustice and oppression, or to struggle toward a more just society, Islam requires its adherents to uphold certain norms and parameters. In the Quran 8:59-60 cited above, in which Muslims are urged to make ready their "strength to the utmost" of their power, one needs to take into account (a) the context of the entire Chapter, where it deals with treachery, hypocrisy and unilateral abrogation of a treaty that was imposed upon Muslims by their adversaries, and (b) the verse that comes after it.

"But if the enemy inclines towards peace, you (also) incline towards peace, and trust in Allah" [Quran 9:61].

This later verse teaches that peace is the ultimate goal. It ought to be the ideal and norm that a society should seek. Islam insists that its adherents work and incline toward peace. Where harm is directed at Muslims and those who want to harm Muslims or cause general harm or injustice, Islam calls on its adherents just like other people not to fold their arms and look, but attempt to resolve the problems and, if necessary, fight as the last resort. In the event that these so-called desist and show inclination to peace, Muslims are duty bound to reciprocate for peace. The life and legacy of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW) were guided by pursuit of justice and peace. Whenever people, Muslims or non-Muslims, take a verse in a fragmented manner, advertently or inadvertently, they commit serious error. By dubbing Islam violent while it guides its followers toward a balance in their life, we merely yield to and validate those fanatical and extremist fringes that use or abuse Islam for their extremist angles and agendas.

Using these verses, one might interpret Boko Haram as fighting an unjust war and violating the premises of Islam they claim to protect. That these cowards could descend so low as kidnapping about 300 innocent teenage girls from school (Islam enjoins its followers not to molest women and to spare them from the gruesome attacks of war), the wanton destruction of life and property, killing of innocent lives, burning down schools and churches shows their very limited understanding of the religion of Allah, which they claim to protect. All these atrocities find no guidance either from the life of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW), the Quran, the Hadiths and the history of Islam.

Peace and justice are amongst the two most important pursuits for humanity and so are these for Islam and Muslims. Islam is meant to guide its adherents toward peace and justice. Here are some of the verses and the Prophetic narrations (hadith) that should be treated by Muslims as norms, and that humanity should hold them to these norms in accordance with the faith of Muslims in the Qur'an and the Prophet.

"Let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression." [Quran 2:193]

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Muslims do not and cannot have any problem with adherents of any other faiths (be it Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism or even animism) or ideology such as communism, capitalism, or socialism, unless there is oppression committed by any of these. This rather simplistic view assumes that Muslims themselves do not engage in practicing any oppression or injustice.

"...if any one slew a person unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land, it would be as if he slew the whole people; and if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people." [Quran 5:35]

All people and all religions uphold the sanctity of life. This is therefore incumbent on all Muslims to respect it. To be a Muslim, therefore, is to show utmost respect for it. The sanctity of life of Muslims and of others was so important in Islam during the life and times of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) that he pursued an ingenious strategy of reclaiming Makkah; the entire conquest was virtually bloodless, a kind of feat unheard of in the blood-thirsty tribal Arab society of his time. Furthermore, even for war and conflict, strict guidelines were set not to harm the life and property of any civilian, who are not active party to any hostility or conflict, and women, children, old men, monks, were to be particularly spared. Boko Haram by indiscriminate killing of people, kidnapping of innocent children, burning down of schools and churches is definitely not following the teachings of the Prophet, the Quran and the Hadiths. What they are doing is so far away from what Islam teaches.

During the life and times of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) someone once asked him, “O Prophet of God, whose Islam is excellent or the best (afdal)? He replied: "From whose tongue and hands the people (an-nas: irrespective of Muslims or non-Muslims) are safe." (Musnad-i-Ahmad, #6762; narrated by Abdullah ibn Amr).

The entire life of the Prophet was dedicated to help a conflict-ridden and blood-feuding society of Arabia come to civilization and serve as an illustration of human potential, where people do not give up hope for positive change and are willing to make adequate sacrifice toward establishing a just society for all people. The struggle of the Prophet was not an end point, but rather a reference point for the entire humanity as a source of guidance and inspiration.

Islam therefore motivates people to seek a balance, tempering the extremities in their lives. It instills courage and valor in the weak and oppressed; at the same time, it humbles those who hold power and authority. It emboldens the downtrodden, while holding the oppressors and exploiters accountable. It urges the otherworldly people to take this world seriously and dearly, while it admonishes those who have forgotten about the life hereafter.

Tackling the economic question

It is unbelievable and unthinkable that Nigeria should be classified as a poor nation. With all the resources endowed in this country, it is unthinkable that this nation would face such high levels of youth unemployment, a ramshackle and decaying educational system, poor health

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system, poor road infrastructure and every form of vice that humanity can ever imagine. This can only be reduced to one word, CORRUPTION. Ranked 7th among oil producing countries, with the second largest reserve of iron ore in the world, trillions of cubic meters of natural gas reserves, gold, diamond, uranium and stones and other solid minerals, yet the country cannot harness all these for the betterment of the Nigerian people. Add to all these, the huge human resources embedded in the 160 million people that inhabit Nigeria, the rich agricultural land and water reserves, Nigeria cannot and should not be counted among poor countries. Even countries that do not have 10% of what we have are doing much better than Nigeria.

A country that imports almost everything it needs including toothpick, razor blades and needles cannot grow. South Korea started its industrial revolution in the in the 80s and today is now one of the greatest industrial nations of the world. Talk about Samsung and LG in the electronic market, Kia and Hyundai in the automobile market and you see a country that can compete with any other country in the world, yet Nigeria continues to wallow in poverty, disease and crises of every kind. That Nigeria cannot produce even ordinary razor blade is shameful and yet the country prides itself as being the giant of Africa, Africa’s largest economy and ranked 26th largest economy in the world. Nigeria is a country that is so given to consumerism of every product from Europe and America. Nigerians pride themselves in driving the latest cars produced from Europe and America and the flurry of electronics from the West and South Korea. It is a consumer-oriented country without production.

Nigeria’s best brains have fled the country in search of greener pastures and even when they come home, they receive the shabbiest treatment ever imagined because their local counterparts are jealous about their achievements. Put all these together, you find a country that is a sinking boat. Yet, the country’s leaders continuously live under the illusion that we are advancing and that the country is growing economically. A nation that cannot feed its population, provide basic medical needs and a vibrant educational system is a nation that is building a bridge to nowhere. Until the economic woes of this nation are addressed, until the health sector, the educational sector and every sector can be addressed, it will be difficult to address the problem of terrorism. Ghana, our immediate neighbor that suffered the same fate in the 1980s, which led to the expulsion of many Ghanaians and the popular “Ghana-must-go” has now become the choice home of many Nigerian parents who want good education for their children. India has become the choice home of medical visits for many that can afford and China has become the choice trading partner for many inferior products that cannot sell elsewhere except Nigeria because of poor regulations.

When the government spends over 70% of the revenue generated on political office holders and when politicians do not see anything wrong with squander mania, how would the country get out of the woods? When the ordinary poor Nigerians sees the outright display of ill-gotten wealth from politicians and their cronies, they feel that the only thing left for them is violence because they have nothing left to live for. Until the government can address these inequality and injustices, it will be difficult to fight and succeed in the war against not only Boko Haram, but also other insurgencies. These are some of the vices Boko Haram claims to be fighting against.

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Former US President Bill Clinton in a recent visit to Nigeria stated that the failure of Nigerian leaders to address economic inequalities and check brain drain syndrome had drastically stifled the nation’s development. Clinton, therefore, advocated urgent redistribution of wealth between the rich and the poor in the country, adding that government should endeavor to empower people through education. He said Nigeria is a country of potential but had three big challenges. First of all, like 90 percent of the countries that have one big resource, Nigeria hasn't done well with its oil money. You should have reinvested it in different ways; you don’t do a better job of managing natural resources. Secondly, Clinton said, Nigerian has to bring economic opportunity to the people who don’t have. This is not a problem specific for Nigeria because almost every place in the world, prosperity is heavily concentrated in and around urban areas. “You have all these political problems, violence, religious differences, and all the rhetoric of Boko Haram, but the truth is the poverty rate in the North (Northern Nigeria) is three times greater than what it is in the Lagos area and to deal with that, you have to have both powerful stake in the local governments and a national policy that work together. You have to figure out a way to have a strategy that will help in sharing prosperity. The third thing Clinton pointed out is that there has to be a way to take the staggering intellectual and organizational ability that Nigerians exhibit in every country in the world in which they are immigrant and bring it to bear here so that the country as a whole can rise. Clinton concluded, that solving the economic divide that is in Nigeria will help the political divide; making better use of our resources. (Clinton: Poverty Helping Fuel Violence in Nigeria. AP February 12, 2012)

Tacking the political question

Nigeria is the only country that I know where a member of his/her ruling party in a quest for nomination challenges a seating president. The shame that followed the nomination and subsequent election of President Goodluck Jonathan cannot and must not be allowed to rear its ugly face in the People’s Democratic Party again. That a seating president could be challenged simply because he/she comes from a particular region or professes a particular religion says a lot how far Nigeria is from understanding democratic norms. It also signals the party’s failure to hold the country together and therefore should be rejected by the people. Of course, one must also realize that in a country where a seating president also says election is a do- or -die affair, it is to be expected that the elections have already been concluded before people head to the polls. This is where all parties must ensure that there is internal democracy within their parties. To avoid heating the polity and to avoid political wrangling within the rank and file of party members, political parties MUST embrace internal democracy to ensure that only the best candidates are nominated and elected. One of the reasons for the rise of the Boko Haram insurgency is the failure of government to deliver on campaign promises as well as lack of internal democracy. When the people realize that their candidate of choice has been shortchanged, they will react, and sometimes, violently. To tackle terrorism and the Boko Haram insurgency, the government must ensure that every vote counts. The Boko Haram insurgency is a pariah political group that is using religion to hide its real objectives and to commit atrocities.

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Election rigging has become part of the Nigeria culture, a culture that cultivates violence and should be rejected. The opposition parties are always crying foul and, that elections have been rigged. But looking at the 2011 elections, especially the General Election the picture that emerged showed that no single party could claim it did not rig the elections. A regional evaluation of the elections showed clearly that the major political parties; PDP, CPC and Action Congress all rigged the elections where they had the instruments to do so. In fact, one makes bold to say that all parties rigged where they had the instrument of power to do so, PDP across the country, CPC in the Northeast and Northwest, APGA in the Southeast, and AC in the Southwest and part of Edo. No one should have cried foul when all were guilty of the same crime.

Conclusion

One may object the need for negotiation with Boko Haram because of the heinous crimes they are committing against the people of Nigeria. Some might even say it is impossible to negotiate with terror groups such as al Qaeda, Hezbollah or Boko Haram because they make unrealizable claims and demands. However, we must come to terms with the fact that in negotiations, demands are never completely realized. Which objectives will be realized and to what extent is a matter of negotiation. And even organizations like al Qaeda, Hezbollah and Boko Haram have demands that could be partially realized. For example, these organizations justify their attacks with reference certain injustices they have observed within the society. Some argued that negotiations between the US and Gaddafi were needless because he was a terrorist running a rogue state, but such a move was vindicated by having Gadhafi accept his role in the PANAM Air bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland and having done so, reduced the threat of terrorism. That was surely a positive outcome, regardless of the fact that Gaddafi was viewed as having been rewarded for terrorist acts. In the end we have to ask ourselves, what is more dubious, negotiating with terrorists or fighting them? You can interpret Islamic terrorism as one form of reaction to the perception that the fundamentalist way of life is under attack and is about to become extinct. Boko Haram's ideology is based on hostility towards democracy and Western 'anti-Islamist' education. The government is at cross roads as to whether to save lives or pander to the public opinion that is against any form of negotiation. Until we can conduct a credible poll to determine how many people are for or against negotiation, government should take every step to explore ways of negotiating with Boko Haram. The question remains, “what is the responsibility of government to its people with regard to security and preservation of life?” This is what must be addressed in our quest for peace and attempt to stem the menace of the Boko Haram insurgency. I hope the government, Nigerians and particularly you, the reader can make an informed decision as to which way to go, do we negotiate or maintain a hardline stance leading to more deaths of innocent people?

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ABOUT CENTRE FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT (CDD)

The Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) was established in the United Kingdom in 1997. The purpose was to mobilize global opinion for democratic development and provide an independent space to reflect critically on the challenges posed to the democratization and development process in West Africa. CDD set out to generate dialogue on alternative pathways that are universally relevant and context sensitive. The Centre’s activities started the same year with a round table organized in London on the democratic future of Nigeria (then under military dictatorship). CDD activities have since grown not only in Nigeria but in the entire West African sub-region and the rest of the continent. The Centre remains focused on capacity building work, policy advocacy and as a research reference point on democratic governance, human security, people-centred development and human rights.

The mission of the Centre for Democracy & Development (CDD) is to be the prime catalyst and facilitator for strategic analysis and capacity building for sustainable democracy and development in the West African sub-region.

CDD INFO:

Head Office/Siege

16,A7 Street, Mount Pleasant Estate (CITEC) Along Jabi-Airport Road, Mbora District FCT, Abuja Email:cddabv@cddwestafrica.org Phone: 092902304 Website:www.cddwestafrica.org Twitter: @cddwestafrica Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/centrefordemocracy.anddevelopment

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